

**SWORN STATEMENT**

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is ODCSOPS

**PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT**

**AUTHORITY:** Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 (SSN)  
**PRINCIPAL PURPOSE:** To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately identified.  
**ROUTINE USES:** Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate living and retrieval.  
**DISCLOSURE:** Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION Abu Ghraib, Iraq, APO AE 09335	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD) 2004/04/27	TIME 2200	3. SSN [REDACTED]	4. GRADE/STATUS SGT
5. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS 66th MILITARY INTELLIGENCE GROUP, Deployed to Abu Ghraib Correctional Facility, Abu Ghraib, Iraq, APO AE 09335				

6. I, [REDACTED], WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

I arrived at Abu Ghraib on 23 October 2003 to conduct interrogation operations. When I first arrived to Abu Ghraib, I received a tour of the facilities, screening area, the living Support Areas and all the work areas. I conducted a right seat ride with the individual I was replacing. I received the Interrogation Rules of Engagement (IROE) and signed the IROE. I really didn't have any questions. It was pretty clear what we could and could not do. I have never witness any abuse of detainees or photos of detainees by MI personnel. I did see one instance where a military dog was used in the Hard Site. An Iraqi police had managed to provide a detainee in the hard site with a pistol. An interrogation was on going and the detainee was not cooperative and the dogs were used. The dog was in the cell with the detainee. The dog was close to the interpreter [REDACTED]. This happened in December. I found out a detainee had been bitten that same night. This technique had to be approved by higher command and I was told this had been approved (the use of a dog). When we wanted to deviate from the approved IROEs we had to send a detail plan and get it approved by LTG SANCHEZ. COL Pappas was in charge and had control of operations and [REDACTED] was in charge of the Interrogation Control Element. My belief was that BG Fast was in charge of the camp.

Q. Do you have anything to add to this statement?  
A. No

////////////////////////////////////End of Statement////////////////////////////////////

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [REDACTED]	PAGE 1 OF [REDACTED] PAGES
ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____"		
THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.		

STATEMENT OF [REDACTED]

TAKEN AT Abu Ghraib DATED 27 April, 2004

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

NOTHING  
Follows  
[REDACTED]

AFFIDAVIT

[REDACTED] HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 1006 FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

[REDACTED]  
(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 27 day of April, 2004 at Abu Ghraib Correction Facility

[REDACTED]  
(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

[REDACTED]  
(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)  
UCMJ Article 136  
(Authority To Administer Oaths)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [REDACTED]

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES



**SWORN STATEMENT**

For use of this form, see AR 100-42; the preparing agency is GDCMPS

**PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT**

**AUTHORITY:**

Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 8387 dated November 22, 1943 (SSM).

**PRINCIPAL PURPOSE:**

To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately identified.

**ROUTINE USES:**

Your social security number is used as an additional means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval.

**DISCLOSURE:**

Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

**1. LOCATION**

**2. DATE** 07/17/2004  
2004/06/06

**3. TIME**  
1515

**4. FILE NUMBER**

**5. SSN**

**7. GRADE/STATUS**

E-3/NG

**6. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME**

**8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS**

72nd Military Police Company, 992 Troop Command, Army National Guard

WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

From 23 May 03 to 15 Oct 03, I was deployed to Abu Ghraib (AG) as the ISG of the 72nd MP Company. My company's mission was to prepare the facility to accept detainees within three days after arrival with a follow-on mission of training Iraqi corrections officers for the eventual transition of AG into Iraqi control. When we arrived at the hard site, we found it to be unusable as it had been ransacked. We built up a portion of the original site and started to receive detainees within four days. Until the end of Jul 03, all detainees at AG were criminal. The main facility was in BIAP. The BIAP facility was overcrowded and AG was originally going to house to overflow. At the end of Aug 03, the 320th MP, arrived at AG. At around the same time, intelligence personnel arrived at AG. There were no interrogations conducted prior to the 205th MI Bde personnel arrived. On occasion, Judge Advocate General (JAG) personnel would come to the facility to interview detainees concerning trial issues. The MI folks arrived and began establishing a location to conduct screening and interrogation operations in preparation of a mission to interrogate suspected SADAAM FETAYEEN members. The criminal detainees were moved to another part of the facility to make way for the security detainees which were going to be interrogated by MI. The MI folks borrowed tents from us to set up the interrogation facility. At one point Camp Vigilant housed about 700 security hold detainees. My company worked more with the MI personnel than the 320th MP's. The MI personnel lived with us and used our mess facilities. In Aug 03, a 320th MP Bn reported to [redacted] that [redacted] and several detainees moved into the sun. I met with [redacted] MCBRIDE and [redacted] after the incident. [redacted] insinuated he had coordinated with me for medical support. This was wrong, as the only thing he asked was the location of the medical tent. Doctor [redacted] examined the detainees, and said a few were dehydrated but there was no permanent damage. For a very short period after the incident, my relationship with [redacted] was strained. There was also a situation where two MI personnel and an interpreter conducted an unauthorized interrogation. The situation was immediately reported to [redacted] and COL PAPPAS who took immediate steps to rectify the situation. At the end of Jul, the criminal prisoners were transferred to Camp Gancey in preparation of a suspected influx of security detainees associated with operation VICTORY BOUNTY. I did witness detainees on adjusted sleep schedules. The schedule for the detainee was posted on the outside of the cell. MI personnel would do most of the walking. The MP's would help out by turning on the lights or banging on the door. At one point, MI personnel would beat on trash cans to wake up the detainees. Once we found out about this, the activity stopped. During the initial set up of the interrogation site, we lent the MI personnel tents and escorted the detainees to and from the interrogation site. The interrogation site consisted of a couple of tents that were open on the sides which allowed personnel to see the conduct of the interrogations. In Sep 03, GEN MILLER visited AG. He spent most of his time with the MI folks, but he had an MP Captain on the team who just explained some of the functions the MP's conducted at GTMO. After the GEN MILLER visit, [redacted] commented that the MP's would end up working for MI. Other than the incidents discussed above, I never witnessed any detainee abuse or maltreatment while at AG. I never witnessed or heard of any MI person asking the MP's to abuse the detainees to help with interrogations. I never witnessed or heard any MP offer to abuse a detainee to help with interrogations. During my time at AG, there were a constant flow of personnel coming through IA. At the beginning of Oct 03, we started our transition with the 372nd MP Bn. The transition consisted of a walkthrough and a right-seat-ride which lasted approximately one week. One of the immediate changes the 372nd made was to restructure the guard force, cutting back on security personnel at Camp Vigilant which resulted in several detainee escapes within days of their transition of authority. After dealing with the 372nd MP's I had concerns in their ability to successfully conduct the mission at AG. The unit had come directly from a mission in the south and seemed distraught about taking over another mission. I feel their morale was extremely low. Detainees were stripped searched during their unprocessing, but I never witnessed or heard of a detainee being stripped as a form of humiliation. I have seen the pictures and cannot understand how it could happen. The actions depicted by the photos clearly fall outside the doctrinally authorized restraining techniques. MP training calls for the restraint (with handcuffs) and the segregation of unruly detainees. It seemed to me that MI was under constant pressure to report. On one occasion, [redacted] made the comment "they were sending someone else to teach us how to do our job," concerning the constant flow of visitors. [redacted] also complained that he had sent up numerous requests through his chain of command requesting rules of engagement of interrogating detainees, which he never received. /

**10. EXHIBIT**

**11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT**

**PAGE 1 OF**

**PAGES**

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF \_\_\_\_\_ TAKEN AT \_\_\_\_\_ DATED \_\_\_\_\_"

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.

STATEMENT OF

[REDACTED]

TAKEN AT

Henderson, NV

DATED

2004/06/06

B. STATEMENT (Continued)

Q: Do you have anything to add to this statement?

A: No. *End of Statement*

[REDACTED]

NOTHING FOLLOWS

AFFIDAVIT

WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE [REDACTED] HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

[REDACTED]  
(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES.

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 6th day of June, 2004 at Henderson, Nevada

[REDACTED]  
(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

[REDACTED]  
(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

5 U.S.C. 303

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

[REDACTED]

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

USAPA 11.00



SWORN STATEMENT			
For use of this form, see AM 180-45; the processing agency is DDCSOPS			
LOCATION Abu Ghraib, IZ	DATE 09JUN04	TIME 1400	FILE NUMBER
LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER		GRADE/STATUS E5
ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS JIDC BCCF/ A Co. 202nd MI BN			
WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:			
<p> <del>TOP</del> to 01APR04, Detainee assessment and Detainee Assessment Branch (DAB) operation were as follows: Once a detainee was determined by the ICE to be of no further intelligence value, a MFR was created by the ICE, signed by [redacted] and the file was transferred to CM&amp;D. If there were no outstanding requirements on that detainee the file was transferred to the DAB. Once a file was received by the DAB a Tiger Team would interview the detainee for the purpose to assessing and making a recommendation as to what the disposition of the detainee should be. DAB assessments covered Summary, Background, Personal Information, Circumstances of Capture, Detainee Explanation, Assessment, Recommendation, Packet Contents and additional Comments. Once an assessment was made, the detainee's file was organized and all reporting not contained in hard copy was included (via electronic dossier). One entire copy was made of each file and was sent by the DAB OIC, [redacted] through channels I do not have knowledge of, to the appellate review board. The original was maintained within the DAB. Additional reporting that was added to the existing files included Interrogation Notes, Interrogation Plans, Knowledgeability Briefs, Analysis Support Packages, Photos, RFIs, DDIRs, and IIRs. Essentially, all reporting that was contained in the electronic dossier and not contained in the hard copy file was added. At no time was reporting removed from the detainee's files. After 01APR04, the mission and operation of the DAB changed to where interviews and assessments were no longer required. The focus then became expediting the back-log of files. All active files were organized, reviewed, and a recommendation was made based entirely on the information contained within the packet. The organization of files is the same as stated previously, all reporting that was not present in the hard copy file, but was present in the electronic dossier was printed and added to the hard copy file. Files were grouped together, instead of a DAB assessment, a MFR was created containing multiple files, and was signed by the [redacted]. Once this was complete, all the active files were transferred to the Magistrate Cell and a completed DA Form 200 was maintained by the DAB. After the back-log of active files was transferred to the Magistrate Cell, the number of personnel in the DAB was reduced. Between 20MAY04 and 01JUN04 all the completed files (original files) that were being maintained were transferred the Magistrate Cell and said transactions were recorded on DA Form 200 which are maintained by the DAB. Currently, detainee's files are processed through the JIDC in one of two ways. The first way is, once the detainee is determined to be "Not Actively Interrogated" an electronic MFR is created and contained within the BATS Database. The file is then transferred from the ICE to CM&amp;D, and if CM&amp;D does not identify any outstanding requirements and file is transferred to the DAB. Once in the DAB the file is organized (same as stated previously), reviewed, and an assessment is made based on the information contained in the file. The electronic MFR is completed, printed, signed by the JIDC Director, and added to the file. The detainee is then removed from MI Hold, CM&amp;D is notified, the file is then transferred to the Magistrate Cell, and a completed DA Form 200 is maintained to record the transaction. The second method of processing files is as follows: Once the detainee is considered to be "Not Actively Interrogated", the file is transferred to Operations where it is organized and a MFR is created containing multiple files. This MFR is checked by CM&amp;D for outstanding requirements, and returned back to Operations where it is signed by the JIDC director. The completed MFR is sent to the DAB and the detainee's contained within the MFR are removed from MI Hold, and CM&amp;D is notified. The files are then transferred to the Magistrate Cell by Operations. When files are processed in this manner, it is the responsibility of JIDC Operation to organize the file and maintain the DA Form 200. The second method was adopted primarily to expedite the removal of detainees that were not of intelligence value or not being actively interrogated from MI Hold. Q: Who did [redacted] work for, A: CACI. Q: Do You Have Anything to Add to This? STATEMENT. A: NO. END OF STATEMENT </p>			
<del>NOT USED</del>			
EXHIBIT:	INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT		PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES
ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____ CONTINUED." THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT AND BE INITIALED AS "PAGE _____ OF _____ PAGES." WHEN ADDITIONAL PAGES ARE UTILIZED, THE BACK OF PAGE 1 WILL BE INKED OUT, AND THE STATEMENT WILL BE CONCLUDED ON THE REVERSE SIDE OF ANOTHER COPY OF THIS FORM.			

