

# FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 05/25/2004

To: Inspection

From: Inspection  
Contact: [Redacted]

Approved By: [Redacted]

b2 -1  
b6 -1  
b7C -1

Drafted By: [Redacted]

Case ID #: 297-HQ-A1327669-E-3

Title: COUNTERTERRORISM DIVISION,  
INQUIRY REGARDING  
ACTIVITIES OF FBI PERSONNEL  
AT ABU GHURAYB PRISON (AGP) DURING  
OCTOBER 2003 - DECEMBER 2003

Synopsis: Forward 15 original investigative inserts and FD-540 1As to file

Enclosures: Enclosed are the following documents.

- (1) Original investigative insert documenting 05/18/2004 interview of SA [Redacted] CJIS, and FD-540 1A envelope containing interview notes of Supervisory Special Agent (SSA) [Redacted] Inspection Division b6 -1 b7C -1
- (2) Original investigative insert documenting 05/17/2004 telephonic interview of SA [Redacted] Little Rock Division, and FD-540 1A envelope containing interview notes of SSA [Redacted] Inspection Division b6 -1 b7C -1
- (3) Original investigative insert documenting 05/17/2004 interview of SA [Redacted] Houston Division, and FD-540 1A envelope containing interview notes of SSA [Redacted] Inspection Division b6 -1 b7C -1
- (4) Original investigative insert documenting 05/18/2004 interview of LS [Redacted] Houston Division, and FD-540 1A envelope containing interview notes of SSA [Redacted] Inspection Division b6 -1 b7C -1
- (5) Original investigative insert documenting 05/17/2004 interview of LS [Redacted] San Francisco Division, and FD-540 1A envelope containing interview notes of SSA [Redacted] Inspection Division b6 -1 b7C -1

15-ENCLOSURE

DETAINEES-3460

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 10-07-2009 BY 61529 JNF/ESB/219 CA-UV-4151

To Counterterrorism Division From Inspection  
Re 297-HQ-A13276697-E, 05/25/2004

- (6) Original investigative insert documenting 05/17/2004 b6 -1  
interview of SA [redacted] Los Angeles Field b7C -1  
Office, and FD-540 1A envelope containing interview notes  
of SSA [redacted] Inspection Division
- (7) Original investigative insert documenting 05/17/2004 b6 -1  
interview of SA [redacted] New York Field Office, b7C -1  
and FD-540 1A envelope containing interview notes of SSA  
[redacted] Inspection Division
- (8) Original investigative insert documenting 05/17/2004  
interview of SA [redacted] New York Field Office, and b6 -1  
FD-540 1A envelope containing interview notes of SSA b7C -1  
[redacted] Inspection Division
- (9) Original investigative insert documenting 05/17/2004  
telephonic interview of LS [redacted] Language b6 -1  
Services Translation Center, FBIHQ (TDY to Iraq), and b7C -1  
FD-540 1A envelope containing interview notes of SSA  
[redacted] Inspection Division
- (10) Original investigative insert documenting 05/17/2004  
telephonic interview of SA [redacted] FA/RDT, CTD, b6 -1  
FBIHQ (TDY to Legat Madrid), and FD-540 1A envelope b7C -1  
containing interview notes of SSA [redacted]  
Inspection Division
- (11) Original investigative insert documenting 05/17/2004  
telephonic interview of SA [redacted] FA/RDT, CTD, b6 -1  
FBIHQ (TDY to Afghanistan), and FD-540 1A envelope b7C -1  
containing interview notes of SSA [redacted]  
Inspection Division
- (12) Original investigative insert documenting 05/17/2004  
telephonic interview of SA [redacted] FA/RDT, CTD, b6 -1  
FBIHQ (TDY to Afghanistan), and FD-540 1A envelope b7C -1  
containing interview notes of SSA [redacted]  
Inspection Division
- (13) Original investigative insert documenting 05/18/2004  
interview of SA [redacted] FA/RDT, CTD, FBIHQ (TDY b6 -1  
to Portland Division), and FD-540 1A envelope containing b7C -1  
interview notes of SSA [redacted] Inspection  
Division
- (14) Original investigative insert documenting 05/17/2004  
interview of Unit Chief (UC) [redacted] BAU-I, b6 -1  
CIRG, and FD-540 1A envelope containing interview notes b7C -1  
of SSA [redacted] Inspection Division.

To Counterterrorism Division From Inspection  
Re. 297-HQ-A13276697-E, 05/25/2004

(15) Original investigative insert documenting 05/21/2004  
telephonic follow-up interview of SA [REDACTED]  
FA/RDT, CTD, FBIHQ, and FD-540 1A envelope containing  
interview notes of SSA [REDACTED] Inspection  
Division

b6 -1  
b7C -1

Details: For background information, based upon the information provided to the Inspection Division by General Counsel Caproni in Enclosure (1), a total of 13 FBI employees (ten SAs and three LSs) were identified as participants in interviews of nine detainees at AGP during the period of October 2003 through December 2003. The number of interviews conducted by FBI personnel at AGP during this same time period totaled 25, as four of the nine detainees were interviewed on multiple occasions.

On 05/17/2004 and 05/18/2004, the Inspection Division conducted interviews of the ten SAs and three LSs identified as having participated in interviews of detainees at AGP. In addition, former On-Scene-Commander Chris Swecker recommended SA [REDACTED] CJIS, also be interviewed due to SA [REDACTED] frequent presence at the AGP during the relevant time period (SA [REDACTED] was TDY to Iraq and present at AGP for the purpose of fingerprinting and processing detainees). On 05/21/2004, SA [REDACTED] was re-interviewed by SSA [REDACTED] Inspection Division, for the purpose of obtaining additional clarification concerning comments made by SA [REDACTED] during his initial interview on 05/18/2004.

b6 -1  
b7C -1

Enclosed for the administrative case file are the referenced documents which include the original insert prepared for each of the 15 interviews conducted to date, along with an FD-540 1A envelope containing the notes taken during each interview.

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DETAINEES-3462

On May 17, 2004, SA [redacted] was contacted telephonically at the Little Rock Division's EL Dorado RA, by SSA [redacted] concerning FBI personnel activities at Abu Ghurayb Prison to which he provided the following information.

b6 -1  
b7C -1

SA [redacted] advised that during the course of the interviews he conducted of [redacted] and [redacted] at no time did he observe any misconduct or mistreatment of prisoners at any time during his presence at ABU Ghurayb prison

b6 -1,4  
b7C -1,4  
b7D -1  
b7F -1

SA [redacted] advised that he did not have reason to believe that any misconduct or mistreatment of detainees at ABU Ghurayb was occurring nor did anyone ever volunteer any information to him that any mistreatment of prisoners had occurred. He further stated that all interviews conducted by him and/or members of his team comported with FBI protocols

b6 -1  
b7C -1

SA [redacted] advised the interview conducted by him of [redacted] took place in an isolated area of the prison whereas the interview of [redacted] took place in the office of the Military Intelligence (MI). During the interviews SA [redacted] was assisted by [redacted] (MI) and SSG [redacted] U.S. Army and a translator

b6 -1,2,4  
b7C -1,2,4  
b7D -1  
b7F -1

SA [redacted] advised that he never felt a need to have an understanding of Department of Defense and/or Department of Justice authorization for permitted use of certain interrogation techniques. That was because he was a bomb technician and he was there for "Intel" and evaluation. He also stated that he does not have any pictures, video tapes, or notes of actions depicting misconduct or inappropriate behavior by U.S. personnel against detainees or was not aware of anyone else who was in possession of such items.

b6 -1  
b7C -1

SA [redacted] advised that if he was aware of any mistreatment or abuse of detainees, he would have reported the inappropriate actions to the authorities.

b6 -1  
b7C -1

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 10-07-2004 BY 61872/DMH/ECS/gjs CA-DV-4151

On May 18, 2004, SA [redacted] was contacted telephonically [redacted] at the [redacted] in DOHA QATAR by SSA [redacted] concerning FBI personnel activities at Abu Ghurayb Prison to which he provided the following information:

b2 -1  
b6 -1  
b7C -1

SA [redacted] advised that during his time at the ABU Ghurayb Prison his role was to only process and fingerprint prisoners and at no time did he observe any misconduct or mistreatment of prisoners at any time during his presence at ABU Ghurayb prison. SA [redacted] processed prisoners at two separate locations, on two occasions he processed detainees inside the ABU Ghurayb prison in a side storage room off to the side of the prison cell block. He didn't recall if that area actually had a particular name. The second location where he processed the majority of the detainees was outside in a tent on the ABU Ghurayb prison grounds. SA [redacted] stated the processing of the detainees occurred around October 2003, generally between the hours of 10am to 5pm, two to three times per week. SA [redacted] further reiterated that he did not interview any of the detainees.

b6 -1  
b7C -1

SA [redacted] advised that he did not have reason to believe that any misconduct or mistreatment of detainees at ABU Ghurayb was occurring in Unit 1A or 1B nor did anyone ever volunteer any information to him that any mistreatment of prisoners had occurred.

b6 -1  
b7C -1

SA [redacted] advised that he never felt a need to have an understanding of Department of Defense and/or Department of Justice authorization for permitted use of certain interrogation techniques. That was because he was only at the prison to process and fingerprint prisoners. He also stated that he does not have any pictures, video tapes, or notes of actions depicting misconduct or inappropriate behavior by U.S. personnel against detainees or was not aware of anyone else who was in possession of such items.

b6 -1  
b7C -1

SA [redacted] advised that he had no additional information relating to the abuse of detainees and if he had been aware of any mistreatment or abuse he would have reported the inappropriate actions to the authorities.

b6 -1  
b7C -1

DETAINEES-3464

b6 -1  
b7C -1

On May 17, 2004, Special Agent (SA) [redacted] FBI Houston, was interviewed by Assistant Inspector (AI) [redacted] Inspection Division SA [redacted] was interviewed in the Houston Field Office regarding his participation in detainee interviews at Abu Ghurayb Prison in Iraq SA [redacted] provided the following information

b6 -1  
b7C -1

SA [redacted] served in Iraq from September 11, 2003 through November 11, 2003 During his deployment to Iraq, he participated in the interviews of detainees at the Abu Ghurayb Prison SA [redacted] did not observe any misconduct or mistreatment of prisoners at any time during his presence at the Abu Ghurayb Prison and had no reason to believe any misconduct or mistreatment of detainees at the prison was occurring

b6 -1,3,4  
b7C -1,3,4

The interviews conducted by SA [redacted] and members of his team were conducted in accordance with FBI protocols and policy They were conducted in the open tent area known as "Camp Vigilant", except for the September 27, 2003 interview of [redacted] which was held in a "hard building" room set up with chairs None of his interviews were conducted Unit 1A or 1B of the prison

b7D -1  
b7F -1

SA [redacted] contact with Military Police personnel in charge of the prison was to arrange interviews with detainees However, on one occasion, following the November 4, 2003 interview of [redacted] SA [redacted] spoke with an MP (believed to be a senior NCO, located in the company administration office where visiting agencies who were interviewing detainees checked in and out) to request that [redacted] be allowed to visit his father in the "hard cell" area The MP responded that he would try to accommodate SA [redacted] request On November 05, 2003, SA [redacted] re-interviewed [redacted] who thanked SA [redacted] for arranging the visit with his son

b6 -1,3,4  
b7C -1,3,  
b7D -1  
b7F -1

SA [redacted] described the roles of members of his interview team as follows

b6 -1  
b7C -1

09/27/2003 - Interview of [redacted]

b6 -1,3,4  
b7C -1,3,4  
b7D -1  
b7F -1

Team SA [redacted] Notes and follow-up questions

SA [redacted] Conducted interview

LS [redacted] Interpreter

10/05/2003 - Interview of [redacted]

b6 -1,3,4  
b7C -1,3,4  
b7D -1  
b7F -1

Team SA [redacted] Notes and follow-up questions

SA [redacted] Conducted interview

LS [redacted] Interpreter

10/06/2003 - Interview of [redacted] b6 -1,3,4  
 Team SA [redacted] - Notes and follow-up questions b7C -1,3,4  
 SA [redacted] Conducted interview b7D -1  
 LS [redacted] Interpreter b7F -1

10/07/2003 - Interview of [redacted]  
 Team SA [redacted] - Conducted interview b6 -1,3,4  
 SA [redacted] Notes and follow-up questions b7C -1,3,4  
 LS [redacted] Interpreter b7D -1  
 b7F -1

11/04/2003 - Interview of [redacted]  
 Team SA [redacted] - Conducted interview b6 -1,3,4  
 SA [redacted] Notes and follow-up questions b7C -1,3,4  
 LS [redacted] Interpreter b7D -1  
 b7F -1

11/05/2003 - Interview of [redacted]  
 Team SA [redacted] Notes and follow-up questions b6 -1,3,4  
 SA [redacted] Conducted interview b7C -1,3,4  
 LS [redacted] Interpreter b7D -1  
 b7F -1

During the interviews conducted by SA [redacted] the interviewees did not advise of any acts of misconduct or mistreatment by U S personnel SA [redacted] was not in possession of any pictures, video tapes, or notes of actions depicting misconduct or inappropriate behavior by U S personnel against detainees, and was not aware of anyone else who was in possession of such items SA [redacted] advised most FBI personnel were provided with a Compact Disc (CD) containing photographs taken by various FBI personnel during their TDY rotation to the Baghdad Operation Center (BOC) SA [redacted] believed he viewed all the photographs contained on the CD and did not see any which depicted misconduct or inappropriate behavior by U S personnel against detainees

b6 -1  
 b7C -1

SA [redacted] was not aware of any authorization to deviate from standard Department of Justice interview protocols He was not aware of any mistreatment or abuse of detainees and consequently did not document or report any such behavior SA [redacted] did not have any additional information relating to the abuse or mistreatment of detainees

b6 -1  
 b7C -1

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KBC:kc

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The following investigation was conducted by AI [redacted] [redacted] b6 -1  
[redacted] INSD, in New York, NY, on 05/17/2004: b7C -1

SA [redacted] NYO, Squad CD-4, [redacted] DOB: b2 -1  
[redacted] SSAN: [redacted] was interviewed. He was advised b6 -1  
of the identity of AI [redacted] and the nature of the interview. He b7C -1  
provided the following information:

SA [redacted] was deployed to Iraq from approximately b6 -1  
11/13/2003 through 01/11/2004. He was an ERT member and worked b7C -1  
three to four days per week at Abu Ghurayb Prison. He was not  
selected for the Abu Ghurayb assignment for any particular reason  
other than his FCI investigative background. He assumed a  
liaison role with the prison personnel, but did not have contact  
with high ranking military officers in charge of the prison. He  
dealt primarily with Military Intelligence (MI) personnel in  
facilitating interviews of prisoners. In the first few months he  
processed prisoners by fingerprinting them and obtaining DNA  
samples. He devised a standard list of questions which were  
asked. He was given access to the prison's stand-alone computer  
database which housed prisoner biographical data and utilized  
that information in facilitating interviews and/or identifying  
subjects to be interviewed. He was not provided a list of  
individuals to interview. Instead, he was told by the OSC, SAC  
Ed Worthington, to use his judgement when identifying individuals  
to be interviewed.

