

## REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS BY INVESTIGATING OFFICER/BOARD OF OFFICERS

For use of this form, see AR 15-6; the proper unit agency is OTJAG.

IF MORE SPACE IS REQUIRED IN FILLING OUT ANY PORTION OF THIS FORM, ATTACH ADDITIONAL SHEETS

## SECTION I - APPOINTMENT

Appointed by [REDACTED], COL, AR, Commander, 3 BCT, 1st Armored Division  
 (Appointing authority)

on 18 April 05 (Attached enclosure 1: Letter of appointment or summary of oral appointment date.) (See para 5-15, AR 15-6.)  
 (Date)

## SECTION II - SESSIONS

The investigation officially commenced at Camp [REDACTED], Iraq at 1000 hrs (Place) (Time)

on 19 APR 05 (If a formal board has for more than one session, check here  Indicate in an enclosure the time each session began and ended, the place, persons present and absent, and explanation of absences, if any.) The following persons (members, respondent, counsel) were present: (After each name, indicate capacity, e.g., Presiding Recorder, Member, Legal Advisor.)

The following persons (members, respondent, counsel) were absent: (Include brief explanation of each absence.) (See paras 5-2 and 5-8a, AR 15-6.)

The investigating officer (Board) finished gathering/hearing evidence at 1300 on 1 May 05 (Time) (Date)

and completed findings and recommendations at 1700 on 9 May 05 (Time) (Date)

## SECTION III - CHECKLIST FOR PROCEEDINGS

## A. COMPLETE IN ALL CASES

	YES	NO	NA
1 Inclosures (para 5-15, AR 15-6)			
a Are the following enclosed and numbered consecutively with Roman numerals: (Attached in order listed)			
a. The letter of appointment or a summary of oral appointment date?	X		
b. Copy of notice to respondent, if any? (See item 9, below)		X	
c. Other correspondence w/ respondent or counsel, if any?		X	
d. All other written communications to or from the appointing authority?		X	
e. Privacy Act Statements (Certified, if otherwise provided orally)?		X	
f. Explanation by the investigating officer or board of any unusual delays, difficulties, irregularities, or other problems encountered (e.g., absence of material witness)?		X	
g. Information as to sessions of a formal board not included on page 1 of this report?		X	
h. Any other significant papers (other than evidence) relating to administrative aspects of the investigation or board?		X	

FOOTNOTES: 1. Captain all negative answers on an attached sheet.  
 2. Use of the NO column certifies a positive representation that the circumstances described in the question did not occur in the investigation or board.

