FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

To: Director's Office
   Counterterrorism

   National Security

   CIRG

   Miami

   Training

From: Counterterrorism
   RFU/UBLU
   Contact:

Approved By: D'Amuro Pasquale J
   Arena Andrew G

Drafted By: jsc

Case ID #: 265A-MM-C99102

Title: GTMO-INTEL;
   GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA
   O:
   M:
   MAJOR CASE 188

Synopsis: To request that the Behavior Analysis Unit (BAU), Critical Incident Response Group (CIRG), be designated the coordinating unit for all behavioral related support to GTMO.
Details: In support of the PENTBOMB investigation, the captioned matter was initiated when U.S. military forces, participating in Operation Enduring Freedom, captured armed Taliban and Al-Qa'ida fighters involved in hostile actions in Afghanistan. Under executive authority, these individuals were captured, disarmed and rendered back to United States Naval Base, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba (GTMO). There are currently 384 detainees located at GTMO, with additional detainees expected to arrive in the near future.

The U.S. military is operating a Joint Intelligence Interrogation Facility (JIIF) at GTMO. Within the JIIF is the Criminal Investigative Task Force (CITF), which is tasked with conducting interviews of detainees. The CITF is made up of representatives from the Army Criminal Investigation Department, the Naval Criminal Investigative Service, and the Air Force Office of Special Investigations. Federal Bureau of Investigation Special Agents, along with members of the CITF and OGAs, are tasked with conducting interviews of the detainees, gathering intelligence, preparing cases for presentation to the developing Military Commission, performing analytical functions, liaising with foreign police and intelligence services, and sending out leads. Supervisory Special Agents, Special Agents, Intelligence Research Specialists, Investigative Analysts, Electronic Technicians, Technically Trained Agents, Language Specialists, Contract Linguists and other support personnel have been detailed to GTMO since January, 2002 in support of this effort. FBI staffing for this commitment has consisted of designated Miami personnel, and experienced TDY personnel at FBIHQ and from various Divisions. This operation is expected to continue for the foreseeable future.

FBI personnel currently engaged in supporting GTMO recognize that a behavioral approach to detainee interrogations, assessments and interaction is an essential component of fully exploiting this operation. A number of FBI entities have an ability to contribute to this objective, which include the Security Division Polygraph Unit, the CIRG Behavioral Analysis Unit (BAU), the Training Division Behavioral Science Unit (BSU), the NSD Programs Operational Training Unit (OTU) and others as necessitated by circumstance. Due to its extensive resources and experience in dealing with major incidents, the BAU will be designated the lead FBI entity in coordinating all behavioral support for the GTMO operation, both at FBIHQ and on the ground at GTMO. BAU activities will also be coordinated through the GTMO Task Force located at FBIHQ.
LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1: (Adm)

DIRECTOR'S OFFICE
AT WASHINGTON, DC
For information.

Set Lead 2: (Adm)

NATIONAL SECURITY
AT WASHINGTON, DC
For information.

Set Lead 3: (Adm)

CIRG
AT WASHINGTON, DC
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Set Lead 4: (Adm)

MIAMI
AT MIAMI, FLORIDA
For information.

Set Lead 5: (Adm)

TRAINING
AT QUANTICO, VA
For information.
Proposed GTMO Training Package

I. Orientation to GTMO
   1. GTMO Mission
   2. Organization (description of different entities and their responsibilities, functions of the different locations, JIIF, CP, SCIF, etc., explanation of Tiger team concept)
   3. Current Procedures (explanation of FBI procedures, paper flows, interview protocol, etc.)
   4. Logistics (description of living quarters, transportation matters, health care issues, communications, meals, etc.)
   5. Attachments: Phone lists, command flow charts (who's who), maps

II. Background Information
   1. Introduction to Islam
   2. Middle Eastern History and cultural issues
   3. General info on Islamic terrorists (motivation, main issues, who of different groups)
   4. al Qaida and Bin Laden
   5. Attachments: Maps of region, al Qaida command chart, glossary of terms and persons

III. Interviewing/Interrogation (General)
   1. General interviewing concepts (rapport building, theme development, etc)
   2. Interview themes, contexts, and problems in dealing with middle eastern cultures and al Qaida members
   3. Successful interviews of terrorists and Qaida members

IV. Interviewing and Interrogation of detainees at GTMO
   1. Interview themes that have been successfully used at GTMO
   2. Specific techniques and suggestions of how to conduct successful interviews at GTMO

