

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is PMG.

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 (SSN).

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately identified.

ROUTINE USES: Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval.

DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION FOB Salerno	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD) 2007/10/07	3. TIME 1209Z	4. FILE NUMBER
5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME (b)(3), (b)(6)	6. SSN (b)(6)	7. GRADE/STATUS CW2	

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

C. Co 1-285th ARB

9.

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

On 07 October 2007, I was the Pilot-in-Command (PIC) of (b)(2)High aircraft 013. My Co-pilot/Gunner (CPG) was MAJ (b)(3), (b)(6). At 0730 we departed Forward Operating Base (FOB) Salerno on a 090 heading with a right turn out to transition to the Clark Range. Approximately two minutes after take-off my CPG contacted (b)(2)High in order to check the status of Clark Range. (b)(2)High immediately informed us that the range was closed due to troops training on it. I contacted Salerno Tower and changed my request to turn around and go to Sager Range. Tower cleared us to transition back to Sager Range and notify tower when our (b)(2)High was complete. We arrived at Sager Range approximately 0737 and began our (b)(2)High of the range. We made approximately five (b)(2)High along the firing range and we launched 3 sets of flares to indicate that we would be firing. There were approximately 10 - 15 personnel located on the Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) range digging in two pits and approximately 5 - 7 personnel located on the backside of a hill located approximately 400 - 500 meters away from the target area. There was one male that was located on the opposite side of the range and he transitioned to the EOD side while we were completing our (b)(2)High. After approximately five minutes and all personnel were well clear of the range we called Salerno Tower and informed them that we completed our (b)(2)High and my CPG contacted Desert Hawk Tactical Operations Command (TOC) and informed them that we were going hot. We expended 8 training rockets, 5 HE rockets, 44 training 30 MM rounds and 76 HEPD 30 MM rounds. We made two (b)(2)High following our (b)(2)High. There were approximately 15 - 20 personnel running out on the range to gather up the expended shells. There was no personnel laying on the ground or a particular gathering of people in any one area. At approximately 0810 I called Salerno Tower to inform him that we were going cold on the range and to request transition to the south approximately five miles. We transitioned the south and swept back to the east over the next hour maintaining approximately a three to five mile standoff from FOB Salerno. We landed at the fuel pits at approximately 0850 to begin refueling. At approximately 0910 we were transitioning to parking and completed shutdown at 0920.**

*****Nothing Else Follows*****

(b)(3), (b)(6)

10. EXHIBIT

11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

(b)(3), (b)(6)

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____"

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.

STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6)

TAKEN AT FOB Salerno

DATED 2007/10/07

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

AFFIDAVIT

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 2. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES:

SGT

(b)(3), (b)(5)

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this _____ day of _____ at _____

S-2 HHC 1/65 ARB
ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

(b)(3), (b)(6)

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

SWORN STATEMENT

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1. LOCATION FOB Salerno, AF	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD) 2007/10/07	3. TIME 1153z	4. FILE NUMBER
5. LAST NAME FIRST NAME MIDDLE NAME (b)(3), (b)(6)	6. SSN (b)(6)	7. GRADE/STATUS O4	

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
TF Deserthawk, HHC/ 1-285th ARB

9. I, (b)(3), (b)(6), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

I was the CPG (Co-Pilot Gunner) with CW3 (b)(6) (Pilot in command) as the crew of (b)(2)High. We conducted gunnery operations at SAGR Range from 0745 until 0812 as a part of a 1.9 hour flight from 0730-0920z. During 27 minutes on the range we expended 30mm (44Rnds TP / 76Rnds HE) and 2.75 (8Rnds TP / 5Rnds HE).

(b)(2)High took off at 0730 and repositioned to refuel pad 4 to outfront Bore site procedures. At 0735 we took off 090 with a right turnout, departing downwind for Camp Clark. Upon radio contact with roughrider, we were notified Clark Range was closed. We redirected to SAL and requested SAGR range from Deserthawk TOC and Salerno Tower. We were notified by Deserthawk TOC that EOD was still on the range. We were cleared by the tower to do a (b)(2)High. Our inbound vector for the range was 300. Upon initial (b)(2)High we confirmed EOD had cleared the range and notified Deserthawk TOC EOD was clear of the range, but did not ask for the range to go hot yet.

During the initial (b)(2)High at 0745 we identified 22-24 LN in the vicinity of the range and continued to sweep the range, orbiting five times. On the initial (b)(2)High we identified three LN groups; the first on the back hill on the right edge of the range approximately 400m from our intended target center and deep on the range and consisting of 6-8 LN. The second and third groups were located in two EOD pits that had been used earlier in the morning; these pits were approximately 600m to the east. I counted a total of 16 LN in the EOD pits digging in the craters. Each group had 7-9 LN in each pit.

To clear the first group on the right edge of the range we orbited three times, flying lower and slower each time, and expelling two sets of flares to indicate our intentions. After the third pass and as we turned out (120) we noticed one LN running from left to right across the range to join the group of 6-8 which had vacated to the ridge just next to the EOD pits. We then conducted one more sweep to clear the range and confirm the last LN had cleared and then conducted one more after that to make sure.

We then conducted range operations, making ten passes. Our initial passes were with 2.75 center and deep and the LN stayed clear to 030 vic the EOD pits. We then followed with 30mm, shooting center and deep each time, using both IHADDS and TADS from the CPG station. After rounds complete we conducted two orbits to sweep the range cold. I saw three sets of small fires due to the munitions. I also saw approximately 20 LN now spread over the range in the vicinity where the expelled shells landed. This location was approximately 800m at 120 degrees from our munitions point of impact.

On either orbit I didn't see a casualty on the range and the LN were spread across the range and not in any type of mass. Their activity did not express anything unusual, it was focused on the ground to identify and pick up spent 30mm casings. At the point we called the range cold at 0812z crossed the airfield centerline and moved to the south to reconnoiter historic POO's and Caves. We finished operations and returned to SAL, wheels down at the FARP, pad three at 0850z. After refuel and temporary delay for spacing from traffic, we repositioned to B6 at 0910z, shutdown complete at 0920z.

nothing follows

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

10. EXHIBIT

11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

(b)(3), (b)(6)

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6)

TAKEN AT FOB Salerno, AF

DATED 2007/10/07

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

nothing follows

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

AFFIDAVIT

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(b)(3), (b)(6)

WITNESSES:

Sgt

(b)(3), (b)(6)

S-2 HHC 1/285 ARD
ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 7th day of October, 2007 at FOB Salerno

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

(b)(3), (b)(6)

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES



REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF:

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
HEADQUARTERS, COMBINED/JOINT TASK FORCE (CJTF)-82
BAGRAM AIRFIELD, AFGHANISTAN
APO AE 09354

110 OCT 2007

CJTF-82-CS

MEMORANDUM FOR LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) Deputy Commander, Task Force Pegasus,
Combined/Joint Task Force (CJTF)-82, Bagram Airfield, Afghanistan APO AE 09354

SUBJECT: Appointment as AR 15-6 Informal Investigating Officer

1. You are hereby appointed as an investigating officer to conduct an informal investigation IAW AR 15-6 into the AH-64 live fire range accident that occurred on 7 October 2007 at Forward Operating Base Salerno and resulted in the death of one local national and the injury to two other local nationals.
2. The scope of the investigation should include the following:
 - a. The facts and circumstances surrounding the range accident that occurred on 7 October 2007;
 - b. Whether proper range procedures were followed before commencing the live fire exercise;
 - c. The precautions in place to warn local nationals that they are entering into a firing range;
 - d. The actions taken by the aircraft crew prior to the exercise to ensure the range was clear;
 - e. The identity of those who were injured and the extent of those injuries;
 - f. The reason the local nationals were on the range;
 - g. Whether the local nationals knew of or were responsible for the placement of an IED near the roadway to the ordinance range; and
 - h. Whether condolence payments were made or if such payments would be appropriate.
3. This will be an informal AR 15-6 investigation. This will be your primary duty until completed and takes precedence over all other duties and assignments. All statements will be in written form and sworn, using DA Form 2823. If witnesses have redeployed, seek to conduct telephonic interviews of them at their home station.
4. If, during the course of the investigation, you suspect that anyone involved has violated any criminal laws, you should advise that person of their Article 31 Rights, prior to questioning. If

CENTCOM 009328

CJTF-82-CS

SUBJECT: Appointment as AR 15-6 Informal Investigating Officer

anyone attempts to interfere with or obstruct your investigation, notify the appointing authority immediately.

5. Use AR 15-6 to guide the investigation. Consider any evidence in the investigation that you determine to be relevant and material to the incident. You should make appropriate findings and recommendations based on the facts gathered during the investigation. The completed investigation should include:

- a. This letter of appointment;
- b. A completed DA Form 1574;
- c. A memorandum for record with your findings and recommendations. Your findings are to be based on the facts you gather and your recommendations should include whether any adverse action is appropriate;
- d. An executive summary;
- e. An index of exhibits;
- f. A chronology of your investigation;
- g. All exhibits labeled in successive order;
- h. A list of all persons interviewed and those from who no statement was taken; and
- i. Proper classification markings.

6. If Afghanistan National Security Forces (ANSF) were involved in this incident, your findings and recommendations are to include any lessons learned you discover during the course of your investigation that may benefit the ANSF.

7. You may consider any evidence in your investigation that you determine to be relevant and material to the above areas. This investigation is your primary duty until completed and takes precedence over all other duties and assignments.

8. No military or civilian witnesses can be ordered to give testimony that may incriminate them. However, you can direct a military or civilian witness to provide testimony if you believe they have relevant information that is not incriminating.

CJTF-82-CS

SUBJECT: Appointment as AR 15-6 Informal Investigating Officer


9. CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) has been designated as your legal advisor. He will assist you with any legal issues that may arise during your investigation. He may be contacted at DSN (b)(2)High or (b)(3), (b)(6) @afghan.swa.army.mil.

10. Submit your completed report no later than 23 October 2007 to CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) for legal review. If any circumstances prevent a timely completion of your report, submit requests for delay to me for approval.

11. The point of contact for this memorandum is CPT (b)(3), (b)(6), CJTF-82, Chief of Administrative Law at DSN (b)(2)High

(b)(3), (b)(6)

LTC, GS
Deputy Chief of Staff



(b)(6)

CENTCOM 009331



(b)(6)

CEM COM 009332




(b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)


(b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

CENTCOM 009333



CENTCOM 009334





(b)(6)



(b)(6)

281037

CP15 [07:57] <SAL_BDOC> SAGER RANGE IS GOING HOT ATT

[07:59] <diablobtlnco> S- Unknown ACM

[07:59] <diablobtlnco> A - Receiving SAF

[07:59] <diablobtlnco> L - (b)(2)High

[07:59] <diablobtlnco> T - 07 0740z OCT 07

[07:59] <diablobtlnco> R- (b)(2)High and (b)(2)High performing Cordon and Knock of AO when they received small arms fire from 500m NW on Hilltop. Currently have 3 x ANA wounded. (b)(2)High with ANA are pursuing to re-establish contact.

[07:59] <diablobtlnco> NOT requesting any support att

CP15 [08:13] <SAL_BDOC> CSH NEEDS O POS BLOOD DONORS ASAP

[08:15] <SAL_BDOC> SAGER RANGE IS COLD ATT

CP21 < [09:18] <SAL_BDOC> SAGER RANGE IS GOING HOT

[09:37] <SAL_BDOC> SAGER RANGE IS COLD ATT

EOD

[06:30] <SAL_BDOC> THERE WILL BE TWO CONTROLLED DETS IN 5 MINUTES [07:26] <SAL_BDOC> S: NA

[07:26] <SAL_BDOC> A: IED FOUND ON DEMO RANGE

[07:26] <SAL_BDOC> L: (b)(2)High

[07:26] <SAL_BDOC> T1 0702Z

[07:26] <SAL_BDOC> R: EOD TEAM ON SITE EXPLOITING

Summary of interview with Dr (b)(6) by LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) , 9 October 2007

(b)(3), (b)(6) served as an interpreter for and assisted in the treatment of (b)(6) and (b)(6) on 7 October 2007 while they were being treated at the SAL CSH. The kids told him that they were at the range picking up metal to sell at the market. They stated that they were hit after an explosion that came from the helicopter. He stated that he specifically asked them if they picked up something that blew up and that (b)(6) told him no. He said that (b)(6) showed him a piece of shrapnel and told him that was what they were picking up. (IO Comment – the fact that he had shrapnel and not 30mm casings may indicate that they were in the impact area and not the area where the 30mm casings normally fall, if they were indeed on the range. The metal the kid had in his possession was observed by both LTC (b)(6) (TF Desert Hawk Commander) and MAJ (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) (TF Professional S5). This is significant because the kids later stated that they were not picking up metal and that they did not know they were on a range.) He also stated that the kids told him “they hid under the dirt when the aircraft came”. Based purely on his conversations with them he believes that they were engaged by an aircraft.

CENTCOM 009339

DAILY STAFF JOURNAL OR DUTY OFFICER'S LOG					PAGE NO.	NO. OF PAGES
For use of this form, see AR 220-15; the proponent agency is Office of The Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations & Plans.					01	03
ORGANIZATION OR INSTALLATION			LOCATION	PERIOD COVERED		
TASK FORCE DESERT HAWK			FOB SALERNO, APO AE 09314			
				FROM	TO	
				HOUR	DATE	HOUR DATE
				1035 Z	07 OCT 07	1111 Z 07 OCT 07
ITEM NO.	TIME		INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ORDERS, ETC.	ACTION TAKEN	INL	
1	1035		SGT (b)(3), (b)(6) (SHIFT NCO) CALLED, REPORTED LN'S POSSIBLY SHOT ON SAGR RANGE, (WIA/KIA), REPORT GIVEN FROM CHILDREN WHO WENT TO KPF TOWER	NOTIFY THE TOC & S-2 OF INCIDENT		
2		1038	RTO CONTACTED (b)(2) HIGL TOLD THEM TO SHUT DOWN & REPORT TO THE TOC-DIRECTED BY BTL CPT	CP21 ACKNOWLEDGED		
3	1036		CONFIRMED A/C FLYING ON RANGE AS CP21(229) (b)(3), (b)(6) W/U TIME 0917	CONFIRMED FROM RTO	(b)(3), (b)(6)	
4		1040	NOTIFIED S-3, DH06 NOTIFIED OF INCIDENT	CONTACT PERSONNEL		
5		1045	BLT CPT CONTACTS SGT (b)(3), (b)(6) (SHIFT NCO), NOTIFIED OF LN'S RETRIEVING BODY, KPF IS GOING TO SITE TO CONFIRM IF IT WAS CAUSED BY A/C OR UXO, ATT STILL DETERMINING IF MEDEVAC IS NEEDED, AS OF NOW NO ONE WITH CAPABILITIES OR KNOWLEDGE HAS GONE OUT TO SITE YET. NEED TO CONFIRM IF IT WAS LN'S FOUND A DUD OR UXO OR WAS SHOT BY SOMEONE.	BTL CPT CLOSING RANGE, DH 06, DH3, BTL CPT, XO NOTIFIED	(b)(3), (b)(6)	
6	1057		RTO CONTACTS REQUEST DD03 TO GO TO SAGR RANGE TO SEE LN ACTIVITY-DIRECTED BY BTL CPT	DD03 ACK'S, ENR TO SAGR RANGE		
7	1055		BTL CPT CONTACTS BDOC, NOTIFIED OF 1 DECEASED LN (b)(6) YR OLD BOY, NEED TO FIND OUT INJURIES, LN CHILD TAKEN TO HOME IN WHEELBARROW BY LN'S, NEED TO FIND AN EYEWITNESS TO START INVESTIGATION.	STATUS UPDATE BY BDOC		
8	1101		CONFIRMED BY BDOC THAT 1 X (b)(6) YR OLD BOY DECEASED 3 LN'S INJURED	NOTIFIED BY BDOC	(b)(3), (b)(6)	
9	1102		DD03 REPORTS 1 HILUX 3 INJURED LN'S & WHEELBARROW, 2 IN TAN UNIFORM	RTO GIVEN INFO VIA RADIO		
10	1107		BTL CPT REQUESTS BDOC SECURE SCENE, BDOC RESPONDS NOT ENOUGH VEH AVAILABLE			
11	1110		FURY IS GOING TO FIND OUT AND SEND OUT TEAM NOTIFIED 1 X (b)(6) YR OLD SHOT IN LEG & 1 X (b)(6) YR OLD DECEASED, POSSIBLY HAVE TO MEDEVAC OUT, INJURED ENROUTE TO SAL NEED TO CONFIRM IF (b)(6) YR OLD IS DECEASED NEED TO LOCATE 12 YR OLD.	NOTIFIED BY FURY	(b)(3), (b)(6)	
12	1111		DD03 CALLED VIA FM FREQ, NOTIFIED TOC OF DECEASED (b)(6) YR OLD IN WHEELBARROW AT GRID	CONTINUED		

(b)(3), (b)(6)