EXHIBITS (para 3-16, AR 15-6)		YES	NO	N/A <sup>3</sup>
4.	Are all items offered (whether or not received) or considered as evidence individually numbered or lettered as exhibits and attached to this report?	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		
5.	Is an index of all exhibits offered to or considered by investigating officer or board attached before the first exhibit?	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		
6.	Has the testimony/statement of each witness been recorded verbatim or been reduced to written form and attached as an exhibit?	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		
7.	Are copies, descriptions, or depictions (if substituted for real or documentary evidence) properly authenticated and is the location of the original evidence indicated?	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		
8.	Are descriptions or diagrams included of locations visited by the investigating officer or board (para 3-6, AR 15-6)?	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		
9.	Is each written stipulation attached as an exhibit and is each oral stipulation either reduced to writing and made an exhibit or recorded in a verbatim record?	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		
10.	If official notice of any matter was taken over the objection of a respondent or counsel, is a statement of the matter of which official notice was taken attached as an exhibit (para 3-16d, AR 15-6)?	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		
11.	Was a quorum present when the board voted on findings and recommendations (para 4-1 and 5-2b, AR 15-5)?	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		
<b>B. COMPLETE ONLY FOR FORMAL BOARD PROCEEDINGS (Chapter 5, AR 15-6)</b>				
1.	At the initial session, did the recorder read, or determine that all participants had read, the letter of appointment (para 5-3b, AR 15-6)?	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		
2.	Was a quorum present at every session of the board (para 5-2b, AR 15-6)?	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		
3.	Was each absence of any member properly excused (para 5-2c, AR 15-6)?	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		
4.	Were members, witnesses, reporter, and interpreter sworn, if required (para 3-1, AR 15-6)?	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		
5.	If any members who voted on findings or recommendations were not present when the board received some evidence, does the recorder describe how they familiarized themselves with that evidence (para 5-2d, AR 15-6)?	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		
<b>C. COMPLETE ONLY IF RESPONDENT WAS DESIGNATED (Section II, Chapter 5, AR 15-6)</b>				
6.	Notice to respondent (para 5-5, AR 15-6):			
a.	Is the method and date of delivery to the respondent indicated on each letter of notification?	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		
b.	Was the date of delivery at least five working days prior to the first session of the board?	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		
c.	Does each letter of notification indicate -			
(1).	the date, hour, and place of the first session of the board concerning that respondent?	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		
(2).	the matter to be investigated, including specific allegations against the respondent, if any?	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		
(3).	the respondent's rights with regard to counsel?	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		
(4).	the name and address of each witness expected to be called by the recorder?	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		
(5).	the respondent's rights to be present, present evidence, and call witnesses?	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		
d.	Was the respondent provided a copy of all unclassified documents in the case file?	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		
e.	If there were relevant classified materials, were the respondent and his counsel given access and an opportunity to examine them?	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		
7.	If any respondent was designated after the proceedings began (or otherwise was absent during part of the proceedings):			
a.	Was he properly notified (para 5-5, AR 15-6)?	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		
b.	Was record of proceedings and evidence received in his absence made available for examination by him and his counsel (para 5-4b, AR 15-6)?	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		
8.	Counsel (para 5-6, AR 15-6):			
a.	Was each respondent represented by counsel?	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		
Name and business address of counsel:				
(If counsel is a lawyer, check here <input type="checkbox"/> )				
b.	Was respondent's counsel present at all open sessions of the board relating to that respondent?	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		
c.	If military counsel was requested but not made available, is a copy (or, if oral, a summary) of the request and the action taken on it included in the report (para 5-6b, AR 15-6)?	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		
9.	If the respondent challenges the legal advisor or any voting member for lack of impartiality (para 5-7, AR 15-6):			
a.	Was the challenge properly denied and by the appropriate officer?	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		
b.	Did each member successfully challenged cease to participate in the proceedings?	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		
10.	Was the respondent given an opportunity to (para 5-8a, AR 15-6):			
a.	Be present with his counsel at all open sessions of the board which deal with any matter which concerns that respondent?	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		
b.	Examine and object to the introduction of real and documentary evidence, including written statements?	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		
c.	Object to the testimony of witnesses and cross-examine witnesses other than his own?	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		
d.	Call witnesses and otherwise introduce evidence?	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		
e.	Testify as a witness?	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		
f.	Make or have his counsel make a final statement or argument (para 5-9, AR 15-6)?	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		
11.	If requested, did the recorder assist the respondent in obtaining evidence in possession of the Government and in arranging for the presence of witnesses (para 5-8b, AR 15-6)?	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		
12.	Are all of the respondent's requests and objectives which were duly indicated in the report of proceedings or in an enclosure or exhibit to it (para 5-11, AR 15-6)?	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		
FOOTNOTES:				
1/ Explain all negative answers on an attached sheet.				
2/ Use of the N/A column constitutes a positive representation that the circumstance described in the question did not occur in this investigation or board.				

## SECTION IV - FINDINGS (part 3-10, AF 15-6)

The investigating officer (board), having carefully considered the evidence, finds

1. Conclusions. Members of 3rd Platoon, C Company, 1/11 ACR acted within the Rules of Engagement and used proper escalation of force in the shooting of a local national while on a mounted patrol on 17 April 2005. The proximate cause of the shooting was the local national failing to react to warning signals from the platoon.

