

ESCALATION OF FORCE (EOF) INVESTIGATION REPORT

101ST AIRBORNE DIVISION (AIR ASSAULT)

TASK FORCE BAND OF BROTHERS

IN ACCORDANCE WITH FRAGO 132 TO OPERATIONS ORDER 01-06, THE FOLLOWING REPORT IS TO BE COMPLETED AND FORWARDED TO THE OFFICE OF THE STAFF JUDGE ADVOCATE OF TASK FORCE BAND OF BROTHERS NO LATER THAN 24 HOURS FOLLOWING COMPLETION OF ANY EOF INVESTIGATIONS.

UNIT: A/3 STB, 3 BCT, 101ST ABN DIV (AASLT)

ESCALATION OF FORCE DATE TIME GROUP: 261421APR06

LOCATION OF ESCALATION OF FORCE INCIDENT: AO RAKKASAN

TYPE OF INVESTIGATION: INVESTIGATION UP AR 15-6

FACTS AND FINDINGS OF INVESTIGATION:

FACTS: AT APPX. 1430 HRS, A TROOPER WAS MANNING A GUARD POSITION [REDACTED] ON THE SOUTHEASTERN CORNER OF [REDACTED] WHEN A TOYOTA WITH 2X LN MALES APPROACHED THE M1 CP. THE VEHICLE DISREGARDED MULTIPLE ATTEMPTS BY THE INP'S MANNING THE CP TO STOP IT, WHICH WAS ALSO CLEARLY MARKED. PASSING THE CP, THE VEHICLE WAS SIGNALLED BY THE GUARD TO STOP BY HAND AND ARM SIGNALS AND WAS SIGNALLED TO MOVE TO THE M1 CP FOR CLEARANCE BY THE INPD. THE DRIVER DISREGARDED THE INSTRUCTIONS AND THEN IMMEDIATELY INCREASED HIS SPEED, HEADING DUE EAST TOWARDS SAMARRA AND [REDACTED] (GUARD TOWER) IMMEDIATELY SOUNDED HIS HORN INITIATING EOF. THE GUARD AT [REDACTED] AGAIN WENT THROUGH EOF PROCEDURES BY WAVING A VS-17 PANEL, HAND AND ARM SIGNALS AND VOICE COMMANDS ("KIF"). AT 1435, THE GUARD BELIEVED THE VEHICLE TO BE A SVBIED AND FIRED A 3-5 RND BURST INTO THE FRONT OF THE VEHICLE TO DISABLE IT. THE VEHICLE STOPPED AND 1X LN DISMOUNTED AND RAN TOWARDS SAMARRA. A TEAM FROM [REDACTED] WAS DEPLOYED TO CLEAR THE VEHICLE. 1X LN WAS SEVERELY WIA (LATER DOW AT [REDACTED] FAS) AND THE OTHER LN WAS CAPTURED BY INP. BOTH LNS WERE SEVERELY INTOXICATED AND AN OPEN BOTTLE OF WHISKEY AND 2X FULL CUPS OF WHISKEY WERE INSIDE THE PASSENGER COMPARTMENT OF THE VEHICLE. THERE WERE 2X LOADED AK-47S INSIDE THE PASSENGER COMPARTMENT AS WELL. THE SURVIVING LN WAS NOT COHERENT AND WAS ON THE VERGE OF PASSING OUT FROM INTOXICATION. THE LN'S WERE LATER IDENTIFIED AS OFF-DUTY INPS.

FINDINGS:

- 1) THAT VBIEDS AND ISBS POSE A CLEAR THREAT WITHIN THE TF 3-187 IN AO. THERE HAVE BEEN 6X VBIEDS IN THE LAST 5 MO, WITH THE LAST ATTACK INITIATED ON 11 APR 06. THE PROPER MEANS TO COMBAT SUSPECTED ISBS AND SVBIEDS IS TO BEGIN EOF AND MAINTAIN STAND-OFF. LNS WITHIN THE AO UNDERSTAND THE PROCEDURES AT CF CPS. IAW THE ROE, "WHEN HOSTILE INTENT IS PRESENT, THE RIGHT EXISTS TO USE PROPORTIONAL FORCE, INCLUDING ARMED FORCE, IN SELF-DEFENSE BY ALL NECESSARY MEANS AVAILABLE TO DETER OR NEUTRALIZE THE POTENTIAL ATTACKER OR, IF NECESSARY, DESTROY THE THREAT." THE ROE ALSO STATES THAT CF MUST USE

