DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY HEADQUARTERS 16th MILITARY POLICE BRIGADE (AIRBORNE) VICTORY BASE, IRAQ APO AE 09342 REPLY TO ATTENTION OF: 12 May 2004 MEMORA DUM FOR Commander, U.S. Army Human Resources Command, ATTN: AH C-ARE, 1 Reserve Way, St. Louis, Missouri 63132-5200 SUBJECT: Request for Certified Official Military Personnel File 1. Under t e provisions of AR 600-8-104, paragraph 2-5, request 2 (two) certified copies of the Perfor ance, Service and Restricted Fiche of the Official Military Personnel File (OMPF) of the folio ing soldiers: a. G HC, 16th MP BDE (ABN), Iraq b. S T HC, 16th MP BDE (ABN), Iraq c. S C I-I HC, 16th MP BDE (ABN), Iraq d. SPC HC, 16th MP BDE (ABN), Iraq e. SPC HC , 16th MP BDE (ABN), Iraq f. SPC HHC, 16th MP BDE (ABN), Iraq g. PFC1111,111111111111111111111111111111111HHC 16th MP BDE (ABN)(REAR), FB 2. These s DIdiers are pending trial by icourt-martial; and the records requested will be used in presenting the Government's Case., Please forward (2) two certified copies of the complete OMPF to the following addreiss: 16th MP BDE (ABN) ATTN: VICTORY BASE, IRAQ • APO AE 09342 3. The POC for this request is the undersigned at DNVT (302) 588-1111W Mir SGT, USA Paralegal 002374 DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY U.S. ARMY HUMAN RESOURCES COMMAND 200 STOVALL STREET ALEXANDRIA, VA 22332-0470 1 AH -PDZ-RC ORD RS A-10-410338 13 OCT 2004 AMBDHL MEGAN MARY SPC WTEZAA YOU ARE ORDERED TO ACTIVE DUTY IN THE GRADE OF RANK SHOWN ABOVE FOR THE PERIOD SH04N IN ACTIVE DUTY COMMITMENT BELOW. YOU WILL PROCEED FROM YOUR CURRENT LOCITION IN TIME TO REPORT ON THE DATE SHOWN BELOW. RPT TO: 16 MP BDE FWD WFP6A1 FT BRAGG NC 28310 REP RT DATE/TIME: 12 SEP 2004 BETWEEN 0800 AND 1700 HRS. ip ASG TO: 16 MP BDE FWD WFP6A1 FT BRAGG NC 28310 DUT1I AT: VICTORY BASE IRAQ APO AE 09342 ACME DUTY COMMITMENT: 6 MONTHS. END DATE: 09 MAR 2005 PURPOSE: UCMJ PROCESSING. ADDITIONAL INSTRUCTIONS: RELIEVED FROM RESERVE COMPONENT ASSIGNMENT ON THE DAY P CEEDING EFFECTIVE DATE OF ORDER. INDIVIDUAL WILL BE RETAINED ON ACTIVE D TY IN HIS OR HER CURRENT GRADE AND IS INCLUDED IN THE ACTIVE ARMY END S RENGTH. ACCESSION INTO DJMS-AC WILL REFLECT A SVC COMP OF "R". SHIPMENT OF H G AND TRAVEL OF DEP NOT APPLICABLE. SPECIAL EXCEPTION NOT TO ISSUE A DD FORM 214 TO SOLDIERS THAT ARE IN 12301, 12302 OR 12304 STATUS THAT REVERT TO R C.M. 202 STATUS. A DO 214 WILL BE ISSUED UPON COMPLETION OF R.C.M. SERVICE. A:1.1, PREVIOUS ACTIVE DUTY SERVICE PRIOR TO R.C.M. STATUS WILL BE ACCOUNTED FOR IN BLOCK 18 OF THE DD 214. EARLY RELEASE AUTHORIZED. FOR ARMY USE: AUTHORITY: R.C.M. 202(C), AR 27-10 CH 21, AR 135-200 (7-4) ACCT CLAS: NONE MDC 1AE4. HOE: PMOS/SSI: 3151 SEX, F. PPN: WM. USAR.RES GR: SPC DORRES: 29 JAN 2002. PEBD: 29 JAN 2002. SCTY CL: NONE FO. T: 460 BY RDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY: ***4********** 1.111111=11111111111P • AHRC * qFFICIAL * CHIEF, RC SPT SVC DIV ***11********** DITIBUTION: 1 SOLDIER 1 1 MP BDE FWD FT BRAGG NC 28310 1 312 MP CO COMBAT SUP 14418 MCMULLEN HWY SW CUMBERLAND MD 21502 5605 1'102375 ' II,VESTIGATING OFFICER'S REPORT (Of Charges Under Article 32, UCMJ and R. C.M. 405, Manual for Courts-Martial) 1 a. FROM: (Name of Itstigating Officer - b. GRADE C. ORGANIZATIONLas , First, MI){. d. DATE OF REPORT HHC, 420th Engineer Brigade APO AE 09391 0-4 8 May 2004 2a. TO (Name of Officek who directed the b. TITLE c. ORGANIZATION investigation - Last, Ffrst, mil Brigade Commander Headquarters, 16th MP Bde (Airborne) APO AE 09342 aningir 3a. NAME OF ACCUSED (Last, First, MI) b. GRADE 0. SSN d. ORGANIZATION e. DATE OF CHARGES Ambuh., Megan M. HHC, 16th MP Bde (Airborne), E-4 Victory Base, Iraq, APO AE 09342 20 March 2004 (Check appropriate answer) 4. IN ACCORDANCE YES NO WITH ARTICLE 32, UCMJ, AND R.C.M. 405, MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, I HAVE INVESTIGATED THE CHARGES APPENDED HERETO (Exhibit 1) X 5. THE ACCUSED WAS REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL (If not, tee 9 below) 6. COUNSEL WHO REPRESENTED THE ACCUSED WAS QUALIFIED UNDER R.C.M. 405(d)(2), 502(d) X X if accused waives counsel. If accused doe • not sign, investigating officer will explain in detail in Item 21.) E OF DEFE SE COUNSEL (Last, First, MI) I b. GRADE 8a NA E OF ASS T DEFENSE COUNSEL (If any) b. GRADE C. ORG NIZATION ((f a ro date c. ORGANIZATION (If appropriate) 0-3 Trial Defense Counsel, Tikrit Branch Office (FOB Danger) d. ADDRESS (If appropriate) 1101 15-1 ST, NW, Suite 202 Region IX d. ADDRESS (If appropriate) Washington, D.C., 20005 9. (To be signed by accused a. PLACE b. DATE HAVE BEEN INFORMED OF MY RIGHT TO BE REPRE P ENTED IN THIS INVESTIGATION BY COUNSEL, INCLUDING MY RIGHT TOCIVIIAN OR MILITARY COUNSEL OF MY CHOICE IF REASONABLY AVAILABLE. I WAIVE MY RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN THIS INVESTI-GATION. c. SIGNATURE OF ACCUSED 10. AT 1 HE BEGINNING OF THE INVESTIGATION I INFORMED THE ACCUSED OF: (Check appropriate answer) a. THE CHARGE(S) UNDER INVESTIGATION YES NO b. THE IDENTITY OF THE ACCUSER X c. THE FIGHT X AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION UNDER ARTICLE 31 d. THE FURPOSE OF THE INVESTIGATION X e. THE FIGHT TO BE PRESENT THROUGHOUT THE TAKING 0' EVIDENCE X f. THE WITNESSES AN X OTHER EVIDENCE KNOWN TO ME IA HICH I EXPECTED TO PRESENT g. THE FIGHT TO CROS -EXAMINE WITNESSES X h.THE FIGHT X TO HAVE AVAILABLE WITNESSES AND EVIDENCE PRESENTED I. THE FIGHT TO PRES X T ANYTHING IN DEFENSE, EXTEN4TION, OR MITIGATION J. THE EIGHT TO MAKE A SWORN OR UNSWORN STATEME9-, ORALLY OR IN WRITING X 11a. THE X ACCUSED AND ACCUSED'S COUNSEL WERE PRESENT THROUGHOUT THE PRESENTATION OF EVIDENCE or counsel (If the accused were absent during any part of the presentation of eviderice, complete b below.) X b. STATE THE CIRCUMS1ANCES AND DESCRIBE THE PROCEEbINGS CONDUCTED IN THE ABSENCE OF ACCUSED OR COUNSEL NOTE: If additional spec a is required for any Item, enter the additions material In Item 21 or on a separate sheet. Identify such material with the proper numerical and, if appropriate, letter ad heading (Example: "7c".)mSecurely attacl- any additional sheets to the form and add a note In the appropriate item of the form: additional sheet." "See 3D FORM 457, AUG 84 EDITIDN OF OCT 69 IS OBSOLETE. USAPPC V1.00 002376 DOD 001276 12a. THE FOLLOWING WITNESSES TESTIFIED ,..4DER OATH (Check appropriate answer) NAME (Last, First, MI)m GRA )E (If any) ORGANIZATION/ADDRESS (Whichever is appropriate) YES NO E-5 302nd MI Battalion X ,:','W-2 CJTF-7 X 1011111. E-9 418th MP Detachment X E6 CID, Ft. Jackson, S.C. Please refer to the attached Enclosure #1 for idditional witnesses b. THE SUBSTANCE OF THE TESTIMONY OF THESE WITNESSES HAS BEEN REDUCED TO WRITING AND IS ATTACHED. 13a. TF E FOLLOWING STATEMENTS, DOCUMENTS, OR MATTERS WERE CONSIDERED; THE ACCUSED WAS PERMITTED TO EXAMINE EACH. DESCRITION OF ITEM LOCATION OF ORIGINAL (If not attached) osecuf n Exh 1-Sworn statement of SP osecution Exh 2-Sw )m statement of SGT.. X Pros 'on Exh 3-Sworn statement of SPC X osecution Exh 4A thaw 4R -20 photos from CID X CD Prosect tion Exh 5-Sworn statement of PFC 1111111111111. Please refer to the attached Enclosure #2 for additional Exhibits from the Investigation I b. EAC-( ITEM CONSID_RED, OR A COPY OR RECITAL OF Th E SUBSTANCE OR NATURE THEREOF, IS ATTACHED 14. THERE ARE GROUNDS TO BELIEVE THAT THE ACCUSED WAS NOT MENTALLY RESPONSIBLE FOR THE OFFENSES) X OR NOT COMPETEIT TO PARTICIPATE IN THE DEFENSIt. (See R.C.M. 909, 916(k).) 15. THE DEFENSE DID REQUEST OBJECTIONS TO BE NOTE4 IN THIS REPORT (If Yes, specify in Item 21 below.) X 16. AL ESSENTIAL W TNESSES WILL BE AVAILABLE IN THE' EVENT OF TRIAL . X 17. THE CHARGES AND SPECIFICATIONS ARE IN PROPER FORM X 16. REASONABLE GROUNDS EXIST TO BELIEVE THAT THE ACCUSED COMMITTED THE OFFENSE(S) ALLEGED X 19..I ANA NOT AWARE OF ANY GROUNDS WHICH WOULD CISQUALIFY ME FROM ACTING AS INVESTIGATING OFFICER. (See R.C.M. 405 (d)(I . 20. I RECOMMEND: a. TRIAL BY . SUMMARY . SPECIAL N GENERAL COURT-MARTIAL b. . C THER (Specify in Item 21 below) 21. REMARKS (Include as necessary, explanation for any delays Os the investigation, and explanation for any "no" answers above.) • Enclosure #1 - Conthuation of DD Form 457 Block 12a Encloshre #2 - Continaation of DD Form 457 Block 13a Enclosure #3 - Defense Counsel's Objections Prior to an During the ART 32 Investigation. Enclosure #4 - Request for Delay, United States v. SPC Megan M. Ambuhl Enclosure #5 - I0 Concurrence on Request for Delay, U13. v. SPC Ambuhl Enclosure #6 - Article 32 Request for Witnesses and Prod uction of Evidence - United States v. SPC Megan M. Ambuhl Enclosure #7 - Secotk Request for Delay - United Statesiv. SPC Megan M. Ambuhl Enclosure #8 - 10 Recommendation on 2nd Defense Regi est for Delay, United States v. SPC Megan M. Ambuhl Enclosure #9 - Approval of of 2nd Request for Delay, Ui, ited States v. SPC Megan M. Ambuhl Enclosure #10 - TO Determination on Trial Counsel's response to Defense Request for Witnesses and Production of Evidence Enclosure #11 - Appointment as Article 32 Investigating Officer Enclosure #12 - Transcript of ART 32 Investigation US V. SPC Ambuhl Enclosure #13 -ART 32 Invekigating Officer's Findings and Recommendations, United States v. SPC Megan M. Ambuhl Block 414 above, Def did not present any grounds to sho*v that the accused was not mentally responsible for the offenses. 22a. T"PED NAME OF INVESTIGATING OFFICER b. 4RADE c. ORGANIZATION HI-IC, 420th Engineer Brigade 0-4 Willillier APO AE 09391 d. SIG e. DATE ? /gif,r-.•c./=:1—. 0 0 2 3 7 rpc v,... Encl sure #1 - CONTINUATIO OF DD FORM 457, BLOCK 12a The ollowing witnesses were Av ilable but invoked their rights 1. 0-3 372" MP CO - invoked at last 32 2. E-8 372" MP CO - invoked at last 32 E-7 372" MP CO - invoked at last 32 The ollowing witnesses were De ared reasonably unavailable CID gents: 1.. SA 10th MP BN - Redeployed to the U.S. Chai of Command: 1.. 0-3 372" MP CO - Redeployed to U.S. Addi ional Witnesses — 1. 0-4 320th MP BN - Kuwait 2. E-4 372" MP CO — LSA Anaconda-Unit attempted to get • ART 32 Inv. but was unable o get to Baghdad. 3 E-6 - LSA Anaconda -invoked at prior 32 4. E-5 372" MP CO - LSA Anaconda-Unit attempted to get • ART 32 Inv. ut was unable o get to Baghdad. 5. E-6 372" MP CO - LSA Anaconda-Unit attempted to get t • L. T 32 Inv. but was unable o get to Baghdad. 6. E-5 372" MP CO - LSA Anaconda-Unit attempted to get t• ART 32 Inv. but was unable o get to Baghdad. 7. E-4 372" MP CO - LSA Anaconda-Unit attempted to get t • T 2 was unable o get to Baghdad. 8. E-5 372" MP CO - LSA Anaconda-Unit attempted to get b was unable o get to Baghdad. 9. E-5 372" MP CO - LSA Anaconda-Unit attempted to get t • AR 32 Inv. but was unable o get to Baghdad. 10. E-4 372" MP CO - LSA Anaconda-Unit attempted to get t• AR 32 Inv. out was unable o get to Baghdad. 11. E-6 372" MP CO - LSA Anaconda-Unit attempted to get t • ART 32 Inv. but was unable o get to Baghdad. Milit Intern ence Witnesses: ‘.1 1. E-4 325th MP BN - Redeployed to U.S. 2. E-4 325th MP BN - Redeployed to U.S. 3. E-4 325`h MP BN - Redeployed to U.S. 0-6 205t15 MI BDE - Redeployed to U.S. Othe Witnesses: 1.. 0-3 Former Interrogation OIC - Redeployed to U.S. e/ticcoe...)eti. EnclosureI, Witness List for DD457 5 6 04 Page 1 of 2 5/8/2004 I 1:20 AM 3 78 2.1111„.0-3 205th MI BDE - Redeployed to U.S. 3. 0-3 Ft. Sam Houston - Redeployed to U.S. 4. 0-5.- cannot locate 5. 0-4 Member of Australian forces - Redeployed to Austra is Co-Accused: E-3 372" MP CO - Fort Bragg, awaiting court-martial 1 .111111111111111, The following witnesses are co-accused, have invoked their rights and are represented by counsel. 1. E-5 372" MP CO 2. E-6 372" MP CO 3. E-4 372" MP CO 4. E-4 372" MP CO 5. E-4 372" MP CO The following witnesses were requested by Defense Counsel and were available. Defense Counsel decided during the Investigation to not call these witnesses and they were therefore deemed reasonably unavailable. 1. Vigilant A, security detainee 2. Vi ilant A, security detainee 3. - Hard site, 6-B, criminal 4. G nci 5, security detainee 5. - Ganci 8, security detainee 6. - Hard site 3-B, criminal 7. Ganci -1, security detainee 8. - Hard site 4-B, criminal 9. Unknown, released 10. - Unknown, released 11. Vigilant C, security detainee 12. Ganci 5, Unknown 13. Unknown, released 14. Ganci 8, security detainee Enclosure 61. Witness List for DD457 5 6 04 Page 2 of 2. 5/8/2004 11:20 ANI 0 02379 Enclosure #2 - CONTINUATION OF DD FORM 457, BLOCK 13a Prosecution Exhibit #6 — Sworn statement of SPC Prosecution Exhibit #7 — CD ROM of pictures and vi eo c i s Prosecution Exhibit #8 — Sworn statement of SPC Prosecution Exhibits #9A thru 90 — Sworn statements of Detainees at the Prison Case File Defense Exhibit A — ARTICLE 15-6 Investigation of the 800 th MP Brigade Defense Exhibit B — Rebuttal of AR 15-6 for SF Defense Exhibit C — Rebuttal of AR 15-6 for 1S Defense Exhibit D — Rebuttal of AR 15-6 f Defense Exhibit E Sworn statement o eAJC6-65Qieeri Enclosure In, Continuation of Exhibits Page 1 of 1 5/B/2004 11:22 AM.kl 3 8 0 Enclosure #3 — Defense Counsel's Objections prior to and during the ART 32 Tnvestigation. The Defense objected to consideration by the JO of the following evidence. These were ilublished inDefense Counsel's memorandum of 10 April, 2004. . 1) Variois Documents (From Detainee Medical Records, 372" MP CO, Medical Section, Abu Ghraib). The case file contains approximately 16 pages of assorted medical daicumen0 obtained from Abu Ghraib. These documents do not purport to be connected tot any alleged victims or to SPC Ambuhl. Further, several of these records are dated outside of the alleged time period of abuse and have no relevance to the charged offenses. 2) Detainee Medical Records (From the 372" MP CO, Medical Section, Abu Ghraib). The case stile contains approximately 30 pages of medical records that do not pertain to any of the alleged victims of the charged offenses. These records do not purport to have any connection to SPC Ambuhl or the charges she is facing. 3) Hard-cell Medical Log (From the 372' .CO, Medical Section, Abu Ghraib). The Case file contains approximately 48 pages of a medical log. These documents do not purport to be connected to any alleged victims or to SPC Ambuhl. These documents do not go to any element of any of the charged offenses. 4) Treatment Logs (From B Company, 109 th Area Support Medical Battalion, BIAP). The case file contains approximately 61 pages of treatment logs. These documents do hot purport to be connected to any alleged victims or to SPC Ambuhl. Further, a Significant number of these documents (49 pages) are outside the time period for the charged offenses and are simply irrelevant to the pending Article 32(b) investigation. 5) Canvas Interview Worksheets. The case file contains approximately 140 canvas interview worksheets that do not contain any pertinent information relevant to the ongoing investigation. Consideration of this collective piece of evidence is prejudicial to SPC Ambuhl. Any potential probative value does not outweigh the prejudice to the soldier tinier M.R.E. 403. 6) Investigative Worksheets. The case file contains approximately 150 investigative worksheets that do not contain any pertinent or relevant information regarding the ongoing investigation. The investigative worksheets are not an exhibit to the CID report aid are irrelevant to the Article 32(b) investigation. 7 Photographs & Video Clips. The case file contains several hundred digital plliotographs and numerous digital video clips. The defense objects to the consideration of the images unless the relevant images can be tied specifically to SPC Ambuhl. None of the photographs were seized from SPC Ambuhl or from any electronic equipment belonging to her. Consideration of the photographs as a group is highly prejudicial to SPC Ambuhl. At a minimum the Government should be required to establish some 5ei/e6---14-.3 Enclosure 03, DC 0 jections during ART 32 5 604 Page 1 of 2 5/6/2004 9:48 PM 00238] nexus be een SPC Ambuhl and the photographs the Government wishes to be considere • 1 DC h the followin oFections durin the investi ation. 1 Admi nce of photos that do not apply specifically to the charges against SPC buhl. 2) Consi s eration of statements from the detainees that have been released. 3) Consi' eration of the CD ROM and specifically those items not relative to the case against S ' C Ambuhl. Enc osuro 63, DC 0 *lions during ART 32 5 604 Page 2 of 2 0 0 238 2 5/6/2004 9:46 PM The Article 3 Base, Iraq. PERSONS P MAJ CPT 1LT Mr. CP SPC SFC PERSONS A None The Govern to review ea The Defense made no obj Government location and run as norm he Investig etailed as th Commander, he investiga 'nvestigating f the case, t tated in the He further st • isposition th s referred aga II the eviden pportunity t Article 32 Transcript U.S. v Ambuhl Proceedings were called to order at 1002 hours, 1 May 2004, at Victory ESENT Investigating Officer overnment Counsel ssistant Government Counsel 'a Defense Counsel ilitary Defense Counsel Accused Recorder SENT ent Counsel stated that sometime today, he would like for all parties h packet to ensure all contents were the same. Counsel conducted a voire dire of the Investigating Officer, and ction to the Investigating Officer being detailed to the hearing. Counsel stated that all parties understand that due to witness different ways testimony would be given, the proceedings may not I. ing officer stated that this was a formal investigation and that he had been Article 32 Investigating Officer by order of Colonel 16th Military Police Brigade (Airborne). ing officer informed the accused that his sole function as the Article 32 fficer was to determine thoroughly and impartially all of the relevant facts weigh and evaluate those facts, and to determine the truth of the matters Barges. ted that he would also consider the form of the charges and the type of t should be made in the case concerning the charges that have been nst the accused. He stated that he would impartially evaluate and weigh e, examine all available witnesses, and give the accused and counsel full cross-examine any available witness. 1 of 19 002383 gmel The Investig ting Officer advised the accused of her right to counsel. The Accused stated the she would be represented by Mr.11111111111111111 The Investigating Officer instructed Mrillig hto fill out items on DD Form 457, Investigating Officer's Report. The Defense Counsel waived the reading of the charges. tit Investigitio . The InveStig ting Officer notified the accused of her rights during the Article 32 The accused stated that she understood her rights. The Inveltig ting Officer stated that the following witnesses would be present: CW2. IMIR, CJTF-7 SGM. 418th MP Det, (CLD) CPT. 372d MP CO 1SG. c 2d MP CO SFC. 372d MP CO Telephonic t stimony: SGT A CO, 302d MI BN, Germany SA PF HHC, 16th MP BDE(ABN) (REAR), Fort Bragg, NC The followin exhibits were presented by the Government Counsel and admitted into evidenc as follows: Prose ution Exhibit 1: Sworn Statements of SPC Prpse ution Exhibit 2: Sworn Statements of SGT Prbse ution Exhibit 3: Sworn Statements of SPC PrOse ution Exhibit 4A — 4R: 18 photos; with objection; Defense Counsel objected Ito hotos not pertaining to SPC Ambuhl The Assita t Government Counsel stated that the witnesses from the 372d MP CO, located t LSA Anaconda would probably not be here due to convoy Lrhe Govern ent Counsel made an Opening Statement. the Defe se Counsel reserved his Opening Statement. 2 of 19 002384 SFC 372d Military Police Company, was called as a witness, sworn, nd testi e• in substance as follows: The wit ess was informed of, and invoked his rights under Article 31, UCMJ, and was exc sed. CPT , 372d Military Police Company, was called as a witness, sworn, n • testified in substance as follows: The wit ess was informed of, and invoked his rights under Article 31, UCMJ, and was exc sed. 1SG 372d Military Police Company, was called as a witness, sworn, nd testifie • in substance as follows: The wit -ss was informed of, and invoked his rights under Article 31, UCMJ, and was exc sed. SGT A CO, 302d MI BN, Germany, was called as a witness, sworn, an • est fie • telephonically in substance as follows: QUESTI NS BY THE DEFENSE COUNSEL (CPT IMF I was de•loyed to Abu Ghraib Prison Iraq at the end of September 2003 until Febryary 20C4; I left when my Battalion redeployed. I was the Systems Administrator and Troj n Spirit Operator for what was called the ICE Intelligence Center for the Inter ga ors, I was assigned to a MI Bn from Camp Victory, and worked with the interr ga ors that worked at Abu Ghraib. I worked in the center where the interrogators prep red the r reports and collected data and kept information. The I p rsonnel had to interact with MPs in order to do their interrogations. The MPs woul•pr vide security, or be told by individual interrogators from MI to alter diets or sleep of eta hees. The Interrogation teams were usually made up of a civilian interr•ga or cr interpreter. They would give direction to the MPs. I may kn w FC Ambuhl, but I don't recognize the name right now. I do of snow how Tier 1A and 1B is set up. I visited it once, and I was told that the real bad • uys were there in individual cells. I actu Hy sat in on one interrogation with SPWan interrogator from Victory Base I as -.0 interrogate a General, and I prove e security. To h 1p ith the interrogations, MP guards would play loud music, alter detainees' diets when fee• ing MRE's and taking out certain items. They would alter detainees' sleep, 3 of 19 i',M2285 use • og • to intimidate, pour water over them and put them in the back of HMMWVs and drive aro nd Phys cal Tra ning that was authorized would be push-ups, overhead arm clap, instr cti•n li e from a Drill Sergeant to a Recruit. I hav ni t s en photos of abuse at Abu. My Chain of Command has not asked me if I have se n a y photos, nor have they told me to delete photos from hard drives. I have only ea d o incidents from interrogators. I hea d • the incident involving SPC I was told that he was too aggressive, and was elie ed I do not know of any UCM action. He was placed in a more analytical I role • t th I E. SPC was also relieved because she had a detainee stripped flake • a d ade him walk back to his cell naked in the view of all the other prisoners. This ap • en 0;1 in November or December 2003. My B• e l dr, moved into the ICE; he was a LTC, and seemed retty involved with eve hi g that went on until he was replaced by a MAJ I wo Id s y t at MI was in control of prison operations. The OPTEMPO was high. I was t e yst m administrator, and there were many requests for new accounts to be adde•to the network. More and more personnel and prisoners would arrive. I would s y t at there was pressure for the interrogators to produce info from the detai ee . I was an overwhelming amount of detainees in the facility. There was no dead ine to g zt detainees out of interrogations. I rec II y statement to CID when I talked of a conversation with I was sittin at he b FAC and heard him and his peers talking about what the MPs did to the .detai ee{hings like beating them up and using them as practice dummies and !knoc ing the out. I had *us ret rued from leave, so this discussion was in December 2003. Som on fro the Nevada National Guard, an older female soldier, told me of some 'stuff hat she saw going on. She documented it, and her chain of command reprised her b ca se f it. She was afraid of her chain of command. She sent the docu e tat! n to her relatives. 