SA [redacted] conducted his first interview at Abu Ghurayb  
approximately one to 1.5 weeks after his arrival in Iraq. The b6 -1,3,4  
subject of the interview was [redacted] from [redacted] who traveled b7C -1,3,4  
to Iraq to participate in jihad. He believed the interviewee was b7D -1  
[redacted]. He also confirmed conducting b7F -1  
interviews of [redacted] and [redacted]  
[redacted]

SA [redacted] did not observe any misconduct or b6 -1  
mistreatment of prisoners at any time during his presence at Abu b7C -1  
Ghurayb prison. He noticed no evidence of physical abuse in  
prisoners he processed for fingerprints and DNA. He had no  
reason to believe that any misconduct or mistreatment of  
detainees at Abu Ghurayb was occurring. He stated the prisoners  
he interviewed were housed in the tent portion of the prison, not  
the main cell blocks. The detainees were brought to the  
interviews by a "handler" from MI. They were shackled and hand-  
cuffed. He removed the shackles and handcuffs for the  
interviews. The prisoners appeared well treated. He had no  
contacts with military guards whose photos were displayed in the



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media as those involved in the alleged abuse. The two primary MI personnel he dealt with were CWO [redacted] and SPC [redacted] [redacted] b6 -2  
b7C -2

SA [redacted] advised he was never in the main cell area. He conducted his interviews in a stand alone building within the prison walls located in the vicinity of the tent area. There were two such buildings referred to as "wood" and "steel" respectively. He could not recall in which one he did the interviews. b6 -1  
b7C -1

SA [redacted] advised he conducted his interviews in the presence of the MI handler for the detainee who was being interviewed and the language specialist (L/S). No guards were present. At the direction of the FBI's Deputy On-Scene Commander, he did not advise the interviewees of their Miranda Warnings. The interviews were not recorded. The results of the interviews were reported via EC. He conducted no interviews in Unit 1A or 1B. SA [redacted] had no substantive contact with Military Police personnel in charge of the prison. b6 -1  
b7C -1

SA [redacted] described the "handlers" for the detainees as those MI personnel who were responsible for the military's interviews of the detainees. He observed during his interviews of detainees, the MI personnel utilized rapport building with the detainees in building a relationship which they used in the interview process. The handlers participated in the interviews. Other members of the interviewing team included other FBI SAs and FBI Language Specialists (L/Ss) who rotated. b6 -1  
b7C -1

During the interviews, no interviewees brought to his attention any acts of misconduct or mistreatment by U.S. personnel. He had no pictures, video tapes, or notes of actions depicting misconduct or inappropriate behavior by U.S. personnel against detainees. He was also unaware of anyone who had possession of such items.

He was aware the Department of Defense utilized sleep deprivation and isolation for prescribed periods of time, but did not witness any such act. He knew of those techniques through the MI handlers. It was his understanding, those techniques were allowed for limited periods of time.

He was not aware of any mistreatment or abuse of detainees. He had no additional information of any abuse/mistreatment of detainees. He described the DOD personnel with whom he worked as very professional. He stated the prisoners appeared to be happy to see their "handlers" because of

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DETAINEEES-3468

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3

the rapport built between them. He had no contact with any prisoners held for criminal reasons, only those held for military or intelligence reasons. Other personnel who conducted interviews of the prisoners were private contractors from an organization known as "CACI." SA [redacted] did not know what the acronym CACI represented. [redacted]

b1  
b6 -1  
b7C -1

[redacted] Other SAs with whom SA [redacted] conducted interviews were [redacted] and [redacted]. [redacted] drew a diagram of the prison representing the area where he conducted interviews. A copy of this diagram is attached to this insert. The original is included with the interview notes in a 1-A envelope.


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DETAINEES-3469

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FOA 5/17/04

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DETAINEES-3470

The following investigation was conducted by AI [redacted] INSD, on 05/17/2004 in New York, NY: b6 -1 b7C -1

SA [redacted] NYO, Squad CD-22, [redacted] DOB. [redacted] SSAN. [redacted] was interviewed. He was advised of the identity of AI [redacted] and the nature of the interview. He provided the following information: b2 -1 b6 -1 b7C -1

SA [redacted] deployed to Iraq on or about 11/13/2003 through 01/16/2004. His primary duties while in Iraq consisted of conducting FCI interviews at Camp Cropper in the vicinity of Baghdad International Airport. He worked primarily with SA [redacted]. He went to Abu Ghurayb prison on approximately five occasions. On one occasion he was searching for a "ghost" detainee through both cell blocks and the tent compound, but did not locate him. He described a "ghost" detainee as someone detained at the prison by intelligence personnel without any record of the detainee's presence. He did not know how many such detainees existed. On one occasion he processed for fingerprinting and DNA approximately 25-50 detainees at the prison. He also introduced a detainee whose name he could not recall to the Iraqi Survey Group (ISG) because of the WMD knowledge that detainee possessed. The ISG was U.S. military, to the best of his recollection. He also dealt with Department of Defense (DOD) personnel who were in civilian clothes. He believed they represented Defense Intelligence Agency. b6 -1 b7C -1

Other than his search for the "ghost" detainee in the cell blocks, he interviewed detainees in the stand alone buildings known as "wood" and "steel," respectively. He actually interviewed the "ghost" detainee prior to the search on one occasion and saw no signs of abuse. The detainee was subsequently released, and that is why SA [redacted] could not locate him during the search. These stand-alone buildings were located outside the cell blocks. Those detainees were from the tent compound, not the main cell blocks. He recalled interviewing [redacted] with SA [redacted] [redacted] was a tent compound detainee. The detainee was delivered to the stand alone building by MPs who did not participate in the interview. The detainee was brought to the interview in hand cuffs. He also saw detainees wearing hoods while they were escorted on the prison grounds. b6 -1,3,4 b7C -1,3,4 b7D -1 b7F -1

SA [redacted] did not observe any misconduct or mistreatment of prisoners at any time during his presence at Abu Ghurayb prison. He conducted a thorough search of all the cells b6 -1 b7C -1

in the prison for the "ghost" detainee and saw no evidence of any mistreatment or misconduct.

SA [redacted] had no reason to believe that any misconduct or mistreatment of detainees was occurring at the prison. While processing numerous (25-50) detainees for fingerprints and DNA samples, he noticed no marks or signs of abuse on the prisoners. He did not recall meeting the guards who were depicted in the media allegedly abusing prisoners in the prison.

b6 -1  
b7C -1

SA [redacted] advised his interviews conducted at Camp Cropper and Abu Ghurayb prison were reported via EC. He did not advise detainees of their Miranda Warning rights, and could not recall why. His interviews always took place in the stand alone buildings previously described and none of his interviewees were housed in units 1A or 1B. He had no substantive contact with Military Police personnel in charge of the prison. The only other member of his interview team at the prison was SA [redacted]. He did not recall a translator being present because the subject of the interview spoke English.

b6 -1  
b7C -1

b6 -1  
b7C -1

During his interviews, no interviewee brought to his attention any acts of misconduct or mistreatment by U.S. personnel. He was in possession of no pictures, video tapes, or notes of actions depicting misconduct or inappropriate behavior by U.S. personnel against detainees. He was not aware of anyone in possession of such items. He had no knowledge of DOD or DOJ authorization for the use of certain interrogation techniques. He and other interviewers, including the MI handlers, would discuss interview strategies as to whether or not the interview would use a positive, rapport building tone, or an accusatorial, negative tone. No discussion or thought was given to using physical interrogation techniques during any interview. He had no knowledge of sleep deprivation or isolation used on detainees. He had no additional information relating to the abuse/mistreatment of detainees.

On May 17, 2004, Language Specialist (LS) [redacted] Language Services Translation Center, FBIHQ, was interviewed telephonically by Assistant Inspector (AI) [redacted] Inspection Division. LS [redacted] was contacted in Baghdad, Iraq, at telephone number [redacted]. The nature of the interview was regarding LS [redacted] participation in detainee interviews at Abu Ghurayb Prison in Iraq. LS [redacted] provided the following information:

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b6 -1  
b7C -1

LS [redacted] was assigned TDY in Iraq on two occasions. His first assignment was from December 2003 through February 2004, and his second was from March 2004 through April 2004. During his assignments in Iraq, he assisted in the interview of detainees at the Abu Ghurayb Prison. LS [redacted] did not observe any misconduct or mistreatment of prisoners at any time during his presence at the Abu Ghurayb Prison and had no reason to believe any misconduct or mistreatment of detainees was occurring. Each interview in which LS [redacted] served as a translator was conducted in accordance with FBI protocols and policy. LS [redacted] described the agents who conducted the interviews as extremely professional and courteous to the prisoners.

b6 -1  
b7C -1

The interviews in which LS [redacted] participated took place in either a wooden structure with multiple interview rooms or a trailer divided into four interview rooms. Both locations were within the prison compound; however, separated from the main prison building where the detainees were held. None of the interviews in which LS [redacted] participated were held in Unit 1A or 1B in the prison. LS [redacted] had no contact with Military Police personnel at the prison.

b6 -1  
b7C -1

LS [redacted]'s interview team consisted of himself and two agents. During the interviews in which LS [redacted] participated, no interviewees advised of any acts of misconduct or mistreatment by U.S. personnel. LS [redacted] did not possess any pictures, video tapes, or notes of actions depicting misconduct or inappropriate behavior by U.S. personnel against detainees, nor was he aware of anyone else who possessed such items. LS [redacted] advised the agents who conducted the interviews followed standard FBI interview procedures.

b6 -1  
b7C -1

LS [redacted] was not aware of any mistreatment or abuse of detainees and consequently did not document or report any such behavior. LS [redacted] did not have any additional information relating to the abuse/mistreatment of detainees.

b6 -1  
b7C -1

The following investigation was conducted by Supervisory Special Agent (SSA) [redacted] in San Francisco, California on May 17, 2004 b6 -1 b7C -1

Language Specialist (LS) [redacted] San Francisco Division, FBI, was interviewed at the San Francisco office LS [redacted] provided the following responses to a list of questions: b6 -1 b7C -1

1 Did you observe any misconduct or mistreatment of prisoners at any time during your presence at Abu Ghurayb prison?

LS [redacted] stated no, she did not observe any misconduct or mistreatment of any of the prisoners. b6 -1 b7C -1

2 Did you have any reason to believe that any misconduct or mistreatment of detainees at Abu Ghurayb was occurring? These reasons could include casual observations, prisoner appearance or demeanor, or conversations with prison personnel.

LS [redacted] stated no, she did not have any reason to believe any misconduct or mistreatment of detainees was occurring. b6 -1 b7C -1

3 Did interviews conducted by you and members of your team comport with prescribed Department of Justice and/or FBI protocols?

LS [redacted] stated yes, DOJ and FBI protocols were followed. b6 -1 b7C -1

4 Please identify where the interviews occurred in the prison.

LS [redacted] stated interviews were conducted in the interview/interrogation rooms on the grounds of the prison b6 -1 b7C -1

5. Were they ever held in Unit 1A or 1B (where the abuses occurred)?

LS [redacted] advised she does not think the interviews were conducted in Unit 1A or Unit 1B, but in the interview/interrogation rooms on the grounds of the prison b6 -1 b7C -1

6 Did you have any substantive contact with Military Police personnel in charge of the prison? If so, who? b6 -1 b7C -1

LS [redacted] stated the only contact she had with the Military Police was when they brought the prisoners to the interview room.

She advised there was no further interaction with the Military Police.

7. Please explain the roles of members which comprised your interview team?

LS [ ] stated her role was interpreter for the interviewing agents. She advised there was one FBI Agent with her a couple of occasions, but generally there were two FBI Agents with her during the interviews. She said there was a Military Intelligence officer present in the interview room most of the time in an observer role, and did not participate in the interviews.

b6 -1  
b7C -1

8. During your interviews did any interviewee bring to your attention any acts of misconduct or mistreatment by U.S. personnel?

LS [ ] advised none of the detainees told her they were subjected to acts of misconduct or mistreatment. The only complaint of the detainees was being cold, and they asked for more blankets. LS [ ] added she told the Military Police of the detainees request for more blankets. She stated the detainees never told her they did not have any blankets.

b6 -1  
b7C -1

9. Are you in possession of any pictures, video tapes, or notes of actions depicting misconduct or inappropriate behavior by U S personnel against detainees? Are you aware of anyone else who is in possession of such items?

LS [ ] stated she is not in possession, nor does she know anyone who is in possession of any pictures, video tapes, or notes of actions depicting misconduct or inappropriate behavior

b6 -1  
b7C -1

10. What, if any, was your understanding of Department of Defense and/or Department of Justice authorization for the permitted use of certain interrogation techniques?