DA FORM 2823, JUL 72

SUPERSEDES DA FORM 2823, 1 JAN 68, WHICH WILL BE USED.

SHAPE 11, 10

AG0000655

DOD 000742

STATEMENT (Continued)

NOT USED

AFFIDAVIT

I HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1 AND ENDS ON PAGE 1 FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME THE STATEMENT IS TRUE I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT. SL2

[Redacted Signature] (Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 9th day of June 1904 at SIDC, DCCF, Ind.

[Redacted Signature] (Signature of Person Administering Oath)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

[Redacted Name] (Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

ICM5 Article 136 (Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

[SL2]

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

18APFC VI.10





MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Interview of [REDACTED]

On 29 MAY 2004 at 0815, MG GEORGE R. FAY, USA, read [REDACTED] her rights (details are on the DA 3881) [REDACTED] exercised her rights to obtain a lawyer. No questioning was initiated and [REDACTED] was given a copy of DA Form 3881. [REDACTED] met with Army lawyers [REDACTED] 54<sup>th</sup> LSO TDS  
Devens, Massachusetts 01432.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED], MI  
Investigating officer



**SWORN STATEMENT**

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is ODCSOPS

**PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT**

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1. LOCATION Metro Park Springfield, VA	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD) 2004/05/24	3. TIME 0900	4. FILE NUMBER
5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME		6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS SPC/E4

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS  
B Company, 2d Military Intelligence Battalion, 66th Military Intelligence Group, Darmstadt, Germany

\_\_\_\_\_ WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

I am a Human Intelligence (HUMINT) Collector/Interrogator (MOS 97E) assigned to B Co, 66th Military Intelligence (MI) Group, Darmstadt, Germany, currently attached to the 202nd MI Battalion (BN) at Abu Garayb (AG), Iraq. I deployed to Kuwait along with 11 other 66th MI Group personnel on 15 Oct 03. I arrived at AG on 19 Oct 03. I was on a Rest and Relaxation leave from 5 to 25 Apr 03. Upon arrival at AG, we received a briefing concerning the breakdown of AG operations, the Tiger Team configuration being used at AG, and Interrogation Rules of Engagement (IROE). I read the IROE slide and nothing, other than the presence of military working dogs, surprised me. We were then split up into various sections and paired up with interrogators who were already experienced with AG operations. I conducted my first interrogation on 21 Oct 03. I can not recall my first section leader because it was for only about a week. My second section leader was \_\_\_\_\_ while I was assigned to A Section. I then moved to the Special Projects Team and my supervisor was \_\_\_\_\_. I predominately worked with interpreters \_\_\_\_\_ and \_\_\_\_\_. While with A Section, I was paired up with a staff sergeant from the Guantanamo Bay (GTMO), Cuba, named \_\_\_\_\_ known as \_\_\_\_\_. I personally observed three incidents which I believe were incidents of detainee abuse. I provided this information in a sworn statement to Army CID on 21 Jan 03 (CID File Number 0003-04-CID149-83130), and more details can be found in that sworn statement. The first incident was what I believed at the time to be an accident when a Military Policeman (MP) named \_\_\_\_\_ was escorting a detainee down a flight of stairs in the AG hard site. The detainee was hand-cuffed, leg-shackled, and had a sandbag over his head. \_\_\_\_\_ was bringing him down the stairs, the inmate appeared to trip and fall on the stairs. This incident was reported to \_\_\_\_\_ and \_\_\_\_\_. The second incident also involved \_\_\_\_\_ and a cooperating detainee named \_\_\_\_\_. \_\_\_\_\_ was a Lebanese national raised in Syria. \_\_\_\_\_ who resided in either Ganci or Vigilant, requested isolation, apparently concerned for his safety because he was cooperating with Coalition Forces. When I arrived at the hard site with \_\_\_\_\_ asked "is this your guy?" and roughly put a sand bag over \_\_\_\_\_ head and began to pull him roughly into the hard site. I was caught of guard by the harsh treatment, but then intervened and asked what \_\_\_\_\_ was doing. \_\_\_\_\_ then responded with something to the effect "is the one of the good guys". When I said he was \_\_\_\_\_ then took the sand bag off \_\_\_\_\_ head and calmed down. \_\_\_\_\_ then said that he was going to strip \_\_\_\_\_ down, but did not have a jump suit to issue him. I notified \_\_\_\_\_ and \_\_\_\_\_ my Officer-in-Charge (OIC), and \_\_\_\_\_ intervened to have \_\_\_\_\_ clothes returned to him. \_\_\_\_\_ remained my detainee and he never mentioned any further abuse after this incident. The third incident occurred in late Dec 03 or early Jan 04 and involved a reluctant Baath Party General Officer named \_\_\_\_\_. I know as \_\_\_\_\_. I had a sleep management plan which was approved by COL PAPPAS (205th MI BDE Commander). I was in Cell Block 1B of the hard site, which was the area of the hard site dedicated to female and juvenile detainees. I had \_\_\_\_\_ held in the shower area of 1B when I witnessed an MP guard and an MP Working Dog Handler with his dog entered 1B. I do not know either of their names, however, investigators showed me digital photographs this day of an MP Working Dog Handler. The MP Handler involved in the incident was the same as the MP Handler in digital photographs numbered as 0196/CG LAPS, 0094/CG LAPS, and 0213 CG LAPS. The dog was a large, black, breed which appeared to be a mix of Labrador Retriever and Belgian Sheppard. It was the only black working dog at AG. The dog was on a leash, but was not muzzled. The MP guard and MP Dog Handler opened a cell in which two juveniles, one known as "Casper" were housed. The Dog Handler allowed the dog to enter the cell and go nuts on the kids, barking and scaring them. The kids were screaming, the smaller one hiding behind \_\_\_\_\_. The Handler allowed the dog to get within about one foot of the kids. Afterward, I heard the Dog Handler say that he had a competition with another Handler to see if they could scare detainees to the point that they would defecate. He mentioned that they had already made some urine, so they appeared to be raising the competition. This happened about 0100 and I returned to my quarters for the night. I forgot about reporting it the next day and did not remember it until the CID investigators came to talk to my in Jun 03. Incidentally \_\_\_\_\_ died in the mortar attack on Abu Garayb on Apr 03. I never witnessed, nor ever heard of anyone taking unauthorized photographs or videotape of detainees. I never heard anyone talking about "softening up" detainees in preparation for interrogations. I was told by \_\_\_\_\_ from the GTMO Team that I was permitted as the interrogator to strip \_\_\_\_\_

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT _____	PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES
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ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT \_\_\_\_\_ TAKEN AT \_\_\_\_\_ DATED \_\_\_\_\_"  
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AG0000658

DOD 000745

STATEMENT OF [REDACTED]

TAKEN AT Alexandria, VA

25  
DATED 2004/05/24

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

a detainee completely naked in the interrogation booth, although I never used this technique personally. The only incident I ever heard of involving such a technique involved [REDACTED] and I do not have any first hand knowledge of that incident. [REDACTED] also told me that I could use working dogs and said that he had used them previously, although he was unclear if he had used them at GTMO or AG. I never used dogs and do not know of any instance in which dogs were used as an interrogation technique. I never questioned the veracity of [REDACTED] statements. I spent a considerable amount of time in the hard site area talking to detainees and giving them cigarettes, building rapport. While there, I would occasionally see inmates without jump suit standing in their cells. I inquired about this and was informed by the MPs that they did not have enough jump suits for all the detainees. I did see some detainees in women's underwear, but this appeared to be by their choice, not as a punishment or harassment. There simply was not enough men's underwear to go around. Since Cell Block 1B of the hard site housed the female detainees, the hard site received shipments of women's underwear and apparently had extra reserves that were offered to the males as better than nothing at all. I had few dealings with OGA and do not know the term "ghost detainee". I know that there are OGA detainees that were off limits for Army interrogators and that some OGA detainees have waited for months for OGA interrogators to see them, violating the 30 isolation limit rule. On only one occasion I recommended a detainee for an extension past the 30 days. The inmate was an Iranian named [REDACTED] and I suggested that he be extended in isolation due to his mental instability. [REDACTED] had gotten into a fight in Gauci for no apparent reason and continued to show a tendency toward violence while in isolation. It was reported to me by [REDACTED] had been bitten by police dogs while his cell was being searched. I went to check on [REDACTED] and saw that he had bites on his thighs. When I asked [REDACTED] what had happened he said that the dog bit him, started to cry, and asked to be sent back to Iran. He was present in digital photograph 017/CG LAPS, shown to me this day by investigators.