1 spo e ith SPC bout the MPs using dogs on the detainees. She said how a ul t e detainees were of the dogs. She described how P etended to be a !dog to s re he detainees. I don't know what happened to SPC ecause she witne .se the incident. She is in the same unit as SPC and SPC Theyare a I in R serve Unit. She did take pictures of the facilities, but I do not know of her :takin•pi tur s of any detainees. 4 of 19 002386 I did not report the abuse that I heard from others. I knew that some of the stuff was authcrized, and did not need to be reported. I talked to ona woman about it only being a matter of time before the abuse got out and an investigation initiated. I spoke to at least everyone that I knew about how the place was p oorly rr n. It was ve unorganized. The response I got that it was a lot worse under Sadaarn. LTC.ad that statement after the Red Cross visited the prison and saw the ..;onditions..e Red Cross criticized the food, from what I remember. I remember soldiers from my BN visiting from Camp Victory being trained on how to linterroga:e and secure prisoners. They were also trained on how to better use their approach es. I ; I know that tie e detainees received blankets and clothing if the interrogators wanted them to h ave it. SPC Slagel had mentioned to me that they made them wear women's panties, and f they cooperated, some would get an extra blanket. SPC11111vve s known to bang on the table, yell, scream, and maybe assaulted detainees cluing interrogations in the booth. This was to not be discussed. It was kept "hush hush" by the individual interrogators. To my knowledge, the only thing that happened after the incidents was the team getting !together -.0 make reports after the interrogation. Nothing was said about not ban ing on 'tables. F othing was put out about not stripping detaineeS naked after the SP incident. She was relieved because she made a detainee walk to his cell nake in ron of other detainees. "QUESTIONS BY THE GOVERNMENT COUNSEL (CPTI111111 I don't know what training was given to the MPs of the 372d MP CO. The only time I saw MPs was while waking through the facility, or at chow. SPCIIIIIIIso told me of two inmates that supposedly raped a child, and the MPs Ipunis led thee-n by making them get into all sorts of sexual positions. ; I am vaguely familiar with interrogation techniques. I know the IROE. Putting inmates in sexual positions naked would not be appropriate. I wouldn't do it if someone ordered ;me to do something like that; not even a CPT. The different things I was told, I wondered if it was a joke for the guards. I wouldn't be 'surprised if the freed innocent prisoners retaliated against the prison after being treated this way, by helping to pinpoint locations in the prison for the mortar attacks. The MPs were directed by the MI personnel to play loud music, vary diets, limit MREs, 'deprive sleep, and PT exhaustion. 5 of 19 002387 People g t in of the IR E. I would n et hi not be a I ga and takin•a ,Taking pi tur was told or througho t th detainee . It would no do have det ine Pictures f th next to a oth is not a t ch Itechniqu s u ;QUEST! NS didn't re ort ;authorize using do s t Dragging det pyrami s s a It was co fus !Reservist- w a shocki g e QUEST! NS I don't know i !counselei m performa ce. The goal •f t !piece tog th It was im ort of terrori ac We woul ge interroga ng concerne trouble for being too aggressive. Physical violence would be over the limit It would not be authorized. someone to get them to soften up. Others shouldn't either. That would order. Putting a leash around someone's neck, pretending to drag them icture would not be authorized. s was forbidden. Personnel were placing pictures on the database, and I move the pictures from the database. These were pictures of soldiers f facility just walking around. It was totally inappropriate to take pictures of is inappropriate to take pictures of detainees naked in a pyramid. You his to soften them up. I don't know of anything that would allow MPs to s masturbate to soften up for an interrogation. This would not be allowed. s masturbation would be illegal also. Pictures of a detainee with his face r detainees genital area masturbating would also be unauthorized. This ique used to soften someone up. I have never heard of any of these ed by MI. BY THE INVESTIGATING OFFICER (MAJ the stuff that I heard, because I thought some of the things I heard was he dietary and sleep stuff was common knowledge within the ICE. MPs scare detainees, I think was approved by our IROE. inees with at leash, making detainees masturbate, and piling them naked d taking pictures of it is not authorized. ng the way the place was run. It was an important mission run by o did not know what they were doing. They were just on their own. It was perience. BY THE DEFENSE COUNSEL (Mr1M1111 the MI personnel received efficiency reports; I got an NCOER, and I soldiers. I guess the people above me were counseled on their e interrogators was to get information, make diagrams of the info and r theories or hypotheses of terrorist events that was going on. nt to get the information to prevent terrorist activity, and find perpetrators ivity. attacked at the prison. There was pressure to get results by effectively he prisoners. If there were no results, then the supervisors would be he goal was to get results. . 002388 6 of 19 General Sa getting ea QUEST! • N Goals w uld civilian i terr General a Brigade, Ba to get in • rm The facil tY no clear cut There is no j pulled b lea people ho I know t at t terrorists an raids wo Id prisoner as With nei he his testi 0 excuse The Arti le The Arti le present. CW2 in subs nc I organiz a chez opened more facilities, and made things better. The place was ed up. This was an incentive to get more information from the prisoners. BY THE GOVERNMENT COUNSEL (CPTIIIIM not justify committing a crime; it would be definitely possible for maybe the • gators to overlook that. They were not under any authority. chez never ordered anyone to commit crimes to get information. The alion, Company, and MI Commanders, never told anyone to commit crimes tion. general, had no real authority base, other than LTC .There were uidelines. stification to have detainees masturbate, piled in pyramids naked, or be hes. The conditions might lead some people to act inappropriately. The ct inappropriately should be punished. ere is a separate facility for women and children. There are more than security detainees at the prison. Some people were living there. The • and up people that were just in the area and probably innocent. If a being kept for robbing an Iraqi bank, I wouldn't know about it. side having anything further, the witness was warned not to discuss y with anyone other than the parties present, and permanently 2 proceeding recessed at 1149, 1 May 2004. 2 proceeding reconvened at 1203, 1 May 2004, with all parties IMIR, CJTF-7, was called as a witness, sworn, and testified as o ows: d process reporting by Iraqi information collectors. I am a 351E, Interrog ion Technician. Prior to my current job, I was at the JIDC at Abu Ghraib from Septem • er 2003 until January 2004. I was reassigned when my unit left. I was asked to stay. I am fam liar detainee pr there is t e problem tic ith the layout of the prison. The largest camp is Ganci; it holds security arily, next is Vigilant, it holds detainees of informational interest; and then and Site; it holds detainees of MI interest, females and juveniles, etainees from the other camps, like rioters, or crazy detainees. . 002389 7 of 19 Tier 1A nd B holds persons of MI interest. I do not know anything about what type of training he P guards would have received at Tier 1A and 1B. In Janu ry 2004, we ceased to bring problematic detainees into the Hard Site, because they cre ted a chaotic environment. The FOB Commander ordered this change. They were tro ble akers. I recall one who would rip up his mattress and relieve himself right on the floor iif his cell; another would sling their feces at the guards. I don't k ow .f the MP guards received any special type of training. I worked in t e Operations section of the JIDC. We accounted for the detainees, and answere q estions from CJTF-7. We tracked requirements and assessments of the detainee ead rs would gather the infToinai from the sections, The ICE NCOIC was SF and the OIC was CP.I don't recall seeing any suspensedates. ere short staffed; we requested for more personnel, and we got more • personn I think th re as interaction with MPs and MI personnel. SPC . was a liaison, -nd ould attend the FOB BUB daily. The personnel from each section would disseminate he info obtained from the BUB. I know S mbuhl; she worked in Tier 1, and she is here today. I don't remember when I fi st et her, but I had a almost daily professional interaction with her. She would pr vid updates on who was present or not. I don't know how long she worked atthe priso he observed juvenile and female detainees. She had interaction with them; sh Iped move them from cell to interrogation wing. I don't k ow s she received any training on how to interrogating prisoners. We did have a conver ati n about supplies and Iraqi food for the detainees. We once talked about rewardin ainees that helped clean and do tasks, with cigarettes, because they lovedto smok I was th "ol Operations expert", everyone would just ask me stuff. I remem er discussion with her about problem detainees; it was about reducing the environ ent hat caused them to misbehave. Some of the detainees were cooperative and othe s w re not. There w re few approved interrogation techniques; for example, prod and go down — when yo sp ak down to someone to get them to cooperate. I do not no of any SPC. know SPChe was an analyst that worked inthe ICE hop I understand that he was removeligciilite of a situation when a detainee a stripped naked. . 8 of 19 002390 !SPC !after she a ask her hat We had an All MI pe son I heard a out the hard ite. Embarra SM opinion. I do not k 0 SPC Am uhl where w pic SPC Am uhl would fa ilita Sleep de riv 'from oth r fil I never h da QUEST! NS The Hard Sit houses Ir qi iof the res of !for MI, fe al Ganci co tai No one fr • m not be int rro moved. Our priori y w against t e C !Every det in fdetermin 421 t • it am a tra ne • interrogat • r f • }of MI. G ner that woul m was also involved in this same incident and was moved to my section relieved from her duties. I asked her why she was moved, but I did not he did. I do not know if SPCIllor SPC IIIIIIreceived any UCMJ. atory IROE training and implemented a mandatory sign out procedure. el attended this training. a riot at Ganci. I do not know of any punishment after they were moved to I hope that they were segregated and silenced. nt of the Arab culture would be contrary to producing results, in my e of our most effective means to communicate is to just develop a rapport. if the MPs were trained on the Arab culture. ould help move the prisoners from their cells to the interrogation wing` or ed them up. The interrogator would ask for the prisoners they needed. ould cross-reference and tell which cell the prisoner was in, and she e the move. tion would be documented in an interrogation plan. It is a separate book s. y problems with SPC Ambuhl. BY THE GOVERNMENT COUNSEL (CPTIIIM has problematic detainees in 1A and 1 B. The rest of the Hard Site orrections prisoners, such as robbers, and thieves. The CPA is in charge he hard site, 2A, 2B, and so on. 1A and 1B contained security detainees s, and juveniles. ed people possibly gathered from raids. There are many camps in Ganci, anci has any interrogation value. Someone removed from a riot would ated. If detainees in Ganci could not be controlled, then they would be s to get information to stop the IED attacks, terrorist activity, and crimes • alition. e was inprocessed and assessed. After the screening, they were be of value or not value to MI. These reports went to CJTF-7. interrogator. I finished my training in 1990; and I have been an r 14 years. MPs would do the sleep management plan, it was requested I Sanchez would have to approve speaking to someone about something ke them upset. An MP could not just do this on his own. . 00 0 I 9 of 19 I am fa iliar with the Geneva Conventions. We treated them the same as POWs; we I treated t e with dignity and respect. Anything outside of that required approval. No MPs atte ded our training. MPs did not attend our Geneva training. The IROE is classifie an located at the JIDC. The wor t cr minals were to be treated with dignity and respect. I never s PC Ambuhl treat anyone without dignity and respect. She would help uswith the em , le detainees. She was nice and pleasant. She knew the difference between rig t and wrong, and what dignity and respect was. I saw her treat people withdignit a dr spect. I assume she was a uard; she took direction from the Shift NCO,SG CPI or SSG There is not ing in the IROE that allows stripping detainees naked. There are times when th y a e naked for strip-searching. Detainees being piled in a pyramid naked, orbeing fo d to masturbate has no MI or military purpose. I've see ah ndful of photos of the pyramid. That type of interrogation "plan" would nothave ma • e to General Sanchez for approval; it would not have made it past me. Forcing eta nees to masturbate kneeling in front of one another would be outside of the bounds. Pla ing a leash around a detainee's neck would be out of bounds. All of the cts would be criminal offenses. If I were ordered to do these acts, I would not carry the out. Embarrassment as a technique would be contradictory to achievingresults. Govern en Counsel shows the witness Prosecution Exhibit 4A. This loo s ii 1A or 1B. I recognize the metal doors. SPC Ambuhl is in this picture. I have se n th other female around, but I do not know her name. I do not recognize thedetainee on he "leash". This scene serves no military purpose; it is inappropriate. Interrog ors would not tell MPs to do this. I have never seen SPC Ambuhl do anythinglike this. QUESTI f N BY THE INVESTIGATING OFFICER (MAJIMIN The rest ft e Hard Site Tiers housed, as I understood it, Iraqi criminals; some I thought ere actually sentenced and serving prison terms. 002392 10 of 19 QUEST! N BY THE DEFENSE COUNSEL (Mr. Volzer) A "uncla sifi: d ' description of the general requirements would be: who's attacking us-, what are so e imminent attacks-, where is the WMD-, what do you know about terrorist activity-? Reports er: generated from the information obtained from the detainees interrogated. CJTF-7 • ev loped the reporting requirement. 1 to 2 pe.pl= would interview or interrogate a detainee, depends on the detainee. You coul•n • le& up" or belittle someone without approval. MI would tell the MPs to make the detainees more receptive. It depended on the environment; a detainee may be move tolnother area, monitored for interaction, told to keep quiet and not interact with othe s, ith proper documentation, put on dietary management, and possibly be given cig re es. These w re ffective techniques were used by MI and required approval. Removing a blanket •r ot er item required approval. Saying I pe sonnel are aggressive is an unfair statement. Some are, and some are not. la a f rmer grunt. 11B and 11C grunts are aggressive too. The inter og tion techniques used are taught. MI does ot wn the detainees. The sleep management procedure was directed by Mi to the M s t supervise and report at the end of the day. After so eorje is interrogated, doesn't mean they could leave the prison. There may be more int rest in keeping them. Yelling w: s n t authorized. We had a few that were loud with the detainees. I saw the sp ial reaction team at the Vigilant camp once. Sometimes handling a situation • the ly works better and is more effective. If one technique is working, we continue o s rutinize that technique. Its not one of those " not broke don't fix it' scenario. We do continue to develop rapport. There w a sign in sheet in the beginning; it is kept with the NCOIC of each tier. The detainee nte rogation plans are classified and kept in the ICE log. Detainee files are secret. QUESTI NS BY THE INTVESTIGATING OFFICER (MAJ.= To prod nd o down is a technique, such as getting a captured officer, making them tired, an calling them a coward. el 11 of 19 002393 You expl it II ow they were captured and use it to your advantage. An example of fear up woul be, "okay, as long as you don't cooperate, you will just stay in here". Approvalis need f r th ese two techniques. With nei her side having anything further, the witness was warned not to discuss his testi ony with anyone other than the parties present, and permanently excuse The Arti le i2 proceeding recessed at 1315, 1 May 2004. The Arti le 2 proceeding reconvened at 1412, 1 May 2004, with all parties present. SGM testified , 418th MP Det (CLD), was called as a witness, sworn, and ubstance as follows: QUEST! BY THE DEFENSE COUNSEL (CPT NM I first arri ed to Iraq 1 February 2004. My mission was to work a BLD/CLD versus a EPW mi • sion. CLD is Camp Liaison Detachment; BLD is Brigade. The 16 th MP BDE (ABN) g ve us our mission. We replaced the 381 st BLD. There were no EPWs, except for a han•ful at Camp Bucca. We took on the detainee operations role. The defi ition of detainee and EPW is in the Geneva Convention, Article 4. Our miss on falls under the 16 th MP BDE (ABN). I have not aware of allegations of abuse a d *treatment of detainees. I have heard of the rumors. I don't k ow hat training was given in the past; I am aware that training is going on now. Th re re 30 corrections personnel from Fort Knox, Fort Leavenworth here to train soldiers at the prison. There is training on the Arab culture, ROE, and the Geneva Conventi • ns. I visit the pri n often. I am aware of the prison breakdown; 1A and 1B houses MI holds, fe al s and juveniles. Juveniles were moved recently. The Hard Site is fairly secure. or ally, females would be separated. We use the Geneva Convention as a guideline Changes aregoing on in Ganci and Vigilant to make conditions safer for the detainees. The 16th P DE (ABN) is refining policies, and SOPs. I do not o of the officer involvement prior; but COL frequently visits theprison. 