Memo to Interested Persons Outlining the ACLU's Opposition to Senate version of The Teen Endangerment Act (7/25/2006)
TO:
Interested Persons
FROM:
ACLU Washington National Office
RE:
The Teen Endangerment Act (S. 8/S. 396/S. 403)
The American Civil Liberties Union opposes the Teen Endangerment Act
(S. 8/S. 396/S. 403), called the
“Child Custody Protection Act” by its sponsors. The bill would make it a federal crime
for a person, other than a parent -- including a grandmother, aunt, sibling, or
clergy member -- to help a teen cross certain state lines for an abortion unless the
teen had already fulfilled the requirements of her home state’s law restricting
teens’ abortions. It would deny
teenagers facing unintended pregnancies the assistance of trusted adults,
endanger their health, and violate their constitutional rights.
(The current version of the House bill, H.R. 748, contains these same
provisions, but also imposes a mandatory parental notification requirement on
teenagers who need abortion services in a state where they do not reside. It also forces doctors, under the threat
of federal criminal prosecution, to comply with an onerous legal scheme
mandating that an out-of-state teen’s parents be notified of her decision to
have an abortion.[1])
- This legislation will not
create good family communication where it does not already exist.
Even in the absence of any legal requirement, mostteens who are
pregnant and seeking an abortion involve a parent in their
decision.[2] The younger the teenager, the more
likely her parents are to know about her decision: ninety percent of adolescents
fourteen or younger report that at least one of their parents knew of their
decision.[3] For thoseteens who do not tell their parents, many valid reasons compel them not to do so.[4] For instance, one third ofteenagers do not involve a parent because
they fear family violence (in many cases because it has already occurred), or
are afraid of being forced to leave home.[5] Long-term studies of abusive and
dysfunctional families reveal that the incidence of violence escalates when a
wife or teenage daughter becomes pregnant.[6] Forcing ateen to notify her
abusive parent of a pregnancy can have dangerous, and even fatal, consequences
for her and for other family members.
In Idaho, a thirteen-year-old sixth-grade student named Spring Adams was
shot to death by her father after he learned she planned to end a pregnancy he
had caused.[7]
When ateenager determines that she cannot tell a parent she is
pregnant, a bill like this will not make her change her mind. The same percentage of teens informs
their parents about their intent to have an abortion in states with and without
laws restricting teens’ access to abortion.[8] This legislation will not create healthy
family communication where it does not already exist.
- For many young women, a
court waiver is not a real alternative.
For many teenagers living under laws restricting their access to
abortion, the prospect of going to court for a waiver of this requirement is
daunting or futile. Some teenagers
live in regions where the local judges simply never grant waivers. For example, the director of an
Indianapolis women’s clinic told the New
York Times in 1992 that she was not aware of any teenager who had been
granted a judicial bypass in that city in the prior six years.[9] Otherteens have reason to fear
being recognized in local courthouses.
Still others simply cannot face revealing intimate details of their lives
to a series of strangers in a formal, legal process. As the Supreme Court has noted, “The
court experience produce[s] fear, tension, anxiety, and shame among minors.”[10]
- This legislation will
isolatethe
most vulnerable teens.
Many teenagers who live in states that restrict teens’ access to abortion
cannot satisfy their home state’s law, either because they cannot tell a parent
about a pregnancy or because the courts are unprepared or unwilling to consider
a teen’s request for a waiver.
In addition, some teenagers must travel out of state to obtain an
abortion because the closest abortion facility is located in a
neighboring state.
The overwhelming majority of teenagers who obtain abortions involve an
adult (a parent, other family member,
counselor, clergy member, teacher, or adult friend) in their decision[11] and are
accompanied by someone to the health-care facility.[12] This legislation, however, would
discourageteenagers who are already isolated and frightened from turning to
someone they trust. Knowing that
anyone who helps them obtain an out-of-state abortion would risk arrest and
imprisonment, manyteens would be forced by this legislation to travel
alone across state lines. Clearly,
it is in the best interests ofteens for caring, responsible adults to
accompany them to an abortion provider and to escort them home after the
surgery.
- By closing outlets for
teenagers facing an unwanted pregnancy, this bill would lead some to dangerous
and desperate acts.
This legislation could push those teens who cannot tell a parent about a
pregnancy to drastic acts that risk their health and well-being. A teenager facing an unwanted pregnancy
is already in crisis. If she is
unable or unwilling to consult her parents, her desperation is deepened by her
isolation. Teenagers in these
circumstances sometimes resort to self-induced abortion or illegal abortion as a
way out. These efforts all too
often have tragic results. For
example, Becky Bell, an Indiana teenager, died from an illegal abortion because
she couldn’t bear to tell her parents about her pregnancy and thus could not
comply with Indiana’s teen abortion law.[13]
Out-of-state travel, in the company of a trusted companion, for a legal abortion, has provided many such
teenagers a difficult but necessary outlet in a crisis. This bill would close that outlet,
leading increasing numbers ofpregnant teenagersto resort to the kinds of alternatives
that all too often end with serious physical harm or death.
- This legislation would
criminalize compassion.
This bill would impose federal criminal penalties on anyone (except a parent) who helps a
teen across certain state lines to obtain an abortion if she has not first
complied with her home state’s teen abortion law. The bill provides no exception for cases
in which a teenager's health would be harmed if medical care were delayed in
order for her to comply with her home state’s abortion statute. The following are some examples of
potential prosecutions under the bill:
- A grandmother who takes care of her
granddaughter every day could be prosecuted for taking her granddaughter to
another state for an abortion, even if she did not know about this federal law
or was unaware of her home state’s teen abortion law;
- An adult older sister could not help her
teenage sister to obtain an out-of-state abortion even if both sisters were
regularly subject to physical abuse by their parents and even if no local court
would ever grant a petition for a court waiver.
As these examples illustrate, this legislation would criminalize caring,
responsible behavior on the part of adults concerned with a teenager's well-being. It would deter
trustworthy adults and professionals from helping ateen to obtain an
out-of-state abortion no matter what the circumstances. It thus would create a barrier to safe,
timely medical care putting teenagers at risk.
- This legislation raises
serious constitutional concerns.
In addition to
its damaging effects onteenagers' health and welfare, this bill violates
both the letter and spirit of the Constitution in at least three respects.
o
It violates constitutional principles of federalism.
First, this legislation conflicts with core constitutional principles of
federalism -- principles recently reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in its
landmark ruling Saenz v. Roe.[14] The Constitution protects the right of
every individual to travel freely from state to state and, when visiting another
state, not to be treated as a foreigner.
As the Supreme Court held in Saenz, “[A] citizen of one state who
travels in other States, intending to return home at the end of his journey, is
entitled to enjoy the ‘Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several
States’ that he visits.”[15] The Supreme Court has previously applied
this principle in the context of restrictive abortion laws. In Doe v. Bolton, the Court held
that, because the Privileges and Immunities Clause “protect[s] persons who enter
[other states] seeking the medical services that are available there,” a state
must make abortions available to visitors on the same legal terms under which it
makes them available to residents.[16] In violation of these essential
principles of federalism, this bill saddlesa teenagerwith the laws of her
home state no matter where she travels in the nation.
The Constitution also protects the right of each state to enforce its own
laws within its territorial boundaries.
Yet, this legislation supplants the laws of the majority of states
because they have either no teen abortion law in effect, or have teen abortion
laws that do not conform to the definition set forth in the bill. In these states, this bill would impose
criminal penalties on visitors that residents do not face under their own
state’s laws. The federal bill thus
would discriminate against teenagers within the same state on the basis of their
state of origin and deprive teens, and those assisting them, of their right to
travel to engage in conduct legal in another state.[17]
That this bill
conflicts with the fundamental nature of our federal scheme should concern
anyone who respects the integrity of the American constitutional system.
o
It subjects teens to government-mandated
harm.
Second, this
legislation violates teenagers’ due process rights by subjecting them to
government-mandated harm. The
Constitution prohibits the government from attempting to deter a
constitutionally protected activity by increasing the danger of engaging in that
activity. Thus, in Carey v.
Population Services International, the Supreme Court held that a state may
not restrict minors’ access to contraceptives in order to deter minors’ sexual
activity “by increasing the hazards attendant on it.”[18] By deprivingteenagers of the
assistance of others when they cross certain state lines to obtain an abortion, this
legislation exposes them to just such heightened peril.
Teens
who must leave their home state to obtain an abortion face far greater dangers
if they travel alone than if they make the trip in the company of someone they
trust. Some abortions involve
surgical procedures that may not permit ateen to drive home, often over
long distances, by herself. This
legislation bans virtually all assistance, including that of theteenager's
grandparents, aunts, uncles, sisters, brothers, cousins, and religious
counselors. It undermines the
government’s asserted interest in protecting teens’ well-being to criminalize
this crucial assistance. The
Supreme Court has held that a statute that undermines the government’s asserted
justification for it is constitutionally deficient. Thus, in Hodgson, the Court held
that a two-parent notice requirement without a court waiver was unconstitutional
where it “disserv[ed] the state interest in protecting . . . the minor” because
it “proved positively harmful to the minor and her family.”[19] Because this bill subjects teenagers to
increased danger by banning assisted travel while leaving them free to travel on
their own, it is irrational and unconstitutional.
o
It lacks a health exception and contains an inadequate life
exception.
Third, this
bill lacks a constitutionally required health exception and contains an
inadequate life exception. The
Supreme Court has held that any restriction on abortion, including laws
restricting teenagers’ access to abortion, must contain an exception to protect
both the health and life of the woman.
In Planned Parenthood v. Casey, the Supreme Court held that all
abortion regulations must contain a valid medical emergency exception, “for the
essential holding of Roe forbids a state from interfering with a woman’s
choice to undergo an abortion procedure if continuing her pregnancy would
constitute a threat to her health.”[20] The Supreme Court recently reaffirmed
this holding in Stenberg v. Carhart, in which it held that “at a minimum”
an abortion restriction must contain an exception to protect a woman’s health.[21] Because this legislation contains no
health exception whatsoever and an impermissibly narrow life exception, it is
unconstitutional.
* * * *
Because the Teen Endangerment Act (S. 8/S. 396/S. 403) would both
isolate vulnerableteenagers and violate their constitutional rights, the ACLU
vigorously opposes its passage.
Endnotes
[1] See ACLU
Interested Persons Memo, The
Teen Endangerment Act (H.R. 748), available at wwww.aclu.org. [2] Stanley K. Henshaw & Kathryn Kost,
Parental Involvement in Minors’ Abortion
Decisions, 24 Family Planning Perspectives 196, 196 (Sept./Oct. 1992). [3] Id. at 200. [4] Id. at 202-03. [5] Id. at 207. [6] Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs,
American Medical Association, Mandatory
Parental Consent to Abortion, 269 JAMA 82, 82-86 (1993). [7] Ensunsa, Adams Charged With Murder, Idaho
Statesman, Aug. 23, 1989. [8] Robert W. Blum, Michael D. Resnick &
Trisha Stark, Factors Associated with the Use of Court
Bypass by Minors to Obtain Abortions, 22 Family Planning Perspectives 158,
160 (July/Aug. 1990). [9] Tamar Lewin, Parental Consent to Abortion: How
Enforcement Can Vary, N.Y. Times, May 28, 1992, at A1; see also Hodgson v. Minnesota,
497 U.S. 417, 440 (1990) (noting that, in Minnesota, “a number of counties are
served by judges who are unwilling to hear bypass petitions”). [10] Hodgson, 497 U.S. at 441. [11] Henshaw &
Kost, supra note 1, at 207. [12] Id. (ninety-three percent of minors who
did not involve a parent in their abortion decision were nonetheless accompanied
by someone to the abortion facility). [13] Rochelle Sharpe, Abortion Law: Fatal Effect?, Gannett
News Service, Nov. 27, 1989; CBS, 60
Minutes, Feb. 24, 1991. [14] 526 U.S. 489 (1999) [15] 526 U.S. at 501. [16] 410 U.S. 179, 200 (1973); see
also Saenz, 526 U.S. at 502 (Privileges and Immunities Clause
“provides important protections for non-residents who enter a State … to procure
medical services ….”). [17] Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S.
618, 629 (1969). [18] 431 U.S. 678, 694 (1977) (plurality
opinion). [19] 497 U.S. at 450. [20] 505 U.S. 833, 880 (1992). [21] 120 S. Ct. 2597, 2609
(2000).
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