//////////////////////END OF STATEMENT//////////////////////

~~Nothing Follows~~

AFFIDAVIT

[REDACTED] HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 2. [REDACTED] FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 25 day of May 2004 at Alexandria, VA

WITNESSES

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

UCMJ, ARTICLE 136

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

PSH/

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES



**PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT**

**AUTHORITY:** Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 (SSN).  
**PRINCIPAL PURPOSE:** To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately identified.  
**ROUTINE USES:** Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval.  
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1. LOCATION CRYSTAL CITY, VIRGINIA	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD) 2004/05/18	3. TIME 1229	4. FILE NUMBER
5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS SGT	
8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS B/CO, 470th MILITARY INTELLIGENCE GROUP, CAMP BULLIS, TX 78234			

9. \_\_\_\_\_, WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

I arrived at Abu Ghraib in Mid October 2003. When I first arrived, I was asked if I wanted to work in the Fusion Analysis Cell (FAC). There were only a few soldiers with Top Secret Clearances and I was one of them. I agreed to work in the FAC. There were a total of five individuals working in the FAC. My focus was on the Foreign Fighters and Extremist Cell. We would bring together all intelligence on these groups from the interrogation reports. From the reports, we would develop link analysis and analytic assessments. I didn't really do interrogations, but did sit in on a few. I was asked to help the interrogators and better guide them with specific questions to assist in gathering intelligence. When I first arrived, I didn't receive training on the Interrogation Rules of Engagement (IROEs) or the Geneva Convention. There was one time when \_\_\_\_\_ held a formation and told everyone to read the IROEs and sign them (this was prior to the CID investigation). We were then given updated IROEs and a class on them when the 202d MI BN assumed responsibility of the JDC. This was sometime in February 2004. At the time I arrived, I believe LTC JORDAN was in charge. Once my \_\_\_\_\_ left, I was placed in charge of the FAC. I worked in the FAC the entire time I was at Abu Ghraib with the exception of six weeks when I left to work in a Tactical HUMINT Team at the entry control point. I never witnessed or heard of any detainee abuse. The only thing close to it was: when we first arrived, The GTMO SGT took us on a tour of the facility. While in the Hard Site, we saw the MPs had two detainees in the middle of the cell. They were naked with a bag over their head, standing on MRE boxes and their hand spread out each holding a bottle in each hand. I asked if this was right. I was told by the GTMO (NCO) that this was the MP's way of disciplining detainees and that it was normal. Apparently the detainees had tried to stab some other detainee. I believe that \_\_\_\_\_ (500th MI in Japan) was also with me. I have never seen or heard of pictures and videos of detainees prior to the CID investigation. After the investigation, \_\_\_\_\_ saw a girl he believed to be an MP with pictures of detainees. He came to me to tell me about it. I told him to take it to CID and report it. I saw dogs being used a few times. The detainees were in the back of a Humvee with the dog handlers and the dogs. The detainees were sitting on one side while the dog handler was sitting on the opposite side. The dogs were next to the dog handler. I know the drivers and passengers were MI, interrogators and/or analysts. I recognize one civilian. He had blond hair, a goatee, was chunky, about 27-28 years old, and about 5'7 or 5'8. From my understanding, they would always have prior approval to use the dogs. Dogs were also used for crowd control along the concertina wire. There were two analyst who were transferred into my section because they were no longer allowed to interrogate. These two, \_\_\_\_\_ were great analyst and outstanding soldiers. These two individuals came to me (separately) with concerns of something they had done. \_\_\_\_\_ told me that \_\_\_\_\_ wasn't involved that he went to the JDC and asked \_\_\_\_\_ go with him because he wanted to show him something. They went to the hard site where the MPs had several detainees naked on the floor and a nerf ball was being thrown at the detainees. Apparently \_\_\_\_\_ got into it and threw a nerf ball at the detainees. After they left, \_\_\_\_\_ asked \_\_\_\_\_ he was okay because he looked concern. They told me they were afraid and they wanted my advice. I told each that they needed to get some legal advice. I told \_\_\_\_\_ They told me they knew about it and that I should not have been told about this. I went ahead and reported it to CID just in case they had not heard. They said they knew about it. The only other incident that I heard of which might have been considered humiliation was when a detainee wanted to smoke. The MPs let him smoke but they made him smoke the entire pack within 30 minutes while he did PT. In reference to OGA detainees, I only dealt with this situation once. I wanted to speak to one of their detainees who was a foreign fighter and belonged to OGA. I asked and was told he would not come to me but that I would be able to see the report OGA wrote up on SIPR. I never got it or saw it. One of the problems we had was sharing information or obtaining information with other units conducting interrogations. The reports would be posted on the portal or a similar site, but the interrogator notes were not posted. One time I saw a report that would have been very helpful to me a month previous. I began to make back channels to share information with other interrogators. This worked out great but my leadership got mad for doing that. I kept doing it because there was information they had which helped us develop link analysis diagrams and write analytic assessments. I was shown some photos. Photo #23 shows \_\_\_\_\_ and \_\_\_\_\_ looking at naked detainees. Photo #11 in file named CG Lapmark shows a female interpreter (name unknown) and a CACI interrogator. There was another photo which showed \_\_\_\_\_ an interpreter working with one of the Military Police.

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT _____	PAGE 1 OF _____ PAGES
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ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF \_\_\_\_\_ TAKEN AT \_\_\_\_\_ DATED \_\_\_\_\_"  
 THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.

AG0000660

DOD 000747

D. STATEMENT (Continued)

Q. Do you have anything else to add to this statement?

A. No.

////////////////////////////////////End of Statement////////////////////////////////////

Nothing follows

AFFIDAVIT

I, [redacted], HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 20. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

[redacted signature] (Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES:

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 18th day of MAY, 2004 at CRYSTAL CITY, VIRGINIA

[redacted signature] (Signature of Person Administering Oath)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

[redacted name] (Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

UCMJ, ARTICLE 136 (Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [redacted]

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES





SWORN STATEMENT		
For use of this form see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is ODCSOPS		
LOCATION Building B30, Camp Victory, Iraq	DATE 12 June 2004	TIME 1347
LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER	GRADE/STATUS SPC/USA
ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS 372nd Military Police, Camp Victory, Iraq		
<p>_____ WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:</p> <p>I reviewed several photographs of the alleged detainees abuse at Baghdad Central Corrections Facility, Iraq and was able to identify the following individuals assigned to the 372nd Military Police: Photograph labeled _____ depicts a Titan linguist whose first name is _____ on the left. I do not recall his last name. The individual on the right is _____. Photograph labeled _____ depicts _____ standing on the left of the photograph. Photograph labeled _____ depicts _____ standing to the right of the dog handler in a tan cap. _____ is standing to the left of the detainee. _____ is standing to the right of _____. The individual standing behind the bars on the left side of the photograph is an Iraqi Policeman, who name is unknown to me. Q: Do you have anything to add to this statement. A: <u>NO</u> <b>END OF STATEMENT</b></p>		
<p><b>NOT USED</b></p>		
EXHIBIT	INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF <u>2</u> PAGES
<p>ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____ CONTINUED." THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT AND BE INITIALED AS "PAGE _____ OF _____ PAGES." WHEN ADDITIONAL PAGES ARE UTILIZED, THE BACK OF PAGE 1 WILL BE LINED OUT, AND THE STATEMENT WILL BE CONCLUDED ON THE REVERSE SIDE OF ANOTHER COPY OF THIS FORM.</p>		

DA FORM 2823, JUL 72

SUPERSEDES DA FORM 2823, 1 JAN 68, WHICH WILL BE USED.

USAPPC V1 10

AG0000662

DOD 000749

STATEMENT (Continued)



NOT USED

AFFIDAVIT

I, \_\_\_\_\_, HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1 AND ENDS ON PAGE 2. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

\_\_\_\_\_  
(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 12th day of June, 19 04 at Building B30, Camp Victory, Iraq

\_\_\_\_\_  
(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

\_\_\_\_\_  
(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

UCMJ, Article 136

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT



PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

USAPPC V1.10



**PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT**

**AUTHORITY:** Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 6 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 (SSN).  
**PRINCIPAL PURPOSE:** To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately  
**ROUTINE USES:** Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval  
**DISCLOSURE:** Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION METRO PARK, SPRINGFIELD, VA	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD) 2004/06/0	3. TIME 1533	4. FILE NUMBER
5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS SGT	
ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS			

**WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:**

I arrived at Guantanamo (GTMO) Bay on July 03. After three month on site, I deployed to Iraq. I arrived at Abu Ghraib on 6 October 2003. I deployed as a member of a GTMO team consisting of CW3 [redacted] who focused on CITE-7/C2 [redacted] (SSG Analyst) focused on setting up the fusion cell and get analyst to better support interrogation operation. [redacted] was placed on the Extremist Foreign Fighters, [redacted] (96B) help [redacted] plus he conducted interrogations as part of Former Regime Elements Tiger Team and myself, an interrogator. Our mission at Abu Ghraib was to help set up the Tiger Team Concept and help them get back on track. I wasn't there to teach interrogation techniques. I would say that [redacted] is very knowledgeable on interrogation operations and passes responsibilities down to the soldiers. He would give me a task and expected me to complete it. He took care of soldiers and wanted the needs of the Army done. [redacted] is a hard working Marine who does everything by the book. [redacted] was quiet but did a good job. [redacted] was outspoken. He spoke his mind and wasn't afraid to speak out. He was [redacted] as experience as he thought. [redacted] is on of the most intelligent individuals I know. He wanted to jump into things more than he should have. He knew his job well. When we first arrived, we settled in and I was given a tour of the Hard Site, Camp Vigilant and Ganci. Within two day, we received training on the Interrogation Rules of Engagement. The first day I arrived, I was told to conduct an interrogation. [redacted] gave me the file of the detainee. She told me that some detainees were in sleep deprivation and some on dietary management. I interrogated a detainee who apparently was a Foreign Fighter from Syria. (I can't recall seeing on the file if the detainee was on sleep deprivation or dietary management. I was then placed as the Section Leader on the Former Regime Tiger Team. My Tiger Team consisted of [redacted]

[redacted] I was the section leader for about a month. My responsibilities were to prioritize detainees for interrogations, separate sources with interrogators, proofread all reports the interrogators on my team wrote and most of the administrative tasks for the team. I was the first authorization for approval of interrogation techniques to be used during an interrogation. My team would request a detainee to interrogate and tell me the approaches they were going to use. I would make the decision to approve and then forward them to [redacted] and they would sign off the interrogation plan and techniques to be used. Those requiring approval from higher were [redacted] and she would send it up. The requests were submitted two to three days prior to the approval because they would take a while to get back. My team submitted a request for a stress position (stress positions were authorized when I first got there) to be used against a detainee who apparently was the head of a cell of a mortar team who was firing mortars at our troops. The team members were [redacted]. The technique to be used was to have the detainee sit against the wall. The duration would be for 15 minutes. I oversaw the interrogation and after a few minutes, I told them to stop. In late October, [redacted] also requested to interrogate a detainee naked. The request was forward to [redacted] and it was approved. I oversaw the interrogation and after a couple of minutes, I told them to stop because I believed this was not a productive technique. I had heard about nakedness at GTMO, but I never used it. Most of the detainees we had had no intelligence value and were brought to us by the 4ID. I would oversee some of the interrogations and the majority of the interrogation techniques were the direct approach, fear up and pride and ego down. I would spot check the team and I saw a few interrogators scream and yell but no physical abuse was conducted. I worked mainly with CW2 [redacted] and [redacted]. The manpower was low and that is why believe I was placed as a section leader. I still had a responsibility to oversee other teams implementing the Tiger Team Concept. I was not able to truly mentor the other teams because I was pretty busy with my Section Team Leader duties and responsibilities. Once more personnel arrived from the 66th MI, 470th MI and 500th MI, I turned over my team to [redacted] and I was taken out as section leader. I gave a tour of the site to [redacted] (500th) SSG [redacted] (66th), [redacted] (66th), [redacted] (66th) and [redacted] (500th). While on the tour, I never saw any detainee abuse. One of my responsibilities as a GTMO Team Member was to present classes on Cultural environment. What was strange was that I was there to help implement the Tiger Team concept and I was placed as a section leader on a Tiger Team [redacted]

10. EXHIBIT 1-4 (E-MAILS)	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [redacted]	PAGE 1 OF [redacted] PAGES
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ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT \_\_\_\_\_ TAKEN AT \_\_\_\_\_ DATED \_\_\_\_\_"

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE BE INDICATED.

AG0000664

STATEMENT (Continued)

None of the other Team members had to give classes or placed in a leadership position. In my eyes, we were misused. Analysts were not allowed to conduct interrogations in GTMO unlike, at Abu Ghraib, where [REDACTED] an analyst was allowed to conducting interrogations. The GTMO Team would get together every once in a while and discuss how the implementation of the Tiger Team Concept was going on and on how the interrogation plans and files were coming along. [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] were focused on establishing a database and making sure everyone could find it and gather information from it. They were able to properly train other analysts by sitting with them. They didn't have to write reports but they reviewed some. In reference to GHOST DETAINEES: One day when I came on shift, I was told by someone that a detainee had died the night before. What I was told happened was that OGA chained a detainee up in the shower area and the detainee ended up dying. I went to [REDACTED] and told him that I had a problem with what OGA did to this Detainee and that what happened could come back and get us in trouble. [REDACTED] said that OGA had their own rules. I then went to [REDACTED] and he told me the same thing. My concern was that they were being placed in the cell without being documented. I told [REDACTED] that the OGA issue needed to be changed and he agreed that they needed to change it. After I moved from the Tiger Team, I was going to be placed as the coordinator with OGA, but that didn't happen. I didn't see OGA treat their detainees any different than the MI detainees. One day when I was walking through the Hard Site, I remember seeing naked detainees in the Iraqi Police site (MPs area). I do not know why they were naked. I saw them naked every once in a while (about weekly). I never questioned the MPs. Anyone who walked through the area should have seen the same thing I saw. In reference to ladies underwear: I remember one MP put a detainee in underwear. The MP was an African American male and an E-5. I believe he said that the detainee was placed in pink silky women's underwear because the detainee was being punished for something he did wrong. I did not get any other information on why the detainee was in silk panties. The individual was in a cell on the second floor and anyone who walked by could see this. I didn't report it because I knew that [REDACTED] would walk around daily and would see this. I saw some detainees shackled to the bed bars, but never to my team's detainees. The MPs ran the cages and they knew I was one of the GTMO guys and they didn't mess with my detainees or me. I would tell them that if they do not touch my detainees unless I told them specifically to do something. We would suggest to the MPs what we wanted them to do to the Detainees, i.e., give them more food, but we had control of our detainees. I was not at the Hard Site the night of the shooting on 24 November. I was volunteered to go. I had heard that there was a detainee who had a weapon in the cell and that the MPs were yelling at him "Drop it. Drop it!" The detainee would not drop the weapon. The detainee shot at our MPs and our MPs fired back. I did not see this. No one really had a duty when I arrived. I am not sure if it was [REDACTED] who came up with a plan. There was a Detainee who was sitting in a vehicle (he had good knowledge of who was a Former Fedayeen). We would take the Iraqi Police and he would identify them as a Former Fedayeen or not. His results were very accurate with names we already had. Once identified as Former Fedayeen, they were set aside to later be questioned. That individual selected to question the selected individuals was [REDACTED] and he had his interpreter, [REDACTED] did one interrogation that evening in the storage area off to the side of the MI Hold. I then became part of the group who kept the Iraqi Police quiet (Shut Up Group). I did see dogs that evening. They were checking the cells. At one time, the dog almost bit me, but the dog did bite the handler. I do not know if the detainees were in the cells when the dogs went in there that evening. [REDACTED] did do one interrogation, I found out he was questioning the [REDACTED] reporter, when I found this out, I told him to stop because this was my detainee. He stopped. There was nothing violating the IROE in that particular Interrogation. The MP's conducted a search of the cells to find out information on any more weapons possibly smuggled in the Hard Site. The next day, I was on a team with [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] who checked all the IPs from the next shift. I did this until I left. The only thing close to detainee abuse that I saw was when a detainee was being forced fed with an I.V. I was told this was to help him eat. The MPs would hold him down while the IV was on him. I did hear that before I got there two interrogators from Fort Bragg had interrogated a female detainee without approval and they were taken out of interrogation operations. There was also the incident with [REDACTED]. The night of the incident, she told me that [REDACTED] had taken her out of interrogations because she had walked a naked detainee back from interrogations. She asked me if I knew what actions they would take against her and I told her She was in trouble. After the incident, [REDACTED] had a formation and told everyone to make sure they were following the IROEs and we had to sign them again. Those that worked in the night shift knew about the incident, but it is possible that those who were on the day shift did not know what happened. I saw an MP (E-6 with Mustache, later identified as [REDACTED] from a photo. I also identified the female the photo was taken of in one of the photos provided by the investigator ([REDACTED]). [REDACTED] take a picture of a female detainee who was leaving the Hard Site. I told [REDACTED] that he was not authorized to have a camera or take pictures. I also told him that if I find out he is taking photos of MI Detainees, he was going to deal with me. I asked of the DISK and I destroyed the disk. I never reported the incident to higher. I do not know why he had the camera in the hard site and I do not know what they do with their detainees, but I told him not to mess with the MI Hold. Soon after that, I departed IRAQ. I was e-mailed by [REDACTED] on several occasions where he told me of the investigation going on and provided some questions being asked. I have provided those e-mails to the Investigative Team as part of this statement. I was also ordered not to discuss anything about this investigation with anyone. Q. Is there anything else you would like to add to this statement? A. No.

END OF STATEMENT

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [REDACTED]

PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGES

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

Not  
used

**AFFIDAVIT**  
I, [REDACTED], HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 32. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

[REDACTED]  
*(Signature of Person Making Statement)*

WITNESSES  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
ARMY A-1  
ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS  
[REDACTED]  
ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 4TH day of JUNE, 2004 at METRO PARK, SPRINGFIELD VA

[REDACTED]  
*(Signature of Person Administering Oath)*

[REDACTED]  
*(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)*

**UCMJ, ARTICLE 136**  
*(Authority To Administer Oaths)*

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT





MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

On 10 June 2004 at 1010 hrs, I called [REDACTED] at (360) 513-2853 to clarify a statement he made on his sworn statement dated 4 June 2004. He wrote:

"In late October [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] also requested to interrogate a detainee naked. The request was forward to [REDACTED] and it was approved."

I asked [REDACTED] if he was sure he requested approval from [REDACTED]. He told me:

"YES, As accurate as he can remember."

I then asked him if he was definitely sure it was [REDACTED]. He said that he only dealt with [REDACTED] and that if it wasn't [REDACTED] it could have been [REDACTED].

[REDACTED]

MAJ, MI  
Investigating Officer



**FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY**

CJTF7-TFF-1 (Abu Ghraib)

6 June 2004

**MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD**

**SUBJECT: Tier 1 Logs and Requests for Exception**

1. (FOUO) On 6 June 2004, [REDACTED] SPC/USA, JIDC approached the undersigned and volunteered that he kept multiple records of several old operations files. Within these files are multiple logs concerning detainee movement within Tier 1. He also provided several requests for exception to IROE. [REDACTED] arrived at JIDC in January 2004. He does not know the location of any other records not already previously located.
2. (FOUO) I assumed control of all documents that pertained to the timeframe 15 July 2003 to 31 January 2004.
3. (U) POC is the undersigned.

[REDACTED]  
Investigating Officer

**FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY**

AG0000668

DOD 000755



PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 (SSN).  
PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately identified.  
ROUTINE USES: Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval.  
DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION Abu Ghraib, Iraq, APO AE 09335 2. DATE (YYYYMMDD) 2004/04/23 3. TIME 1510 4. FILE NUMBER

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME 6. SSN 7. GRADE/STATUS CIV

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS CACI, Abu Ghraib Correctional Facility, Abu Ghraib, Iraq, APO AE 09335

9. [REDACTED] WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

I arrived at Abu Ghraib on 15 October 2003 work as a screener with in and out processed detainees. When I first arrived to Abu Ghraib, I received a one week of inprocessing. The inprocessing included orientation to the area, briefing on Interrogation Rules of Engagement (IROE) and I signed the IROEs. I felt I was very knowledgeable of what I could or could not do. I received Geneva Convention training at CRC but not at Abu Ghraib. It was a bit confusing as to who was in charge. I was told the 519th was in charge but the 205th was in charge of the entire site. I did not witness or know about any detainee abuse, any photos taken or the use of dogs.

Q. Do you have anything to add to this statement?  
A. No  
////////////////////////////////////End of Statement////////////////////////////////////

10. EXHIBIT 11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF \_\_\_\_\_ TAKEN AT \_\_\_\_\_ DATED \_\_\_\_\_"  
THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.

Nothing

follows



AFFIDAVIT

I, [REDACTED], HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 2. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

[REDACTED]

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES:

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 27 day of April, 2004 at Abu Ghraib

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

[REDACTED]

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

[REDACTED]

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

UCMJ, Article 136  
(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [REDACTED]

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES



PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 /SSN/
PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately identified.
ROUTINE USES: Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval.
DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION DARMSTADT, GERMANY
2. DATE (YYMMDD) 2004/05/11
3. TIME 1628
4. FILE NUMBER
5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME
6. SSN
7. GRADE/STATUS SPC
8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS 302nd Military Intelligence Group, Heidelberg, Germany APO AE 09102

9. [REDACTED] WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:
I arrived at Abu Ghraib in late November 2003. I am a 98J and when I arrived at Abu Ghraib I was assigned to a Tiger Team for about a month. I was then assigned as the analyst who research, put questions together for the interrogators, and scheduled the interrogators with detainees. When we first arrived we received training on the Interrogation Rules of Engagements (IROEs) and signed the the IROEs. These IROEs were posted on the wall next to the Interrogation Control Elements. We knew what we could do and what we couldn't do but we did not know what the MPs could or couldn't not do in their area. There was one time when [REDACTED] held a formation and told everyone not to do it or you will be caught. We did not know what the incident was or who they did what. I knew you couldn't abuse detainee. That was just common sense. I knew pictures were not allowed. This was posted on the wall. I never saw any photos or videos of detainees. The only thing I saw was the use of sandbags over the detainees head. I never heard or had any knowledge of MI telling MPs to "soften-up" or abuse a detainee to get them ready for the interrogation. I had heard prior to my arrival that the MPs would wet the detainees and get them cold. Then they would take the detainees to the booth (I never personally witnessed or heard first hand). Dog were used to walk down the hallway, but never go in the interrogation booth. I do remember seeing a naked detainee against the wall in TIER 1B. The MPs were getting him wet. [REDACTED] was with me at the time. This occurred sometime in December. I didn't tell anyone because I didn't know what MPs could do or not do. I had the perception (do not know where I got the perception from) that the MPs did this when a new detainee arrived. As 302nd MI we weren't attached to the unit there. My team would go to [REDACTED] as our immediate supervisor

Q. Do you have anything else to add to this statement?
A. No

End of Statement
Nothing follows
[REDACTED]

10. EXHIBIT
11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT
PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF [REDACTED] TAKEN AT [REDACTED] DATED [REDACTED]
THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE BE INDICATED.



Nothing

News

[Redacted]

AFFIDAVIT

I, [Redacted], HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 2. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

[Redacted Signature]  
(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 11th day of MAY 2004 at DARMSTADT, GERMANY

[Redacted Signature]  
(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

[Redacted Name]  
(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

UCMJ, ARTICLE 136

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

[Redacted Initials]

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**PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT**

**AUTHORITY:** Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2081; E.O. 8397 dated November 22, 1943 (SSN).  
**PRINCIPAL PURPOSE:** To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately identified.  
**ROUTINE USES:** Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval.  
**DISCLOSURE:** Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION Metro Park Springfield, VA	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD) 2004/05/24	3. TIME 1945	4. FILE NUMBER
5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS E6	
8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS CI Detachment Zama, 500th MI Group, APO AP 96338			

I WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

I arrived at Abu Ghraib (AG) on 21 October and was assigned as the Chief of the Terrorist, Foreign Fighters and Extremist element of the JDC. At various times I had the following personnel assigned to my team, but not all at the same time:

[REDACTED] went through a 2 to 3 day newcomers' orientation and tour of the facility immediately after my arrival, as did all newly arriving personnel. [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] did the IROE portion of the orientation. The IROEs were in line with current doctrine and training, but also reflected what I had experienced in previous assignments. Incoming personnel had to acknowledge in writing they had been informed of and understood the IROEs. I did not have any concerns over the IROE and was pleased to see that certain procedures, especially sleep deprivation, had to be approved by LTG Sanchez. Sleep management technique and process was being developed as I was leaving GTMO and I had wondered how it was worked out and put into practice. It was good to see that a higher approval authority (LTG Sanchez) was required. The IROEs were posted in numerous places and were quite conspicuous. I do not recall if the in processing involved reading the 12 October Memorandum signed by LTG Sanchez. We were aware of the techniques and procedures that required approvals, especially those that required approval by the CG. Interrogators and first line supervisors knew to ask if they were uncertain on any of the approval levels. My duties called for me to participate directly in interrogations as well as observe the interrogations conducted by personnel in my section. I did not observe or hear about any violations of the IROEs. On one occasion I did hear some dogs barking and asked about it and was told they were being used for an interrogation. I had been told by [REDACTED] about the general procedures for dogs: they had to be requested and approved with an IROE exception to policy memo prior to use, could not be in the booth, only present in the area and the dogs could not touch the detainees. [REDACTED] used the dogs, said he had requested approval. I did not see the approval, but knew that the SOP was that [REDACTED] would not have given the go ahead if she had not received the proper authority. At one time I had requested approval to use sleep management and to use the MP dogs but did not employ either as the approval was not received in a timely manner. It was not until 6 weeks after I requested it that the approval came through. I did not see the written approval but was informed that it had been approved. The process for obtaining approvals was that the interrogation team had to request it in writing in accordance with the interrogation plan and submit it to the section leader who sent it to [REDACTED] who would in turn forward it thru the Deputy Commander to C2/JTF-7. As far as I know there was no tracking system at the section level - I put the request in the distribution box and checked later to see if it was gone. If it was no longer there, I assumed that ops had forwarded it, since it was not returned to me. We were transitioning from a paper/hard copy system to an automated system had been put in place for recording and tracking the detainees. The maneuver element was supposed to send the detainee with a capture tag and preliminary screening info when the detainee was forwarded to us. Detainees of intelligence interest were put on "MI Hold" as soon as they were identified as such. Our screeners would take the paperwork that came with the detainee and prepare a screening review which was forwarded to the magistrate, who in turn passed the packet to [REDACTED] and the operations folks. There the info (identifying info, capture data, location, etc) was entered into the computer system by the AG Number, the ISN Number and cross referenced to name. The hard copy dossier was then passed to the Section leaders who parceled them out to the teams. Most of the time we cross checked the hard copy with the data base to make sure the info had been entered. The interrogators entered follow up data from the interrogation process as they progressed. I am not sure if the data base can be assessed from outside Iraq. A civilian woman named [REDACTED] who traveled to the various units training them on the system would be the best person to contact about that accessing the Biometric Automated Tool (BAT) data base. Higher priority MI hold detainees would be interrogated as soon as possible. Other MI hold detainees could conceivably be held for up to two months before being interrogated. During Oct and Nov the pace was very hectic at AG - in fact it was "crazy" 14 to 18 hours days were the norm. We had constant mortar attacks and other types of harassing fire and the maneuver elements were literally flooding us with new detainees. As we finished interrogations and felt we had exhausted intelligence value we forwarded the packets to the Detainee Assessment Branch for processing and consideration for release. The DAB memo would be filled out and put into [REDACTED] box for review and processing. I could check the data base from my section and see if the memo had been accepted by the DAB.

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES
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ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT" TAKEN AT \_\_\_\_\_ DATED \_\_\_\_\_

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

I observed or heard about some out of the ordinary procedures as explained below. One detainee in an unrecalled block (where the Iraqi Police were held when the round up was conducted) was handcuffed to the cell bar - he could move a short distance and could sit down but was handcuffed in such a manner that his movement was somewhat restricted. He was restrained in this manner because he had tried to attack one of the MPs who had been searching his cell for drugs. On another occasion I observed another detainee in Block 1B being put through a physical training session by the MPs by having to carry water jugs back and forth, up and down the hallway. Another occasion involved a high value detainee we knew was coming in for interrogation. He told us that he had cold water thrown on him and when we further questioned him on the details we found that he had been given a shower and all we had was cold water. This detainee [REDACTED] has recently been quoted in the London Times about the cold water incident and said he had been beaten and hit in his mouth. We actually favored him and treated him quite well, with extra rations and cigarettes, etc to have him feel like he was being favored and to keep him talking. The mouth incident was actually a tooth infection and we had made sure he had dental care. This particular detainee had been in Kurdish control for some time before he was transferred to us. One of the results of the Red Cross visit was a stipulation that all detainees had to be dressed in orange jumpsuits. [REDACTED] made a comment that it did not stipulate how much of a jump suit so he reportedly cut off the sleeves and legs and made it into two pieces for the detainee to wear. At the time [REDACTED] was working a "special project" and reported directly to COL Pappas and did it to one particular detainee who was a suspected high level al Qaeda operative. On another occasion we experienced a slight problem when we returned a detainee to his cell from the wood site. This detainee was always hostile and arrogant. On this particular occasion he jumped up against the interrogator and right after jumped up and down in place (as would a small child throwing a tantrum). [REDACTED] said that because of this, the detainee would "have a new look" - the next morning his head was shaved.

I never saw any abuse or humiliation of prisoners by either Army personnel or OGA personnel. I do not know of any unauthorized use of guard dogs for interrogation. I never saw any unauthorized photos or videos of detainees. However, when [REDACTED] in processed, I was told he took a picture of the compound and that he was told to delete it, he was not allowed to take pictures. He immediately deleted the picture. Later, [REDACTED] was taking a picture of a departing female in the ops shop and I told him to delete the photo, which he did. I am confident that all my Soldiers or civilian/contract interrogators would have come to me to report any humiliation or abuse. I am sure that most of the other Soldiers and civilians/contractors would also come to me, as they had a sense of trust in me. I knew [REDACTED] from a previous assignment, but on this tour he was not assigned to me and we did not work together. I feel he is arrogant and cocky and he did not talk to me. I saw him in the booth on occasion, but did not really observe his work. I heard about his attitude from others but never heard any problems about his work. I did not work with [REDACTED] and did not hear anything adverse about his work. [REDACTED] was very confident, almost arrogant. He felt he should have been in charge and not have to work for a military interrogator and not have to listen to a SGT or SSG. I never heard any complaints about his work. [REDACTED] was very reliable and I would have believed him if he came to me about observing any abuse - he never did so. I expected that all my Soldiers would have done so. I saw them on a daily basis and held weekly section meetings. On one occasion [REDACTED] was walking a detainee from his cell and I was escorting them. [REDACTED] had hooded and cuffed him and turned him around to walk down the stairs. The detainee lost his balance and fell. I had already returned to the ICE but two soldiers saw this and immediately reported it to me. I immediately informed [REDACTED] that it was an accident and not deliberate. She immediately addressed [REDACTED] and the MP shift NCOIC about the matter. [REDACTED] was always bragging and stretching the truth. Toward the end of November he was working as an analyst and may have received an Article 15 for drinking. I do not know if he ever worked with [REDACTED]. He pal'd around with [REDACTED]. Interrogators might not know what the MPs were doing or what they were supposed to do or not do. I always felt that the MPs had more leeway than we did, but the MPs should also know right from wrong. The interrogators should know what they are allowed to do and what they cannot do. Q: Is there anything else you would like to add? A: No [REDACTED]

End of Statement

~~NOTHING  
FOLLOWS~~

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT  
[REDACTED]

PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGES

NOTHING

FOLLOWS

AFFIDAVIT

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[REDACTED]  
(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES:

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 24 day of May 2004 at Springfield, VA

[REDACTED]  
(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

[REDACTED]  
(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

UCMJ, ARTICLE 136

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES



**PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT**

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**DISCLOSURE:** Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION OSJA, DARMSTADT, GERMANY	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD) 2004/05/1	3. TIME 1316	4. FILE NUMBER
5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME [REDACTED]	6. SSN [REDACTED]	7. GRADE/STATUS LTC	
8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS G2, HQ USAEUR, Heidelberg, Germany APO AE 09102			

9. [REDACTED] WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

I arrived in Iraq the third week in April. I was assigned initially as the G2 Planner, then as the V Corps Deputy G2. Once MG FAST became the C2, I went to C2 Operations and eventually became the C2 Chief of Staff. I traveled to Abu Ghraib approximately five times from early October to Late January before I departed country on 6 Feb. My visits were related to checking on the support for CACI contracted personnel at the site. I had no relationship with the TITAN Contract, though the CJTF-7 Language Manager (not the CFLCC contract officer) fell under me. I do not recall who was the particular individual that had overall responsibility or was the senior TITAN Contractor at Abu Ghraib, if there even was one. My focus from a linguist perspective was on getting requirements from the units filled by CFLCC. V Corps was already a user of a CACI contract in place but it was for force protection, counter terrorism and analytical slots. The vehicle used for the interrogation and screening services in CJTF-7 was under an existing Army contract that CJTF-7 did not have purview of. The contracting office was Fort Huachuca. The first time we began considering expanding the Statement Of Work on the existing contract was in the summer of 2004. The year prior when the TPFDD and the Request for Forces for the war plan were being drawn, we identified a shortage of HUMINT and Counterintelligence assets to conduct Corps and Division level operations. We identified the shortage and FORSCOM had already begun the mobilization of numerous reserve units. We knew the reserves' mobilization would most likely be for one year and ultimately we had to look at who would replace these units. As the ground phase of the war ended and Stability and Support Operations (SASO) began, the pace of raids and number of captured personnel was increasing through the summer. The Tactical HUMINT Team and interrogation operations were quickly becoming the "core" of the SASO intelligence effort. The Corps and divisions did not have enough assets to screen and interrogate all detainees being captured in a timely manner to provide actionable intelligence. The demand for interrogation results was intense at times as the leadership struggled with defining the emerging threat. The screening of detainees at the tactical level was not being done due to a shortage in assets. The divisions needed their Tactical HUMINT Teams out with the maneuver assets, gathering intelligence for their next operation/raid. Detainees would arrive at the theater interrogation facility without proper screening, no background data, etc, making interrogation difficult. Around July 03 we began looking at options for future MI resources/rotations. We held a mid level conference and knew there were minimal HUMINT assets available long term because they had already been mobilized (and pending demobilization in about 6-8 months), or committed to other operations such as OEF. We began looking at the option of possibly filling the HUMINT and CI shortages at static locations such as division/theater interrogation facilities with civilian contract services to augment the military personnel. The Theater Interrogation Facility was in Baghdad International Airport (BIAP), Camp Cropper at the time. Once time at Cropper, [REDACTED] myself and some other senior interrogators sat down to discuss the possibility of integrating civilian contractors (former interrogators and screeners) into the operation. Everyone agreed it made sense and we began developing the statement of work (SOW). I also discussed the concept with 205th MI Brigade personnel, specifically [REDACTED] the S3 and others on the C2 staff such as COL BOLTZ. I worked the SOW and would discuss it with [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] as we went through versions. The SOWs were actually for more than screening and interrogations. In June, V Corps was not fully staffed to become the CJTF-7 and did not have the resources required. Within the C2, Coalition partners began giving us staff but we didn't get any significant fill from other services for months, with the exception of the USMC. For instance, we did not have an officer really qualified to be a G2X/C2X until late September. It was a hectic time. Many in CJTF-7 looked to contracting solutions to provide services. As examples, we needed to stand up an open source analysis cell, which started with reserve component personnel and ultimately transitioned to contractors; the same with our SSO shop and locally employed persons (LEP) screening effort. For instance, we developed the concept to hire LEP screeners for vetting local nationals being employed by the US military (as done in the Balkans) so that some military CI assets could be freed for operational missions. At previously stated, the number of enemy personnel being detained by units was too large for the assets on the ground (and growing), and the detainees were often not being screened or processed fast enough. Often when the detainees came in to Camp Cropper, many were being dropped off without any paperwork. This was often due to the lack of resources at the divisional and below levels. We looked at using contract services as databasers/analysts, screeners and interrogators to help alleviate this shortfall. The package we put together for [REDACTED]

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [REDACTED]	PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES
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ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF [REDACTED] TAKEN AT [REDACTED] DATED [REDACTED]"  
 THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.

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STATEMENT (Continued)

division was for approximately 5 x screeners, 3 x interrogators, and 2 x analysts/databases. For the theater level, we needed more interrogators, so the package was approximately 6 x screeners, 8 x interrogators, and 4 x analysts. The SOWs were staffed in July. The final approval for the SOW and funding was the DCG. The money for the contract was MIPRed in August and we began to receive the first hires in September, onward. CACI would review all resumes and would forward to them or me, for those that met the required skills as specified in the contract. There were many resumes that were not even considered due to lack of skills required, and rejected by CACI without sending to us. We did specify in the SOW employees had to have the right skills such as prior interrogators, valid clearance etc, and that employees fell under local unit SOPs, regulations, etc for interrogation operations. Both and I reviewed 99% of the resumes as a QC; I could never say 100% because life downrange was hectic and busy. There were occasions when was the only one who reviewed the resume; such was the personal and professional relationship I had with who I know is a HUMINT professional. We would approve the individual to come to theater based on the resume qualifications and clearance validation. I do not know if CACI actually conducted interviews with those meeting the requirements. The contract did not specify that interview had to be done. Those hired would travel to a CRC where they would receive their equipment and training. (I do not know what the specific training they actually received was but would assume the Geneva Convention was covered as a general topic). I did meet with the 205th S-3 and I had a daily relationship on a range of issues) and discussed the integration of the contractors into the overall units, from both a support and operational standpoint. I believe it was clear that the contractors belonged to the unit, and worked for the unit. Either or I did the same with the Divisions. Once in theater, the first green suiter they saw was usually when they arrived to the supported unit, because usually the contract country manager on site was the one who met them first at BIAP and arranged movement to the unit. We told the units that the contractors were just another asset that belonged to them; similar in concept to the individual augmented military interrogators that came from other commands. I know there was a 205th MI Brigade training program at Abu Ghraib, but I do not know its content. The contract did not specify how a contractor could be fired or what steps needed to be taken. If someone left, I tried to find out why, but I cannot say that was always the case or always possible. I also can't say that I actually sat down with 205th leadership and laid out how the firing process went if any contractor did not perform to standard. But I believe they knew to go to me if there ever was a problem that could not be resolved on site - we (the Bde and the G2/C2 staff) were a close team. I only know of one individual fired due to her questionable suitability, and that was a staff position, and I directed the firing based on statements provided by the staff section and supervisor. She made inappropriate sexual comments, lacked the appropriate clearance and refused to respect military rank. She did not follow the CACI rules of conduct, and CACI took swift action to remove her. There was an analyst who was reported by the unit chain (302d MI BN) to have used alcohol one night (before the CACI rules of conduct were established); that individual was appropriately reprimanded by CACI, with my full knowledge and approval or their action. I have no other knowledge of any problems with performance of CACI employees. There were some who showed up and saw the austere conditions and quit. That was not at all unprecedented, because we were used to TITAN linguists quitting all the time because of the conditions since the beginning of the war. CACI did move some personnel between sites due to minor issues such as internal personality disputes, or to balance out teams between theater and divisions. However, I was never made aware of any problems with contractors at Abu Ghraib regarding their conduct or performance from CACI or the unit chain of command. Feedback that I got from and COL Pappas was always good regarding their performance. I can say that when I visited Abu Ghraib, my intuition was that you didn't get a good feeling. I didn't see many mid level leadership or above on the MP's side. Conditions were very austere, with seemingly lax security/standards. I did have complaints from the contract screeners that they sometimes had to do prisoner escort, when the detainees initially arrived at the holding area and were being processed (which they are not required to do) and wanted to be armed for self defense. I reported the issue to COL PAPPAS and and they resolved it. I also informed the C2, BG(P) Fast. At the time I left Iraq, the issue of arming contractors for self-protection was still under consideration, pending theater policy. The MI personnel I interfaced with were very professional, working under extraordinary conditions. I believe COL PAPPAS and staff were doing their utmost to improve the situation. was one of the hardest working individuals there, a real professional. Regarding I did not have a good intuitive feeling about what he was doing sometimes, though nothing tangible. For instance, he took me around the facility and I left thinking, "Is he really an MP or is he MI (I later found out he was CA, former MI)?" He seemed to spend an inordinate amount of time concerned with detention operations, vice interrogation. There were some professional issues between him and COL PAPPAS. COL PAPPAS never came out and told me, but through his S-3 and Deputy, I knew there was some tension between the two, but I do not believe it was related to inappropriate behavior represented himself as running interrogation operations and we all understood that was his role while at Abu Ghraib. At some point (around DEC 04) COL PAPPAS made it known that he was not comfortable with and I helped facilitate the move from Abu Ghraib to job within the C2.

Q. Do you have anything else to add to this statement?

A. No.

//////////////////////////////////////End of Statement//////////////////////////////////////

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT	PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGES
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Nothing

follows

AFFIDAVIT

I, [REDACTED], HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE [REDACTED] FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

[REDACTED]

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES:

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 14th day of MAY 2004 at DARMSTADT, GERMANY

[REDACTED]

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

[REDACTED]

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

UCMJ, ARTICLE 136

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

[REDACTED]

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Sworn Statement of [REDACTED]

Privacy Act Statement

Authority: 10 USC 301; 5 USC 2951; EO 9397, dated 22 Nov 43

Principal Purpose: To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately identified.

Routine Uses: Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval.

Disclosure: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary

Location: Heidelberg, Germany

Date: 16 July 2004

Name: [REDACTED]

SSN: [REDACTED]

Rank: LTC

Organization: V Corps, APO AE 09014

Q: What is your current duty assignment?

I am currently the Deputy G-2 for <sup>USCIB V Corps</sup> HQ, USAREUR, Heidelberg, Germany

Q: What unit were you assigned to in Iraq?

I originally deployed to Iraq as the G-2 planner for V Corps which became CJTF-7 in JUN 03. For a short while, I was in the C-2, Ops. In OCT 03, I became the C-2 Chief of Staff under MG Fast. I departed Iraq in FEB 04.

Q: Have you been interviewed previously about this matter?

Yes, I was interviewed by someone out of the IG shop about three and a half weeks ago. I can't recall the name. I was also interviewed by [REDACTED] WRT Abu Ghraib.

Q: Do you recall attending the BUBs over there?

Yes, I would generally attend the BUB during mornings and evenings. Regarding the comment that you were referring to, I can't recall any specific comment being made by LTG Sanchez. I do recall one instance where we all kind of collectively stopped and scratched our heads after a comment by the general, but I honestly can't recall the context of that comment. I do not even want to speculate as to what the substance of that comment was.

Q: Do you recall a conversation you had with [REDACTED]

No, I don't recall any discussion with [REDACTED] about a comment, though we talked numerous times each day about lots of issue. It could have happened, but I simply cannot remember.

Q: What was your understanding of the ROE for combat operations? For example, if US Forces are engaged by a hostile force. The hostile force is armed and has fired upon US forces, the hostile force is now maneuvering away from our forces, but has not laid down its arms and not indicated surrender in any way, what would the ROE allow US forces to do at that point?

It sounds like at that point, the enemy is still an armed force capable of further resistance. We could still engage it.

Q: What kind of oversight did you provide for any contracts in Iraq?

I had no direct oversight of the Titan contract. CJTF-7 was a user of the contract. I had oversight of the CJTF-7 language manager. My role was to identify requirements for linguists Category 1 through 3. I did not perform oversight over the Titan linguists. I was more supervising the requirements manager than anything else.

As for the CACI contract, while there was never a COR officially appointed in writing by the Cont Officer, I was the closest thing to being the COR for that contract.

Q: How many CACI contractors did you have there?

For phase I beginning in JUL 03, we started getting fills in AUG-OCT for detainee screeners, interrogators, personnel for the SSO shop, local national employee screeners and open source intel analysts. This was about 45-50 employees (actual fill) of a requirement of approx 70. By late DEC 03 to early 2004, we had filled all these slots. Phase II expanded in part due to [REDACTED] study or the JIDC. We had about 90 additional contractors including interrogation report writers, more intel analysts for the JIDC and C2 staff, more CI/HUMINT specialists, planners and foreign disclosure officers. Many of these positions were still unfilled as I departed in FEB 04.

Q: What was the need for all these contractors?

For one thing, my personal opinion is that we were not resourced to make the transition from being a Corps headquarters to a CJTF HQ. We had a Joint Manning Document that was not being filled systematically by the other services (except the Marines) or by our coalition partners. CJTF-7 headquarters was struggling to be effective in a combined/joint and SASO environment, especially early on. The CPA mission was larger than expected, there were numerous undocumented requirements that developed, and the spectrum of issues that CJTF-7 HQ dealt with from day to day was extremely broad. We were staffing/directing matters from in the "weeds" tactical, day-to-day operations such as precise targeting of groups, through strategic CENTCOM/Service/NCA level issues. We found ourselves faced with a range of issues that were very different from those faced by a traditional Corps HQ. Frankly, we were "covering down" on all sorts of positions with all sorts of MOS. Further, we were filling positions with individuals who were much lower in rank than the positions called for. We had 55 or so joint slots and only the Marines filled theirs. It wasn't until DEC 03 that

we started to see USN and USAF fills of any significance, and those only came after a long fight and were almost always lower in grade than the requirement.

Three dynamics necessitated our use of contractors in intelligence:

1. CJTF-7 wanted to reduce green suiters' performance of some tasks where possible. At first, during ground operations, HUMINT ops were not a high priority compared to the other intel disciplines. The rate at which our units maneuvered made the HUMINT gathered often OBE by the time it was reported. However, after we transitioned to SASO and became relatively static, HUMINT became far more important and critical to the operation. HUMINT became the "coin of the realm" as we determined the nature of the evolving threat and developing insurgency, and provided intel support to raids and precision targeting. At the same time we were setting up numerous permanent bases/camps which required intel support to force protection, screening local nationals to work at those camps, screening the MEK population, screening Iraqis for certain positions of trust (BLAP, linguists, key government officials, etc) - the demand for CI/HUMINT was very high. There was never enough and the demand was only growing. Because of the demand versus availability, Tactical HUMINT Teams (CI and interrogators) were one of the most "emotional" assets to task organize within the CJTF, usually resulting in GO level involvement.
2. The detainee population began skyrocketing in summer 03. We did not have enough assets to process detainees and extract timely, actionable intelligence at any echelon. It was nearly impossible to speedily transport, process and keep up with the number of detainees captured during the dozens of raids being performed every day throughout the AO. We had whole groups of detainees that would arrive at holding areas with no specific information about the circumstances of capture other than the fact that they might have been involved in, for example, a raid against a possible bomb-making cell. Who was in the room with the material, vice who was just rounded up in the general area was often unknown to the interrogator (an example). This made the subsequent interrogation mission very difficult, and was directly linked to a lack of screening and HUMINT assets.
3. Much of our CI & HUMINT assets were from the reserve component, as well as a significant number of our analysts. The RC assets were on a 365 day clock, and very unlikely to be extended to a second year. I recall several mid-level sourcing meetings, and looking at 6-10 months down the road it was pretty clear that shortages would be very likely in these areas once our RC assets redeploy. We knew that by late 03/early 04 we would lose about 2/3 of our CI/HUMINT assets to demobilization, and sourcing of replacements was very unclear at the time. Other commands were looking at contracting options (ie CENTCOM J2X was looking at a company (either ACS or SOS I can't recall)) and we knew GITMO was using contractors.

Q: Did you assess the quality of the contractor personnel?

Generally, the contractors were very professional and the skills/experience they brought to the table were very good. I personally was able to assess contractors at Camp Victory on a near daily basis. At Abu Ghraib, I relied on the JIDC/Brigade staff on the ground, COL Pappas, [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]. They always had positive comments about the CACI contractors.

Q: Did you interface daily with contractors?

At Camp Victory, I had daily interaction with many contractors, specifically analysts, SSO and local national screeners. Again, at Abu Ghraib, I relied on the staff at that site to fill me in on the duty performance of their contractors. I made between 5 to 6 trips there between the fall of 2003 and winter of 2004.

Q: Did you have a formal system to monitor contractors and validate their performance?

No, there was no formal system to monitor their performance, though there was an informal process as indicated earlier. In retrospect, that's one of our biggest mistakes, but we were pretty much consumed trying to get personnel in, support established, operational, etc, all during combat ops. Everything I saw first-hand and heard from others indicated that contractor performance was going very well. We did not get around to establishing a formal system to monitor their performance. We should have made that happen. I was aware of only two problems throughout the contractor force, one dealing with an SSO employee at Victory who lacked the proper clearance and had duty performance issues, and the second dealing with an OSINT analyst downtown who drank alcohol in the Green Zone. The former resulted in CACI firing the employee; the latter (though contractors were not under GO #1 per our SJA) resulted in a reprimand from the company to the employee for poor judgment, and the institution of a CACI code of conduct that all Iraq employees had to review/sign which precluded the use of alcohol, among other common sense items. The only complaint I recall was about possibly arming the screeners at Abu Ghraib. There were security issues out there which I observed first hand that made many contractors desire an individual weapon for personal protection in the event of a riot or breakout attempt. This was still being staffed when I departed, but was a valid concern, which I relayed to MG Fast earlier. COL Pappas took action to mitigate the concerns, pending staffing, by ensuring that contract personnel were never required to escort detainees, as was happening periodically due to a lack of MPs at the screening point.

Q: Were contractors briefed on the requirements of the Geneva Conventions and the CJTF-7 Interrogation Memo?

I do not have first-hand information on this matter. However, I was told by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] (a CACI contractor in the C2X) that all interrogators read the memo before going into the "booth." I was also told about the interrogator orientation program/brief (believe developed by [REDACTED] which included training on the Geneva Conventions as well as 205<sup>th</sup> MI Bde SOPs, etc at Abu Ghraib; I believe contract personnel went through this orientation program.

Q: What was [REDACTED] role?

He arrived in September '03 as an individual augmentee, soon after I got back from leave to see my new baby. [REDACTED] selected him to be the JDC director / OIC of interrogation ops, to support COL Pappas. Later, there was some tension between COL Pappas and [REDACTED]. I was asked by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] if there was a place to move [REDACTED] due to this conflict. When the "Party of Five" tasking came down in Dec 03 (a new requirement for a LTC), we moved [REDACTED] over there.

Q: What was the command relationship like at Abu Ghraib with the multiple command structures there?

What I know was the MI chain of command over there was solidly under the 205<sup>th</sup> MI BDE and COL Pappas. There was not much confusion as to the chain of command within the MI chain. I cannot speak to the other command relationship but there did appear to be confusion with the MP relationship.

Q: Do you recall working with [REDACTED]

I interacted with [REDACTED] on a couple of occasions, but more so with [REDACTED]

Q: Do you know [REDACTED]

I don't recall the name.

Q: Who is [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] is a CACI contractor through a V Corps contract. He was embedded in V Corps as we deployed. His work is excellent. When we wanted to hire contractors at in CJTF-7, we originally looked to expand the V Corps CACI contract. However, we received guidance not to do so since we knew CJTF-7 will be around a long time after we left. We did not want the contract to be associated with a unit such as us that would redeploy from the AO. One of the Vice Presidents of CACI [REDACTED] was there at the time and suggested that instead of using the V Corps contract that an alternate route, was using the Ft. Huachuca contract. Nobody knew then that it was a DOI blanket purchase agreement at the time, vice Army. We assumed a Ft. Huachuca contract would be an Army contract. Huachuca wound up blessing off on the proposed statements of work and CJTF-7 provided funding.

Q: At Abu Ghraib, was there an individual responsible for monitoring contractor performance?

There was no single person tagged with monitoring the contractors, though interrogation oversight went through interrogation ops channels. I went to to the BDE S-3 for operational support or employment issues or feedback. I went to the Commander for

issues related to command satisfaction with contractor performance. We had a senior CACI employee [REDACTED] on the ground as a "contract team leader," so to speak, as the direct POC for the MI Brigade.

Q: In your opinion, is the use of contractors in future operations a viable option?

Yes, although the command and control needs to be tight. The current active and reserve component structure isn't sufficient, at least for CI/HUMINT given current and foreseeable OPTEMPO. OIF I seriously depleted us with regard to RC assets, as discussed earlier.

It's unfortunate that one guy might give the whole experience a bad name; contractors bring unique skills, experience and backgrounds to complex operations. As an aside regarding [REDACTED] I'm 99% sure and I confirmed this with [REDACTED] that [REDACTED] was initially hired as a screener. This means he didn't need to have been a 97E interrogator or equivalent. If a decision was made to put him in the booth for interrogations, this was made internally at Abu Ghraib. I don't know of anything from a regulatory perspective that prevents a screener that demonstrates superior skills from being used as an interrogator, but that is not the norm. I do know that he did have strategic debriefing training, but do not believe he was a formally trained interrogator.

Q: Are the strategic level interrogators at INSCOM and DHS military or civilian?

Military I think, at least predominantly.

Q: Do we have a DA Civilian population of interrogators?

We have a GS132 intel series; but they are generally not used/trained in that role to my knowledge. There may be some special program interrogators.

As an aside, HUMINT assets in the AC have been greatly depleted from the force structure. At Corps level, there is supposed to be a Tactical Exploitation Battalion (TEB) with an interrogation company. But most of the active Corps TEBs lost their interrogators. Only the 18th Airborne Corps retained theirs - the 519<sup>th</sup> MI. There is a lot of demand for tactical HUMINT operationally, but during force re-structuring, those Corps and below assets have often been used as bill payers.

Q: Does V Corps have an MP Brigade?

Yes, the 18<sup>th</sup> MP Brigade, but they were assigned and consumed by their mission of securing Baghdad. The 800<sup>th</sup> MP BDE was given the Abu Ghraib mission partly because they advertised their services in the detention ops unit, as far back as our initial planning process and performed this role during the ground war for CFLCC. Also, they were not a V Corps asset, they were retained by ARCENT.



I, [REDACTED] have read this statement which begins on page 1 and ends on page 7. I fully understand the contents of the entire statement made by me. The statement is true. I have initialed all corrections. I have made this statement freely without hope of benefit or reward, without threat of punishment, and without coercion, unlawful influence, or unlawful inducement.

[REDACTED]  
(Signature of LTC)


Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 16<sup>th</sup> day of July 2004 at

APD KE 090023, HELDEBERG, GE  
(Location)

[REDACTED]  
(Typed name of Person Administering Oath)

10 USC 1044(a) HQ US CORPS OSTA  
(Authority to Administer Oaths)

SUPV. ATTY





## MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Identification of CPT [REDACTED] 372<sup>nd</sup> MP Company, as the Individual Who Reportedly Assaulted an Iraqi Detainee at Abu Ghraib Hard Site on 24 November 2003

1. On 23 June 2004 [REDACTED] Article 15-6 Investigating Officer (MG Fay Inquiry), interviewed [REDACTED] SGT/E-5, USAR, 229<sup>th</sup> Military Police Company, Virginia Beach, VA, concerning the incident he reported to US Army Criminal Investigative Command on 20 January 2004, in which he observed a US Army soldier choking, dragging, and kicking an Iraqi detainee in the Hard Site of Abu Ghraib Detention Facility on or about 24 November 2003. At the time of the incident [REDACTED] identified the individual involved in the incident only as a soldier because the individual was not dressed in full military uniform and therefore [REDACTED] could not identify him by name or rank. Subsequent to the incident, [REDACTED] saw the individual again, this time in his full uniform with Captain's rank, but he did not see the Captain's name tag. [REDACTED] presented [REDACTED] nine photographs of US Army Captains who were assigned at Abu Ghraib at the time of the incident. The photographs were eight by ten inch color print outs of digital photographs obtained from the Department of Defense (DoD) Common Access Card (CAC) database. The photographs were presented to [REDACTED] randomly and without comment, other than instruction to [REDACTED] that he look carefully at the photographs to determine if any of them was the individual he observed choking and kicking the detainee at Abu Ghraib. All photographs were presented simultaneously and [REDACTED] was allowed to peruse and study them at his leisure. [REDACTED] immediately and without hesitation identified [REDACTED] USAR, 372<sup>nd</sup> MP Company, as the individual who he had observed choking, dragging, and kicking a detainee at the Abu Ghraib Hard Site on or about 24 November 2003. After [REDACTED] identified CPT [REDACTED] from the nine photographs [REDACTED] asked [REDACTED] if he was sure of his choice, and [REDACTED] stated he was "absolutely sure." In his civilian profession [REDACTED] is a correctional professional employed by the State of Virginia. [REDACTED] executed DA Form 2823, Sworn Statement, dated 23 June 2003, which stated the following:

"At approximately 1050 hrs on 23 June 2004 investigator [REDACTED] presented a line up of photo's (sic). After reviewing the photo's (sic) I identified [REDACTED] digital photo #244410378 as the individual as described (sic) in the statement dated 20 Jan 04. As a professional jailer for eleven years, the conduct and treatment of the prisoners were not to standards. I have nothing else to add at this time."

2. On 24 June 2004 [REDACTED] Article 15-6 Investigating Officer (MG Fay Inquiry), interviewed [REDACTED] SPC/E-4, USAR, 229<sup>th</sup> Military Police Company, Virginia Beach, VA, concerning the incident he reported to US Army Criminal Investigation Command on 20 January 2004, in which he observed a US Army soldier striking and kicking an Iraqi detainee in the Hard Site of Abu Ghraib Detention Facility on or about 24 November 2003. At the time of the incident [REDACTED] identified the individual involved in the

incident only as a soldier because the individual was not dressed in full military uniform and therefore [REDACTED] could not identify him by name or rank. Subsequent to the incident [REDACTED] saw the individual again, this time in his full uniform with Captain's rank, but he did not see the Captain's name tag. [REDACTED] presented [REDACTED] nine photographs of US Army Captains who were assigned at Abu Ghraib at the time of the incident. The photographs were eight by ten inch color print outs of digital photographs obtained from the Department of Defense (DoD) Common Access Card (CAC) database. The photographs were presented to [REDACTED] randomly and without comment, other than instruction to [REDACTED] that he look carefully at the photographs to determine if any of them was the individual he observed striking and kicking the detainee at Abu Ghraib. All photographs were presented simultaneously and SPC [REDACTED] was allowed to peruse and study them at his leisure. [REDACTED] immediately and without hesitation identified [REDACTED] USAR, 372<sup>nd</sup> MP Company, as the individual who he had observed striking and kicking a detainee at the Abu Ghraib Hard Site on or about 24 November 2003. After [REDACTED] identified [REDACTED] from the nine photographs, [REDACTED] asked [REDACTED] if he was sure of his choice, and [REDACTED] stated that he was "100 percent sure." In his civilian profession, SPC is a detective for the Newport News, VA, Police Department. [REDACTED] executed DA Form 2823, Sworn Statement, dated 24 June 2003, which stated the following:

"On June 24, 2004, I identified [REDACTED] from a photospread (sic) provided to me as being the unknown Captain described in my January 20, 2004 statement to CID [REDACTED]. This is the Captain that I witness beating a prisoner inside the hard site in late November 2003. I have nothing further to add to this statement."

3. [REDACTED] was the Officer-in-Charge of the Hard Site facility at Abu Ghraib at the time of the incident on 24 November 2003.

4. [REDACTED] attorney-at-law, Law Offices of [REDACTED] legal representative for [REDACTED] telephoned [REDACTED] investigating officer (MG Fay Inquiry) on 9 June 2004, and notified [REDACTED] wanted to cooperate with investigating officers, but that he would submit to an interview and make a statement only if granted immunity. MG Fay declined to accept [REDACTED] conditional offer to cooperate and no further effort has been made to interview [REDACTED]

5. POC is the undersigned at (703) 428-4822

Enclosures:

DA Form 2823, Sworn Statement,  
dated 23 Jun 04, executed by  
[REDACTED]

DA Form 2823, Sworn Statement,  
dated 24 Jun 04, executed by  
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]  
AR 15-6 Investigating Officer

[REDACTED]  
DA Form 2823, Sworn Statement,  
dated 20 Jan 04, executed by

[REDACTED]  
DA Form 2823, Sworn Statement,  
dated 20 Jan 04, executed by

[REDACTED]  
MFR, dated 9 Jun 04, Subject: Procedure 15  
Interview of CPT [REDACTED] USAR



SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is ODCSOPS


PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 (SSN).
PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately
ROUTINE USES: Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval
DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION: HOPEWELL, VA.
2. DATE (YYMMDD): 20040623
3. TIME: 1125
4. FILE NUMBER
5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME
6. SSN
7. GRADE/STATUS: E-5
8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS: 207th MP B, VIRGINIA BEACH, VA.

I WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:
I APPROXIMATELY 1030HRS ON 23 JUNE 04 INVESTIGATOR I IDENTIFIED PRESENTED A LINE UP OF PHOTOS. AFTER REVIEWING THE PHOTOS CAPTAIN DIGITAL PHOTO WAS IDENTIFIED AS THE INDIVIDUAL AS DESCRIBED IN THE STATEMENT DATED 20 JANU. AS A PROFESSIONAL SAILOR FOR ELEVEN YEARS THE CONDUCT AND TREATMENT OF THE PRISONERS WERE NOT TO STANDARDS. I HAVE NOTHING ELSE TO ADD AT THIS TIME

NOTHING FOLLOWS



Not Used

10. EXHIBIT
11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT
PAGE 1 OF 1 PAGES

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT TAKEN AT DATED
THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED

STATEMENT OF [REDACTED] TAKEN AT Hopewell, VA DATED 20070623

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

[REDACTED]

Not

[REDACTED]

Used

AFFIDAVIT

[REDACTED] HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 263 FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

[REDACTED]  
(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES:

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 23 day of June, 2007  
at Hopewell VA

\_\_\_\_\_  
ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

[REDACTED]  
(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

\_\_\_\_\_  
ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

[REDACTED]  
(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)  
5 USC 303  
(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT  
[REDACTED]

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES





SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is ODCSOPS

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 (SSN).
PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately
ROUTINE USES: Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval.
DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION: Newport News, Virginia
2. DATE (YYYYMMDD): 2004/06/24
3. TIME: 0815
4. FILE NUMBER
5. LAST NAME FIRST NAME MIDDLE NAME
6. SSN
7. GRADE/STATUS: E-4
8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS: 229th Military Police Co., Virginia Beach, Virginia

... WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:
On June 24, 2004, I identified Capt. [redacted] from a photo spread provided to me as being the unknown Captain described in my January 20, 2004 statement to CID Agent [redacted]. This is the Captain that I witnessed beating a prisoner inside the hard site in late November 2003. I have nothing further to add to this statement.

Nothing follows

Nothing

Follows

10. EXHIBIT
11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT
PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT TAKEN AT DATED
THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE BE INDICATED.

STATEMENT OF [REDACTED]

TAKEN AT

Newport News, VA

DATED

2004 06 24

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

NOT

Used

AFFIDAVIT

I, [REDACTED], HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 2. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

[REDACTED]  
Signature of Person Making Statement

WITNESSES:

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 24th day of June, 2004 at Newport News, Virginia

[REDACTED]  
Signature of Person Administering Oath

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

[REDACTED]  
(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

5 USC 303

(Authority To Administer Oath)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES