

On 10 February 2004, a panel of officers, directed by Major General Antonio Taguba, conducted the following interview. Major General Taguba was appointed as an Investigating Officer under the provisions of Army Regulation 15-6, by Lieutenant General David D. McKiernan, Commanding General of the Coalition Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC), to look into allegations of maltreatment of detainees, detainee escapes and accountability lapses, at Abu Gharib, also known as the Baghdad Central Confinement Facility (BCCF). The panel also inquired into training, standards, employment, command policies, and internal policies, concerning the detainees held at Abu Gharib prison. Finally, the panel looked into the command climate and the command and supervisory presence

The following persons were present:

COL [REDACTED], MP, CFLCC – PMO, **Interviewer**
LTC [REDACTED] JA, CFLCC – SJA, **Interviewer**
LTC [REDACTED], 705th MP Battalion, **Interviewer**
SFC [REDACTED], 229th MP Company, **Respondent**

The interview is summarized as follows:

I'm Sergeant First Class [REDACTED], 229th MP Company. My sosh is [REDACTED]. I am in the IRF, the Internal Reaction Force, which is separate from the Quick Reaction Force. We handle all issues inside the wall, dealing with prisoners. I work for 1LT Sutton. Before, I worked in Customs at Camp Doha.

COL [REDACTED] reads an excerpt from a sworn statement, dated 20 January 2004:

“The MI person hit him on the back of the head with a closed fist, causing the suspect to fall forward. The suspect was handcuffed, on his knees, and had a towel wrapped around his head. The MI soldier kept yelling, ‘Eyes down,’ and ‘Get up,’ while knocking the suspect down, and repeating the verbal abuse towards the suspect. Another MI soldier came to the assistance of the MI person. The 2nd MI soldier put an arm lock around the suspect’s neck, pulling the suspect forward from the ground. While pulling the suspect from the ground by the neck, the MI soldier was twisting left and right, yelling at the suspect, while the first MI soldier struck the suspect in the mid-section of the stomach. 1LT [REDACTED] IRF Commander, approached the soldier and asked if this treatment was necessary. The MI soldier told the 1LT that he was a trained professional and to let him to let him handle the situation. The 1LT reminded the soldiers that the suspect may be innocent. The MI soldiers continued their verbal abuse, and excessive force. The 1LT stated to the MI soldiers that this abuse was not necessary. The MI soldiers ignored the 1LT, and continued to verbally abuse the suspect and drug the suspect off by the neck. The 1LT approached MAJ [REDACTED], and asked the Major if he was going to let this continue. The Major said nothing, and the 1LT stated that he was not going to allow this abuse to continue. The 1LT went to the MI vehicle and wanted to know who was the NCOIC.”

Finished reading the statement, COL [REDACTED] continues the interview with SFC [REDACTED]. SFC [REDACTED] responds as follows:

I do recall the incident. We all wrote statements on this on August 23rd, about 20 minutes after the incident. I'm surprised you don't have it. 20 January is the second time we reported this incident. We reported this a second time, because we didn't know if this had been investigated. SPC [REDACTED] asked CPT [REDACTED], a Marine who works in the Magistrate Cell, and CPT [REDACTED] said he spoke with the 800th, who told the Captain that he could handle the investigation, that they didn't have time for it. In a few days, after that, the CID folks showed up because of another incident going on at the prison.

I don't recall who interviewed me, but he told me this was turned over to CID. They looked at it, and turned it back over to the command. He knew of no resolution to it. I was under the assumption, from CID, that it was turned back over to the MI command, who have since left a few months ago. I think it was the 205th or 202nd... I remember the 1SG's name was [REDACTED]. Shortly after the incident occurred, 1LT [REDACTED] and I were called to the Battalion TOC, by MAJ [REDACTED] and met with their 1SG, who tried to do some battle damage assessment.

We did the statements, that night, after the incident. We turned them in to 1LT [REDACTED] who turned them in to CPT [REDACTED], our Company Commander, who turned them over to LTC [REDACTED] or MAJ [REDACTED]. They went to someone in the Battalion, but we got no resolution from the 800th at all.

I haven't met COL [REDACTED], yet, but I know LTC [REDACTED] is leaps and bounds over anything we've seen from the 800th. He recognizes senior NCOs by name. Speaks with you every time he sees you. He asks you how things are going. The Brigade CSM met with all senior NCOs, last week, after only being on the ground just a few days. And, within a few days, issued us all brand new brassards. I've hadn't had a brassard from the 800th, since I've been here. I was told we could buy some. I only know of a couple of occasions when BG Karpinski had interaction with any of the soldiers in our unit. It was back in August or early September. She went into 2 towers, and spoke with one of soldiers, who was augmented to another platoon, and spoke about the prisoners. She didn't ask him how his living conditions were; she just wanted to know how the prisoners were. She talked about setting up an intramural inter compound soccer league with him. The other occasion was when Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld came. I wasn't there, but my soldiers said she told Rumsfeld we had everything we needed. She told him we were "Good to go." We were far from "good to go."

As far as the Brigade CSM from the 800th, that was another investigation we brought to the Brigade. The 377th Theatre Support Command investigated him. He came to visit, and had an inappropriate liaison with one of my soldiers. He spoke directly to one of my E4s, before speaking to anyone else. He put his arm around her, and walked around with her. He was rubbing her shoulders, and they disappeared for about 5 or 10 minutes. When they came back, he sat down with her. He was holding his hand on her leg, with his arm around her. She was having some difficult times, with the stress of coming from

Camp Doha to up there, but it wasn't anything that required the physical touching. I think she was trying to play the stress card, to get out of pulling duty. We had her evaluated, and the doctor said she was completely fine. But, several of my soldiers observed that, including myself. A couple of them were so angry, that they wrote sworn statements and turned them in to CPT [REDACTED] our EO Representative, which eventually spearheaded the 15-6. That was my first time meeting CSM [REDACTED]

CSM [REDACTED] came out another time, and I spoke with him about the lack of communication devices. We had no phones, no way of calling home to say we're still alive, even though the mortar attacks happen every night. He gave me his satellite phone, and said, "Call home." I said that's not the issue. "We have 115 soldiers, here, that don't have access to a phone. What's being done to fix that?" He said, "Well send up a request for a phone." I said that's already been done. He said, "Well use mine," and I said, "Well, we need to line up every soldier out here, and get them a free phone call," and he then he told me he had to go.

The only other person I know from the 800th is the HHC Commander, a female Captain. When we were at Arifjan, I had a soldier whose brother was killed. She helped me get all the emergency leave paperwork squared away. And, CPT [REDACTED] helped us get up here.

They've never come and talk to us. We'd tell them our living conditions suck, and that we've eaten T-Rations, and that we've eaten breakfast 12 days in a row in September for dinner, but none of those people would come out to see that. SGM [REDACTED] LTC [REDACTED] and the folks from the 16th are the first people from the Brigade to spend the night at that prison. I've never seen anybody from the 800th come and spend the night, there. They are gone by dark, because Abu Gharib is a dangerous place after dark.

Morale was really bad back in August and September, because we moved from Camp Doha, which has ideal living conditions, to Iraq. But, morale kind of leveled off mid-field. The mortar attacks don't help, and the fact that we don't do anything about the mortar attacks really doesn't help. The 82nd goes out, and the QRF goes out, but from what I understand, if you don't have the right information in 90 seconds, you're not going to get those guys.

I would have thought that a Brigadier General could stop a buck, but I may be wrong. There are enough people, here, that have been told what's going on, that someone should be able to fix this problem. Related to these incidents, my personal feeling is, as someone who's been a cop for 10 years in the civilian world, if they had taken action on this back in August, it would have set the stage that prisoner abuse was not going to be tolerated.

We're a CS Company that was re-organized prior to deploying as an I/R Company. We changed our MTOE, when we left 1 year ago, today. We went to our MOB Station, and we had time at our MOB Station, where CPT [REDACTED] met with the Platoon Leaders and Platoon Sergeants, and we sat down and developed a training plan. We set up Camp

Alpha. It was engineer tape, but it was a compound, and we rotated all 3 platoons through tower guard operations, through internal operations, and escort details, because, at the time, we didn't know what we were going to do. We looked at the METL Tasks for an I/R Company, and we knew there were a lot of things we could be doing. We tried to prepare for what we thought we were going to be doing. It's funny, because soldiers hated Camp Alpha, back in Indiana, but when we got on the ground up there, they were like this is just like Camp Alpha; this is going to be easy. Then, it turns out we were only going to be responsible for Tower Guard Operations, which made it easier.

I don't think you need to have training, to know that hitting someone in your custody is wrong. It's an issue of right and wrong. I've had many conversations with the MI folks after that, and I told them from the beginning, that I wouldn't tolerate that.

Finished with their discussion, the panel gave SFC [REDACTED] a list of items, to be addressed, and brought back on a Sworn Statement.