002394 12 of 19 We have MPs and MI personnel in the inprocessing center at the prison. I do not know of any cross over training. When we made our assessment, we noted that the nutrition and sanitation conditions were not within the Geneva Convention. I do not know if the Geneva Conventions was followed before the 16 th MP BDE (ABN) arrived.' is being followed now. There are weigh ins, and the meals are nutritional. The GenOa Convention recommends that female detainees be guarded and searched by female MPS. When a ietainee arrives, they are assessed and inprocessed within 72 hours. I do not know of any SOPs being left behind or given to the 372d MP CO. We at tha BLD look at the prison from a Geneva Convention standpoint. We ensure that prisoners are treated properly, and that environmental conditions are correct. The 372d MP CO was previously at Mosul. I am not aware of anyone else performing the prisol mission before them. We brought our regulations and documentation with us. I have walked throughout the compound and had casual conversations with the soldiers. We have a big switch of 01F1 and OIF 2 personnel. With neither side having anything further, the witness was warned not to discuss his testimor y with anyone other than the parties present, and permanently excused. The Article 32 proceeding recessed at 1435, 1 May 2004. The Article 32 proceeding reconvened at 1459, 1 May 2004, with all parties present. SA U. S. Army CID, Fort Jackson, SC, was called as a witness, sworn, and testified telephonically in substance as follows: QUESTIONS BY THE DEFENSE COUNSEL (CPTIIIIIIN I first became involved in the detainee abuse case when we received a anonymous letter anc cd-rom containing pictures. In the preliminary stage of the investigation, I was the case manager. I left in February 2004. Our CID detachment was located at Abu Ghraib; we were three agents conducting interviews of prisoners. We also had three translators. In order to find' out who the detainees were that were abuse, we obtained logs of the prisoners that were in the isolation wing at the time of 7November and a couple of other days. 13 of 19 002395 Initially, t e person who came forward with the le er and cd-rom provided the names of the main persons involved. This was SPC .he went through the pictures with us and iden ified the military personnel involved. He identified the majority of the personn I, aril knew who they were. Others, he did not know. We interviewed every single MI and military personnel that worked in the prison; we sent numerous requests for assis ance to other CID offices worldwide to interview all other persons that were ever at t e prison and identified in the photographs. I have no idea of any UCMJ action. The cas is Still open. I interviewed several' hundred people, but I cannot remember a SPC I believe PC came forward because he knew this stuff was wrong, and that CPL ould go back to work in the isolation wing and continue the abuse. He wanted e a • us to ;stop. He received the pictures approximately one week before he came forward. He Was weighing his conscience, and decided to do the right thing. I think se eral people suspected abuse but did not report it. I don't know the status of any UC J against anyone. CID does not recommend what action be taken against subjects f our investigations. We just gather facts; the chain of command decides what to o. We briefed the Company and Battalion commanders about our progress during th investigation. I remem er My interview with SGT- he was interviewed twice. He lied in his first stateme t, and told the truth in his second statement; admitting to stepping, stomping, and jum ing ion the detainees. After talk ng With the detainees and ersonnel, the names of he main perpetrators of the abus were CPLM.ilin The ones taking pictures SS.and SG.were SP Arithuhl, PF.and anot er I cannot recall. These names are based on the in erviews, and who was there. I recall th dOtainees mentioning SPC Ambuhl; they would refer to her as Miss Megan. I can't re all if she helped a detainee by giving him an inhaler. When I i terviewed a detainee, I explained why I was there, and just gave them a pen and a s •rn Statement form in Arabic or English; and they would write what they knew about the incidents. Their statements were later translated. If something wasn't clear, we had follow up questions. If they did not know someone's name, they were told to just desc ibe That person using as much detail as possible. I remem s er SGT.but not his statement. I remember SSG111111once being a suspect; thdught he observed the abuse; he was later cleared of any wrongdoing. This was all based on our interviews of the personnel that were there. SFC.as I remember was not involved. It became a arent throw h the course of the in -stigation, that the nightshift-- SPC Ambuhl, CPL .SSG.PFC 14 of 19 002396 anil on occasion SPC would. had left; , do these acts after SFC and afte the chain of comma d had changed shifts and gone home. It became clear to me that t ey knew t SFC would not tolerate these acts. There was one incident heti'SFC as on the upper tiera w an incident and ordered them to stop i mediately; I be leve he observed SGT tepping on a detainee. They were sh•cked at how angry he was when he told them to stop. I don't believe that SFC 1111111r polled that incident. I have n • recollection of SGT again, I spoke with several hundred personnel. . SPC as identified as one of the people in the photos, but I don't recall his state=4 Ile never came forward to report any misconduct to the CID office. SPC acid SPC 'were MI soldiers identified in one of the photographs. I am not 310 of any UCMJ action pending on anyone; I left Iraq in February 2004, and until very recently, I did of know of a yone pending any UCMJ action. I turned the investigation over to SA I don't know if he did any follow up interviews. We gave thel15-6 Investigation to a copy of our case file; we also provided the photos and sltatements we gathered. I do not racall a SGT again, I spoke with hundreds of personnel. Our main purpose wasrto identify the personnel in the photos; we also wanted to find out if MI told the MPs to dO these acts. If so, we wanted to know who told them; that's why we interview3d everyone. No one said do this to that person, or anything specific. Our second purpOse was to have the most thorough investigation that we could. We wanted to talk with each and every person mentioned in the interviews. Most of the iiiiterrogators did not wear nametags. You knew who they were, if you knew them. We wduld figure out who was working, and interview all the handlers, interrogators and guards. I do not recall if there are any civilians involved in the investigation; several people were interviewed. I remember We listed someone as a subject if there was reasonable belief that th y committed a crime. The investigative file is a working document, and the status of per onnel involved may change. Like when SSG as listed as a subject, and later tak n off of the status report. There are nuMerous things involved when determining if someone is derelict in their duty; if they inform their chain of command, then they are not derelict in my mind, and the way the yaw puts it, as I know. No one repoltted any abuse up until January 15, 2004, to CID; however, there was one individua whb reported the abuse to his chain of command—his NCOIC. 15 of 19 002397 1 The NC IC then went to SS to report the abuse; and because SSG s the perpetrator in this incident, it did not go anywhere. The individual that it did the right thing. Arnbuhl reported the abuse to SFCIIME she wou4subject of the 11 ions It would be different if she had reported it to SS I am not a his was an ongoing incident. The NCOIC that reported the incl ent to SSG I lielieve, did not report ito an one else. When he reported to SSG he did not know that SSG was the perpetrator. I do not ecall interviewing SPC11111111r SPC The investigation is still open, and pen• ingia few requests for assistance. You can a d and remove subjects as credible nformation becomes known. 1 I worked at Fibu from October 2003 to February 2004; I would visit the Hard Site at leas once or twice a week. We would interview suspects of crimes against U.S. Forcesor individuals who knew of deaths of U.S. Forces. On occasion, I visited with CPT in tier 1a anc 1 B. I had no involvement with the Red Cross. I heard of a gleceased individual that was being stored at the facility, but I don't know the specifics. Oilir focus was Iraqis committing crimes against U.S. soldiers. Based on our proximity and the amount of time, the 12 th CID came over to help with the investigation There were a lot of people to be interviewed. They were initially investigating hostile fire incidents. It was a higher priority to work the logistics of this case. I had no nteiaction with SPC Ambuhl; I would see her when I went to the Hard Site. I did not see hler commit any abuse. I only went there during the day in the morning; the alleged abus happened in the evening or nighttime. I never saw the detainees do any PT. I believe a SPCIllror someone else hung a detainee in handcuffs for over six hours. I don't recall SPC mbuhl letting the detainee down. I don't re ­ ..:all f I interviewed PFC.., I read every document when I was there, but I cannot rem tuber any statements that she made. I do not remember if she changed her stories; s e may have. There were a lot of people and documents in this case. We do criminal record checks on our subjects. I believe PF received an Article 1f­ . for a improper relationship with CP I believe as admonished, and they were told to stay awayfrom each other. I don't remember if CPL 11111111Aas commended to take anger management by his commander. When I inte iewed the detainees, I did not provide any names. I would not ask, for instance, "Di CPL hit you?"-1 would simply ask "Were you in the isolation 002398 16 of 19 wing-- ar d what happened when you were there?" We wanted a clear and unbiased environment I don't know if they wore their BDU Tops while in the isolation wing. I don't know if they were tolc to not use their first names; or to even use fake names. The MI personnel I interviewed never told me they told the MPs what to do to the prisoners. In some of tl--e incidents, some of the detainees being abused were not actively scheduled for interrogation. They were rioters. This appeared to me as just retaliation against tie rioters. The riots were in separate camps. We interviewed all of the MI personnel. No one admitted to telling the MPs to soften up any detainees; if they had, they would have been violating the UCMJ and the Geneva Convention. No one ever admitted to "good job, keep doing what you are doing". MI had their very specific interrogation plan. It detailed things they could and could not do. No one I interviewed said they were abused during an interrogation. I am not aware of any MI investigation. There was absolutely no evidence that the MI or MP chain of command authorized any of this kind of maltreatment. These individuals were acting on their own. The photos I saw, and the totality of our interviews, show that certain individuals were just having fun at the expense of the prisoners. Taking pictures of sexual positions, the assaults, and things along that nature were done simply because they could. It all happened after hours. The fear instilled in the prisoners after these incidents may have been a benefit, but I don't know for sure. These individuals wanted to do this for fun. QUESTIONS BY THE GOVERNMENT COUNSEL (CP111111111111 Benefiting tha interrogators did not come out in our investigation. The abused individuals were not going to be interrogated. The rioters would have been in another camp if trey had military intelligence value. It is clear to me that the abuse was retaliatioi after the riot. I know I am here today to help clarify the allegations against SPC Ambuhl. My investigation determined that she was present and took pictures. She is in the pictures with PFIMINFolding a leash around a detainee's neck. She is described as being present by some of the detainees during the abuse. I do not reca I her present at the riot incident. Our investigation did not determine her committing any abuse; nor did it determine that she stopped the abuse or reported the abuse. I don't remember a statement from .If he described a tall white female with green eyes r amed Miss Megan, he would e talking about SPC Ambuhl. I did not give the detainee 3 any names. 002399 17 of 19 I told the Mya" wo pronoun QUEST! There w FOB Co investig The corn The corn reviewe The det except f said that abuse d With nei testimon The Arti The Arti present. PFC ti Id ing • N s a m ion a a to ine r S des tai er wi le le called a a The wit ss them, a ds Upon di cu not wish to The Arti le The Arti le present. The foil win into evid nc Pr se Pr se use the names if they knew them, and to describe what happened. "Miss Iso be SPC Ambuhl. In the Arab dialect, they have a hard time Megan, and end up saying Mya. BY THE DEFENSE COUNSEL (CPTIMINNI amnesty period during the course of our investigation, ordered by the nder. We did not collect any of this evidence; none of it pertained to our We reviewed cds and media as requested by the chain of command. der had access to the amnesty boxes; it entirely a command function. der would have kept all the other contraband. We returned the stuff we e chain of command to be destroyed. statements were translated. .s ted that all the guards were good CP1.11111and SG., as I specifically recall. He also ite all e abuse, e realized that the majority of U.S. soldiers did not ees. He only pointed out SG I.and CP111111111abusing him. ide having anything further, the witness was warned not to discuss his h anyone other than the parties present, and permanently excused. 2 proceeding recessed at 1608, 1 May 2004. 2 proceeding reconvened at 1617, 1 May 2004, with all parties HC 16th MP BDE (ABN) (REAR), Fort Bragg, NC, SC, was fitness, sworn, and testified telephonically in substance as follows: was read her Article 31 rights; she acknowledged and understood ted that she would participate in the proceedings without a lawyer. sion wit all parties present, the Defense Team decided that they did uestion 2 proceeding recessed at 1640, 1 May 2004. 2 proceeding reconvened at 1643, 1 May 2004, with all parties exhibits were presented by the Government Counsel and admitted as follows: ution Exhibit 5: Sworn Statements of PFC ution Exhibit 6: Sworn Statement of SP c r 002400 18 of 19 The Arti le 32 proceeding recessed at 1643, 1 May 2004. The Arti le 32 proceeding reconvened at 0713, 3 May 2004, with all parties present except for the Assistant Government Counsel. The Go ernment Counsel asked that the members of the 372d MP CO be declared unavail ble since they could not make their convoy to Victory Base. The foil wing exhibits were presented by the Government Counsel and admitted into evi ence as follows: P osecution Exhibit 7: CD Rom containing photos and video clips; with objectio ; the Defense objects to photos that do not pertain to SPC Ambuhl's charges P osecution Exhibit 8: Sworn Statement of SP P osecution Exhibit 9A 90(oscar): Sworn Statement o detainees; with objectio ; the Defense objects to the statements of detainees that have been release THE GO ERNMENT RESTS The foll • wing exhibits were presented by the Defense Counsel and admitted into evidenc as follows: D fense Exhibit A: 15-6 Investigation of 800 th MP Bde D fense Exhibit B: Rebuttal to 15-6, by SFC D fense Exhibit C: Rebuttal to 15-6 by 1SG D fense Exhibit D: Rebuttal to 15-6 by CP D: fense Exhibit E: Sworn Statement of CP THE DE • ElslSE RESTS The Gov rnrnent Counsel made a closing statement. The Def nse Counsel made a closing statement. The Arti • le J2 proceeding adjourned at 0814, 3 May 2004. 002401 19 of 19 DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY HEADQUARTERS, 420th ENGINEER BRIGADE Victory Base, IRAQ APO AE 09342 R PLY TO ENTiON OF Builders in Battle! AFRC-1 AR. BA-LG. 8 MAY 2004 MEMO NDUM FOR RECORD SUBJE 1 T: Article 32(b) Investigating Officer's Findings and Recommendations, United States v. SPC egln M. Ambuhl 1. On March 2004, I was appointed as an investigating officer (10) pursuant to the Uniform Cods of Military Justice (UCMJ), Article 32, to investigate the charges noted below against Spe 'alist Megan M. Ambuhl, HHC, 16th MP BDE (ABN), Victory Base, Iraq APO AE 093 k 2. The charges preferred were: Charge I: ART 81 Conspiracy Charge II: ART 92 Dereliction of Duty Charge III: ART 93 Cruelty and Maltreatment Charge IV: ART 134 Indecent Acts with Another 2. Duri g the conduct of the investigation, there were two delays granted. Both were attributed to th defense. The first was a 15-day request to allow defense adequate time to prepare for the.T 32 investigation. The second delay was an 11-day request to allow for a civilian defe se counsel to travel to Victory Base for the ART 32 investigation and to prepare for the inve tigation. . Upo completion of the investigation and consideration of all evidence presented during the inve figation (as noted in block 13a of DD Form 457 and Enclosure #2), I have the following findi gs regarding the charges against Specialist Megan M. Ambuhl. Charge I: Violation of UCMJ, Article 81, Conspiracy i. The Specification: In that Specialist Megan M. Ambuhl, U.S. Army, did, at or near Baghdad Central Correctional Facility, Abu Ghraib, Iraq, on or about 23 October 2003 conspireand enter into an agreement with SSG .SGT PL.PCIFIFSPC.and PF.commit an offense under UCMJ, Ma treatment of subordinates, and did effect the object of the conspiracy when she participated in a photograph with PFC who tied a leash around the neck of a detainee and led the detainee down h corridor with the leash around his neck. (See PE 4A thru 4D, PE 5) ii. I believe that the evidence presented shows that reasonable grounds exist to believe that the accused committed this offense. Enclosure 013 1-ligating Officers Memorandum of Findings 5 8 04 .Page 1 of 3 ,,OCI-.654//er/3 5/8/2004 11:19 AM 002402 AFRC­SUBJE v. SPC AR-EBA-LG T: Article 32(b) Investigating Officer's Findings and Recommendations, United States egan M. Ambuhl iii. Strengths-The Trial Counsel presented evidence to show that SPC Ambuhl entered into an agreement with the co-accused to maltreat a detainee and then performed the overt act by proceeding downstairs with the co accused to pull the detainee from the cell, place a tie down strap around his neck and then participate in a picture with PFC .as she held the leash. Charge II: Violation of UCMJ, Article 92, Dereliction of Duty i. The Specification: In that Specialist Megan M. Ambuhl, U.S. Army, who knew of her duties as a Military Police soldier at or near Baghdad Central Correctional Facility, Abu Ghraib, Iraq, from on or about 20 October 2003 to on or about 1 December 2003, was derelict in the performance of those duties in that she willfully failed to protect Iraqi detainees from abuse, cruelty and maltreatment, as it was her duty to do. (See PE 3, PE 4A thru 4D, PE 5) ii. I believe that the evidence presented shows that reasonable grounds exist to believe that the accused committed this offense. iii. Strengths-Trial counsel presented compelling evidence to show that SPC Ambuhl had a duty as an MP and as the NCOIC of 1B to oversee and prqtect those housed at BCCF. It is reasonable to expect that SPC Ambuhl would have known those duties by virtue of her MOS and of being a U.S. Soldier. Finally, she was willfully derelict in those duties when she did not proteCt those detainees under her control. Charge III: Violation of UCMJ, Article 93, Cruelty and Maltreatment i. The Specification: In that SPC Megan Ambuhl, U.S. Army, at or near Baghdad Central Correctional Facility, Abu Gluaib, Iraq, on or about 8 November 2003, did maltreat several Iraqi detainees, persons subject to her orders, by watching naked detainees in a pyramid of human bodies. ii. I do not believe that the evidence presented shows reasonable grounds exist to believe that the accused committed this offense. iii. Weaknesses-There is no contention that element 1 of this charge has been met. I do believe that Trial Counsel failed to present adequate evidence to meet the second element of this charge. SPC Ambuhl was present as the pyramid was built but aside from showing that she was present, Trial Counsel did not present evidence that SPC Ambuhl carried out any act of cruelty or maltreatment other than being present at the building of the pyramid. Charge IV: Violation of UCMJ, Article 134, Indecent Acts with Another i. The Specification: In that SPC Megan Ambuhl, U.S. Army, did, at or near Baghdad Central Correctional Facility, Abu Ghraib, Iraq, on or about 8 November 2003Goifully commit an indecent act with Iraqi detainees, SSG CPL.SPC.PF( .by observing a group of etainees masturbating, or aempting to masturbate, while they were located Enclosure Nl3 1 estigating Officers Memorandum of Findings 5 804 Page 2 of 3 5/8/2004 11:19 AM 00240: AFRC-CAR-EBA-LG SUBJECT: Article 32(b) Investigating Officer's Findings and Recommendations, United States v. SPC Megan M. Ambuhl in a public corridor of the Baghdad Central Correctional Facility, with other soldiers who photographed or watched the detainees' actions. ii. I do not believe that the evidence presented shows reasonable grounds exist to believe that the accused committed this offense. iii. Weaknesses-Of the three elements of this charge, I believe that Trial counsel failed to provide adequate evidence to show that elements #1 and #2 were met. SPC Ambuhl was present when the detainees were forced to masturbate but Trial counsel failed to provide evidence that she played any role, other than being present, in the perpetuation of the act itself. I do feel that element #3 was proven adequately as SPC Ambuhl being present was prejudice to good order and discipline and certainly brings discredit upon the armed forces. 4. After review of all evidence presented and completion of the Article 32 Investigation, it is my recommendation that Charges I and II against Specialist Megan Ambuhl be referred to a General Court Martial. I further recommend that Trial Counsel provide additional evidence to show that the elements listed above as not met, were indeed met if they intend to proceed with charges III and IV. 5. POC for this memorandum is MAJ11.1111.1 at . or by phone at DNVT/DSN 559ifin 1111111111wr MAJ, EN Article 32 Investigating Officer . Enclosure 813 Investigating Officers Memorandum of Findings 5 804 Page 3 of 3 5/8/2004 11:19 AM 002404 DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY UNITED STATES ARMY TRIAL. DEFENSE SERVICE REGION IX, FOB DANGER BRANCH OFFICE APO AE 00302 REPLY TO ATTENTION OF: AETV-BGJA-TDS. 29 March 2004 MEMORANDUM FOR MAJ Article 32 Investigating Officer, Headquarters, 420 th .9342 Engineer Brigade, Victory Bas „ SUBJECT: Request for Delay, United States v. SPC Megan M. Ambuhl 1. The defense requests a delay in the Article 32(b) hearing currently scheduled for 5 April 2004. The earliestavailable date for the defense to go forward with the Article 32 will be 20 April 2004. The defense requiresthis delay for the following reasons. a. Defense counsel received the preferral packet on 26 March 2004. The packet contains several hundred pages of evidence and statements. The packet also contains a CD Rom with over 1,000 visual depictions. Counsel and SPC Ambuhl both must have ample time to conduct an even preliminary review of the evidence. b. Defense counsel is located at FOB Danger in Tikrit and is reliant on military convoys or MILAIR to get to Victory Base. Defense counsel met with SPC Ambuhl on 26 March 2004 but requires at least two additional meetings with the client simply to prepare for the Article 32. These trips require significant advanced planning and coordination due to travel limitation in the Iraqi Theater. c. The defense cannot reasonably be prepared to represent SPC Ambuhl at the Article 32 hearing by 5 April 2004. An unprepared counsel is tantamount to no counsel at all. U.S. v. Miro, 22 M.J. 509 (USACMR1986). The delay is necessary for the defense counsel to reasonably prepare for the Article 32 hearing. Counsel needs time to interview witnesses, coordinate with civilian defense counsel, if any, and otherwise prepare for the hearing which includes 5 charged co-accused, several uncharged potential co-accused,voluminous documents and alleged victim statements in Farsi or Arabic. d. SPC Ambuhl has considered hiring a civilian attorney. Granting the requested delay will allow the soldier to exercise her right to counsel and to explore avenues to hire a civilian attorney and ensure his or herpresence for the Article 32(b) hearing. e. Granting the requested delay will allow the government and the defense to explore a possible alternate disposition of this case. 1. Defense counsel is one of only two defense attorneys deployed to serve the entire l s' Infantry Division.In addition to representation of courts-martial clients, counsel is responsible for serving the needs of clients throughout a dozen geographically diverse FOBs in Iraq. Granting the requested delay will allow counsel to schedule coverage for these areas and to prioritize trial defense counsel requirements. 