The primary purpose of this proposed training package is to prepare FBI agents, with varying degrees of experience and exposure to terrorism matters, to be in position to conduct successful interviews of detainees at GTMO. A secondary purpose would be for this package to be utilized as reference material, for consultation on maps, names, etc. It is proposed that this package be computer based, so that it would be accessible by agents at anytime, and would allow the inclusion of photographs, videos, Powerpoint presentations, documents, etc.
Proposed GTMO Training Package

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   1. GTMO Mission
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   1. Interview themes that have been successfully used at GTMO
   2. Specific ideas and suggestions of how to conduct successful interviews at GTMO

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GTMO Issues for SAC Wiley

* Lack of Overall CITF Focus

  Shotgun approach to Detainee interview process as opposed to better-planned, specifically-targeted interviews.

  Example: Investigation has determined that at least seven (7) current, known al-Quëda Detainees were 'arrested' at the same safe house in Faisalabad, Pakistan. There is/has been no effort to have the same interview team(s) talk to each of these individuals.

  No true analytical assistance for the CITF Interview Teams. Neither FBIHQ nor Ft. Belvoir personnel, provides specific information/questions before a scheduled interview of a Detainee to the CITF team.

* Department of Defense (DoD) Interrogation Tactics

  BAU personnel witnessed sleep deprivation, the use of duct tape on an individual's mouth, and utilization of loud music/bright lights/growling dogs in the Detainee interview process by DoD representatives. These tactics were brought to the attention of the appropriate DoD legal personnel who requested that BAU members write out "statements" concerning these matters.

* Problems with Information Flow

  There are at least four(4) different "case files" for each Detainee. The CITF, the CTC, the DHS, and Fort Belvoir all maintain information on each Detainee. There is no coordination between these groups to ensure that everyone has the appropriate intelligence on each Detainee prior to the interview process.
Behavioral Analysis Unit (BAU) 

Request Form

Date of Request: __________

Name: ___________________________  Team: ___________________________

Contact Number: __________

Detainee ISN #: __________  Date of interview: __________

Specific BAU Request:

____ Case File Review

____ Case Consultation

____ Interview Observation/Suggestions

____ Other - ________________________________

________________________________________

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________________________________________
Behavioral Analysis Unit (BAU)

Detainee Interview Feedback Form

*We are attempting to capture the institutional knowledge gained by interviewers in the box, during their time at GITMO. Please take a few minutes to fill out this form.

Dates of deployment: ____________________________

Name(s) of Interviewing Agent(s): ____________________________

Team Assignment: __________

Approximate Number of Interviews Conducted: __________

1. Give an example of the most “successful” interview you did. Please provide a brief summary of the interview, and include detainee ISN #, techniques that were used and any other pertinent data.

2. Describe other successful techniques you employed during interviews.
3. Describe unsuccessful techniques that were employed.

4. Any other comments?????
From:  
To:  
Date: Wed, Feb 19, 2003 7:21 PM  
Subject: Re: SSA's Addendum

Thanks for forwarding this to me. I have reviewed your paper about the role of the BAU at GTMO, and comments. I think it is important to take a comprehensive look at how the NCAVC can continue to positively impact the FBI's tasking at GTMO. I recognize that there are no easy answers to many of the challenges there and that your assignment is not an easy one. It's also important for each of us to keep in mind that this is new for the USG in total and not just the FBI.

I know each of you has a lot to offer and that combined with the other talent here we can maximize our capacity to meet this challenge. We will assess where we are and how best to use innovation, new initiatives, renewed cooperation and coordination with all FBI assets and other USG elements to advance the effort there.

Some of the continuity issues with the FBI presence that you raise should improve. As you know we met with the CTD ADIC about this issue. I expect there will be positive changes, although that will not occur overnight.

I told you that I would give you my impressions about the SAC's response to the GTMO briefing last week. It is clear to me that he has justifiably high expectations for each of us, as he does of everyone in CIRG. He is looking for us to be creative and provide proactive suggestions to advance the interview/interrogation process there. I look forward to discussing your GTMO experience with each of you in person prior to the visit and I will make there in March. I will be interested in all of your work there. I will need to get into some detail about your efforts to interact with other CITF elements, DOD, our SA's, the nature and extent of the special projects you worked on, some outcomes of strategies recommended, any specific training deficiencies of FBI personnel, cultural issues, language issues, opportunity for wider NCAVC involved telephone consultations, information sharing, etc.

