DRONES / CENTCOM / 2163 DIF
AGENDA

- Why is this important?
- Defining the terms
- Lead Up
- Shift Change
- The Call
- BDA
- Reporting
- Improvements
Why Is This Important?

- SOTF-SOUTH was responsible for a significant CIVCAS incident
- We need to learn from this mistake and ensure it does not happen again
- We must protect the population
- We can help the GFC make sound decisions by asking the right questions and utilizing our procedures to prevent future CIVCAS
DEFINITIONS

TIC - AN ENGAGEMENT OCCURRING WHEN FRIENDLY FORCES RECEIVE DIRECT OR INDIRECT FIRES (NOT A LEGAL OR DOCTRINAL TERM) WE ARE ALSO STATING THAT THERE IS NO DIFFERENCE BETWEEN A TIC AND AN AIR TIC, ONLY THE ASSETS THAT ARE PUSHED.

PID- A REASONABLE CERTAINTY THAT THE OBJECT OF THE ATTACK IS A LEGITIMATE MILITARY TARGET* IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE ROE. (CENTCOM ROE, 15 DEC 06)

* HOSTILE INTENT OR COMMITTING HOSTILE ACT


IMMINENT USE OF FORCE- THE DETERMINATION OF WHETHER THE USE OF FORCE AGAINST US FORCES IS IMMINENT* WILL BE BASED ON AN ASSESSMENT OF ALL FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES KNOWN TO US FORCES AT THE TIME AND MAY BE MADE AT ANY LEVEL. IMMINENT DOES NOT NECESSARILY MEAN IMMEDIATE OR INSTANTANEOUS. (SROE, 13 JUNE 2005)

* IMMINENT MEANS ABOUT TO HAPPEN OR OCCUR; SOMETHING THAT WILL TAKE PLACE VERY SOON

HOSTILE ACT- AN ATTACK OR OTHER USE OF FORCE AGAINST THE UNITED STATES, US FORCES OR OTHER DESIGNATED PERSONS OR PROPERTY. IT ALSO INCLUDES FORCES USED DIRECTLY TO PRECLUDE OR IMPEDE THE MISSION AND/OR DUTIES OF US FORCES, INCLUDING THE RECOVERY OF US PERSONNEL OR VITAL USG PROPERTY. (SROE, 13 JUNE 2005)
LEAD UP (cont.)

• WHAT SHOULD HAVE HAPPENED THAT DIDN’T

• NBC SHOULD HAVE RECONFIRMED WITH THE GFC THAT HIS DECISION TO KEEP CCA/CAS OFF THE OBJ AND TO LET THE SITUATION DEVELOP HAD NOT CHANGED. NBC DID NOT VERIFY ANY CHANGES IN THE GFC’S PREVIOUS DECISION BASED ON HIS ASSUMPTION THAT AS THE VEHICLES WERE MOVING AWAY FROM THE OBJECTIVE, RATHER THAN TOWARDS, THE GFC WOULD NOT CHANGE HIS PLAN AND WOULD CONTINUE TO LET THE SITUATION DEVELOP.

SHIFT CHANGE


- NBC DID NOT INFORM DBC OF THE GFC’S CURRENT INTENT FOR CCA / CAS

- WHAT WAS THE PICTURE PAINTED FOR THE DAY SHIFT
  - VEHICLES WERE POTENTIALLY RESPONDING TO ENEMY CDR’S CALL TO MUSTER FORCES AND MANEUVERING TO ATTACK FROM THE SOUTH

- WHAT WERE DAY SHIFT’S ACTIONS
  - INFORMED THE OF THE CURRENT SITUATION

- WHAT SHOULD HAVE BEEN DONE DIFFERENTLY
  - ALERTED THE OPCEN DIRECTOR / SGM UPON LEARNING OF SITUATION

- WHY WASN’T THIS DONE
  - DBC WAS STILL ALLOWING THE SITUATION TO DEVELOP
THE CALL

• APPROXIMATELY 0345Z, CJSOTF-A CDR CALLED, LOOKING TO SPEAK WITH THE SOTF CDR

• DBC AWOKE THE CDR AND EXPLAINED THE CURRENT SITUATION

• WHAT WAS THE PICTURE THAT WAS PAINTED FOR THE SOTF CDR
  • THE SUMMARY OF WHAT THE LAST 4 HOURS OF ISR HAD OBSERVED AND A SUMMARY OF THE SALT-A REPORTS FROM THE ODA. ENEMY FORCES WERE POTENTIALLY MANEUVERING TO THE SOUTHWEST AND POSSIBLY POSITIONING TO ATTACK THE GAF.