2. The requested delay is attributable to the defense. If I may be of further assistance in this matter, pleasecontact me via email at. or by phone at DN'VT• 553M 11111111Mia Crl", JA Trial Defense Counsel 002405 ff'Alczt)SiteE a** AFZA-AP-IO MEMORANDUM FOR Commander, 16th Military Police Brigade (Airborne), Victory Base, Iraq APO AE 09342 SUBJECT: Request for Delay 1. In the case of U.S. vs SPC Megan M. Ambuhl, HHC, 16 th MP BDE (ABN), the Defense has submitted the attached request for delay until 20 April 2004. 2. The Article 32 was initially scheduled for 5 April 2004. Defense counsel received the case file on 26 March 2004, and is based FOB Danger in Tikrit. Defense needs more time to meet with its client and go over the entire case file. 3. SPC Ambuhl is also considering hiring a civilian attorney. 4. The Trial Counsel recommends approval of the delay as requested by defense. 5. I concur with both counsel and recommend that the request for delay be approved. 6. The POC for this memo is the undersigned at 55911111 Encl . as MAJ, EN Investigating Officer 0 0 2 4 0 6 A/c46 5age e- DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY UNITED STATES ARMY TRIAL DEFENSE SERVICE REGION IX, FOB DANGER BRANCH OFFICE APO AE 09392 REPLY TO ATTENTION OF: AETV-BGJA-TDS 10 April 2004 MEMORANDUM FOR MAJ Charles Ransome, Article 32 Investigating Officer, Headquarters,420th Engineer Brigade, Victory Base, Iraq, APO AE 09342 SUBJECT: Article 32 Request for Witnesses and Production of Evidence — United States v. SPC Megan M Ambuhl 1. The Defense requests that the following witnesses be produced at the Article 32 investigative hearing scheduled for 20 April 2004, TAW with Rules for Courts-Martial (R.C.M.) 405(0(9) and 405(g): a. CID Agents i. S ec Agent.testimony is relevant because he interviewed numerous alleged victims and made severa visits to the Abu Ghraib prison facility during the period of the alleged offenses. Agent 111111also interviewed several alleged co-conspirators. Iiiiial Agent .1111111, loth MP BN, Baghdad, Iraq, APO AE 09335. iiipecial Agent 10th MP BN, Baghdad, Iraq, APO AE 09335. Agent.testimony is relevant ecause she interviewed several of the alleged victims and actively investigated the allegations in this case. b. Iraqi Detainees The Defense requests a certified interpreter to translate the testimony of the Iraqi detainee witnesses. The testimony of these witnesses is extremely relevant. These individuals may have potentially exculpatory information. The Defense has limited if any access to them based on their current status. For that reason, the Defense requests that the government produce the listed detainees to testify at the Article 32(b) Investigation. TAW R.C.M. 405(g)(4)(A) the Defense objects to consideration of the Sworn Statements of the listed alleged victims and Iraqi detainees. Such statements may not be considered by the IO over the objection of the Defense. All alleged victims and detainees reside at Abu Ghraib Prison in Abu Ghraib, Iraq. They are as follows: 002407 EA./ce.z5-tege--ca AETV-BGJA-TDS SUBJECT: Article 32 Request for Witnesses and Production of Evidence — United States v. SPC Megan M. Ambuhl c. Chain of Command — 372" MP Company i. CPT111111111111former Company Commander -:) CPTIllircan testify as to the training provided to his unit, specifically any training regarding detention facilities. CPT an testify as to his knowledge of the alleged abuses that occurred at Abu Ghraib. If necessary, the defense requests immunity for this witness to testify. ii. CPT ¦111.111ormer Platoon Leader (C :1) CPT IIIIIPan testify as to the training given to reserve MPs, . an MPs, s e-cifically the training regarding detention facilities and control of detainees. CPT can testify as to his knowledge of the alleged abuses that occurred at Abu Ghraib. If necessary, the defense requests immunity for this witness to testify. iii. MSG former Company 1SG ) As the senior enlisted member of the 372" MP Company, 1SG can testify as to the training given to his MPs. He can testify as to his knowledge of the 111111.- alleged abuses that occurred at Abu Ghraib. If necessary, the defense requests immunity for this witness to testify. iv. SFC , former Platoon Sergeant FC1111111upervised many of the co-accused at Abu Ghraib. e con•uc e• spo e facility, specifically cell blocks la and lb. SFC witnessed at least one of the charges to which SPC Ambuhl is facing court-martial. He can provide exculpatory testimony for SPC Ambuhl. His testimony is highly relevant and critical to this case. If necessary, the defense requests immunity for this witness to testify. d. Co-Accused — 372" MP Company i. SGT ii. PFC iii. SSG iv. CPL v. SPC vi. SP 2 002408 AETV-BGJA-TDS SUBJECT: Article 32 Request for Witnesses and Production of Evidence — United States v. SPC Megan M Ambuhl e. Additional Witnesses — 372' MP Company i. MAJ1111011111rformer S-3 for the 320th MP Battalion (Da:. ) As the S-3 MAJW/Irvas responsible for drafting and disseminating ROE guidance. The ROE and any training received by the 372nd MPs are extremely relevant to Charge II. ii. SPC111.1.11. 1) SPC First reported the Ailronffenses to CID. His credibility and motivation are highly relevant. Further, SPC .ay provided exculpatorytestimony regarding SPC Ambuhl. iii. SSG, iv. SOT was the operations NCOIC of Abu Ghraib during the time ame of the charged offenses. He will testify that he never witnessed any abuse taking place at the prison. v. SSG was the Force Protection NCO of Abu Ghraib unng e time ame o.ged offenses. He can testify as to the day-to-day operations of Abu Ghraib and what procedures were in place on cell blocks lb for interacting with detainees. vi. SGT 11111MIF GT.pent time at blocks la and lb durin October,November, and December 2003. SGT orked at la on evenings when CPL as not working. He can provided testimony as to the procedures used on the cell blocks and to training that he and his unit received. vii. SPC SPC.orked on the same block as SPC e can es.as to the nature of detainees t at were held on 1 b and as to the types of training received by her reserved unit. She can testify as to the interaction between the MI representatives and the MP guards. viii. SGT worked at block la during October, November, and December 2003. He worked at la on evenings when CPL Graner was not working. He can provided testimony as to the procedures used on the cell blocks and to training that he and his unit received. He can testify as to the general nature of detainees that were held on block la and the procedures that MI used for interrogation. 3 002409 AETV-BGJA-TDS SUBJECT: Article 32 Request for Witnesses and Production of Evidence — United States v. SPC Megan M Ambuhl ix. SGT 1111111111111. ) SGT.worked at block la during October, November, and December 2003. He can provided testimony as to the procedures used on the cell blocks and to training that he and his unit received. He can testify as to the general nature of detainees that were held on block la and the procedures that MI used for interrogation. He will also testify to the lack of any standard procedure or accountability at Abu Ghraib. x. SPC ) SPC Irartvorked at block la during October, November, and December 2003. He can provided testimony as to the procedures used on the cell blocks and to training that he and his unit received. He can testify as to the general nature of detainees that were held on block la and the procedures that MI used for interrogation. xi. SSG Um? •) SSGIIR can testify as to the procedures used on the cell blocks and to training that he and his unit received. He will also testify to the lack of any standard procedure or accountability at Abu Ghraib. f. Military Intelligence Witnesses i. SPC.25th MI Battalion ii. SP. 25th MI Battalion iii. SPC.25th MI Battalion iv. SG 02nd MI Battalion '11 testify that members of his chain of command told him to delete Abu Ghraib photos off of his computer hard drive prior to the CID investigat on. v. CW2 EOM formerly assigned to 325 th MI Battalion 1) CW2.as an MI Interrogator that worked daily at Abu Ghraib at • locks la and lb. CW.testify about authorized MI interrogation technique . CW2.can testify as to the interaction and coordination between the MI interrogat irs and the MP guards. CW2111111pias been transferred to the CPA in Baghdad. vi. OE .205 th MI Brigade __.1 C011111111will testify as to his knowledge of allegations of abuse and(or mistreatment of detainees between 16 Sep 03 and 22 Dec 03. In command during the time of the alleged offenses, COL IIIIIrknowledge of misconduct at Abu Ghraib and the chain-of-commands response to such allegations is highly relevant. 4 002410 AETV-BGJA-TDS SUBJ CT: Article 32 Request for Witnesses and Production of Evidence — United States v. SPC Megan M. Ambuhl Other Witnesses i. CPT.former Interrogation OIC, DNVT: 559 ) CPT., a Mili.Intelligence officer, is familiar with the —. ii Cam Vigilant SOP and can testify as to JTF-7 policies regarding Interrogation Rules of Enga ement for detainees at Abu Ghraib. ii. CPTIFINIP205th MI Brigade Opera 'onal Law, DNVT: 559-11111111. CPTERwas the legal advisor for the MI Group who ran Abu Ghraib prison. CPT.can testify to the procedur s put into place for dealing with detainees and the traininthat was taught to the members of t 372" MP Company for their work at the tip facility. CPT.visited Abu Ghraib during the re evant time period and can testify to theconditions at e facility. iii. CBT , Ft. Sam Houston PTIIIIIIwas one of several attorneys who provided advice on detainee operations and ROE at Abu Ghraib. iv. SGM1111111. 418th MP Detachn+nt iii. CJTF-7, BIAP, Baghdad, Iraq LTC 'illtestify as to his knowledge of allegations ofabuse and/or mi;­ treatment of detainees between 16 Sep 03 and 22 Dec 03. iv. MAJ.CJTF-7 LTC.asked MAJ.o respond to inqui ies by the ICRC during the fall of 2003. When ca e to testifylhe can explain the ICRC inquiries and testify as to his response on behalf of CJTF-7. 2. If the Government contends that any Defense requested witness is not reasonably available under R.C.M. 405(g), the Defense requests that you make a determination under R.C.M. 405(g)(2). Your determination should be made afterkhe Government explains on the record the specific efforts made to locate and contact the witne sses and after consultation with your legal advisor as to Whether or not the witness is reasonably available. If deemed reasonably unavailable, the Defense requests that a specific factUal reason be stated on the record. 3. The DefenSe requehts that the following documents and evidence be produced to the Defense at the Article 32 heariiig, LAW with R.C.M. 405(f)(1i)) and 405(g)(1)(B): a. All copies of ID reports (including 28s), military police reports, or any other reports made by a law enforc ment agency relevant to this investigation to include the Agent Activity Reports and the Agen Activity Summaries compiled by the following investigators: 5 002411 AETV-BGJA-TDS SUBJECT: 'Article 32 Request for Witnesses and Production of Evidence — United States v. SPC Megan M Ambuhl i.SA xi.SA ii. SA xii. SA iii. SA xiii. S iv. SA xiv. SA v.SA xv.SA vi. SA xvi. SA vii. SA xvii. S viii. SA xviii. S ix. SA xix. SA x. SA xx. SA b. All evidence seized from the crime scene or any related evidence be present or made available for inspection by the Defense and the Investigating Officer including but not limited to any evidence seized as a result of the CID searches conducted throughout this investigation; c. Any and all ROE/RUF guidance established by 372" MP Company from October 2003 to the present; d. Any and all OPORDs that pertain to the Abu Ghraib mission to include the ROE/RUF card then in effect; e. Training records for SPC Megan Ambul and the co-accused; f. Complete medical records for the Iraqi detainees listed in paragraph lb of this Memorandum; g. Any and all unit level and/or IG complaints regarding the treatment of Abu Ghraib detainees lodged against any solider assigned to the 372n d MP Company, the 800 th MP Brigade,the 205th MI Company, the 325 th MI Battalion, or the 20th MI Brigade; h. A complete copy of the unit counseling files to include any records of nonjudicial punishment or administrative action for the following soldiers: i. SPC M_ egan M_ . Ambuhl viii. SSG ii. SGT ix. CPL iii. SP x. SPC iv. SPC xi. SPC v. SGT .xii. SG vi. SSG xiii. SPC vii. PFC xiv. SPC i. Copies of any relief-in-place (RIP) schedules or training schedules between the 72" MP Company (Las Vegas, Nevada) and the 372 nd MP Company, to include any OPORDERs; 6 002412 AETV-BGJA-TDS SUBJECT: Article 32 Request for Witnesses and Production of Evidence — United States v. SPC Megan Al. Ambuhl j. A copy of the final CID case file with exhibits, of case number 0005-04-CID149, as referenced in the AIR of SA Eadated 22 Jan 04, regarding a K-9 incident at Abu Ghraib; k. Copies of the two Working Papers referenced by BG Karpinski in her 24 th Dec 03 letter toMs..ICRC Protection Coordinator; 1. Co ies of the ICRC reports dated Oct 03 and Dec 03 obtained by CID from CW4 Mr as referenced in SA.AIR, dated 5 Feb 04; m. Copies of the official detainee file (as referenced in para. 3-4 of the Camp Vigilant Operations Procedures SOP (draft)) of the detainees listed in para. lb of this Memoradum. At a minimum, the defense requests the name, detainee sequence number, capture number, capture date and crime charged with or suspected of for the detainees listed in para. lb of this Memorandum; n. A copy of the "Behavior Modification Plan" as referenced in para. 3-12 of the SOP; o. A copy of the draft of Chapter 4 as referenced on pages 9-10 of the SOP; p. A copy of the parallel AR 15-6 Investigation concerning the charged offenses and the actions and conduct of the leadership of the 372nd MP Company and the 800th MP Brigade (toinclude, any documents maintained by the AR 15-6 Officer to include his or her appointmentmemorandum); q. Copies of any Press Releases or PAO information disseminated by the command regarding the charges faced by SPC Ambuhl and her co-accused, to include documents drafted by the Office of the Staff Judge Advocate for release; r. Copies of any administrative action, relief-for-cause documents, letters of reprimand, and OERs/NCOERs for the members of the commands of 372" I MP Company and 800th MP Battalion who were in command from October 2003 through March 2004; s. Copies of any SIGACTS, FRAGOs, OPORDERs, or other similar documents related to the ICRC visits to Abu Ghraib from October to December 2003; t. Copies of any documents obtained or produced by MAJIIIII as a result of his response by CJTF-7 to allegations of abuse and/or mistreatment of detainees between 16 Sep 03 and 22Dec 03; u. Copies of all documents, including documents of UCMJ or administrative action,regarding 3 soldiers from the 519 th who ordered a female detainee to strip as referenced by CPT n the preferral packet; 7 002413 AETV-BGJA-TDS SUBJECT: Article 32 Request for Witnesses and Production of Evidence — United States v. SPC Megan M Ambuhl v. Copies of all documents, including documents of UCMJ or administrative action, regarding the 'Spence Incident,' as referenced by CW2 . n the preferralpacket; w. Copiesi of all documents, including documents of UCMJ or admiailtraciye action, from the August 2003 incident where 2 or 3 soldiers were disciplined by LTCafter a CID investigation into abuse, as referenced by nu/um JIDC, MI, Operations Officer, asreferenced in the preferral packet; x. Copies ' f all negative counselings, UCMJ records, and records of administrative actionregarding the i. slowing soldiers from 4 fil Platoon, 372' . Company: SPC11111.11. SPC SP.SPC11.111SPC map SPC111111111pd SSG y. Copies f all work schedules maintained by the 372" MP Company or higher headquarters s owing which soldiers were scheduled to work which shifts at cell blocks la and lb during Oct ber, November and December 2003; z. The De ense reserves the right to ask for additional evidence, as it becomes known duringthe Article 32 nvestigation. 4. If the Gove.ent contends that any Defense requested evidence relevant to this case is not reasonably av ilable under R.C.M. 405(g), the Defense requests that you make a determination under R.C.M 05(g)(2). This determination should be made after the Government counsel explains on th record the specific efforts made to locate and produce the evidence and consultation *th your legal advisor as to whether the evidence is reasonably available. 5. The Defense objects to consideration by the I0 of the following evidence: a. Various Documents (From Detainee Medical Records, 372" MP CO, Medical Section,Abu Ghraib). The case file contains approximately 16 pages of assorted medical documents obtained from Abu Ghraib. These documents do not purport to be connected to any alleged victims or to SPC Ambuhl. Further, several of these records are dated outside of the alleged time period of abuse and have no relevance to the charged offenses. b. Detainee Medical Records (From the 372' .CO, Medical Section, Abu Ghraib). The case file contains approximately 30 pages of medical records that do not pertain to any of thealleged victims of the charged offenses. These records do not purport to have any connection to SPC Ambuhl or the charges she is facing. c. Hard-cell Medical Log (From the 372" MP CO, Medical Section, Abu Ghraib). The case file contains approximately 48 pages of a medical log. These documents do not purport to be connected to any alleged victims or to SPC Ambuhl. These documents do not go to any elementof any of the charged offenses. 8 002414 AETV-BGJA-TDS SUBJECT: Article 32 Request for Witnesses and Production of Evidence — United States v. SPC Megan M. ./Imbuhl L. d. Tr atment Logs (From B Company, 109th Area Support Medical Battalion, BIAP). The case file contains approximately 61 pages of treatment logs. These documents do not purport to be connected to any alleged victims or to SPC Ambuhl. Further, a significant number of these documents (49 pages) are outside the time period for the charged offenses and are simply irrelevant to the pending Article 32(b) investigation. e. Canvas Interview Worksheets. The case file contains approximately 140 canvas interview worksheets that do not contain any pertinent information relevant to the ongoing investigation. Consideration of this collective piece of evidence is prejudicial to SPC Ambuhl. Any potential probative value does not outweigh the prejudice to the soldier under M.R.E. 403. f. Investigative Worksheets. The case file contains approximately 150 investigative worksheets that do not contain any pertinent or relevant information regarding the ongoing investigation. The investigative worksheets are not an exhibit to the CID report and are irrelevant to the Article 32(b) investigation. g. Photographs & Video Clips. The case file contains several hundred digital photographs and numerous digital video clips. The defense objects to the consideration of the images unless the relevant images can be tied specifically to SPC Ambuhl. None of the photographs were seized from SF'C Ambuhl or from any electronic equipment belonging to her. Consideration of the photographs as a group is highly prejudicial to SPC Ambuhl. At a minimum the Government should be required to establish some nexus between SPC Ambuhl and the photographs the Government wishes to be considered. 6. The Defen'se expresses the following additional concerns regarding the Article 32 pretrial investigation in this case: a. Receipt of Legal Advice. The defense specifically requests that the I0 make all determination's on questions of law after referring to R.C.M. 405, DA Pam 27-17, and based on advice from your legal advisor. As per DA Pam 27-17, para.1-2e, SPC Ambuhl and defense counsel are entitled to be informed of any legal advice received by the I0 and the opportunity to reply to that legal advice. The Defense proposes that both parties be present during receipt of legal advice, that you restate the legal advice on the record, and that both parties be given the opportunity to respond to that advice before you make a determination on a question of law. b. Marking Evidence. For record purposes, the Defense requests that you have the reporter mark each piece of evidence received and catalog the evidence. Please do not admit the "packet" as part of the record. This will prevent the parties and you from determining which evidence has been objectedl to and ruled upon. I i c. Deliver* of Report to Defense Counsel. The Defense requests that the convening authority direct deliverYi of your report to the Defense Counsel instead of SPC Ambuhl. See, R.C.M. 405(j)(3). To effect this delivery, I ask that you state my request in your report, and request that 9 002415 AETV-BGJA-TDS SUBJECT: Article 32 Request for Witnesses and Production of Evidence — United States v. SPC Megan M Ambuhl the report be delivered with a personal certification and date annotation so that the Defense may comment on the report within five (5) days allocated UP R.C.M. 405 (j)(4). Defense counsel and SPC Ambuhl are located in different physical jurisdictions and service upon SPC Ambuhl can not be considered the same as service on Defense Counsel. d. Verbatim Testimony. The Defense requests a verbatim transcript of the testimony presented during the Article 32 hearing. Alternatively, and lAW R.C.M. 405(h) and its applicable discussion, the Defense requests that each witness swear to the truth of his or her testimony, after it is reduced to writing. 7. If I may be of further assistance in this matter, please contact me via email at .:or by DNVT phone at: 553 .or 553-1111 //original signed// CPT, JA Trial Defense Counsel 10 002416 DOD 001316 .16 4,,,• g... 6 • t:.,{­ .:4 ..", .f. • • 1.,. v ,„. . V t.. !.;.I. .04 Y.* It 4 , ' V. 11 • 4. **am ......,....N.. 4- ii. *SA 1ii 1,, "rirr-.1. • 1 f 104 0 % II^ '4'14444 , g. -te e. NI, 11 :+14. ieigge;i ' , 'it :t 4 r I • le; .: ,.,, ! . .;. . li jk" W44,. t 41-r; •*4 1. t ' , i V1,4 t4' . -413 . 3 % ,I 4 . .1 ...1'. A ¦ . • 2 3. • ,- ..-ii — ... ::‘ t.41 f • i, 1 . , q414 .3 -\'' 4$ 11 i ' 4 a 11''4" i I 7{' f •....,.1.' '.• .„ {.44 4bil . 4 . { ik-{,:':{IP.{ r4 s „. • , ‘,1 .. ‘ ,3 . . T .,4 41 ,.. • ' t,., . 4$. t* ''' iiks , 7 c., ft 1 , IF 4 1i 1 T Aji •.,!", :4.6 ... ,.• '"' 1 4 A4 At' 4. "Alt Y t': P et. . % „._. . A;f.¦ N , ..: • f. ',, A t - 4 '@,.. ..., 34•4.1000,* 4 1;% '' 1 , ii• %vt, ,,...e..,.." 