DA FORM 1 NOV 62 1594

PREVIOUS EDITION OF THIS FORM IS OBSOLETE

1988 O-210-290
CENTCOM 009340

DAILY STAFF JOURNAL OR DUTY OFFICER'S LOG						PAGE NO.		NO. OF PAGES	
For use of this form, see AR 220-15; the proponent agency is Office of The Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations & Plans.						02		03	
ORGANIZATION OR INSTALLATION TASK FORCE DESERT HAWK			LOCATION FOB SALERNO, APO AE 09314		PERIOD COVERED				
					FROM		TO		
					HOUR 117 Z	DATE 07 OCT 07	HOUR 1200	DATE 07 OCT 07	
ITEM NO.	TIME		INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ORDERS, ETC.	ACTION TAKEN	INL				
	IN	OUT							
			POSSIBLE CASUALTY (b)(2)High	NOTIFIED BY DD03					
13	1113		1 ST UP (b)(2)High IS TASKED TO GO TO SAGR RANGE TO GO TAKE PICTURES AND REPORT	NOTIFIED BY DH3A	(b)(3), (b)(6)				
14	1115		REQUESTED A/C TO GO TO SIGHT TO CONDUCT SURVEY (CP11: (b)(3), (b)(6))						
			TOLD TO STAND DOWN BECAUSE THEY SHOT ON RANGE POSS. INVOLVED.	RTD NOTIFIED A/C VIA RADIO					
15	1116		MAJOR (b)(3), (b)(6) AT SML ARMS RANGE, NOTIFIED AND IS ENROUTE TO FOB-DIRECTED BY BTL CPT	DH BTL CPT LOCATE MAJ). ((b)(3), (b)(6)				
16	1116		2 LN'S AT GATE 6, LN'S ARE BEING CLEARED TO GO TO THE HOSPITAL	NOTIFIED BY BTL CPT FROM BDOC					
17	1123		MAJ (b)(3), (b)(6) ARRIVES TO TOC FROM GUNNERY RANGE, ENROUTE TO HOSPITAL TO VERIFY LN'S WOUNDS AND STATUS.	NOTIFIED TOC	(b)(3), (b)(6)				
18	1124		BTL CPT NOTIFIES DH06 OF BDOC'S REQUEST THAT PROFESSIONAL MP'S TO GO TO SCENE TO CONDUCT INVESTIGATION.	NOTIFIED DH06	(b)(3), (b)(6)				
19	1133		(b)(3), (b)(6) ARRIVE IN TOC, PILOTS ARE BRIEFED BY S-2, REQUEST INFO OF TIME OF FIRE (CW5 (b)(3), (b)(6) S-2: SSG (b)(3), (b)(6) SGT (b)(3), (b)(6) TALKING TO PILOTS)	MR. (b)(3), (b)(6) S-2 TALKED TO PILOTS	(b)(3), (b)(6)				
20	1136		BTL CPT REQUESTING ASSISTANCE FROM CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) TO GET INFO FROM PILOT'S, SEPARATING PILOTS & GET INDIVIDUAL STATEMENTS, ALSO W/ (b)(3), (b)(6)	BTL CPT REQUESTING STATMENTS					
21	1145		SGT (b)(3), (b)(6) PROCEEDED TO RECEIVE STATEMENTS FROM 1LT (b)(3), (b)(6)	LOGGED	(b)(3), (b)(6)				
22	1151		BTL CPT REQUESTS PRO MOVE TO DETERMINE SITE OF INCIDENT, SECURE AND DOCUMENT, CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) POC	DH BTL CPT CALLS 2-321					
23	1158		BTL CPT CONTACTS BDOC: SGT (b)(3), (b)(6), WANTED TO KNOW IF THEY COULD SEND AN UPDARMORED HMMWV TO LOCATION, BDOC CURRENTLY MAKING PLANS FOR TEAM TO GO TO LOCATION W/KPF 07	BTL CPT NOTIFIED OF STATUS	(b)(3), (b)(6)				
24	1200		MSG (b)(3), (b)(6) ENTERS TOC, WANTED TO KNOW IF A LN WAS KILLED, WANTED TO KNOW BECAUSE HE WAS ON A LARGE ARMS RANGE WORKING AS HUMVEE DETAIL TO PUSH LN'S AWAY AND BELIEVES THEY THEY PUSHED LN'S OVER THE HILL ONTO THE OTHER RANGE.	BTL CPT INFORMED	(b)(3), (b)(6)				

DA FORM 1 NOV 62 1594

PREVIOUS EDITION OF THIS FORM IS OBSOLETE

1988 O -210 - 290
CENTCOM 009341

DAILY STAFF JOURNAL OR DUTY OFFICER'S LOG					PAGE NO.	NO. OF PAGES
For use of this form, see AR 220-15; the proponent agency is Office of The Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations & Plans.					03	03
ORGANIZATION OR INSTALLATION		LOCATION		PERIOD COVERED		
TASK FORCE DESERT HAWK		FOB SALERNO, APO AE 09314				
				FROM	TO	
				HOUR	DATE	HOUR DATE
				1203 Z	07 OCT 07	1546 Z 07 OCT 07
ITEM NO.	TIME		INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ORDERS, ETC.	ACTION TAKEN	INL	
25	1203		DH BLT CPT REQUESTS MAJ (b)(3), (b)(6) TO COMPLETE A STATEMENT, MAJ (b)(3), (b)(6) COMPLIES	BTL CPT REQUESTS STATEMENT	(b)(3), (b)(6)	
26	1218		DD03 PILOT CW3 (b)(3), (b)(6) ARRIVES TOC, BLT CPT REQUESTS SWORN STATEMENTS FROM DD03 PILOTS OF WHAT WAS OBSERVED.	DD03 REPORTS TO TOC	(b)(3), (b)(6)	
27	1218		S-2 SGT (b)(3), (b)(6) RECIEVES INFO OF WHAT WAS OBSERVED FROM MR. (b)(3), (b)(6)	S-2 NOTIFIED	(b)(3), (b)(6)	
28	1220		DD03 STATES HIS OBSERVATIONS & REQUESTED TO WRITE SWORN STATEMENT: WHITE HILUX X 2 TAN UNIFORMED MALES, LN'S RUNNING W/ WHEELBARROW, WHEELBARROW SEEN STOPPED (b)(3), (b)(6) Y/O WRAPPED IN RUG, HANDS WERE FOLDED ON CHEST, SHAWL PUT OVER CHILD.			
29	1221		CP16: (b)(3), (b)(6) NOTIFIES TOC THAT THEY ARE GOING TO RANGE, REQUEST CONFIRMATION THAT THEY ARE CLEAR TO GO ON RANGE TO RECON AND VIDEO RECORD SITE.	RTO CONFIRMS, ACKS GUNS COLD	(b)(3), (b)(6)	
30	1222		BTL NCO CONTACT BDOC TO REQUEST TO GO ON RANGE TO CONDUCT SURVEILLANCE, A/C CLEARED TO GO ON RANGE AND CONDUCT RECON.	TOC NOTIFIED, RTO NOTIFIED	(b)(3), (b)(6)	
31	1225		DH BTL CPT NOTIFIES PRO TOC OF (b)(2)High (b)(2)High OF LOCATION OF DECEASED LN MALE, AS REPORTED BY DD03 AND PHOTO'S. DH BTL CPT REQUESTS PRO GO TO HOUSE AT GRID AND VEIW DECEASED IOT DETERMINE CAUSE OF DEATH. PRO TOC REPORTS UNABLE TO DO THIS.	PRO TOC NOTIFIED		
32	1520		ALL STATEMENTS, PHOTOS AND DOCUMENTS COMPILED FOR POSSIBLE INVESTIGATION	TAPE FILED W/ DH05		
32	1525		RECEIVE TAPE OF RANGE AND POSSIBLE INJURY SITES, FROM CP 16 CW4 (b)(3), (b)(6) (CW2) (b)(3), (b)(6)	TAPE FILED W/ DH05		
33	1546		PUBLIC AFFAIRS REQUESTING CONFIRMATION OF HELICOPTERS RESULTING IN LN DEATH. PROPOSED RELEASE STATES INJURY DEATH RESULTED FROM HELO FIRE. TOLD PAO WE WILL NOT CONFIRM ANYTHING.			

b)(3), (b)(6)

Pages 20 through 23 redacted for the following reasons:

(b)(6)



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, TASK FORCE DESERT HAWK
FOB SALERNO, AFGHANISTAN
APO, AE 09314

CJTF-76-DESERTHAWK

08 March 2007

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Air to Ground Test Fire Range, Salerno, Afghanistan

1. This memorandum outlines the procedure for use of the air to ground test fire range established at Salerno Air Field. This range will support periodic training events and testing of aviation weapons in order to conduct maintenance checks and maintain crewmember proficiency using 2.75 inch rockets, 30mm, and 7.62 rounds.
2. Crews will adhere to the following procedures regarding the use of the Salerno Air to Ground Range (SAGR):
 - a. Mark Gunnery on the OEF Risk Matrix under Item #3 Mission Complexity.
 - b. Coordinate the use of the range with Desert Hawk Operations and verify with Desert Hawk Operations prior to using the range that coordination has occurred. (Desert Hawk Ops will coordinate approximate times of use IOT deconflict any ground maneuver element or EOD using the Controlled Detonation Pit IVO the range.)
 - c. First RECON and clear the range area prior to firing weapons. Next call Desert Hawk Ops and advise them of the range status. If the range is cold, Ops will coordinate with BDOC and advise them of the intent to use the SAGR.
 - d. Desert Hawk Operations will call the A/C on FM and approve the use of the range only after BDOC has put out the announcement over the "big voice" and MIRC'd the FOB.
 - e. Contact and inform Salerno tower and Desert Hawk OPS when the SAGR is in use and when firing is complete. If unable to contact Desert Hawk Ops, ensure coordination is done with Salerno Tower.
 - f. Monitor Desert Hawk Operations FM or CAG FM and Salerno tower VHF freq.
 - g. Adhere to the inbound and outbound headings, start fire and cease fire lines outlined in this document, SAGR PPT Brief and as depicted on the SAGR kneeboard.

CENTCOM 009347

CJTF-76-DESERTHAWK

SUBJECT: Air to Ground Test Fire Range, Salerno, Afghanistan

3. Range information and firing restrictions for the AH-64 on SAGR are as follows:

- a. Fire Lane is 200 meters wide and 1500 meters long. It begins at the IP grid (b)(2)High
b)(2)High
- b. Inbound heading is 310 degrees + - 5 degrees. Outbound heading is 120 degrees
- c. The target area is located at grid (b)(2)High
- d. The start fire line is road running east-west approximately 200 meters north of the IP. The cease-fire line is located 500 meters prior to the target area.
- e. Running and diving fire is authorized for this range. Hover fire is authorized for 30mm harmonization and 240H door gunnery only.

4. Range information and firing restrictions for the UH-60 and Ch-47 are as follows:

- a. UH-60/CH-47 Door Gunnery may be performed using an aircraft heading of 220/040 degrees, over, or immediately adjacent to the road, with an IP-SFL/CFL at (b)(2)High and
(b)(2)High
- b. The target area is located at grid (b)(2)High
- c. The firing azimuth will be 310 degrees + - 5 degrees
- d. Ground, Takeoff, Hover, Moving, Running (30-50 Kn, 15-200ft) modes are authorized.
- e. Ground and Hover modes are only authorized from (b)(2)High
- f. If LN approach the aircraft from any direction the range will be placed in a cold status.

5. Pilots are **NOT AUTHORIZED** to shoot any kind of ordinance into the EOD Controlled Detonation Pit area. If there is any confusion as to where the EOD pit is located, review the SAGR PPT slides or contact the Master Gunner or TF Safety Officer for further guidance on using this range.

6. Ammunition types approved for training or test fire purposes are as follows:

- a. 30mm M789 HEDP and M789 TP.
- b. Rocket type and warheads include MK40/66 M151/229 HE-PD and M274 practice Smoke rounds.
- c. 7.62 ball/tracer

CENTCOM 009348

CJTF-76-DESERTHAWK

SUBJECT: Air to Ground Test Fire Range, Salerno, Afghanistan

7. When test firing the weapons at the SAGR either on training missions or maintenance test flights, the briefing and OEF Risk Assessment Matrix will show that training or testing involving the aircraft weapons systems is intended by noting in Block 3 under MISSION COMPLEXITY "Gunnery". The corresponding risk value will be added to the risk assessment.

8. POC for this document is CW4(b)(3), (b)(6) TF Desert Hawk Master Gunner.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

LTC, AV
Commanding

CENTCOM 009349

TASK FORCE DESERT HAWK PILOT DEBRIEF FORM VERSION 9584.12



Mission/AMR# :

Training



DATE:

07 Oct 07

	Aircraft 1	Aircraft 2	Aircraft 3
Type	144		
Call Sign	(b)(2)High		
PC			
PI	(b)(3), (b)(6)		
PAX	X		
Cargo Weight	X		
Take Off Time	0915		
Landing Time	1115		
Day Flight Hours	2.0		
Night Flight Hours	X		
NVG Flight Hours	X		
NVS Flight Hours	X		
FM	GO / NO GO	GO / NO GO	GO / NO GO
HF	GO / NO GO	GO / NO GO	GO / NO GO
SATCOM	GO / NO GO	GO / NO GO	GO / NO GO
EDM	GO / NO GO	GO / NO GO	GO / NO GO

Ammunition Data	TNG/MSN	TNG/MSN	TNG/MSN
7.62 MM	X		
30 MM	40		
2.75 HE	X		
2.75 WP	X		
2.75 ILUM	X		
2.75 IR ILUM	X		
2.75 FLCHT	X		

FLARE DATA	Aircraft 1	Aircraft 2	Aircraft 3
LAUNCH GRID(S)			
L410/M206	X		
LA14/M211			
LA15/M212			
MD73/M796			
Reason For Launch(es)?			CENTCOM 009350

Engagement Criteria	
Aircraft Grid: <i>Sagr Range</i>	Round Distance From A/C: <i>m</i>
Aircraft Heading:	Round Elevation:
Aircraft Airspeed: <i>kts</i>	Type of Round:
Aircraft Altitude: <i>ft</i>	Number of Rounds:
POO Grid:	Number of Enemy:
POO Distance From A/C: <i>m</i>	Action Taken: Returned Fire Yes/No


Increased Enemy Force Activity	IED Activity
Unusual Concentrations of Motorcycles? <i>NA</i>	Piles of Rocks Along the Road? <i>NA</i>
Unusual Concentrations of Personnel? <i>NA</i>	Dead Animals in the Road? <i>NA</i>
Unusual Concentration of Vehicles/People Around Compounds? <i>NA</i>	Holes/Mounds Along the Road? <i>NA</i>

Mission Summary: At 0930Z we went hot on Sagr Range. We cleared the area and then fired 14 training rockets and 40 rounds of 30mm. We then proceeded to look at historical POO sites to the east of SAH. We contacted professional 71 and they had a convoy to the north of SAH. We followed the route to look for potential IED's. Professional then had us look at specific grids for future operations. We had nothing significant to report.

CENTCOM 009351



(b)(6)





DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, TASK FORCE DESERT HAWK
FOB SALERNO, AFGHANISTAN
APO, AE 09314

CJTF-76-DESERTHAWK

08 March 2007

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Air to Ground Test Fire Range, Salerno, Afghanistan

1. This memorandum outlines the procedure for use of the air to ground test fire range established at Salerno Air Field. This range will support periodic training events and testing of aviation weapons in order to conduct maintenance checks and maintain crewmember proficiency using 2.75 inch rockets, 30mm, and 7.62 rounds.
2. Crews will adhere to the following procedures regarding the use of the Salerno Air to Ground Range (SAGR):
 - a. Mark Gunnery on the OEF Risk Matrix under Item #3 Mission Complexity.