LS [ ] advised posted on the wall of one of the offices was a military or Department of Defense list of what was allowed during interrogation. The list contained about nine or ten bullets of information regarding what was allowed during interrogation.

b6 -1  
b7C -1

11. If you were aware of any mistreatment or abuse of detainees, did you document or report it to anyone?

LS [ ] stated she was not aware of any mistreatment or abuse.

b6 -1  
b7C -1



12 Do you have any additional information relating to the  
abuse/mistreatment of detainees?

LS  stated she did not have any other information related  
to the abuse/mistreatment of detainees

b6 -1  
b7C -1

The following investigation was conducted by Supervisory Special Agent (SSA) [redacted] in Los Angeles, California on May 17, 2004. b6 -1 b7C -1

Special Agent (SA) [redacted] Los Angeles Division, FBI, was interviewed at the Radisson Hotel, Los Angeles Airport. SA [redacted] provided the following responses to a list of questions: b6 -1 b7C -1

1. Did you observe any misconduct or mistreatment of prisoners at any time during your presence at Abu Ghurayb prison?

SA [redacted] stated he did not observe any misconduct or mistreatment of any of the prisoners. He advised on three or four occasions, he observed detainees who were ordered to strip and then placed in isolation with no clothes. SA [redacted] added the stripping of prisoners was no different than the searching procedures he had observed of the guards in jails in the United States. b6 -1 b7C -1

2. Did you have any reason to believe that any misconduct or mistreatment of detainees at Abu Ghurayb was occurring? These reasons could include casual observations, prisoner appearance or demeanor, or conversations with prison personnel.

SA [redacted] stated during an interview conducted with SA [redacted] the detainee, [redacted] (phonetic), complained he was stripped naked, kept naked in his cell and subjected to sleep deprivation. [redacted] also told SA [redacted] and SA [redacted] he was also roughed up by the hands of American personnel who interviewed him. [redacted] told SA [redacted] and SA [redacted] the American personnel who mistreated him were not dressed in military uniforms. SA [redacted] advised he and SA [redacted] interviewed [redacted] about eight times, and the information was documented on ECs to the [redacted] file. SA [redacted] stated he did not notice any physical marks on [redacted] which would indicate any mistreatment. SA [redacted] advised [redacted] the Anssar Al Islam, a classified terrorist group operating in northern Iraq. SA [redacted] added the group allegedly has ties with Al Qaeda. b2 -5 b6 -1,3,4 b7C -1,3,4 b7D -1 b7F -1

3. Did interviews conducted by you and members of your team comport with prescribed Department of Justice and/or FBI protocols?

SA [redacted] stated absolutely. b6 -1 b7C -1

4. Please identify where the interviews occurred in the prison.

SA [redacted] advised the interviews occurred in interrogation rooms which were in two different wooden buildings within the prison compound. One building was close to the isolation cells, and the other building was by the open prison population. SA [redacted] stated each building contained six interrogation rooms, with three rooms with windows on each side of the building separated by a hallway.

b6 -1  
b7C -1

5. Were they ever held in Unit 1A or 1B (where the abuses occurred)?

SA [redacted] stated the interviews were not conducted in Unit 1A or 1B.

b6 -1  
b7C -1

6. Did you have any substantive contact with Military Police personnel in charge of the prison? If so, who?

SA [redacted] stated he had casual conversations with Sergeant [redacted] (first name unknown) of the Military Police (MP). Sergeant [redacted] was the point of contact (POC) of the MPs who escorted the detainees to the interrogation rooms.

b6 -1,2  
b7C -1,2

7. Please explain the roles of members which comprised your interview team?

SA [redacted] stated he acted as the translator and interviewer, although the other Agents acted as lead interviewers during most of the interviews. A Military Intelligence (MI) representative was always present during the interviews, but acted as an observer and never participated in the interviews.

b6 -1  
b7C -1

8. During your interviews did any interviewee bring to your attention any acts of misconduct or mistreatment by U.S. personnel?

See response to question #2.

9. Are you in possession of any pictures, video tapes, or notes of actions depicting misconduct or inappropriate behavior by U.S. personnel against detainees? Are you aware of anyone else who is in possession of such items?

SA [redacted] stated he is not in possession, nor does he know anyone who is in possession of any pictures, video tapes, or notes of actions depicting misconduct or inappropriate behavior.

b6 -1  
b7C -1

10. What, if any, was your understanding of Department of Defense and/or Department of Justice authorization for the permitted use of certain interrogation techniques?

SA [redacted] advised it was his understanding that those in charge of the prison allowed sleep deprivation, although he was not aware if it was a permissible tactic or not. SA [redacted] stated he did not mention to anyone the information related to the mistreatment described by [redacted]. SA [redacted] advised he was certain the EC authored by SA [redacted] documented the mistreatment described by [redacted]. SA [redacted] advised SA [redacted] showed him every EC containing their interview results. He remembered seeing some of the ECs written by the other lead Agents, although he did not see all of the ECs.

b6 -1,3,4  
b7C -1,3,4  
b7D -1  
b7F -1

11. If you were aware of any mistreatment or abuse of detainees, did you document or report it to anyone?

SA [redacted] stated he did not verbally report to anyone the mistreatment described by [redacted] but an EC contained the information.

b6 -1,3,4  
b7C -1,3,4  
b7D -1  
b7F -1

12. Do you have any additional information relating to the abuse/mistreatment of detainees?

SA [redacted] stated he did not have any other information. He added the MI personnel and the MPs appeared to be very professional. The POC of the MI was Chief Warrant Officer [redacted] (first name unknown).

b6 -1,2  
b7C -1,2

297-HQ-A1327669-E-3  
PMB pmb

PMB

On May 17, 2004, Supervisory Special Agent (SSA) [redacted] Inspection Division, FBIHQ, interviewed Special Agent (SA) [redacted] via telephone, concerning FBI Personnel Activities at Abu Ghurayb Prison in Iraq between October 2003 and December 2003. SA [redacted] has an EOD date of [redacted] and is currently assigned to the Fly Away Rapid Deployment Team Unit (FARDTU), Operational Response Section, Counterterrorism Division and was interviewed while on TDY assignment to Madrid, Spain. SA [redacted] has been assigned to FARDTU for approximately one year. SA [redacted] provided the following responses to questions contained in a document title, "Questions Concerning FBI Personnel Activities at Abu Ghurayb Prison-IRAQ"

b6 -1  
b7C -1

SA [redacted] stated she did not observe any misconduct or mistreatment of prisoners during her time at Abu Ghurayb Prison, nor did she have any reason to believe that any misconduct or mistreatment of detainees at Abu Ghurayb Prison was occurring. According to SA [redacted] all interviews of detainees conducted by her team conformed to Department of Justice and FBI Protocol

b6 -1  
b7C -1

SA [redacted] explained she participated in approximately ten interviews of detainees located at Abu Ghurayb Prison between 09/12/2003 and 11/12/2003. All but one of these interviews took place in one of the two interrogation tents located outside the brick buildings of Abu Ghurayb Prison. These tents were described by SA [redacted] as three sided tents, with the fourth side exposed to the public. SA [redacted] recalled participating in one interview conducted inside the brick buildings of Abu Ghurayb Prison, and SA [redacted] was unaware of any number or letter designation given to this area of the prison.

b6 -1  
b7C -1

The only contact SA [redacted] remembered having with Military Police (MP) or Military Intelligence (MI) personnel was when she would coordinate with them regarding the logistics of conducting an interview. SA [redacted] said she would ask about the availability of the prisoner for an interview, and she would inquire about a location for the interview to take place. The only other contact SA [redacted] recalled having with the MPs or with MI personnel, was when she forwarded a request by a detainee for long pants, as the detainee was clothed in shorts. The next time SA [redacted] saw the detainee, she noticed he was clothed in a traditional robe rather than shorts.

b6 -1  
b7C -1

According to SA [redacted] her interview team was usually made up of herself, SA [redacted] Houston Division, and Language Analyst (LA) [redacted] Houston Division. SA [redacted] stated that LA [redacted] San Francisco Division, replaced LA [redacted] on several occasions as the translator. SA [redacted] explained that SA [redacted] and herself would alternate their roles during the interviews, with SA [redacted] asking questions and SA [redacted] taking notes during one interview, and SA [redacted] asking questions and SA [redacted] taking notes during the next interview. The LA would occasionally take notes, however, these notes, as well as all other interview notes, were maintained in a 1-A envelope. SA [redacted] said that on one occasion [redacted]

b1  
b6 -1,2  
b7C -1,2

At no time did any interviewee bring to SA [redacted] attention any acts of misconduct or mistreatment by US personnel. To the contrary, SA [redacted] recalled that several interviewees commented they were treated well and glad to be in the custody of the Americans as opposed to being a prisoner of local law enforcement.

b6 -1  
b7C -1

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

b6 -1  
b7C -1

SA [redacted] stated she is not in possession of any pictures, videotapes, or notes of actions depicting misconduct or inappropriate behavior by U S personnel against detainees, nor is she aware of anyone else who is in possession of such items

b6 -1,3  
b6 -4,5  
b7C -1,3  
b7C -4,5  
b7D -1  
b7E -1

It was SA [redacted] understanding that FBI personnel were required to follow all FBI rules and policies governing interrogation, as if these interrogations took place in the United States. The only additional instruction she received regarding the interview of a detainee, was the specific instruction received by an Iraqi official from the Ministry of Justice, [redacted]. According to SA [redacted] [redacted] requested that a detainee named [redacted] be read his U S constitutional rights prior to his interrogation.

SA [redacted] concluded the interview by stating she had no additional information relating to the abuse/mistreatment of detainees at Abu Ghurayb Prison. b6 -1  
b7C -1

On May 17, 2004, Special Agent (SA) [redacted] Fly-Away Rapid Deployment Team, Counterterrorism Division, was interviewed telephonically by Assistant Inspector (AI) [redacted] Inspection Division. SA [redacted] was contacted in Baghram, Afghanistan, at telephone number [redacted]. The nature of the interview was regarding SA [redacted] participation in detainee interviews at Abu Ghurayb Prison in Iraq. SA [redacted] provided the following information

b2 -1  
b6 -1  
b7C -1

SA [redacted] served in Iraq from early September 2003 through mid November 2003. During his deployment to Iraq, he participated in the interview of a detainee at the Abu Ghurayb Prison. SA [redacted] did not observe any misconduct or mistreatment of prisoners at any time during his presence at the Abu Ghurayb Prison. Further, based on observation and prisoner appearance/demeanor, he had no reason to believe any misconduct or mistreatment of detainees was occurring. Consequently, SA [redacted] did not document or report any such behavior. SA [redacted] conducted his interview in accordance with FBI protocols and policy

b6 -1  
b7C -1

SA [redacted] conducted his interview in a ply-wood building which contained approximately eight interview rooms. The structure was adjacent to the main prison building where the detainees were housed. The interview conducted by SA [redacted] was not held in Unit 1A or 1B in the prison. SA [redacted] did not have any substantive contact with Military Police personnel. The Military Police were utilized to transport the prisoners from the prison building to the interview facility. SA [redacted] had no other contact with the Military Police

b6 -1  
b7C -1

SA [redacted] interview team consisted of himself, SA [redacted] and a Language Specialist from Houston Division known as [redacted] last name known (LNU). SA [redacted] could not recall [redacted] full name; however, advised that [redacted] was also known as [redacted]. SA [redacted] and SA [redacted] conducted the interview and [redacted] LNU translated for the interview. SA [redacted] interviewee did not report any acts of misconduct or mistreatment by U.S. personnel. SA [redacted] did not possess any pictures, video tapes, or notes of actions depicting misconduct or inappropriate behavior by U.S. personnel against detainees. SA [redacted] was not aware of anyone who possessed such items. SA [redacted] was not aware of any authorization to deviate from standard FBI interview protocols.

b6 -1  
b7C -1

SA [redacted] did not have any additional information relating to the abuse/mistreatment of detainees.

b6 -1  
b7C -1

On May 17, 2004, Special Agent (SA) [redacted] Fly-Away Rapid Deployment Team, Counterterrorism Division, was interviewed telephonically by Assistant Inspector (AI) [redacted] [redacted] Inspection Division. SA [redacted] was contacted in Baghdad, Afghanistan, at telephone number [redacted]. The nature of the interview was regarding SA [redacted] participation in detainee interviews at Abu Ghurayb Prison in Iraq. SA [redacted] provided the following information:

b2 -1  
b6 -1  
b7C -1

SA [redacted] served in Iraq from early September 2003 through mid November 2003. During his deployment to Iraq, he participated in the interview of a detainee at the Abu Ghurayb Prison. SA [redacted] did not observe any misconduct or mistreatment of prisoners at any time during his presence at the Abu Ghurayb Prison and had no reason to believe any misconduct or mistreatment of detainees was occurring. The interview conducted by SA [redacted] and members of his team was conducted in accordance with FBI protocols and policy.

b6 -1  
b7C -1

The interview conducted by SA [redacted] took place in a ply-wood structure inside the prison compound, but separated from the main prison building where the detainees were held. The ply-wood structure was divided into approximately eight interview/interrogation rooms. The interview conducted by SA [redacted] was not held in Unit 1A or 1B in the prison.

b6 -1  
b7C -1

The only contact SA [redacted] had with Military Police personnel was to arrange for the detainee to be escorted from the holding facility to the interview room.

b6 -1  
b7C -1

SA [redacted] interview team consisted of himself, SA [redacted] and a translator from Houston Division known as [redacted]. SA [redacted] could not recall [redacted] full name. SA [redacted] and SA [redacted] conducted the interview and [redacted] served as the translator. During the interview conducted by SA [redacted] the interviewee did not advise of any acts of misconduct or mistreatment by U.S. personnel. SA [redacted] did not possess any pictures, video tapes, or notes of actions depicting misconduct or inappropriate behavior by U.S. personnel against detainees, nor was he aware of anyone else who possessed such items. SA [redacted] was not aware of any authorization to deviate from standard FBI interview protocols.