• WHAT COA WAS DECIDED UPON
  • 0350Z-0415Z, FSO, DBC, AND SOTF CDR DISCUSS THE POSSIBILITY OF CONDUCTING AVI OF VEHICLES TO DETERMINE THEIR INTENTIONS. CDR DECIDES UPON THIS COA AND OPCEN BEGINS COORDINATIONS.

• WAS THIS RELAYED TO THE TEAM
  • NO – THERE WAS VIRTUALLY SECONDS AFTER THIS COA WAS ANNOUNCED BY THE CDR AND THE 1ST VEHICLE WAS ENGAGED

• WHAT EVENTS LED UP TO THE STRIKE
  • 0350Z, TF REPORTS OH-58’S BINGO AND RTB TO TK FOR REFUEL.
  • 0407Z, PREDATOR REPORTS THAT THE TWO CHILDREN PREVIOUSLY SEEN WERE ASSESSED AS ADOLESCENTS.
  • 0415Z, PREDATOR REPORTS THAT OH-58S WERE CLEARED TO ENGAGE THE VEHICLES. ONE MINUTE LATER, SPLASH WAS REPORTED.

• WHAT ACTIONS COULD HAVE BEEN TAKEN JUST PRIOR TO THE STRIKE
  • COULD HAVE VERIFIED THE GFC’S INTENT WITH THE AIR ASSETS
BDA

• HOW LONG AFTER THE STRIKE WAS BDA
  • OVER 3 HOURS, ADDITIONALLY, ISR HAD TO BE PULLED OFF THE SITE DUE TO THE WEATHER

• WAS CIVCAS CONFIRMED DURING BDA
  • WHAT WAS REPORTED WAS 15X EKIA, WITH 3X WOMAN AND 3X CHILDREN UNINJURED

• WERE REPORTS AT THAT TIME ACCURATE AND TIMELY
  • GFC REPORTED 15XKIA AND 7X WIA, BTL CPT SUBMITTED THIS TO CJSOTFA

• WHAT COULD HAVE BEEN DONE TO ENSURE A BETTER BDA WAS CONDUCTED
  • BETTER CONNECTION WITH THE GFC VIA SAT-V, FOLLOWED BY AN IRIIDIUM CALL EVERY 10 MINUTES.
REPORTING

• HOW LONG AFTER CIVCAS WAS CONFIRMED WAS 1IR AND 2IR SENT UP
  • 1IR WAS SUBMITTED AFTER CJSOTF REQUESTED IT

• DID THIS MEET THE TIME STANDARD FOR REPORTING
  • IT DID NOT FOLLOW THE ISAF REPORTING CRITERIA FOR CIVCAS

• WHAT STEPS DID THE OPCEN TAKE TO ENSURE REPORTS WERE TIMELY AND ACCURATE
  • BTL CPT REPORTED THE INFORMATION THAT WAS PASSED FROM THE GFC

• WHAT SHOULD HAVE BEEN DONE THAT WASN’T AFTER THE STRIKE
  • BOG BDA CONDUCTED WITHIN 2 HOURS
  • CONFIRMATION WITH GFC OF WHAT WAS AT THE SITE
  • REPORTS SHOULD HAVE BEEN SENT UP REGARDLESS OF WHAT CJSOTF WANTED AT THAT
IMPROVEMENTS

• WE MUST ENSURE WE KNOW GFC’S INTENT AND UNDERSTAND HIS PERCEPTION OF THE SITUATION BY ASKING A SERIES OF STANDARD QUESTIONS

• WAKE UP CRITERIA MUST BE ADHERED TO WITHOUT EXCEPTIONS

• ENSURE TEAMS KNOW CDR’S GUIDANCE CONCERNING FIRES WITH POTENTIAL FOR CIVCAS
QUESTIONS?
DRONES / CENTCOM / 2175-2186
DIF