I have a meeting out of the office tomorrow morning. I'll try to reach you by phone later in the day.

Take care,

>>> 02/19 3:08 PM >>>

Hello, I chose not to provide an addendum, however, he sent us an e-mail with his comments prior to leaving GTMO (see attached). I had suggested the idea of having a team of two BAU SSAs dedicated to the GTMO project, which was explained in further detail in our proposal. Re our presentation, he mentions in his e-mail that we were allowed more than 30 minutes. The fact is that he had created the schedule several days prior to the training which allowed us only 30 minutes. When we told him that we would like more time, he allowed us 40 minutes. The bottom line is that once the agents arrive at GTMO, little training time is devoted to behavioral issues.

As of the date of our proposal, we still have not received any requests for assistance. Again, we are trying to stay busy by politely requesting to monitor interviews. Thanks,
I hope this finds you both doing well.

You raise significant points in this e-mail that need to be addressed. If there are deficiencies in how we offer our services we must identify methods to improve the process. Unfortunately our travel there this week didn't work out because it would have provided us with some more detail about the specific issues.

There are questions I have, and I know the SAC will have about our operations, down there. For example:

1. How many requests are you receiving for interview assistance?
2. Are you at Delta daily and available there for consultation?
3. What is the current schedule of interviews that are being conducted?
4. Why aren't the behavioral request forms being used?
5. Is the ownership issue concerned about, just with us or all TDY'ers there? (you can assure him that we have ownership of the BAU effort there, and if it's broken we will fix it)
6. What is the status of the overall FBI effort to bring agents to Quantico or Ft. Belvoir for training before they travel to GTMO?

I won't go on with other questions. I think for tomorrow's meeting it is important to know that we are not in a position to diminish our presence there without a full presentation of problems, options and solutions to the SAC and possibly HQ. I'll try to call you tonight or tomorrow morning.

>>>02/10 9:59 AM>>>  
(SA) has asked and I to participate in a meeting with (CA) and himself on the possibility of modifying our role here and still continuing to serve the mission. I don't particularly know what their position is going to be, but they've obviously observed that, while we are very much present and available to offer our help, we are not fully occupied. We have worked on 2 special projects in the past 3 1/2 weeks and prepared formal reports documenting our opinions. The reports were well received. The Behavioral Request Forms created by CD and BM have not been utilized and my understanding is that this has been the case for the past 2 rotations. wants some recommendations so that the problem doesn't pass to the next SSA. leaves on Sunday (2/16), and in his assessment the inefficiencies that exist in the system overall are due to the lack of ownership that participants feel when they are here for only 45 days. He's big into ownership of the problem and resolution.

By the way, we've been given 30 minutes to provide behavioral training for the arriving crew tomorrow. had about 20 minutes for the talk he delivered the day I arrived with the incoming crowd.

One of the topics we'll discuss on Wednesday with will be providing more indepth training, possibly at Ft. Lauderdale where everyone gathers for an overnight stay before the flight to GTMO. They're all staying at one of two hotels which are right across the street from one another so it would be convenient and allow us a larger block of time to cover relevant issues. Once they get to GTMO, the orientation includes so much admin business that the behavioral lecture is not much of a priority. and I have discussed the possibility of having a liaison agent from BAU who would visit GTMO on a regular basis. This individual would offer continuity for the BAU as a point of contact on communications (email, etc.) as well as identify particular special projects that may benefit from BAU consultation either via an on-site visit or a conference call. Again, BAU needs to make sure the SCI F at Aquia is furnished with a STU phone that has conference capabilities, teleconference would be ideal. My understanding is that we have not made such provisions as yet. staff does most of its work by teleconference and
Since I've got nothing else to do, couple Friday night thoughts.

I've been trying to get a handle on Detainees of interest to the FBI. In looking at the many lists that have been prepared and the ongoing FBI Special Projects, I've come up with 33 ISNs. Here they are with * denoting TFOS interest, **FBIHQ lists, and other agency interest noted in parentheses:

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A couple observations: 1. There are about 18 ** but we are only working as FBISPs 760, 252/51/334, 569, 24, 261 (CITF/FBI), and 682. Some of these are not on the FBIHQ list. I suspect that some analysis has indicated that these should get the priority, but I'd like to make sure of that. If we've already gone through that process or if it's just too dynamic here then maybe we don't need to have a targeting review process.

2. Given the DHS/DIA "incursion" which I believe will develop steam, I strongly believe we have to come up with a strategy that will make sense to the CG and which does not sound like turf protection. From my perspective, there are several aspects of the strategy.

a. No real evidence that other techniques work (somebody has to do a real analysis of the 63 material and make that case but be careful. I've heard a lot of folks downplay purported DHS successes such as getting the detainee to salute but we also use very fuzzy behavioral standards such as he's talking to us/doesn't keep his head down etc.)
b. Sufficiently articulated real potential for a detainee to be a ART III Court witness where any technique used will be at issue. While clearly this will also be at issue in the Commission cases, there is no indication that the exclusionary provisions will be as strict. (DOJ's take on the proposed Int Interrogation procedures and this issue will be critical.)
c. No real exigencies which require extraordinary techniques.

I'm sure these are not new issues, but I would like to get folks take on this. I don't like to lose and I do not feel completely comfortable with the arguments I've heard, especially if the new procedures get the DOJ nod. I think our strategy/argument must be sharper, and should probably include some level of collaboration with DHS/DIA. Which raises additional issues. If the new procedures are approved, DOJ and FBI OGC must also opine re: an agent's connection to a process which includes such techniques even if approved. We can't put our agents anywhere close to a problem area EVEN if DOJ says DOD can employ. e.g. I can envision a collaborative process where Art III testimony may be relevant and where we develop a strategy where the FBI takes first crack for ____ weeks, DIA/DHS involved as analysts/monitors, Progress assessed as time goes on with DHS waiting in the wings for entry with their approved techniques if no FBI success. Does that still put FBI SAs at risk because they are knowingly part of a process which uses techniques not condoned in U.S. courts?

In any event, couple thoughts. Would appreciate yours.

CC:
On 14 December 2002, a document entitled Interrogation Tactics was provided by
LTC JTF, to SAC Tim James, CITF. This document describes in detail the
interrogation tactics authorized for use in detainee interrogation operations at JTF-
GTMO. These tactics are identical to those used in a military training school known as
SERE (Survival, Escape, Resistance and Evasion) which prepares soldiers and airmen on
methods to resist interrogation. Among the techniques approved for use are shoulder and
stomach slapping, stripping, hooding, manhandling and the use of stress positions. SAC
James was asked for his opinion regarding the use of these tactics. He subsequently
requested the assistance of the FBI's Behavioral Analysis Unit (BAU) in GTMO in
formulating a response.

Accordingly, the following observations and comments are offered:

Both the military and the law enforcement agencies (LEA) share the identical
mission of obtaining intelligence in order to prevent future attacks on Americans.
LEA have the additional responsibility of soliciting information from detainees to
be used in military tribunals.

Presently, there is a fundamental difference between the military and LEA
regarding which style of interrogation should be used. The overall LEA model
emphasizes a rapport-based approach without relying on the use of coercion. The
military model is based on SERE tactics which are taught in a two-week military
school. This school uses aggressive, coercive interrogation techniques as a way to
"break" soldiers who are being trained in methods to resist interrogation.

The SERE methods were designed for use in a battlefield environment as a means
of collecting tactical intelligence, i.e., to uncover enemy plans, determine enemy
strength, movement, weapon capabilities and logistical support, etc. However,
there is no evidence to support that captured combatant techniques work
effectively in the interrogation of detainees in a non-combat environment such as
GTMO. LEA believes that these techniques discourage, rather than encourage,
detainee cooperation.

LEA agents are responsible for investigating a wide variety of criminal and
counterintelligence matters around the world. Accordingly, they are highly
trained and experienced in eliciting information from reluctant subjects of diverse
cultural and socio-economic backgrounds. LEA agents only use rapport-based
methods that are in compliance with guidelines promulgated by federal and
military courts. LEA agents are neither trained nor authorized to use coercive
interrogation techniques under any circumstances.
Utilizing rapport-based methods, LEA have realized numerous successes during several major terrorism investigations including the bombings of embassies in East Africa, the bombing of the USS Cole and the 1993 World Trade Center bombing. Like most of the GTMO detainees, the perpetrators of these terrorist acts were motivated by a distorted religious doctrine and reinforced by a group/cultural dynamic.