b6 -1  
b7C -1

b6 -1  
b7C -1

SA [redacted] was not aware of any mistreatment or abuse of detainees and consequently did not document or report any such behavior. SA [redacted] did not have any additional information relating to the abuse/mistreatment of detainees.

b6 -1  
b7C -1



ER

The following investigation was conducted by Supervisory Special Agent (SSA) [redacted] in Portland, Oregon on May 18, 2004

b6 -1  
b7C -1

Special Agent (SA) [redacted] assigned to the Fly Away/Rapid Deployment Team at FBI Headquarters (FBIHQ) provided the following information:

b6 -1  
b7C -1

SA [redacted] started work with the FBI on [redacted]. His FBIHQ extension is [redacted] and cell phone is [redacted]. In his capacity as an SA assigned to the Fly Away Team, he served in Iraq from 11/05/2003 until 01/30/2004. As one of his duties in Iraq, he interviewed detainees at Abu Ghurayb Prison. As a result, the following questions were posed to SA [redacted]

b2 -1  
b6 -1  
b7C -1

1 Did you observe any misconduct or mistreatment of prisoners at any time during your presence at Abu Ghurayb prison?

Response: SA [redacted] stated he did not observe any mistreatment of the nature, or extent, as recently reported by the media. SA [redacted] stated he observed three incidents that caught his attention. On one occasion at Abu Ghurayb Prison, SA [redacted] observed military personnel restraining a detainee. The detainee was spread eagle on a mattress on the floor and yelling and flailing. The military personnel advised SA [redacted] the detainee was mentally ill. The detainee was covered with a blanket. SA [redacted] also thinks he remembers observing an IV bag for the detainee. SA [redacted] stated his observations were consistent with military personnel attempting to assist a mentally ill person. SA [redacted] also noted the prison held numerous mentally ill detainees.

b6 -1  
b7C -1

The second incident consisted of a detainee, either naked or wearing boxer shorts, lying prone on the wet floor. There was one military person in the vicinity, but no one was interacting with the detainee.

The third incident consisted of a detainee standing on the second floor of the prison and handcuffed to a waist high railing. An empty green nylon sand bag was placed over the detainee's head. The prisoner was draped in a shower curtain. The military personnel advised SA [redacted] the detainee was being subjected to sleep deprivation. SA [redacted] observed a military policeman (MP) lightly slap the detainee on his back.

b6 -1  
b7C -1

The slap was not hard, and consistent with someone trying to assure the detainee did not fall asleep.

2. Did you have any reason to believe that any misconduct or mistreatment of detainees at Abu Ghurayb was occurring? These reasons could include casual observations, prisoner appearance or demeanor, or conversations with prison personnel.

Response: No, other than the limited observations documented in the response to question number one. SA [redacted] noted there was documentation and limited conversation related to "Ego Up and Ego Down," and "Fear Up and Fear Down," referring to the detainees. Before SA [redacted] was able to conduct interviews in the prison, he was required to sign a Military Intelligence (MI) document delineating the interview techniques allowed, and those requiring specific approval. The document appeared to be a standard form, and applicable to agencies wanting to conduct interviews of detainees. SA [redacted] thinks the document specifically mentioned "Ego Up and Ego Down," as well as "Fear Up and Fear Down." SA [redacted] noted sleep deprivation was not on the list of permissible interview activities, but required a specific request. SA [redacted] stated he generally discussed the form, read the form, and signed the form. He did not maintain a copy of the form.

b6 -1  
b7C -1

3. Did interview conducted by you and members of your team comport with prescribed Department of Justice and/or FBI protocols?

Response: Yes. SA [redacted] noted he was not aware of any specific DOJ or FBI protocols established for the detainee interviews. He said he did not give the detainees Miranda rights, but stated he was conducting the interview for intelligence information. SA [redacted] added that he, and his associates, treated the interviewees professionally and humanely at all times.

b6 -1  
b7C -1

4. Please identify where the interviews occurred in the prison.

Response: SA [redacted] stated each of his interviews was conducted in an interview facility called the "wood site." It was called the wood site because it was a structure built of wood. It was located approximately 150 yards from the security cell block portion of the main prison. The "wood site" consisted of six interview rooms. Each room held a plastic table and plastic or metal chairs. Each room also had

b6 -1  
b7C -1

one door, a one way glass/mirror for persons outside the room to observe the interview, and an air conditioning/heating unit

SA [ ] stated the interviewees would be removed from the main prison and escorted to the interview site, the "wood site." Per prison regulations, the prisoners were escorted in handcuffs and hoods. For the first interviews conducted by SA [ ] the detainee was escorted by MI or other military police personnel. Later, SA [ ] sometimes escorted the detainee from the cell area to the interview site.

b6 -1  
b7C -1

5 Were they ever held in Units 1A or 1B (where the abuses occurred)?

Response: SA [ ] stated he was not aware of the 1A or 1B classification for areas of the prison, nor was he aware of the specific area in question. He stated he obtained his detainees from the last wing of the prison. To get to the wing holding his detainees, he would enter the front of the prison building and walk down the center corridor. Four or five wings, on both sides of the central corridor, spoked off from the main corridor. SA [ ] stated he walked to the last set of wings, and passed all the wings while traveling to his destination. On one occasion when SA [ ] interviewed detainee [ ] unidentified military personnel brought the detainee to SA [ ] SA [ ] thought the detainee was in Camp Vigilant, the open air detention camp next to the Abu Ghurayb Prison. From the wing holding SA [ ] interview subjects, SA [ ] escorted them out the back door to the interview building.

b6 -1,3,4  
b7C -1,3,4  
b7D -1  
b7F -1

6 Did you have any substantive contact with Military Police personnel in charge of the prison? If so, who?

Response: SA [ ] stated his conversations with Military Police personnel in charge of the prison were frequent, but not substantive nor related to interviews other than in general terms. Relative to Military Intelligence personnel, SA [ ] noted he met Colonel [ ] on one occasion. He did not hold any substantive conversation with the Colonel

b6 -1,2  
b7C -1,2

SA [ ] met Lt. Colonel [ ] on several occasions. On at least one occasion, they discussed general security issues because of attempted prison escapes, prisoner

b6 -1,2  
b7C -1,2

uprisings, a shooting incident inside the high security cellblock, and attacks on the prison from the surrounding village. They did not discuss interview techniques.

SA [redacted] met both Captain [redacted] and Major [redacted]. SA [redacted] thinks Captain [redacted] was in charge of the MI interview teams. SA [redacted] conversed with both officers on several occasions, but did not discuss specific interview techniques. SA [redacted] noted he knew how he was going to proceed on his interviews, and knew his procedures were within DOJ and FBI parameters. SA [redacted] stated he introduced other interviewers to Major [redacted].

b6 -1,2  
b7C -1,2

SA [redacted] said his primary prison contact person was Chief Warrant Officer [redacted]. Chief [redacted] supervised the Sgts. and Specialists responsible for scheduling and monitoring interviews. On several occasions, SA [redacted] discussed his proposed interview approaches for specific detainees, with Chief [redacted]. SA [redacted] indicated his intent, to Chief [redacted] to pursue a lengthy and professional series of interviews with a detainee. At no time did Chief [redacted] suggest a more aggressive approach for the interviews.

b6 -1,2  
b7C -1,2

7. Please explain the roles of members which comprised your interview team.

Response: SA [redacted] said he primarily interviewed detainee [redacted]. SA [redacted] primary counterpart in the interviews was SA [redacted]. SA [redacted] served as a translator and co-interviewer. After SA [redacted] left the country, [redacted] served as a translator in the interviews. On one occasion, Intelligence Analyst [redacted] served as an observer and note taker. On one occasion, [redacted] served as a linguist during an interview. On another occasion, SA [redacted] served as a co-interviewer with SA [redacted].

b6 -1,3,4  
b7C -1,3,4  
b7D -1  
b7F -1

8. During your interviews, did any interviewee bring to your attention any acts of misconduct or mistreatment by U S personnel?

Response: No. During the first interviews with detainee [redacted] complained of commotion and screaming at night. SA [redacted] said he interpreted the detainee's statements as possible surmise on the detainee's part that other detainees might be subject to torture. SA [redacted] said the detainee was in a cell with a solid door and walls, so was unable to report on anything he observed. SA [redacted]

b6 -1,3,4  
b7C -1,3,4  
b7D -1  
b7F -1

[redacted] also perceived the detainee's complaint of hearing screams as "posturing" to support his early anti U.S. position, as well as a complaint regarding lack of sleep. SA [redacted] noted the prison was a very noisy environment with frequent wailing and/or yelling. SA [redacted] does not recall his interview subjects complaining of abuse to themselves, or to anyone else in the prison. At one point, detainee [redacted] complained of not being able to see a doctor. SA [redacted] arranged for doctor visits to detainee [redacted].

b6 -1,3,4  
b7C -1,3,4  
b7D -1  
b7E -1

9. Are you in possession of any pictures, video tapes, or notes of actions depicting misconduct or inappropriate behavior by U.S. personnel against detainees? Are you aware of anyone else who is in possession of such items?

Response: No / No

10. What, if any, was your understanding of Department of Defense and/or Department of Justice authorization for the permitted use of certain interrogation techniques?

Response: SA [redacted] stated that other than the initial DOD form he signed prior to conducting interviews, he was not aware of DOD authorizations or techniques regarding interviews. SA [redacted] said the DOD techniques were irrelevant to his interviews. SA [redacted] stated he did not have any understanding of altered DOJ interview standards, other than not utilizing Miranda warnings.

b6 -1  
b7C -1

11. If you were aware of any mistreatment or abuse of detainees, did you document or report it to anyone?

Response: Not Applicable

12. Do you have any additional information relating to the abuse/mistreatment of detainees?

Response: No. SA [redacted] wanted to note the difference in his interview techniques between detainee [redacted] and detainee [redacted]. SA [redacted] noted detainee [redacted] was a potential long term interview subject with information of possible value over a period of time. Conversely, detainee [redacted] was thought to hold information of immediate value only. As a result, the interview technique with detainee [redacted] was more aggressive. The techniques included yelling and hitting the table. SA [redacted] stated they did not, at any

b6 -1,3,4  
b7C -1,3,4  
b7D -1  
b7E -1

time, threaten the detainees with abuse or harm, or harm a detainee

SA [redacted] noted he provided amenities to one detainee/interviewee. SA [redacted] brought a light bulb for the detainee's cell, provided him with polypropolene underwear and sandals, and provided him a copy of the Koran. SA [redacted] requested the prison guards to treat one detainee, of interview interest, very professionally. Specifically, SA [redacted] requested the prison personnel to not ridicule or humiliate the detainee, and to respect his needs for prayer time.

b6 -1  
b7C -1

MA

On May 17, 2004, Supervisory Special Agent (SSA [redacted]) of the Federal Bureau of Investigation's (FBI) Inspection Division, interviewed Unit Chief (UC) [redacted] at his place of business, the Behavioral Analysis Unit-I, (BAU-I), Critical Incident Response Group (CIRG), located in Quantico, Virginia. UC Chief [redacted] has an EOD date as a Special Agent (SA), of [redacted]. He has held his current position as UC since [redacted]. The purpose of the interview was to inquire about UC [redacted] knowledge of FBI personnel activities at Abu Ghurayb Prison between October 2003 and December 2003. UC [redacted] advised he had arrived in Iraq on 12/06/2003 and departed Iraq on 12/07/2003. His reason for visiting Abu Ghurayb Prison was to determine how his unit (BAU-I) could support FBI personnel in their interviews/interrogations of Iraqi prisoners in Iraq, if called to do so. UC [redacted] provided the following response to questions asked from a document titled, "Questions Concerning FBI Activities at Abu Ghurayb Prison-IRAQ"

b6 -1  
b7C -1

During his one day at Abu Ghurayb Prison, UC [redacted] said he did not observe any misconduct or mistreatment of detainees, nor did he have any reason to believe that any misconduct or mistreatment of detainees at Abu Ghurayb Prison was occurring. The one interview in which UC [redacted] participated, adhered to all rules, guidelines, and protocols established by the Department of Justice and/or FBI.

b6 -1  
b7C -1

The interview UC [redacted] participated in, took place inside an air-conditioned, pre-fabricated structure located inside the walled compound of Abu Ghurayb Prison, but away from the older main buildings. It was the opinion of UC [redacted] that this pre-fabricated facility, which was called the "Wood Site", contained approximately two rooms. UC [redacted] also opined that the "Wood Site" was built for interrogations/interviews because the facility was more comfortable and removed from the cells contained in the main prison. UC [redacted] was not aware of any number or letter designation for the "Wood Site".

b6 -1  
b7C -1

UC [redacted] said he had no substantive contact with the Military Police (MP) or with Military Intelligence (MI). His only contact with the MP or MI was when he was introduced to them as he processed into the prison, signing into a register and checking-in his weapon.

b6 -1  
b7C -1

UC [redacted] described the lone interview he participated in as being comprised of a lead interviewer, SA [redacted] the translator, SA [redacted] (Last Name Unknown), and himself as the observer. UC [redacted] could not recall what unit SA [redacted] was assigned to, however, he did know that SA [redacted] is currently assigned to the Fly Away Rapid Deployment Team Unit based out of FBIHQ. UC [redacted] stated SA [redacted] may have been assigned to the Pittsburgh Division.

b6 -1  
b7C -1

According to UC [redacted] at no time did any interviewee bring to his attention any act of misconduct or mistreatment by U.S. personnel. UC [redacted] also explained that he does not have any pictures, video tapes, or notes of actions depicting misconduct or inappropriate behavior by U.S. personnel against detainees, nor is UC [redacted] aware of anyone else who is in possession of such items.

b6 -1  
b7C -1

UC [redacted] could recall no authorization for the use of interrogation techniques not normally employed by the FBI. The interview/interrogation techniques observed by UC [redacted] conformed with DOJ/FBI policy, procedure and guidelines and were in accordance with U.S. law. UC [redacted] was not aware of any Department of Defense authorization for the permitted use of certain interrogation techniques in Iraq.

b6 -1  
b7C -1

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2

b6 -1 UC [ ] had no additional information relating to the abuse/mistreatment of detainees  
b7C -1 at Abu Ghurayb Prison

DETAINEES-3491

3000



CP

The following investigation was conducted by SSA [redacted] on 05/21/2004. The information was gathered from a telephonic follow up interview of SA [redacted] to a personal interview between SSA [redacted] and SA [redacted] on 05/18/2004.

b6 -1  
b7C -1

SA [redacted] provided information concerning the reference, from his prior conversation with SSA [redacted] to his request that prison guards not "ridicule or humiliate" a specific detainee. SA [redacted] stated he did not observe any physical harassment of detainees, other than the examples he previously noted. He observed the prison guards verbally harassing and ridiculing the detainees. It was never aggressive, but was degrading

b6 -1  
b7C -1

As an example, SA [redacted] observed the guards give the detainees cleaning supplies and ordered them to scrub the floors. He observed the orders given in a "theatrical and humiliating" manner, that is the guards ordered the detainees to clean "their" (meaning the guard's) floor and repeatedly yelled orders to the detainees. SA [redacted] described the treatment as constant verbal haranguing. SA [redacted] noted the treatment was not unlike treatment he had observed in U.S. prisons/jails.

b6 -1  
b7C -1

SA [redacted] stated he requested the guards spare the specific detainee the "ridicule and humiliation" not because SA [redacted] was concerned for the safety of the detainee, but because SA [redacted] wanted the detainee to think SA [redacted] had the power to change the detainee's environment. SA [redacted] requested the guards call the specific detainee by his true name

b6 -1  
b7C -1

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
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DATE 10-07-2004 BY 61579DNR/BOE/230 04-07-1154

297-HQ-A1327669-E-3  
ELM elm

On 05/18/2004, Language Specialist (LS) [redacted] EOD [redacted] telephone number [redacted] assigned to FBI Houston, was contacted by SSA [redacted] [redacted] at the J. Edgar Hoover Building, FBIHQ, Washington, D C , regarding his knowledge concerning FBI personnel activities at Abu Ghurayb Prison, Baghdad, IRAQ [redacted] provided the following information

b2 -1  
b6 -1  
b7C -1

[redacted] stated that between 09/12/2003 through 11/11/2003, he served as an interpreter at the Abu Ghurayb prison. During that time, he did not observe any misconduct of mistreatment of prisoners. [redacted] stated that on one occasion, he witnessed one military police (MP) officer yelling in the face of a prisoner who did not understand the directions of the MP. This particular incident stood out because several agents, and MPs were around and witnessed the MP shouting and "talking down" to the prisoner. However, no observations of physical contact or abuse were noted.

b6 -1  
b7C -1

[redacted] advised that he was part of interview teams that consisted of at least two FBI agents, two HRT members, and him. The agents, [redacted] (phonetic), from FBI El Paso, and [redacted] LNU, from FBI Los Angeles were [redacted] primary team members. [redacted] stated that all contact with the prisoners was conducted in either an office outside the cell blocks, an air conditioned tent, or a fixed office building (similar to a trailer) detached from the cell blocks, but on the Abu Ghurayb Prison compound. [redacted] stated that all prisoners were afforded water, restroom breaks, and chairs. Detainees were placed in comfortable settings and agents went out of their way to treat all detainees with dignity and respect. On several occasions, FBI agents delivered messages to family members of detainees. All interviews were conducted in a professional manner and in accordance with Department of Defense and/or Department of Justice protocols. [redacted] stated that FBI employees went out of their way to ensure each detainee was treated with dignity and respect.

b6 -1  
b7C -1

[redacted] stated that during his interviews with detainees, on three occasions, prisoners brought to his team's attention acts of abuse had taken place prior to arriving at Abu Ghurayb Prison. [redacted] stated that his interviews determined those acts of abuse occurred during arrests by military personnel further described as non-American (presumed to be Iraqi Military). Examples of the reported acts of abuse included being kicked in the stomach, electric shock, threats to harm family members, and one burn victim. The burn victim, an Iraqi Intelligence Officer (IO) was the only individual [redacted] recalled contacting outside the prisons compound. This individual was a patient in a Baghdad hospital and was contacted there several times by himself and SA [redacted]. [redacted] stated that FBI Agents took pictures of all injuries, even those which occurred prior to the incarcerations at the AGP. These findings were documented on the FD-302's of interviewing agents.

b6 -1  
b7C -1

DATE: 10-29-2004  
CLASSIFIED BY: 61579DMK/DCR/BJG 04-CV-4151  
REASON: 1.4 (C)  
DECLASSIFY ON: 10-29-2028

~~SECRET~~

[redacted] advised that he had limited contact with MPs. Aside from FBI personnel, his other contact would have been with individuals [redacted] who accompanied him to a few interviews. [redacted] stated that only agents had direct contact with MPs. His role as the translator did not lend itself to other outside contacts. [redacted] advised that during the time in Abu Ghurayb Prison, he did not record, photograph, or video tape any instances of abuse nor did he have the same in his possession. Other than what was reported above, [redacted] was not aware of any improprieties resulting in the abuse of prisoners as described on television today.

(S)

b1  
b6 -1  
b7c -1

~~SECRET~~

DETAINEES-3494

3003

#  
- MUSIC -

SA [redacted] - [redacted] [redacted] b2 -1  
 ( [redacted] Doha QATAR b6 -1  
 SA [redacted] [redacted] [redacted] b7C -1

b6 -1  
b7C -1

1) NO

[redacted]  
5/17/04  
1:30 PM

2) NO, nor did anyone volunteer that there was any  
 treatment that was occurring to [redacted]

b6 -3,4  
b7C -3,4  
b7D -1  
b7F -1

3) Yes

4) One was in a jail consider [redacted]  
 in an area of isolation

b6 -3,4  
b7C -3,4  
b7D -1  
b7F -1

Dr interviewed took place in the offices of Military Intelligence

5) No idea where that unit is at

b6 -2  
b7C -2

6) Corresponds with Captain [redacted], MI, Airman  
 was the officer of Intelligence - Two other MI  
 who's name seems to escape (SSG [redacted] Army)

7) There were two MI people and a translator -  
 usually we would try to bring our own FBI  
 interpreter

8) NO

(12) No

DETAINEES-3495

9) NO

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 DATE 10-06-2004 BY 81579BKH/6CS/gjg/0404151

10) No occasion ever presented to him which would  
 require him to ask that He provided the MI

[Redacted]  
5/17/04  
11:30 AM  
b6 -1  
b7C -1

interview that was occurring to [Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6 -3,4  
b7C -3,4  
b7D -1  
b7F -1

3) Yes

4) One was in a jail corridor [Redacted] in an area of isolation

Dr. interviewed those places in the offices of Military Intelligence

5) No idea where that unit is at

6) Corresponds with Captain [Redacted], MI, AISUM was the office of Intelligence - Two other MI who's name seems to escape (SSG [Redacted])

b6 -1  
b7C -1

7) There were two MI people and a Translator - usually we would try to bring our own FBI in-house

8) NO

(12) No

9) NO

10) No occasion ever presented to him which would require him to ask that He provided the MI people with a bit of Target questions provided by what to ask him guideline questions 'I&D' Improvised Explosive Device  
IT WAS A ~~target~~ SET of questions that related to BOMB related matters which would indicate an interest in the ~~target~~ 'CXC' cell - He was a Bomb Tech - was not going to discuss interrogated matters - we were strictly will and evaluated

11) NOT aware of any - if he HAD been aware he would have reported it

Sn

[Redacted]

b2 -1

[Redacted]

e-210

b6 -1

b7C -1

50 22

[Redacted]

( [Redacted]

[Redacted]

b2 -1

Date Q mem

Call  
etc [Redacted]

b2 -1

5/17/04

[Redacted]

b6 -1  
b7C -1

Bagram, Af.  
AFGHANISTAN

FL-1 AUSA Rapid Deployment Unit  
EWG Staff. - mid Nov.

(A) No

(B) No

(C) YES

(D) Bidding ply-wood  
& interior interrogation rooms  
in compound prison

(E) No

(F) No

Arranging . . . to transport prisoner to  
intv facility.

(G) [Redacted]

Logistics Specialist, Houston D:V

b6 -1  
b7C -1

[Redacted]

(H) No

(I) No

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DATE 10-06-2014 BY 61273 DMW/bcr/gjs 04-cv-4151

DETAINEES-3498

8) YES

9) Bidding ply-wood & interview interrogation rooms in compound prison

5) NO

6) NO  
Arranging intv to transport prisoner to intv facility.

7) 

b6 -1  
b7C -1

Law specialist Houston Div



8) NO

9) NO

10) NOT AWARE (of specific actions, headline) Used FBI intr. standards

11) NOT AWARE

12) NO





930da 5/17/04

10/17/03 - 12/14/03

1. INTERVIEW W/ CJIS BIOGRAPHIC  
INTERVIEWS; NOT COLLOQ PHISWORE

N.O.

1. DID NOT OBSERVE ANY MISCONDUCT OR  
MISSTATEMENT

DID NOT HAVE A

2 - NO REASON TO BELIEVE MY WORK.


3. YES

4. INTERVIEWS CONDUCTED IN INTERVIEW (INTERVIEW)  
ROOMS; ON THE GROUNDS OF PRISON

5. DON'T THINK SO, HOWEVER CONDUCTED  
INTERVIEWS IN ROOMS DESCRIBED ABOVE.

6. NO, NIPS BRING PHYSICIANS TO INTERVIEW  
ROOM NO FURTHER INTERACTION.

7. INTERVIEW, COUPLE TIMES, THESE  
THINGS WERE (ONE ABOUT W/NO.  
COUNTRYS, 2 ABOUT W/NO.  
MOST OF THE TIME, THERE WAS A  
MILITARY INTERVIEWER (MI)  
AGENTS ASKED QUESTIONS  
MI WAS OBSERVING ME, DID NOT  
PARTICIPATE IN INTERVIEW.



8. NO. ONLY CONFIDENT WAS BEING SOLD,  
ASKED FOR MORE BULLETS, TOLD ~~YES~~  
9. Military Possession of ASKED FOR MORE  
9 BULLETS

9. - NO, NOT IN POSSESSION OF ANY ~~IT~~ S.  
- NO.

10. POSTED ON THE WALL OF ~~THE~~ ONE OF  
THE OFFICES WAS A MILITARY ON  
DOD LIST OF ~~INTERESTING~~ WHAT  
WAS ALLOWED DURING INTERROGATION  
POSSIBLY 9 OR 10 BULLETS

11. WASN'T AWARE OF ANY ASSISTANCE AT AISO

12. NO



b6 -1  
b7C -1

①  
strip

1. ~~some~~ NO MISCONDUCT OR MISTREATMENT.  
3-4 TIMES, DETAINEES ORDERED TO STRIP  
& PLACED IN <sup>ISOLATION</sup> CELL w/NO CONTACT.

2. ~~NO~~ YES. ONE INSTANCE IN WHICH DETAINEES  
COMPLAINING ABOUT BEING STRIPPED NAKED,  
KIDNAP NAKED AND <sup>BY DETAINEES</sup> SLEPT DEPRIVED  
& SOILED ROUGHED UP. DETAINEE WAS  
INTERVIEWED BY ANOTHER PERSON WHO WORE  
MILITARY UNIFORMS WHO MISTREATED  
HIM. DETAINEE WAS INTERVIEWED ABOUT  
8 TIMES, & ALL WAS DOCUMENTED ON CDS.

TO [REDACTED] FILE [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] MASSAR AL ISLAM - NO <sup>PHYSICAL</sup> MARKS.

7. <sup>REITERATED</sup> ~~SA~~ <sup>UNIDENTIFIED</sup> TOURIST GROUP OPERATING  
IN IRAQ, ALLEGED TIES W/AL QAEDA.  
[REDACTED] - Fugitive - FSIHQ.

3. Assumptions

4. Intercom Rooms  
→ DIFFERENT WOODEN BUILDINGS WITH PHYSICAL  
COMPLAINT, 1 CROSS TO ISOLATION CELL,  
OTHER BY oral production.  
6 rooms in street building  
→ rooms on street side w/windows  
separated by HALLS.

b2 -4  
b6 -1,3,4  
b7C -1,3,4  
b7D -1  
b7F -1

b6 -1  
b7C -1

[Redacted]

(2)

5. no interviews were conducted in Unit 6A or 1B.

b6 -2  
b7C -2

6. [Redacted] w/SGT [Redacted] IS WAS  
present DOTMOS for interviews.  
SGT [Redacted] WAS MP PC#0 GOT  
DOTMOS for interview. Reus

7. numbers were 3AS & MF.  
As an interviewer / translator, most  
interviews, other agents were used  
interviewers,  
MI - OBSERVER, some party parts in  
interviews.

8. Report to #2

DETAINEES-3503

9. NO. NO

10. Understanding that this in charge of  
the physical account sleep deprivation  
was not aware if it was a Commission  
article or not, then in Case #2  
discuss DOTMOS. Please note that  
during first interview, there a point of  
this, DOTMOS discussion inconsistent.  
Many consider that of role of discussing  
interview of DOTMOS inconsistent.  
SA [Redacted] was author of BC.  
~~SA~~ SA [Redacted] Shows every BC risk  
review. Was not present & others

b6 -1  
b7C -1

b6 -1  
b7C -1



3

~~DELETED~~

Remembered Station, Lots SA's shown  
Since BUS & DID NOT MET SHOW  
SMB


11. OL DOCUMENTS DOTIONS IN Ques #2  
DID NOT REPORT WORKING TO ANGUS.

12. NO MIS & UPS APPROX TO DO JURY PHOTOCOPY  
\* POC WAS CHIEF RESEARCH OFFICER



b6 -2  
b7C -2


11/4 -



b6 -1,3,4  
b7C -1,3,4  
b7D -1  
b7F -1

Jeerm

b6 -1  
b7C -1



→ Interview

~~Notes~~  
Notes follow up  
Interpreter



Requested MP (unaware of identity) <sup>Senior NCO</sup> to move son into cell for night.

→ located in office company administrative area, the place office "the were visiting agencies who are conducting detainee interviews check in + check-out


→ son from 10/7 interview be allowed to visit his father in hard cell area that evening. MP responded he would try to accommodate request.

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11/5 -




Jeerm



Notes  
Interview  
Interpreter

b6 -1,3,4  
b7C -1,3,4  
b7D -1  
b7F -1

→ confirmed son  visited cell.

DETAINEES-3505

⑦  
⑧ No

⑨ A - NO  
B - NO

⑩ However, most FBI personnel were provided  
4 CD containing photographs taken by various  
FBI personnel during their TDY, ~~in~~ <sup>notation</sup> Baghdad.  
to the Baghdad operation center.


→ Believes knew all & did not ~~recall seeing~~ <sup>see</sup>  
any which depicted misconduct or inappropriate  
behavior by U.S. personnel against detainees

⑩ ~~Unaware~~  
~~press - sleep deprivation~~

~~Unaware~~ Other than ~~some~~ DOJ authorized  
interview techniques, and those authorized by  
in adherence with Geneva convention.  
Do not know of any other, nor witnessed  
any other.

⑩ N/A

⑫ None.





[Redacted]

Houston Division

b6 -1

b7C -1

EOD

[Redacted]

- Rotation # 4

~~9/1/2003 - 11/1/2003~~

9/11/2003 - 11/11/2003

① No

② No

③ Yes

- ↳ DOJ +/or FBI
- ↳ not lengthy → 3 1/2 hrs w/ breaks
- ↳ Water available
- ↳ treated w/ respect + dignity
- ↳ bathroom breaks

DETAINEES-3508

④ Outside in open tent area

↳ "camp vigilante"

↳ where security detainees were maintained

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12/1/03 ←

→ one interview ~~conducted~~ conducted in a "hard build"  
room w/ chairs.

↳ Not in Unit 1A or Unit 1B.

↳ At request of FBI subje. released

[Redacted]

b6 -3,4  
b7C -3,4  
b7D -1  
b7E -1

- ⑤ No  
↳ unfamiliar w/ units 1A + 1B  
↳ unaware of the location of these units.

- ⑥ Telephone #s  
~~Names~~ of points of contacts to arrange prisoner interviews:  
↳ Master Sgt [redacted]

b6 -2  
b7C -2

No substantive contact

↳ one contact w/

All contacts w/ military were to arrange interviews of detainees.

- First 4  
⑦ team consisted of  
Murrell  
SA [redacted] (Fly team)  
Inter LS. [redacted]

b6 -1  
b7C -1

DETAINEES-3509

Last 2 interviews

[redacted]  
LS. [redacted]

b6 -1  
b7C -1

Interview

9/27 -

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Team

[Redacted]

- took notes + follow-up quest  
- conducted interviews  
- interpreter

b6 -1,3,4  
b7C -1,3,4  
b7D -1  
b7F -1

10/5 -

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Team

[Redacted]

- Notes & follow-up  
- Conducted interviews  
- interpreter

b6 -1,3,4  
b7C -1,3,4  
b7D -1  
b7F -1

10/6 -

Same as 10/5

10/7 -

[Redacted]

1 son of 10/5-6/03 interview

Team

[Redacted]

- conducted interview  
- Notes + follow-up  
- interpreter

b6 -1,3,4  
b7C -1,3,4  
b7D -1  
b7F -1

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Verm (unreadable)  
CONTACT

Camp

Buco  
Southern

Tracy



b6 -1  
b7C -1

b6 -1  
b7C -1



Tot  
enclosures

A Tent / Camp Dancy + Rebels  
(Camp Vigilant  
Collection Facility.)

- They could consult interviews  
Just processing

They would spend about 8 min  
Between 16 + 1000

ITS AN OPEN TENT - A lot of food and  
stuff

- They DID GO into the Prison Tower

- 100 cells in a wing (ONE or TWO wings)

in an  
isolated  
wing  
SIT

- Side storage room ~~with~~ off the cell block

Between 10 am - 5 pm -

- Never at night -
  - Because of the Maly- ATTACKS  
They would Travel
- 

Processing in other parts of country

- Convoys - we they 3 to four times  
A week -

On May 18, 2004, SA [redacted] was contacted telephonically [redacted] at the [redacted] in DOHA QATAR by SSA [redacted] concerning FBI personnel activities at Abu Ghurayb Prison to which he provided the following information:

b2 -1  
b6 -1  
b7C -1

SA [redacted] advised that during his time at the ABU Ghurayb Prison his role was to only process and fingerprint prisoners and at no time did he observe any misconduct or mistreatment of prisoners at any time during his presence at ABU Ghurayb prison.

b6 -1  
b7C -1

SA [redacted] advised that he did not have reason to believe that any misconduct or mistreatment of detainees at ABU Ghurayb was occurring in Unit 1A or 1B nor did anyone ever volunteer any information to him that any mistreatment of prisoners had occurred.

b6 -1  
b7C -1

SA [redacted] advised that he never felt a need to have an understanding of Department of Defense and/or Department of Justice authorization for permitted use of certain interrogation techniques. That was because he was only at the prison to process and fingerprint prisoners. He also stated that he does not have any pictures, video tapes, or notes of actions depicting misconduct or inappropriate behavior by U.S. personnel against detainees or was not aware of anyone else who was in possession of such items.

b6 -1  
b7C -1

SA [redacted] advised that he had no additional information relating to the abuse of detainees and if he had been aware of any mistreatment or abuse he would have reported the inappropriate actions to the authorities

b6 -1  
b7C -1

b6 -1  
b7C -1


[redacted]

*any about this - pls see me  
1/11/04*

*Its determine:*

\* *Where in prison did he process/finger-  
print & what time period was he  
at AGP & how frequently - u daily?*

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DATE 10-07-2004 BY 61573INH/3CR/225 04-CV-4151



b6 -1  
b7C -1

### Questions Concerning FBI Personnel Activities at Abu Ghurayb Prison - IRAQ


Time period: October 2003 - December 2003

- 1 Did you observe any misconduct or mistreatment of prisoners at any time during your presence at Abu Ghurayb prison? *no*
- 2 Did you have any reason to believe that any misconduct or mistreatment of detainees at Abu Ghurayb was occurring? These reasons could include casual observations, prisoner appearance or demeanor, or conversations with prison personnel *no*
- 3 Did interviews conducted by you and members of your team comport with prescribed Department of Justice and/or FBI protocols? *Yes*
- 4 Please identify where the interviews occurred in the prison
- 5 Were they ever held in Unit 1A or 1B (where the abuses occurred)?
- 6 Did you have any substantive contact with Military Police personnel in charge of the prison? If so, who?
- 7 Please explain the roles of members which comprised your interview team? *1/1*
- 8 During your interviews did any interviewee bring to your attention any acts of misconduct or mistreatment by U S personnel? *no*
- 9 Are you in possession of any pictures, video tapes, or notes of actions depicting misconduct or inappropriate behavior by U S personnel against detainees? Are you aware of anyone else who is in possession of such items? *no*
- 10 What, if any, was your understanding of Department of Defense and/or Department of Justice authorization for the permitted use of certain interrogation techniques?
- 11 If you were aware of any mistreatment or abuse of detainees, did you document or report it to anyone? *no would have reported it*
- 12 Do you have any additional information relating to the abuse/mistreatment of detainees?

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DETAINEES-3514

AN-HQ-A-E 76697-E



b2 -1

b6 -1  
b7C -1

LS. [Redacted]

Houston, Texas

EDD. [Redacted] 11/4/03 time in Baghdad  
Houston, TX [Redacted]

- Observed yelling in face + prisoners not understanding shouting at prisoners face - no physical contact  
"Talking down - Don't yell at me - Ueral loud voices" - One of the military groups.

(Only intercept from 5 whs)

- 2 - HKT  
SA [Redacted] - E (Law)  
[Redacted] (LA) former C.S.

NO - Other than above

b6 -1  
b7C -1

- NO - (End of Oct) HKT Transfer prisoners

- Yes - Very prof. water, chair, comfortable out of their way. - ~~Assae~~

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Fortune before arrival Nayef P.O.

① One prisoner - [Redacted] Al-Nayef bombing suspect described he was Fortunate Saddam group (non-aren). Buried w/ sheer sticks + talking wife how they left his man

b6 -3,4  
b7C -3,4  
b7D -1  
b7E -1

NO Aren - Involvement  
② [Redacted] (N) Bomb suspect - ~~inter~~ FBI released said when he was arrested he was killed in stomach by military broke into house.

③ Hospital Al-Anni IRAQI I.D. - Burns over body told come during arrest in back

DETAINEES-3515



b6 -1  
b7C -1

of Havel - which was hot & covered  
burns near body - Agent took picture  
SA [redacted] El Paso - # interviewed  
successful times, (Suspect + I.D.)  
[redacted] doc + sent - 302 re: this matter

X - big team including w/ prisoners - all groups  
of SA - very respectful. Accn. needs  
messages to family

b6 -1  
b7C -1

[redacted] Always outside prison - Outside of cells.

4. In a room located in tent - Buffalo  
trailer - Penna.  
picture w/ interviews  
rooms + air  
present to them.

5. Don't know - not sure where there are  
pictures <sup>on TV</sup> are similar. But not sure.

6. Very minimal contact. Agents w/ PD,  
<sub>none</sub>

7. LS, 2 - @ agents } Prisoner w/ 2 people  
did Al Anni (Hosp) } HNT outside

8. NO — other before.
9. NO — 2<sup>nd</sup> NO } NOTHING from him or people  
talking
10. Don't recall anything other than sleep. at  
that time he didn't know. at time  
their interviews were "Good Guys."
11. Others were there no need to report  
Swigthy was shared to agents
12. NO — Mustafa — taking clothes off  
not sure if truth or not

2/1/43 PD  
11/1/82



3/21

b6 -1  
b7C -1

True in theory  
observed & heard

harassing & ridiculing in work

name calling & verbal harassment

not aggressive - but degrading  
to inmates

because I wanted detainees to  
know I had power to change  
his environment

asked they call him by true name  
& allow dignity -  
was when I gave light bulbs

not observed physical harassment  
of detainees

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DATE 10-07-2004 BY 61575DMF/SDB/214 04-CV-415

saw guards frequently request  
detainees to clean rear cells  
but in humiliating way -  
guards give cleaning supplies &  
almost in theatrical manner  
yell to inmate on floor  
was clean." Inmate appeared  
humiliated by constant orders &

DETAINEES-3521

constant verbal haranguing

Anything remotely physical was the

DETAINEES-3522

b6 -1  
b7C -1

[redacted] (INSD) (FBI)

From MCCRAW, STEVEN C

Sent Thursday, June 03, 2004 6 07 AM

b6 -1  
b7C -1

To: [redacted] (INSD) (FBI)

Cc: [redacted] (INSD) (FBI), [redacted] (INSD) (FBI), [redacted] (PH) (FBI)

Subject: RE Abu Ghurayb Prison (AGP) Matter

UNCLASSIFIED  
NON-RECORD

b6 -1  
b7C -1

[redacted] thanks

-----Original Message-----

From: [redacted] (INSD) (FBI)

b6 -1  
b7C -1

Sent: Wednesday, June 02, 2004 5:27 PM

To: MCCRAW, STEVEN C

Cc: [redacted] (INSD) (FBI); [redacted] (INSD) (FBI); [redacted] (INSD) (FBI)

Subject: Abu Ghurayb Prison (AGP) Matter

UNCLASSIFIED  
NON-RECORD

Steve-

Per your request, I followed up with Valene Caproni and she advised there are no additional interviews that need to be conducted on the AGP matter at this time. I also let her know I'd be out for the next three weeks in the event something new came in on this matter.

[redacted] b6 -1  
b7C -1

FYI - All work conducted to date on the AGP matter has been documented and filed by [redacted] in 297-HQ-A13276697-E. In addition, I have a folder on my desk that has duplicate copies of the ECs/inserts/all supporting docs in case you need anything on this while I'm out.

b6 -1  
b7C -1

Thanks-  
[redacted] b6 -1  
b7C -1

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DATE 10-05-2009 BY 61579PMH/BCP/gjg 04-CV-4151

UNCLASSIFIED

b6 -1  
b7C -1

[Redacted] (INSD) (FBI)

From: [Redacted] (Div10) (FBI)  
Sent: Wednesday, May 26, 2004 11 38 AM  
To: [Redacted] (INSD) (FBI)  
Subject: FW: News from Iraq

b6 -1  
b7C -1

**SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED  
NON-RECORD**

-----Original Message-----

From: [Redacted] (CK) (FBI)  
Sent: Wednesday, May 26, 2004 9 41 AM  
To: [Redacted] (Div10) (FBI)  
Subject: Fw: News from Iraq

b6 -1  
b7C -1

**SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED  
NON-RECORD**

[Redacted] b6 -1  
[Redacted] b7C -1

THOUGHT YOU MIGHT FIND THE ATTACHED PHOTOS OF INTEREST

I AM STILL WAITING FOR THE ANSWER TO YOUR QUESTION FROM SA [Redacted] REGARDING HIS EXACT LOCATION WHILE AT THE ABULGHURAYB PRISON FBIHQ HAS ADVISED ME THAT THEY HAVE LEFT MESSAGES FOR SA [Redacted] TO RECONTACT ME I HAVE ALSO SENT HIM AN E-MAIL HOPEFULLY UPON YOUR RETURN THIS MATTER WILL BE RESOLVED

b6 -1  
b7C -1

[Redacted] b6 -1  
[Redacted] b7C -1  
FYI

Thanks [Redacted]

-----Original Message-----

From: [Redacted] (CK) (FBI)  
Sent: Wednesday, May 26, 2004 6 21 AM  
To: [Redacted] (CK) (FBI); [Redacted] (CK) (FBI); [Redacted] (CK) (FBI); [Redacted] (CK) (FBI); [Redacted] (CK) (FBI)

b6 -1  
b7C -1

[Redacted]

Subject: News from Iraq

**SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED  
NON-RECORD**

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DATE 10-05-2004 BY 61582ZMR/ECB/gig 04-001-4151

All ~

Attached, you will find the latest news from our team in Iraq with some photos as well

[Redacted] b6 -1  
[Redacted] b7C -1

9/20/2004

DETAINEES-3524

SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED

SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED

SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED

[Redacted] (INSD) (FBI)

From: [Redacted] (Div10) (FBI) b6 -1  
Sent: Sunday, May 23, 2004 2:13 PM b7C -1  
To: [Redacted] (INSD) (FBI)  
Cc: Caproni, Valene E (OGC) (FBI)  
Subject: Follow Up Interview re Abu G

SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED  
NON-RECORD

b6 -1  
b7C -1

[Redacted] and/or Valene - Attached an "insert" on the follow up interview. Let me know if you think it suffices. [Redacted]

SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED

b6 -1  
b7C -1

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DATE 10-05-2004 BY 61275DHR/BCE/358 DA-CV-4153

DETAINEES-3526

9/20/2004



b6 -1  
b7C -1

[Redacted] INSD) (FBI)

**From:** [Redacted]  
**Sent:** Saturday, May 22, 2004 12 23 PM b6 -1  
**To:** Caproni, Valerie E (OGC) (FBI) b7C -1  
**Cc:** [Redacted] INSD) (FBI), [Redacted] (INSD) (FBI)  
**Subject:** RE Post report

**UNCLASSIFIED**  
**NON-RECORD**

Valerie, We are ready to launch on the other interviews and as you know there is zero indication of this thus far

-----Original Message-----

**From:** Caproni, Valerie E. (Div09) (FBI)  
**Sent:** Saturday, May 22, 2004 12 17 PM  
**To:** CHANDLER, CASSANDRA M. (Div00) (FBI), KALISCH, ELENI P. (Div00) (FBI), WAINSTEIN, KENNETH L. (Div00) (FBI), MUELLER, ROBERT S. III (Div00) (FBI), MCCRAW, STEVEN C.; GEBHARDT, BRUCE J. (Div00) (FBI)  
**Cc:** BRIESE, M C. (Div13) (FBI); HARRINGTON, T J (Div13) (FBI)  
**Subject:** Post report

**UNCLASSIFIED**  
**NON-RECORD**

According to the Washington Post, one of the MPs that gave a statement in the Abu Ghraib prison investigation said that FBI was involved in the abuse We are going to try to get a copy of the statement and see if there is anything we can do to follow up As of right now, my information is that because of the danger at the prison, our people never spent the night

**UNCLASSIFIED**

**UNCLASSIFIED**

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DATE 10-05-2004 BY 61519 DMH/PCS/gjg LE-CV-4151

b6 -1  
b7C -1

[redacted] (INSD) (FBI)

From: [redacted] (HN) (FBI)  
Sent: Friday, May 21, 2004 2:24 PM  
To: [redacted] (DN) (FBI)  
Subject: FW: Finalized EC with two of the enclosures

**SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED**  
**NON-RECORD**

[redacted] b6 -1  
b7C -1

Pls recontact SA [redacted] and clarify what he specifically meant by this statement. If we can catch him today, that would be great.

Thanks-

[redacted]  
-----Original Message-----  
From: Caproni, Valerie E. (Div09) (FBI)  
Sent: Friday, May 21, 2004 2:02 PM  
To: [redacted] (HN) (FBI)  
Cc: [redacted] (Div10) (FBI)  
Subject: RE: Finalized EC with two of the enclosures

**SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED**  
**NON-RECORD**

One more requested follow up. SA [redacted] said he asked the prison guards to treat a particular detainee "professionally". The EC specifically mentions that he asked the prison officials not to ridicule or humiliate the detainee. That would suggest that SA [redacted] believed the guards were ridiculing and humiliating detainees. Can you follow up with some questions about why he was worried about ridicule and humiliation?

-----Original Message-----  
From: [redacted] (HN) (FBI)  
Sent: Friday, May 21, 2004 1:46 PM  
To: Caproni, Valerie E. (Div09) (FBI)  
Cc: [redacted] (Div10) (FBI)  
Subject: Finalized EC with two of the enclosures

**SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED**  
**NON-RECORD**

Ms Caproni-

Attached are copies of the final, approved EC and two of the referenced enclosures. FYI, the last paragraph on page 5 of the EC references information concerning one SA who mentioned he was provided with a CD (presumably by CTD as part of a pre-deployment pkg) which contained photos taken by various FBI personnel during their TDY rotation to the Baghdad Operation Center. In INSD's interview, the SA [redacted] (Houston Division) stated he believed he reviewed all the photos on the CD and did not see any which depicted misconduct or inappropriate behavior by U.S. personnel against detainees.

b6 -1  
b7C -1

b6 -1  
b7C -1

Chief Inspector [redacted] followed up with CTD on this issue and was informed that CTD did not provide a CD of photos as part of their pre-deployment pkg. Pls advise whether you believe additional follow-up is needed on the issue of photos taken by personnel deployed to Iraq - i.e., do you believe we need to

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request any and all photos taken by FBI personnel deployed to Iraq and conduct an independent review and assessment to identify any photos that may be relevant to this inquiry [Note Everyone identified to be interviewed in association with this inquiry is asked whether they possess any pictures, videotapes, or notes of actions depicting misconduct or inappropriate behavior by U S personnel against detainees, or whether they are aware of anyone else who is in possession of such items (Question 9) ]

Thanks-

[Redacted]

b6 -1

b7C -1

SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED

SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED

SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED

9/20/2004

DETAINEES-3529

003037

b6 -1  
b7C -1

[redacted] (INSD) (FBI)

From: [redacted] (HN) (FBI)  
Sent: Friday, May 21, 2004 2:22 PM  
To: Caproni, Valerie E (OGC) (FBI)  
Cc: [redacted] (INSD) (FBI)  
Subject: RE: Finalized EC with two of the enclosures

**SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED**  
**NON-RECORD**

Will do, the TL who interviewed SA [redacted] will request him to send the CD into INSD

b6 -1  
b7C -1

-----Original Message-----

From: Caproni, Valerie E. (Div09) (FBI)  
Sent: Friday, May 21, 2004 1:49 PM  
To: [redacted] (HN) (FBI)  
Cc: [redacted] (Div10) (FBI)  
Subject: RE: Finalized EC with two of the enclosures

**SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED**  
**NON-RECORD**

Let's not go out to all employees who've been to Iraq just yet, but can we get SA [redacted] to send up the CD?

b6 -1  
b7C -1

-----Original Message-----

From: [redacted] (HN) (FBI)  
Sent: Friday, May 21, 2004 1:46 PM  
To: Caproni, Valerie E (Div09) (FBI)  
Cc: [redacted] (Div10) (FBI)  
Subject: Finalized EC with two of the enclosures

**SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED**  
**NON-RECORD**

Ms Caproni-

Attached are copies of the final, approved EC and two of the referenced enclosures. FYI, the last paragraph on page 5 of the EC references information concerning one SA who mentioned he was provided with a CD (presumably by CTD as part of a pre-deployment pkg) which contained photos taken by various FBI personnel during their TDY rotation to the Baghdad Operation Center. In INSD's interview, the SA [redacted] (Houston Division) stated he believed he reviewed all the photos on the CD and did not see any which depicted misconduct or inappropriate behavior by U S personnel against detainees.

b6 -1  
b7C -1

Chief Inspector [redacted] followed up with CTD on this issue and was informed that CTD did not provide a CD of photos as part of their pre-deployment pkg. Pls advise whether you believe additional follow-up is needed on the issue of photos taken by personnel deployed to Iraq - i.e., do you believe we need to request any and all photos taken by FBI personnel deployed to Iraq and conduct an independent review and assessment to identify any photos that may be relevant to this inquiry. [Note: Everyone identified to be interviewed in association with this inquiry is asked whether they possess any pictures, videotapes, or notes of actions depicting misconduct or inappropriate behavior by U S personnel against detainees, or whether they are aware of anyone else who in

b6 -1  
b7C -1

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possession of such items (Question 9) ]

Thanks-



b6 -1  
b7C -1

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SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED

SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED

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b6 -1  
b7C -1

[Redacted] (INSD) (FBI)

From [Redacted] (HN) (FBI) b6 -1  
Sent Friday, May 21, 2004 12:51 PM b7C -1  
To [Redacted] (INSD) (FBI)  
Subject Finalized EC w/two of the referenced Enclosures

SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED  
NON-RECORD

b6 -1  
b7C -1

[Redacted]

I'm e-mailing you the final, approved EC with two of the referenced enclosures in case you want to forward it on via e-mail to General Counsel Caproni and DAD Harrington

Thanks-  
[Redacted] b6 -1  
b7C -1

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9/20/2004

[redacted] (INSD) (FBI) b6 -1  
b7C -1

From: [redacted] (Div10) (FBI)  
Sent: Thursday, May 20, 2004 1 29 PM b6 -1  
To: HARRINGTON, T J (CTD) (FBI) b7C -1  
Cc: [redacted] (INSD) (FBI)  
Subject: FW: AGP Matter - FYI

**SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED**  
**NON-RECORD**

TJ [redacted] references in the e-mail below a CD which may have been provided to personnel deployed to Iraq. The CD apparently contained photos of matters in the BOC and, I presume, contain no photos of prisoner matters or other possibly inappropriate conduct. Its probably all innocent stuff to prepare people for what to expect, but we'd like to cover the base in this prisoner interrogation review we're conducting. Would you be able to identify who is distributing these and get a copy.

b6 -1  
b7C -1

Thanks

[redacted] b6 -1  
-----Original Message----- b7C -1

From: [redacted] (HN) (FBI) b6 -1  
Sent: Thursday, May 20, 2004 12 29 PM b7C -1  
To: [redacted] (Div10) (FBI)  
Subject: AGP Matter - FYI

**SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED**  
**NON-RECORD**

[redacted] b6 -1  
b7C -1

In the revised draft of the EC, there is info concerning one SA who mentioned he was provided with a CD (presumably by CTD as part of a pre-deployment pkg) which contained photos taken by various FBI personnel during their TDY rotation to the Baghdad Operation Center (see last paragraph on page 5). The SA stated he believed he reviewed all the photos on the CD and did not see any which depicted misconduct or inappropriate behavior by U.S. personnel against detainees. I'd recommend someone follow-up with CTD on this to get a copy of the CD they are providing to personnel deployed to Iraq and conduct an independent review of the photos to ensure there aren't any which would be relevant to this inquiry. Let me know if you concur and if you want me to take care of this (if OGC has the primary point on this matter they may want to conduct the review).

Thanks-

[redacted] b6 -1  
b7C -1

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**SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED**

DETAINEES-3537

9/20/2004

[Redacted]

(INSD) (FBI)

b6 -1  
b7C -1

From: [Redacted] (HN) (FBI)

b6 -1

Sent: Thursday, May 20, 2004 11:24 AM

b7C -1

To: [Redacted] (INSD) (FBI)

Subject: Revised Draft of EC & Enclosures

**SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED**  
**NON-RECORD**

FYI - Attached is a copy of the revised draft of the EC & two of the enclosures. Pls note The EC and one enclosure are classified as ~~SECRET~~

Thanks-

[Redacted]

b6 -1  
b7C -1

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DETAINEES-3539


9/20/2004

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b6 -1  
b7C -1




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b6 -1  
b7C -1



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DATE 10-05-2004 BY 61579DMH/BCE/gjg 04CV-4151

DETAINEES-3543

From: [redacted]@leo.gov  
To: [redacted]@leo.gov, [redacted]@leo.gov  
Sent: Sunday, May 23, 2004 2:16 PM  
Subject: [redacted] Update

b6 -1  
b7C -1

[redacted] b6 -1  
[redacted] b7C -1

Attached is an update from [redacted]. He would like it to be forwarded to [redacted] and [redacted] and also to [redacted] for her to forward to the applicable mailing list. I'm also sending a few pictures that can be put with the update on the web page. Comments for the pictures are below, but the pictures will come separately, since LEO is a pain to use. Enjoy!

b6 -1  
b7C -1

Thanks, [redacted] b6 -1  
[redacted] b7C -1

Comments

theTeam Left to right [redacted] (Boston), [redacted] (CJIS), [redacted] (Boston), [redacted] (CJIS), [redacted] (HQ), [redacted] (Boston). Here at Camp Bucca, we carry weapons pretty much all the time in case anyone comes over the walls or the detainees decide to riot.

b6 -1  
b7C -1

workArea The tent where we are set up to process detainees. They bring them in about 10-15 at a time. We are doing interviews with each of them, which makes each process about 20 minutes.

thePen This is where the detainees stay. Believe it or not, they had an escape back in April. I guess someone dug under [redacted], climbed over the [redacted] in front of [redacted], climbed up out [redacted] and climbed over the [redacted] behind [redacted] made it to the [redacted] then through the [redacted]. Gotta admire the determination of that guy. By the way, did I mention that it's hot?

b2 -5  
b7E -2

theWork Left to right [redacted] (CJIS), [redacted] (Iraq), [redacted] (Boston), [redacted] (Interpreter). [redacted] has a towel draped over his shoulders. They soak these in water and wear them during the heat of the day to keep cool.

b6 -1,2  
b7C -1,2

[redacted] Works [redacted] (CJIS) taking the first fingerprint of a Camp Bucca detainee on May 21, 2004.

b6 -1  
b7C -1

[redacted] Update b6 -1  
[redacted] b7C -1

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HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 10-05-2004 BY 61575RWH/60233/96 C4-07-4151

## Iraq Update

This is an informal update which supplements official Bureau communications already sent describing the mission and work of the CJIS-led team currently in Iraq as part of the FBI's Deployment # 8 to the combat theater. It is sent for the benefit of the CJIS staff which works to support these overseas missions, and its intent is to give an overall view of what the deployment team faces while in the field.

The mission tail hooked to Deployment # 8 was initiated and negotiated by CJIS teams in Deployments 4, 6 and 7. It embeds this team, a CJIS Supervisory Special Agent, a CJIS ITMS technician, an FBIHQ investigative analyst, and three Special Agents from the Boston Division, in the detainee population at Camp Bucca, Southern Iraq. This camp is becoming America's next Guantanamo Bay, Cuba facility. The camp is set up for long-term interment of hard-core fighters and coalition enemies - bomb makers, foreign fighters, terrorists - and has a population of about 2,400. The entire population of Abu Ghurayb, the prison outside of Baghdad where previous CJIS teams did much processing, is being moved about 300 at a time, every three days or so, to Camp Bucca, and the population is expected to top 4,000.

Most at this camp have never been biometrically processed - the military persists in its practice of trying to track detainees through name, photo and ID bracelet databases - and it is target rich for the CJIS team. The mission on this deployment is twofold: 1) To process the detainees for fingerprints, photos, biographical information and oral DNA swabs for inclusion in IAFIS and the NCIC VGTOF, 2) To interview detainees in an attempt to identify those who are particularly dangerous or who should be otherwise of continuing interest to the FBI. The mission mirrors similar missions by CJIS teams in Afghanistan, which produced information leading to the identification of terrorists and terrorist organizations within the U.S. The mission to Iraq is similarly important, and is being closely monitored by FBIHQ and Counter Terrorism.

We are 10 days into our deployment, and to date have processed about 100 detainees. We are running at about 20 percent answering yes without hesitation to the following questions: Do you consider yourself to be a Jihadi, Holy Warrior? Are you willing to conduct a martyrdom mission? Will you continue Jihad upon your release? Our team is operating under what even the U.S. military refers to as "austere" conditions, to include 120 degree heat, tent quarters, lack of air conditioning, no running water, limited facilities as to latrines, showers, chow and morale / welfare entertainment. There is also nothing to look at when you are outside. It is flat desert all around, with a hot, 30 mile per hour prevailing wind called the "shalma," that blows all summer and shakes the tent noisily at night. Our processing area is also a tent, and the conditions will test our equipment's ability to withstand heat, dust and foraging camel spiders (which can be one foot across).

We were initially delayed in Doha for about four days due to the very heavy fighting in Southern Iraq. We made the best of that. A few highlights of

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this deployment thus far

\* We visited Centcom in Doha, with the FBI agents who will be doing the document exploitation mission with military intelligence. While there, we were asked to give a Power point presentation of the FBI efforts in the combat theater. Word is trickling down that DOD is requiring that prints be gathered to FBI standards, and the operational officers - Colonels, Lt Colonels and Majors - wanted to know what that was. We used the same presentation that we used for White House staff. While at the camp, we also renewed DOD IDs. These were first issued last May and had expired, which is an indication of how long we have been going to this combat theater.

\* We conducted our first ever exchange of fingerprints with the Government of Qatar, a continuation of negotiations initiated during other deployments. We had brought with us electronic and hard copies of two ten-prints - a dead suicide bomber who had been shot before he could set off his car bomb in Irbil, Iraq, and the prints of Abu Abbas, the Palestinian terrorist who masterminded the Achille Lauro cruise ship takeover and killing of wheelchair-bound Leon Klinghoffer (Abbas died of a heart attack while in coalition custody). We also brought a latent print - a single print lifted from one finger recovered at the site of the Assassin's Gate suicide car bombing. The prints were non-ident. But we now have access to this system, a 1.2 million print Morpho Sagem system that ITMS tech [REDACTED] evaluated for future electronic exchanges. Simply because of proximity to Iraq, I would expect to eventually experience "hits" against this system.

b6 -1  
b7C -1

\* We traveled to Basra on the 19th by British C-130. There was an acrobatic finish to the flight, when the pilot saw what he believed to be ground fire, and we got out of the plane and saw nothing but desert, flat and dry, with the flames of natural gas wells and black smoke plumes on the horizon. The convoy to Camp Bucca, an hour and a half on deserted highways in full battle rattle -- helmets, kevlar, rifles with armored Humvees front and back -- was through the tank battlefields of the 91 Gulf war and fields where camels grazed in large numbers. Our HRT advance team did an excellent job securing us a tent, work space and a Humvee, to the doors of which we have affixed a fingerprint card, to mark it as the CJIS Humvee. A U S contractor was shot by insurgents at the front gate about eight hours after we passed through, and the risk of attacks remain high.

\* This deployment could represent an interesting opportunity, in that this camp is being stood up as this theater's Guantanamo Bay, which was the final holding facility for detainees from the Afghan conflict. Construction of huge outdoor holding pens, converting barbed wire enclosures to more permanent structures, is at a feverish pace. The long-term interview groups, to include military intelligence and other agencies, are in the process of moving down as the detainees are shifted from Abu Ghurayb and other facilities, like those in Mosel, to here. There is no criminal population here, unlike Abu Ghurayb, which held coalition enemies and garden variety thieves, robbers and rapists. The detainee population will likely double, as will the U S presence. What we have found here, which is not a surprise considering what we found in other parts of Iraq, is that there is

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no consistent way in which detainees are processed or tracked. We found a broken BATS machine, incapable of taking prints or any other biometric markers, and a group of MP and Military Intelligence officers doing the best they can, which means tracking via Excel-type spreadsheets. There is still no group doing ten prints in the combat theater except for the FBI.

\* This is a critical situation. Databases in theater are stove piped to the point that the MPs and MI officers in the camp can't tell you why detainees are being held. They can't tell you where they were picked up, or how long they have been in custody. The detainees by now, many having been in custody for as long as a year, know this and it is reflected in interviews, where they claim they were just walking on the street and American soldiers arrested them. As an interrogator, you have no records - arrest, interview, etc - that you can consult to refute these claims. It is quite frustrating, and I think it is an issue that FBI command staff should be continually broaching with the military. It is my opinion, as an FBI agent, that were this prison on U.S. soil, a judge would release almost every detainee for lack of evidence. The reasons for arrest and detention simply have not been tracked, and neither have the detainees, none of whom were ten-printed prior to the arrival of the FBI team. Eighty percent came to this camp after being arrested / captured outside of Baghdad, and so are unlikely to have been processed at some earlier time by an FBI team.

\* The military has been extremely accommodating in our mission. We have full access throughout the camp, including laundry, mail, PX, chow halls, weight room, and the plywood basketball court. We have three MPs assigned to us each day, who do the hot, sweaty work of moving the detainees and guarding them while we process. We also have three translators per day, as few in this population speak English. (We are totally dependent on the military for translators.) We attend the camp All Hands meetings, command staff meetings and threat level meetings. We are arranging a convoy to the British detainee facility to determine its population. We have extremely long days - 7 am to whenever, with an evening full of paperwork. We are drinking lots and lots of water. Dehydration has sent one soldier to the infirmary each day we have been here. (Imagine the large plastic coke bottles that you buy for outdoor picnics. Typically, minimum intake is eight of those full of water every day.) We also have begun to get bug bites, despite anti-malarial drugs and slatherings of DEET. We are told that the record for flies killed in an hour in a guard tower - the MPs in the towers are issued a fly swatter along with rifle ammunition - is 300. That is controversial, as some claim the tower was "baited" with a spilled coke. The record holder claims they were clean kills.

Regards,



b6 -1


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DETAINEES-3547

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
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DETAINEES-3548

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


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DETAINEES-3549

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DETAINEES-3550

**ABU GHURAYB PRISON - IRAQ  
FBI PERSONNEL INTERVIEWS**

FBI Personnel - Name of Individual Interviewed at AGP (# of times by that FBI SA/LS)	Office of Assignment/POC	Current Location/ Status	INSD Personnel Assigned to Conduct Interview	INSD TL/AI Advised
SA [redacted] -At prison almost every day	CJIS SC [redacted]	TDY to IRAQ Telephone: [redacted]	TL [redacted]	Yes b2 -1 b6 -1 b7C -1
SA [redacted] (1) [redacted] (1)	Little Rock A/SAC Mike Folmar [redacted] A/ASAC Barb Walls Cell [redacted]	Little Rock - Confirmed Assigned to El Dorado RA - Will need advance notice, have requested he drive into HQ City for interview	TL [redacted]	Yes b2 -1 b6 -1,3,4 b7C -1,3,4 b7D -1 b7F -1
SA [redacted] [redacted] (ph), aka [redacted] (4)	Houston A/ASAC Russ Robinson [redacted]	Houston - Confirmed	TL [redacted] b2 -1 b6 -1,3,4 b7C -1,3,4 b7D -1 b7F -1	Yes
LS [redacted] [redacted] (ph), aka [redacted] (2) [redacted] (1)	Houston A/ASAC Robinson [redacted]	At FBIHQ for LS Orientation POC [redacted] [redacted]	TL [redacted] b2 -1 b6 -1,3,4 b7C -1,3,4 b7D -1 b7F -1	Yes
LS [redacted] [redacted] ph), aka [redacted] (2) [redacted] [redacted] (1)	San Francisco ASAC Paula Wendell [redacted]	San Francisco - Confirmed Available Monday	TL [redacted]	Yes b2 -1 b6 -1,3,4 b7C -1,3,4 b7D -1 b7F -1

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HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 10-07-2009 BY 61579RHH/ECS/gjd/4-cv-4151

DETAINEES-3553

FBI Personnel - Name of Individual Interviewed at AGP (# of times by that FBI SA/LS)	Office of Assignment/POC	Current Location/ Status	INSD Personnel Assigned to Conduct Interview	INSD TL/AI Advised
SA [redacted] Work [redacted] [redacted] aka [redacted] (9) [redacted] (2) [redacted] (1)	Los Angeles SAC Randy Parsons Cell [redacted]	Confirmed Available Monday Work [redacted]	TL [redacted]  b2 -1 b6 -1,3,4 b7C -1,3,4 b7D -1 b7E -1	Yes
SA [redacted] [redacted] (2) [redacted] [redacted] 2) [redacted] (1)	New York A/SAC Amy Lyons [redacted]	Confirmed New York, Squad CD-4 Work [redacted]	TL [redacted]  b2 -1 b6 -1,3,4 b7C -1,3,4 b7D -1 b7E -1	Yes
SA [redacted] [redacted] (1)	New York A/SAC Lyons [redacted]	Confirmed New York, Squad CD-22 Work [redacted]	TL [redacted] b2 -1 b6 -1,3,4 b7C -1,3,4 b7D -1 b7E -1	Yes
LS [redacted] [redacted] (3) [redacted] (1)	TDY Iraq SC Frank Battle, CTD [redacted] [redacted]	Confirmed Interview Set For Monday, 05/17/2004 at 10:00 a.m (EST) Telephone: [redacted]  TDY to Iraq Alt [redacted]	TL [redacted]  b2 -1 b6 -1,3,4 b7C -1,3,4 b7D -1 b7E -1	Yes
SA [redacted] [redacted] (ph), aka [redacted] (x)	Fly Away SC Frank Battle, CTD	Confirmed Monday, 05/17/03 9:30 - 10:00 AM (EST)  Legat Madrid (5/7 - 7/7/04)  Legat [redacted] Tel [redacted]  Pager [redacted] Cell [redacted]	TL [redacted]  b2 -1 b6 -1,3,4 b7C -1,3,4 b7D -1 b7E -1	Yes

(2)

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FBI Personnel - Name of Individual Interviewed at AGP (# of times by that FBI SA/LS)	Office of Assignment/POC	Current Location/ Status	INSD Personnel Assigned to Conduct Interview	INSD TL/AI Advised
SA [redacted] [redacted] (1)	Fly Away SC Frank Battle, CTD	E-mail Sent Confirmed - Monday AM  Afghanistan (5/10 - 8/31/04)  Ph [redacted] Iridium Phones [redacted]  Pager Cell [redacted]	TL [redacted]  b2 -1 b6 -1,3,4 b7C -1,3,4 b7D -1 b7F -1	Yes
SA [redacted] [redacted] (1)	Fly Away SC Frank Battle, CTD	E-mail Sent Confirmed - Monday AM  Afghanistan (5/10 - 8/31/04)  Ph [redacted] Iridium Phones [redacted]  Pager Cell [redacted]	TL [redacted]  b2 -1 b6 -1,3,4 b7C -1,3,4 b7D -1 b7F -1	Yes
SA [redacted] [redacted] (12) [redacted] (1)	Fly Away SC Frank Battle, CTD	Confirmed Tuesday, 5/18 (Early A.M.)  Portland (5/12-5/26/2004)  Pager Cell [redacted]	TL [redacted] b2 -1 b6 -1,3,4 b7C -1,3,4 b7D -1 b7F -1	Yes
UC [redacted] [redacted] (1)	CIRG ASAC Jan Fedarecyk	CIRG Available Monday Anytime  Work Pager [redacted]	TL [redacted] b2 -1 b6 -1,3,4 b7C -1,3,4 b7D -1 b7F -1	Yes

(3)

DETAINEES-3555