1A1 1 - . % 9 ! I ,-D V • -.''' 'e 3 1 4vg. ' * V ' -4i1,6/0 .4. t .1... •., t .4 .4 ..,. t .0. 3G2417 COURT-MARTIAL RECORD . NAME A Mauvk Li MESA M M. -s-PC SSN ACTIONS CODED: ASSIGNED. TO: INITIAL PANEL ACCA EKA-14.1--DIM . CcA cLeg...K oP eatAT FINAL COMPANION(S): RETURN THIS FILE TO OFFICE OF THE CLERK OF COURT US ARMY JUDICIARY 901 NORTH STUART STREET, SUITE 1200 ARLINGTON, VA. 2203-4837 VOL ar-OF 1 I 1 VOL(S)- ARMY 2 0 0 4 1 1 3 0 JALS-CC FORM 24 1 tOCTOBER 2000 VOL II of III ORIGINAL COPY VERBATIM' ftECORD OF TRIAL 2 (and accompanying papers) OF AMBUHL, Megan M. .111111•1111 Specialist (NAME: Last, First Middle Initial) (Social Security Number) (Rank) HNC, 16th MP Ede (ABN) III Corps • US Army Victory Base, Iraq (unit/Comntnd Name) (Branch of Service) (Station or Ship) BY GENERALCOURT-MARTIAL CONVENED BY COMMANDING GENERAL (Title of Convening Authority) Headquarters, III Corps (Unit/Command of Convening Authority) TRIED AT Victory Base, Iraq/Mannheim ON 11, 23 and 25 August 2004 (Place'or Places of Trial) (Date or Dates of Trial) COMPANION CASES: SGT SSG SPC SPC SPC r.4 SPC CI= C=0 C.) f-n PFC rn c- 7z1.op-737) a 1-ri c-, -4 and signed the foregoing charges and sPeolfications under oath that he/she is a person subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice and that he/she either has personal .krieWlecige of or has investigated the matters set forth therein and that the Same are true to the best of his/her knowledge and belief. HHC, XVIII Abn Corps 11.111MS 0111/C0("{ Organization of ()Meer 0-3. Trial Counsel Grade{ ------,:31---. -a7 Cape* fo Adel/Neter Oath (See RCM. 30704 - mast be a commissioned ehIcer) 002432 12. on aomce,r,ck tt, the acoined was informed of the:charges against him/her and of (he .name(s) of The eddbeeKti) W*41M aogya.o. Mea R.C.M; 3084ifOatificatiOn cannot be made.) 1:0' rni(Sie. letti folP adq.{Abn) APP AE 09342 040Lallation of h‘nraticliate'Corntnander 04 11/. REOEIFFT suuria.WCOURP.IiktifplAt.P,OfESINGALtTtioRITY. 13. The sworn orusges)Were .hot*. at -: 171'40144w* 4,161! Military Police Brigatlei(AirOorrP) OO)W..P934.. . 1)alightitkin ofmmandor Officer Exercialrtg Smarmy Court:Martial{ kabf 461 FOR TH 1 Commanding Tref Capers* all Officer Signing 14410e.cp't 0-6 PP. 'OREWkE.6i4 OF' 14a. DESIGNATION. CE Referred for trial to the . Court-martial ccinvened by , sahject tp the felleviringinetntotions: 2 or BY command or owiei *peat Name °MOW,{ Oftat Capacity of Offter ttgning On , 1 (caused to be) served a copy hereof on (each ot) the above named accused. Typed Name of Trial Counsel{ Grade or Rank of Thal Counsel ohne: FOOTNOTES 1 WP00.iirK.­ 0440/xfattk 0900,044W.Sighs/POstStinio; .00Prilkeble Wards are Striation, • • - - •{• ,:••• •{' I I' { 0- 41 •".ieNku"{• la., DO FOR 458 ( Y20 CONTINUATION SHEET DD Faint 458, AMBUFIL,. Megan M., SPC: HHC, 16th MP Bde (Abn), ill Corps, Victory Base; Iraq APO AE 0934 Item 10 (continued) CHARGE lit VIOLATION OF THE UCMJ, ARTICLE 93 THE SPECIFICATION: In that Specialist 'Megan Arnbuhl, U.S. Army,- at or near Baghdad Central COrrectichatFaCility, Abu Ghtaib, Iraq, on or about 8 November. 20037 did maltreat SeVeratiracil detainees, persons subleict to her orders, by watching naked detainees in a pyramid of human bodies. CHARGE IV; VIOLATION OF THE UCMJ, ARTICLE 134 THE SPECIFICATION!: In that Specialist Megan M. Ambuhl, U.S. Army, did, at cr near Baghdad Central Comactionat Facility, Atiu.Ghtalk Iraq, on.or about 8 Nov ember 2003 wron tail commit art act with .frittli clettilittas StOft ta eant „Specialist. and nva e 85.4 Ing a group o.s mastOrbaiang, or attemp ng tna.Mita they were located-in a public corridor cl the Baghdad Central Correctional Fability, with other soidiers who photographed or stvetched the detainees' actions. 002434 AFZA-AP-HHC MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD SUBJECT: Servide of Preferfatof Charges Ittthe case of United States Specialist MeoartM. Ambuhl 1, I hereby 'knowledge that the charges against: me were read and preferred on this 20 day of Mei-CH .at 112-1 .hours. Further, I hereby acknowledge receipt of said charge sheet(s) and allied papers, 2. !further unlind that I have an appointment at Trial Defense Services, ph: (302) 838-.triller B12, Cairp Victory, Iraq, at ,4_411 MEGAN M. AMBUHL SPC, USA 002435 OFFICE OF THE CLERK OF COURT US ARMY JUDICIARY ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA 22203-1837 THE RECORD OF TRIAL HAS BEEN REVIEWED FOR RELEASE UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT. THE DOCUMENT[S] DESCRIBED AS FOLLOWS HAVE BEEN REMOVED FROM THIS COPY OF THE RECORD BECAUSE THE RELEASE WOULD BE IN VIOLATION OF THE DOD FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT PROGRAM, DOD 5400.7-R, EXEMPTION (7)(C), 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(7)(C): Criminal Investigation Report Contents cannot be released outside the Department of the Army without the approval of the Commander, United States Army Criminal Investigation Command, Fort Belvoir, VA. 002436 OFFICE OF THE CLERK OF COURT US ARMY JUDICIARY ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA 22203-1837 THE RECORD OF TRIAL HAS BEEN REVIEWED FOR RELEASE UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT. THE DOCUMENT[S] DESCRIBED AS FOLLOWS HAS [HAVE] BEEN REMOVED FROM THIS COPY OF THE RECORD BECAUSE THE RELEASE WOULD BE IN VIOLATION OF THE DOD FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT PROGRAM, DOD 5400.7-R, EXEMPTION 6 and 7(C): Article 15-6 Investigation of the 800th Military Police Brigade 002437 AFZA-AP-CO 2.1 Ari MEMORANDUM FOR Investigating Officer, U.S. v SPC Ambuhl SUBJECT: De dision on Seco d Request for Delay 1. I have revievited the enclos d Defense Second Request for Delay in the case of U.S. vs SPC Megan M. Am• uhl, HHC, 16 th MP BDE (ABN). 2..The request for delay s disapproved. OR 3. This second request f r delay is approved, and the Article 32(b) session in the case of LIS. vs Ambuhl ill be rescheduled for 1 May 2004. Encl as Commanding 002438 REPLY TO ATTENTIO AFRC-CAR- MEMORAN Office, Regio SUBJECT: 211 1. I have rev scheduled the sched 2. The Articl at a time t 3. This delay 4. POC for t DNVT 30 DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY HEADQUARTERS, 420th ENGINEER BRIGADE LSA ANACONDA APO AE 09302-1344 OF Builders in Battle! BA- 20 APR 04 P UM ORO..1M, Trial Defense Counsel, Tikrit Branch Req rst for Delay, United States v. SPC Megan M. Ambuhl wed efense Counsel's.r a dela in theArticle 32(b) investigation 2 as agreed to a delay from or 0 April 2004 wi ed da e of 20 April 2004 to 1 May, 2004. 32(b session in the case of U.S. vs Ambuhl will be rescheduled for 1 May 2004 bed: ermined. s att butable to the defense. s rrie or dum is at :. mil or by phone at 55 //Ori incl Si ed// Article 32 Investigating Officer 002439 DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY HEADQUARTERS, 420th ENGINEER BRIGADE LSA ANACONDA APO AE 09302-1344 REPLY TO ATTENTI OF Builders in Battle! AFRC-CAR- BA-G 20 APR 04 MEMORAN Iii UM 01111111111111111111, Trial Defense Counsel, Tikrit Branch Office, Regio SUBJECT: D fense Request for Informal Meeting, United States v. SPC Megan M. Ambuhl 1. I have rev ewed efense Counsel's request for an informal meeting between Trial Counsel (TC), Def nse unsel (DC) and the Investigating Officer (10). We have all agreed to meet 21 April 21 04 at 1400 hours at the Camp Victory Courthouse. Additionally, DC has requested hat S C Ambuhl participate in the informal meeting and has also re uested that the meeti be Id "On the Record". I have discussed each request with .of CJTF7. is m morandum serves to provide my decision upon these two requests. 2. DC has re and as su 802 and t 3. DC has re prepared t record of taken and surfaced. 4. Please rep to DC. If Investigat ueste that SPC Ambuhl attend the informal meeting. This is an informal meeting 1SP Ambuhl is not entitled to attend. This meeting will be similar to an R.C.M. refor only DC, TC and the IO are to be present. ueste that the informal meeting be transcribed or placed "On the Record". lam hold this informal meeting as requested by DC although there will be no verbatim e me ting published and no transcription taken. It is acceptable for notes to be Will ublish my decisions formally in writing for the record on issues that are y to y attention by 1200 hours on 21 April 2004 whether or not this is acceptable his is of acceptable, we will postpone this meeting until the ART 32(b) n sc eduled for 1 May, 2004. 5. POC for t me orandum is sumpat or by phone at DNVT 53 //Original ignedll Article 32 In estigating Officer 002440 DOD 001340 JTF7-16th MP BDE SJA NCOIC From: us.Ermy.mil Sent: 4 3:35 PM To: JTF7 16 Cc: SV s lc, CJTF7-OPLAW Subject: Re: RE: RE: Request for Delay Card for IMIMMINhis I just got off the phone with. . He has'agreed to a delay to 1 MAY 2004 for the ART 32 investigati n. This is attributable to the defense. I will follow up with a mem s stating this. 410111¦NOMM MAJ, EN S-4, 420th EN Bricrade DNVT "Let's Roll" 9-11-01 "The only thing necessary for the Triumph of evil is for good men to do nothing" - Edmund Burke (1729-1797) Original Message . From: vcmain.hq.c5.army.mil > Date: Tuesday, April 20, 2004 :20 am Subject: RE: RE: Request for Delay • Sir: • Are you available at 1500 today at the courthouse? allIMINIMP > wants to go over some preliminaries as to availability of witnesses. • VR > 16th MP BDE (ABN) > Trial Co > 302-588- > AIRBORNE. .Original Message . > From:. @us.army.mil [ > Sent: on ay, April 19, 2004 7:31 PM > To: _. .mil > Cc:. CJUT/-OPS OSJA; >411¦1110111 > M CPT CJTF7 16MP; eIIIIIIIIIIIIINMIMIMIMIMCJTF7-16th MP BDE SJA NCOIC; > R LTC CJTF7-OPLAW > Subject: Re: RE: Request for Delay >411ROMMENNO > please forward the attached memos to 411.111.111111. for his > review/approval.If we cannot gain his approval in time for > tomorrow's investigation, we must > be prepared to proceed as originally scheduled. 002441 1 • > S-4, 420th EN Brigade > DNVT • > "Let's Roll" 9-11-01 >"The only thing necessary for the Tr umph of evil is for good men > to do > nothing" - Edmund Burke (1729-1797) . Original Message . > From: -. > Date: Monday, Aril 19, 2004 2:53 pm1 > Subject: Re: RE: Request for Delay > . Sir, >> > > Thank you for our patience. A fo al request is attached. > Again, I have of yet heard from.but will inform the > > government as oon as I do. Thank ou for your consideration of > . this request. >> > . V/R, >> >> > >. , JA > > Trial Defense ounsel > > Tikrit Branch •ffice (FOB Danger) > Region IX > > DNVT: 553. or 55311111 » E-mail: >> > > . Original Message > > From: > > Date: Monday, april 19, 2004 5:34 pm > > Subject: Re: R : Request for Delay >> > > )4111110 > > .> I will keep y eyes open. >> > >> > > > MAJ, EN > > > S-4, 420th E Brigade > > . DNVT 302 559 >> > > > > > > > . Origin:1 Message . > > > From:.M 1LT QJTF7-OPS OSJA" > > .*1>Date: Monday, April 19, > 2004 > > > 1:49 pm > > > Subject: RE: Request for Delay >> > > > > > Sir, >> > > > > > > I just spo e to 1111111M1111111. She is having difficulty > > > accessing > > > > her email > > > > and she is currently meeting with her client. She requested >I > > > > notify you > > > > that she w 11 be submitting a formal request for delay > within > > the .> > > > next hour. > > > > The govern ent does not object to a reasonable delay, so 0 2 4 4 2 > long 2 > > as > > > > the delay > > > > is credited to the defense. >> > > > > > > v/r > > »1111111111111.111.111111111. >> > > > > > > . Original Message. > > > > From:.! ,. >> > > > > Sent: Monday, Aril 19, 2004 07:4 > > > > To.•.. . >> > > Cc: 011111110@svg-law.com;.CJTF7 16MP; 1101011110 01111111111111111 > > > > CJTF7-OPS OSJA; 11111111 11111041110 CJTF7-16th MP BDE SJA > > > . NCOIC; > > > >.C1TF7-OPLAW > >. > Subject: Re: Request for Delay >> > > >> > > 011111111111111.1. > > > > please forward a formal request for delay by 1700 hours today > > > detailing the requested length of delay and the specific reasons >> » for the > > > > delay. In the absence of a formal request, we will proceed > . with >> > > the ART > > > > 32 hearing tomorrow, 20 April, here at Camp Victory. >> > > >> »filialMier, please > > > > prepare to have SPC Ambuhl brought to Camp Victory for the > ART 32 > > > > Investigation tomorrow, 20 April. >> > > > > > I am currently at Victory nd can be reached at 537- . > >01.111111111.1.1111.> > > > ».1.1111111111111111/MM >> > > INEEM > > > . S-4, 420th > > » DNVT 302 559 >> > > >> > > . Original Messaae ---4- > > > > Fr(. _ > > > > Date: Monday, April 19, 204 9:46 am > > > > Subject: Re: Request for D lay >> > > > > > > . Sir, >> > > > > > > > . I have e-mailed.but have not heard back from > him > > yet. . >> > > > > > > . He does not have a copy f the packet and apparently, was > > just > > > > > retained last week. >> > > > > > > > > Currently, I am working ut of the TDS Victory office but >I > do > > > > . have limited access to e mail. >> > > > > > > > V/R >> > > >> > > > • > > > > Trial Defense Counsel 0 0 2 4 4 3 • > > > > Tikrit Branch Office (FO Danger) 3 > > > » Region IX > > > > > DNVT: .553-1IIPor 553 > > > > . E-mail: r. • >> > > > > > > > > . Origina0. Message >> > » Fror > > > > > Date: Monday, April 19, GUU4 9:ti am > > > > > Subject: Re: Request for Delay >> > > > > > > > > >.how much of a delay are you requesting? > > > > > > Additional) , SMOMINOMMIPplease provide a memorandum > (as > > > > > opposed > > > > > > to an emailD requesting the delay. Please forward the > > > > > memorandum. II > > > > > > ASAP so th4 we can work this immediately. >> > > > > >> > > > >> > > > > > > > > > S-4, 420th N41134gade > > > > » DNVT 302 55 >> > > > > >> > > > > > > > > > > . Origi al Message >> > > > > Ffom > > > > > > Date: Sunda , April 18, 2004 2:57 pm > > > > > > Subject: Re uest for Delay >> > > > > > > > > > > > Sir, >> > > > > > > > > > > > > Good eventing. Please accept my personal apologies for > > the > > > > > > > lateness pf this req est. >> > > > > > > > > > > > > The defene requests a delay in the Art. 32 hearing > > > . scheduled > > > > > . for > > > > > > . 20 April 004 in the case of U.S. v. Ambuhl. >> > > > > > > > > > > > > I just re eived notice today that SPC Ambuhl has hired > > > >111! »MOM, >> > > > > , a civilian attorney from Washington, D.C., to > > > > . represent > > > > > > > her in hr pending c se. Both SPC Ambuhl an > eralle > > > > > desire > > > > > > > his prese ce at the Article 32 hearing. >> > > > > > > > > > > > > s e-mail address is in the "cc" line of > this > > e- > > > > > mail. > > > > > > > His furth4. contact Information is as follows: Om. »40, •> > > > > •> > > > > >., 1101 15th Street, NW, > > Suite > > > . 202, > > > > > > > Washington, D.C., 20005. His phone number is: (202) > 828- >>411011 > > » > > > > > > . Thank you for your c$nsideration of this request. >> > > > > > > > > > > » V/R, >> > > > > > >> > > > > > 002444 4 1. > > > > > > CPT,. > JA > > > > > > > Trial Def nse Counse > > > > > > Tikrit Br nch Office (tOB Danger) > > > > > > Region IX > > > > > > > 55 401. or 5 3- DNVT:. > > > > > > > E-mail: mil > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > 002445 5 AFZA-AP-I0 MEMORANDUM FOR Com nder, 16th Military Police Brigade (Airborne), Victory Base, Iraq APO AE 42 SUBJECT: Request for Dely 1. In the case of U.S. vs SP egan M. Ambuhl, HHC, 16th MP BDE (ABN), the Defense has submitted the a tt ched request for delay until 20 April 2004. 2. The Article 32 was initial! heduled for 5 April 2004. Defense counsel received the case file on 26 rch 2004, and is based FOB Danger in Tikrit. Defense needs more time to eet with its client and go over the entire case file. 3. SPC Ambuhl is also consid ring hiring a civilian attorney. 4. The Trial Counsel recomrin nds approval of the delay as requested by defense. 5. I concur with both counsel nd recommend that the request for delay be approved. 6. The POC for this memo iI e undersigned at 559 Encl as 11111111mmo Investigating Officer 002446 DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY HEADQUARTERS, 420th ENGINEER BRIGADE LSA ANACONDA APO AE 09302-1344 REPLY TO ATTENTION OF Builders in Battle! . AFRC-CAR-EBA-LG 19 APR 04 MEMORANDUM FOR Commander, 16th Military Police Brigade (Airborne), Victory Base, Iraq APO AE 09342 SUBJECT: 2" Defense Request for Delay, United States v. SPC Megan M. Ambuhl 1. In the case of U.S. vs SPC Megan M. Ambuhl, HHC, 16 th MP BDE (ABN), the Defense has submitted the attached 2". request for delay in the ART 32 investigation to 20 May, 2004. 2. The Article 32 was initially scheduled for 5 April 2004. Defense Counsel was granted a request for delay to 20 April 2004. 3. SPC Ambuhl has retained a civilian attorney and is requesting this second delay to allow him to travel to Iraq to attend and prepare for the investigation. 4. Trial counsel recommends approval of a 7-10 day delay from 20 April or no later than 1 May 2004. 5. As the investigating officer, I recommend a 10 day delay as a reasonable delay and ask that you approve Defense Counsel's request for a 2' delay for a period of 10 days. 6. POC for this memorandum is.at. 1 or by phone at DNVT 5371.0imir //original signed// Article 32 Investigating Officer 002447 DOD 001347 DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY UNITED STATES ARMY TRIAL DEFENSE SERVICE REGION IX, FOB DANGER BRANCH OFFICE APO AE 09392 REPLY TO ATTENTION OF: . AETV-BGJA-TDS 19 April 2004 MEMORANDUM FOR. Article 32 Investigating Officer, Headquarters, 420 th Engineer Brigade, Victory Base, Iraq, APO AE 09342 SUBJECT: Second Request for Delay -- United States v. SPC Megan M. Ambuhl 1. As previously requested by e-mail on 18 April 2004, the defense requests a delay in the Article 32(b) hearing currently scheduled for 20 April 2004. The defense requests a delay until approximately 20 May 2004, for the following reasons: a. On 18 A ril 2004 Trial Defense Counsel was notified formally that SPC Ambuhl obtained civilian counsel, b.ungloe s not have a copy of the preferral packet or copies of any evidence in this case. c. IMO maintains a law practice in Washington, D.C. and has not yet finalized the extensive coordination to travel to Iraq to represent SPC Ambuhl. 2. Further, the government has indicated that the majority of witnesses the defense has requested to testify at the Article 32 hearing are physically unavailable. Granting a delay will allow for continued efforts to produce the requested defense witnesses at the Article 32 hearing. 3. The requested delay is attributable to the defense. If I may be of further assistance in this matter, please contact me via email at. phone at DNVT: 553.0 //.• • Trial Defense Counsel OC 49 11111111111,PT CJTF7 16MP From:. CJTF7 16MP Sent:. Monday, April 9, 0 . 4 6:40 PM To: Cc: CJ-fF7-OPSubJA;11011111@svg-law.comliMMIL J F7.16MP JTF7-16thMPBDESJAN JTF7-0PL. Subject:. RE: RE: Request tor. Delay Sir: The government will not object to a delay of 7-10 days and no later than 1 May 2004. The first request for a delay from 5 April until 20 April was requested to review the file and seek civilian counsel. That date was not met. 26 days, approximate _y 1 month, total delay should be adequate to review the file and ob aLn civilian counsel. If civilian counsel was retained on the 18th o -April, 13 days should be sufficient time to get to Baghdad. VR MP BDE Trial Counsel 302-58801MP AIRBORNE! . Original Message. From: [mailto:j. Sent: Monday, April 19, 2004 5:53 M To:.us.army.mil Cc:.CJTF7-OPS OFJA; =01101111101 CJTF7-16th MP BDE SJA NCOIC; CJTF7-0PLAW ubject: Re: RE: Request for Delay Sir, Thank you for your patience. A to mel request is attached. Again, I have not yet heard fromalIMMID but will inform the government as soon as I do. Thank you for your c nsideration of this request. V/R, A Trial Defense Counsel Tikrit Branch Office (FOB Danger) Region IX DNVT: 55311111Por 553111. E-mail . Original Message . From. Date: Monday, April 19, 2004 5:34 pm Subject: Re: RE: Request for Delay >1111111 > I will keep my eyes open. 002449 1 >11111¦11111 > MAJ, EN > S--4, 420th > DNVT 302 559 > . Ori > From: CJTF7- PS OSJA" Monday, April 19, 2004 > 1:49 pm > Subject: RE: Request for Delay > . Sir, >> > > I just spoke to 11111111.11WS e is having difficulty > accessing > . her email > > and she is currently meeting wit her client. She requested I • > notify you > > that she will be submitting a fo mal request for delay within > the > > next hour. The government does not object t a reasonable delay, so long as . > the delay • > is credited to the defense. >> > > v r >> >> > > . Original Message. > > From: > .Sent: Monday, April 19, 2004 -0 > > To: > >.vg-law.com;.CJTF7 16MP; 1111111111 >> > >.JA;.CJTF7-16th MP BDE SJA >> > >.JTF7-OPLAW > >.: Request for Delay ec :. >> >> > > please forward a formal request for delay by 1700 hours today > > detailing the requested length of delay and the specific reasons > > for the > > delay. In the absence of a formal request, we will proceed with > > the ART • > 32 hearing tomorrow, 20 April, hire at Camp Victory. •> > >.please > prepare to have SPC Ambuhl broug t to Camp Victory for the ART 32 > > Investigation tomorrow, 20 April >> > > I am currently at Victory and ca be reached at 537-frarirara >> > > > >0111111111111111 > > -4, 420th Elite > . DNVT 302 559 >> > > . Oriainal Messaae >> F > > Date: Monday, April 19, 2004 9:4 am > > Subject: Re: Request for Delay >> > > .> > > Sir, 002450 2 > > I have e-mailed Mr.11111. but have not heard back from him 2 > yet. >> > > > He does not have a copy of thelpacket and apparently, was just > > > retained last week. >> > > > > Currently, I am working out of the TDS Victory office but I do > > > have limited access to e-mail., >> > >» V R > > > > > > > > > Trial Defense Counsel > > > Tikrit Branch Office. (FOB Dangr) > > > Region IX > > > 553. DNVT:.or 55311111, > > > E-mai > > > > > > . Original Message . > » From > > > Date:.April 19,. Monday,.20041 9:21 am > > > Request for Delay. Subject: Re:. > > > > > > >.how much of a delay are you requesting? > > > >. itionally,.ease provide a memorandum (as > » opposed > > > > to an email) requesting the delay. Please forward the > > > memorandum > > > > ASAP so that we can work this immediately. >> > > > > > > >> > > > > > > S-4, 420th EN Brigade > > > . DNVT 302 559-1111111 >> > > >> > > > > > > . Original Messaae . > > > > From: _ > > > > Date: Sunday, April 18, 2004 2:57 pm > > > > Subject: Request for Delay >> > > >> > » Sir, >> > > > > > > > > Good evening. Please accept my personal apologies for the > > > > . lateness of this request. >> > > > > > > > > The defense requests a delay in the Art. 32 hearing scheduled > > > . for > > > > > 20 April 2004 in the case of U.S. v. Ambuhl. >> > > > > > > > >.received notice today that SPC Ambuhl has hired Mr. >> > > > > > > SS a civilian attorney from Washington, D.C., to > > . represent > > > > > her in the pending case. Both SPC Ambuhl and UMW > > . desire > > > > > his presence at the Article 32 hearing. >> > > > > > > > 111111111Ns e-mail address is in the "cc" line of this e- > > . mail. > > > > > His further contact information is as follows: 5. 1101 15th Street, NW, Suite > > 202, > > > > > Washington, D.C., 20005. His phone number is: (202) 828111111 >> > > > > > > > > Thank you for your consideration of this request. 3 > > > > > > > > > V/R, > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > JA PT,. > > > > Trial Defense Counsel > > > > (FOB Danger) > Tikrit Branch Office. > > > > Region IX > > > > 553. DNVT: r 553IIIIIIp > > > > > E-mail: > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > >.> > > > 002452 4 DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY 372 .d MILITARY POLICE COMPANY APO AE 09432 REPLY to ATTENTION! OF 12 April 04 MEMORANDUM THRU Staff Judge Advocate, III Corp FOR LTG Thomas Metz, CG, ET Corps . SUBJECT: Rebuttal of AR 15-6 for 372°aMP Company 1. In reading the AR 15-6 Investigative Report, I found it very thorough, involving subject matter experts in the field of Detention Operations and numerous references to AR's or supporting Documents. It would have been nice to have such a library of resources available when the 372" Military Police was tasked to conduct Detention Operations at the Abu Ghriab Prison Facility. 2. The 372" MP Company was assigned to the Abu Ghriab Prison in October 2003. The Unit assumed responsibility on'17 October 03 after a RIP with the 72" MP Company. Prior to this Mission the Unit had been doing a Law and Order Mission in the city of Al Hillah, TACON to the V4 Marines. The Unit was commended for the outstanding achievements while conducting those operations. 3. During the short 2 week period before Prison Task assumption, a multitude of activities were undertaken, from developing an unimproved living area, service support, force protection, convoy route reconnaissance, learning detention / prison operations, and establishing support and logistics in the area. Abu Ghraib was not just an EPW Operation, but a vague composite of civilian criminals, military detainees, other government detainees, and a host of civilian contract help. 4. These variables complicated by the list of ever increasing numbers of Detainees, CPA, Iraqi Correctional Guards, Prison Reconstruction, limited resources, reduction in our personnel, 12 -hour work shifts, and limited basic life support systems. Least of which was the decision to use a Military Police Combat Support Company to conduct these Detention Operations. Who was responsible for making that decision? Was it beyond the 800 th MP BDE? Our unit had no METL on I/R training or from the mob station prior to our arrival at the prison. Our unit was validated on Combat Support Operations. 5. MG Ryder conducted an assessment of Prison and Detention operations in Iraq, during 13 Oct through 6 Nov 2003. A thorough assessment was conducted at Abu Ghraib. Unfortunately that document or report was never shared with the company or BN working the facility. What could have been corrected if we had the insight of the November Report? Who was the report release too? Is it available to the Prison now? 002453 E- 6. Theodore Roosevelt said "do what you can, with what you have, the best you can." An operational plan was set out to accomplish the mission. The resources of the Company and Battalion were limited, but that could not stop conducting operations at Abu Ghraib. 7. Our unit followed the guidelines for training set forth by BN. We pull our soldiers with civilian correction experience, trained on non lethal weapons, 800 th ROE, Detainee feeding at Ganci, and prison-civil disturbance and extraction. The Re.-port fails to mention any successful aspects of the mission. Those successes were possible because 95% of the company's soldiers "did the right thing." Camp Vigilant stood as a model for efficient Detention Operations with minimal resources, no disturbances and no escapes. 8. Every soldier is trained annually on the Geneva Convention and the Laws of War and another class was given by instructors at Ft Lee during mobilization. It was part of the Validation. What they retained or what was accepted varies with individuals. Reflect on the Army Doctoral policy and training of Sexual Harassment; far less complex than the Geneva Convention as it applies to Detainee Operations. Yet why have there been so many reported or unreported incidents of sexual harassment? A "Zero Tolerance" is in place and yet the Army is "evaluating" its policy. Why are there continued problems? 9. Nearly every day I spent time with my soldiers at the Hard site and Camp Vigilant, various times and varying shifts. A greater emphasis was placed on Camp Vigilant as they were more vulnerable, with fewer assets, fewer constraints, and they had no assigned OIC. Other duties included establishment of the basic life support for the company and integration of the sections into the Battalion. 10. How does this command view the 9/11 hearings? Does it feel the current Administration had the ability to forecast and predict the tragedy? Could or would anything been avoided if the Administration had been better trained or informed? Are they making excuses or is it Monday morning quarterbacking by the hearing committee. 11. What of the Clericill11111. Who was monitoring him and his movement? What of the city of Fallujah? Would a more restrictive Course of Action result in a change of recent events? 12. What is the status of the Abu Gluaib complex now? Are all the corrective measures from MG Ryder and this AR 15-6 in place for a smooth operation? It's difficult to be at all places at all times. To accomplish multiple tasks, others must be put in responsible positions. We were let down by the soldiers placed in those position of responsibility. 13. This was by no means a perfect deployment. The 372" conducted operations through the Iraqi summer under some of the harshest and poorest. conditions while working under the marines in Al Hillah. The Army Logistical and Support assets were not even available until the unit arrived at the prison. The Report refers to the psychological pressures. Yes, these pressures were recognized and mediated by allowing soldiers more comforts while inside their Living Support Areas. Civilian clothing was allowed there but there was an enforced uniform code while on duty or outside the USA's. 002454 l 5. The Unit Conducted 15 Company grade Article 15 proceedings, numerous other situations were handled by First Line Leader Counseling's. Several NCO's were removed from their positions for inappropriate behavior. Standards were enforced. 16. I agree as "leaders" we all have room for improvement. That's why the Army's Doctrine for corrective action is corrective in nature, administered fairly, without prejudice, administered for the development of soldiers. The Soldier's Creed states "leave no fallen comrade behind." These administrative remedies are leaving good soldiers. Yes, there have been documented short comings, but lets not loose site of any gains or benefits from this experience. 17. I agree with the findings of the report; more could have been done to increase the level of awareness. The 372 nd is a Military Police Combat Support Company. Our history and background is not in the Internment / Resettlement, or EPW areas. After being tasked with this mission the BN mandatory training was conducted, experienced civilian correctional soldiers were aligned with critical positions within the Hard site and Camp Vigilant. The Unit had less. than two weeks to prepare for the Operation. The Plan mostly worked. A few individuals, conducting criminal activity, left the boundaries of good training and judgment. Recognize their shortcomings and take the appropriate action. 18. Take into consideration the isolation of the past 82 days waiting for this conclusion. I request any reprimand be filed locally, as an effort to salvage any benefit from this hard and painful experience. I would request you reconsider the administrative remedies recommended and evaluate the future potential, contributions of a soldier. 111111r. 372 '" military Police Company LI 4 3 J 04 ". DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY 372 nd . MILITARY POLICE COMPANY APO AE 09432 REPLY TO ATTENTION OF 12 April 04 MEMORANDUM THRU111111111111111111. Staff Judge Advocate, Ell Corp FOR LTG Thomas Metz, CG, III Corps SUBJECT: Rebuttal of AR 15-6 for . 372nd MP Company 1.After reading the AR 15-6 Investigative Report, I found that it was very thorough and contained many subject matter experts in the field of Detention Operations and numerous references to AR's, FM's and many other supporting documents. Unfortunately none of these were made available to the immediate chain of command nor to the soldiers about to operate the Abu Ghraib Prison. We also have never seen any of the other findings of the prison that were mentioned in the 15-6, MG Ryder's report, for example. Also we were never given a copy of the ICRC reports to take corrective action, we were simply briefed. Had these and other reports been made available corrective action would have been taken, possibly making the dutieS of the MP's safer and easier, and in turn doing the same for the detainees. 2. The Soldiers of the platoon and company received a briefing of cultural awareness and basics of the Geneva Convention at the mobilization site. However I did not have access to the Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War to post at locations throughout the hard site of Abu Ghraib. I did ask, on several occasions, to be provided with some form of what was. ected by the MP's and what they were and were not to do. This request was made to.and 111111111oth of whom were with the MI BDE..was with the SJA. We did have a copy of the 800 111 MP BIDE ROE and a copy of this was poste at every tier in the hard site as well as the MP's office. If not posted on the wall it was posted on the MP's clipboard which also contained the inmate numbers of those housed on that tier. 3. I was the NCOIC of the hard site, I Worked directly for the OIC of the hard sitelll MIMI took a managerial role within the prison. There were two shift NCOIC's One for day shift (0400-1600) the other for night shift (1600-0400). I worked an over lapping shift of 1000­0100 so that I was able to work with all of the soldiers in my platoon. I also did this to make it easier for the soldier of the platoon to see me if there were any concerns that needed to be addressed. I made checks of the prison routinely, to include the towers, tiers and the health clinic. I worked extensively for the first several weeks after we took over operations from the 72 nd MP Company working on a data base where we could effectively track inmates. This data base included the names of the inmates, their Inmate Number and their cell assignment. It also noted any specific information that was pertinent, such as TB patients, sentenced inmates, etc. This kind of information was not easily obtained from the BN and allot of times their information was incorrect. This data base was developed to make tracking of prisoners and head 96 counts easier for theguards, and we were then able to give the BN a correct roster digitally when , requested. I also made regularly checks on the water tank and generator room, to ensure that there was enough water for the detainees and to ensure that power went uninterrupted when ever possible. I also tried to keep track of maintenance concerns and tried by best to have these fixed in a timely manner. I relied on the shift NCOIC's and the shift SOG to take the supervisory role of the guards working the site for their specific shift. After .ad gone home in December for -REFRAD, I was instructed bylining to more closely supervise the operations at the hard site to include tier 1, in which I did. But as always to accomplish multiple tasks, others must be put in responsible positions. Most of those soldiers did an outstanding job, however we were let down by a few soldiers placed in those position of responsibility. A few individuals, conducting criminal activity, left the boundaries of good training and judgment. Recognize their shortcomings and deal with them. 4. The soldiers of the 372 nd MP Company were trained on the common tasks of EPW procedure, but not IR operations. The 372" MP Company is a combat support element of the Military Police Corps, therefore at the mob site we trained specifically on combat support . operations, to include battlefield circulation control, convoy escorts, close quarters combat, and some law enforcement. We carried out allot of these duties during the first part of our mission in Al Hillah Iraq where we were OPCON to the 1/4 Marine BN. We were unaware that our mission would eventually be Internment and Resettlement Operations. Had we know this long in advance of starting the mission we would have been able to adequately retrain ourselves for this type of mission. Because of the lack of knowledge and in turn the lack of training we had to rely on the civilian experience of a few members of the company to train the rest of the company in the two weeks prior to assuming the operations at the prison and then an ongoing OJT. Prior to taking this mission we made it very clear to the chain of command that we were inexperienced in this type of operation. 5. The soldier who allegedly stomped on a detainee's hands and feet was not reported by . me because I did not witness any physical contact. I entered the B side of wing 1, walked up the steps to retrieve some paper work, I had noticed that some detainees had been brought in and looked down at the A side and saw on of the guards stomp his foot once, but could not by my vantage point see why he was stomping. Judging by the reaction of the detainee, or lack there of, I had no reason to believe that any contact had been made. The detainee did not flinch nor did he cry out in pain as if he had been struck. I then called for the soldier to leave the tier and return back to his station, the shift NCOIC, 111111111n, and the tier NCOIC,1111111 were both present, and both are corrections officers as civilians they seemed to have control of the detainees. This statement was given by me to CID during their investigation. The soldier was later counseled and removed from the hard site for allegations of verbally abusive activity against detainees in tier 3A. This counseling was given to him on 16 November.2003 and he was moved into a position within force protection which limited his contact with the detainees. I would have and never will condone any abusive activity, verbal or physical, towards anyone, be it friend or foe. I and other soldiers willingly donated items from our care packages for use be the inmates in the prison. Items such as shampoo, soap, toothpaste, etc, these supplies were difficult to get through the CPA supply system. Many of the detainees did not have shoes, the company supply SGT allowed me to sign out 2 boxes of socks to hand out to the inmates with no shoes. For the juveniles we brought in gum and candy to reward them for good behavior or for a work detail of cleaning. The care and welfare of the detainees were priority to me, the Iraqi people were taught by Saddam to hate the Americans, I wanted to prove to them that we were not the bad guys that he made us out to be.. 002457 6. Since we have been suspended from the operations at the prison and the company, we have been treated as guilty. We have not until this point been given a chance to defend ourselves. We were initially told that we would be suspended for 7-10 days and to pack for a week, this was three months ago. The actions of a few individuals have broken the moral of the soldiers and the leaders of the company. Statements were made that the chain of command had no knowledge of the acts of abuse, in which we did not. These acts were carried out at times when the chain was not around, our fault lines in the fact that we trusted an experienced E-6 and civilian corrections officer in the shift supervisory role and an experienced corrections officer as the tier NCOIC. In an effort to gain any benefit and knowledge from this painful and difficult experience, I request that you reconsider the administrative remedieS recommended and evaluate the future potential of a soldier and NCO. 411111111111111116 PLATOON SERGEANT 372' Military Police Company 0 024 DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY 32O nd MILITARY POLICE COMPANY APO AE 09432 REPLY TO ATTENTION OF 12 April 04 MEMORANDUM Staff Judge Advocate, Ea Corp FOR LTG Thomas Metz, CG, Corps . SUBJECT: Rebuttal of AR 15-6 forill1111 372nd MP Company 1. This is my rebuttal, of the 15-6 investigation for the incidents at Abu-Ghurayb Prison. After reading through the entire packet several times, I can easily defend all the allegations against me and my soldiers. However, I am quit certain that the outcomes have been decided and a response is only a formality at this point The first thing I want to say is" I accept full responsibility for the actions of the soldiers of the 372 nd MP CO." I full a ree that I should have .a.er job at supervising them I had assigned an OIC . and a NCOIC.to' • oversee operations during this period. We are a Combat Support Company so I concur with the fact that we are not trained in UR functions. We completed the mandatory training required by the 320th BN and a two week RIP with the 72' d MP CO. We did everything as they were and improved on all areas of accountability and training of the IP's. At the MOB station we trained according to our IvLETL which is consistent with a CS mission. 2.1111111. statement in the investigation is inaccurate. He was not present during the escapes and was assigned the escort missions at the BN. His platoon did a geat job , but the escapes are noted in the report. Also, because he was doing an escort mission during the abuses, I believe he is mistaken for . and should be excluded from being held accountable in this 15-6. 3. Anytime the command was made aware of any situations we were extremely proactive. I have documentation to support the disciplinary measures and all the counseling that was administered during this deployment. I strongly disagree with any reference of an undisciplined atmosphere... 4. The first half of this mission we were TACOM to the 'A Marines and we performed a L&O, Police 'Training Academy, Police Force Mission in the city of Al-Hila ,Iraq. We performed extremely well and this company received high praise from the Marines. All the extra training that we focused on at Ft.Lee probably saved a few of my soldier's lives. I am extremely glad we had the opportunity and would not change anything we did there. It would have been nice to know out mission so. we could have focused training toward a specific mission. 5. The only thing to decide here is where do you put the letter of reprimand? I guess if you go from what CNN said we will all receive letters that will effectively end our careers. I had dreams before this deployment started to someday lead a BN. The important thing here is my company 0 0 45 0 knows that the leadership did there absolute best and we will continue to hold our heads high. I would hope you will consider the past three months we have been isolated and confined from my company as part of the punishment afforded to us Unlike the General Officer appointed above me, I take the responsibility of what my soldiers did. It's easy sitting back as the Monday morning qUarterback and second guessing everything. We had numerous visits by Gen Sanchez and many other dignitaries and experts from CPA and ICRC. In all those visits, no one mentioned that we should post the Geneva Convention or why isn't there an SOP from the Brigade. I wasn't aware the Geneva Convention had to be Posted or I would have asked someone to get us a copy. This company was undermanned and under trained for this mission. Regardless of that, they still performed well and it's only the actions of a few ignorant people that caused this entire event. As I told the General during the 15-6, It would not of mattered if the policies were posted or not, it would not of stopped these particular soldiers from performing there actions. There was an SOP for Bucca and they had a similar incident. I hope that I can continue to stay in .the military, before this incident I was. once very proud and actually volunteered to be here. This company accomplished and affected the lives of many Iraqi citizens in a very positive way. It's amazing that the entire chain-of-command could be so incompetent .372'd Military Police Company 002460 SWORN STATEMENT For use of this form, see AR 190.45; the proponent agency is ODCSOPS PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT AUTHORITY:.Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 (SSN). PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately ROUTINE USES:.Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval. DISCLOSURE:.Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary. 1. LOCATION 2., DATE (YYYYPIMOD) TIME.4. FILE NUMBER ABU GHRAIB PRISON, ABU GHRAIB, IRAQ 18 JAN 04 'D 01 0003-04-C1D149-83130 ODLE NAME 6. SSN 7 GRADE/STATUS CPT 8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS 372ND MILITARY POLICE COMPANY, CUMBERLAND, MD (DEPLOYED TO ABU GHRAIB, IRAQ) WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH: I am the current warder of the Hard Site at Abu-Ghuraub. I have additional responsibilities of the Vigilant Yard along with escorts, a PSD mission and•company responsibilities. On15 Oct 03, we accepted the mission from the 72nd Military Police Company. I divided all my responsibilities among my platoons to evenly distribute as much of the work load as possible. I assigned one .platoOn to Vigilant the two others split duties at Hard Site. The third platoon is currently still at AL-Hilla performing the PSD Mission. Wing one at the Hard Site is u ed exclusively. by MI and OGA and other government agencies. Wing one .was supervised mostly.by 1111.111111101111101110.was very involved with the interrogation process and the day to day activity that occurred. I spent approximately 70% of my time supervising and coordinating the construction activity at the Hard Site. I also worked closely with the CPA to ensure all aspects of the current contract were fulfilled. The rest of my time was spent assisting and mentoring, the • current Iraqi Warden, operating Cainp Vigilant, and performin company commander tasks. Because I knew it was impossible to accom lis all these missions at once, I assigned . as OIC of the Hard Site...Wm worked closely with and they understood the daily routine of tier one. is a su erb officer of outstanding morale and ethical values and I am convinced he had absolutely no knowledge of any misconduct. would often stay later into the night, on many occasions I can recall him returning. well after midnight. I am not sure o the exact date, but in November of 200' heard there was a 15-6 investigation on a possible situation which involved interrogator abuse to certain female detainees agankpearheaded the investigation. I was told nothing was founded and everything returned as usual:It was not uncommonto see people without clothing, I only ever saw males, I was'told the" whole nudity thing" was an interrogation procedure used by MI, and never thought much of it. We then had a visit by the ICRC and one of there main concerns were the inmates not having clothing or proper bedding. Another major issue was the prison itself was cold. In DeceMber, I heard some stories about ossible abuse but I was never able to confirm or gather sufficient evidence to sustain anything concrete, I immediately assigned (the PLT SOT). to the wing just to ensure all was well. often worked late into the evening and s .. ed to ensuring the proper care was given to all .at '.returned to the States in Dec as a refrad an .continued to work the wing. On a few occasions when .did see something minor he made immediate correc ions. was awoken the morning of the 13th of Jan by my operations ser es t. She • .e me that the BN Commander wished to speak with me. I reported to the 320th TOC area and was greeted by . He proceeded to explain the allegations and he • immediately started to interview ray soldiers and con iscate computers and pictures. When I initially saw the pictures, I was absolutely appalled at what I saw. I specifical e soldiers to certain missions based on there civilian corrections, .. backgrounds. Many of the pictures contained.and.in them. I have since seen and heard many other . stories that absolutely sadden me and I can't believe these two sol ters whom I trusted were mainly responsible for these. actions Some of the pictures contained other people observing or participating in events. I will not defend the actins of my soldiers but I know they were others who had knowledge to illegal activity. In the beginning of our mission, it appeared that the MI tactics were very aggressive and then appeared to taper in intensity as time went along. One of my accused soldiers approached me and said" . He was unclear of the rules and didrinnow what he could or couldn't do" I replied" You are a correctional officer back home, that is the sorriest excuse l have ever heard." I know I am responsible for the site and continue to question myself for not detecting there behavior earlier. [ thought [ had assigned respbrisible soldiers with the right knowledge and was totally unaware of any alleged illegal activity caking place. As I stated earlier, I did not spend a lot of time in wing 1 because I was and continue to be extremely busy with many other duties. I feel that I made reasonable decisions and [ took the appropriate steps in assigning work duties. My company and the U.S Army will probably not recover from this for a long time. I am ashamed of what my soldiers did and embarrassed as well. This company deserves better, we have worked extremely hard only to have a r.,, ,,, soldiers tear down the morale and all our accomplishments. ( only hope these two soldiers can live with there choices because it will likely affect many people for a ton time. ... Q. Who was A. He was the i.ommander for the Battalion, which has departed the area. Q. Do you know where is now? 10. EXHIBIT 11. INITIALS OF P‘RSItIAKING STATEMENT PAGE 1 OF PAGES ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT. {TAKEN AT {DATED { THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUS T BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST SE BE INDICATED. DA FORM 2823, DEC 1998 OA FORM 2823, JUL 72, IS OBSOLETE 0 21,6UtP.A vr.uc EJ-.1 0 , Only LI v 71 V Statement oft./ taken on lg Ian 04, at the Abu Ghraib Prison, Abu Ghraib, Iraq A. He was my 4 th Platoon Leader. He was the OTC for the Hardsite. Q. Have you witnessed any interrogations conducted by MI? 0 Partial. I saw detainees in their rooms without clothing. The interrogators were • within the -rooms talking to the detainees. It was common practice to walk the tier . and see detainees without clothing and bedding. Q. During this time period did any of your soldier inform you of the abuse going on in the tiers? A. No... • Q. Who was assigned to work the tiers during the Midnight shift? .• A. CPL 111111SG PC 1111.1, SPC.which . worked wing I. The other tiers had soldier working them,. but was controlled by thn platoons. They handled their relief and days off. SSGIIIIIIIIIWand•CPL were initially assigned to a separate platoon, bid because of their experience they were brought into the hard site. Q.. What was the investigation conducted byll111111111/ A. It was my understanding it dealt with an interrogator had a female detainee in the nude being interrogated in a closed room. .. Q. Wh was the esult of the investigation? A. handled the investigation and it was unfounded. Q. At the time was their any MP's involved? A. No. Q. Have you had any disciplinary issue with the MP's in the hard site and the detainees? A. I.pulled outallil as the Platoon Sergeant's approached me as he was becoming a little aggressive with the detainees. I pulled hiin out as a preventive measure. Q. When did this occur? A. Towards the end of Nov 03. Q. Describe how he was being aggressive? A. I. was informed about excessive yelling, and being very agitated. The Chain of Command \, as c ncemed for his well being and had him pulled. Q. Was -returned to the hard site after a cooling off period? A. No, he is still working with .‘. Q. Is it. common to have Admin pecialist and Mechanics in the hard site? A. Absolutely not. Q. Did you authorize them in the hard site? A. The mechanic yes, as he was assigned to a 24 hour duty for generator mechanical cE3urpose. The Admin did not have and reason to be there. • Is there an SOP for the hard site operation? Yes. Q. Are all soldiers require to read and understand the SOP? A.Yes. a Is there any documentation showing everyone read and understood the SOP? I do not think so. Q. Are the MP's in the site authorized to conduct their own form of interrogationatZ4i2 Initials. Page c of —1 Pages Statement of., taken on 18 Jan 04, at the Abu Ghia .rison, Abu Gliraib, Iraq A, No. Q. Do you know who authorized them to conduct thesetypes of acts depicted on the pictures previously shown to you? A. No. Q. Was the Chain of Command aware of these types of acts being conducted in the hard site? A. No. -. - Q. What happened when the ICRC walked through the hard site? A. The flist time they were upset with what they saw. They were concerned with the. amount of nudity and the area was cold and damp. The detainees did not have appropriate clothing and bedding. The second visit occurred two weeks ago, and things were much better. There nudity has stopped and they seemed happy with what they saw. Q. Have you heard of Your soldiers being told to give detain€eS' the spetial treatment or something to this affect? A. No. Q. How long has CPLIIIIIIIIRbeen assigned to your unit? A. He just came on board when we mobilized. He was an insert. Q. Have you had any problems with his work performance? A. Yes, he constantly challenges orders and requests from:the leadership. He would put stuff on his uniform that he was not authorized. Q. How long has SSG.been assigned to your unit? A. I believe he was assigned to the unit prior to the mobilization. I was just coming on board when we got Our .orders. There are several assigned that was inserts to the unit for the deployment. Q. Was there any disciplinary issue concerning SSG11111.1.111, A. NO. Q. As far as the other soldiers involved were there any disciplinary issues concerning. them? A. PFC.had an issue of disobeying a direct order to stay away from CPL GRANIER: Q. When you viewed the pictures did you recognize any other soldiers previously not identified? A. I believe two of the soldiers are . an 4`h Plt, 372"-I cannot be 100% sure on.ITzttifthis What actions have you taken to correct the issue regarding this investigation? We immediately moved all suspects out of the hard site and reassigned them. We reassured everyone uncle .he SOP and LTG SANCHEZ's guidance. Everyone will sign a roster. .now work the evenings to ensure nothing further occurs. The Command is making more unannounced visits to the hard site. All soldiers were informed no interrogations were to be conducted by them. Q. Do you wish to add anything else to your statement? A. No. C RC_C.1!;%-\--) 002463 Initials. Page.of LI Pages •..use Oriel tForo, OitICIta EXHiBIT DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY UNITED STATES ARMY TRIAL DEFENSE SERVICE REGION IX, FOB DANGER BRANCH OFFICE APO AE 09392 REPLY TO ATTENTION OF: . AETV-BGJA-TDS 10 April 2004 MEMORANDUM FORMININIIF, Article 32 Investigating Officer, Headquarters, 420th Engineer Brigade, ctory Base, Iraq, A 0 AE 09342 SUBJECT: Article 32 Request for Witnesses and Production of Evidence — United States v. SPC Megan M Ambuhl 1. The Defense requests that the following witnesses be produced at the Article 32 investigative hearing scheduled for 20 April 2004, IAW with Rules for Courts-Martial (R.C.M.) 405(f)(9) and 405(g): cik a. CID Agents (3.1„ ji0\00 i. Special Agent 0111111.10th MP BN, Baghdad, Iraq, APO AE 09335. Agent testimony is relevant,because he interviewed numerous alleged victims and made several visits to the Abu Ghraib prison facility duffing the period of the alleged offenses. Agent 11110141so interviewed several alleged co-conspirators. ii. Special Agent...1r 1oth MP BN, Baghdad, Iraq, IAPO AE 09135. Agenl. testimony is.relevant because she interviewed several of the alleged victims and actively investigated the allegations in this case. b. Iraqi Detainees . • The Defense requests a certified interpreter to translate the testimony of the Iraqi detainee witnesses. The testimony of these witnesses is extremely relevant. These individuals may have potentially exculpatory information. The Defense has limited if any access to them based on their current status. For that reason, the Defense requests that the government produce the listed detainees to testify at the Article 32(b) Investigation. IAW R.C.M. 405(g)(4)(A) the Defense objects to consideration of the Sworn Statements of the listed alleged victims and Iraqi detainees. Such statements may not be considered by the I0 over the objection of the Defense. All alleged victims and detainees reside at Abu Ghraib Prison in Abu Ghraib, Iraq. They are as follows: Yc. i. 002464 AETV-BGJA-TDS SUBJECT: Article 32 Request for Witnesses and Production of Evidence — United States v. SPC Megan M Ambuhl C....¦••••• c. Chain of Command — 372nd MP Company , former Company Commander .,se can testify as to the .ing provided to his unit, specifically any training regarding detention facilities. .can testify as to his knowledge of the alleged abuses that occurred at Abu Ghraib. If necessary, the defense requests immunity for this witness to testify. • ii. ormer Platoon Leader , 11111111111 can testify as to the training givento reserve MPs, specifically the training regarding detention facilities and control of detainees. can testify as to his knowledge of the alleged abuses that occurred at Abu Ghraib. If necessary, the defense requests immunity for this witness to testify. iii. , former Company 1SG . .he senior enlisted member of the 372" MP Company UMWcan testify as to the training given to his MPs. He can testify as to his knowledge of the alleged abuses that occurred at Abu Ghraib. If necessary, the defense requests immunity for this witness to testify. L iv. . ,, former Platoon Sergeant 'Car supervised many of the co-accused at Abu Ghraib. He conducted spot-checks of the facility, specifically cell blocks 1 a and lb. UMW witnessed at least one of the charges to which SPC Ambuhl is facing court-martial. He can provide exculpatory testimony for SPC Ambuhl. His testimony is highly relevant and critical to this case. If necessary, the defense requests immunity for this witness to testify. d. Co-Accused — 372nd MP Company i. SGT ii. PFC iii. SSG iv. CPL v. SPC vi. SPC 2 002465 AETV-BGJA-TDS SUBJECT: Article 32 Request for Witnesses and Production of Evidence — United States v. SPC Megan M. Ambuhl e. Additional Witnesses – 372 nd MP Company former S-3 for the 320th MP Battalion the S-3111111111111111as responsible for drafting and disseminating ROE guidance. The ROE and any training received by the 372nd MPs are extremely relevant to Charge II. H. um first reported the alle ed offenses to CID. His credibility and motivation are highly relevant. Further, .may provided exculpatory testimony regarding SPC Ambuhl. V d iammip iv. as the operations NCOIC of Abu Ghraib during the time fram of theipharged offenses. He will testify that he never witnessed any abuse taking place at the prison. was the Force Protection NCO of Abu Ghraib during the time frame of the charged o enses. He can testify as to the day-to-day operations of Abu Ghraib and what procedures were in place on cell blocks lb for interacting with detainees. vi. il).spent time at blocks la and lb during October, November, and December 2003. .orked at la on evenings when CPL Graner was not working. He can provided testimony as to the procedures used on the cell blocks and to training that he and his unit received. — vii. .141111.111,s , ImEr worked on the same block as.. Ambuhl. She can testify as to the nature of detainees that were held on 1 b and as to the types of training received by her reserved unit. She can testify as to the interaction between the MI representatives and the MP guards. ; „, ; 01111111m worked at block la during October, November, and December 2403. He worked at la on evenings when CPL 11101Pwas not working. He can provided testimony a4 to the procedures used on the cell blocks and to training that he and his unit received. re can testify alto the general nature of detainees that were held on block la and the procedures teat lv l useellorinterrogation. *Op - • 3 002466 AETV-BGJA-TDS SUBJECT: Article 32 R6quest for Witnesses and Production of Evidence — United States v. SPC Megan M. Ambuhl ix. r worked at block la during October, November, and December 2003. He can provided testimony as to the procedures used on the cell blocks and to training that he and his unit received. He can testify as to the general nature of detainees that were held on block 1 a and the procedures that MI used for interrogation. He will also testify to the lack of any standard procedure or accountability at Abu Ghraib. x. _____ .worked at block 1 a during October, November, and December 2003. He can provided testimony as to the procedures used on the cell blocks and to training that he and his unit received. He can testify as to the general nature of detainees that were held on block la and the procedures that MI used for interrogation. 111111111 can testify as to the procedures used on the cell blocks an.raining at e an. his unit received. He will also testify to the lack of any standard procedure or accountability at Abu Ghraib. f. Military Intelligence Witnesses , 325 th MI Battalion ii.. , 325th MI Battalion 25th MI Battalion 2" MI Battalion us.army.mil). '11 testify that members of his chain of command told him to delete Abu Ghraib photos off of his computer hard drive prior to the CID investigation. formerly assigned to 325 th MI Battalion 6119-40 - was an MI Interrogator that worked daily at AllyGhraib at blocks 1.1 b. will testify about authorized MI interrogation techniques..can testi as to the interaction and coordination between the MI interrogators and the MP guards. .has been transferred to the CPA in Baghdad. vi. 111111/Marir05th MI Brigade will testify as to his knowledge of allegations of abuse and/or mistreatment of detainees between 16 Sep 03 an4,22ffrec 03. In command during the time of the alleged offenses, cnowledge of misconduct at Abu Ghraib and the chain-of-commands response to suc a egations is highly relevant. 4 002467 AETV-BGJA-TDS SUBJECT: Article 32 Request for Witnesses and Production of Evidence — United States v. SPC Megan M. Ambuhl g. Other Witnesses 11111SIB a Military Intelligence officer, is familiar with the V °. Camp Vigilant SOP and can testify as to CJTF-7 policies regarding Interrogation Rules of Engagement for detainees at Abu Ghraib. 11101111/1/1111M, former Interrogation OIC, DNVT: 559-1 1'1" glt"f k 205 th MI Brigade Operational Law, DNVT: 559-1111111111111 diminumummin difillgiwas the legal advisor for the MI Group who ran Abu (q."11 Ghraib prison. MM. can testify to the procedures put into place for dealing with detainees and the training that was taught to the members of the 372" MP Company for their work at the facility. MM. visited Abu Ghraib during the relevant time period and can testify to the conditions at the facility. iii. inamOMMIP0 Ft. Sam Houston (C: _.)111.11111.111was one of several attorneys who provided advice on detainee operations and ROE at Abu Ghraib. iv. 141.1.01.111116 418'1' MP Detachment wi I testify as to his knowledge of allegations of abuse and/or mistreatment of detainees between 16 Sep 03 and 22 Dec 03.iveriiAmpt/16-7.c• - iv.., CJTF-7 1111111116110taske to respond to inquiries by the ICRC during the fall of 2003. When called to testify he can explain the ICRC inquiries and testify as to his response on behalf of CJTF-7. 2. If the Government contends that any Defense requested witness is not reasonably available under R.C.M. 405(g), the Defense requests that you make a determination under R.C.M. 405(g)(2). Your determination should be made after the Government explains on the record the specific efforts made to locate and contact the witnesses and after consultation with your legal advisor as to whether or not the witness is reasonably available. If deemed reasonably unavailable, the Defense requests that a specific factual reason be stated on the record. 3. The Defense requests that the following documents and evidence be produced to the Defense at the Article 32 hearing, IAW with R.C.M. 405(f)(10) and 405(g)(1)(B): •.a. All copies of CID reports (including 28s), military police reports, or any other reports made by a law enforcement agency relevant to this investigation to include the Agent Activity Reports and the Agent Activity Summaries compiled by the following investigators: 5 002468 AETV-BGJA-TDS SUBJECT: Artie le'32 Request for Witnesses and Production of Evidence — United States v. SPC Megan M Ambuhl i. S iv. SA OMMONIMIN. ii.SA v. SA iii. S vi. SAII=0 viii.SA .11111.1111111111I vii. SA ix. SAINNIMIIIIM viii. SA x.SA ix. SA xi.SA x. SA xii. SA xi. SA xiii.SA xii. SA xiv.SA xiii. SA b. 411 evidence seized from the crime scene or any related evidence be present or made available for inspection by the Defense and the Investigating Officer including but not limited to any evidence seized as a result of the CID searches conducted throughout this investigation; . c. Any and all ROE/RUF guidance established by 372" MP Company from October 2003 to the present; d. Any and all OPORDs that pertain to the Abu Ghraib mission to include the ROE/RUF card then in effect; e. Training records for SPC Megan Ambul and the co-accused; f. Complete medical records for the Iraqi detainees listed in paragraph lb of this Memorandum; g. Any and all unit level and/or IG complaints regarding the treatment of Abu Ghraib detainees lodged against any solider assigned to the 372" MP Company, the 800 th MP Brigade, the 205 th MI Company, the 325 th MI Battalion, or the 20 th MI Brigade; h. A complete copy of the unit counseling files to include any records of nonjudicial punishment or administrative action for the following soldiers: n. SPC Megan M. Ambuhl ix. x. xi. iv. xii. v. xiii. vi. XIII. vii. XIV. i. Copies of any relief-in-place (RIP) schedules or training schedules between the 72' MP Company (Las Vegas, Nevada) and the 372" MP Company, to include any OPORDERs; 6 . 02469 AETV-BGJA-TDS SUBJECT: Article 32 Request for Witnesses and Production of Evidence — United States v. SPC Megan M Ambuhl j. A copy of the final CID case file with exhibits, of case number 0005-04-CID149, as referenced in the AIR otomme dated 22 Jan 04, regarding a K-9 incident at Abu Ghraib; k. Copies of the two Working Papers referenced by BG Karpinski in her 24 th Dec 03 letter to ICRC Protection Coordinator; 1. Copies of the ICRC reports dated Oct 03 and Dec 03 obtained by CID from 1111111... as referenced iroll111111.111111111111111111111111s AIR, dated 5 Feb 04; m. 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Recorder PERSONS ABSENT None • The Government Counsel stated that sometime today, he would like for all parties to review each packet to ensure all contents were the same. :‘ The Defense Counsel conducted a voire dire of the Investigating Officer, and made no objection to the Investigating Officer being detailed to the hearing. Government Counsel stated that all parties understand that due to witness location and different ways testimony would be given, the proceedings may not run as normal. The Investigating officer stated that this was a formal investigation and that he had been detailed as the Article 32 Investigating Officer by order of Colone11111111.1M Commander, 16th Military Police Brigade (Airborne). The investigating officer informed the accused that his sole function as the Article 32 investigating officer was to determine thoroughly and impartially all of the relevant facts of the case, to weigh and evaluate those facts, and to determine the truth of the matters stated in the charges. He further stated that he would also consider the form of the charges and the type of disposition that should be made in the case concerning the charges that have been preferred against the accused. He stated that he would impartially evaluate and weigh all the evidence, examine all available witnesses, and give the accused and counsel full opportunity to cross-examine any available witness. . 