*Sgt  
Kee  
All*

2. Sequence of Events. The sequence of events that led to the incident follows. MC/1/11 was conducting a routine, mounted, platoon-sized patrol along Route [REDACTED], moving north to south. The patrol consisted of 4 vehicles: C31 (platoon leader), C32, C33 and C34 (platoon sergeant). At approximately 172340 APR 05 a single LN vehicle moved in between elements of their patrol rather than yield right of way to the military traffic. At the command of the platoon sergeant, the platoon executed a maneuver to box in this vehicle and bring it to a halt to enable them to search it. The vehicle was stopped, the platoon established 360 degree security and began searching the vehicle. Rear security halted all oncoming traffic, stopping 5-10 cars. Three to five minutes after the patrol stopped, a White Passat, driven by [REDACTED], approached the patrol from its rear, passing the stopped traffic at a high rate of speed (up to 40 mph). The rear security element, consisting of 3 dismounts, flashed Surefire lights to try to warn the oncoming vehicle. When it failed to stop, CPL [REDACTED] fired a single warning shot. When it still failed to stop, all three dismounts (CPL [REDACTED], SPC [REDACTED] and CPL [REDACTED]) fired a single shot at the vehicle, hitting the driver twice and the vehicle three times. (Exhibits G, J, L) The vehicle careened into a nearby fence. The patrol then administered first aid to the driver, and searched the vehicle and passengers. After rendering first aid, the patrol began evacuating the driver, but stopped at an IP checkpoint where they turned over the driver to the IPs who evacuated him to a local hospital. The driver was stabilized, but subsequently died in the hospital due to complications from the shooting. (Exhibit O)

3. The platoon used proper escalation of force. The amount of time they were stopped (2-5 minutes according to all accounts) precluded setting out traffic control measures such as cones, concertina or tire spikes. The unit did flash an assortment of lights, to include surefires, at the oncoming traffic. All traffic stopped with the exception of the vehicle in question. They did fire a single warning shot at about 50 m prior to engaging the vehicle. None of these measures had any effect on oncoming vehicle. The passengers in the vehicle acknowledged that they saw the warning signals.

4. The patrol had positive ID of the subject vehicle. They used proper escalation of force and the vehicle continued to approach at a high rate of speed. The vehicle's failure to follow the example of the stopped vehicles and its high rate of speed towards the stopped patrol demonstrated hostile intent and made it a legitimate military target.

5. Unit SOP. Members of the platoon called this operation either a "Snap TCF" or a "Stop and Search". Nobody could provide a written SOP for these tasks, but most had similar descriptions of how they are executed (Exhibits E thru N). The unpublished, but commonly understood battle drill for a "stop and search" is that the platoon boxes in and forces a vehicle to stop. Once stopped, the platoon establishes 360 degree security (METT-TC dependent). Once the patrol is stopped for five minutes they begin to increase their force protection posture with a combination of concertina, spike strips and traffic cones in order to better establish a standoff with oncoming vehicles. The task force SOP for conducting a TCF (Exhibit Q) does not include "snap TCF" or "stop and search".

6. The TCF failed to stop the vehicle for two reasons. First, the vehicle did not want to stop; the vehicle continued to travel towards the stopped patrol despite the fact that, according to the passengers, the driver saw the patrol. Secondly, the patrol had not yet had the opportunity to increase their security posture with protective devices for additional standoff.

7. There were no Law of War violations. The patrol was legitimately acting out of self defense. (See Continuation Page)

## SECTION V - RECOMMENDATIONS (part 3-11, AF 15-6)

In view of the above findings the investigating officer (board) recommends:

1. No individuals be punished under the UCMJ for this shooting. While a tragic loss for the family, soldiers acted within the ROE.
2. The unit codify and rehearse its "snap TCF" and "stop and search" SOPs. The platoon performed the basic steps necessary to prevent this shooting. It occurred because the local national failed to heed to the warning measures. However, several additional measures may have been able to prevent the shooting. The unit could consider in its SOP to put protective barrier materials out immediately upon stopping, but I believe that decision rests on METT-TC considerations. The platoon could also consider as part of its SOP at night to turn the rear security vehicle around to orient headlights at oncoming traffic. Taking these steps may help prevent additional shootings of local nationals.
3. Recommended the commander reconsider the practice of sending out patrols with neither their habitual platoon leader nor platoon sergeant. There is nothing to indicate that this had any direct contribution to the shooting of the local national. However, lack of familiarity with platoon level systems and the platoon's unfamiliarity with the leaders could have contributed to a level of uncertainty as to what was happening at the scene. In the event this scenario does occur, a careful review and rehearsal of SOPs and battle drills would be appropriate prior to the patrol SP.
4. I do not believe that there are any other significant operational lessons to be captured and disseminated from this incident.

Continuation sheet to Form 1574, Section IV (Findings)

8. Other relevant notes

While not the proximate cause of the shooting, the platoon did not have its normal, assigned leadership with them during the shooting. This night, 3rd platoon was under the leadership of the company HQ platoon leader and operations sergeant, rather than its assigned platoon leader and platoon sergeant who were meeting with their TF commander and BDE commander on a separate incident. Although both had been on patrols before, this was the first time they led this platoon. (Exhibits E, F)

The platoon did limited rehearsals prior to mission execution. All members stated that they did rollover and fire drills. No TCP rehearsals were conducted since the unit did not expect to execute a TCP. The platoon leader stated that he did do a talk through of several scenarios. (Exhibits E-M)

**SECTION VI - AUTHENTICATIONS** (para 3-17, AR 15-4)

THIS REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS IS COMPLETE AND ACCURATE. (If any voting member or the recorder fails to sign here or in Section VII below, indicate the reason in the space where his signature should appear.)

(Recorder)

[REDACTED], MAJ, EN

(Investigating Officer (President))

(Member)

(Member)

(Member)

(Member)

**SECTION VII - MINORITY REPORT** (para 3-18, AR 15-4)

To the extent indicated in Inclosure [REDACTED], the undersigned does not concur in the findings and recommendations of the board. (In the inclosure, identify by number each finding and/or recommendation in which the dissenting member(s) does not concur. State the reasons for disagreement. Additional/substitute findings and/or recommendations may be included in the inclosure.)

(Member)

(Member)

**SECTION VIII - ACTION BY APPOINTING AUTHORITY** (para 2-3, AR 15-6)

The findings and recommendations of the [REDACTED] (Investigating officer) (board) are [REDACTED] (unapproved) (approved with following exceptions/ substitutions). (If the appointing authority returns the proceedings to the investigating officer or board for further proceedings or corrective action, attach that correspondence (or a summary, if oral) as a numbered enclosure.)

Exhibits

- A - Appointment Orders
- B - Chronology of investigation
- C - Incident illustration (3 pages)
- D - Incident photos (18 Pages)
- E - Sworn Statement and questions (LT [REDACTED])
- F - Sworn Statement and questions (SPC [REDACTED])
- G - Sworn Statement and questions (CPL [REDACTED])
- H - Sworn Statement and questions (SSG [REDACTED])
- I - Sworn Statement and questions (SGT [REDACTED])
- J - Sworn Statement and questions (SPC [REDACTED])
- K - Sworn Statement and questions (SSG [REDACTED])
- L - Sworn Statement and questions (CPL [REDACTED])
- M - Sworn Statement and questions (SGT [REDACTED])
- N - Sworn statement and questions (CPT [REDACTED])
- O - Sworn statement from interpreter
- P - Statement from doctor
- Q - TP I/I TACSOP extract for TCP (2 Pages)
- R - Commanders Inquiry Summary



REPLY TO:  
ATTENTION OF:

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
HEADQUARTERS, 3RD BRIGADE, 1ST ARMOR DIVISION  
CAMP █, IRAQ  
APO AE 09378

AFZJ-BB-CO

18 April 2005

MEMORANDUM FOR MAJ █, 70th EN BN, 3rd BCT, 1st AD, █, Iraq  
09378

SUBJECT: Appointment as Investigating Officer

1. Pursuant to AR 15-6, paragraph 2-1, you are hereby appointed as an investigating officer to investigate the shooting of a local national that occurred while an element of 1/11 ACR was conducting a hasty tactical checkpoint (TCP) during a mounted patrol on 18 April 2005.
2. In your investigation, use procedures under AR 15-6, Chapter 4, for an informal board of officers. All witness statements will be sworn, and you will follow the procedures in AR 15-6, paragraph 3-7e for Privacy Act statements. If the person you are interviewing states that he/she does not know anything about the allegations, prepare a sworn statement to that effect for the witness to sign. If, in the course of your investigation, you suspect a soldier has committed an offense under the UCMJ, you must advise and read him/her their rights under the UCMJ, Article 31, or the Fifth Amendment, as appropriate, prior to conducting any interview.
3. During your investigation, answer the following questions:
  - a. What was the sequence of events that led up to the incident?
  - b. Did the soldiers involved properly escalate the use of force?
  - c. Did the patrol have Positive Identification (were they reasonable certain that the object of attack was a legitimate military target) before engaging the local national?
  - d. What is the unit's Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) for conducting a tactical TCP?
  - e. Why did the TCP fail to halt all the traffic?
  - f. Were there any Law of War violations?
  - g. What can the unit do to decrease the number of shooting involving local nationals?
  - h. Are there any operational lessons that should be captured and disseminated?

AFZJ-BB-CO

SUBJECT: Appointment as Investigating Officer

- i. Were there any other contributing factors that, if changed, could have altered the outcome?
4. You may obtain assistance from CPT [REDACTED], the Command Judge Advocate for 3rd BCT, 1st AD. CPT [REDACTED] will serve as your legal counsel. Prior to starting your investigation, you should contact him at the Brigade Tactical Operation Center (TOC) for legal guidance concerning your investigation.
5. Submit your findings and recommendations on DA Form 1574 to CPT [REDACTED] for legal review no later than 25 April 2005.

[REDACTED]  
COL, AR  
Commanding

# CIR REPORT

## COMMANDER'S INCIDENT REPORT:

LINE 1: Unit reporting: TF 1/1 ACR

LINE 2: Incident: 3<sup>rd</sup> PLT, Charlie Troop (Sisel) engages LN vehicle during patrol

LINE 3: Datetime group (DTG) incident occurred: 172203APR05

LINE 4: Location of Incident: [REDACTED]

LINE 5: Personnel involved

Name	Rank	Unit	SSN	Sex	Age	Race
[REDACTED]	2LT	3C/11 ACR	[REDACTED]	M	24	White
[REDACTED]	CPL	3C/11 ACR	[REDACTED]	M	21	White
[REDACTED]	SPC	3C/11 ACR	[REDACTED]	M	35	Asian
[REDACTED]	CPL	3C/11 ACR	[REDACTED]	M	23	Asian

LINE 6: Summary of incident:

At approximately 162200APR05 the third platoon from Charlie Troop, 1<sup>st</sup> Squadron, 11<sup>th</sup> ACR was conducting a mounted patrol vicinity [REDACTED]. The patrol leader was 2LT [REDACTED]. The patrol consisted of 4 M1114's and 16 personnel. All vehicles had their white lights turned on. Immediately after making the turn from RTE [REDACTED] onto RTE [REDACTED] the patrol was passed by a civilian vehicle that sped through the convoy. They immediately pulled this vehicle over and were attempting to question the occupants, a man and a woman about why they had passed the patrol.

Approximately 2 or 3 minutes after stopping, the patrol was approached from the rear by a civilian vehicle. The vehicle was a White VW Passat, moving at 40 MPH. This triggered an escalation of force. There were approximately 5 or 6 personnel from the platoon dismounted at the time. The dismounted personnel from the Platoon attempted to warn the approaching vehicle to stop vehicle by lighting it up with a Q-beam light and weapon mounted surefire flashlight. They also used hand and arm signals. CPL [REDACTED] fired one warning shot and then due to the proximity of the vehicle, SPC [REDACTED] and CPL [REDACTED] followed it up almost immediately with four shots aimed at the front of the vehicle with the intent to disable the vehicle or driver. The vehicle was hit in the Grill, Hood, and Driver's Door. The three soldiers who fired the four shots were CPL [REDACTED] (2), SPC [REDACTED] (1), and CPL [REDACTED] (1).

When the vehicle stopped, the platoon searched the vehicle. They found it to contain 3 LN occupants, all males between the ages of 19-25. They had no contraband and did not appear intoxicated. The driver of the vehicle was wounded with 2 gunshot wounds. The first bullet entered on the left side just below the rib cage and exited his back. The second bullet hit in the same area just below the first wound with no obvious exit wound. The LN also had a small shrapnel wound on the right forearm. The platoon medic treated the wounds and stabilized the patient. They loaded the wounded LN into one of the platoon's vehicles for MEDEVAC to the CSRI, however a few hundred yards down the road they came upon an IP checkpoint. The IPs informed the patrol leader that they could get the wounded man to a hospital more quickly and they took possession of the LN at 2223 hours and evacuated him to a hospital adjacent to the Adhamiya IP station. At that time the medic characterized the patient as stable. The platoon has contacted the Lieutenant [REDACTED] of the IP unit who evacuated the LN, they are brought back the police report at 0440 and will contact the IP unit again in the morning to get the exact name of the hospital so that we can follow up on the wounded LN's condition.