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is ODCSOPS

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1993 (SSN).
INCIPAL PURPOSE: To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately
ROUTINE USES: Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval
DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION: Camp Victory, Iraq
2. DATE (YYYYMMDD): 2004/02/10
3. TIME: 2100
4. FILE NUMBER
5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME
6. SSN
7. GRADE/STATUS: SFC/E-7

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS: 229th Military Police Company Abu Gharab, Iraq APO AE 09335

9. I, [REDACTED], WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

Our unit was mobilized on 10 Feb 2003 and reported to its mob station. Upon arriving at mob station all required training was completed. Once complete we began mission training for MP I/R Company. CPT [REDACTED] prepared a operation order and each platoon was assigned a piece of the mission. A make shift prison camp was established using engineer tape and stacks. Each platoon rotated through each portion of the training over a weeks time. Once arriving in country we were assigned a customs mission from April to August 2003, at which time we move to Abu Gharab Prison to operate a prison compound. Once arriving [REDACTED] were assigned tower guard duties for Camp Ganci which closely resemble the make shift camp we trained on at mob station. No other training was offered to our unit except to qualify everyone on the use of less-than-lethal rounds for shotguns. Since August our units main mission has been the tower guard operations. Our unit was also assigned the IRF (internal reaction force) which was a new concept to be used as a QRF for situations inside the prison walls. Training for this was established by LT [REDACTED] and myself using FM's and years of civilian Law Enforcement training in the area of civil disturbance. The ROE and Rules of Interaction were the only other items briefed prior to beginning our missions. There were no Geneva convention classes given to our unit. In September 2003 IRF responded to a call to pick up prisoners at the main gate. I was incorrect earlier ont he date on this incident. It was September rather than August. During which time we witnessed a prisoner being assaulted by MI soldiers. Sworn statements were completed that night on the incident and forwarded to CPT [REDACTED] who forwarded them to LTC Phillabom. Until now no one has asked to speak with anyone who completed a statement. Sometime in late 2003 SPC [REDACTED] spoke with a JAG Captain from the MAG Cell about the incident. SPC [REDACTED] relayed to me that the CPT had contacted the 800th MP Brigade about the incident and was told that he could investigate it himself. The CPT not being sure and being to busy with his assigned work declined to conduct an investigation. In Jan after the news of other crimes against prisoners broke a CID team was sent to conduct interviews about the incidents which had occurred. During my interview I asked about the August incident and was told that they were aware of that but had sent it back to the MI BN for investigation. After the CID interview I advised SPC [REDACTED] that we would wait a few weeks until the 16th MP BDE arrived and turn the statements over to the JAG or IG for investigation as I did not feel that the 800th was concerned about the incident. Until now I do not believe that this incident has been investigated in any way shape or form. A copy of the original statement from August is attached. Since the 16th MP BDE's arrival the change in command climate has changed tremendously. Not only have they arrived but the Deputy Brigade Commander is our acting BN Commander which has put us in direct link with the BDE staff. LTC [REDACTED] is very visible and make a concerted effort to speak with all soldiers that he comes in contact with. He seems to value senior NCO input and wants us to bring forward thoughts and Ideas to better the prison environment. The BDE CSM also is very visible. He met with all senior NCO's a few days after his arrival. He stressed that the prison mission was one of the most significant missions that they had and that CPA stressed this as well. That is the first time that I had heard that this was an important mission by anyone outside of the prison. During our meeting he took lots of notes and gave us his word that he would work the issues to the best of his ability. Just this visit and promise to try was 100% more effort than was put forth by the previous BDE CSM. He also gave us the first 16th MP Brassards which had come in to our soldiers. He wanted them to look sharp and be proud of who they are and what they are doing. The 800th told us to buy our own which is why only a few soldiers had them. Prior to leaving he spent several more days visiting all the soldiers to include spending some time in their living areas to see how they lived. He also had his EO NCO speak with soldiers to get their feelings on how things were going. He was very concerned about some of the long term issues that were going unresolved, many since August and September. Elements of the 16th BDE were the first BDE staff to actually spend the night at our prison and see what the conditions are like in the middle of the night. I have not personally met the new BDE CDR but I have seen him at the prison several times in the past few weeks compared to only seeing Gen. Karpinski a few times and never in the troop living areas. Since August she had only spoken with 2 soldiers from our company, one of which was my soldiers. He said she was more concerned about the prisoners and starting them a soccer league than how he was doing. All in all it appears that the new BDE is trying to fix the problems we are dealing with as quickly as possible. End of Statement

10. EXHIBIT
11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT
PAGE 1 OF 7 PAGES

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT TAKEN AT DATED

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE BE INDICATED

STATEMENT OF

[REDACTED]

TAKEN AT 2100

DATED 2004/02/10

9 STATEMENT (Continued)

////////////////////////////////////Not Used////////////////////////////////////

AFFIDAVIT

I, [REDACTED], HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 1. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

[REDACTED SIGNATURE]
(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES:

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 11 day of February, 2004 at CJTF 7 PAVE WASHINGTON DC

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

[REDACTED SIGNATURE]
(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

[REDACTED NAME]
[REDACTED]
(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [REDACTED]

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is ODCSOPS

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 (SSN).
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ROUTINE USES: Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval.
DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION Abu Ghraib Prison, Iraq APO AE 09335	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD) 2003/09/21	3. TIME 0100	4. FILE NUMBER
5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME [REDACTED]	6. SSN [REDACTED]	7. GRADE/STATUS SFC/E-7	
8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS 229th Military Police Company			

9. I, [REDACTED], WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

On 20 Sep 03 at approx. 2145 a mortar attack was received in the vicinity of Camp Vigilant. At approx 2230 the IRF (internal Reaction Force) was called to the 320th BN TOC and advised that a mortar had landed in the MI BN tent and there were approx. 15 wounded that were being medivac. We were told to stand by there and wait for further. Shortly thereafter we were told to go back to our living quarters and stand by to be called again. About 2330 we were called to respond to the ECP (entry control point). Once arriving we were told that the QRF was outside the wire attempting to stop a vehicle which they believed may be involved with the attack. We were told to stand fast and be prepared to be their backup should the need arise. They soon stopped the vehicle and transported it back to the ECP with the 2 occupants a male and female. Once arriving the vehicle was searched and the two in custody were taken over to the visitor tent where we responded and watched over the two. A few minutes later at approx. 0030 21 Sep 03 a HMMWV pulled up with approx. 10 soldiers and came over to us. The first soldier wearing a desert camo flak jacket came up to the male prisoner and began screaming at him telling him eyes down and asking "what the fuck are you looking at". He then grabbed him by the back of the head and pushed it down into the dirt. 1LT [REDACTED] told him that was unnecessary and the soldier looked at him and told him "that he was the professional at this he knew what he was doing". 1LT [REDACTED] said that doesn't look to professional. I then said that I had never been taught that when I went through intergator school. At this point another soldier (a very large stocky soldier) came over and started yelling at him to get up. He grabbed him and yanked him up off the ground and secured his arms and began walking him back towards the vehicle. He continued screaming and forcefully moving towards the truck. As he passed me I told him to "at ease and calm down". He continued past me to the back of the truck. Once reaching the back of the truck he began striking the prisoner in the back of the head and back. He continued screaming at him to get into the truck. The soldier then forcefully slammed the prisoner into the bed of the truck. once the prisoner was in the bed of the truck he was struck a few more times and told to put a mask on. When the prisoner turned towards the back of the truck it appeared that he was bleeding from the lip, but I was unsure do to the poor lighting. At this point I asked the NCOIC what unit he was from and he told me the 519th MI. I then realized that these were soldiers from the unit that had been attacked. At this point the vehicle left and the IRF secured back to our living area. After arriving back in our area 1SG [REDACTED] was called by Maj. [REDACTED] and asked that both he and I responded to the TOC. Once arriving we introduced to 1SG [REDACTED] who is the 1Sg of the MI group. He told us that this had never happened and that had been doing these operations for 14 months in Afganistan and Iraq. He continued to apologize and remind us that he had people that were wounded and everyone was upset. Maj. [REDACTED] told us that Cpt. [REDACTED] had been told and she was very upset over the incident. We explained to them that during our many years of law enforcement that you never send a suspect back to a group of officers that were directly effected by an incident because you don't know what they might do and that this case was exactly the same. We were told by the 1SG that they would handle it and we advised that we were going to forward statements of the incident as well. Maj. [REDACTED] advised that he would forward that paperwork to the BN CDR so that action could be taken. 1LT [REDACTED] and I then responded back to the IRF barracks where we advised the team to complete statements of the incident and we advised them of what the 1Sg had told us.

-----End of Statement-----

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [REDACTED]	PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES
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ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____"

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.

STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

Not Used

AFFIDAVIT

I, _____, HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 1 I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES:

CJTF-7 PMD
Embargoed Iraq
ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 11 day of February, 2001 at CJTF-7 PMD Embargoed Iraq

(Administering Oath)

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

Art 136(b)(4) 49CAF
(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT _____