Protect the Supreme Court as a Guardian of Civil Liberties and Civil Rights.
Vote "No" on Cloture on Alito Nomination
Re: Nomination of Samuel A. Alito, Jr. to
the United States Supreme Court
Dear Senator:
The American Civil Liberties Union strongly urges you to vote “NO” on
cloture on the nomination of Judge Samuel A. Alito, Jr. to replace retiring
Justice Sandra Day O’Connor on the Supreme Court. This vote is critical to protecting the
Supreme Court as a guardian of civil liberties and civil rights.
The ACLU does not make the
decision to oppose Alito lightly. Only twice in the ACLU’s 86 year history
has our Board voted to oppose Supreme Court nominees – that of Chief Justice
William Rehnquist, in his initial nomination to the Court, and Judge Robert
Bork. But this is a momentous time
in history, and Alito’s confirmation to the Supreme Court would have significant
impact on the American people. A
nominee with Alito's history of deference to executive authority and support for
government power would strike a blow to basic freedoms. In this high-stakes climate for civil
liberties and civil rights, the Supreme Court must be a bulwark against
incursions on our fundamental freedoms.
If confirmed as the next Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, Alito
could dramatically change the direction of the Supreme Court by tipping the
balance from the moderate position of Justice O’Connor, whom he would be
replacing, to a position hostile to civil liberties and civil rights. He could thereby change the country for
years to come.
We are witnesses to an
extraordinary time in history when our executive branch is trying to centralize
power and bypass other branches of government. At a time when our President has claimed
unprecedented authority to spy on our own people and jail people indefinitely
without trial, America needs a Supreme Court justice who will uphold our
precious civil liberties, staying true to the balance of powers envisioned by
our Founders. But confirming Alito,
someone with a proven record of undue deference to executive powers, could
dangerously upset that balance of powers.
ALITO HAS SHOWN AN
ALARMING DEFERENCE TO THE POWER OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH.
It is of special concern that
Alito will be replacing Justice Sandra Day O’Connor who has been a critical
swing vote on issues relating to reproductive freedom, religion, employment
discrimination, affirmative action, and civil rights. She has also exhibited the caution and
courage necessary in times of war to protect civil liberties. We are deeply concerned that Alito would
not bring the same balance and moderation to the Court.
Two years ago, Justice O'Connor eloquently expressed what
is at stake in these critical times when she wrote that it is “clear that a
state of war is not a blank check for the President when it comes to the rights
of the Nation’s citizens.”[1] Having justices on the Supreme Court
adhering to this viewpoint is critical now more than ever given the various
issues the Court may consider, such as the constitutional limits of the Patriot
Act and the President’s authorization of warrantless spying on Americans. Throughout his career, Alito has
promoted an expansive view of executive authority and a limited view of the
congressional and judicial roles in curbing abuses of that authority.
His own record and public
statements have led us to this conclusion.
As an adherent to the “unitary executive theory,” Alito and others
working in the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) in the Reagan Justice Department,
advocated this theory to support an aggressive expansion of the recognized
powers of the President. For
example, in a 2000 speech to the Federalist Society, Alito stated that “I
thought then, and I still think, that this [unitary executive] theory best
captures the meaning of the Constitution’s text and structure.”[2] He said that under this theory,
“the president has not just some executive powers, but the executive
power – the whole thing.”[3] Moreover, in a recently released
1986 document from Alito’s time with the OLC, Alito recommended the increased
use of presidential signing statements – a statement issued by the President
setting forth his interpretation of the law – in order to trump congressional
intent and legislative history.
Alito recommended such a proposal in order to “increase the power of the
Executive to shape the law.”[4]
It is this unitary executive
theory, to which Alito adheres, that has become the foundation for much of the
Bush Administration’s troubling behavior, including the now infamous torture
memo and the jailing of U.S. citizens as enemy combatants without charging
them.[5] And, just as Alito once advocated, this
Administration has used the unitary executive theory to attempt to trump
congressional interpretation of statutes through the use of presidential signing
statements. For example, President
Bush recently used this exact process to undermine the Senate’s anti-torture
legislation. Late last year, in a
vote of 90 to 9, the Senate passed an amendment, sponsored by Senator John
McCain, to ban the use of torture at home and abroad. While the White House threatened to veto
the legislation, Senator McCain convinced the President to approve the
anti-torture law. When the
President signed the law, however, he issued a signing statement setting forth,
in part, that “[t]he executive branch shall construe [the law], relating to
detainees, in a manner consistent with the constitutional authority of the
President to supervise the unitary executive branch and as Commander in Chief. .
. .”[6] The signing statement undermined his
commitment to ban torture and set forth a presidential claim that he can
authorize torture regardless of Congress’ intent and in contravention of the
plain language of the statute.
The fact that Alito has
advocated that courts give a president’s signing statement great deference in
determining the meaning and intent of the law is particularly problematic at a
time when the executive branch is trying to usurp power in a way we have not
seen since the Nixon Administration.
We know that Alito has advocated the use of presidential signing
statements in order to curb what he saw as abuses by Congress by providing the
President with the “last word” on statutory interpretation.[7] That should be particularly problematic
to the Senate since giving deference to such authority means that the intent of
Congress may be circumvented. If
confirmed, Alito would now be in the position of reviewing the type of
troublesome presidential action he himself helped to foster.
There are more examples of
Alito’s undue deference to the executive branch. While in the Solicitor General’s office,
in a brief before the Supreme Court in Mitchell v. Forsyth, Alito advocated
that the Attorney General, who had authorized illegal wiretaps of Americans, was
entitled to absolute immunity for any personal liability.[8] In a recently released 1984 memo, he had
earlier advised arguing for qualified, rather than absolute immunity, for fear
of losing the case at the Supreme Court, but he made clear that he personally
believed that officials should have absolute immunity with regard to such
behavior.[9] Alito stated: “I do not question that
the Attorney General should have [absolute] immunity, but for tactical reasons I
would not raise the issue here.”[10] This is certainly a dismaying
revelation considering the fact that at the highest levels, this Administration
has authorized and conducted spying on U.S. citizens. If confirmed, these issues are almost
certain to come before Alito as a justice.
In addition to the extremely
broad view of executive authority taken in his earlier writings, Alito has also
taken a narrow view on congressional power in his judicial opinions. For example, in United States v. Rybar, Alito argued in
dissent that Congress had exceeded its power under the Commerce Clause by making
it a federal crime to possess a submachine gun, despite the federal government’s
long history of regulating firearms.[11] Although it is only one example, the
significance of Rybar should not be
understated. The Commerce Clause is the basis for numerous congressional
statutes protecting many individual rights, including civil rights and the
health and safety of Americans.
In another example of ruling to
limit congressional authority, Alito wrote the majority opinion in Chittister v. Department of Community &
Economic Development.[12]
In that case, Alito held that a provision of the Family Medical Leave
Act (FMLA) entitling employees to leave when they or family members are
seriously ill could not be applied against the states. Doing so, he wrote, exceeded Congress’
authority under the Fourteenth Amendment.[13] Alito reasoned that Congress had
purported to abrogate sovereign immunity under the FMLA in order to prevent
employment discrimination on the basis of gender and that Congress’ findings
focused on: 1) the importance of both men and women caring for young children
and family members with serious health conditions, and 2) the disproportionate
burden family caretaking imposes on women.[14] Instead, he found “[n]otably absent . .
. any finding concerning the existence, much less the prevalence, in public
employment of personal sick leave practices that amounted to intentional gender
discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection Clause” or such evidence in
the legislation record.[15] His opinion cut further into
congressional authority to protect civil rights by holding:
[E]ven if there were
relevant findings or evidence, the FMLA provisions at issue here would not be
congruent or proportional. Unlike
the Equal Protection Clause, which the FMLA is said to enforce, the FMLA does
much more than require nondiscriminatory sick leave practices; it creates a
substantive entitlement to leave.
This is ‘disproportionate to any unconstitutional conduct that
conceivably could be targeted by the Act.’[16]
Alito’s position on the FMLA was later implicitly rejected
by the Supreme Court in a similar case.
Three years later, in Nevada
Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs, the Supreme Court held, in a
decision written by Chief Justice Rehnquist, that states could be required by
FMLA to provide employees with leave to care for an ill family member.[17] The Court held “that Congress ‘is not
confined to the enactment of legislation that merely parrots the precise wording
of the Fourteenth Amendment,’ but may prohibit ‘a somewhat broader swath of
conduct, including that which is not itself forbidden by the Amendment’s
text.’”[18]
There is every indication from
Alito’s record that his confirmation to the Supreme Court would tip the Court
away from a balancing of powers toward undue deference to presidential and
executive power. The basic civics
lesson here is that there are three co-equal branches of government that should
provide checks and balances to the others.
This concept is being fundamentally rejected by this Administration, the
same Administration that now has nominated a jurist to the Supreme Court who not
only agrees with its philosophy, but also has been instrumental in developing
this approach.
THE ALITO
NOMINATION THREATENS THE LEGACY OF JUSTICE SANDRA DAY
O’CONNOR.
Replacing Justice O’Connor on
the Supreme Court has the possibility of dramatic changes in many areas of
constitutional law. It is,
therefore, not enough to evaluate Alito’s record in a vacuum. It must be considered in light of the
Justice whom he will be replacing on the Court, if confirmed. Indeed, Justice O’Connor has often been
in the 5-4 majority of decisions to protect individual rights. Her opinions took into account the real
life impact of her decisions – whether they were, for example, considering the
burden on women of restrictions on their reproductive lives or recognizing the
value of diversity in higher education.
Unfortunately, in addition to raising dramatic presidential and executive
authority concerns, Alito has repeatedly advocated against our fundamental civil
rights and civil liberties.
Perhaps the best description of
Alito’s overall philosophy in these critical areas was provided by Alito himself
in 1985, when he submitted a now well-publicized letter to the Reagan
Administration seeking a position with the Justice Department’s Office of Legal
Counsel. “I am and always have been a conservative and an adherent to the same
philosophical views that I believe are central to this Administration,” he
wrote.[19] Alito then went
on to explain that he had been inspired to attend law school by his disagreement
with the decisions of the Warren Court, “particularly in the areas of criminal
procedure, the Establishment Clause, and reapportionment.”[20] He also expressed particular pride in
the role he had played in the Solicitor General’s Office in helping to craft
Supreme Court briefs arguing “that racial and ethnic quotas should not be
allowed and that the Constitution does not protect a right to an abortion.”[21] Finally, his letter proclaimed, in stark
contrast to the position taken by Chief Justice Roberts during his recent
confirmation hearings, that these were positions “in which I personally believe
very strongly.”[22]
These remarks, made two decades
ago, would be easier to discount if they were not largely consistent with
positions that Alito has taken during his fifteen years on the United States
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.
This is particularly worrisome because his remarks involve a series of
issues – racial justice, religion, and reproductive rights – in which Justice
O’Connor has played a critical role on the Supreme Court as an often-decisive
swing vote.
ALITO HAS
REPEATEDLY ADVOCATED AGAINST OUR FUNDAMENTAL CIVIL RIGHTS AND CIVIL
LIBERTIES.
Alito’s judicial philosophy
raises serious questions about his commitment to preserving our fundamental
constitutional freedoms and civil rights.
Alito has an extensive public record accumulated over a quarter century
as a federal prosecutor, Justice Department attorney, and federal judge. His intellectual qualifications are not
in doubt. But credentials alone do
not warrant elevation to the Supreme Court; one’s judicial philosophy is
paramount. There is often
considerable room to interpret Supreme Court decisions and congressional
statutes, and Alito has regularly used that room as an opportunity to narrow and
restrict civil rights and civil liberties protections. For example, Alito
- Wrote a dissent in Planned Parenthood v. Casey arguing that
a state’s spousal notification requirement did not unduly burden a woman’s right
to privacy, a position later rejected by the Supreme Court;
- Joined a dissent arguing that a student-led prayer at a
high school graduation ceremony did not violate the Establishment Clause;
- Wrote several dissents arguing for higher standards for
plaintiffs seeking trial on their race, gender and disability discrimination
claims;
- Dissented from a decision ruling that the strip search of
a suspect’s wife and ten-year-old daughter exceeded the scope of the search
warrant and was therefore unconstitutional;
- Rejected a death row inmate’s ineffective assistance of
counsel claim where the trial counsel had failed to uncover substantial
mitigating evidence – a decision later reversed by the Supreme Court;
- Dissented from an en banc ruling in a death penalty case
arguing that the prosecution had unconstitutionally used its peremptory
challenges to exclude all the black prospective jurors;
- Wrote a dissent arguing that a policy prohibiting all
prisoners in long-term segregation from possessing newspapers, magazines or
photographs unless they were religious or legal did not violate the First
Amendment.
It is, of course, impossible to
summarize a fifteen-year judicial career in a few bullet points or with a few
cases. But it is also fair to say
that these highlighted decisions illustrate a broader pattern of judicial
decision-making privileging governmental power over individual rights. What is critically important to remember
is that while Alito may state that he would be guided by stare decisis – the principle of
following prior case law – as a Supreme Court Justice, unlike a court of appeals
judge, Alito would create precedent according to his own interpretations,
not be bound by it.
Recent revelations about
presidential authorization of domestic spying, in defiance of the law, make it
clear that the Senate cannot, and must not, approve a nominee who has little
regard for the constitutional system of checks and balances. The Supreme Court is the final guardian
of our liberties, and Alito has all too often taken a hostile position toward
our fundamental civil liberties and civil rights. At a time in our history when so many
are worried about an administration that thinks it is above the law, now is not
the time to approve any nominee who gives undue deference to the executive
branch.
We urge the Senate to reject the
nomination of Alito to the Supreme Court--and to vote “NO” on cloture. Thank you for your attention to this
matter.
Very truly yours,
Caroline Fredrickson
Director
ACLU Washington Legislative Office
Christopher E. Anders
Legislative Counsel
ACLU Washington Legislative Office
[1] Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 536
(2004) (citing Youngstown Sheet v.
Tube Co., 343 U.S. 579, 587 (1952)).
[2] Judge Samuel
Alito, Third Circuit Court of Appeals, Administrative Law and Regulation:
Presidential Oversight and the Administrative State, Panelist Address before the
Federalist Society (Nov. 2000), in 2 Engage: The
Journal of The Federalist Society’s Practice Groups, Nov. 2001, at 12).
[3] Id. (emphasis in the
original).
[4] Memorandum from
Samuel A. Alito, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel,
Department of Justice, to The Litigation Strategy Working Group, Using Presidential Signing Statement to Make
Fuller Use of the President’s Constitutionally Assigned Role in the Process of
Enacting Law 2 (Feb. 5, 1986) (hereafter Signing Statement
Memo).
[5] For example,
Justice Thomas recently referred to the unitary executive in dissenting from the
Court’s decision to restrict Presidential power to unilaterally detain U.S.
citizens as enemy combatants in Hamdi v.
Rumsfeld. See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 580-81. (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
[6] Statement on
Signing the Department of Defense, Emergency Supplemental Appropriations to
Address Hurricanes in the Gulf of Mexico, and Pandemic Influenza Act, 2006 41
Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 1918, 1919
(Dec. 30, 2005).
[7] Signing Statement
Memo, supra note 5, at 2.
[8] Questionnaire of Samuel A. Alito, Jr. of New
Jersey, Nominee to the Supreme Court of the United States 33 (2005).
The Supreme Court ultimately rejected this approach. See Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511
(1985).
[9] Memorandum from
Samuel A. Alito to the Solicitor General, re: Forsyth v. Kleindienst 5 (June 12,
1984).
[11] 103 F.3d 273, 286
(3d Cir. 1996) (Alito, J., dissenting).
[12] 226 F.3d 223 (3d. Cir. 2000).
[16] Id. at 229 (quoting Kimel v. Florida
Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 63 (2000)).
[17] 538 U.S. 721
(2003).
[18] Id. at 737 (quoting Kimel, 528
U.S. at 81).
[19] Application of Samuel A. Alito, Jr. for
Deputy Assistant Attorney General in the Office of Legal Counsel (Nov. 15,
1985).