(b)(2)High

CENTCOM 009354

CJTF-76-DESERTHAWK

SUBJECT: Air to Ground Test Fire Range, Salerno, Afghanistan

3. Range information and firing restrictions for the AH-64 on SAGR are as follows:

(b)(2)High

CJTF-76-DESERTHAWK

SUBJECT: Air to Ground Test Fire Range, Salerno, Afghanistan

(b)(2)High

8. POC for this document is CW4 (b)(3), (b)(6) TF Desert Hawk Master (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

LTC, AV
Commanding

CENTCOM 009356

TASK FORCE DESERT HAWK PILOT DEBRIEF FORM VERSION 9584.12



Mission/AMR# : DQRF / TRNG



DATE: 7 OCT 07

	Aircraft 1	Aircraft 2	Aircraft 3
Type	AH-64D		
Call Sign	(b)(2)High		
PC			
PI	(b)(3), (b)(6)		
PAX	N/A		
Cargo Weight	N/A		
Take Off Time	0730		
Landing Time	0920		
Day Flight Hours	1.9		
Night Flight Hours	—		
NVG Flight Hours	—		
NVS Flight Hours	—		
FM	(GO) / NO GO	GO / NO GO	GO / NO GO
HF	(GO) / NO GO	GO / NO GO	GO / NO GO
SATCOM	GO / NO GO	GO / NO GO	GO / NO GO
EDM	(GO) / NO GO	GO / NO GO	GO / NO GO

Ammunition Data	TNG/MSN	TNG/MSN	TNG/MSN
7.62 MM	—		
30 MM	600 44 TP 60 HE		
2.75 HE	5 HE 8 TP		
2.75 WP	—		
2.75 ILUM	—		
2.75 IR ILUM	—		
2.75 FLCHT	—		

FLARE DATA	Aircraft 1	Aircraft 2	Aircraft 3
LAUNCH GRID(S)			
L410/M206			
LA14/M211			
LA15/M212			
MD73/M796	—		
Reason For Launch(es)?	INADVERTENT		CENTCOM 009357

Engagement Criteria	
Aircraft Grid:	Round Distance From A/C: m
Aircraft Heading:	Round Elevation:
Aircraft Airspeed: kts	Type of Round:
Aircraft Altitude: ft	Number of Rounds:
POO Grid:	Number of Enemy:
POO Distance From A/C: m	Action Taken: Returned Fire Yes/No

Increased Enemy Force Activity	IED Activity
Unusual Concentrations of Motorcycles? N/A	Piles of Rocks Along the Road? N/A
Unusual Concentrations of Personnel? N/A	Dead Animals in the Road? N/A
Unusual Concentration of Vehicles/People Around Compounds? N/A	Holes/Mounds Along the Road? N/A

Mission Summary: NSTR

(b)(3), (b)(6)

~~CENTCOM 009358~~

SALERNO AIR TO GROUND RANGE

CURRENT AS OF 3 AUGUST 06

- 1. CURRENT RANGE AND NEW RANGE SDZ COMPARISON**
- 2. 30MM SDZ**
- 3. ROCKET SDZ**
- 4. IMPACT AREA**
- 5. INBOUND HEADINGS / START - CEASE FIRE LINES**
- 6. LAND USE REQUIREMENTS**
- 7. AVIATOR KNEE BOARDS**
- 8. RANGE LOI**

CENTCOM 009359

Pages 37 through 46 redacted for the following reasons:


(b)(2) High
(b)(2)High

SALERNO AIR TO GROUND RANGE

LOOKING NORTH FROM THE IP AND START FIRE LINE

CENTCOM 009370

SALERNO AIR TO GROUND RANGE



CENTCOM 009371

SALERNO AIR TO GROUND RANGE

(IMPACT AREA)

CAUTION!!!
FIRE ON WEST SIDE
OF RIDGE ONLY

TARGET AREA

WARNING!!!
RESTRICTED AREA
DO NOT FIRE INTO
EOD SAND PIT AREA


CENTCOM 009372

SALERNO AIR TO GROUND RANGE

TGT GRID
[REDACTED]
ALT 3870

(IMPACT AREA)

CAUTION!!!
RIGHT BREAKS ONLY



WARNING!!!
RESTRICTED AREA
DO NOT FIRE INTO
EOD SAND PIT AREA

CENTCOM 009373

SALERNO AIR TO GROUND RANGE

(START FIRE CEASE FIRE LINES)

WARNING!!!
RESTRICTED AREA
DO NOT FIRE INTO
EOD SAND PIT AREA

TGT GRID
[REDACTED]
ALT 3870

HEADING 310

START FIRE LINE


CENTCOM 009374

SALERNO AIR TO GROUND RANGE

(START FIRE CEASE FIRE LINES)

START FIRE LINE

OUTBOUND
HEADING 120



INBOUND
HEADING 3

CENTCOM 009375

LOOKING SOUTH FROM TEST SITE AREA

SALERNO AIR TO GROUND RANGE

(LAND USE)

LAND USE AREA



310

CENTCOM 009376

AH-64 RANGE KNEEBOARD (SALERNO)


REV 07/1206

AUTHORIZED MUNITIONS

**30 MM M788 OR
M789**

2.75 ROCKETS

**M274 PRACTICE
M151 HE PD**



**TGT
ALT 3870**

**MODE
RUNNING
DIVING
60 - 120 KTAS
200' TO 500' AGL**

**RANGE
500 - 1500
METERS**

NOT AUTHORIZED

**M255E1 FLECHETTE
M257 ILLUM
M156/159 WP**



310°

**RIGHT BREAKS
ONLY!!!!
DO NOT FIRE INTO
EOD PIT!!!!!!**

**IP
(2)Hi**

- 1 COORDINATE WITH DESERT HAWK (DH)
OPS FOR RANGE TIMES.
- 2 COORDINATE W SAL TWR FOR RNG
SWEEP
- 3 CALL SAL TWR AND DH OPS W HOT
TIME AND COLD TIME
- 4 RIGHT BREAKS ONLY
- 5 AVOID THE EOD PIT
- 6 SUBMIT AMMO EXPENDATURE REPORT
(S-2 DEBRIEF)

1

CENTCOM 009377

HAZARD INVENTORY LOG

Page 8 of 11

Log #	Date	Resp. Person	Hazard	Corrective Action	Reference	Target Date	Risk Code	Date Done	System Defect
01-06	15MAR06	(b)(3), (b)(6)	(b)(2)High	Try and order a TriCon shipping container for a Hazmat collection point in the Aviation Task Force Area		30MAR06	3	20APR06	CENTCOM 009378
02-06	15MAR06			Order Hazmat spill and clean up supplies for the Aviation Task Force Area		5APR06	3	15FEB07	
03-06	20MAR06					5APR06	3	3AUG06	
04-06	25MAR06					5APR06	5	15FEB07	
05-06	25MAR06			(b)(2)High		1MAY06	5	15FEB07	
06-06	11JUL06					1SEP06	5	15FEB07	
07-06	12JUL06			Try and order more Tri-Max extinguishers. Talk to Brigade and get interim extinguishers.		01OCT07	5		
08-06	12JUL06			Order spare parts		1SEP06	3	15FEB07	
09-06	12JUL06			Order more Emergency Eye/Face Wash Stations		1SEP06	4	15FEB07	
10-06	12JUL06			Order more First Aid Kits		1SEP06	5	15FEB07	

(b)(2)High

HAZARD INVENTORY LOG

UNIT: Task Force Desert Hawk Hazard log

Page 2 of 11

Log #	Date	Resp. Person	Hazard	Corrective Action	Reference	Target Date	Risk Code	Date Done	System Defect
11-06	29JUL06	(b)(3), (b)(6)	(b)(2)High	Teast, inspect, and marking of grounding points		1SEP06	5	15FEB07	
12-06	29JUL06			Get Items fabricated		1SEP06	5	01MAR07	
13-06	29JUL06			Order Items and set up Boards		1SEP06	5	15FEB07	
14-06	29JUL06			(b)(2)High		1SEP06	5	15FEB07	
15-06	1AUG06				Complete Semi annual Safety Inspection	1SEP06	5	15FEB07	Not Completed by 183rd
15-07	10AUG06				Inspect the area and order or make the required items	1SEP06	5	01APR07	
15-08	10AUG06	(b)(3), (b)(6)	(b)(2)High	Order Fuel Sample Bottles		1OCT06	5	15FEB2007	
15-09	10AUG06					1OCT06	3	15FEB07	

CENTCOM 009379

HAZARD INVENTORY LOG

UNIT: Task Force Desert Hawk Hazard log

Page 3 of 11

Log #	Date	Resp. Person	Hazard	Corrective Action	Reference	Target Date	Risk Code	Date Done	System Defect
07-01	15FEB07	(b)(3), (b)(6)	(b)(2)High	Brief soldiers and post signs		28FEB07	3	01APR07	
07-02	15FEB07			Turn in work order through KBR for the construction of 3 feet wide bridges with handrails.		15MAR07	4	20APR07	
07-03	15FEB07			Long term goal is to either pave or concrete ramp area.		30OCT07	3		
07-04	15FEB07			Compact ground around parking, establish crossing areas spanning the drainage and grade the area beside the drainage so that an aircraft can ground taxi to the runway.		30OCT07	3		
07-05	15FEB07	(b)(3), (b)(6)	(b)(2)High	(b)(2)High		28FEB07	3	15APR07	
07-05	15FEB07					15APR07	3	15APR07	
07-06	15FEB07				Order green T-Shirts (authorized via CTA) for all the refuelers.	30JUL07	4		

CENTCOM 009380

HAZARD INVENTORY LOG

UNIT: Task Force Desert Hawk Hazard log

Page 4 of 11

Log #	Date	Resp. Person	Hazard	Corrective Action	Reference	Target Date	Risk Code	Date Done	System Defect
07-07	15FEB07	(b)(3), (b)(6)	(b)(3), (b)(6)	(b)(2)High		19FEB07	4	01APR07	
07-08	15FEB07					15MAR07	4	01APR07	
07-09	01FEB07					30MAR07	4	30MAR07	
07-10	18FEB07					30MAR07	4		On Order
07-11	18FEB07			Rock the remaining 2/3rds of the HLZ in order to eliminate dusty landing conditions and facility rolling take-offs as necessary.		30JUN07	4		Pushed to BDE

CENTCOM 009381

(b)(2)High

HAZARD INVENTORY LOG

UNIT: Task Force Desert Hawk Hazard log

Page 5 of 11

Log #	Date	Resp. Person	Hazard	Corrective Action	Reference	Target Date	Risk Code	Date Done	System Defect
07-12	18FEB07	(b)(3), (b)(6)	(b)(2)High			30JUL07	5		On Going until AHA, Tower and FARP village is relocated.
07-13	18FEB07					30MAY07	4	01APR07	
07-14	18FEB07					28FEB07	4	01APR07	
07-15	18FEB07					28FEB07	4	15MAR07	
07-16	18FEB07					30MAR07	4	15MAR07	

(b)(2)High

CENTCOM 009382

HAZARD INVENTORY LOG

UNIT: Task Force Desert Hawk Hazard log

Page 6 of 11

Log #	Date	Resp. Person	Hazard	Corrective Action	Reference	Target Date	Risk Code	Date Done	System Defect
07-17	18FEB07	(b)(3), (b)(6)	(b)(2)High			28FEB07	5	05MAR07	
07-18	18FEB07					16MAR07	5	16MAR07	CENTCOM 009383
07-19	28MAR07					30APR07	5	21APR07	Approved for use.
07-20	28MAR07					30APR07	5	21JUN07	Windows out only
07-21	28MAR07					15APR07	5	21APR07	No Hats
07-22	28MAR07					30APR07	5	15APR07	Took some lights down
07-23	28MAR07					15APR07	5	21APR07	2 crew chiefs/gunners required
07-24	28MAR07					On Going	4	On Going	Continue to monitor

(b)(2)High

HAZARD INVENTORY LOG

UNIT: Task Force Desert Hawk Hazard log

Page 7 of 11

Log #	Date	Resp. Person	Hazard	Corrective Action	Reference	Target Date	Risk Code	Date Done	System Defect
07-25	18APR07	(b)(3), (b)(6)	(b)(2)High			30MAY07	4	10JUL07	Medevac battalion is ordering
07-26	18APR07					30APR07	4	21MAY07	Current WX reporting at OE
07-28	18APR07					30APR07	4	25APR07	Enforce eyewear standard at FARPs
07-29	18APR07					15MAY07	5	21MAY07	Benchmark is Adequate
07-30	16MAY07					30JUN07	4	21MAY07	Stands Issue
07-31	16MAY07					30JUN07	4	30JUN07	No PPC programs
07-32	16MAY07					30JUN07	4	20AUG07	

(b)(2)High

CENTCOM 009384

HAZARD INVENTORY LOG

UNIT: Task Force Desert Hawk Hazard log

Page 8 of 11

Log #	Date	Resp. Person	Hazard	Corrective Action	Reference	Target Date	Risk Code	Date Done	System Defect		
07-33 SAI	10JUL07	(b)(3), (b)(6)	(b)(3), (b)(6)			30AUG07	3				
07-34 SAI	10JUL07					01OCT07	4				
07-35 SAI	10JUL07					30AUG07	3				
07-36 SAI	10JUL07					30JUN07	2	30JUN07	Completed		
07-37 SAI	10JUL07					10JUL07	3	10JUL07	Completed		
07-38 SAI	10JUL07	New tracker in place									
07-39 SAI	10JUL07										

CENTCOM 009385

(b)(2)High

HAZARD INVENTORY LOG

UNIT: Task Force Desert Hawk Hazard log

Page 9 of 11

Log #	Date	Resp. Person	Hazard	Corrective Action	Reference	Target Date	Risk Code	Date Done	System Defect
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07-40 SAI	10JUL07	(b)(3), (b)(6)	(b)(2)High			30AUG07	4		
07-41 SAI	10JUL07					30AUG07	4	20AUG07	Blossom mated barrels.
07-42 SAI	10JUL07					30AUG07	3		Ordered
07-43 SAI	10JUL07					30AUG07	4		
07-44 SAI	10JUL07					30AUG07	4		Respirators are on order. No hygienist is available.
07-45 SAI	10JUL07					30AUG07	4		
07-46 SAI	10JUL07					30AUG07	2		
07-47 SAI	10JUL07					30AUG07	4		
07-48 SAI	10JUL07					30AUG07	4		

(b)(2)High

ENTCOM 009386

HAZARD INVENTORY LOG

UNIT: Task Force Desert Hawk Hazard log

Page 10 of 11

Log #	Date	Resp. Person	Hazard	Corrective Action	Reference	Target Date	Risk Code	Date Done	System Defect
07-49 SAI	10JUL07	(b)(3), (b)(6)	(b)(2)High	(b)(2)High		30AUG07	4		
07-50 SAI	10JUL07					30AUG07	4		
07-51 SAI	10JUL07					30AUG07	4		
07-52 SAI	10JUL07	BAE				30AUG07	4		Leaving in October

CENTCOM 009387

HAZARD INVENTORY LOG

UNIT: Task Force Desert Hawk Hazard log

Page 11 of 11

Log #	Date	Resp. Person	Hazard	Corrective Action	Reference	Target Date	Risk Code	Date Done	System Defect
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07-53	10JUL07	(b)(3), (b)(6)				12JUL07	2	20AUG07	Equipment Moved to approved storage
07-54	12AUG07					16AUG07	4	16AUG07	Addressed and Safety Day and by the command.
07-55	16AUG07					15SEP07	3		
07-56	16AUG07					15SEP07	4		
07-57	16AUG07					30AUG07	3		
07-58	16AUG07	S6				01OCT07	3		Leaving Country
07-59	16AUG07					15SEP07	4		
07-60	16AUG07					25AUG07	3		

(b)(2)High

(b)(2)High

Page 66 redacted for the following reason:

(b)(5)

Timeline
Sunday, 7 October 2007
(All times are Zulu)

0635: EOD conducts two controlled detonations. (BDOC RTO Log)

0700: EOD finds an IED on demo range when returning to base. (2 x 82MM Austrian HE rounds with an unknown detonation device stored in a plastic burlap bag buried in the ground at grid (b)(2)High) Decision was made to destroy in place. (BDOC RTO Log)

0715: An explosion in the area of the EOD's location heard, IED detonated in place. (BDOC RTO Log)

0730 (b)(2)High departs FOB SAL. (DH Flight Mission Tracker)

0737: (b)(2)High arrives at SAGR (Salerno Aerial Gunnery Range). (Sworn Statement CW2 (b)(3), (b)(6))

~0737 - 0742: Clears SAGR range by making approximately five cold passes and firing flares. (Sworn Statement CW2 (b)(3), (b)(6)) (IO comment - per CW2 (b)(3), (b)(6) statement he took approximately five minutes to clear the range but according to the time they arrived and the time the range went hot they actually spent 19 minutes clearing the range.)

0756: SAGR is going hot. EOD personnel have cleared the range. (BDOC RTO Log)

0757: SAGR going hot (TOC LOG)

0815: SAGR is cold (TOC LOG and BDOC RTO Log) (IO Comment - Capone15 took 19 minutes to expend 13 rockets and 120 rds 30mm. Total time on range to include cold passes was 38 minutes)

0915: (b)(2)High Departs FOB SAL. Immediately after departure contacts SAL Tower and DHTOC to activate SAGR. (Sworn Statement CW2 (b)(3), (b)(6))

0917: (b)(2)High Departs FOB SAL (DH Flight Mission Tracker)

0917: SAGR goes hot. (BDOC RTO Log) (Per statements from (b)(2)High (b)(2)High they called DH TOC to go hot on SAGR immediately following takeoff).

0918: SAGR goes hot. (DHTOC Log)

0917 - 0925: (b)(2)High conducts 3 - 4 orbits to clear SAGR. Sees 4 - 5 children at (b)(2)High (south of EOD pit) (Sworn Statement CW2 (b)(3), (b)(6))

CENTCOM 009390

0920: (b)(2)High lands FOB SAL (DH Flight Mission Tracker)

~0930 - 0935: (b)(2)High flew 7 hot runs firing 7 training rockets and 40rds 30mm HE at (b)(2)High (Sworn Statement CW2 (b)(3), (b)(6))

~0930 - 0935: (b)(2)High observes 2 children approaching the range from the north from the direction of KPF7.

0935: (b)(2)High calls range cold. (IO Comment - From the time (b)(2)High departed FOB SAL until the time the range went cold was only 17 minutes to conduct 4 cold runs, 7 hot runs, and a final cold run according to sworn statements from the crew and the BDOC log.)

0935: SAGR goes cold. (BDOC RTO Log)

0937: SAGR goes cold. (DHTOC Log)

1033: A Khowst Provisional Forces (KPF) interpreter informs the BDOC that three LN children were wounded and one was killed by a helicopter. This is the initial report that came from KPF7 to the KPF interpreter to the BDOC. LN children reported this to KPF7. (BDOC RTO Log) (IO Comment - Initial report had the number wounded reported in error. Actual number of LNs involved was two injured and one killed.)

1100: KPF radios to BDOC thru the KPF interpreter that KPF is now on scene and reports two LN kids injured and one LN child killed. BDOC directs KPF to get more information and to bring in the injured children to SAL CASH for treatment.

~ 1100: (b)(2)High (DH UH-60 sent to recon range area) spots four LNs in white civilian clothes and an ANA truck with three personnel dressed in brown BDUs at (b)(2)High One of the LNs is pushing a hand cart with the remains of the child that was killed. (Information derived from DH TOC log and photos taken by (b)(2)High)

1101 - 1110: A LN observed moving the remains of child from (b)(2)High to hut at (b)(2)High

1105: (b)(2)High returns to FOB SAL (DH Flight Mission Tracker)

1108: The KPF interpreter informed BDOC that the two injured LNs were going to be brought to KPF6, which is the entry control point for the North Gate of SAL. Report one LN is age 6 w/leg injury and the other is age 12 w/head injury.

1115: (b)(2)High directed to return to base. (Sworn Statement from CW2 (b)(3), (b)(6))

CENTCOM 009391

1118: (b)(2)High lands FOB SAL. (DH TOC Log)

1121: SPC (b)(3), (b)(6) request thru KPF that the one LN that was killed needs to be brought in for examination of wounds. However, the family had taken the child home and KPF informed BDOC that they could not take the remains into SAL for examination without (b)(2)High approval, which was not granted to the BDOC's knowledge. (BDOC duty log)

1203: (b)(2)High logged, meaning the two LN kids are being received at the Combat Support Hospital (CSH). (BDOC duty log)

CENTCOM 009392

List of Persons Interviewed and Persons who Provided Sworn Statements

1. Sworn Statement - CW2 (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(2)High Pilot-in-Command); Interviewed 9 OCT 07
2. Sworn Statement - MAJ (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(2)High Co-Pilot Gunner)
3. Sworn Statement - CW2 (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(2)High Pilot-in-Command); Interviewed 9 OCT 07
4. Sworn Statement - CW2 (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(2)High Co-Pilot Gunner); Interviewed 9 OCT 07
5. Sworn Statement - CW4 (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(2)High Pilot-in-Command)
6. Sworn Statement - CW2 (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(2)High Pilot)
7. Sworn Statement - MAJ (b)(3), (b)(6) (MD who treated (b)(6) (b)(6) ; Interviewed 8 OCT 07
8. Sworn Statement - LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6) (MD who treated (b)(6) (b)(6) ; Interviewed 8 OCT 07
9. Sworn Statement - CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) (BDOC OIC); Interviewed 8 OCT 07
10. Sworn Statement - SGT (b)(3), (b)(6) (BDOC NCO); Interviewed 8 OCT 07
11. Sworn Statement - CW3 (b)(3), (b)(6) (TF Desert Hawk Safety Officer); Interviewed 8 OCT 07
12. Interviewed (b)(6) from the Khowst Provincial Forces, 9 OCT 07
13. Interviewed (b)(3), (b)(6) 9 OCT 07
14. Interviewed (b)(3), (b)(6) , 10 OCT 07

CENTCOM 009393

Summary of interview with (b)(6) by LTC (b)(6) 10 October 2007

(b)(6) were interviewed in the TF Professional lounge on 10 October 2007. They were accompanied by an adult male who identified himself as the children's uncle. Also present during the interview was CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) (82nd CAB SJA) and MAJ (b)(3), (b)(6) (TF Professional Civil Affairs Officer). Both children seemed to be recovering well from their wounds and in good spirits. (b)(6) had a slight limp and used a cane to walk.

They stated that they were out grazing their animals (10 cows) at the time of the incident. They stated that they were not actually located with the animals at the time of the incident but that they were close by. They said that they had never been in that area before. When asked if they would accompany me to the site of the incident, they claimed that they cannot remember where they were at the time. When asked if they were picking up metal they stated that they were not and that they had never been to that site or picked up metal. They later stated that they knew it was illegal to pick up the metal. No matter how much we assured them that it was OK, they never admitted picking up metal. (IO Comment – Their statement that they were not picking up metal is a direct contradiction to what they told medical personnel when they were treated at the CSH on 7 October 07. In fact, several people witnessed (b)(6) showing a piece of shrapnel that he had picked up. It is also unlikely that they don't know where they were. Two of the three children live within one mile of the impact area of SAGR. I am confident that they were picking up metal on the range and know exactly where they were. No animals were observed anywhere in the area of the range.)

They stated that they did observe the aircraft fire and were sure that the rounds that hit them came from the helicopter. They stated that they hid in the grass when the aircraft approached and that they were in the area where the aircrafts round were impacting. They said that they did not see any danger signs posted and did not know they were on the range. (b)(6) stated that when the helicopter fired that it fired one rocket and then fired the machine gun and that it was the machine gun fire that hit them. (IO Comment – this was a significant statement because the crew of (b)(2)High fired three pairs of training rockets in three passes that would likely have not injured the children if they were hiding on the range. On the next pass they did indeed fire 1 rocket and then 30mm. On the next pass they also fired 30mm. According to the children the aircraft only made two passes. Although the aircraft made several passes they only made two passes with 30mm HE rounds – all other ordinance was training rockets/blue spears.)

They stated that (b)(6) was standing up at the time he was hit and that he never moved from the location he was hit. His wounds were on the front of his legs, torso, and face. According to their story when they saw that (b)(6) was dead they ran away. They stated that one of their relatives was at a nearby village and saw what happened and came out to get them with a wheel barrow. They stated that the relative took (b)(6) home in the wheel barrow due to his injuries and then came back and picked up (b)(6). When asked how long it took him to walk home from the site (b)(6) stated 30 minutes. (IO Comment – It is highly unlikely that anyone observed the incident from a village because the closest home is about one mile away.)

CENTCOM 009394

When asked about the adult male who carried (b)(6) back to his house and if he could take us to the site, I was told that he had left the area and they had no way to contact him.

(IO Comment - My assessment of the statements made by the children is that some of their statements are not factual and that they had been coached during the two days between the incident and the interview. I believe they did so because they thought it was illegal to pickup metal and because they knew they should not have been in the area where the aircraft fire.)

CENTCOM 009395



REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, TASK FORCE DESERT HAWK
FOB SALERNO, AFGHANISTAN
APO AE 09314

CJTF-82-DESERT HAWKS

05JUN2007

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Semi-Annual Aerial Range Safety Assessment Survey

1. The semi-annual aerial range survey was taken on 05JUN2007.
2. The following deficiencies were noted:
 - a. Local personnel remain a hazard when utilized SAGR or Clark Ranges.
3. The following areas were noted as strong points:

(b)(2)High
4. Point of contact for this memorandum is CW3(b)(3), (b)(6) Task Force Desert Hawk Safety Officer at (b)(3), (b)(6) @afghan.swa.army.mil.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

CW3, AV
Task Force Safety Officer

CENTCOM 009396



REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, TASK FORCE DESERT HAWK
FOB SALERNO, AFGHANISTAN
APO AE 09314

CJTF-82-DESERT HAWKS

10JUL2007

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Summary of the 1st Semi-Annual Safety Inspection

1. Listed below is the summary of areas inspected during the semi-annual safety inspection conducted 25JUN07 through 10JUL07.

Date	Area Inspected	Deficiencies	Strong Points
25JUN	Fire Prevention	- Flight Line is short at least 3 fire extinguishers.	- Strong support from the local fire department
05JUL	Training Area	- None	- Training areas are clearly defined. Primarily for mountain ops and hoist ops.
05JUL	Mission Risk Assessments	- Current RAV is undervalued (per comments by CRC).	- Deliberate OPS.
05JUL	Pre-Accident Plan	- Quick reference checklist needs added. - Name/Phone numbers need updated. - References to 183rd need removed.	- Monthly drills are being conducted.
05JUL	PIC Selection	- None	- PICs being nominated via the stands board.
05JUL	OHR	- None	- Being used IAW the true intent of the OHR.
05JUL	Hazard Awareness	- No Hazard Map Posted	- None

CENTCOM 009397

CJTF-82-DESERT HAWKS

SUBJECT: Summary of the 1st Semi-Annual Safety Inspection

Date	Area Inspected	Deficiencies	Strong Points
05JUL	Airspace Management	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Arty/Mortars being fired as aircraft pass through ROZs. - Arty being fired into objective when helos are still on station. - AF dropping bombs in close proximity to helos during TICs. 	- None
05JUL	Aerial Range Safety	- Local personnel continue to "crowd" the range collecting metal.	- Ranges procedures are clearly defined using the range cards.
05JUL	Warfighter Management	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Aircrews are failing to update their tracking sheets in a timely manner. -Reset periods are often not being taken due to mission requirements. 	- The 72 hour reset plan for reduction of flight hours seems to be an effective tool.
06JUL	POL Storage	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Eye wash stations at outlying FOBs. - Hand wash stations at outlying FOBs. 	- All FARPs ran by TF Desert Hawk continue to be well above average.
06JUL	HAZCOM	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Lack of accurate MSDS binders. - HAZWASTE containers not labeled. - No HAZCOM SOP. 	- Annual training conducted and documented.
06JUL	HAZWASTE	- Not all containers are marked.	- KBR has a strong SOP for waste disposal.
06JUL	FOD	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Helo Parking Area - FOD at outlying FOB HLZs. 	- None
07JUL	Survival Training	- None	- Strong review of TTP while at UFTP, followed by SPIN specific instruction in country. Winter training scheduled for November.
07JUL	QDR	-None	- Use of electronic tracking
07JUL	AOAP	- None	- Use of electronic tracking
07JUL	ALSE	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - No fire proof containers. - Lack of effective work/storage space. 	- Record Keeping

CENTCOM 009398

CJTF-82-DESERT HAWKS

SUBJECT: Summary of the 1st Semi-Annual Safety Inspection

Date	Area Inspected	Deficiencies	Strong Points
08JUL	Shops	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Safety Boards Incomplete. - Work areas were cluttered. - Lack of effective work space. - Limited number of warning signs (eye protection, noise warnings, no smoking, etc.) - No monthly inspections of work areas. 	- None
08JUL	Respirator Program	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Short of proper respirators. - No formal survey of respirator needs. 	- None
08JUL	Lifting Devices	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Approximately 75% of lifting devices need load tested and date stamped. 	- None
08JUL	GSE Preventive Maintenance	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Regular PMCS isn't being done on all GSE. - Periodic services and inspections are not being completed. 	- None
08JUL	Driver's Training	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Training isn't being conducted. - Gator use - No NVGs available for night operations. 	- POV classes scheduled prior to redeployment.
08JUL	Confined Space Operations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - No confined space gear. - No confined space SOP. 	- None
08JUL	ATC Operations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - ATSCOM recommending a revision of the work cycle for ATC workers. - No digital voice recorder in tower. 	- Great working relationship.

CENTCOM 009399

CJTF-82-DESERT HAWKS

SUBJECT: Summary of the 1st Semi-Annual Safety Inspection

Date	Area Inspected	Deficiencies	Strong Points
09JUL	Aviation medicine	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Aircrews are failing to inform the flight surgeon when medical care, other than that given by a flight surgeon, is completed. - CDRs are sometimes going against grounding (temp) recommendations from the flight surgeon. - Certain exams have to be waived due to the lack of equipment in country. - SACMS-VT has not been completed since we arrived in country (6 month cert). - Contract ATC personnel need to coordinate with aeromed to ensure they have current flight physicals (FAA class III). 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Strong records keeping - Excellent medic integration into the medevac/casevac program.
09JUL	Hearing Conservation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - No hearing booth in country. - Personnel are not using provided hearing protection. - No hearing protection required signs 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Thorough screening for hearing was conducted prior to arrival in theater. - Training is on the yearly calendar. - Hearing protection is readily available.
10JUL	Jingle Air Operations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Refueling operations are substandard and pose a risk to US personnel. - Expanding operations (4 aircraft) without consulting the aviation task force. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - None

4. Point of contact for this memorandum is CW3 (b)(3), (b)(6) Task Force Desert Hawk Safety Officer at (b)(3), (b)(6) @afghan.swa.army.mil.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

CW3, AV
Task Force Safety Officer

CENTCOM 009400

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is PMG.

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 (SSN).
PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately identified.
ROUTINE USES: Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval.
DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
5. LA (b)(3), (b)(6) E	6. SSN (b)(6)	7. GRADE/STATUS 05 USAFR	
8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS			
9. I, (b)(3), (b)(6), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH: I am a general surgeon and cared for a child on 07 Oct 2007. I was told he was injured on the Apache Range at Salerno, Afghanistan and that he was one of two children being brought here with one deceased child. Upon arrival at the trauma bay, he was in stable condition. He was alert and oriented. He stated his age as (b)(6). Upon examination, he had multiple puncture wounds consistent with fragments from an explosion. These wounds were on the left shoulder, left back at scapular tip, left hip, left mid thigh, left calf and right mid forearm. None were bleeding at the time of exam. There was no surrounding tissue destruction. No neuro or vascular injuries were noted nor any serious torso trauma. X-rays were done and showed fragments, mostly superficial, none serious, associated with these puncture wounds. These were metallic appearing and consistent with fragments from an explosion. These were low velocity fragments since their penetration and amount of tissue destruction was limited.			
10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS (b)(3), (b)(6) ON MAKING STATEMENT		PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES
ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____"			
THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.			

STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT SAL DATED 10 Oct 2007

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

The assessment was this patient suffered numerous superficial fragment injuries resulting from an explosion. The wounds were cleansed and irrigated using local anesthesia and dressed with sterile gauze. The fragments were not removed because chasing them would cause more tissue damage. The patients were then sent to the local national Brick clinic just off base for overnight observation.

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

(b)(3), (b)(6)

PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGES

STATEMENT OF

(b)(3), (b)(6)

TAKEN AT

SAL

DATED

10 Oct 2007

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

AFFIDAVIT

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 3. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL

(b)(3), (b)(6)

WITNESSES:

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 10th day of OCT, 07 at SAL

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(b)(3), (b)(6)

TS, USAF

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(b)(3), (b)(6)

h)

ith)

15-6 IO

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

(b)(3), (b)(6)

PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 2ND BATTALION, 321ST (ABN) FIELD ARTILLERY
FOB SALERNO, AFGHANISTAN, APO AE 09314

09 OCT 2007

MEMORANDUM FOR Base Defense Operations (BDOC)

SUBJECT: FOB Salerno Personnel Access

1. Please allow (b)(3), (b)(6) access to FOB Salerno tomorrow – 10 Oct 2007. They will arrive at the KPF gate at 0900 L.
2. Point of Contact for this memorandum is the undersigned at DSN (b)(2)High or Roshan (b)(2)High

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

MAJ, CA
Civil Military Operations Officer

Major (b)(3), (b)(6)
S5 Civil Affairs
FOB Salerno
Khost, Afghanistan


(b)(3), (b)(6)

APPROVED

ORIGINAL


CENTCOM 009404

SAGR Range Recon Photos – 8 October 2007



CENTCOM 009405

SAGR Range Recon Photos – 8 October 2007



CENTCOM 009406

SAGR Range Recon Photos – 8 October 2007

Impact
Area

EOD
Pit

Hut where two of the three
children lived and where
were taken after the incident

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

CENTCOM 009407

Index of Exhibits

A: TF Desert Hawk SIR
 B: TF Desert Hawk Automated TOC Log
 C: TF Desert Hawk TOC Log
 D: TF Desert Hawk Mission/Training Tracker
 E: BDOC Log
 F: BDOC Shift NCO Log
 G: (b)(2)High Pilot Debrief
 H: Sworn Statement - CW2 (b)(3), (b)(6) ((b)(2)High Pilot-in-Command)
 I: Sworn Statement - MAJ (b)(3), (b)(6) ((b)(2)High Co-Pilot Gunner)
 J: (b)(2)High Pilot Debrief
 K: Sworn Statement - CW2 (b)(3), (b)(6) ((b)(2)High Pilot-in-Command)
 L: Sworn Statement - CW2 (b)(3), (b)(6) ((b)(2)High Co-Pilot Gunner)
 M: Sworn Statement - CW4 (b)(3), (b)(6) ((b)(2)High Pilot-in-Command)
 N: Sworn Statement - CW2 (b)(3), (b)(6) ((b)(2)High Pilot)
 O: Sworn Statement - MAJ (b)(3), (b)(6) (MD who treated (b)(6))
 P: 396th CSH Medical Records from 7 OCT 07 for (b)(3), (b)(6)
 Q: Sworn Statement - LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6) (MD who treated (b)(6))
 R: 396th CSH Medical Records from 7 OCT 07 for (b)(3), (b)(6)
 S: Sworn Statement - CPT (BDOC OIC)
 T: Sworn Statement - SGT (b)(3), (b)(6) (BDOC NCO)
 U: Sworn Statement - CW3 (TF Desert Hawk Safety Officer)
 V: Notes from 10/07/07 Solatia Incident - MAJ (b)(3), (b)(6)
 W: BDOC access log for LNs for IO interview on 9 OCT 07
 X: TF Desert Hawk Memorandum for Record - Subject: Semi-Annual Aerial Range Safety Assessment Survey
 Y: TF Desert Hawk Hazard Log
 Z: TF Desert Hawk Memorandum for Record - Subject: Air to Ground Range, Salerno, Afghanistan
 AA: TF Desert Hawk Range Brief/Kneeboard Card
 BB: SAGR Range Sketch
 CC: Pictures of injuries sustained by (b)(3), (b)(6)
 DD: Pictures of injuries sustained by (b)(3), (b)(6)
 EE: Pictures of the (b)(6) being removed from the SAGR area and after arrival at his home
 FF: ISAF News Release
 GG: Range Recon Photos from 8 OCT 07
 HH: Summary of interview with (b)(6) from the Khowst Provincial Forces, 9 OCT 07
 II: Summary of interview with (b)(3), (b)(6) , 9 OCT 07
 JJ: Summary of interview with (b)(3), (b)(6) , 10 OCT 07

CENTCOM 009408

List of Persons Interviewed and Persons who Provided Sworn Statements

1. Sworn Statement - CW2 (b)(3), (b)(6) ((b)(2)High Pilot-in-Command); Interviewed 9 OCT 07
2. Sworn Statement - MAJ (b)(3), (b)(6) ((b)(2)High Co-Pilot Gunner)
3. Sworn Statement - CW2 (b)(3), (b)(6) ((b)(2)High Pilot-in-Command); Interviewed 9 OCT 07
4. Sworn Statement - CW2 (b)(3), (b)(6) ((b)(2)High Co-Pilot Gunner); Interviewed 9 OCT 07
5. Sworn Statement - CW4 (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(2)High Pilot-in-Command)
6. Sworn Statement - CW2 (b)(3), (b)(6) ((b)(2)High Pilot)
7. Sworn Statement - MAJ (b)(3), (b)(6) (MD who treated (b)(6) (b)(6) ; Interviewed 8 OCT 07
8. Sworn Statement - LtCol (b)(3), (b)(6) (MD who treated (b)(6) (b)(6) ; Interviewed 8 OCT 07
9. Sworn Statement - CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) (BDOC OIC); Interviewed 8 OCT 07
10. Sworn Statement - SGT (b)(3), (b)(6) (BDOC NCO); Interviewed 8 OCT 07
11. Sworn Statement - CW3 (b)(3), (b)(6) (TF Desert Hawk Safety Officer); Interviewed 8 OCT 07
12. Interviewed (b)(6) from the Khowst Provincial Forces, 9 OCT 07
13. Interviewed (b)(3), (b)(6) , 9 OCT 07
14. Interviewed (b)(3), (b)(6) , 10 OCT 07

CENTCOM 009409

1118: (b)(2)High lands FOB SAL. (DH TOC Log)

1121: SPC (b)(3), (b)(6) request thru KPF that the one LN that was killed needs to be brought in for examination of wounds. However, the family had taken the child home and KPF informed BDOC that they could not take the remains into SAL for examination without (b)(2)High approval, which was not granted to the BDOC's knowledge. (BDOC duty log)

1203: (b)(2)High logged, meaning the two LN kids are being received at the Combat Support Hospital (CSH). (BDOC duty log)

CENTCOM 009410

281036

TRAINING / MTF STATUS									
MISSION	(2) Hi	TN	CS	CREWS	ETD	ATD	ETA	JHRS	POS
TRNG	1-C	013	CP15	(b)(3), (b)(6)	TBD	0730	TBD	0920	MC
TRNG	4-C	229	CP21		0900	0917	1100	1105	MC
TRNG			CP		0900		1030		
TRNG	5-C	242	CP22		TBD	2029	TBD	2302	MC
ATM	2-C	188	CP16		1300	1221	1500	1501	2.5 MC
ATM	2-C	188	CP16		2100		2300		
MTF	2-C	188	CP16		0700	0917	0900	1030	MC

CENTCOM 009411

281036

QRF/MED STATUS											
MISSION	(2)H	TN	CS	CREWS		ETD	ATD	ETA	ATA	HRS	POS
BEFORE SWAP											
OE MED	8-C	738	DO32	(b)(3), (b)(6)						0.6	
OE CHASE	1-C	291	DD01	(b)(3), (b)(6)						0.6	
AFTER SWAP											
OE MED	5-C	655	DO32	(b)(3), (b)(6)						2.5	
OE CHASE	1-C	291	DD01	(b)(3), (b)(6)						1.8	
MME: 10-07E OE:1305 - 1311; COP: 1318-1323; OE (.5 HRS)											
MME: ACFT (738) DD01 (291) (1.2) HRS											
ACFT SWAP (.8) HRS											
D ATK1	1-C	013	CP15	(b)(3), (b)(6)						2	
D ATK2	4-C	229	CP21	(b)(3), (b)(6)						1.6	
AH-MED CHASE	7-C	034	CP11	(b)(3), (b)(6)							
D MRDY	8-C	307	DD02	(b)(3), (b)(6)			631				
SAL MED	8-C	738	DO33	(b)(3), (b)(6)			631			1.4	
MME: 10-07B: SAL:0631-0704; (2)H											
CCA ISO KHAKI RING SAL:0343 0456:SAL											
← FORMER FLIGHT NO GUNNER											
N ATK1	5-C	242	CP22	(b)(3), (b)(6)							
N ATK2	2-C	188	CP16	(b)(3), (b)(6)						2.5	
N MRDY	8-C	307	DD02	(b)(3), (b)(6)							
SAL MED		410	DO33	(b)(3), (b)(6)							

CENTCOM 009412

Page 90 redacted for the following reason:

(b)(2)High, (b)(6)



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, TASK FORCE PEGASUS
COMBINED/JOINT TASK FORCE (CJTF)-82
BAGRAM, AFGHANISTAN
APO AE 0934-9998

REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF:

CJTF-82-AV-CO

18 October 2007

MEMORANDUM FOR Commander, Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF)-82, ATTN: Chief of Staff,
Bagram Airfield, Afghanistan, APO AE 09354

SUBJECT: Executive Summary, AR 15-6 Findings for Salerno Aerial Gunnery Range Incident on 7
October 2007

1. Background

a. On 7 October 2007 I was appointed the CJTF-82 Commander to conduct an informal 15-6 investigation of an incident in the vicinity of Salerno Aerial Gunnery Range which is located about 500 meters north of FOB Salerno. I was notified at approximately 1600Z on 7 OCT 07 and departed Bagram for FOB Salerno at approximately 0130Z 8 OCT 07. I arrived at FOB Salerno at approximately 0230Z and immediately began the investigation. I departed Salerno on 11 OCT 07 and returned to Bagram to complete the investigation.

b. On 7 October 2007 at 1033Z the Khowst Provincial Forces (KPF) at KPF7 reported to the FOB Salerno (SAL) Base Defense Operations Center (BDOC) that two kids had approached KPF7 and reported that three local national (LN) children had been wounded and that one had been killed by helicopter fire. KPF7 is one of eight fixed OPs around SAL that are manned by KPF. Subsequent reports from the KPF indicated that the actual numbers were two injured and one killed. This report proved to be accurate and two LN children were injured and one was killed vicinity Salerno Aerial Gunnery Range (SAGR). The child who was killed was (b)(6) and the two injured children were (b)(6).

c. SAGR is used by TF Desert Hawk for aerial gunnery. The impact area is at the base of a ridgeline with moderate high ground on both sides of the impact area that represent the right and left limits of the range. The range and impact area are easily identifiable by prominent terrain features and has been used routinely by TF Desert Hawk crews. Just to the east of the SAGR impact area and across a ridgeline are two sand pits routinely used by EOD to detonate UXO. There are no signs, markings, fences and/or etc that identify the area as a range or danger area.

d. TF Desert Hawk's (b)(2)High (single AH-64), that was on the range from 0917Z to 0935Z, is the most likely cause of the accident given the circumstantial evidence and the sequence of events. The crew for (b)(2)High was CW2 (b)(3), (b)(6) (Pilot-in-Command) and CW2 (b)(3), (b)(6) (Co-Pilot Gunner).

2. Findings

a. (b)(2)High engagements on SARG are the most likely cause of the accident. This finding is based on circumstantial evidence and because their hot time on SAGR fits the timeline of events much more closely than any of the other known events that could have caused the injuries. However, without knowing the exact location where the injuries were sustained it is not possible to say definitively that (b)(2)High was the cause of the injuries sustained by the children. Bottom line, the findings of the investigation are inconclusive but it is "probable" that the injuries were sustained because the children hide on the range and were not observed by (b)(2)High. The crew stated that they conducted four cold sweeps to recon and clear the range and no personnel were observed on the

CENTCOM 009414

CJTF-82-AV-CO

SUBJECT: Executive Summary, AR 15-6 Findings for Salerno Aerial Gunnery Range Incident on 7 October 2007

range. The evidence indicates that the crew of (b)(2)High followed all range procedures and SOPs. I did not find that there was any negligence on the part of the crew of (b)(2)High

b. There are no markings, signs, fences or warnings of any sort that indicate the boundaries of the range or the presence of a danger/impact area.

c. Crews have developed TTPs for dealing with LNs on the range. These TTPs are common knowledge but are not documented. It is unclear in the SAGR SOP if "recon and clear" the range means verifying that there are no personnel on the range or if it implies that the pilots may take necessary action to clear personnel off the range. Pilot interpretation is that they can take necessary actions (flying low and slow overhead and/or firing flares) to clear people off the range.

d. SAGR is and will continue to be a hazard to local personnel even if the range was clearly marked. The desire for the shrapnel and 30mm casing is driving the LNs to take risk and put themselves in dangerous areas to get the limited supply of metal on the range. TF Professional has repeatedly addressed this with local leaders without resolution. There is no reason to believe that this will improve as long as we continue to fire on SAGR. If SAGR remains active as an aerial gunnery range the risk to LNs who scavenge the metal on the range will be very high and the likelihood of death or injury to LNs is very high.

e. Although there have been no SAFIREs reported on SAGR, the threat assessment in the bowl around SAL is moderate. In fact, there was an IED on the road going to the range the day of this incident. The TTPs used by the crews to clear the range (low and slow passes) and the predictability of the flight pattern on the range coupled with the fact that the outbound turn is done into rising terrain makes the aircraft vulnerable to enemy attacks.

3. Recommendations

a. I recommend the use of SAGR be discontinued. I do not feel that there is a course of action that will ensure the safety of LNs due to their willingness to put themselves in dangerous situations. My recommendation is to identify multiple free fire areas along routine flight corridors that can be used to test fire weapons and maintain crew proficiency. These free fire areas should be well clear of populated areas and preferably in known enemy territory (show of force). Using multiple free fire areas and using various inbound headings would reduce the predictability to both LNs and enemy elements. Clearing procedures prior to firing in these areas would need to be clearly defined and documented and firing would not be conducted if the areas were not clear. Free fire areas should be over terrain that can easily be cleared by aerial recon.

b. Range SOPs need to be revised to define what clearing the range actually means. Does it mean that you do not fire if personnel are on the range or does it mean that aircrews take actions to get people off the range? If aircrews are allowed to use TTPs to clear the range, those need to be documented and clearly defined.

c. Recommend that the responsibilities, relationship, and capabilities between TF Fury, TF Professional, and the BDOC be relooked. My observation is that the BDOC controls the ground around the FOB but does not have the resources required to cover the area (ie armored vehicles). This was a factor in this investigation because TF Desert Hawk requested that the BDOC send personnel out to the range immediately after the incident was reported to investigate. The BDOC had the people (b)(2)High but not the transportation resources. Had this happened in a timely manner we possibly could have known the location of the incident and could have definitively determined the cause of the injuries. Additionally, when trying to arrange transportation to get to the range I encountered a similar situation. The BDOC did not have the vehicle resources to support my request and TF Professional was unwilling to support because the BDOC controls the terrain. Recommend the BDOC be resourced to cover their assigned AO or that the BDOC mission be tasked to some other maneuver element.

d. Recommend that condolence payments be made to the families based on the death of (b)(6) (b)(6) and for non-serious injuries to (b)(6)

CENTCOM 009415

CJTF-82-AV-CO

SUBJECT: Executive Summary, AR 15-6 Findings for Salerno Aerial Gunnery Range Incident on 7 October 2007

4. Point of contact for this investigation is LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) at DSN: (b)(2)High

(b)(3), (b)(6)

LTC, AV
Deputy Commander

CENTCOM 009416

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is PMG.

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 (SSN) .
PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately identified.
ROUTINE USES: Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval.
DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION FOB Salerno, Afghanistan	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD) 2007/10/07	3. TIME 1145Z	4. FILE NUMBER
5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME (b)(3), (b)(6)	6. SSN (b)(6)	7. GRADE/STATUS CW-2	

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
C Company 1-285th ARB, FOB Salerno Afghanistan APO AE 09314

9. I, (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(6), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

CW2 (b)(3), (b)(6) and I took off for a training flight at 0915Z. We were in aircraft 05229 (b)(2)High. Upon taking off, we called Deserthawk TOC to coordinate for Sager range to go hot. We flew to the range to perform our (b)(2)High of the engagement area prior to firing. We performed 3-4 orbits around the engagement area. Neither CW2 (b)(3), (b)(6) or I saw any personnel around the engagement area. The only personnel that we saw were 4-5 children at grid (b)(2)High well south of the E.O.D. detonation pit. We called Deserthawk TOC at this time and told them our (b)(2)High was complete. The TOC verified that the range was cleared to go hot. I then called Salerno tower to inform them that our (b)(2)High was complete, and that we were going hot on the range. This was at approximately 0925Z-0930Z. I fired 7 training practice rockets (blue spears) at grid (b)(2)High. Once I was complete, CW2 (b)(3), (b)(6) fired 7 training practice rockets at the same grid. All rockets hit within 25m of that grid. The area that we fired at was a prominent rock face within the middle of the engagement area. The rock face was easily identified from the surrounding area. In the past I have not seen people in the vicinity of the rock face. We also fired 40 rounds of 30MM at the same rock face, grid (b)(2)High. While firing at the range, we never saw any personnel within the engagement area. The 4-5 children had remained in the vicinity of grid (b)(2)High, well clear of our fires. Historically, locals gather at this area but do not conflict with range operations. I called Salerno tower and Deserthawk TOC to inform them that we were cold at the range. We called the range cold at approximately 0935Z. We continued our training flight within the Salerno bowl until 1100Z. We performed reconnaissance for (b)(2)High of historical IED sites. Once complete, we performed 4-5 traffic patterns around the airfield. At this time we were informed by Deserthawk TOC to shutdown (1100Z).

*****NOTHING FOLLOWS*****

(b)(3), (b)(6)

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6)	PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES
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ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____"

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.

STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(6)) TAKEN AT _____ DATED 2007/10/07

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

Large empty rectangular area for the statement, crossed out with a large 'X'.

AFFIDAVIT

I, (b)(3), (b)(6) _____, HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH _____ PAGE _____. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFL

(b)(3), (b)(6)

WITNESSES:

SGT

(b)(3), (b)(6)

F-2 HHC 1/285 ARB
ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this _____ day of _____, _____ at _____

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is PMG.

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 (SSN) .
PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately identified.
ROUTINE USES: Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval.
DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION FOB Salerno	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD) 2007/10/07	3. TIME 1140Z	4. FILE NUMBER
5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME (b)(3), (b)(6)	6. SSN (b)(6)	7. GRADE/STATUS CW2	
8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS C. Co 1-285th ARB			

9. I, (b)(6), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:
On October 07, 2007 at 0915 hrs Zulu, CW2 (b)(3), (b)(6) and I were wheels up for a training flight. Immediately after takeoff we called SAL tower and DHTOC to activate Sagr range. After four range sweeps to clear the range we did not see any individuals on or near the range. Once we were sure the range was clear, we called DHTOC to assure we were cleared to fire on the range. After clearance to fire (at approximately 0930 Zulu), we flew 7 hot runs firing 14 training rockets and 40 rounds of 30mm HE. All of our rounds landed within 20 meters of grid (b)(2)High. During our engagement we observed two children, one wearing white, the other wearing blue. They came from approximately 2 kilometers to the north, we suspected they were going to collect the brass from our engagement. While we were on the range, the children stayed near the EOD pit and never proceeded closer to Sagr range than grid (b)(2)High. After rounds complete, we called DHTOC to let them know we were finished shooting and we continued with our training flight. NOTHING FOLLOWS

(b)(3), (b)(6)

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6)	PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES
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ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____"

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is PMG.

AUTHORITY:	Title 10, USC Section 301; Title 5, USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 Social Security Number (SSN).
PRINCIPAL PURPOSE:	To document potential criminal activity involving the U.S. Army, and to allow Army officials to maintain discipline, law and order through investigation of complaints and incidents.
ROUTINE USES:	Information provided may be further disclosed to federal, state, local, and foreign government law enforcement agencies, prosecutors, courts, child protective services, victims, witnesses, the Department of Veterans Affairs, and the Office of Personnel Management. Information provided may be used for determinations regarding judicial or non-judicial punishment, other administrative disciplinary actions, security clearances, recruitment, retention, placement, and other personnel actions.
DISCLOSURE:	Disclosure of your SSN and other information is voluntary.

9. I, (b)(6), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

(b)(3), (b)(6) ----- Nothing Else Follows-----

IT	11.	PERSON MAKING STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF	2	PAGES
	(b)(3), (b)(6)				

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.

STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6)


TAKEN AT 1250 ZULU

DATED 2007/10/07

(b)(3), (b)(6)

STATEMENT (Continued)

(b)(3), (b)(6)



(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

AFFIDAVIT

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE _____. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(Signature)

W

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this _____ day of _____, _____ at _____

C/2-82 TF Desert Hawk
FOB Salerno, Afghanistan APO AE 09314
ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

C/2-82 TF Desert Hawk
FOB Salerno, Afghanistan APO AE 09314
ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS (b)(3), (b)(6) MAKING STATEMENT

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is PMG.

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10, USC Section 301; Title 5, USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 Social Security Number (SSN).

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To document potential criminal activity involving the U.S. Army, and to allow Army officials to maintain discipline, law and order through investigation of complaints and incidents.

ROUTINE USES: Information provided may be further disclosed to federal, state, local, and foreign government law enforcement agencies, prosecutors, courts, child protective services, victims, witnesses, the Department of Veterans Affairs, and the Office of Personnel Management. Information provided may be used for determinations regarding judicial or non-judicial punishment, other administrative disciplinary actions, security clearances, recruitment, retention, placement, and other personnel actions.

DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your SSN and other information is voluntary.

1. LOCATION FOB SALERNO, AFGANISTAN	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD) 2007/10/07	3. TIME 1258Z	4. FILE NUMBER
5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME (b)(3), (b)(6)	6. SSN (b)(6)	7. GRADE/STATUS W2 / AD	
8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS C Company, 2/82 Avn Regt, TF Desert Hawk FOB Salerno, APO AE 09314			

9. I, (b)(3), (b)(6), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

ON THE 7TH DAY OF OCTOBER 2007 AT 1100 ZULU, I WAS THE PILOT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) SERIAL NUMBER (b)(2)High A UH-60 BLACKHAWK, ON SHORT FINAL TO LAND AT FOB SALERNO WHEN I WAS RETASKED BY DERSERT HAWK TOC BATTLE CAPTAIN TO DO AN AIR RECON OF THE AH-64 RANGE NORTH OF THE FOB FOR LOCAL PESONAL IN THE RANGE AREA. WE DEPARTED THE RUNWAY ON A HEADING OF 090 WITH A LEFT TURN OUT TO THE RANGE. UPON REACHING THE AREA OF (b)(2)High WE LOCATED FOUR LOCALS IN WHITE CIVILIAN CLOTHES AND AN ANA TAN TRUCK WITH 3 PESONAL DRESSED IN TAN BATTLE DRESSED UNIFORMS. ONE OF THE LOCALS WAS PUSHING A WHEEL BARREL WITH SOMETHING COVERED. THE LOCALS AND SOLDIERS WERE HAVING A DISCUSSION. AROUND THE PICK UP TRUCK. ONE LOCAL BEGIN TO RUN AWAY WITH WHAT LOOKED TO BE A BRIEFCASE TUCKED UNDER HIS ARM. AFTER THE DISCUSSION A TOTAL OF 3 LOCALS CONTIUED TO THE HUT LOCATED AT (b)(3), (b)(6). UPON THE WHEEL BARREL REACHING THE HUT THE PEOPLE AT THE HUT UNCOVERED WHAT WAS ON THE BARREL. IT WAS A YOUNG MALE IN WHITE CLOTHES WHOM LOOKED ABOUT THE AGE OF (b)(6) YEARS. THEY COVERED HIM WITH A BROWN SHRUD. AFTER WE SAW THIS WE CONTIUED TO LOOK FOR MORE LOCAL PEOPLE IN THE RANGE AREA. WE FOUND ANOTHER 4 LOCALS ON THE OTHER SIDE OF THE RIDGE LINE. AROUND 1115 ZULU WE RECIEVED THE ORDER FROM THE BATTLE CAPTIAN TO RETURN TO BASE AFTER RADIO COMMUNICATIONS DURING THE RECON. SPC (b)(3), (b)(6) TOOK SEVERAL PHOTOS. I DOWNLOADED THEM TO GIVE TO DESERT HAWK TOC FOR THEIR OFFICAL RECORDS.

NOTHING ELSE FOLLOWS

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITI (b)(3), (b)(6)	PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES
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ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____"

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.

DA FORM 2823, NOV 2006

DA FORM 2823, DEC 1998, IS OBSOLETE

CENTCOM 0094 (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

STATEMENT OF

(b)(3), (b)(6)

TAKEN AT 1258 Z

DATED 2007/10/07

(b)(3), (b)(6)

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

AFFIDAVIT

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE _____. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 7TH day of OCTOBER, 2007 at 1345 Z

(b)(3), (b)(6)

CW3(P)

C 2/82 AVN FOB SALERNO
ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

ath)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

CPT, AV

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

CPT, AV

(Type name of Person Administering Oath)

C 2-82 AVN FOB SALERNO
ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

DUTY BASED CAPTAIN 1-295 ARB TF DN
(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is PMG.

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 (SSN).
PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately identified.
ROUTINE USES: Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval.
DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION <u>Camp Salerno AF</u>	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD) <u>20071008</u>	3. TIME <u>0954 Z</u>	4. FILE NUMBER
5. (b)(3), (b)(6)	6. (b)(6)	7. GRADE/STATUS <u>MAJ AD</u>	

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
455 EMDG Task Force used, USAF APO AE 09314

9. I, (b)(3), (b)(6), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

On 7 Oct 07 @ approximately 5:00 pm (1700) local time we received a radio transmission that there were children at the KPF gate brought in by KPF soldiers who were claiming to have been injured on the helicopter range. Two children were picked up in an ambulance at the entry point by our medical staff. The two boys were brought to the 396th CASIT trauma treatment area (EMT). I evaluated a boy who claimed to be (b)(6) years old and one of the General Surgeons evaluated a boy who claimed to be (b)(6). The patient I evaluated complained of pain to the right side of his head. I inquired about visual or auditory problems and he said, through a translator, that he had trouble hearing in his right ear earlier but that had gone away. I examined the boy and found a wound posterior to his right ear about 5mm in diameter consistent with a shrapnel injury. I completed his physical exam and XRay evaluation and found no other evidence of injury and no radio opaque foreign bodies on XRay.

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6)	PAGE 1 OF <u>2</u> PAGES
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ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____"

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.

STATEMENT OF

(b)(3), (b)(6)

TAKEN AT

SAL

DATED

~~8 Oct 07~~ 8 Oct 07

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

I inquired about how the injuries occurred through our medical translator. The boy reported that he and his brothers were picking up the metal from the helicopter range when a helicopter came over the overhead and then he was hurt. I asked the boy if he or his brothers picked up something that blew up and he said no. I treated the boy with tetanus prophylaxis and cleaned and dressed his wounds. I instructed that the boy would remain overnight for observation. Our facility was over capacity, so he was transferred to a clinic run by our medical interpreters and released the next morning per their discretion.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

(b)(3), (b)(6)

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

AFFIDAVIT

I, _____ (b)(3), (b)(6), HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE _____. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTION CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

administer oaths, this _____ day of _____, _____ at _____

T. F. Regalado
ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(b)(3), (b)(6)

h)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

15-610

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

PAGE OF PAGES

Pages 105 through 107 redacted for the following reasons:

(b)(1)1.4a and (b)(2)High
(b)(1)1.4a and c and (b)(2)High
(b)(6)



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, TASK FORCE PEGASUS
COMBINED/JOINT TASK FORCE (CJTF)-82
BAGRAM, AFGHANISTAN
APO AE 0934-9998

REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF:

CJTF-82-AV-CO

18 October 2007

MEMORANDUM FOR Commander, Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF)-82, ATTN: Chief of Staff,
Bagram Airfield, Afghanistan, APO AE 09354

SUBJECT: AR 15-6 Findings for Salerno Aerial Gunnery Range Incident on 7 October 2007

1. Background

a. On 7 October 2007 at 1033Z the Khowst Provincial Forces (KPF) at KPF7 reported to the FOB Salerno (SAL) Base Defense Operations Center (BDOC) that two kids had approached KPF7 and reported that three local national (LN) children had been wounded and that one had been killed by helicopter fire. KPF7 is one of eight fixed OPs around SAL that are manned by KPF. Subsequent reports from the KPF indicated that the actual numbers were two injured and one killed (see exhibit E). This report proved to be accurate and two LN children were injured and one was killed vicinity Salerno Aerial Gunnery Range (SAGR). The child that was killed was moved from the SAGR area by a LN, believed to be his uncle, in a wheel barrow. The LN moving the body was first seen at (b)(2)High at 1101Z proceeding to a hut at (b)(2)High (b)(2)High that is believed to be the home of the child and his brother (one of the injured children). The child who was killed was (b)(6) and the two injured children were (b)(6) (b)(6) were brothers and (b)(6) is their cousin per an interview with the children (see exhibit JJ).

b. The injury sustained by (b)(6) was one shrapnel wound behind the right ear. Wound was 3-5mm in diameter and the metal was not still in the wound when he was treated (see exhibits O, P, and CC). The injuries sustained by (b)(6) were small shrapnel puncture wounds on the left shoulder, left back, left hip, left mid thigh, left calf, and right mid forearm. They were consistent with wounds from an explosion. X-rays determine that most of the metal fragments were embedded in the tissue but none were removed because the removal would have caused more tissue damage (see exhibits Q, R and DD). Both boys were treated and released.

c. SAGR is an area designated as an aerial gunnery range about 500 meters north of SAL. The range is used by TF Desert Hawk for aerial gunnery and was started and used by previous aviation Task Forces at SAL. The impact area is at the base of a ridgeline with moderate high ground on both sides of the impact area that represent the right and left limits of the range. The range and impact area are easily identifiable by prominent terrain features and has been used routinely by TF Desert Hawk crews. Just to the east of the SAGR impact area and across a ridgeline are two sand pits routinely used by EOD to detonate UXO. There are no signs, markings, fences and/or etc that identify the area as a range or danger area (see attached SAGR sketch and exhibit AA and GG).

d. The presence of kids on SAGR and Clark (another aerial gunnery range used by TF Desert Hawk) is a known problem. Every crew that I talked to said it was an issue/hazard. This has been document during TF Desert Hawk Safety/Stands meetings and during the most recent

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Semi-Annual Aerial Range Safety Assessment Survey dated 5 June 2007 (see exhibits X and Y). LNs come onto the range area, the impact area, and the EOD pit to pick up the casing from the 30mm and shrapnel from the rockets and munitions exploded in the EOD pit. The metal is sold at local markets. As the number of LNs competing for the metal has increased, the LNs have become more emboldened and continue to encroach on the range boundaries while the aircraft are firing on the range. Several Soldiers stated that LNs on the SAL small arms range have either stolen or attempted to steal the targets off the range while they are being fired at. Several other crew members stated that they have seen LNs run onto the range after a hot pass to pick up brass and try to run off again before the aircraft turns back inbound. In other cases this has been observed by personnel not in the aircraft while the aircrews were unaware because they hide on the ridgeline and run out between passes but take cover again before the aircraft comes back around. Due to the nature of the terrain on the range with tall grass, shrub brush, gullies, and rock formations it is extremely difficult to locate individuals if they hide when the aircraft approaches (see exhibits AA and GG).

(b)(2)High

(b)(2)High **The bottom line is that SAGR is a hazard because the LN's desire for the metal drives them to put themselves in a known danger area in order to retrieve the metal before someone else gets it. Because of their actions and the close proximity of civilians to SAGR, any aerial gunner operations on SAGR will be high risk to LNs in the area. (very quick response time when aircraft start firing – kids are usually present within 2-3 minutes along the range boundaries)**

f. On the day of the incident, 7 October 2007, there were three known events on the range that could possibly have caused the injuries to the children involved. First is the controlled detonation in the EOD pit and the detonation on an IED that was blown in place on the road leading to the EOD pit at 0715Z. (There is no evidence to indicate that the children involved or anyone I spoke to were aware of the IED or how it was emplaced.) It is extremely unlikely that this was the cause of the injuries because these detonations were observed and because it does not fit the timeline considering the other events that occurred. Second was (b)(2)High (single AH-64) that fired on SAGR between 0757Z and 0815Z. The crew of (b)(2)High was CW2 (b)(3), (b)(6) (Pilot-in-Command) and MAJ (b)(3), (b)(6) (Co-Pilot Gunner). Due to the timeline of events it is very unlikely that this is when the incident occurred. Finally, TF Desert Hawk's (b)(2)High (single AH-64), that was on the range from 0917Z to 0935Z, is the most likely cause of the accident given the circumstantial evidence and the sequence of events (see attached timeline). The crew for (b)(2)High was CW2 (b)(3), (b)(6) (Pilot-in-Command) and CW2 (b)(3), (b)(6) (Co-Pilot Gunner).

2. Findings

a. (b)(2)High engagements on SARG are the most likely cause of the accident. This finding is based on circumstantial evidence and because their hot time on SAGR fits the timeline of events much more closely than any of the other known events that could have caused the injuries. However, without knowing the exact location where the injuries were sustained it is not possible to say definitively that (b)(2)High was the cause of the injuries sustained by the children. **Bottom line, the findings of the investigation are inconclusive but it is "probable" that the injuries were sustained because the children hide on the range and were not observed by (b)(2)High.** The crew stated that they conducted four cold sweeps to recon and clear the range and no personnel were observed on the range. The evidence indicates that the crew of (b)(2)High followed all range procedures and SOPs. I did not find that there was any negligence on the part of the crew of (b)(2)High. The key pieces of evidence that support the above finding are as follows:

- 1) Based on the timeline, the sequence of events and the distances between SAGR and where the children live it possible that (b)(2)High could have caused the injuries.
- 2) The children that reported to KPF7 stated that the injuries and death were caused by helicopter fire.
- 3) The injured children stated that they were sure that the explosions came from the helicopter. They stated that they saw it fire one rocket and then the machine gun and that it was the machine gun fire that injured them. This makes sense because on (b)(2)High first three hot turns they only fired training rockets/blue spears. On the fourth turn they fired one rocket and 30mm. The kids stated that the aircraft only made two passes. While this is not the case, (b)(2)High only made two passes where they fired 30mm HE. All their other passes were training rockets only.
- 4) When interviewed, the children stated that they were not picking up metal and that they did not know they were on a range. However, when they were being treated at the CSH they stated that they were picking up metal and actually showed a piece of metal to the doctors that treated them (see exhibit HH and JJ).
- 5) The first known/observed location of the body of (b)(6) was on the road leading away from the EOD pit and SAGR in a wheel barrow being pushed by a LN. Although we do not know the exact location of the accident, this clearly indicates that the fatal injuries were sustained vicinity of SAGR. The claim by the injured children that they did not know they were on a range and that they could not take me to the site because they didn't know where they were simple is not believable. Two of the kids lived approximately 1400 meters from the impact area on the range. From their home, they can observe and hear aircraft firing on SAGR. My assessment is that they would not admit where they were because they knew they were in an area they should not have been and because they thought it was illegal to be picking up the metal from the helicopters (see exhibit JJ).
- 6) The injuries sustained by the children were consistent with 30mm HE shrapnel and not a larger weapon system or explosion. None of the children had injuries that would indicate that they picked up or stepped on something that exploded. The doctors who treated them stated that the injuries were very small pieces and that they were not high velocity. This would indicate that it was a smaller explosion and that they were not in the immediate location of the blast.
- 7) Based on an interview with the KPF personnel that saw the remains of the child that was killed and photos taken by (b)(2)High (UH-60 sent to recon the site) there is no

indication that the child picked up or stepped on something that exploded. Both hands and feet appear to be intact which indicates that his injuries were not likely caused by UXO.

b. **There are no markings, signs, fences or warnings of any sort that indicate the boundaries of the range or the presence of a danger/impact area.** However, I do not believe that the absence of warning signs contributed to the accident. I believe that they knew the risk and decided to pickup metal anyway. Also believe that any fence put around the area would be immediately stolen by LNs and removed from the area.

c. Crews have developed TTPs for dealing with LNs on the range. These TTPs are common knowledge but are not documented. It is unclear in the SAGR SOP if "recon and clear" the range means verifying that there are no personnel on the range or if it implies that the pilots may take necessary action to clear personnel off the range. Pilot interpretation is that they can take necessary actions (flying low and slow overhead and/or firing flares) to clear people off the range.

d. **SAGR is and will continue to be a hazard to local personnel even if the range was clearly marked.** The desire for the shrapnel and 30mm casing is driving the LNs to take risk and put themselves in dangerous areas to get the limited supply of metal on the range. TF Professional has repeatedly addressed this with local leaders without resolution. There is no reason to believe that this will improve as long as we continue to fire on SAGR. **If SAGR remains active as an aerial gunnery range the risk to LNs who scavenge the metal on the range will be very high and the likelihood of death or injury to LNs is very high.**

e. Although there have been no SAFIREs reported on SAGR, the threat assessment in the bowl around SAL is moderate. In fact, there was an IED on the road going to the range the day of this incident.

(b)(2)High

and the predictability of the flight pattern on the range coupled with the fact that the outbound turn is done into rising terrain makes the aircraft vulnerable to enemy attacks. All the locals who pickup metal on the range and are very familiar with the patterns and procedures on the range and I am confident that the enemy is equally familiar with our patterns on the range.

3. Recommendations

a. **I recommend the use of SAGR be discontinued.** I do not feel that there is a course of action that will ensure the safety of LNs due to there willingness to put themselves in dangerous situations. My recommendation is to identify multiple free fire areas along routine flight corridors that can be used to test fire weapons and maintain crew proficiency. These free fire areas should be well clear of populated areas and preferably in known enemy territory (show of force). Using multiple free fire areas and using various inbound headings would reduce the predictability to both LNs and enemy elements. Clearing procedures prior to firing in these areas would need to be clearly defined and documented and firing would not be conducted if the areas were not clear. Free fire areas should be over terrain that can easily be cleared by aerial recon.

b. Range SOPs need to be revised to define what clearing the range actually means. Does it mean that you do not fire if personnel are on the range or does it mean that aircrews take actions to get people off the range? If aircrews are allowed to use TTPs to clear the range, those need to be documented and clearly defined.

c. Recommend that the responsibilities, relationship, and capabilities between TF Fury, TF Professional, and the BDOC be relooked. My observation is that the BDOC controls the ground around the FOB but does not have the resources required to cover the area (ie armored

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SUBJECT: AR 15-6 Findings for Salerno Aerial Gunnery Range Incident on 7 October 2007

vehicles). This was a factor in this investigation because TF Desert Hawk requested that the BDOC send personnel out to the range immediately after the incident was reported to investigate. The BDOC had the people (b)(2)High but not the transportation resources. Had this happened in a timely manner we possibly could have known the location of the incident and could have definitively determined the cause of the injuries. Additionally, when trying to arrange transportation to get to the range I encountered a similar situation. The BDOC did not have the vehicle resources to support my request and TF Profession was unwilling to support because the BDOC controls the terrain. Recommend the BDOC be resourced to cover their assigned AO or that the BDOC mission be task to some other maneuver element.

d. Recommend that condolence payments be made to the families based on the death of (b)(6) (b)(6) and for non-serious injuries to (b)(6)

4. Point of contact for this investigation is LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) at DSN: (b)(2)High

(b)(3), (b)(6)

LTC, AV
Deputy Commander

NOTES FROM 10/07/07 SOLATIA INCIDENT

BY MAJ (b)(3), (b)(6)
2-321 AFAR S9

On 07 October 2007 at 1545, I was informed by the 2-321 Battle Captain, CPT(3), (b)(6), that there was an incident involving LNs and there was a report of injuries and one death.

At 1720, I was accompanied by the Battalion S3, MAJ(3), (b)(6) and CPT(3), (b)(6) to the CASH in order to interview LN family members and injured children receiving care.

Summary of Questions and Answers:

(b)(6), military age male, cousin of the injured children stated the following:

The injured children were 1) (b)(6)
old.

One child, (b)(6) years old was dead.

(b)(6) had a minor shrapnel wound behind his R Ear.

(b)(6) received shrapnel to the hip, both arms and back.

At the time of the incident, (b)(6) was at home and did not witness the incident.

He stated that the children were accompanying animals for grazing when they were injured. (b)(6) was killed by some sort of explosion and was brought back to his family house for burial. (b)(6) wounds included shrapnel to the face and torso.

(b)(6) stated the following:

They (all three children) were "picking up metal" around 1430-1530L. RAZA GUL was killed by an explosion. There were helicopters present at the time of the explosion. He did not know if the explosion was from gun fire or rockets. He was not grazing animals and the family does not own animals. He came to this location before to "pick up metal". There are no signs, billboards or fences that make the location off limits. He approached the site from the South of the large mountain range North of FOB Salerno. He approached via high ground and not in the wadis.

Family Contact Information: (b)(6)

//NOTHING ELSE FOLLOWS//

CENTCOM 009436

Summary of interview with (b)(6) from the Khowst Provincial Forces (KPF) by LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) 9 October 2007

On 7 October 07 (b)(6) went to KPF7 (one of eight fixed OPs manned by KPF around SAL) to take food supplies. While there, he observed an AH-64 firing on SAGR. After about 30 minutes (from the aircraft firing) two kids approached the OP from the direction of SAGR and reported to them that some other kids had been injured and one was killed by the helicopter. (IO Comment – This initial report from KPF7 was logged by the BDOC at 1033Z – 58 minutes after (b)(2)High called SAGR cold. By 1100Z a local national had moved the remains from the site of the incident (actual location unknown) to about 500 meter from the hut where the remains were taken. Of note is that during my interview with the (b)(2)High crew they informed me that while they were firing they observed two children approaching the range from vicinity of OP7. It makes sense that these kids would go back out the same way to report the incident since they would have known where the OP was and is additional circumstantial evidence that this accident may have happened during (b)(2)High flight.)

He stated that he went over to check it out in a pickup truck and found LNs pushing a wheel barrow with the body of a young boy. He proceeded to the house of the family where the boy lived and told them that the boy had been killed and was on the way to the house. At that time they were only about 500 meters from the house. (IO- Comment – The family apparently already knew because photos taken by Daddy 03 indicate that the family was preparing a place for the body before the KPF vehicle arrived. This indicates that one of the injured children had already came home and told them and got help to go retrieve (b)(6) body.)

He stated that the boy's legs appeared to be broken and that he had injuries in the stomach area. After he departed the house, he transported the injured children to the SAL gate where they were picked up by medical personnel.

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Page 115 redacted for the following reason:

(b)(2)High



REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF:

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
HEADQUARTERS, COMBINED/JOINT TASK FORCE (CJTF)-82
BAGRAM AIRFIELD, AFGHANISTAN
APO AE 09354

24 OCT 2007

CJTF-82-CG

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: AR 15-6 Investigation into the AH-64 live fire range accident that occurred on 7 October 2007 at Forward Operating Base Salerno and resulted in the death of one local national and the injury to two other local nationals

1. I have reviewed the AR 15-6 Investigation concerning the FOB Salerno Aerial Gunnery Range (SAGR) incident that occurred on 7 October 2007. The investigating officer (IO) found that the accident occurred when three local nationals hid behind a rock formation on the aerial gunnery range in order to collect shell casings from the range. The IO found that the local nationals were likely injured when the aircraft conducted the live fire exercise. The IO found that the crew of the aircraft was not negligent, that they followed all range procedures and SOPs, and that the injuries did not result from the negligence of the crew. I approve the IO's findings and recommendations with the following exceptions and substitutions:

a. The recommendations to discontinue the use of the SAGR and to designate free fire areas are returned to the unit for further study and appropriate action. The gunnery ranger SOP should be reviewed and revised in order to develop standards designed to maximize training capabilities while minimizing the risks to the civilian populace.

b. The recommendation to make a condolence payment to the family of the injured civilians is returned to the unit for appropriate action.

2. The investigation is returned to the unit for appropriate action consistent with the Investigating Officer's findings and recommendations and my additional instructions above.

DAVID M. RODRIGUEZ
Major General, USA
Commanding

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Page 117 redacted for the following reason:

(b)(5)

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ORGANIZATION OR INSTALLATION			LOCATION		PERIOD COVERED			
Fob, SALERNO			BDOC		FROM		TO	
					HOUR	DATE	HOUR	DATE
					0457	07 Oct 07	0557	07 Oct 07
ITEM NO.	TIME		INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ORDERS, ETC.			ACTION TAKEN		INL
	IN	OUT						
01	0457		2 LN vic Enter the Fob: SPC b)(3), (b)(6) Assume					
			to RTO duty			LOGGED		
02	0459		1 LN vic Enter the Fob			LOGGED		
03	0504		2 mil Exit the Fob CN PMT 10 Jingle Enter			LOGGED		
04	0508		RADIO CHECK			LOGGED		
05	0509		2 Jingle Truck Exit the Fob			LOGGED		
06	0511		2 LN vic Exit the Fob			LOGGED		
07	0512		1 Jingle Truck Enter the Fob			LOGGED		
08	0518		1 LN vic Enter the Fob			LOGGED		
09	0519		1 LN vic Enter the Fob			LOGGED		
10	0526		7 V Exit Fob CRK # RCP9			Logged		
11	0528		4 V Military Exit Fob			Logged		
12	0530		2 LN vic Exit the Fob			LOGGED		
13	0534		5 military vic Exit CN: 2321			LOGGED		
14	0535		1 LN vic Enter the Fob			LOGGED		
15	0539		1 LN vic Exit the Fob			LOGGED		
16	0543		Small arms RANGE is going hot 762mm					
			and Below			LOGGED		
17	0544		1 LN vic Enter the Fob			LOGGED		
18	0551		1 military vic; 1 LN vic Enter the Fob			LOGGED		
19	0552		1 LN vic Exit the Fob L.			LOGGED		
20	0554		1 LN vic Enter the Fob			LOGGED		
21	0557		1 Jingle Truck Exit the Fob			LOGGED		

TYPED NAME AND GRADE OF OFFICER OR OFFICIAL ON DUTY
 SPC (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

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ORGANIZATION OR INSTALLATION		LOCATION		PERIOD COVERED			
Fob. SACERNO		BDUC		FROM		TO	
				HOUR	DATE	HOUR	DATE
				0558	07 OCT 07	0705	07 OCT 07
ITEM NO.	TIME		INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ORDERS, ETC.	ACTION TAKEN	INL		
	IN	OUT					
22	0559		1 LN VIL Enter the Fob	LOGGED			
23	0602		2 Jingle Truck Exit the Fob	LOGGED			
24	0609		1 LN VIL Enter the Fob	LOGGED			
25	0613		1 LN VIL Enter the Fob	LOGGED			
26	0619		3 military VIL exit CN (b)(3), (b)(6)	LOGGED			
27	0623		OP 9 REPORTED LN Kids cutting C-WIRE				
			6 AZ 229 316m	LOGGED			
28	0624		OP 8 reported that its 5-6 LN				
			KIDS in the SAME AREA	LOGGED			
29	0625		1 Jingle Truck exit; 1 LN VIL Enter	LOGGED			
30	0629		2 controlled Dets in 5 MDA (EOD)	LOGGED			
31	0629		1 AF Ready MIX Exit the Fob	LOGGED			
32	0631		1 LN VIL Exit the Fob	LOGGED			
33	0632		1 Jingle Truck exit; 1 LN VIL Enter	LOGGED			
34	0643		6 military VIL exit CN: 2321	LOGGED			
35	0649		2 military VIL Exit; 1 KOF VIL Enter	LOGGED			
36	0651		1 LN VIL Exit the Fob	LOGGED			
37	0654		1 LN VIL Exit the Fob	LOGGED			
38	0700		EDD REPORTED that they located a IED				
			DEMO ON RANGE; they have 3 VIL 1 VIL				
			is returning back to base with 2 civilians				
			And the other 2 VIL will pull security	LOGGED			
39	0705		1 military VIL enter Auxiliary Gate				

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ORGANIZATION OR INSTALLATION			LOCATION			PERIOD COVERED			
Fob 15 ALERNO			B Doc			FROM		TO	
						HOUR	DATE	HOUR	DATE
						0707	07 Oct 07	0807	07 Oct 07
ITEM NO.	TIME		INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ORDERS, ETC.	ACTION TAKEN	INL				
	IN	OUT							
40	0707		OPG reported LN ICD taking poles						
			@ 02 190; 12m	LOGGED					
41	0708		1 military vic enter; 1 LN tractor enter	LOGGED					
42	0709		1 military vic enter the Fob	LOGGED					
43	0711		1 military vic enter the Fob	LOGGED					
44	0721		IED did an explosion right of						
			det the IED	LOGGED					
45	0729		1 LN exit; 1 KPF water buffalo						
			enter	LOGGED					
46	0749		2 jingle tracks; 1 LN vic exiting	LOGGED					
47	0752		OPG reports @ 170 dist 150m						
			LN white man taking poles	LOGGED					
48	0753		2 USVICS CN PMT ENTERS	LOGGED					
49	0757		1 LN VIC ENTERS FOB	LOGGED					
50	0758		@ 0739z mustang blue was						
			called it is coming by air	LOGGED					
51	0759		@ 0750 SAGER RANGE IS						
			GOING HOT → FOD CLEARED THE RANGE	LOGGED					
52	0804		@ 0738 Big voice announcement						
			for SPC (b)(3), (b)(6) AND SPC (b)(3), (b)(6)						
			TO REPORT TO FLIGHT LINE FOD						
			A MEDICAL	LOGGED					
53	0807		1 KPF VIC; 1 KPF H2O BUFFALO EXIT	LOGGED					

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ORGANIZATION OR INSTALLATION		LOCATION		PERIOD COVERED	
F66, SALERNO		B Doc		FROM TO	
				HOUR DATE	HOUR DATE
				0813	07 OCT 07
ITEM NO.	TIME IN	TIME OUT	INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ORDERS, ETC.	ACTION TAKEN	INL
54	0813		Announcement made for all O PUS blood donors to report to the CSH IMMEDIATELY	LOGGED	
55	0814		@ 0745 Shield 6 & Shield 4 went with CRT to talk to village elders about kids stealing C-wire (BY OPB Village NIN OF F66)	LOGGED	
56	0815		SAGER RANGE IS COLD ATT	LOGGED	
57	0816		1 KPF VIC EXITS; 1 LN VIC ENTERS	LOGGED	
58	0832		OP 8 REPORTED 2 LN; 1 LN WEARING A BLUE BERKA W/ BLACK MANJAMS AND THE OTHER LN WEARING WHITE MANJAMS WITH WHITE HAT	LOGGED	
59	0835		OP 8 REPORTED @ A2 136; 130m LN MALE WEARING WHITE MANJAMS IS WALKING WITH CELL PHONE	LOGGED	
60	0836		1 LN VIC EXIT THE F66B	LOGGED	
61	0837		ON THE BIG EYE: BASE SEEN THAT THE LN WITH THE PHONE WENT INTO THE VILLAGE	LOGGED	
62	0849		1 US VIC ENTER THE F66N: THT	LOGGED	
63	0911		4 US VIC ENTER THE F66 CNEOD	LOGGED	
64	0913		RADIO CHECK	LOGGED	

TYPED NAME AND GRADE OF OFFICER OR OFFICIAL ON DUTY

SPC

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

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ORGANIZATION OR INSTALLATION		LOCATION		PERIOD COVERED			
Fob, SALEARN		BDoc		FROM		TO	
				HOUR	DATE	HOUR	DATE
				0917	07 Oct 02	1036	07 Oct 02
ITEM NO.	TIME		INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ORDERS, ETC.	ACTION TAKEN	INL		
	IN	OUT					
65	0917		SAGAR RANGE IS GOING HOT	LOGGED			
66	0927		1 LN ; 1 US EXIT THE Fob	LOGGED			
67	0928		2 US VIC ENTER THE Fob: CN CLARK	LOGGED			
68	0929		1 LN VIC ENTER THE Fob	LOGGED			
69	0935		SAGAR RANGE IS COLD	LOGGED			
70	0936		1 Jingle Truck Exit ; 1 US ENTER	LOGGED			
71	0937		Shield 4 informed BDOC that all				
			PERSONNEL IS RETURNING BACK TO THE				
			BASE	LOGGED			
72	1008		1 LN VIC EXIT THE Fob	LOGGED			
73	1014		1 LN VIC EXIT THE Fob	LOGGED			
74	1017		1 LN Jingle Truck ENTER THE Fob	LOGGED			(3), (b)(
75	1030		1 US VIC EXIT THE Fob	LOGGED			
76	1031		1 LN VIC ENTER THE Fob	LOGGED			
76	1033		THE TEP informed BDOC that 3 LN				
			got Wounded and 1 WAS KILLED				
			by the helicopter: The LN kids				
			informed KPF7 About this situation	LOGGED			
77	1034		OP9 Reported that 2 LN FEMMES				
			@ A2 NO: 170m ARE TRYING TO FREE				
			their Goat from C-WIRE	LOGGED			
78	1034		1 US VIC ESCORT 1 AMP INTO THE Fob	LOGGED			
79	1036		OP5 REPORTED 20 LN ARE ON THE RANGES	LOGGED			

TYPED NAME AND GRADE OF OFFICER OR OFFICIAL ON DUTY

9C

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

DA FORM 1007, NOV 1994

PREVIOUS EDITION OF THIS FORM I

DA FORM 1007, NOV 1994

CENTCOM 009445

DAILY STAFF JOURNAL OR DUTY OFFICER'S LOG						PAGE NO.	NO. OF PAGES
For use of this form, see AR 220-15; the proponent agency is Office of The Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations & Plans						6	11
ORGANIZATION OR INSTALLATION			LOCATION		PERIOD COVERED		
Fob, Salerno			BDoc				
					FROM	TO	
					HOUR	DATE	HOUR
					1037	07 OCT 07	1121
DATE	TIME	IN	OUT	INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ORDERS, ETC.			ACTION TAKEN
ITEM NO.							INL
80	1037			2 US vic exit the Fob ON CHALK			LOGGED
81	1043			1 LN vic exit; 1 LN vic enter			LOGGED
82	1047			1 Jingle Truck exit the Fob			LOGGED
83	1054			1 US & 1 AEP exit Fob			LOGGED
84	1055			1 LN vic exit the Fob			LOGGED
85	1057			1 US vic enter the Fob			LOGGED
86	1100			The TERP inform BDoc that 3 LN were hit; 1 LN KIA is dead 13 yrs of age and 2 LN are injured but they were sent home (The helicopter incident); KPF will get more info			LOGGED
87	1100			RADIO check			LOGGED
88	1104			2 US vic enter the Fob			LOGGED
89	1108			The TERP informed BDoc that the 2 injured personnel is arriving @ KPF 6; 1 LN which is (b)(6) has leg injury; the other is (b)(6) yrs has head injury; (b)(6) yr old boy is dead			LOGGED
90	1115			The injured LN is @ the NIS with strapnal in leg			LOGGED
91	1121			I informed NG that the Deceased LN need to return to base so they could investigate the wounds			LOGGED
TYPED NAME AND GRADE OF OFFICER ON DUTY				SI			
SPC (b)(3), (b)(6)				(b)(3), (b)(6)			

DA FORM 1594, NOV 1962

PREVIOUS EDITION OF THIS FORM IS OBSOLETE.

APD PE v3.00ES

CENTCOM 009446

DAILY STAFF JOURNAL		OR DUTY OFFICER'S LOG		PAGE NO.		NO. OF PAGES	
For use of this form, see AR 220-15; the proponent agency is Office of The Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations & Plans				7		11	
ORGANIZATION OR INSTALLATION		LOCATION		PERIOD COVERED			
Fob, SALERNO		BDoc		FROM		TO	
				HOUR	DATE	HOUR	DATE
				1121	07 Oct 07	1251	07 Oct 07
ITEM NO.	TIME		INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ORDERS, ETC.	ACTION TAKEN	INL		
	IN	OUT					
92	1125		BASE conduct spot report with				
			AS NEGATIVE Activity	LOGGED			
93	1128		1 LN vic exit the Fob	LOGGED			
94	1146		OP8 reported @ A2 164 distant				
			unknown HEAR Gun shots	LOGGED			
95	1148		1 LN vic exit the Fob; 1 KPF chow				
			truck exit the Fob	LOGGED			
96	1150		1 LN Doctor exit; 1 KPF 156 enter	LOGGED			
97	1154		3 US vic enter the Fob and the CSH				
			15 @ NG to look @ injuries	LOGGED			
98	1201		The CSH is Entering the Fob with				
			3 personnel	LOGGED			
99	1203		MUSTANG WHITE: by Ground	LOGGED			
100	1206		1 LN vic enters the FOB	logged			
101	1208		1 LN vic enter the Fob	LOGGED			
102	1213		KPF 156 exits the FOB	logged			
103	1214		Radio Check	logged			
104	1215		2 US + 1 LN exit the FOB	logged			
105	1219		KPF 156 ENTER the Fob	LOGGED			
106	1232		LN paperboy delivered papers	logged			
107	1235		STARS and STRIPES PAPER MAN IS @ NG	LOGGED			
108	1241		KPF 156 EXIT the Fob	LOGGED			
109	1249		SP6 b)(3), (b)(6) assumes duty as BDOC RTC	Logged			
TYPED NAME AND GRADE OF OFFICER OR OFFICIAL ON DUTY				SIGNATURE			

b)(3), (b)(6)

BDOC shift NCO Log

DAILY STAFF JOURNAL OR DUTY OFFICER'S LOG For use of this form, see AR 220-15: the proponent agency is Office of The Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations & Plans					PAGE NO. 1		NO. OF PAGES 1	
ORGANIZATION OR INSTALLATION			LOCATION		PERIOD COVERED			
4 th BCT BDOC			SALERNO, AFGHANISTAN		FROM		TO	
					FROM	DATE	FROM	DATE
					0500	7 Oct 07	0500	8 Oct 07
ITEM NO.	TIME		INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ORDERS, ETC.	ACTION TAKEN	INL			
	IN	OUT						
1	0500		SGT (b)(3), (b)(6) and SPC b(3), (b)(6) report for duty and assume responsibility	Received incoming brief				
2	0543		Small arms range goes hot	Logged				
3	0630		SOG's conduct shift change	Briefed incoming SOG's				
4	0635		EOD conducts 2 controlled DET's	Logged				
5	0702		EOD found an IED on demo range when returning to base. Grid for demo range (b)(3), (b)(6) 2-32mm Austrian H.E., unknown as far as detonation device, stored in a plastic burlap bag buried in the ground	Logged, contacted Pro Toc, Fury Toc, sent up SALUTE report				
6	0715		An explosion in the area of EOD's location on range, Found out that the IED was in the EOD Safe area	Logged, EOD was able to make coms with EOD team on site via blue force tracer				
7	0736		ERT, EOD rallied to move out to Demo range because of seeing an individual walking up the hill behind the EOD range	Logged				
8	0737		Mustang Blue by air	Logged, Big voiced				
9	0745		Shield6, Shield4, "A", "B" SOG along with ERT went to talk to village elders about kids stealing C-wire. N/W village, village just off OP6	Logged	(3), (b)(6)			
10	0755		SAGAR range goes hot	Logged, Big voiced				
11	0812		CSH request 0 pos blood donors to report to the hospital TOC	Logged, Big voiced				
12	0815		SAGAR range goes cold	Logged, mIRC'd				
13	0917		SAGAR range goes hot	Logged mIRC'd				
14	0936		SAGAR range goes cold	Logged, mIRC'd				
15	0938		Shield6, Shield4 along with all personnel who went to the N/W village returned inside the wire, no issues	Logged				
16	1040		Temp came to inform that there had been LN's shot on Sagar range. First report was that 1 had been killed and 3 wounded. Later report was that there had been 1 killed and 2 wounded. No 4 th individual. The one who was killed was a b(6)y/o boy. Another was 6 with shrapnel to the leg. Another, b(6)y/o with injuries to the head. KPF brought kids to N/G for medical attention	Logged, informed Desert Hawk Toc (CPT)(3), (b)(6) and SSG(b)(3), (b)(6)); Pro Toc (CPT)(3), (b)(6) and Fury Toc (CPT)(3), (b)(6)				
17	1203		Mustang White by ground, The 2 LN kids that	Logged				

EOD P.T.

IED DET

TYPED NAME AND RANK OF OFFICER OR OFFICIAL ON DUTY (b)(3), (b)(6) SGT Shift NCOIC			SIGNATURE		
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DAILY STAFF JOURNAL OR DUTY OFFICER'S LOG					PAGE NO.		NO. OF PAGES	
For use of this form, see AR 220-15: the proponent agency is Office of The Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations & Plans					2		1	
ORGANIZATION OR INSTALLATION			LOCATION		PERIOD COVERED			
					FROM		TO	
4 TH BCT BDOC			SALERNO, AFGHANISTAN		HOUR	DATE	HOUR	DATE
					0500	7 Oct 07	0500	8 Oct 07
ITEM NO.	TIME		INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ORDERS, ETC.	ACTION TAKEN	INL			
	IN	OUT						
			had been shot on the range					
18	1631		OP7 reports seeing Approx 15 tracers being fired from west to east, OP8 confirmed seeing tracers	Logged				
19	1700		SGT (b)(3), (b)(6) reports for duty and assumes responsibility	Received incoming brief				
20	1736		OP7 Reports small arms fire	Logged				
21	1845		OP8 Reports tracers rounds fired	Logged	(b)(3), (b)(6)			
22	2055		OP1 Reports flares, KPF confirms	Logged				
23	311		OP10 Reports LN stealing poles at FOB outer fence	Logged				
24	429		BSOG fired a W/S from OP10 to chase kids away	Logged				
25	0450		SGT (b)(3), (b)(6) reports for duty	Logged				
26			Log Closed					
27								
28								
29								
30								
31								
32								
33			OP7 Reports small arms fire	Logged				
34			OP8 Reports tracers rounds fired	Logged				
35								
36								
37								
38								
39			reports for duty	Logged				
40			Log Closed					
41								
42								
43								
44								
45								

TYPED NAME AND RANK OF OFFICER OR OFFICIAL ON DUTY		SIGNATURE	
(b)(3), (b)(6) SGT Shift NCOIC			

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is PMG.

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 (SSN).
PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately identified.
ROUTINE USES: Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval.
DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION Salevno	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD) 20071009 (3), (b)(6)	3. TIME 0723Z (3), (b)(6)	4. FILE NUMBER
5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME (b)(3), (b)(6)	6. SSN (b)(6)	7. GRADE/STATUS CPT	
8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS HHC/782nd BSB FOB Salevno APO AE 09314			

9. I, _____ (b)(3), (b)(6), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

(3), (b)(6) 1A 071033Z OCT 07, The BDOC interpreter came into inform us that four LNs were injured by the APACHES using the gunnery range. The initial report was that ~~three~~ (3), (b)(6) three LN children were injured and one was dead. I told the shift NCO, SGT (b)(3), (b)(6) to notify TF DESERT HAWK and TF FURY battle captains of the situation, and I asked the interpreter to contact the Khost Provincial Force (KPF) so that they could go and verify the information, as well as determine the severity of the injuries. KPF came back and stated that three LN children were involved in the incident, of which one had died as a result of the injuries. SGT (b)(3), (b)(6) notified the 390 CSH TOC to see if they were able to take these patients. Once we confirmed that the hospital was able to treat the two LN children (one with injuries to the leg and the other to the head) we notified the BDOC interpreter to inform KPF personnel. The CSH sent a FLA down to the main VCP and the patient transfer took place on site. This was approximately 1200Z. (b)(3), (b)(6)

/// _____ END OF STATEMENT _____ ///

(b)(3), (b)(6)

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6)	PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES
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ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ IN AT _____ DATED _____"

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.

STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6)

TAKEN AT FOB SALEPNO DATED 09 October 2007

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

Not Used

(b)(3), (b)(6)

AFFIDAVIT

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 2. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(Statement)

WITNESSES:

S

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 9 day of October, 2007

HHL 182nd OSB BDOC
ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(b)(3), (b)(6)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(Oath)

ABT 136(b)(4)

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

(b)(3), (b)(6)

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

SWORN STATEMENT

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PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

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DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION <u>Fob Salerno, Afghanistan</u>	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD) <u>2007 10 09</u> (3), (b)	3. TIME <u>1155L</u>	4. FILE NUMBER
5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME <u>(b)(3), (b)(6)</u>	6. SSN <u>(b)(6)</u>	7. GRADE/STATUS <u>E-5</u>	

8. I, BDOC
I, (b)(3), (b)(6), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

(3), (b) On or around 1040z of Oct 7, 2007, Amaid, the BDoc Interpreter came to inform that kids had been shot by helicopters on the range. The terp initially said there was 1 killed and 3 injured. I told the terp to confirm and get as much info as possible.

I then called Desert Hawk TOC and talked to SGT (b)(3), (b)(6). I informed him of what our terp had informed us. I stated that I was confirming and was trying to get more information, that I would call back when I had more info.

I then called Fury Battle Cpt. (CPT (b)(3), (b)(6)) to inform him of the situation. Also called the hospital to inform them. The Hospital status was RED and I was told that the children wouldn't been seen. Even though this situation seemed to be our fault. (U.S. Military's fault)

When the terp returned he said that there was only 3 kids total. 1 was infact dead and a relative was removing the body in a wheel barrel. The other 2 kids were being picked up by KPF and being brought to Salerno North Grade. 1 kid was 6 years old with a leg injury. The other was 12 years old and had a head and shoulder injury.

CPT (3), (b) from Desert Hawk TOC called and put me on speaker so the S-3 could hear everything. I informed them of everything and that the children were on their way to Salerno.

At one point in all the phone traffic, Cpt (3), (b) from professional 12-321 called to inquire about the events that were taking place. They needed to know in case of having to go to the location of where the kids had been injured and conducting a sweep or site investigation.

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT <u>(b)(3), (b)(6)</u>	PAGE 1 OF <u>3</u> PAGES
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ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____"

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USE THIS PAGE IF NEEDED. IF THIS PAGE IS NOT NEEDED, PLEASE PROCEED TO FINAL PAGE OF THIS FORM.

STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT BDOc DATED 9 Oct 2007

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

When the children finally arrived to the North Gate. I called the Hospital to inform them. The Hospital still didn't want to take the children because of Bed status RED. I then called Desert Hawk Tac to let them know that the children had arrived, but the Hospital didn't want to take them.

At 1204z A Mustang White was called for the two children coming in for medical attention. The hospital Ambulance went to the North Gate and Picked up the children.

The children were treated and taken home by family. (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

(b)(3), (b)(6)

PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGES

STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6)

TAKEN AT BDOC

DATED 9 Oct 2007

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

AFFIDAVIT

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 3. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

g Statement)

WITNESSES:

SFC

(b)(3), (b)(6)

HAC 10241435 BDOC
ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 9 day of October, 2007 at FOB Salerno BDOC.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

ring Oath)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

ering Oath)

Commission
(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

(b)(3), (b)(6)

PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES

SWORN STATEMENT

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DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION Forward Operating Base Salerno, Afghanistan	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD) 2007/10/09	3. TIME 1054Z	4. FILE NUMBER
5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME (b)(3), (b)(6)	6. SSN (b)(6)	7. GRADE/STATUS W3	

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

HHC 1/285th ARB, Task Force Desert Hawk, APO AE 09314

9.

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

Local personnel on the ranges at FOB Salerno continue to pose an accidental risk during aerial gunnery training. Personnel from the communities surrounding the ranges will often "flock" to the range when aircraft occupy it for aerial gunnery practice. These groups are composed primarily of teenage boys with adults being present at times. These groups often start coming onto the range when aircraft are actively firing weapons.

(b)(2)High

During the RIP process in February, the 183rd Attack Battalion instructed the AH-64D pilots on the use of the SAGR range. This included academics, a range card (knee board product that identifies boundaries, start fire point, impact areas and overall range procedures) and a flight on the range to physically see the layout and boundaries. Furthermore, the Task Force Master Gunner completed a range assessment that included the Surface Danger Zone (SDZ) for each type of munition to be used. Risk mitigators included shooting only non-dud producing munitions into the area, using the foothill area of the range for targeting in order to minimize any "over-spill" of weapon's effects based on the SDZ, and continuous clearing of the area.

During the use of the SAGR range over the past 9 months, the trend of local personnel becoming more aggressive towards occupying the range for metal collection has become prominent. During a normal range engagement, after making one or two engagements, personnel are often seen running from the surrounding dwellings towards the range. For the majority of engagements, the local personnel will hold short of the range, using the Eastern mountain ridge (Eastern boundary of range) as a holding area. They usually stay on the non-range side, near the EOD pit. In the past months, the personnel have become more aggressive, often running onto the range as the aircraft are firing. As an example, I was performing flight duties a few weeks ago on the SAGR range and witnessed a group of 10 to 15 children run onto the range in-between engagements. I had just completed a rocket engagement utilizing training (non-explosive warhead) rockets and turned outbound. Upon turning outbound from the range, I visually verified that no one was running out to collect the metal from the training rockets. I transferred the controls to the front seat pilot for him to perform a rocket engagement. Upon the inbound run, with the helicopter approximately 1000 meters from the target point, I witnessed a group of approximately 10 to 15 teenage boys run right into the target area. I announced that we had personnel on the range, safed all weapons and terminated training. I was personally surprised at how fast the range went from being clear to having a substantial group of personnel in the target area. From the time I verified the range being clear on the outbound leg to the inbound leg was no more than 45 seconds.

Because of personnel occupying the range for metal collection, aircrews will often fire the 30MM Area Weapon System (AWS) first. This will leave spent casings approximately 800 meters from the intended target area. If personnel do come out to the range, they will move out to collect the spent casings, leaving the weapons impact area/aim point clear. This serves as an early indication process. You'll see personnel occupying the range in an area other than the impact point, providing the aircrew the opportunity to call a cease-fire prior to personnel occupying the impact area. Other procedures to warn personnel on the ground that you are firing is the practice of popping flares. Aircrews will often fire flares from a safe altitude to warn personnel on the ground that the aircraft are about to fire. They will also give hand commands for personnel to stay off the range while aircraft are firing.

Over the past month or so, personnel collecting metal on the range have become more aggressive. During the Task Force's most recent safety survey

10. EXHIBIT	11. IN (b)(3), (b)(6)	VT	PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES
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ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____"

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.

USE THIS PAGE IF NEEDED. IF THIS PAGE IS NOT NEEDED, PLEASE PROCEED TO FINAL PAGE OF THIS FORM.

STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) _____ TAKEN AT 1054Z _____ DATED 2007/10/09 _____

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

(25JUN07 - 10JUL07), the trend of personnel occupying the range was annotated as a hazard under the Aerial Range Safety portion of the survey. This hazard was passed onto the leaders of this task force through the safety and standardization council conducted on September 12th, 2007. Aircrews were to be more vigilant when clearing the ranges and during engagements.

This topic has been discussed numerous times at both the formal and informal levels. In order for aircrews to maintain proficiency at aerial weapons utilization, aircrews must be able to conduct aerial gunnery. All AH64D aircrews have followed both written procedures and tactics to ensure that no collateral damage is caused. The two aircrews who utilized SAGR on the day of the death have reputations of following all procedures. There have been no complaints or concerns that would make me think that these aircrews would vary from set and known standards. End of Statement

(b)(3), (b)(6)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

(b)(3), (b)(6)

PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGES

PAGE 2, L

CENTCOM 009456 PD PE v1.01

STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) _____ TAKEN AT 1054Z _____ DATED 2007/10/09

9. STATEMENT _____

End of Statement (b)(3), (b)(6)

AFFIDAVIT

I, (b)(3), (b)(6) _____, HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 3. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(Making Statement)

WITNESSES:

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 11th day of OCT, 2007 at SAL, J. L. ...

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(ing Oath)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

LPT
(Type)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(Oath)

VSC 1044H
(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES