



REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF:

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 256th BRIGADE COMBAT TEAM
CAMP [REDACTED] IRAQ
APO AE [REDACTED]

ATZQ-256BCT-8JA

03 September 2005

MEMORANDUM FOR Commander, HHC, 256th Brigade Combat Team, APO AE [REDACTED]

SUBJECT: 15-6 Investigation Findings, Escalation of Force, Local National KIA
Location: 1-156 Armor Battalion/Grid Location [REDACTED]
256 BCT Investigation No.: 05-316

1. Attached is the 15-6 investigation concerning the above referenced incident which was reported on or about 28 August 2005. It has been reviewed by the Office of the Staff Judge Advocate and General [REDACTED] *Basilica*

2. The findings and recommendations are approved. BG *John Basilica Jr* [REDACTED], 256 BCT Commander, agrees with the Investigating Officer that soldiers acted within the Rules of Engagement. Expedite condolence payments. No RBI is needed.

3. POC for this memorandum is the undersigned at [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

MAJ, JA
Deputy Staff Judge Advocate

REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS BY INVESTIGATING OFFICER/BOARD OF OFFICERS

For use of this form, see AR 15-6; the proponent agency is OTJAG.

IF MORE SPACE IS REQUIRED IN FILLING OUT ANY PORTION OF THIS FORM, ATTACH ADDITIONAL SHEETS

SECTION I - APPOINTMENT

Appointed by BG [REDACTED] John Basilica Jr.
(Appointing authority)

on 28 AUG 05 (Date) (Attach inclosure 1: Letter of appointment or summary of oral appointment data.) (See para 3-15, AR 15-6.)

SECTION II - SESSIONS

The (investigation) (board) commenced at CP [REDACTED], Iraq at 1200
(Place) (Time)

on 28 Aug 05 (If a formal board met for more than one session, check here ☐. Indicate in an inclosure the time each session began and ended, the place, persons present and absent, and explanation of absences, if any.) The following persons (members, respondents, counsel) were present: (After each name, indicate capacity, e.g., President, Recorder, Member, Legal Advisor.)
MAJ [REDACTED] 15-610

The following persons (members, respondents, counsel) were absent: (Include brief explanation of each absence.) (See paras 1-2 and 3-8a, AR 15-6.)

The (investigating officer) (board) finished gathering/hearing evidence at 1500 on 31 AUG 05
(Time) (Date)
and completed findings and recommendations at 2000 on 31 AUG 06
(Time) (Date)

SECTION III - CHECKLIST FOR PROCEEDINGS

A. COMPLETE IN ALL CASES

	YES	NO	NA
1. Inclosures (para 3-15, AR 15-6)			
Are the following inclosed and numbered consecutively with Roman numerals: (Attached in order listed)			
a. The letter of appointment or a summary of oral appointment data?	X		
b. Copy of notice to respondents, if any? (See item 2, below)			X
c. Other correspondence with respondent or counsel, if any?			X
d. All other written communications to or from the appointing authority?			X
e. Privacy Act Statements (Certificate, if statement provided orally)?			X
f. Explanation by the investigating officer or board of any unusual delays, difficulties, irregularities, or other problems encountered (e.g., absence of material witnesses)?			X
g. Information as to sessions of a formal board not included on page 1 of this report			X
h. Any other significant papers (other than evidence) relating to administrative aspects of the investigation or board?			X

FOOTNOTES:

1. Explain off negative answers on an attached sheet.

2. Use of the first column constitutes a positive representation that the circumstances described in the questions did not occur in the investigation or board.

