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## <u>PROCEEDINGS</u>

THE CLERK: Case number 10-5087, Mohammedou Ould Salahi, Detainee, Guantanamo Bay Naval Station and Yahdih Ould Salahi, as next friend of Mohammedou Ould Salahi v. Barack Obama, President of the United States, et al. Mr. Flentje for the Appellants; Ms. Duncan for the Appellees.

JUDGE SENTELLE: And during this portion of the argument I will ask Counsel to stay away from any classified references, and then if necessary we will seal the courtroom for any portion involving the classified material.

ORAL ARGUMENT AUGUST E. FLENTJE, ESQ.

ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANTS

MR. FLENTJE: Yes, Your Honor.

JUDGE SENTELLE: Thank you, Counsel.

MR. FLENTJE: May it please the Court, I'm August

Flentje with the Justice Department, and here on behalf of the

United States.

In this case the District Court's factual findings that after Salahi became a sworn al-Qaida member he continued to provide support to al-Qaida and closely associate with several al-Qaida operatives established as a matter of law that he never disassociated from al-Qaida, but remained part of the group. In reaching the opposite conclusion the District Court made two important legal errors, the Court failed to look at Salahi's activities and associations

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      together with each other, and together with the decision he
 2
      made to join al-Qaida to determine whether it was more likely
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      than not that he had left the group. And the Court erred by
 4
      failing to put some burden on Salahi to establish that he
 5
      disassociated from al-Qaida after swearing bayat, a burden the
 6
      Court found that he had failed to meet because he had not
 7
      acted to sever his ties.
                First --
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 9
                JUDGE TATEL: Before you get into those I want to do
     what I did in the last case and make sure I completely
10
     understand the argument the Government's making here. In the
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12
      District Court the Government arqued that there were two bases
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      for detention, that the Petitioner aided the September 11
14
      attacks, and that he was part of al-Qaida, right?
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                MR. FLENTJE: Initially, but --
                JUDGE TATEL: Yes. You abandoned the first claim,
16
17
      right?
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                MR. FLENTJE:
                             Yes.
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                JUDGE TATEL: In the District Court. And added that
20
      he could be detained because he personally, in materials,
21
     supported al-Qaida, correct?
22
                MR. FLENTJE: After the hearing that argument was
23
     made in the District Court. Yes.
24
                JUDGE TATEL: And the District Court ruled against
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you on that?

1 MR. FLENTJE: Yes. 2 JUDGE TATEL: And you're not appealing that? 3 MR. FLENTJE: Yes, we haven't raised that issue on appeal. JUDGE TATEL: Okay. So, the only issue before us is 5 6 whether he is part of it, that's it? MR. FLENTJE: That is the only issue. 8 JUDGE TATEL: Okay. Great. Thank you. Okay. 9 MR. FLENTJE: Did he remain part of al-Qaida? 10 JUDGE TATEL: Yes. 11 MR. FLENTJE: And we would say irrespective of the burden what the Court did here by all but ignoring this 12 decision to swear bayat, an enduring loyalty to al-Qaida was 13 to dissect the time line of his activities in a way similar to 14 the way the Court in Adahi dissected the various pieces of 15 16 evidence --17 JUDGE TATEL: Well --18 MR. FLENTJE: -- showing --JUDGE TATEL: -- what's your response to -- I want 19 20 to ask your response to two things the District Court said. One was he said the reason he didn't shift the burden of proof 21 22 is because the Petitioner swore bayat in 1991 at a time when the United States and al-Qaida's interests in Afghanistan were 23 identical, that is both the U.S. and al-Qaida were opposing 24

the Communist government of Afghanistan. And the District

25

Court ruled that, you know, al-Qaida at the time of capture 1 2 was a very different organization than it was at the time he swore bayat. And it's relevant, he says, but not for shifting 3 4 the burden, right? So --5 MR. FLENTJE: The Court said that in rejecting the 6 Government's legal argument that it should shift the burden. 7 So, it wasn't a factual finding, but it was sort of a method 8 to analyze whether it was appropriate to shift the burden. 9 would --10 JUDGE TATEL: Right. 11 MR. FLENTJE: -- say that is wrong under the laws of 12 war. 13 JUDGE TATEL: Well, yes. 14 MR. FLENTJE: The laws of war look to association 15 with an organization or with a state military force, they 16 don't ask about the motivation of the person who's in the 17 force, and they don't ask about the motivation of the nation when they joined the force. 18 19 JUDGE TATEL: Yes, but see, you're talking about the 20 hypothetical in your brief, right, about the German soldier? 21 MR. FLENTJE: Sure. 22 JUDGE TATEL: Yes, you're totally right about that. 23 But, you know, a German soldier who joins the German army in the '30s and is captured in 1943, that was your hypothetical, 24

25

right?

1	MR. FLENTJE: Yes.
2	JUDGE TATEL: Of course you don't look into it
3	because there's absolutely no doubt in 1943 that a uniformed
4	armed German soldier is part of the German military.
5	MR. FLENTJE: Well, the only point we're trying to
6	make
7	JUDGE TATEL: I mean, that's the question here, is
8	the Petitioner at the time of capture still a member of al-
9	Qaida, and the District Court said, found, as a matter of
10	fact, that because he didn't disregard the bayat he simply
11	said because al-Qaida is a very different organization at the
12	time of capture than it was at the time of the oath that
13	that's not a justification for shifting the burden of proof.
14	MR. FLENTJE: Well, we would say it still makes
15	sense to shift the burden of proof and your question sort of
16	reveals that because after the oath the entire question in the
17	case turns to did he remain part of al-Qaida? And
18	JUDGE TATEL: Right.
19	MR. FLENTJE: his first line of evidence is his
20	claim in his declaration that he severed all ties.
21	JUDGE TATEL: Right.
22	MR. FLENTJE: Now, if he never came into court, and
23	never said he had severed ties from al-Qaida presumably the
24	Government would easily win the habeas case. So, the question
25	must be did he sever ties, and we would say

1 JUDGE TATEL: Right. 2 MR. FLENTJE: -- he has to come forward with some showing, meet some burden to show that. It doesn't matter 3 4 when he joined al-Qaida --5 JUDGE TATEL: Well, you keep ignoring my question. 6 I mean, I agree that the --7 MR. FLENTJE: I'm trying to address it. I'm sorry. 8 JUDGE TATEL: -- only question is, the question you 9 started talking about was the burden shifting. You said the 10 District Court erred by not shifting the burden. I was asking 11 you number one, how do you respond to his finding that he's 12 not saying that the joining, the swearing of bayat is 13 irrelevant, he's saying that it's not a basis for shifting the burden because al-Qaida's goals changed so dramatically 14 15 between the time he joined and the time he was captured. I know, I'm seeing an answer to that. The other thing he said 16 17 was he said, I mean, the District Court pointed out there's no way someone who's been detained in Guantanamo with no access 18 to information for eight years could possibly meet that burden 19 of proof anyway. 20 21 MR. FLENTJE: Well, Your Honor, there is a simple 22 way --23 JUDGE TATEL: So --24 MR. FLENTJE: -- to meet that burden --25 JUDGE TATEL: -- yes.

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1
                MR. FLENTJE: -- it is to tell the Court honestly
 2
      what you've been up to. He said -- and that's exactly what he
      tried to do in Court, he said look, I cut off all ties, and
 3
      then he talked about his activities in the intervening period.
 4
      And we suggest that if you look at the District Court's
 5
 6
      specific findings about those activities in the intervening
 7
      period it does not support his claim to have cut off all ties,
 8
      and the District Court --
 9
                JUDGE TATEL: Okay.
10
                MR. FLENTJE: -- essentially --
11
                JUDGE TATEL: Okay. That's --
12
                MR. FLENTJE:
                             -- agreed with that.
13
                JUDGE TATEL:
                             -- fine. I mean, and, you know, you
14
      can argue the case that way, and --
15
                MR. FLENTJE: Well, we're arguing it both ways, Your
      Honor.
16
17
                JUDGE SENTELLE: Whatever way it takes.
18
                JUDGE TATEL: Yes. Okay. I still, I just have to
19
     tell you, I still don't get your response to the point I've
20
     made about the District Court's finding. It is a finding that
      the goals of al-Qaida changed, and it's a finding supported by
2.1
22
     historical fact. I mean, the fact is that at that time it
23
     wasn't until after the first Gulf War when United States
24
     military forces were in Saudi Arabia that Osama Bin Laden
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switched to calling for attacks on the United States.

25

7 JUDGE SENTELLE: So far as the record discloses. JUDGE TATEL: Yes. Right. And so, I mean, 2 historically his finding is well supported, so --3 MR. FLENTJE: Well, the District Court's finding --4 5 JUDGE TATEL: -- you know --MR. FLENTJE: -- on the nature of al-Oaida was off 6 7 by many years. He said --JUDGE TATEL: I agree with you --8 MR. FLENTJE: -- the late 1990s. 9 10 JUDGE TATEL: -- that the, al-Qaida's hostility to 11 the United States began occurring much earlier than you would 12 know from the District Court's opinion. But for purposes of 13 this case when he swore bayat the United States and al-Qaida 14 had a common goal, destroying the Communist government in 15 Afghanistan. And it wasn't until the following year that al-16 Qaida began to change its mission, and it's at that point that  $\parallel$ he said he disassociated. So, the District Court --17 18 MR. FLENTJE: A couple of --JUDGE TATEL: -- is simply saying that's not enough 19 to shift the burden to him, it's still the Government's burden 20 21 to show using bayat and anything else it wants that he was part of al-Qaida. 22 23 JUDGE BROWN: Does the record here actually support the finding that al-Qaida's purposes were actually that 24 narrow? 25

1.3

MR. FLENTJE: It doesn't. There wasn't much on that
in the District Court opinion. It was a one-liner in a
footnote in rejecting a legal argument. So, it didn't purport
to be any sort of factual finding. And if you look at the 9-
11 report you can see that kind of Bin Laden's focus on the
U.S. was prompted by the Gulf War build up in 1990. In early
1992, which is the same time Salahi was fighting for al-Qaida
Bin Laden announced that, announced his intentions to rid the
Gulf of U.S. forces. So, there's certainly the District
Court's statement is not supported by the history of al-Qaida.

More importantly, the need to shift the burden doesn't have to do with these intentions. And we would submit that the same analysis that you would apply in the German soldier situation should apply here. If someone has enlistment papers from 1936 you would not go and say well, Germany was friends with the United States in 1936, and you wouldn't say this guy loves America, you would look at whether, that he had a discharge in between 1936 --

JUDGE TATEL: No you wouldn't.

MR. FLENTJE: -- and the time he was captured.

JUDGE TATEL: No you wouldn't. And the reason you wouldn't is that under your hypothetical he was captured in 1943, right? As a uniformed, armed member of the German military. There's no question that he's part of the German military.

1	MR. FLENTJE: Well, that part of the hypothetical
2	JUDGE TATEL: And that's the question in this case.
3	JUDGE SENTELLE: Yes. You're addressing a different
4	issue.
5	JUDGE TATEL: Yes.
6	MR. FLENTJE: Well, the nature of al-Qaida is
7	different, and I agree, there is no, there's probably not a
8	formal discharge from al-Qaida, but that doesn't mean that he
9	should have some obligation to show convincingly that he left
10	the group. Instead, what the evidence here shows enduring
11	ties, he swore bayat, and then year after year he
, 12	is associating with high level al-Qaida
13	JUDGE SENTELLE: But he did testify that he had
14	left
15	JUDGE TATEL: Right.
16	MR. FLENTJE: Absolutely.
17	JUDGE SENTELLE: al-Qaida.
18	MR. FLENTJE: He's trying to meet that burden. I
19	think he
20	JUDGE SENTELLE: Yes, he did try to meet that
21	burden. And what is the review that we are making of the
22	District Court's decision if it has that evidence on the one
23	side, and the Government's evidence on the other side?
24	MR. FLENTJE: Point one I would say is the District
25	Court did not accept as true his claim that he severed all

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ties. The District Court said in that same footnote he never
 1
 2
      acted affirmatively to sever his ties, and that was his first
      line of argument. The second point --
 3
                JUDGE SENTELLE: That's a so-what. I mean, we would
 4
      assume he would not act affirmatively to sever his ties,
 5
      that's going to get him killed.
 6
 7
                JUDGE TATEL: Exactly.
 8
                JUDGE SENTELLE: Yes, that's going to get him
      killed. And he --
 9
10
                JUDGE TATEL: Right.
                JUDGE SENTELLE: -- doesn't have to prove that he
11
12
      went and told them I'm quitting, he has to, his burden was, if
13
      he has one, would be to establish that he had withdrawn from
14
      al-Oaida.
15
                MR. FLENTJE: Sure. Well, then we --
16
                JUDGE SENTELLE: His evidence is he said I withdrew
17
      from al-Qaida, the Government (indiscernible). I'm not saying
      anything about the Government's evidence, the Government
18
      presents good evidence that he's not telling the truth, but
19
     the District Court weighed it and came out the other way.
20
21
     what is our review supposed to be?
22
                MR. FLENTJE: I think we're really at the line
     between what is a clearly erroneous review, and a legal
23
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review. I mean, the Court has said that whether he did X or Y

is a factual finding for clear err review, but at the same

1 time the Court said the import of him doing X, Y, and Z, and we have a lot of that here because the District Court found he 2 3 maintained these associations --JUDGE SENTELLE: The question of being --MR. FLENTJE: -- and he maintained --5 6 JUDGE SENTELLE: -- part of al-Qaida is a mixed 7 question of law and fact, right? MR. FLENTJE: Yes. So, it's hard for me to say 8 9 exactly where on the line --10 JUDGE TATEL: Yes. 11 MR. FLENTJE: -- this fits. 12 JUDGE TATEL: But the District Court's finding 13 wasn't that he remained part of it, it was that he was, you 14 know, a freelancer, that he was a committed Jihadist. I mean, 15 that's why the District Court looked at this, he said, look, 16 this guy, he's a committed Jihadist, we know that, and he used to be a member of al-Qaida, he has a lot of al-Qaida 17 connections, and from time to time he recruited, sent someone 18 19 over to al-Qaida, but he did it as a freelancer. 20 MR. FLENTJE: I think that's where we get right into the Adahi problem in this case, because by suggesting he's a 21 freelancer completely ignores that he swore loyalty to the 22 23 organization. 24 JUDGE TATEL: Okav. 25 MR. FLENTJE: If he swore loyalty and then is

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      continuing to help them --
 2
                JUDGE TATEL: Yes, I understand.
 3
                MR. FLENTJE: -- as al-Qaida is turning against the
 4
      United States how can that --
                JUDGE TATEL: Yes.
 5
                MR. FLENTJE: -- not show a continued --
 6
 7
                JUDGE TATEL: I understand that --
 8
                MR. FLENTJE: -- voluntarily -- I'm sorry.
 9
                JUDGE TATEL: Right. I understand that part of your
10
      argument. So, we're now beyond the burden of proof. Let me
11
      ask you this, you argue -- now, Awad was decided after, was it
12
      decided after all the briefing, or was it decided before your
13
      reply brief? I can't remember.
14
                MR. FLENTJE: It was before our reply brief,
15
      after --
16
                JUDGE TATEL: But after the --
17
                MR. FLENTJE: -- after our first brief.
                JUDGE TATEL: -- after the brief. So --
18
19
                MR. FLENTJE: And I'm not sure about Petitioner's
20
      brief.
21
                JUDGE TATEL: -- I'm curious about your reaction to
22
      Awad. And my question relates to the, you know, the command
23
      structure argument, right?
24
               MR. FLENTJE: Yes. Sure.
25
                JUDGE TATEL: Awad looks, now, Awad looks different
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to me than this case. In *Awad* the Petitioner there traveled to Afghanistan right after September 11th, right?

MR. FLENTJE: Yes.

JUDGE TATEL: He traveled right after September 11th, and he engaged in armed conflict against the United States and its allies. Okay. His name was a list, which was discovered at this training camp. He joined this group of fighters who were barricaded in this hospital, right?

MR. FLENTJE: Yes.

JUDGE TATEL: And the District Court, or the Court of Appeals said, "These fighters treated Awad as one of their own." So, it was in that context that we said look, that's enough, you don't need any more evidence that he followed orders or commands, this was in and of itself enough.

This case is totally different. He, the Petitioner here was captured far from the battlefield, right? There's no allegation that he --

MR. FLENTJE: Yes.

JUDGE TATEL: -- engaged in hostile activities against the United States. So, in a case like this the command structure argument might actually be useful because it's a way of distinguishing as we said in Ben Asiad (phonetic sp.), whatever that case is, distinguishing freel'ancers from people who are actually part of. One way you know someone like this might be part of al-Qaida if he's taking orders, or

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1
      operating within the command structure.
 2
                MR. FLENTJE:
                             We know -- we have --
 3
                JUDGE TATEL: So, isn't that a -- so, what I'm
      saying is why doesn't the command structure while it was
 4
 5
      inappropriate in Awad still a perfectly appropriate way to
 6
      analyze this case?
 7
                MR. FLENTJE: I think two --
 8
                JUDGE TATEL: You see my point?
 9
                MR. FLENTJE: -- responses.
10
                JUDGE TATEL:
                             Yes.
11
                MR. FLENTJE: One, when thinking about alternatives
12
      to showing one is in the command structure alternative number
13
      one is formally joining the force, and that's what bayat
      comprises.
14
15
                JUDGE TATEL: Okay. Why don't we agree for purposes
16
      of my question we're going to set bayat aside, okay?
17
                MR. FLENTJE: I don't think we can do that. That is
18
      not a fair way to analyze the evidence regarding this --
19
                JUDGE TATEL: Well, since I'm asking the
20
      questions --
21
                MR. FLENTJE: Yes. Okay.
                JUDGE TATEL: -- okay, I get to decide. I'm not
22
23
      deciding the case, I'm just --
24
               MR. FLENTJE: Sure.
25
                JUDGE TATEL: -- asking a question. Okay?
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there's no obligation that I ask all questions at once and
 1
 2
      consider them in their entirety.
 3
                MR. FLENTJE: Fair.
                JUDGE TATEL: It's just a legal question I'm asking
 4
     you about Awad. You make the argument that the command
 5
 6
      structure argument doesn't apply here. And we certainly did
 7
      in Awad suggest it had problems. I'm only asking you whether
      or not because of the different factual situations in these
 8
      cases it's not a useful way to think about the case, along
 9
     with everything else, okay?
10
                MR. FLENTJE: Well, you mentioned about Awad.
11
     was treated by the fighters as one of their own.
12
13
                JUDGE TATEL: Right.
                MR. FLENTJE: Salahi was treated by these high level
14
15
      al-Qaida operatives as one of their own.
16
                JUDGE TATEL: Okay. But he didn't --
17
                MR. FLENTJE: Again --
                JUDGE TATEL: -- fight with them. He wasn't
1.8
19
     captured in Afghanistan.
20
               MR. FLENTJE: Well, he fought with them initially,
21
     and then continued to be treated as if he was one of them.
22
                JUDGE TATEL: But he --
23
               MR. FLENTJE: He traveled amongst them.
24
               JUDGE TATEL:
                             Right.
25
               MR. FLENTJE: -- lived with al-Qaida --
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1
                JUDGE TATEL: Yes, but --
 2
                MR. FLENTJE: -- cells.
 3
                JUDGE TATEL: -- but wouldn't it help --
 4
                MR. FLENTJE: He provided recruits.
 5
                JUDGE TATEL: -- wouldn't it help to, if you're
      trying to prove that he's, "part of al-Qaida," what's wrong,
 6
 7
      wouldn't it be a perfectly appropriate question, and wouldn't
 8
      the Government in fact try to argue that in what he was doing,
 9
      his recruiting activities, and all these other things that he
10
      was in fact following orders?
11
                MR. FLENTJE: Well, sure, that is --
                JUDGE TATEL: Okay.
12
13
                MR. FLENTJE: -- absolutely one way --
                JUDGE TATEL: Of course, right?
14
15
                MR. FLENTJE: -- to show, and it's --
16
                JUDGE TATEL: All right. So --
17
                MR. FLENTJE: -- a good way.
                JUDGE TATEL: -- isn't the absence of orders equally
18
19
      relevant?
20
                MR. FLENTJE: Well, I hate to get back to bayat,
21
      because you wanted me to ignore it, but bayat is --
22
                JUDGE TATEL: I agree, I told you --
23
               MR. FLENTJE: -- the best --
24
                JUDGE TATEL: -- why don't you accept for purposes
25
     of the question that I completely agree with you that the
```

1 District Court didn't adequately consider bayat in his 2 ultimate analysis, okay? MR. FLENTJE: Okay. 3 4 JUDGE TATEL: Assume you win that argument. I agree 5 with you. MR. FLENTJE: Then we would certainly want to point 6 7 out --JUDGE TATEL: Right. 8 MR. FLENTJE: -- indications that there are orders 9 10 going on. 11 JUDGE TATEL: Okay. And --12 MR. FLENTJE: And I think we --13 JUDGE TATEL: -- wouldn't it be equally relevant 14 that there weren't any in terms of whether he was part of? 15 MR. FLENTJE: It depends on the nature of the 16 activity, I believe. 17 JUDGE TATEL: How can it possibly --MR. FLENTJE: I mean, no, I think one good --18 JUDGE TATEL: -- be relevant one way and not the 19 other way? I mean, if you say it's relevant that he took 20 orders to show that he's part of how can you possibly then say 21 it's inappropriate for the District Court to point out that he 22 didn't take orders? 23 24 MR. FLENTJE: I think that's a fair point. I 25 mean --

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JUDGE TATEL: Okay. All right. So --
 1
 2
                MR. FLENTJE: -- it's obviously --
 3
                JUDGE TATEL: -- we agree on that too now, right?
      Right?
 4
                MR. FLENTJE: (No audible response.)
 5
                JUDGE TATEL: Can you give me an example, I want an
 6
 7
      example from you of a situation where someone is dealing with,
 8
     or cooperating with al-Qaida, okay, but not part of it. Can
 9
     you get me any examples?
10
                MR. FLENTJE: Well, I mean, I guess a completely
11
      independent contractor who was, I mean, I haven't thought a
      lot about that --
12
                JUDGE TATEL: Okay. Like --
13
14
                MR. FLENTJE:
                             -- hypothetical. But, I mean --
15
                JUDGE TATEL: Well, like maybe someone who sells say
16
     cell phones, right?
               MR. FLENTJE: I mean, Ben Asiad suggested --
17
                JUDGE TATEL: And he sells cell phones --
18
               MR. FLENTJE: Yes.
19
                JUDGE TATEL: -- to al-Qaida, even if he knew al-
20
21
     Qaida was al-Qaida he might be quilty of material support,
22
     right, but he's not a part of.
23
               MR. FLENTJE: I think that's a fair --
24
               JUDGE TATEL:
                             Right?
25
               MR. FLENTJE:
                            -- that's a fair statement.
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Τ	JUDGE TATEL: Okay. And what about, for example,
2	you know, a parent who allows an al-Qaida son to stay in their
3	house for a couple of nights?
4	MR. FLENTJE: Absolutely. That's an example from
5	Gherebi.
6	JUDGE TATEL: Right. Not part of, right? Yes or
7	no?
8	MR. FLENTJE: I mean, I think you'd have to have
9	more evidence.
10	JUDGE TATEL: Yes.
11	MR. FLENTJE: Yes.
12	JUDGE TATEL: And suppose someone, you know, sets up
13	a website for information about cyber attacks and learns that
14	al-Qaida members are, you know, checking out his website and
15	doesn't take it down, is that person a part of?
16	MR. FLENTJE: I hate to comment on that. I mean,
17	here Salahi was setting up a website, and when an al-Qaida
18	operative said you better shut that down, there's surveillance
19	concerns he shut it down. I mean, that suggests, first, it
20	suggests there's an order coming out. I mean, it might not
21	look like
22	JUDGE TATEL: Well, you've got a District Court
23	MR. FLENTJE: a military order, but it's
24	JUDGE TATEL: You've got a District Court finding on
25	that, that doesn't help you.

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MR. FLENTJE: No, that's not true. The finding --
 1
 2
                JUDGE TATEL:
                             It's not?
 3
                MR. FLENTJE: -- by the District Court was this
     project didn't materialize, it didn't materialize because of
 4
     the al-Qaida order. That's a helpful finding, that suggests
 5
 6
     he was following directions, that was in the year 2000, very
 7
      close to 9-11, and that involved this Ganczarski guy who's a
 8
      known al-Qaida member, so we know this was tied to al-Qaida.
 9
      So, I don't think the District Court finding on that is --
                JUDGE TATEL: I don't think the District Court, I'm
10
     just looking at this, the District Court did not find that he
11
     did it under orders.
12
13
                MR. FLENTJE: He said he stopped at --
                             He stopped.
14
                JUDGE TATEL:
                JUDGE SENTELLE: He didn't find one way or the other
15
     on that question, did he?
16
17
                MR. FLENTJE: He halted it at Ganczarski's request.
                            Right. But he didn't --
18
                JUDGE TATEL:
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                MR. FLENTJE: I mean --
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                JUDGE TATEL: -- find it was pursuant to orders.
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               MR. FLENTJE:
                             Well, I mean, we're not going to find
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     military style orders with al-Qaida, that's pretty close.
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               JUDGE TATEL: You're not?
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               MR. FLENTJE: That is pretty close. And I think if
      you look at --
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JUDGE TATEL: Well, yes, but see that's my point. 1 2 The point here is that, you know, these are facts, and you're 3 disagreeing with the inferences the District Court drew from the facts, but, you know, we're --4 5 MR. FLENTJE: It's --JUDGE TATEL: I mean, ultimately we face a question 6 7 of law, but when the District Court doesn't make a finding one way or another about whether he took that down pursuant to 8 9 orders, we can't conclude that he did. 10 MR. FLENTJE: Well, we would suggest that --11 JUDGE TATEL: I mean, I know your inference is that 12 he did, but the --13 MR. FLENTJE: We would suggest --14 JUDGE TATEL: -- trier of fact didn't make that 15 inference. MR. FLENTJE: I mean, I think you can in one 16 circumstance, because Salahi himself testified at trial that 17 that is why he took it down, and he said it was concerns about 18 19 "surveillance," he agreed there was concerns about 2.0 surveillance that led Ganczarski to tell him that he should 21 stop. That's at J.A. 2639. But beyond that, I mean, another response to that is the 22 District Court didn't find there were not orders, and the 23 District Court in other places where it found that there were 24 25 not orders does not look at bayat, it separates the activities

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      from bayat. And I hate to, I know I'm getting back to --
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                JUDGE TATEL: No, no, no, I --
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                JUDGE SENTELLE: Yes.
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                MR. FLENTJE: -- that first point --
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                JUDGE TATEL: I told you --
 6
                MR. FLENTJE: -- but it's a really --
                JUDGE TATEL: -- for purposes of all this you can
      accept the idea that I agree with you on that.
 9
                JUDGE SENTELLE:
                                Yes.
10
                MR. FLENTJE: Submitted --
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                JUDGE SENTELLE: And he has two other judges he can
     be talking to while he's saying all these things.
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13
                MR. FLENTJE: Exactly.
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                JUDGE SENTELLE: Your time actually --
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                JUDGE BROWN: I want to get --
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                JUDGE SENTELLE: Excuse me, go ahead.
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                JUDGE BROWN: I want to get back to this command
      structure discussion for a moment. On the one hand you say
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      that no longer applies because after Al-Adahi said you don't
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      have to show that, but you also say but whether he was
21
     receiving orders is not irrelevant. Is there anything
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     inconsistent about those positions? In other words could
23
     someone receive orders and not be part of the command
24
     structure of the organization?
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               MR. FLENTJE: I doubt it. I mean, I think if you're
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case.

getting orders and following through you're definitely part of 1 2 it. So --3 JUDGE TATEL: Right. 4 MR. FLENTJE: -- as Chief Judge Sentelle said sufficient but not necessary in the Awad opinion. And, you 5 know, I want to point out, Salahi himself said at his CSRT 6 statement that bayat was a direction to, "take orders and 7 8 follow Osama Bin Laden." That is a pretty powerful evidence that the bayat means something in an ongoing way, it means 9 10 that when he's doing stuff to help al-Qaida it is likely just someone carrying out their duties to the group as a sworn 11 12 member. And I think there's another --13 JUDGE BROWN: Well, so is your argument that the command structure standard is no longer necessary, but that it 14 15 was met here? 16 MR. FLENTJE: Certainly. We certainly think it was met here because of the nature of bayat as suggesting that the 17 18 things he's doing to help al-Qaida are within the command 19 structure. He is a part of the force, so when he's taking 20 actions to help the force he's --JUDGE SENTELLE: But you don't have to show --21 22 MR. FLENTJE: -- part of the force. 23 JUDGE SENTELLE: -- it's within the command 24 structure. However, when you can show it that does carry your

1	MR. FLENTJE: It certainly helps our case. And, you
2	know, Abu Hafs
3	JUDGE SENTELLE: Well, if you actually could show it
4	conclusively that he was in the command structure you've won
5	your case on that point, right?
6	MR. FLENTJE: Sure. Abu Hafs who is an al-Qaida
7	leader and asking him to help Mr. al-Iraqi get around Germany,
8	another al-Qaida leader, that strongly suggests that there are
9	orders along to help him, and that they come from al-Qaida,
10	because these are two al-Qaida leaders that are being
11	JUDGE TATEL: Again, the District Court's findings
12	don't help you on that.
13	JUDGE SENTELLE: Yes.
14	MR. FLENTJE: Well, the District Court kind of
15	dismissed the evidence but didn't
16	JUDGE TATEL: No it didn't. He evaluated all the
17	evidence, and drew inferences from that event differently from
18	the ones you wish to draw, and those inferences are the ones
19	we're reviewing here. If they're clearly erroneous, fine, but
20	you don't say they are.
21	MR. FLENTJE: Well, we're willing to win on a
22	clearly erroneous standard.
23	JUDGE TATEL: Okay. One last question. If we agree
24	with you that the District Court, that the opinion, that the
25	District Court's opinion has problems under these later

decided cases, like Awad, and the one that requires the 1 2 evidence to be looked at in its entirety, I assume the answer 3 is what you're looking for is a remand, right? We would be happy with a remand. 4 MR. FLENTJE: 5 JUDGE TATEL: Yes. 6 MR. FLENTJE: We do think the facts --JUDGE TATEL: Yes. 8 MR. FLENTJE: -- that were found by the District 9 Court show as a matter of law that he remained part of al-Qaida, that someone who swore loyalty and continued to closely 10 associate and provide support to al-Qaida is still in al-11 12 Qaida, and that is the District Court's finding, the District 13 Court found there was continuing support, and the District 14 Court found there were close associations with numerous al-Qaida operatives. And if you look, even look under those the 15 16 types of support, and in particular the recruiting is the type 17 of thing that would make someone part of the force. 18 JUDGE SENTELLE: Is the United States conceding that 19 the preponderance standard is required, or are you merely 20 accepting that it's likely to be applied? 21 MR. FLENTJE: We think the preponderance standard is 22 appropriate. 23 JUDGE SENTELLE: Okay. You understand --24 MR. FLENTJE: And it's --25 JUDGE SENTELLE: You've read what Judge Randolph has

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1	writte	en I	in t	he	past	that	a	standard	less	than	a	preponderance
2	might	be	app	lic	cable	in -	••••					

MR. FLENTJE: We're conceding a preponderance standard in this case for sure.

JUDGE SENTELLE: You are conceding a preponderance standard. Okay.

MR. FLENTJE: No further questions, so thanks.

ORAL ARGUMENT OF THERESA M. DUNCAN, ESQ.

## ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLEES

MS. DUNCAN: May it please the Court, Theresa Duncan appearing on behalf of the Petitioner/Appellee Mohammedou Ould Salahi.

In this appeal the Government is arguing against rulings the District Court never made, and ignoring the rulings it did make. Recognizing the weakness of its case and the correctness of the trial court's decision the Government also misrepresents the record and the District Court's factual findings, ignoring the substantial deference to which those factual findings are due. Judge Robertson held four days of hearings in this case, heard two days of testimony including a day and a half by Mr. Salahi who testified by video conferencing from Guantanamo so that Judge Robertson was able to watch him as he testified and assess his credibility.

JUDGE SENTELLE: Was the Court properly assessing the evidence when it treated the Government's evidence as

1	being, viewing the Government's evidence with something like
2	skepticism?
3	MS. DUNCAN: Yes, Your Honor. The District Court
4	was doing what all of the District Courts have done in these
5	Guantanamo Bay cases, and that is refusing to give the
6	Government a presumption of reliability.
7	JUDGE SENTELLE: Now, he didn't say he was refusing
8	to give them presumption of liability, he went beyond that,
9	didn't he?
10	MS. DUNCAN: No, Your Honor, I don't believe
11	JUDGE SENTELLE: No.
12	MS. DUNCAN: he did. He
13	JUDGE SENTELLE: What did he mean by that phrase
14	then that he was viewing it with something like skepticism?
15	MS. DUNCAN: That he was
16	JUDGE SENTELLE: It sounds as if he is downgrading
17	the evidence before he ever hears it, like
18	MS. DUNCAN: He was
19	JUDGE SENTELLE: the Government has some other
20	burden to overcome besides a preponderance.
21	MS. DUNCAN: He was refusing to consider the
22	Government's evidence without skepticism. And when you look
23	at the, in his opinion at the place where he mentions I'm
24	applying my judicial skepticism to this evidence he's weighing
25	the credibility of different types of evidence from different

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places and giving them the weight that he thinks it deserves.
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      So, in his application of that comment --
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                JUDGE SENTELLE: That's not what he said, though.
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      He said that he was viewing it with something like skepticism,
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      and he said it twice, I think, didn't he?
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                MS. DUNCAN: Correct, Your Honor, he did say it
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      twice. He said it at the very beginning, and I think there
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      he's talking about not accepting the Government's evidence
 9
      without skepticism, which --
                JUDGE SENTELLE: That's two different things, to say
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      not accepting it without skepticism, saying I'm applying
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      skepticism to it. I mean, he didn't say he was going to apply
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      skepticism to the Petitioner's evidence, did he?
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                MS. DUNCAN: But, Your Honor, he did apply
      skepticism to our evidence. If you read in his footnote his
15
      treatment of Dr. Iacopino's testimony it shows the application
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      of judicial skepticism. So, I think Judge Robertson did --
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                JUDGE SENTELLE: What did he say about skepticism in
19
     that footnote?
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                MS. DUNCAN: He doesn't say the word skepticism --
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                JUDGE SENTELLE: No, he doesn't.
22
                MS. DUNCAN: -- Your Honor, but he, when you read
23
      through his analysis of Dr. Iacopino's testimony he's applying
24
      judicial skepticism.
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JUDGE SENTELLE: He didn't believe all of it, right?

-	MS. DONCAN: That's coffect. That's skepticism.
2	JUDGE SENTELLE: That doesn't mean he's applying
3	skepticism, it means he didn't believe all of it.
4	MS. DUNCAN: But it's applying skepticism, applying
5	skepticism is a way of analyzing evidence. If you accept
6	evidence without skepticism it's saying whatever is written on
7	this page I accept. And to apply skepticism to it is to
8	JUDGE SENTELLE: Why did he bother saying this
9	unless he's applying some different level of skepticism?
10	MS. DUNCAN: Well, Your Honor, in <i>Awad</i> he said it a
11	different way. He said that he would assess the evidence
12	credibility line by line, that
13	JUDGE SENTELLE: Yes.
14	MS. DUNCAN: he would look for internal
15	corroboration.
16	JUDGE SENTELLE: Yes.
17	MS. DUNCAN: So, he references Awad
18	JUDGE SENTELLE: But that's not what he said here,
19	he didn't say I'm going to treat this the way I normally treat
20	evidence, by weighing it and looking for internal
21	inconsistencies, he said I'm treating it with skepticism.
22	MS. DUNCAN: He does say that, Your Honor, but I
23	think when you read, I mean you read the opinion in total, and
24	you read the way that he has approached the other two cases in
25	which he denied the opinions the skepticism is

1 JUDGE SENTELLE: Can we look at those other two 2 cases? MS. DUNCAN: I think that they informed to the 3 4 extent that he incorporated Awad into this opinion, so clearly 5 you can look at his analysis there. But when you look at his 6 approach to the three Guantanamo cases he's decided, and when 7 you incorporate Awad into this opinion that skepticism is not 8 a higher burden, it's merely a way of approaching the 9 Government's evidence, and it is consistent with the way that 10 the other District Courts have approached the Government's 11 evidence, and the way this Court has approached --12 JUDGE SENTELLE: Have any of the other District 13 Courts used that phrasing that I'm approaching the 14 Government's evidence with skepticism? 15 MS. DUNCAN: Your Honor, I don't recall if any other 16 judge has worded --JUDGE SENTELLE: Have we ever approved that 17 formulation? 18 19 MS. DUNCAN: Not the word skepticism, but in Ben 20 Asiad this Court did look at the Government's evidence with some skepticism and asking whether some, you know, outside 21 evidence corroborated evidence at issue in that case, which is 22 23 not accepting the Government's exhibit at face value, but

rather approaching it, making your own credibility

determinations of whether that evidence under the totality is

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1 reliable. 2 JUDGE SENTELLE: But he has to make credibility determinations on all evidence in all cases. 3 4 MS. DUNCAN: Correct, Your Honor. 5 JUDGE SENTELLE: But he normally would not say all right, I'm going to look at your evidence, but I'm treating it 6 7 with skepticism. He's doing something, or seems to be saying 8 that he's doing something different here than he does in a run 9 of the mill case. 10 MS. DUNCAN: Well, I would agree with you to some extent, but it's not imposing a higher burden on the 11 Government, rather it's recognizing the unique nature of this 12 13 evidence, that the Government relied exclusively on interrogation reports in its case, and particularly 14 interrogation reports of Mr. Salahi after admitting that Mr. 15 16 Salahi was subjected to --17 JUDGE SENTELLE: Let us -- I'm not sure where we crossed the line into classified. 18 19 MS. DUNCAN: Your Honor, I promise you that I --JUDGE SENTELLE: Okay, good. 20 21 MS. DUNCAN: -- know that line and I'll --22 JUDGE SENTELLE: Be careful. 23 MS. DUNCAN: -- honor it. 24 JUDGE SENTELLE: Good. 25 MS. DUNCAN: I promise.

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JUDGE SENTELLE: Okay.

MS. DUNCAN: That the circumstances under which Mr. Salahi made the statements on which the Government relied were, I mean, the Government has admitted in public reports in a public pleadings that we would call it torture they would call it coercive circumstances, but nonetheless that those circumstances as Judge Robertson found rendered all of Mr. Salahi's statements to interrogators suspect. Given those circumstances, given the nature of the evidence in this case where we don't always know who the declarant is, we don't know what the circumstances, under what circumstances statements were made, evidence was gathered, judicial skepticism is really just a means of assessing the reliability of evidence under this unique circumstance of the Guantanamo cases. when you read his opinion as a whole it's clear that he's not holding the Government to a higher standard, he's properly applying the preponderance of the evidence standard, but figuring out a way where you have conflicting accounts where things aren't corroborated to give the particular pieces of evidence and the Government's ultimate showing the weight it deserves.

JUDGE TATEL: I'm sorry, were you done?

JUDGE SENTELLE: Go ahead. Go ahead.

JUDGE TATEL: I have a couple of questions. I hear what you're saying about fact finding and our obligations to

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review that on the appropriate standard, I have a couple of questions about the legal standards the District Court applied that I'd like to ask you. You're familiar with our opinion in Ben Asiad, right?

MS. DUNCAN: Yes, Your Honor.

JUDGE TATEL: Where we say that the determination must be made on a case by case basis with a functional rather than formal approach, right?

MS. DUNCAN: Correct.

JUDGE TATEL: And of course you're familiar with Awad. So, and you heard my questions about why I think, at least I think Awad and the -- why I think the command structure approach may still have relevance in a case like this, okay. But my question has to do with whether, with how the District Court applied it here. Let me just give you an example or two. When he's talking about recruiting, and we can stay away from classified stuff here, he says, he's talking about the detainee's, the Petitioner's statements about recruiting, he says in none of those statements did he say he was tasked to do so, that is to do the recruiting. Tasked. Nor did he provide detail about any specific recruiting mission he was given. Okay?

MS. DUNCAN: Correct.

JUDGE TATEL: So, is this really consistent with Awad? I mean, what he's looking for is -- and there's more

examples, let me just give you one other and then you'll see my point. He's talking about the damaging, he's talking about the most damaging evidence against the Petitioner here is these things he did with his brother in law who was close to Osama Bin Laden, right? And then he says, he says none of these events or incidents has been shown to be, to have happened within the command structure, right?

MS. DUNCAN: Correct.

JUDGE TATEL: Okay. So, under Awad and Ben Asiad it seems to me that while that's certainly one question, it's important to know whether, you know, there was an explicit order, or if something was carried out within the command structure, don't you think it's possible that if you take those cases, what those cases are about that the District Court should also have been asking well, maybe there aren't any explicit orders, but the Petitioner's behavior over these period of years, his recruiting and all these other things, although there were no specific orders it was such that it was pretty obvious that there was a formal relationship. In other words it was happening so regularly, and there was so much activity that even if there wasn't an order he wasn't really a freelancer, it was a formal relationship and he could be considered part of al-Qaida.

MS. DUNCAN: Your Honor, I'll treat each of those facts differently --

1	JUDGE TATEL: Yes.
2	MS. DUNCAN: but within that analysis. Judge
3	Robertson recognized that the test for determining whether a
4	person is part of al-Qaida is a flexible and functional test.
5	He adopted Judge Bates' decision in Hamlily, which also
6	recognizes it's not formal but more of a functional test.
7	JUDGE TATEL: Yes, but in each of these examples I
8	gave you it's not flexible.
9	MS. DUNCAN: But
10	JUDGE TATEL: He's looking for actual functioning
11	within the command structure.
12	MS. DUNCAN: And his approach to those particular
13	facts makes sense under the circumstances. With respect to
14	recruiting, the allegation of recruiting, the record below
15	indicates that when Mr. Salahi was a member of the broader
16	Jihadi community.
17	JUDGE TATEL: Right.
18	MS. DUNCAN: As you discussed earlier with
19	respect
20	JUDGE TATEL: Right.
21	MS. DUNCAN: to Afghanistan in 1991
22	JUDGE TATEL: Yes.
23	MS. DUNCAN: there were Jihadi community in
24	Bosnia and Chechnya, which is separate and different from al-
25	Qaida as the judge specifically found below. So, the evidence

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      is ambiguous about the nature of conversations that he would
 2
      have had with people about his experiences in Afghanistan, or
 3
      about the Jihadi movement in general, so that Judge Robertson
 4
      needed to apply a framework for determining, is this as Mr.
      Salahi testified simply not recruiting, maybe talking to
 5
      people about his experiences but not recruiting for al-Qaida,
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 7
      or is it recruiting for al-Qaida? And the judge applied the
 8
      command structure --
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                JUDGE TATEL: Right. But my question is --
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                MS. DUNCAN: -- analysis --
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                JUDGE TATEL: -- did he ever, given that we hadn't
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      yet decided Awad did he ever ask the question whether even if
      there aren't formal orders, or formal commands that the
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      Petitioner's behavior over a period of years could still be
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     viewed as part of al-Qaida? And he didn't ask that question.
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                MS. DUNCAN: Your Honor --
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                JUDGE TATEL: And are you telling me that that
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      question is, that he did ask it, or that he didn't, and he
     didn't ask it because it's inappropriate?
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                MS. DUNCAN: Your Honor, I can't speak for Judge
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     Robertson whether --
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                JUDGE TATEL: No, we can only look at his order.
     ∥I'm asking you --
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               MS. DUNCAN: Right.
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JUDGE TATEL: -- where in his opinion he did it?

1 MS. DUNCAN: And I think in --2 JUDGE TATEL: Right? MS. DUNCAN: In his order I think that he did apply 3 sort of a functional approach to the evidence. I think that, 4 5 you know, that he -- the command structure test made sense where the evidence was ambiguous, where it was open to two 6 7 different interpretations. 8 JUDGE TATEL: No, no, no. My question is -- I'm with you that, at least speaking for myself, that the command 9 structure test still makes sense in a case like this. 10 question is whether given Awad and Ben Asiad, the opinion here 11 12 applies it in a formalistic way that's too formalistic. I mean, even his conclusion, you know, you said well, he was 13 just looking at that fact, but look at his conclusion, he says 14 I'm at page 280 under conclusion, he says the Government had 15 to show that the support Petitioner provided from time to time 16 was provided within al-Qaida's command structure. 17 18 MS. DUNCAN: Correct. JUDGE TATEL: And -- yes. And do you think that 19 after Awad and Ben Asiad is a correct statement of the law? 20 Or do you -- well, why don't you answer that question? 21 22 MS. DUNCAN: Well, clearly under Ben Asiad and Awad 23 it's no longer the law that --24 JUDGE TATEL: Right.

MS. DUNCAN: -- that Court --

JUDGE SENTELLE: Yes.

MS. DUNCAN: -- had to make that specific factual --

JUDGE TATEL: Exactly.

MS. DUNCAN: -- finding.

JUDGE TATEL: So, don't we really need to remand this now for the District Court to look at this under the proper test? I mean, look, these cases were decided after he wrote his opinion, so, you know, we all understand that. But now the law is pretty clear, and why doesn't this have to go back?

MS. DUNCAN: Because under the Court's factual findings, Your Honor, even if you apply a more functional test and you --

JUDGE TATEL: Right.

MS. DUNCAN: -- the evidence still doesn't lead up to the finding of by a preponderance of the evidence that Mr. Salahi was part of al-Qaida, as Judge Robertson found from, you know, for the last year and a half when Mr. Salahi was living in Mauritania there was no evidence of a connection between him and the members of al-Qaida in a support role. And we can talk more about that later. But even under the record as it exists there's no need to remand because it's still those factual findings when given the deference --

JUDGE TATEL: Well, what about the Government's argument about Al-Adahi, our decision in Al-Adahi, and their

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      argument that the District Court here looked at, too often
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      looked at the evidence in isolation and didn't step back and
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      look it all in its entirety?
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                MS. DUNCAN: Your Honor, the Government looks --
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                JUDGE TATEL: You know, the conditional probability
      standard.
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 7
                MS. DUNCAN: Correct, Your Honor. The Government
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      looks at one statement by Judge Robertson late in his opinion
 9
      and ignores the rest of the opinion. At the very beginning
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      Judge Robertson summarizes all of the Government's allegations
11
      against Mr. Salahi, he devotes two full pages to a time
      line --
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13
                JUDGE TATEL: Right.
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                MS. DUNCAN: -- summarizing the allegations --
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                JUDGE TATEL: Yes.
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                MS. DUNCAN: -- against Mr. --
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                JUDGE TATEL: That's true.
18
                MS. DUNCAN: -- Salahi.
19
                JUDGE TATEL: That's true.
20
                MS. DUNCAN: He, throughout the opinion he, you
21
      know, he builds on the evidence, and views that evidence as a
22
     whole in connection to each other. The part where the
23
      Government focuses and argues that he committed the error of
24
      Adahi is where Judge Robertson is addressing the Government's
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      argument that aside from what Mr. Salahi may or may not have
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1	done, the fact of his association with so many people that the
2	Government alleges are al-Qaida is a reason for finding him as
3	part of al-Qaida, and the
4	JUDGE TATEL: Independently.
5	MS. DUNCAN: Independently.
6	JUDGE TATEL: Yes.
7	MS. DUNCAN: Because by the time Judge
8	JUDGE TATEL: No, but that's the word the Judge
9	used. But that's exactly what we said in
10	MS. DUNCAN: Adahi.
11	JUDGE TATEL: You know which case I mean.
12	MS. DUNCAN: Yes, I know what you mean.
13	JUDGE SENTELLE: Don't hold any of us to the
14	JUDGE TATEL: That's exactly what
15	JUDGE SENTELLE: proper pronunciation of these
16	cases.
17	JUDGE TATEL: Yes.
18	MS. DUNCAN: Me either, Your Honor.
19	JUDGE TATEL: That's exactly what we said in the
20	conditional probability case that he can't do.
21	MS. DUNCAN: Right, but
22	JUDGE TATEL: You can't look at a piece of evidence
23	and say this evidence independently is insufficient to hold
24	him.
25	MS. DUNCAN: But by the time Judge Robertson makes
	$\Pi$

1 | that statement of --

JUDGE TATEL: Yes.

MS. DUNCAN: -- independently he has already analyzed in total the connections between Mr. Salahi and these individuals, what the Government has alleged Mr. Salahi did, which we countered with evidence that he did not, and has looked at that evidence as a whole. And so here the Court is simply looking at just given the fact of the relationships, having determined that, you know, recognized for example that there's the accusation that Mr. Salahi sent money, or helped his cousin get money to his family in Mauritania, having looked at that is the mere fact that he has a connection with his cousin sort of divorced from that enough to make his al-Qaida. No. And when you get to the very end of Judge Robertson's opinion he again summarizes all of the evidence.

JUDGE TATEL: Well, I'm not sure he does. And you just got to my next question. I'm looking at the same part of the opinion you are, page 280, right? And my question is prompted by the Government's argument that, assume for purposes of this question, by the way, that I completely agree with you about not shifting the burden of proof, okay?

MS. DUNCAN: Okay.

JUDGE TATEL: But still, swearing bayat is relevant to the ultimate decision, correct?

MS. DUNCAN: Correct, Your Honor.

JUDGE TATEL: You agree with that? Okay.

2 MS. DUNCAN: I do agree with that.

JUDGE TATEL: And do you see any evidence in this opinion that once the District Court rejected the Government's argument about shifting the burden that he still kept the importance of swearing bayat on the table?

MS. DUNCAN: Yes, Your Honor. He did consider the fact of bayat for what it was. I mean --

JUDGE TATEL: Well, look at page 280. You wanted to talk about the conclusion, okay, here's what the Court says, this is his conclusion, the Government has shown that Petitioner, that Salahi is an al-Qaida sympathizer, perhaps a fellow traveler, that he was in touch with al-Qaida members, and that from time to time he provided sporadic support, right?

MS. DUNCAN: To members of al-Qaida.

JUDGE TATEL: Yes. No mention of swearing bayat. In other words, when he got down to the bottom line about his judgment here he didn't seem to have taken account of the fact that he swore. Now, maybe the proper finding would have been look, I've taken account of bayat, he did swear it, but the fact is it was pre-'92, I think it's of little value, and, you know, he was a freelancer, and that's not sufficient to be part of it. That might have been a perfectly defensible decision that would have survived an appeal. But since he

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didn't say that we don't know what he would think if our
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      decision in Al-Adahi had been decided, and it was so clear at
      the time he wrote this opinion that he clearly had to consider
 3
      bayat in the contents of his final conclusion. We just don't
 4
      know what he would have done.
 5
                MS. DUNCAN: Well, Your Honor, we --
 6
                JUDGE TATEL: And we can't make that judgment for
 7
 8
      him, can we?
                MS. DUNCAN: Well, Your Honor, we do know that he
 9
      considered it.
1.0
                JUDGE TATEL: How do we know?
11
                JUDGE SENTELLE: How do we know that?
12
                MS. DUNCAN: If you continue on in his conclusion --
1.3
14
                JUDGE TATEL: Yes.
                MS. DUNCAN: -- it's in the next paragraph he says,
15
16
     he acknowledges that Salahi fought with al-Qaida in
17
      Afghanistan 20 years ago.
                JUDGE TATEL: Right.
18
19
                MS. DUNCAN: That he was part of al-Qaida 20 years
20
      ago.
                JUDGE TATEL:
                             Right.
21
                MS. DUNCAN: So, he does include that in his overall
22
     analysis of the facts.
23
24
                JUDGE SENTELLE: Had he fought with al-Qaida he did
25
     not reference the oath of bayat.
```

1	MS. DUNCAN: He doesn't specifically say
2	JUDGE SENTELLE: He doesn't say.
3	MS. DUNCAN: He does not specifically say bayat.
4	JUDGE SENTELLE: Lose the specifically. He doesn't
5	say anything about the oath of bayat does he in that
6	conclusion?
7	MS. DUNCAN: But I think that he doesn't he does
8	not say the word bayat, Your Honor. But the time that Mr.
9	Salahi fought with al-Qaida in Afghanistan, I mean, that is a
10	central fact. To that Mr. Salahi
11	JUDGE SENTELLE: That's a fact, and then one of the
12	other facts is when he fought with them he had already sworn
13	bayat, too.
14	MS. DUNCAN: That's correct. And he
15	JUDGE SENTELLE: And he did not reference that fact
16	in this conclusion, did he?
17	MS. DUNCAN: He doesn't say the word bayat in
18	this
19	JUDGE SENTELLE: He doesn't say anything about the
20	oath at all, does he? And Counsel, you can't change the
21	record.
22	MS. DUNCAN: I'm not trying to change the record
23	JUDGE SENTELLE: Okay.
24	MS. DUNCAN: Your Honor, but I'm trying to
25	explain what the record supports in terms of the fighting with

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al-Qaida.
 1
 2
                JUDGE SENTELLE: And that record is that in this
 3
     opinion, in the conclusion he does not make any reference in
 4
     any fashion to the oath of bayat, right?
 5
                MS. DUNCAN: He does not mention the word.
 6
                JUDGE SENTELLE: He does not make any reference to
 7
      that oath at all, does he? Yes or no? Don't tell me anything
      but yes or no.
 8
 9
                MS. DUNCAN: I guess I'm trying --
10
                JUDGE SENTELLE: Then you can explain, but first you
11
     have to say yes or no. Does he make any reference to that
12
      oath in any fashion in that conclusion?
1.3
                MS. DUNCAN: I would say yes, Your Honor.
14
                JUDGE SENTELLE: All right. Tell me where it is,
15
     read it to me.
                MS. DUNCAN: Okay. In the --
16
17
                JUDGE SENTELLE: Read me the part about that oath,
     Counsel.
18
19
               MS. DUNCAN: In where he says Salahi fought with al-
20
     Qaida in Afghanistan there was testimony below by Mr.
      Salahi --
21
22
                JUDGE SENTELLE: That's your best answer to that
23
      question?
               MS. DUNCAN: Well, let me tell you what Mr. Salahi
24
     testified. He testified --
25
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JUDGE SENTELLE: Never mind what Salahi testified,
 1
      we're talking about what's in this conclusion at this point.
 2
      Counsel, you can admit that it's not in there.
 3
                MS. DUNCAN: I admit the word is not there, Your
 4
     Honor.
 5
                JUDGE SENTELLE: Okay. Now, admit that there is no
 6
     reference at all of that oath in there.
 7
                MS. DUNCAN: I -- there --
 8
                JUDGE SENTELLE: It's not there, Counsel, is it?
 9
                MS. DUNCAN: But it's implicit in the fighting with
10
11
     Afghanistan, Your Honor, because Mr. Salahi testified below
      that he swore bayat in order to fight with al-Qaida against
12
      the Communist in 1991, that he could not have fought had he
13
14
      not --
                JUDGE SENTELLE: Are those not two different facts,
15
      swearing the oath and fighting?
16
                MS. DUNCAN: Not on the record as it stands below.
17
                JUDGE SENTELLE: Those are two different facts.
18
19
                MS. DUNCAN: They are, but they're connected facts.
                JUDGE SENTELLE: Those are two different facts.
20
21
                MS. DUNCAN: They're different but connected.
                JUDGE SENTELLE: And he finds one -- Counsel, please
22
     don't try to defend a record you don't have.
23
                MS. DUNCAN: I do have this record, though, Your
24
25
     Honor. I mean, it is the testimony --
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1	JUDGE SENTELLE: You have the you're stuck with
2	the record you've got, and he doesn't make any reference to
3	that in here.
4	MS. DUNCAN: I acknowledge that he does not
5	explicitly reference
6	JUDGE SENTELLE: Thank you, Counsel.
7	MS. DUNCAN: that here.
8	JUDGE TATEL: Can I
9	JUDGE SENTELLE: You could have saved a lot of time
10	if you'd done that sooner.
11	JUDGE TATEL: Can I question. My last question.
12	So, we have an interesting situation here, we have a situation
13	where we're reviewing a District Court decision that was
14	decided shortly before three really important opinions of this
15	Court about how to review these cases, right?
16	MS. DUNCAN: Correct.
17	JUDGE TATEL: It's pre-Awad, it's pre-Ben Asiad,
18	which makes it very clear that we need not a formal but a
19	flexible approach, right?
20	MS. DUNCAN: Correct.
21	JUDGE TATEL: And we also have Al-Adahi, right?
22	Which makes it clear that you have to look at it all together.
23	So, why wouldn't it make sense for an Appeals Court in this
24	situation, even though we may think that the District Court
25	under the law at that time, you know, made, let's assume

you're right, pretty much got it right, wouldn't it make sense for purposes of consistency of our decisions to send it back for a fresh look at the record under these new decisions so that we have consistent, as much consistent decision-making about the handling of these habeas cases as possible? What's wrong with doing that?

MS. DUNCAN: Your Honor, the record, the opinion as it stands, and the record as it stands fits well, snugly within those later three opinions.

JUDGE TATEL: Well, assume I don't agree with you, but I know that's what you think, and that's what I'd argue if I were you, too. But let's assume I don't agree with you, okay? And you've heard my questions about all three of these cases, about Awad and Al-Adahi. And if that's my view, which I understand you don't agree with, wouldn't it be appropriate for the Appeals Court to ask the District Court to take another look under these stands so that we have the decisions, you know, we have a lot of District Courts deciding lots of detainee cases, and the only way we're going to get consistency here to have all the detainees treated equally under the same legal principles is to make sure that when we have a situation like this where we do have three new decisions with three new sets of principles that it's re-evaluated under them. What's the matter with that?

MS. DUNCAN: Your Honor, I mean, there's nothing --

JUDGE TATEL: Right. 1 MS. DUNCAN: -- there's nothing legally the matter 2 with it. 3 JUDGE TATEL: Right. 4 MS. DUNCAN: I think, I mean, as you recognize I 5 think it's unnecessary. It also essentially means starting 6 from scratch given Judge Robertson's retirement from the 7 bench. 8 JUDGE TATEL: Well, yes. Well, we have a big record 9 and it might be necessary to hear some more evidence. But the 10 point is we would have, we would then have a decision, and it 11 still might come out your way because you're confident that it 12 meets those standards. We would have a decision that meets 13 the D.C. Circuit's most recent standards, and then we'd be 14 sure also that this detainee will be treated the same way as 15 other detainees by other District Courts. See what I mean? 16 17 MS. DUNCAN: I understand what you're saying. JUDGE TATEL: Yes. 18 MS. DUNCAN: We would ask the Court to first 19 consider --2.0 JUDGE TATEL: Yes. 21 MS. DUNCAN: -- under Judge Robertson's factual 22 findings and giving them the deference to which they are --23 JUDGE TATEL: Right. 24 MS. DUNCAN: -- due, and under those three cases 25

it's our position, of course, that --1 JUDGE TATEL: Right. 2 MS. DUNCAN: -- we win. 3 JUDGE TATEL: I understand. 4 MS. DUNCAN: And we have no need to go back --5 JUDGE TATEL: I completely --6 MS. DUNCAN: -- down, but --7 JUDGE TATEL: I understand that. Right. 8 MS. DUNCAN: -- I understand what you're saying, 9 Your Honor. 10 JUDGE TATEL: Yes. But you get my point, right? 11 MS. DUNCAN: I do understand your --12 JUDGE TATEL: Yes. 13 MS. DUNCAN: -- point, Your Honor. 14 JUDGE TATEL: Okay. 15 In your exchange with the Chief Judge 16 JUDGE BROWN: 17 you said that there were, these facts were connected, bayat and the fighting in Afghanistan. But is it the case that 18 every al-Qaida sympathizer who fought in Afghanistan had to 19 20 swear bayat? MS. DUNCAN: I don't know the answer to that, Your 21 Honor. What I know is that Mr. Salahi testified below that he 22 swore bayat because he understood if he didn't he wouldn't be 23 able to fight with al-Qaida against the Communist government 24 in 1991. That was his understanding of the oath. 25

1	JUDGE SENTELLE: Okay. If there's no further
2	questions, I realize rebuttal would be in order, but I do
3	we need to have a classified session?
4	JUDGE TATEL: I don't think so. Do you?
5	JUDGE SENTELLE: Right now it doesn't sound like it
6	JUDGE TATEL: Janice?
7	JUDGE SENTELLE: Do you think we need a classified
8	session? Okay. Let's go directly to rebuttal then in this,
9	one of the unless one of Counsel wishes to ask us to go
10	into classified session. We have ruled that we will go into
11	it if it's needed, but
12	MS. DUNCAN: Your Honor, may I consult with my co-
13	counsel?
14	JUDGE SENTELLE: Okay. We'll go ahead and have a
15	rebuttal then, and then you can consult. I was thinking we
16	might not go into rebuttal, but we'll go ahead and go into
17	rebuttal and then you can consult.
18	MS. DUNCAN: Thank you, Your Honor.
19	JUDGE SENTELLE: Come ahead then, Counsel.
20	ORAL ARGUMENT OF AUGUST E. FLENTJE, ESQ.
21	ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANTS
22	MR. FLENTJE: May it please the Court. I just want
23	to take one last stab at burden shifting. Judge Tatel, you
24	expressed concern about how the nature of al-Qaida has
25	changed, and we would say that is certainly relevant to

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whether Salahi has shown convincingly that he left the group,
1
     that and things like the passage of time, and absence of al-
2
      Qaida associations, but it's not a reason not to shift the
3
     burden as a legal matter. Once we have shown him to be a
4
     formal member of the group, and I think at any point in time
 5
     it would be some, there's some obligation for him to come and
 6
     say look, no, actually I've left, I'm doing other things now,
 7
     and I'm no longer in the group. And here we don't have that.
 8
     As --
 9
                JUDGE SENTELLE: Are you contending that he had to
10
      formally go to al-Qaida and tell them he quit?
11
                MR. FLENTJE: Absolutely not. There are, I think --
12
                JUDGE SENTELLE:
                                 Okay.
13
                MR. FLENTJE: -- a number of ways you can --
14
                JUDGE SENTELLE: I misunderstood what you just said,
15
      then.
16
                MR. FLENTJE: No, he's telling the Court I've left
17
      the group.
18
                JUDGE SENTELLE: Okay.
19
                MR. FLENTJE: He's not telling al-Qaida he's left
20
      the group.
21
                JUDGE SENTELLE: Well, he did tell the Court that he
22
      quit the group, didn't he?
23
                MR. FLENTJE: Yes, and that's --
24
                JUDGE SENTELLE: Okay.
25
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MR. FLENTJE: -- what the Court --
 1
               JUDGE SENTELLE: So, he made it that far.
 2
               MR. FLENTJE: Yes. And we submit that the Court
 3
     didn't really buy that completely. And, you know, he
 4
     continued to voluntarily affiliate, and that's the words from
 5
     Ben Asiad with al-Qaida as al-Qaida issued its fatwa
 6
     Americans, and as it, after that fatwa he --
 7
               JUDGE TATEL: Are you arguing this on your rebuttal
 8
     because you think you need to shift the burden to win this
 9
     case?
10
               MR. FLENTJE: Absolutely not, Your Honor. I mean --
11
               JUDGE SENTELLE: Okay.
12
               JUDGE TATEL: Okay.
13
               MR. FLENTJE: -- shifting the burden is sort of a
14
     small piece. I mean, I think effective --
15
               JUDGE SENTELLE: Right. Is that really proper
16
17
     rebuttal, even?
               MR. FLENTJE: Sorry, Your Honor.
18
               JUDGE SENTELLE: Yes. Unless my colleagues have
19
      further questions I think your time is now expired. I'll give
20
      everybody one more chance to ask us to go into classified
21
      session. Take a minute if you need to.
22
               MR. FLENTJE: The Government does not think --
23
               MS. DUNCAN: And Your Honor, neither do we.
24
               JUDGE SENTELLE: I'm sorry? I don't hear well.
25
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## DIGITALLY SIGNED CERTIFICATE

I certify that the foregoing is a correct transcription of the electronic sound recording of the proceedings in the above-entitled matter.

Caula Under wood

Paula Underwood

October 5, 2010

DEPOSITION SERVICES, INC.