LEA does not believe that coercive interrogation techniques are effective. However, on those rare occasions when these techniques have yielded results, the reliability of the information gathered has proven to be highly questionable. Detainees who are coerced into making admissions often develop strong feelings of anger and resentment toward their interrogators. Instead of creating an environment conducive to fostering continued cooperation, the interrogation process ends up fueling hostility and strengthening a detainee’s will to resist.

A recovered Al Qaeda training manual cautions its members to expect Americans to use coercive interrogation tactics, even torture, to elicit information. The manual draws attention to these techniques and characterizes them as further proof of the evil and unjust acts which Americans commit against Muslims. Thus, the use of coercive techniques only serves to reinforce these erroneous perceptions. In essence, we end up proving ourselves worthy of the detainees’ righteous resolve and inspiring continued resistance. By contrast, the use of a rapport-based approach represents the first step in disrupting a detainee’s belief system. The value of this tactic has long been recognized by intelligence officers, law enforcement personnel and diplomats.

An advantage of a rapport-based model is that it allows interrogators to capitalize on a collective knowledge acquired about the unique mindset of those drawn to radical fundamentalism. It allows interviewers the opportunity to tailor specific approaches based on a careful review of a detainee’s particular circumstances, rather than relying on haphazard, prescriptive approaches.

Rapport-based approaches work best after a detainee's motivations are understood and incorporated into a specific plan designed to exploit his psychological needs and vulnerabilities.

A rapport-based model avoids the potential for detainee abuse by practitioners. This point cannot be overstated. Both research and experience demonstrate that when coercive techniques are used in closed environments, there is a real potential for mistreatment to occur. This holds true even for highly trained and disciplined interrogators for whom the line between permissive behavior and abuse can easily become blurred. This phenomenon is often so subtle that it can escape the attention of interrogators as well as their leaders tasked with oversight responsibilities.
It should be noted that the above issues have been addressed previously in both private discussions and in written communications with command personnel on more than one occasion. The LEA headquarters elements have formally voiced their collective opinion that coercive SERE tactics are not only unsuitable in GTMO, but more importantly they are ineffective. Additionally, there are serious concerns about the legality of these techniques.

Despite the advice of LEA behavioral experts who have consistently advocated the use of a rapport-based approach, there appears to be a tendency to revert to a shortsighted, coercive model of interrogation. This is the inevitable result of frustration caused by intense pressure to elicit new information and exacerbated by an undue sense of urgency. As real as these pressures may seem, they should not distract us from employing sound methodological tools to accomplish our ultimate objective...preventing and disrupting future acts of terrorism.
immediately with the nearest appropriate representative of the State of which he is a national, or, if he is a stateless person, to the representative of the State where he usually resides.

4. When a State, pursuant to this article, has taken a person into custody, it shall immediately notify the States referred to in article 5, paragraph 1, of the fact that such person is in custody and of the circumstances which warrant his detention. The State which makes the preliminary inquiry contemplated in paragraph 2 of this article shall promptly report its findings to the said State and shall indicate whether it intends to exercise jurisdiction.

**Article 7**

1. The State Party in territory under whose jurisdiction a person alleged to have committed any offence referred to in article 4 is found, shall in the cases contemplated in article 5, if it does not extradite him, submit the case to its competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution.

2. These authorities shall take their decision in the same manner as in the case of any ordinary offence of a serious nature under the law of that State. In the cases referred to in article 5, paragraph 2, the standards of evidence required for prosecution and conviction shall in no way be less stringent than those which apply in the cases referred to in article 5, paragraph 1.

3. Any person regarding whom proceedings are brought in connection with any of the offences referred to in article 4 shall be guaranteed fair treatment at all stages of the proceedings.

**Article 8**

1. The offences referred to in article 4 shall be deemed to be included as extraditable offences in any extradition treaty existing between States Parties. States Parties undertake to include such offences as extraditable offences in every extradition treaty to be concluded between them.

2. If a State Party which makes extradition conditional on the existence of a treaty receives a request for extradition from another State Party with which it has no extradition treaty, it may consider this Convention as the legal basis for extradition in respect of such offenses. Extradition shall be subject to the other conditions provided by the law of the requested State.

3. States Parties which do not make extradition conditional on the existence of a treaty shall recognize such offences as extraditable offences between themselves subject to the conditions provided by the law of the requested state.

4. Such offences shall be treated, for the purpose of extradition between States Parties, as if they had been committed not only in the place in which they occurred but also in the territories of the States required to establish their jurisdiction in accordance with article 5, paragraph 1.

**Article 9**

1. States Parties shall afford one another the greatest measure of assistance in connection with civil proceedings brought in respect of any of the offences referred to in article 4, including the supply of all evidence at their disposal necessary for the proceedings.

2. States Parties shall carry out their obligations under paragraph 1 of this article in conformity with any treaties on mutual judicial assistance that may exist between them.

**Article 10**

1. Each State Party shall ensure that education and information regarding the prohibition against torture are fully included in the training of law enforcement personnel, civil or military, medical personnel, public officials and other persons who may be involved in the custody, interrogation or treatment of any individual subjected to any form of arrest, detention or imprisonment.
The FBI's mission has not been altered at GTMO. It is inclusive of JTF-170's force protection mission and will assist DoD in its prosecutive mission working closely with CITF.

The make-up of the teams will remain the same and additional teams are planned. In coordination with those teams, we can afford BAP opportunities to be a part of or conduct their own interrogations.

Prior to each interrogation, a complete pre-brief is conducted by the DoD analyst assigned to the TEAM. The entire TEAM is required to attend. Each detainee has a file containing background and investigative reports and those files are available for review.

Yes, we are making a concerted effort to have the same TEAMs and lead interrogators, who's selection is usually decided at the team level, to conduct interviews of those of specific nationalities, etc. We will coordinate having those interrogators available for comment with BAP.

Our "projected" goal of 30 per day was set by DoD. We have cautioned JTF-170 command here with relying strictly on numbers as the sole measure of results. JTF-170 has agreed with the FBI's position and has made 30 interrogations a day a plan instead of a requirement. This is a DoD show, but we're in a position to tweak the process.

There is no time limit set for interviews. I've seen them generally run from one hour and in other cases well over 4 hours. In one recent case, a six and one-half hour interview resulted in a break in the detainee's cover story and the beginning of different relationships between the interrogators and the detainee.

Please remember, we have in most, if not all, little or no intel [that we can disclose] or other information to confront or refute the detainees' accounts. So patience and continuity in our approach, i.e. use of the TIGER TEAMS, has been a major bump in our effectiveness.

Will get EC your way, any further questions, please let me know.

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05/13 1:30 PM ---

Thanks for the information on how the teams are comprised. The BAP team wants to provide assistance for this project, and we have a few questions—

For JTF 170, are the FBI's objectives limited to the same as DOD's in terms of strategic force protection, or do we have secondary purposes for our mission?

Will the makeup of the teams remain the same, or will the BAP have opportunities to conduct interviews/interrogations?

What data would we have in advance of the prescreening?

Does the interrogation area have the capability to monitor/record the interviews?

Given the number of ethnicities within the team responsibilities, would the same person be used to interview others from the same background, and could he/she share their experiences with the BAP?

Is your goal to interview 30 detainees per day?

How much time do you usually allocate to each interview?
We can brief the teams, tour the base and provide interview and cultural assistance to each team and directly assist beginning at the pre-screens. Please send an e-mail to us and to CTD requesting our help, and when you need us. National Security Programs Operational Training Unit, Counterintelligence Division

To assist you further, I have attached three docs which provide additional background re the TIGER TEAM concept employed at GTMO.

1) "ANALYSIS ORG 07050" breaks down the four (4) areas covered by sixteen (16) TIGER TEAMS. The areas of coverage are: North Africa/Europe (NA/E); Central Asia (CA); Saudi Arabia (SA); and Gulf States (GS). This doc identifies the specific countries assigned to each area.

2) "TIGER TEAM CONCEPT" is a Power Point presentation prepared by JTF-170 with input from all.

3) "TIGERTEAMS.xls" breaks down each TIGER TEAM identifying those assigned to each team.

Questions, please call E-MAIL, jd.

CC:
From:         
To:           
Date: Thu, May 9, 2002 9:52 PM       
Subject: Re: Need your advice... Roger that...

JD, Roger that... message received and understood. It may play better if your admin guy sent TD's AD an EC requesting the BSU-DODPI presentation with the CT AD on the approval line? What ever it takes, I'm standing-by to assist as necessary. Be careful out there!

>>> 05/09 4:53 PM >>>
Before you send, let me line it up with UBL/U and CT AD. Will advise. jd

>>> 05/09 4:32 PM >>>
Hi JD... one more 'obstacle' before we see you... need your advice as to how you'd like this handled or how you/your folks would like to handle it?: FYI, Assistant Director (AD) Cassandra Chandler, Training Division (TD) wants to have the AD of Counter-Terrorism Division (CTD),... or the logical AD of your choice, approve my/TD's involvement/travel. in support of your operations. I can craft an EC to that effect and send it to AD CTD immediately; however, before I do that, I thought I'd ask for your input: Await your response...

SSA

Behavioral Science Unit
FBI Academy. Training Division

Roger that, thanks...will coordinate. I have my ADMIN agent ordering score cards as we speak. Look forward to your travel. jd

>>> 05/09 11:43 AM >>>

JD, All logical FBI behavioral science components are lining up their resources to assist you. You probably need a score card figure out who's who... here goes:

BSU (Behavioral Science Unit, Training Division) is my unit... we offer our partnership with the Dept. of Defense Polygraph Institute (DODPI) to bring you the latest technology for effective interviewing; specifically, the use of eye movement and P300 brainwave... we will not be suggesting the use of the poly at this time unless you specifically request it.

BAU (Behavioral Analysis Unit, Critical Incident Response Group - CIRG) operation. They offer criminal investigative analysis (profiling); expert advice on interview strategies; threat assessments from an operation perspective.

BAP (NSD & CTD) is similar to BAU but from a CI and CT point of view... field agents assigned to this operation, like SA in Tampa have different areas of expertise, such as non-verbal indicators of deception; also has experts on middle east culture that may be able to assist with issues such as 'interior decoration and condo design'.

Your message was read and understood... 5/16 may be a little too early for & my travel... we may need a couple more days to put our (BSU-DODPI) presentation/proposal together... 5/16 may be ok for BAP & BAU; but, you will have to confirm that with those identified above; I have no admin authority over their operations. I will be in touch as soon as DODPI gives the green light and we're ready to travel. Be careful out there. Best regards...

SSA

FBI017686CBT
OVERVIEW

• This approach:
• Is applicable to personnel, security, and law enforcement situations
• Is completely non-coercive
• Lends itself to follow-up interviews
• Is readily accepted by the
• While easy to understand
Countermeasures:

Stage IV - Post Offense Behavior by Attacker's Handlers or Associates

Indicative Behaviors:

Countermeasures:
Abuse Allegations

Report all allegations of detainee mistreatment to AGC.

This includes 1st, 2nd, 3rd hand information as well as allegations contained in documents that you may be reviewing.

Notify the OSC immediately if you witness actions on the part of anyone that you believe is "mistreatment."

This notification should be facilitated by setting a face to face appointment with the OSC and AGC.
IRAQ PRE-DEPLOYMENT BRIEFING
Rotation #11
January 8-12, 2004
FBI Academy, Admin 2 Conference Room

Saturday, January 8
8:00 a.m. Medical training

Sunday, January 9
8:00 a.m. Medical training

Monday, January 10
8:00 a.m. Logistics
9:00 a.m. Overview
Iraq - FBI Mission
10:00 a.m. Iraqi Culture
10:30 a.m. Interviewing Techniques
Role of the Analyst
11:25 a.m. HRT Threat Brief
11:55 a.m. TFOS
12:30 p.m. Lunch
1:30 p.m. Deadly Force Policy
(HRT Class Room)
2:00 p.m. HRT Situational Training
5:00 p.m. CJIS

Tuesday, January 11

OIG REQ 2/18/05-PART 9
DOJOIG 007010
FBI0000343
Tuesday morning the class will be split and separate briefings will be conducted for the CTD deployment and the RCLO.

8:00 a.m.  ITOS II Briefings
Confirmed
Ansar Al-Islam
Counter-Insurgency
AMZ
Current Operations

8:00 a.m.  RCLO Briefings
SSA
Confirmed
Current Operations
Baghdad Cell
Doha Cell
Washington D.C. cell

11:30 a.m.  IED/TEDAC

12:00 p.m.  TRU

12:15 p.m.  Lunch

1:15 p.m.  Firearms

6:00 p.m.  Dinner

**Wednesday, January 12**

8:00 a.m.  CTD Operational Response

8:30 a.m.  EAP

9:00 a.m.  Final Equipment Prep

9:30 a.m.  Load Buses

10:15 a.m.  Depart Quantico for Dulles International Airport
No Duplication Fees are charged for Deleted Page Information Sheet(s).

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