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DECLASSIFIED BY 65179/DMH/BAW/STP/bls  
ON 02-10-2011

**FBI Atlanta**  
**Intelligence Note from Domain Management**  
**Intelligence Related to the Black Separatist Threat**  
**October 07, 2009**

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**Approval:** SIA [redacted]  
Derived from: FBI NSIS XX 20080301  
Declassify on: 20340929

**Subject:** (U//FOUO) Black Separatist Threat within the Atlanta Division Area of Responsibility

**Summary:**

(U//FOUO) The Atlanta Domain Team assesses with moderate confidence the [redacted]

[redacted]

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**Scope:**

(U//FOUO) This domain intelligence note identifies and assesses the black separatist presence and threat to the Atlanta Division's area of responsibility (AOR). Information is current as of 25 September 2009.

(U) The following information was utilized for this domain note: FBI Atlanta information on black separatists, to include source reporting, assessments, and case files; interviews of FBI Atlanta agents and analysts; FBI reporting on black separatists; and open source data to include US Census Data, Southern Poverty Law Center information, and additional Internet searches.

(U//FOUO) This information addresses requirements contained in [redacted]. The Atlanta Domain Team submitted Intelligence Information Needs (IINs) identified in this domain note to the Collection Management Team for further review.

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801H-AT-C104290 Serial 13

**Key Judgments<sup>1</sup>**

- (U//FOUO) The Atlanta Domain Team assesses with moderate confidence the

[Redacted]

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- (U//FOUO) The Atlanta Domain Team assesses with moderate confidence the

[Redacted]

**Background:**

(U//FOUO) The Atlanta Division encompasses the State of Georgia and is home to over nine million diverse residents. The chart below depicts the population increases among the white and black/African American populations in Georgia from 2000 to 2005-2007, according to US Census data; it also includes estimated population percentages for 2015.<sup>1</sup> Historically, black separatist groups have maintained a presence within Atlanta's area of responsibility (AOR). From 1998 to 2001, Khalid Abdul Muhammad, a former leader within Nation of Islam, operated in Atlanta and was the national leader of the New Black Panther Party (NBPP), leading it in a more radical and potentially more violent direction.

[Redacted] Georgia NBPP members have been and continue to be active in the NBPP organization.<sup>2</sup>

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|          | 2000 census data | % of total GA pop (2000 data) | 2007 census data | % of total GA pop (2007 data) | 2015 Estimate % of total pop |
|----------|------------------|-------------------------------|------------------|-------------------------------|------------------------------|
| White    | 5,327,281        | 65.1                          | 5,918,880        | 62.0                          | 59                           |
| Black    | 2,349,542        | 28.7                          | 2,855,189        | 29.9                          | 28                           |
| Other    | 509,630          | 6.2                           | 770,681          | 8.1                           | 13                           |
| Total GA | 8,186,453        | 100%                          | 9,544,750        | 100%                          | 100%                         |

**Details:**

(U) The known black separatist extremist groups operating within Atlanta's AOR are the New Black Panther Party (NBPP) and the Nation of Islam (NoI). In addition to these

<sup>1</sup> (U) **High Confidence** generally indicates that judgments are based on high-quality information from multiple sources or from a single highly reliable source, and/or that the nature of the issue makes it possible to render a solid judgment.

(U) **Medium Confidence** generally means that the information is credibly sourced and plausible, but can be interpreted in various ways, or is not of sufficient quality or corroborated sufficiently to warrant a higher level of confidence.

(U) **Low Confidence** generally means that the information's credibility and/or plausibility is questionable, the information is too fragmented or poorly corroborated to make solid analytic inferences, or that the FBI has significant concerns or problems with the sources.

\* This statement can be in a text box or in a footnote.

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groups, there is also the potential for an individual with similar ideology to conduct extremist activity within Atlanta's AOR.

(U) *New Black Panther Party (NBPP)*

(U) The Atlanta Domain Team assesses with moderate confidence the [redacted]

[redacted]

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(U) Augusta: Although past reporting [redacted]

[redacted] According to Augusta RA reporting, [redacted]  
[redacted]  
[redacted]. Most recently in December 2008, NBPP members conducted a protest against the police officers' killing of a black individual in the Cherry Tree housing projects area of Augusta. During the media reporting on this incident, [redacted]  
[redacted]<sup>3</sup>

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(U) Savannah: Past reporting identified [redacted]

[redacted]<sup>4</sup> [redacted]  
[redacted]  
[redacted] While past reporting indicates that [redacted]  
[redacted]

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(U) Atlanta: Within the Atlanta metropolitan area, the Atlanta Division has identified

[redacted]

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- (U) In [redacted] was involved in the [redacted] and in [redacted] legally purchased [redacted]  
[redacted]<sup>7</sup>

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- (U) In July 2006, NBPP members were noted at former Congresswoman Cynthia McKinney's side during the elections. There were also reports from the news

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media that individuals dressed in NBPP uniforms assaulted reporters when they approached McKinney for comments.<sup>8</sup> In addition, in November 2006, NBPP initiated a protest and rally following the shooting death by Atlanta police officers of an elderly African American woman, which was covered by the media.<sup>9</sup>

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- [redacted] has attempted to [redacted] a [redacted] [redacted] in support of his work for the NBPP.<sup>10</sup>

- [redacted]

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(U) [redacted]

(U) *Recruitment*: Between 2005 – 2007, reporting from multiple offices indicated that

[redacted]

<sup>15</sup> Within Atlanta's AOR, [redacted]

[redacted]

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[redacted] Based on the above information, there are indicators that [redacted]

*Nation of Islam (NoI)/Fruit of Islam (FoI)*

(U) The Atlanta Domain Team assesses with low confidence the [redacted]

[redacted]

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• [Redacted]

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• (U) [Redacted] According to the Southern Poverty Law Center, the NOI does have a presence in Macon, GA.

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• [Redacted]

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• [Redacted]

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*Cross-Program*

[Redacted]

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[Redacted] <sup>iii 26</sup> Within Atlanta's AOR, there are indications that black separatist extremist group members are [Redacted]

• (U) In December 2001, [Redacted] indicated there is a strong alliance between the Crips and NBPP in Atlanta.<sup>27</sup>

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• [Redacted]  
[Redacted]  
[Redacted]<sup>28</sup>

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<sup>ii</sup> NOI's website is [www.noj.org](http://www.noj.org)

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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**Outlook:**

(U)

[Redacted]

Despite this, the Atlanta Domain Team assesses with moderate confidence that the known black separatist groups operating within Atlanta's AOR, NBPP and NoI/FoI, [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

The Atlanta Domain team assesses with high confidence that [Redacted]

[Redacted]

**Source Coverage:**

(U) The Atlanta Division has identified [Redacted]

[Redacted]

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**Intelligence Gaps:**

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**Recommendations:**

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**Appendix A: Threat Justification Matrix**

**(U) Black Separatist Threat Assessment Table**

|                              |                      | Threat Level | Confidence Level | Description |
|------------------------------|----------------------|--------------|------------------|-------------|
| Capability                   | Physical Means/Tools |              |                  |             |
|                              | Knowledge            |              |                  |             |
|                              | Sophistication       |              |                  |             |
|                              | Association          |              |                  |             |
| Intent                       | Activity             |              |                  |             |
|                              | Risk                 |              |                  |             |
| Criticality *potential for * | Violence             |              |                  |             |
|                              | Economic Impact      |              |                  |             |
|                              | National Security    |              |                  |             |
|                              | Public Trust         |              |                  |             |
| Vulnerability                | Target Richness      |              |                  |             |
|                              | Defense              |              |                  |             |
|                              | Access               |              |                  |             |

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(U) Domain Management Threat Assessment Methodology

| Capability           | Low  | Medium  | High   |
|----------------------|--|---|--|
| Physical Means/Tools | Has identified tools and/or needs  | Has the ability to readily obtain materials or already has some materials   | Possesses requisite materials and tools  |
| Knowledge            | Actors rarely exhibit a specialized skill set and do not seek training   | Actors occasionally exhibit a specialized skill set but are actively seeking training related to that skill set                                 | Actors routinely exhibit a specialized skill set and actively seek training related to skill set   |
| Sophistication       | Actors have little or no organizational structure, exhibit a limited if not absent ability to adapt and/or modify their techniques | Actors occasionally employ highly structured, long term plans, rarely exhibit an ability to adapt and/or modify their techniques as appropriate | Actors routinely employ highly structured, long-term plans, regularly exhibiting an ability to adapt, modify their techniques as appropriate and avoid detection |
| Associations         | Actors have no connections to persons of concern to the FBI or Intelligence Community  | Actors have connections to persons of concern to the FBI or Intelligence Community within Domain  | Actors have multiple connections to persons of concern to the FBI or Intelligence Community within and outside domain  |

| Intent             | Low   | Medium   | High  |
|--------------------|---|--|---|
| Activity           | Actors have vocalized desires but has taken little or no action to achieve goal | Actors have occasionally taken some action to achieve goal | Actors have made continuous and dedicated actions to achieve goal |
| Acceptance of Risk | Avoids Risk   | Willingness to accept minimal risk                         | Willing to accept substantial risk                                |

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| Criticality       | Low   | Medium   | High   |
|-------------------|---|--|--|
| Violence          | Aggression and violent actions rarely result in death or psychological trauma   | Aggression and violent actions typically result in moderate loss of life or bodily harm or is expected to result in severe psychological trauma    | Aggression and violent actions typically result in substantial loss of life or severe bodily harm and often include collateral damage            |
| Economic Impact   | Actor(s) poses to exact thousands of dollars in losses to US entities   | Actor(s) poses to exact millions to tens of millions of dollars in losses to US entities   | Actor(s) poses to exact hundreds of millions to billions of dollars in losses to US entities   |
| National Security | Actor(s) specifically targets US entities, potentially resulting in damage to US national security, regional infrastructure or the nation's critical infrastructure | Actor(s) specifically targets US entities, potentially resulting in serious damage to US national security or the nation's critical infrastructure | Actor(s) specifically targets US entities, potentially resulting in grave damage to US national security or the nation's critical infrastructure |
| Public Trust      | Actions affect local levels of public trust only  | Actions affect regional levels of public trust only  | Actions affect national levels of public trust   |

| Vulnerability   | Low                                     | Medium   | High  |
|-----------------|---|--|---|
| Target Richness | Traditional singular targets            | Traditional type pf target but many them in domain                                       | Non-traditional targets, many potential targets in domain |
| Defenses        | Well-protected and difficult to exploit | Simple security that requires threat to have a plan and basic level of skill to overcome | No defenses, target easily attacked or compromised        |
| Access          | Actor(s) do not have access to target   | Actor(s) have indirect access or the potential to obtain direct access to target         | Actor(s) have direct access to target                     |

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**Appendix B: Common Operational Pictures (COPs)**

(U/FOUO) The Atlanta Domain Team produced a COP comparing the [redacted]  
 [redacted]  
 [redacted] As demonstrated by the COP, [redacted]  
 [redacted]

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**End Notes:**

<sup>1</sup> Office of Planning and Budget: Policy, Planning, and Technical Support, "Georgia 2015 Population Projections," dated 2005

<sup>2</sup> FBI documents, 100A-WF-232405, serial 215, dated 04 January 2006, and 100A-AT-94658, serial 269, dated 23 November 2004.

<sup>3</sup> FBI Augusta RA reporting and The Augusta Chronicle, "200 March After Elmore's Funeral," by Johnny Edwards, December 23, 2008 ([http://chronicle.augusta.com/stories/2008/12/23/met\\_505057.shtml](http://chronicle.augusta.com/stories/2008/12/23/met_505057.shtml)).

<sup>4</sup> Refer to 266A-AT-96326 for additional information, closed November 2004.

<sup>5</sup> FBI EC, 100A-AT-94658, serial 229, dated 31 March 2004.

<sup>6</sup> FBI documents, [redacted] multiple serials.

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<sup>7</sup> FBI Letterhead Memorandum (LHM), 100A-WF-232405, serial 215, dated 04 January 2006.

<sup>8</sup> FBI EC, 801F-AT-101762, serial 75, dated 26 March 2007.

<sup>9</sup> FBI EC, 100A-WF-232405, serial 202, dated 13 December 2006.

<sup>10</sup> FBI LHM, 100A-WF-232405, serial 215, dated 04 January 2006.

<sup>11</sup> FBI EC, [redacted] dated 02 August 2007.

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<sup>12</sup> FBI 302, [redacted] dated 09 May 2007.

<sup>13</sup> FBI Situational Intelligence Report, "(U//LES)" [redacted] dated 19 March 2009.

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<sup>14</sup> FBI source reporting from a collaborative source with good access, [redacted] dated 14 May 2009.

<sup>15</sup> FBI documents, 100A-AT-232405, multiple serials, dated 2005 - 2007.

<sup>16</sup> FBI LHM, 100A-AT-94658, serial 1, dated 27 September 2002.

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<sup>17</sup> FBI Situational Intelligence Report "(U//FOUO)" [redacted]

[redacted] dated 19 February 2009.

<sup>18</sup> FBI documents, [redacted] 11/2006, [redacted]

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<sup>19</sup> FBI source reporting from a collaborative source with good access, [redacted] dated 14 May 2009.

<sup>20</sup> FBI source reporting from a collaborative source with good access, [redacted] dated 06 May 2009.

<sup>21</sup> FBI source reporting from a collaborative source with good access, [redacted] dated 18 May 2009.

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<sup>22</sup> [redacted]

<sup>23</sup> FBI source reporting from a collaborative source with good access, [redacted] dated 06 May 2009.

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<sup>24</sup> FBI documents, 801F-AT-101762, serial 75, dated 26 March 2007, and 801E-AT-101760, serial 89, dated 14 May 2009.

<sup>25</sup> FBI EC, [redacted] dated 26 January 2007.

<sup>26</sup> FBI LHM, 100A-WF-232405, serial 215, dated 04 January 2006.

<sup>27</sup> FBI LHM, 100A-AT-94658, serial 1, dated 27 September 2002.

<sup>28</sup> FBI EC [redacted] dated 05 June 2009.

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<sup>29</sup> FBI 302, 266A-AT-96326, serial 45, dated 01 October 2004.

<sup>30</sup> FBI LHM, 100K-DE-103300, serial 3, dated 08 October 2008.

<sup>31</sup> FBI source reporting from a collaborative source with good access, [redacted] dated 09 February 2009.

<sup>32</sup> FBI LHM, 100K-DE-103300, serial 3, dated 08 October 2008.

<sup>33</sup> FBI EC [redacted] dated 18 June 2009.