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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY BRAVO COMPANY, 3rd BATTALION, 187TH INFANTRY 101ST AIRBORNE DIVISION (AIR ASSAULT) PB OLSON, SAMARRA, IRAQ APO AE 09349

AFZB-KC-H-B

1 JUN 2006

MEMORANDUM FOR Commander, 3RD Battalion, 187 Infantry Regiment, 3rd Brigade Combat Team, 101st Airborne Division (AASLT), FOB Brassfield-Mora, APO AE 09349

SUBJECT: Authorized Use of Deadly Force on 30 May 2006

B/3-187 IN is currently assigned an area of operation on the eastern side of the Tigris River which includes the entire city of Samarra, Iraq. We currently have two patrol bases; one which is located on the Northwest side of the city next to the river, PB and one which is in the center of the city, PB 2 only secure route which attached the two patrol bases is the which is overwatched with three overt observation post that are strategically position to have interlocking fires with each other. The three overt OPs, as well as the patrol bases are setup in a defense to provide force protection to the soldier who man them but more importantly for the OPs is it is postured to overwatch, protect and secure the route. They are task with securing the LOC in order to EX 2 allow freedom of maneuver to the company, logistical convoys, civilian contractors, Iraqi National Police Commandos, Iraqi Police and any Coalition force element, as well as, securing that same route for Casualty evaluation for Iraqi Security Forces and CFs elements. As build into the defensive and the evaluation plan the LOC must stay security to allow PB from CFs.

There has been numerous debates on whether to close or maintain PB and the and it has came up for closure on several occasions and each time the MNC-I commander has made a decision to keep CFs there because of it's tactical and strategic location. The LOC is also key terrain based on PB since it only houses one infantry platoon from my company. We learned from past experience in Samarra that a patrol base can easily be isolated and cut off and it places increased enemy threat due to that.

3-69 AR, 3d ID established the overt OPs and after two VBIED attacks and over 10 IED attacks, they closed and made it a CF/ISF route only in July/August 2005. At which point jersey barriers, concertina wire and signs in both Arabic and English were placed along the route to prevent traffic other than CF/ISF to use it. The signs clearly state that if you cross over the barriers and passed the warning signs that deadly force is authorized. There has been authorized use of deadly force to prevent traffic from utilizing this route due to the threat of attack on ISF/CF along the route, as well as at the OPs. 3-69 AR had authorized use of deadly force to stop traffic from traveling and threaten CF/ISF

personnel along the LOC and so did 1-26 IN National Guard and 1-33 CAV while they were stationed here. We have had the same authorized use of deadly force on the LOC on 3 other occasions and we have had the same on the patrol bases.

The OPs have been attacked a total of 45 times since our arrival to Samarra in late December 2005. OP has been attacked 3 times; OP has been attacked 26 times resulting in 1 CF KIA and 2 CF WIA; and OP has been attacked 17 times. With the heighten threat recently from HUMINT and SIGINT reporting of possible Vibes and the past history of Vices and Vibes in Samarra, it is crucial that my soldier's stay vigilant and follow the appropriate measures to ensure protection of their lives, and the other CFs and Isis, as well

as, to ensure the protection of law abiding citizens.

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On 30 May 2006, the possible AIF occupied vehicle was traveling along Route and turned North on passed the warning signs and barriers at which point disabling shots were fired to stop the vehicle. The vehicle increased in speed and continued up the secured LOC at which point the soldier fired kill shots into the vehicle.

The fact that the crucial LOC has been closed to civilian traffic for a while and that it has signs and barriers to warn traffic that deadly force will be used to protect the LOC, convoys and OPs to prevent unauthorized traffic from driving on it, as well as past history of the LOC shows that an authorized deadly force incident occurred. Also, the car was giving an opportunity to stop with the disabling shots and did not stop but continued on the Route before it was engaged with kill shots. We use every means necessary and at our disposal to prevent innocent life from being lost. The incident is misfortunate, and any lose of innocent life is tragic.

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Immediate Correspondence

Ref / IP headquarters in Samara

To IP headquarters in SAD

PLAINTIF # 1374 The Samara Police center notified us in its letter number 593 of 30/05/2006 that on 30/05/2006 at 15:45 the police headquarters in Samara reported 2 female bodies in the Samara public hospital, we immediately went to the hospital to find out that the 2 bodies are of Saliha Muhammad Hussain Al Asudi housewife, 55 years old, living in Samara Nahiyah Almuaatassim, and Nabiha Nasif Jassim Al Asudi housewife, 30 years old living in Samara Nahiyat Almuaatassim, they were shot by the American forces in Al Muaatassim area nearby the youth center (due to the fact that this report was handwritten it was not possible to read and translate the last sentence)

Signature

EXL

Samara police headquarters

Exhibit 9, View from Intersection at the and and low low visible. Demonstrative of signs visible along the length of the length cars to not drive on and efforts to warn LNs. Photo dated 20 FEB 06. looking West. Warning sign