GRADUATED FORCE. GRADUATED FORCE PREVENTS THE USE OF DEADLY FORCE WITHOUT ALLOWING THE INDIVIDUAL A REASONABLE MEANS TO RESPOND TO CF. THE GUARD INTERPRETED THE LN DRIVER'S NONCOMPLIANCE WITH HIS INSTRUCTIONS (AND FURTHER MOVEMENT IN SPITE OF REPEATED ORDERS TO STOP) AS A HOSTILE ACT AND A DIRECT THREAT TO HIMSELF AND OTHER CF AROUND HIM. ONLY THEN DID HE USE LETHAL FORCE TO DISABLE THE VEHICLE AND PROTECT HIMSELF AND HIS BATTLE BUDDIES.

2) THAT THE GUARD'S APPLICATION OF PUBLISHED EOF PROCEDURES WAS TO STANDARD AND GAVE THE LN EVERY OPPORTUNITY TO ALTER HIS BEHAVIOR AND SAVE HIS OWN LIFE. ANY REASONABLE PERSON WOULD IMMEDIATELY STOP IF A HEAVILY ARMED SOLDIER WAVED, YELLED AND POINTED A WEAPON AT THEM. THE FACT THAT THE LN'S WERE INTOXICATED IS NOT RELEVANT TO THE GUARD'S APPLICATION OF LETHAL FORCE AS HE HAD NO WAY OF KNOWING THE MENTAL STATE OR CAPACITY OF THE MEN IN THE VEHICLE APPROACHING HIM.

RECOMMENDATION(S) OF INVESTIGATION: NO FURTHER ADMINISTRATIVE OR UCMJ ACTION AGAINST ANY SOLDIER. CONTINUE TO REVIEW AND ENFORCE EOF PROCEDURES PRIOR TO AND DURING EVERY OPERATION.

CJA COMMENT: WHILE THE LN'S INTOXICATION IS NOT RELEVANT TO DETERMINING WHETHER THE TROOPER'S USE OF FORCE WAS PROPER, IT IS RELEVANT IN ESTABLISHING THE RECKLESSNESS OF THE LN'S AND THEIR DISREGARD OF CLEAR AND UNAMBIGUOUS EOF PROCEDURES.

PREPARED BY: [REDACTED]
DATE: 16 MAY 06.

EX 4

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
A COMPANY, 3rd SPECIAL TROOPS BATTALION
TASK FORCE 3-187TH INFANTRY REGIMENT
101ST AIRBORNE DIVISION (AIR ASSAULT)
PB RAZOR, IRAQ
APO AE 09349

AFZB-KC-G

10 MAY 2006

Approved [REDACTED] 16 May 06

MEMORANDUM FOR Commander, 3rd Brigade, 101ST ABN Division, FOB Speicher, Iraq APO AE 09393

SUBJECT: 15-6 Investigation Facts, Findings and Recommendations to A/3 STB Escalation of Force
Incident, 26 April 2006.

1. The following are the facts of the A/3 STB Escalation of Force Incident, 24 April 2006:

At 1430 Hrs on 26 April 2006, [REDACTED] manned a guard position on the southeastern most corner of Patrol Base Razor. At 1430 a Toyota Sprinter with two local national approached the M1 checkpoint. The vehicle disregarded the checkpoint which was clearly marked. The vehicle was signaled by [REDACTED] to stop, the vehicle stopped and was given instruction to move to the M1 checkpoint for clearance by the INPD (See Exhibit A). The driver disregarded the instructions given to him. The local national immediately increased his speed and headed east towards Sammara proper. [REDACTED] again went through the steps of EOF, the driver was within 10 meters and could hear and see [REDACTED] clearly. [REDACTED] raised his weapon as a show of force and the vehicle again accelerated towards Sammara. [REDACTED] then engaged the vehicle with a 5-7 round burst to disable the vehicle (See Exhibit C1-2). The vehicle stopped, one LNs dismounted and ran towards Sammara, the second LN slumped over in the vehicle. A team was then deployed from Patrol Base Razor in order to clear the vehicle. One local national was severely wounded (later died of wound at Patrol Base Razors FAS), the second was secured by 1/3 INP BN members and moved to the Patrol Base Razor ECP. Both LNs were extremely intoxicated, an open bottle of whiskey and two cups full of whiskey were inside the passenger compartment of the Toyota. Additionally, both LNs were carrying loaded AK-47s in the passenger compartment. The surviving LN was not coherent and on the verge of passing out from intoxication. Lastly, the INP controlling the CP tried to stop this vehicle and the occupants disregarded their instructions multiple times before speeding through and being engaged.

2. The following are the findings of the A/3 STB Escalation of Force Incident, 24 April 2006:

Vehicle Borne IED's and Individual Suicide Bombers (ISBs) pose a clear threat within the Area of Operations for all units assigned to 3-187IN, as indicated in Enclosure 5, FRAGO 43 to 3/187 (Exhibit F). There have been instances of AIF willing to kill themselves in order to kill US forces in the 3-187IN AO. The most recent attack was initiated against C/3-187 on 11Apr06. In the last 5 months, there have been 6 VBIED incidents in AO IRON (Exhibit E).

The proper means to combat suspected ISBs and SVBIEDs is to begin escalation of force procedures and maintain stand-off. As directed in FRAGO 43, [REDACTED] (Exhibit 6).

Local Nationals within the 3-187IN AO know not to interfere with Coalition Forces and to follow instructions at traffic control points. According to the Rules of Engagement [REDACTED] *Ex 1*

AFZB-KC-G

10 MAY 2006

SUBJECT: 15-6 Investigation Facts, Findings and Recommendations to A/3 STB Escalation of Force Incident, 24 April 2006.

[REDACTED] The ROE also states that Coalition Forces must use graduated force. Graduated Force prevents the use of deadly force without allowing the individual a reasonable means to respond to Coalition Forces. [REDACTED] Ex 4 interpreted the LN driver's noncompliance with his instructions and further movement in spite of repeated orders to stop as a hostile act and a direct threat to himself and other coalition forces around him. He then used lethal force to disable the vehicle and protect himself and his battle buddies. His application of published escalation of force procedures was to standard and gave the LN every opportunity to alter his behavior and save his own life. Any reasonable person stop whatever they were doing immediately if a heavily armed Soldier waved, yelled, and pointed a weapon at them. The fact that the LN's were intoxicated is not relevant to any analysis of [REDACTED] application of lethal force as he had no way of knowing the mental state or capacity of the men in the vehicle approaching him. Ex 4

3. Recommendations by the Investigating Officer (IO) in reference to the findings of the B/3-187IN Escalation of Force on 25 April 2006:

Based on my findings the proper Escalation of Force procedures were used within the Rules of Engagement for Task Force Band of Brothers. I recommend no further administrative or UCMJ action against PFC Johnston or any other Soldier. I recommend that A/3 STB and all units within Task Force Iron continue to review and enforce Escalation of Force procedures prior to and during every operation.

4. POC is the undersigned at [REDACTED] Ex 4

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
CPT, EN
Commanding



REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 3rd BRIGADE COMBAT TEAM
101st AIRBORNE DIVISION (AIR ASSAULT)
FOB SPEICHER, IRAQ, APO AE 09349



AFZB-KC-CO

27 April 2006

MEMORANDUM FOR [REDACTED] A Co., 3rd Special Troops Battalion, 3rd Brigade
Combat Team, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), FOB Brassfield-Mora, APO AE 09349

SUBJECT: Appointment Order for Investigating Officer UP AR 15-6

1. Effective 28 April 2006, [REDACTED] is hereby appointed as the investigating officer. EX 4

2. AUTHORITY. AR 15-6, Investigations.

3. PURPOSE. To perform an informal investigation IAW AR 15-6, obtaining details pertaining to the Escalation of Force (EoF) by A/3 STB on 261421APR06 vic Patrol Base Razor, Samarra, Iraq. Your investigation should answer the following questions:

a. What were the facts and circumstances surrounding the incident?

b. Was the engagement IAW MNC-I EoF guidelines and procedures? Was the engagement IAW MNC-I and 3 BCT Rules of Engagement (ROE)?

c. What recommendations should be made to prevent similar EoFs in the future?

4. PERIOD. Until the investigation is completed and no further investigation is required, unless released sooner by the appointing authority.

5. SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS. Conduct of this investigation will be your PRIMARY duty until the investigation is submitted to the appointing authority. Your findings will be supported by substantial evidence and by a greater weight of evidence than supports any different conclusion. Your findings and recommendations will be submitted to this headquarters NLT 051700MAY06. Prior to submission, you will obtain a final legal review of your findings and recommendations from the 3 BCT CJA.

6. POC this action is 3 BCT CJA, at [REDACTED] VOIP 673-0164. EX 4

[REDACTED]
COL, IN
Commanding

EX 6

استمرار القسم

SWORN STATEMENT

السبب الاساسى

الاستعلامات والروابط
المحفوظات:التاريخ: ٢٠١٣/١٢/٢٣ توقيت: رقم الأضبطة

الموقع

مستوى الحاله:

رقم الهوية:

الاسم الثلاثي:

العنوان الكامل:

القسم بالله العظيم بصلة اقوالى المدونة أدناه

On 20.12.2013 at 2000 hrs. AMRY (TROOP) 2000 FROM SAMARRA
 FROM 020 TO 021 TROOPMAN M11 CHECKPOINT, 2000 RECOGNIZED THE
 INDIVIDUALS FROM 2000 FIVE MINUTES AND THE VEHICLE CAME ON
 AND THE CHECKPOINT WAS ESTABLISHED IN THE CHECKPOINT TROOP
 AND THEN, AND THEN CONTACTED WITH THE SECURITY FORCES BATTALION
 SUMARRA AND THEN 020 TROOP, THE CHECKPOINT HELD ON.

رقم المسجلة:

توقيع المتعهد:


مقدم صديقه سمه: استلم في يوم

Ex

٢٠١٣/١٢/٢٣

Ex 2

Exhibit D



SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45: the proponent agency is ODCSOPS

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10 USC Section 301, Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 (SSN).
 PRINCIPAL To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately identified.
 ROUTINE USES: Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval.
 DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
P B Razor	20060426	1515	
5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS	
		PFC	
8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS			
A Co 35 TB			

9. [REDACTED] WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH

I [REDACTED] on 26 April 2006 at P.B. Razor at [REDACTED] about the last days. Yesterday escalation of force by the MOI found I.E.D material in the truck. Today at 1400 a vehical coming from the west bypass 21 the check point. Razor 1 sound the horn which initiated escalation. By the vehical kept moving & threw the VS 17 panel in front of the 50 cal. By then the vehical was still moving at this time I felt it might be a SVB IED. I got out and showed hand and arm signals and yelled KIF 3 times. The vehical kept moving and I engaged with my M249 3 to 5 round burst. Came to a slow roll. The passenger got out the drivers door open the vehical kept moving and stop about 150-200 meters, stop in the west bound lane. At the same time the passenger started to move east and I yelled stop and put up his hands. The passenger kept walking got into

Ex
b.Ex
b.

10. EXHIBIT

11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [REDACTED]

PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT" TAKEN AT DATED

Ex
b.

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.

STATEMENT OF [REDACTED]

TAKEN AT LS 15

DATED 26 24 01

EX

4

9 STATEMENT (Continued)

a white hongo truck turn around and speed heading east.

What was the location of the vehicle when you first identified it?

past the first west Jersey barrier part of mike 1
Check point [REDACTED]

What speed was the vehicle moving?

30 - 35 mph [REDACTED]

Where exactly did you place the US 17 panel?

I spread cross the 50 cal barrel which faces directly west and easily visible by anyone traveling along highway 1. [REDACTED]

End of statement

EX

EX

EX

6

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGES

EXL

3. STATEMENT (Continued)

, HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT
I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE
TO ME, AND I HAVE READ AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE
HEREIN, SOLELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT
THE AID OF AN ATTORNEY, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES:

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 26 day of APR. 06
at 15 32

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(_____, _____, _____) Administering Oath)

Commissioned Officer
(Authority To Administer Oaths)

PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES

USAPA V1.00

13136

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45: the proponent agency is DDCSOPS

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10 USC Section 301, Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 13397 dated November 22, 1943 (SSN)
 PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately identified
 ROUTINE USES: Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval.
 DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
PAtruj BASE RAZUR	20060426	1515	
5. LAST NAME FIRST NAME MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS	
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	E-415AC	
8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS		EX 4	
Alpha Company 3rd STB			
9. [REDACTED]			

WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

I [REDACTED] WAS At guard point Razur 1 guard tower At approximately 1400 I saw a 4 door light color vehicle with approximately two passenger coming from the west heading to the east towards the city of SHIARAH. Instead of heading south towards the checkpoint it avoided it and kept on going east. Turned the city of SHIARAH. After I [REDACTED] had seen it ch. that I started escalation of force And sounded the horn. The vehicle was going approximately 25 35 MPH And did not bother slowing down or stopping. It kept going towards Razur 3 location, and razur 3 then took out the VSE panel and also shouted for it to stop. The vehicle still did not stop, so razur 3 fired approximately 3 to 5 rounds And hit the vehicle as it was passing razur 3 location They kept going 25 30 meters more And then stopped in

EX 4

EX 6

10. EXHIBIT

11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES

EX 6

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF

TAKEN AT

DATED

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.

STATEMENT OF [REDACTED]

TAKEN AT [REDACTED]

1515

DATED 26.04.26

9 STATEMENT *(Continued)*

EX
4

The West Bound lane. One passenger got out of the vehicle and started walking toward the city of SAMARRA

What is the location that you first identified the vehicle? The farthest I recognized that marks the Mich 1 checkpoint. SAS

Is it possible that the vehicle came from the south from Al Qulaa? No.

— End of Statement —

EX
4

EX

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [REDACTED]

PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGES

EX
6

STATEMENT OF [REDACTED] TAKEN AT 1515 DATED 2006 04 26 EX 6

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

AFFIDAVIT

[REDACTED] HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 2. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

[REDACTED] (Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES:

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 26 day of APR 06
at 1530

[REDACTED] (Signature of Person Administering Oath)

[REDACTED] (Organization or Address)

[REDACTED] (Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

Commissary Officer
(Authority To Administer Oaths)

[REDACTED] (Organization or Address)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [REDACTED]

PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES EX 6

VBIED Roll-Up, AO IRON 27 DEC 2005 – 25 MAR 2006

At 271340DEC05 an MOI commando patrol was struck by a VBIED on [REDACTED] EX 2. The VBIED was described as a white truck which approached the patrol from the left flank and detonated between the first and second trucks of the patrol. An MOI informant had described this attack in detail, along with AIF who would be filming the attack in a black Opal. Based on the informant's information, commandos positively ID'd 2 AIF in a black Opal filming the attack. The blast of the VBIED had caused the Opal to catch fire, which killed the driver, and MOI engaged the filmer, shooting him in the head. ID was recovered naming the driver of the VBIED as Qaiser Najim Altaki, the filmer as Ahmed Latef Medhi (he also had a fake ID with the name of Abdolah Salih Ferhan). The driver of the Opal was burned too badly for ID to be recovered. The video being filmed was also destroyed in the fire. BDA: 3 x EKIA, 4 x MOI WIA (evacuated to PB Razor, 2 x evacuated from PB Razor to FOB Speicher).

At 051220CJAN06 a B/1/17 FA CLP traveling north on the [REDACTED] reported being struck by a static VBIED. The VBIED was sitting approximately 1 meter off the right side of the road, and detonated on the 6th vehicle of the 27 vehicle CLP. The VBIED was described as a white, normal cab sized Nissan Datsun pickup truck. The VBIED had no occupants. After the VBIED detonated, KBR employees traveling with the CLP observed 1 x individual sprinting away from the site, a possible triggerman. The VBIED damaged 1 x Humvee (2 x flat tires) and no injuries were reported. The CLP had multiple [REDACTED] in use, including an [REDACTED] EOD is being dispatched to conduct a PBA. UPDATE: Vehicle was a white Datsun with approx 80lbs and the frag was consistent with a 155MM round. Explosives were located in the cab and 2 spots in the bed of the truck. NFI [REDACTED] EX 2

At 101421MAR2006, a VBIED Detonated against a Samarra Iraqi Police (IP) combat patrol in the Salah Ad Din province of Iraq, in Samarra vicinity grid [REDACTED] EX 2. The Samarra Joint Coordination Cell (JCC) reported an unknown explosion. Shortly thereafter, the report was updated to a confirmed VBIED Detonation targeting the IPs. The JCC also confirmed IP and Local National (LN) wounded; 8x IP WIA (7x RTD; 1x Air Medevac'd to LSAA for closed head injury); 3x LN WIA (Released); and 1x LN KIA (LN was the Imam for the Authman Eban Afan Mosque). EOD and WIT reported that the VBIED consisted of various types of artillery and mortars; 2x 155mm shipping plugs were discovered; fragments from 160mm and 240mm mortars were identified. The VBIED was a white Toyota truck parked in front of the Sunni mosque named above and was RC triggered. CLOSED: 101742MAR1006.

At 251333MAR2006, a Vehicle Borne IED (VBIED) Detonated against a 1st Special Police Commando Brigade (CDO) patrol in the Salah Ad Din province of Iraq, in Samarra at the intersection of [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] EX 2. The CDO patrol was directly outside the CDO Headquarters. The VBIED detonated effectively against the patrol resulting in 4x CDO WIA. The WIA were ground evacuated to Patrol Base (PB) RAZOR's Level II Medical Treatment Facility. The casualties were categorized as 3x Urgent Litter patients and 1x Priority Ambulatory patient. All 4x CDO WIA were Aero-MEDEVACed to LSAA for further treatment.