11:55 AM: US SOLDIERS ON TOP OF THE [REDACTED] OBSERVED A WHITE 4 DOOR DAEWOO PRINCE STOPPED ALMOST DIRECTLY WEST OF THEIR LOCATION ON [REDACTED]. AN INDIVIDUAL IN THE FRONT PASSENGER SEAT WAS HOLDING WHAT APPEARED TO BE A ROCKET PROPELLED GRENADE LAUNCHER OUT THE FRONT WINDOW. IT APPEARED THAT HE WAS AIMING IT AT THE 2 US TANKS AND POLICE VEHICLES THAT WERE SECURING THE ORIGINAL AMBUSH SITE. THE LEADER OF US TROOPS ON TOP OF THE [REDACTED] BELIEVED THAT OCCUPANTS OF THE WHITE DAEWOO DEMONSTRATED HOSTILE INTENT BASED ON WHAT HE BELIEVED TO BE SOMEONE AIMING A ROCKET GRENADE AT US TROOPS. THE LEADER ORDERED ONE OF HIS SOLDIERS TO OBTAIN A PAIR OF BINOCULARS TO CONFIRM IT WAS INDEED AN RPG. THE INDIVIDUAL HANGING OUT OF THE CAR, HOWEVER, HAD GONE BACK INSIDE THE CAR BY THE TIME THE BINOCULARS WERE FETCHED. THE CAR THEN BEGAN TO BACK UP. THE LEADER DETERMINED THAT HE NEEDED TO STOP THIS CAR BEFORE IT COULD ATTACK THE UNITS RESPONDING TO THE INITIAL AMBUSH. THE LEADER ORDERED HIS TROOPS TO ATTEMPT TO STOP THE DAEWOO USING WARNING SHOTS IN ACCORDANCE WITH ESCALATION OF FORCE PROVISIONS OF THE RULES OF ENGAGEMENT. WHEN THE DAEWOO DID NOT HEED THE WARNING SHOTS AND BEGAN TO SPEED UP IN REVERSE, HE ORDERED HIS TROOPS TO DISABLE THE DAEWOO USING AIMED RIFLE FIRE AND MACHINEGUN FIRE, AGAIN IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE RULES OF ENGAGEMENT. THE LEADER ORDERED HIS MEN TO DISABLE THE MOVING VEHICLE BY SHOOTING AT ITS TIRES AND ENGINE BLOCK. WHEN THE DAEWOO CAME TO A HALT, A US TANK OBSERVED FROM ITS POSITION THAT THE DRIVER OF THE VEHICLE WAS EITHER KILLED OR SERIOUSLY WOUNDED.

12:05 PM: BOTH TANKS AND BRADLEYS THEN MOVED TO CORDON AND SEARCH THE WHITE DAEWOO PRINCE ON [REDACTED]. THE SOLDIERS IN THE BACK OF THE BRADLEY SEARCHED THE CAR AND FOUND WALID KALHED, A REUTERS NEWS SERVICE EMPLOYEE AND [REDACTED] A REUTERS CAMERAMAN, WITH MINOR SUPERFICIAL WOUNDS. THE HIGHER HEADQUARTERS FOR US FORCES DIRECTED THE UNITS ON THE GROUND TO MAINTAIN A PERIMETER AROUND THE CAR UNTIL AN INVESTIGATING OFFICER COULD ARRIVE. THE PASSENGER OF THE WHITE 4 DOOR DAEWOO PRINCE WAS GIVEN WATER AND TREATED FOR MINOR ABRASIONS FROM BROKEN GLASS BY A US MEDIC. SOLDIERS SEARCHED THE CAR AND FOUND A NEWS CAMERA AND 2 CELL PHONES. THE SOLDIERS DETERMINED THROUGH TACTICAL QUESTIONING THAT THE 2 INDIVIDUALS IN THE CAR WERE FROM REUTERS NEWS AGENCY. *Kalhed Mohamad*

US SOLDIERS GAVE WATER TO [REDACTED] AFTER HE GOT OUT OF HIS CAR. US MEDICS ALSO TREATED HIM ON THE SCENE FOR A MINOR ABRASION TO THE BACK. [REDACTED] CLAIMS HE DID NOT SEE ANY FORCES ON ANY BUILDING ABOVE HIM. SPECIFICALLY [REDACTED] DENYS SEEING ANY US [REDACTED]. US FORCES ONLY DETAINED [REDACTED] AFTER THEY DETERMINED THERE WERE INCONSISTENCIES WITH HIS STORY REGARDING WHEN HE WAS SENT TO THE SCENE. [REDACTED] MAINTAINED THAT HIS DISPATCHER HAD SENT HIM AT 9:30 AM TO THIS SCENE WHICH MEANS HE WOULD HAVE FOUND OUT ABOUT ATTACK BEFORE IT HAPPENED. US PERSONNEL WOULD NOT ALLOW OTHER REPORTERS WHO ARRIVED AT THE SCENE BEYOND THEIR OUTER PERIMETER TO ENSURE INTEGRITY OF THE INCIDENT SCENE. THESE INDIVIDUALS WERE NEVER DETAINED AND WERE FREE TO WALK AWAY AT ANY TIME. THE INVESTIGATING OFFICER ASKED THAT [REDACTED] SIT ON THE GROUND SO THAT THE INVESTIGATING OFFICER COULD TAKE A PICTURE OF [REDACTED] NEXT TO HIS CAMERA EQUIPMENT. [REDACTED]. US SOLDIERS THEN PLACED HIM IN THE BACK OF A BRADLEY FIGHTING VEHICLE TO GET HIM OUT OF THE SUN. THEY GAVE HIM MORE WATER AND TALKED TO HIM TO CALM HIM DOWN BECAUSE HE WAS NOTICEABLY UPSET. *see exhibit for details*

ON AUGUST 31, 2005, THE INVESTIGATING OFFICER INTERVIEWED THE REUTERS DISPATCHER WHO SENT THE NEWS TEAM TO THE SCENE OF THE ATTACK. [REDACTED]. HE MAINTAINED THAT HE DISPATCHED [REDACTED] AT APPROXIMATELY 1100 HRS. THE DISPATCHER'S ACCOUNT OF THE TIME-LINE AND [REDACTED] ACCOUNT OF THE TIME-LINE CANNOT BE RECONCILED AS BOTH MAINTAIN THEIR STORIES. HOWEVER, TRAINED DEBRIEFERS WHO TALKED TO BOTH MEN BELIEVE THAT [REDACTED] SENSE OF TIME IS OFF AND THAT THE DISPATCHER'S STORY IS MORE ACCURATE. EITHER WAY THE TIMING OF THE DISPATCH IS NOT RELEVANT TO THE UNDERLYING CONCLUSION WHICH IS THAT THE SOLDIERS ON THE MALL FOLLOWED THE RULES OF ENGAGEMENT GIVEN THE ABOVE SITUATION.

3:00 P.M. 31 AUGUST 2005 [REDACTED] WAS RELEASED FROM US CUSTODY TO THE BUREAU CHIEF OF REUTERS NEWS SERVICE.

SECTION IV - FINDINGS (para 3-10, AR 15-6)

The (investigating officer) (boud), having carefully considered the evidence, finds:

THE TASK FORCE 1-156 SOLDIERS ON TOP OF THE [REDACTED] IN [REDACTED], WHO SHOT A WHITE DAEWOO PRINCE ON [REDACTED] ON OR ABOUT 11:55 AM, AUGUST 28, 2005, AND KILLED WALID [REDACTED], A REUTERS NEWS SERVICE EMPLOYEE, ACTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE RULES OF Khaled Mohamed

11:22 AM: AUG 28. US SOLDIERS ON TOP OF [REDACTED] WITNESSED 3 IRAQI POLICE ("IP") VEHICLES BEING AMBUSHED BY INSURGENTS USING RIFLES AND MACHINEGUNS NORTH OF [REDACTED] ON [REDACTED]. IP'S RETURNED FIRE AND SECURED SITE. LEADER OF THE US UNIT ON TOP OF [REDACTED] CALLED FOR ASSISTANCE FROM 2 US TANKS IN AREA. DIRECTLY SOUTH OF THE [REDACTED]. TF 1-156 STOOD UP A BRADLEY INFANTRY FIGHTING VEHICLE SECTION AT CAMP [REDACTED] AND DEPLOYED IT IN SUPPORT OF THE IRAQI POLICE UNIT THAT WAS AMBUSHED.

11:24 AM: AFTER THE LEADER OF US FORCES ON TOP OF [REDACTED] DETERMINED THAT THE DIRECTION OF ENEMY SHOOTING CAME FROM EAST OF THE AMBUSH SITE, HE DIRECTED HIS 4 MAN TEAM TO FIRE ON A TREELINE EAST OF THE AMBUSH SITE. HE ALSO CALLED FOR THE TANKS SOUTH OF THE [REDACTED] TO MANEUVER IN SUPPORT OF THE AMBUSHED IRAQI POLICE.

11:26 AM: 2 US TANKS RESPONDED TO THE ENEMY AMBUSH SITE FROM SOUTH SIDE OF THE [REDACTED] AND TRAVELLED NORTH ON [REDACTED]. THE TANK UNIT LEADER REPORTED 5 IP WOUNDED AND 2 IP KILLED.

11:30 AM: 2 US BRADLEY INFANTRY FIGHTING VEHICLES DEPARTED FROM CAMP [REDACTED] IN RESPONSE TO THE AMBUSH.

11:40 AM: US SOLDIERS ON TOP OF [REDACTED] OBSERVED A SECOND ENEMY ATTACK ON BOTH OF THE US TANKS AND IRAQI POLICE RESPONDING TO THE INITIAL AMBUSH. THE ENEMY ATTACKED THE FORCES RESPONDING TO THE AMBUSH WITH RIFLES, MACHINEGUNS, AND MORTARS. THE 2 US TANKS CLOSED THEIR HATCHES AND MOVED OUT OF THE ATTACK AREA. ONE TANK MOVED NORTH OF THE AMBUSH SITE AND ONE TANK MOVED SOUTH.

11:40 A.M. 2 US BRADLEYS ARRIVED ON SCENE DURING THIS ATTACK AND MOVED WEST OF THE ATTACK AREA INTO [REDACTED]. LOCAL NATIONALS IN THE AREA MOTIONED TO THE BRADLEYS SIGNALING THE DIRECTION OF FLEEING ENEMY (WEST). THE 2 US BRADLEYS OBSERVED A WHITE SEDAN MOVING QUICKLY IN REVERSE ON A SIDE STREET TO THE WEST AND THEY PURSUED IT. THEY FOUND AN ABANDONED WHITE 4 DOOR SEDAN WITH ALL ITS DOORS OPEN.

11:53 AM: 2 US BRADLEYS ATTEMPTED TO PURSUE INDIVIDUALS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE COORDINATED ATTACK ON THE IP ELEMENT [REDACTED]. BRADLEYS STOP 2 LOCAL NATIONAL CARS SUSPECTED OF ATTACKING IP CONVOY AND BEGINTO SEARCH THE CARS.

11:53 AM: 2 US TANKS MOVED TO THE SITE OF THE ABANDONED WHITE SEDAN IN [REDACTED] AND DISCOVER A DUFFLE BAG WITH IED MAKING MATERIALS. THE TANKS THEN MOVED TO ASSIST BRADLEYS WITH THE SEARCH

SECTION V - RECOMMENDATIONS (para 3-11, AR 15-6)

In view of the above findings the (investigating officer) (boud) recommends:

A. That the command take no action against the US soldiers that engaged the white Daewoo Prince as I have found them to have utilized proportional force only after ROE had been met.

B. That the command pay a condolence payment to the family of the killed Reuters reporter.

C. That the command pay a condolence payment to the Reuters reporter who was detained.

SECTION VI - AUTHENTICATION (para 3-17, AR 15-6)

THIS REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS IS COMPLETE AND ACCURATE. (If any voting member or the recorder fails to sign here or in Section VII below, indicate the reason in the space where his signature should appear.)


MAJ

(Recorder)

(Investigating Officer) (President)

(Member)

(Member)

(Member)

(Member)

SECTION VII - MINORITY REPORT (para 3-13, AR 15-6)

To the extent indicated in Inclosure _____, the undersigned do(es) not concur in the findings and recommendations of the board. (In the inclosure, identify by number each finding and/or recommendation in which the dissenting member(s) do(es) not concur. State the reasons for disagreement. Additional/substitute findings and/or recommendations may be included in the inclosure.)

(Member)


(Member)

SECTION VIII - ACTION BY APPOINTING AUTHORITY (para 3-3, AR 15-6)

The findings and recommendations of the (Investigating officer) (board) are (approved) (disapproved) (approved with following exceptions/ substitutions). (If the appointing authority returns the proceedings to the investigating officer or board for further proceedings or corrective action, attach that correspondence (or a summary, if oral) as a numbered inclosure.)

I agree with the Investigating Officer that soldiers acted within the Rules of Engagement. Expedite condolence payments.

John Basilica, Jr.


BG, USA
Commanding

Classified Documents Removed



REGALY 112
ATTENTION (1)

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 256th BRIGADE COMBAT TEAM
CAMP [REDACTED] IRAQ
APO AE [REDACTED]

S: 31 Augus. 2005

ATZQ-256BCISJA

28 August 2005

MEMORANDUM FOR Major [REDACTED], HHC 256 BCT, APO AE 09326

SUBJECT: Appointment of Investigating Officer
Escalation of Force, Local National KIA, [REDACTED] 1-156 Armor Battalion
256 BCT No.: 05-316

1. You are hereby appointed Investigating Officer pursuant to AR 15-6 to conduct an informal investigation into the above referenced incident which occurred on or about 28 August 2005. You should rely on your military knowledge and experience when ascertaining the facts relative to the investigation and in the framing of your recommendations.
2. In your investigation, collect required sworn statements on DA Form 2823, Sworn Statement, ensuring that they are properly completed.
3. All interviewees suspected of possible Uniform Code of Military Justice violations will execute DA Form 3881, Rights Warning Procedure/Waiver Certificate.
4. Submit your findings and recommendations on DA Form 1574 to this headquarters within 72 hours. Your findings should include a comprehensive and chronological description of events as well as your understanding of why the incident occurred. Recommendations should include but not be limited to corrective actions designed to prevent future occurrences of the same or similar incidents. In the event your recommendations include disciplinary action, do not recommend specific levels of disposition or punishments.
5. At the conclusion of your investigation, you will submit your DA Form 1574 and all exhibits to the Staff Judge Advocate for legal review.

John Basilica Jr.
[REDACTED]
BG, USA
Commanding

EN_1 (CIR_BLUE_2_REPORT)_FRAGO_483_OPORD_04-21

LINE 1: Unit reporting: C Co 1/156

LINE 2: Incident: Local National - KIA

LINE 3: Datetime group (DTG) incident occurred: 281115AUG05 (approx.)

LINE 4: Location of incident: [REDACTED]

LINE 5: Personnel involved

Name	Rank	Unit	SSN	Sex
[REDACTED]	SGT	Co. C, 1-156	[REDACTED]	M

LINE 6: Summary of Incident: Dismounts on the [REDACTED] (SGT [REDACTED] NCOIC) observed a white Daewoo Prince moving along route [REDACTED]. The driver was holding an object which appeared to be an RPG launcher outside of the driver side window of the car (total time approx. 8 sec. of). The vehicle was at that time stopped approximately 200 meters south of where the IP's were being ambushed (2nd iteration of SAF to include 8 rounds of mortar fire). The dismounts thought that they had been ID'd by the then thought to be RPG gunman because their vehicle began to move in reverse (South on [REDACTED] in the North bound lane. The NCOIC gave direction to shoot warning shots, which did not stop the vehicle. The NCOIC then gave direction to shoot to disable the car by shooting out the tires and engine block. The vehicle finally came to a stop after the tires were blown and the engine block was engaged. The NCOIC gave the order to cease fire. The Tank section (2IC/1-156; C22 and C24) moved to the location of the car after arriving on the scene and found one LN KIA (vehicle driver) and one LN uninjured (camera man). The scene was cordoned off and secured by 3IC/1-156; C23 and C34 until relieved by higher headquarters. **UPDATED:** The uninjured LN was then further evaluated and treated for superficial abrasions caused by shards of glass (this was the only "injury" to the occupant of the vehicle - "Hader"). Once treated, the LN was detained for further questioning. His video equipment was also confiscated for evaluation as holding possible intelligence. THH questioned the LN (not wounded, treated for abrasions for shards of glass) at Camp [REDACTED] with the following results: Detainee appeared calm and collected during the interview. The LN's name was [REDACTED] who has worked for a man named [REDACTED] for the last year. [REDACTED] indicated that today was his first day to work in Baghdad. [REDACTED] also indicated that approximately one hour before they arrived on the scene, [REDACTED] (employer) told [REDACTED] to go to the scene of a car which had been attacked. [REDACTED] gave [REDACTED] a video camera and told him to go with a driver named [REDACTED] who knew where the car, which was involved in the incident, was located. [REDACTED] then told of how when they got to the scene of the incident shooting broke out & they began to back up the car. When he was asked about hanging out the window with the camera, [REDACTED] became flustered and stated that he couldn't remember what he was doing.

POINTS COUNTERING NEWS RELEASE: [REDACTED] position on [REDACTED] was not a [REDACTED] position, but a dismounted position securing the Northern portion of [REDACTED] and route [REDACTED] to the West and NW of the [REDACTED]. The two colleagues who first arrived on the scene after the engagement were never detained, just not allowed near the disabled vehicle and body. The cameraman who was detained was not wounded. He was checked thoroughly by a medic, treated for superficial abrasions and kept under security in the open, because there was no shade. After the vehicle was cleared just prior to the 15-6 officer arrived, the detainee was placed in the back of a Bradley Fighting Vehicle and given cold water. There were no other LN's killed during or after the attack, only 2 IP's KIA and one WIA in addition to the driver of the engaged vehicle. The engaged vehicle was on the main route ([REDACTED] not an off ramp. Soldiers treated all personnel present professionally and were gainfully employed pulling security on the site, not joking among themselves near the body.

LINE 7: Damage to government and/or civilian property: One LN Daewoo Prince disabled. One LN KIA.

LINE 8: Commander reporting: CPT [REDACTED]

EN 1 (CIR_BLUE_2_REPORT)_FRAGO_483_OFORD_04-21

LINE 1: Unit reporting: C Co 1/156 / 256 BCT

LINE 2: Incident: Wounded Local National

LINE 3: Date/time group (DTG) incident occurred: 281115AUG05 (approx.)

LINE 4: Location of incident: [REDACTED]

LINE 5: Personnel involved

Name	Rank	Unit	SSN	Sex
[REDACTED]	SGT	Co. C, 1-156	[REDACTED]	M

LINE 6: Summary of incident: At 1121 hrs, TF 1-156 heard SAF coming from RTE [REDACTED] at [REDACTED]. When 1-156 elements arrived at the scene, they learned that AIF had ambushed the IPs. They found 2X IPs KIA and 5X IPs WIA. At around 1141 hrs, while TF 1-156 elements were working the scene, the unit was engaged with SAF and IDF from AIF that dismounted their vehicle and fled on foot in the [REDACTED]. Aviation was requested and arrived on scene. TF 1-156 lost contact with the AIF.

Just 200 meters south of the incident, dismounted [REDACTED] on the [REDACTED] (SGT [REDACTED] NCOIC) near [REDACTED] observed a white Daewoo Prince moving along route [REDACTED]. The passenger was holding an object which appeared to be an RPG launcher outside of the passenger side window of the car (total time approx. 8 sec's). (The unit later learned that the object was not an RPG, but was camera equipment being held out the window by a Reuters camera crew) At that time, the vehicle was stopped approximately 200 meters south of where the IPs were being ambushed a second time, which consisted of the SAF and 5x rounds of mortar fire.

TF 1-156 had just issued a BOLO over FM described as a white four door sedan, which was the vehicle description for the vehicle that AIF were in when engaging the Iraqi Police. The dismounts thought that they had been spotted by what was believed at the time to be RPG gunman because their vehicle began to move in reverse (south on [REDACTED] in the North bound lane. Additionally, the LN's vehicle matched the description of the BOLO just issued by TF 1-156.

As the vehicle continued to move, the NCOIC gave directions to shoot warning shots, which did not stop the vehicle. The NCOIC then gave an order to shoot to disable the car by shooting out the tires and engine block. The vehicle finally came to a stop after the tires were blown and the engine block was engaged. The NCOIC then gave the order to cease fire. The Tank section (2IC/1-156, C22 and C24) moved to the location of the car after arriving on the scene and found 1X LN KIA (vehicle driver) and 1X LN uninjured (camera man). The scene was cordoned off and secured by 3IC/1-156, C33 and C34 until relieved by higher headquarters. The uninjured LN was taken to the company's headquarters for as an intelligence hold IOT conduct tactical questioning.

A THF has been dispatched to go to the company headquarters to conduct tactical questioning of the LN, [REDACTED], who is a Reuters camera man from [REDACTED] Iraq.

The LN KIA was taken by Reuters employees.

Additionally, a 15-6 officer was appointed and went to the scene prior to elements leaving the area IOT gather facts and photos of the incident.

LINE 7: Damage to government and/or civilian property: 1X LN Daewoo Prince disabled, 1X LN

秘訣

LINE 8: Commander reporting: CPT