[REDACTED] received the initial report from [REDACTED] at 172203APR05 and informed [REDACTED] (See attached sworn statement). Informed [REDACTED] of the incident at 172220APR05. [REDACTED] called [REDACTED] to report incident as directed by [REDACTED]. And followed up with complete report when platoon returned to Camp [REDACTED].

LINE 7: Damage to government and/or civilian property: No damage to US equipment. 1 LN civilian automobile with undetermined damage was driven away from the scene by the other two occupants..

CIR REPORT

LINE 8: Commander reporting LTC [REDACTED]

C-12

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**Exhibit B (Chronology of Investigation)**

**Chronology**

191000 APR – Received mission to do 15-6 on legal rational shooting in 1/11 AO

191330 APR – Talked to Ironhouse 3 to establish baseline information on the incident and who was involved

191500 APR – CPT [REDACTED] (1/11) and Ironhouse 3 brought me CPT [REDACTED] initial commander's inquiry report.

192000 APR – Reviewed commander's inquiry and developed QGA for investigation.

202000 APR – Discussed incident with CPT [REDACTED]; CPT [REDACTED] reported that the LN had died; also gave me the doctor's statement; arranged to meet platoon members at 231400 APR for questions; asked if he had a published SOP for "Snap TICP", they do not

211800 APR – Talked to most of the platoon members, reviewed statements and asked questions

221600 APR – Interviewed the calling platoon leader and platoon sergeant

30 APR – Interviewed company commander (CPT [REDACTED])

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**Exhibit B (Chronology of Investigation)**

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- 3) White Patrol  
approaches patrol  
from the rear at  
approx. 40 MPH

4) Vehicle fails to  
head signals by C.  
beam. Sunfires and  
arm signals.

- 2) White Patrol  
passes other halted  
vehicles at 40 MPH

1) Patrol stops vehicle for approaching  
from the rear at high rate of speed,  
ignoring hand and arm signals and  
attempting the pass the convoy. Patrol  
was stopped no more than more 2-3  
min. with 5 personnel dismounted  
around the vehicle when approached  
(subject vehicle).

- 3) White Patrol  
approaches patrol  
from the rear at  
approx. 40 MPH

4) Vehicle fails to  
head signals by C.  
beam. Sunfires and  
arm signals.

- 2) White Patrol  
passes other halted  
vehicles at 40 MPH

1) Patrol stops vehicle for approaching  
from the rear at high rate of speed,  
ignoring hand and arm signals and  
attempting the pass the convoy. Patrol  
was stopped no more than more 2-3  
min. with 5 personnel dismounted  
around the vehicle when approached  
(subject vehicle).


- 6) CPL [REDACTED] and CPL [REDACTED] fired one  
M4 shot at vehicle. One shot  
struck GR1 one strikes hand  
and one strikes GR2. GR1 was hit  
survives right into fence!

- 7) Vehicle approaches for the  
right and drives to a stop  
with front end resting in a  
gate in the fence along the  
right side of the road.

- 9) Patrol loads casualty onto  
GR1 and begins evacuation  
to the North attempting to get  
an RT (A-H)

- 8) Patrol approaches white patient,  
treats casually, searches for  
contraband (NSTR), and questions  
occupants. Passengers indicate they  
saw the patrol and told the driver to  
stop. Medic indicates casualty has two  
GARs to left lower chest & shrapnel to  
right forearm. Medic indicates he  
believes ground zero was beat CGA.

Note: Patrol was in a command  
"shadow" and direct  
communications was nearly  
impossible. Most of the  
communication between Patrol and  
Benzel TOC was accomplished by  
relay through Death-striker 36 (A-H).  
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