002623 1 of 19 The Investigating Officer advised the accused of her right to counsel. The Accused stated the she would be represented by Mr...MP The Investigating Officer instructed Mr. umto fill oUt items on DD Form 457, Investigating Officer's Report. The Defense Counsel waived the reading of the charges. The Investigating Officer notified the accused of her rights during the Article 32 InvestigatiOn. The accused stated that she understood her rights. The Investigating Officer stated that the following witnesses would be present: CW2. IMIR, CJTF-7 SGM. 418th MP Det, (CLD) CPT. •72d MP CO 1SG. 2d MP CO SFC. 372d MP CO Telephonic testimony: SGT .A CO, 302d MI BN, Germany SAIMINIMMIft CID PFC. , HHC, 16th MP BDE(ABN) (REAR), Fort Bragg, NC . The following exhibits were presented by the Government Counsel and admitted into evidence as follows: Prosecution Exhibit 1: Sworn Statements of SPC Prosecution Exhibit 2: Sworn Statements of SGT Prosecution Exhibit 3: Sworn Statements of SPC Prosecution Exhibit 4A — 4R: 18 photos; with objection; Defense Counsel objected to photos not pertaining to SPC Ambuhl The Assistant Government Counsel stated that the witnesses from the 372d MP CO, located at LSA Anaconda would probably not be here duo to convoy difficulty. The Government Counsel made an Opening Statement. The Defense Counsel reserved his Opening Statement. 002624 2 of 19 SFC MINIEMS 372d Military Police Company, was called as a witness, sworn, and testified in substance as follows: The witness was informed of, and invoked his rights under Article 31, UCMJ, and was excused. CPT 372d Military Police Company, was called as a witness, sworn, and testified in substance as follows: The witness was informed of, and invoked his rights under Article 31, UCMJ, and was excused. 1SG ailMiNIPIEN 372d Military Police Company, was called as a witness, sworn, and testified in substance as follows: The witness was informed of, and invoked his rights under Article 31, UCMJ, and was excused. t SGT A CO, 302d MI BN, Germany, was called as a witness, sworn, and testified to ephonically in substance as follows: QUESTIONS BY THE DEFENSE COUNSEL (CPT 111.1111116 I was deployed to Abu Ghraib Prison Iraq at the end of September 2003 until February 2004; I left when my Battalion redeployed. I was the Systems Administrator and Trojan Spirit Operator for what was called the ICE Intelligence Center for the Interrogators. I was assigned to a MI Bn from Camp Victory, and worked with the interrogators that worked at Abu Ghraib. I worked in the center where the interrogators prepared their reports and collected data and kept information. The MI personnel had to interact with MPs in order to do their interrogations. The MPs would provide security, or be told by individual interrogators from MI to alter diets or sleep of detainees. The Interrogation teams were usually made up of a civilian interrogator or interpreter. They would give direction to the MPs. I may know SPC Ambuhl, but I don't recognize the name right now. I do not know how Tier 1A and 1B is set up. I visited it once, and I was told that the real bad guys were there in individual cells. I actually sat in on one interrogation with SPCIMEML an interrogator from Victory Base. I was to interrogate a General, and I provided security. To help with the interrogations, MP guards would play loud music, alter detainees' diets when feeding MRE's and taking out certain items. They would alter detainees' sleep, 002625 3 of 19 use dogs to intimidate, pour water over them and put them in the back of HMMWVs and drive around. Physical Training that was authorized would be push-ups, overhead arm clap, instruction like from a Drill Sergeant to a Recruit. I have not seen photos of abuse at Abu. My Chain of Command has not asked me if I have seen any photos, nor have they told me to delete photos from hard drives. I have only heard of incidents from interrogators. I heard of the incident involving SPCNIIIr I was told that he was too aggressive, and was relieved. I do not know of any UCMJ action. He was placed in a more analytical role at the ICE. SPC lanaWas also relieved because she had a detainee stripped naked and made him walk back to his cell naked in the view of all the other prisoners. This happened in November or December 2003. My Bde Cdr, moved into the ICE; he was a LTC, and seemed pretty involved with everything that went on until he was replaced by a MAJfillb I would say that MI was in control of prison operations. The OPTEMPO was high. I was the system administrator, and there were many requests for new accounts to be added to the network. More and more personnel and prisoners would arrive. I would say that there was pressure for the interrogators to produce info from the detainees. It was an overwhelming amount of detainees in the facility. There was no deadline to get detainees out of interrogations. I recall my statement to CID when I talked of a conversation with SPC .I was sitting at the DFAC and heard him and his peers talking about what the MPs did to the detainees. Things like beating them up and using them as practice dummies and knocking them out. I had just returned from leave, so this discussion was in December 2003. Someone from the Nevada National Guard, an older female soldier, told me of some stuff that she saw going on. She documented it, and her chain of command reprised her because of it. She was afraid of her chain of command. She sent the documentation to her relatives. I spoke with a SPAIIIIIIIIIIIIMebout the MPs using dogs on the detainees. She said how fearful the detainees were of the dogs. She described how a MP pretended to be a dog to scare the detainees. I don't know what happened to SPC -because she witnessed the incident. She is in the same unit as SPCqlIllbband SPC111111110 They are all in a Reserve Unit. She did take pictures of the facilities, but I do not know of her taking pictures of any detainees. . 01)262 6 4 of 19 I did not report the abuse that I heard from others. I knew that some of the stuff was authorized, and did not need to be reported. I talked to one woman about it only being a matter of time before the abuse got out'and an investigation initiated. I spoke to at least everyone that I knew about how the place was poorly run. It was very unorganized. The response I got that it was a lot worse under Sadaam. LTC. mad that statement after the Red Cross visited the prison and saw the conditions. The Red Cross criticized the food, from what I remember. I remember soldiers from my BN visiting from Camp Victory being trained on how to interrogate and secure prisoners. They were also trained on how to better use their approaches. I know that the detainees received blankets and clothing if the interrogators wanted them to have it. SPCJIMMhad mentioned to me that they made them wear women's panties, and if they cooperated, some would get an extra blanket. SPC.as known to bang on the table, yell, scream, and maybe assaulted detainees during interrogations in the booth. This was to not be discussed. It was kept "hush hush" by the individual interrogators. To my knowledge, the only thing that happened after the incidents was the team getting together to make reports after the interrogation. Nothing was said about not banging on tables. Nothing was put out about not stripping detainees naked after the SPCA, incident. She was relieved because she made a detainee walk to his cell naked in front of other detainees. QUESTIONS BY THE GOVERNMENT COUNSEL iCPTIIIMMIN I don't know what training was given to the MPs of the 372d MP CO. The only time I saw MPs was while waking through the facility, or at chow. SPCIMIghipalso told me of two inmates that supposedly raped a child, and the MPs punished them by making them get into all sorts of sexual positions. I am vaguely familiar with interrogation techniques. I know the IROE. Putting inmates in sexual positions naked would not be appropriate. I,Wouldn't do it if someone ordered me to do something like that; not even a CPT. The different things I was told, I wondered if it was a joke for the guards. I wouldn't be surprised if the freed innocent prisoners retaliated against the prison after being treated this way, by helping to pinpoint locations in the prison for the mortar attacks. The MPs were directed by the MI personnel to play loud music, vary diets, limit MREs, deprive sleep, and PT exhaustion. 002627 5 of 19 People got in trouble for being too aggressive. Physical violence would be over the limit of the IROE. It would not be authorized. I would not hit someone to get them to soften up. Others shouldn't either. That would not be a legal order. Putting a leash around someone's neck, pretending to drag them and taking a picture would not be authorized. Taking pictures was forbidden. Personnel were placing pictures on the database, and I was told to remove the pictures from the database. These were pictures of soldiers throughout the facility just walking around. It was totally inappropriate to take pictures of detainees. It is inappropriate to take pictures of detainees naked in a pyramid. You would not do this to soften them up. I don't know of anything that would allow MPs to have detainees masturbate to soften up for an interrogation. This would not be allowed. Pictures of this masturbation would be illegal also. Pictures of a detainee with his face next to another detainees genital area masturbating would also be unauthorized. This is not a technique used to soften someone up. I have never heard of any of these techniques used by MI. QUESTIONS BY THE INVESTIGATING OFFICER (MAJ111.16a) I didn't report the stuff that I heard, because I thought some of the things I heard was authorized. The dietary and sleep stuff was common knowledge within the ICE. MPs using dogs to scare detainees, I think was approved by our IROE. Dragging detainees with at leash, making detainees masturbate, and piling them naked in pyramids and taking pictures of it is not authorized. It was confusing the way the place was run. It was an important mission run by Reservists who did not know what they were doing. They were just on their own. It was a shocking experience. QUESTIONS BY THE DEFENSE COUNSEL (Mr. UM I don't know if the MI personnel received efficiency reports; I got an NCOER, and I counseled my soldiers. I guess the people above me were counseled on their performance. The goal of the interrogators was to get information, make diagrams of the info and piece together theories or hypotheses of terrorist events that was going on. It was important to get the information to prevent terrorist activity, and find perpetrators• of terrorist activity. We would get attacked at the prison. There was pressure to get results by effectively interrogating the prisoners. If there were no results, then the supervisors would be concerned. The goal was to get results. 002628 6 of 19 General Sanchez opened more facilities, and made things better. The place was getting cleaned up. This was an incentive to get more information from the prisoners. QUESTIONS BY THE GOVERNMENT COUNSEL (COT41.111111111114 Goals would not justify committing a crime; it would be definitely possible for maybe the civilian interrogators to overlook that. They were not under any authority. General Sanchez never ordered anyone to commit crimes to get information. The Brigade, Battalion, Company, and MI Commanders, never told anyone to commit crimes to get information. The facility in general, had no real authority base, other than LTC OM There were no clear-cut guidelines. There is no justification to have detainees masturbate, piled in pyramids naked, or be pulled by leashes. The conditions might lead some people to act inappropriately. The people who act inappropriately should be punished. I know that there is a separate facility for women and children. There are more than terrorists and security detainees at the prison. Some people were living there. The raids would round up people that were just in the area and probably innocent. If a prisoner was being kept for robbing an Iraqi bank, I wouldn't know about it. With neither side having anything further, the witness was warned not to discuss his testimony with anyone other than the parties present, and permanently excused. The Article 32 proceeding recessed at 1149, 1 May 2004: The Article 32 proceeding reconvened at 1203, 1 May 2004, with all parties present. CW241111111.1.1111ftaIMIR, CJTF-7, was called as a witness, sworn, and testified in substance as follows: I organize and process reporting by Iraqi information collectors. I am a 351E, Interrogations Technician. Prior to my current job, I was at the JIDC at Abu Ghraib from September 2003 until January 2004. I was reassigned when my unit left. I was asked to stay. I am familiar with the layout of the prison. The largest camp is Ganci; it holds security detainees primarily, next is Vigilant, it holds detainees of informational interest; and then there is the Hard Site; it holds detainees of MI interest, females and juveniles, problematic detainees from the other camps, like rioters, or crazy detainees. 002629 7 of 19 Tier 1A and 1B holds persons of MI interest. I do not know anything about what type of training the MP guards would have received at Tier 1A and 1 B. In January 2004, we ceased to bring problematic detainees into the Hard Site, because they created ,a chaotic environment. The FOB Commander ordered this change. They were troubleenakers. I recall one who would rip up his mattress and relieve himself right on the floor of his cell; another would sling their feces at the guards. I don't know if the MP guards received any special type of training. I worked in the Operations section of the JIDC. We accounted for the detainees, and answered questions from CJTF-7. We tracked requirements and assessments of the detainees. Leaders would gather the information from the sections, The ICE NCOIC was SFC Viand the OIC was CPT.I don't recall seeing any suspense dates. We were short staffed; we requested or more personnel, and we got more personnel. I think there was interaction with MPs and MI personnel. SPOINIMMIllawas a liaison, and would attend the FOB BUB daily. The personnel from each section would disseminate the info obtained from the BUB. I know SPC Ambuhl; she worked in Tier 1, and she is here today. I don't remember when I first met her, but I had a almost daily professional interaction with her. She would provide updates on who was present or not. I don't know how long she worked at the prison. She observed juvenile and female detainees. She had interaction with them; she helped move them from cell to interrogation wing. I don't know is she received any training on how to interrogating prisoners. We did have a conversation about supplies and Iraqi food for the detainees. We once talked about rewarding detainees that helped clean and do tasks, with cigarettes, because they loved to smoke. I was the "old Operations expert", everyone would just ask me stuff. I remember a discussion with her about problem detainees; it was about reducing the environment that caused them to misbehave. Some of the detainees were cooperative and others were not. There were a; few approved interrogation techniques; for example, prod and go down — when you speak down to someone to get them to cooperate. I do not knoW of any SPC I . I know SPOON/he was an analyst that worked in the ICE shop. I understand that he was removed because of a situation when a detainee was stripped naked. 00 630 8 of 19 SPC (was also involved in this same incident and was moved to my section after she was relieved from her duties. I asked her why she was moved, but I did not ask her what she did. I do not know if SPC mor SPC MOM received any UCMJ. We had mandatory IROE training and implemented a mandatory sign out procedure. All MI personnel attended this training. I heard about a riot at Ganci. I do not know of any punishment after they were moved to the hard site. I hope that they were segregated and silenced. Embarrassment of the Arab culture would be contrary to producing results, in my opinion. Some of our most effective means to communicate is to just develop a rapport. I do not know if the MPs were trained on the Arab culture. SPC Ambuhl would help move the prisoners from their cells to the interrogation wing or where we picked them up. The interrogator would ask for the prisoners they needed. SPC Ambuhl would cross-reference and tell which cell the prisoner was In, and she would facilitate the move. Sleep deprivation would be documented in an interrogation plan. It is a separate book from other files. I never had any problems with SPC Ambuhl. QUESTIONS BY THE GOVERNMENT COUNSEL (CPT McCabe) The Hard Site has problematic detainees in 1A and 1 B. The rest of the Hard Site houses Iraqi corrections prisoners, such as robbers, and thieves. The CPA is in charge of the rest of the hard site, 2A, 2B, and so on. 1A and 1B contained security detainees for MI, females, and juveniles. Ganci contained people possibly gathered from raids. There are many camps in Ganci, No one from Ganci has any interrogation value. Someone removed from a riot would not be interrogated. If detainees in Ganci could not be controlled, then they would be moved. Our priority was to get information to stop the IED attacks, terrorist activity, and crimes against the Coalition. Every detainee was inprocessed and assessed. After the screening, they were determined to be of value or not value to MI. These reports went to CJTF-7. I am a trained interrogator. I finished my training in 1990; and I have been an interrogator for 14 years. MPs would do the sleep management plan, it was requested of MI. General Sanchez would have to approve speaking to someone about something that would make them upset. An MP could not just do this on his own. . 0 02631 9 of 19 I am familiar with the Geneva Conventions. We treated them the same as POWs; we treated them with dignity and respect. Anything outside of that required approval. No MPs attended our training. MPs did not attend our Geneva training. The IROE is classified and located at the JIDC. The worst criminals were to be treated with dignity and respect. I never saw SPC Ambuhl treat anyone without dignity and respect. She would help us with the female detainees. She was nice and pleasant. She knew the difference between right and wrong, and what dignity and respect was. I saw her treat people with dignity and respect. I assume she was a guard; she took direction from the Shift NCO, SGT. SSG111111116, There is nothing in the IROE that allows stripping detainees naked. There are times when they•are naked for strip-searching. Detainees being piled in a pyramid naked, or being forced to masturbate has no MI or military purpose. I've seen a handful of photos of the pyramid. That type of interrogation "plan" would not have made it to General Sanchez for approval; it would not have made it past me. Forcing detainees to masturbate kneeling in front of one another would be outside of the bounds. Placing a leash around a detainee's neck would be out of bounds. All of these acts would be criminal offenses. If I were ordered to do these acts, I would not carry them out. Embarrassment as a technique would be contradictory to achieving results. Government Counsel shows the witness Prosecution Exhibit 4A. This looks like 1A or 1B. I recognize the metal doors. SPC Ambuhl is in this picture. I have seen the other female around, but I do not know her name. I do not recognize the detainee on the "leash". This scene serves no military purpose; it is inappropriate. , Interrogators would not tell MPs to do this. I have never seen SPC Ambuhl do anything like this. QUESTIONSZY THE INVESTIGATING OFFICER (MAJ Ransome) The rest of the Hard Site Tiers houSed, as I understood it, Iraqi criminals; some I thought were actually sentenced and serving prison terms. 002632 10 of 19 QUESTIONS BY THE DEFENSE COUNSEL (Mr. Volzer) A "unclassified description of the general requirements would be: who's attacking us-, what are some imminent attacks-, where is the WMD-, what do you know about terrorist activity-? Reports were generated from the information obtained from the detainees interrogated. CJTF-7 developed the reporting requirement. 1 to 2 people would interview or interrogate a detainee, depends on the detainee. You could not "fear up" or belittle someone without approval. MI would tell the MPs to make the detainees more receptive. It depended on the environment; a detainee may be moved to another area, monitored for interaction, told to keep quiet and not interact with others, with proper documentation, put on dietary management, and possibly be given cigarettes. These were effective techniques were used by MI and 'required approval. Removing a blanket or other item required approval. Saying MI personnel are aggressive is an unfair statement. Some are, and some are not. I am a former grunt. 11 B and 11 C grunts are aggressive too. The interrogation techniques used are taught. MI does not own the detainees. The sleep management procedure was directed by Mi to the MPs to supervise and report at the end of the day. After someone is interrogated, doesn't mean they could leave the prison. There may be more interest in keeping them. Yelling was not authorized. We had a few that were loud with the detainees. I saw the special reaction team at the Vigilant camp once. Sometimes handling a situation quietly works better and is more effective. If one technique is working, we continue to scrutinize that technique. Its not one of those " not broke don't fix it' scenarios. We do continue to develop rapport. There was a sign in sheet in the beginning; it is kept with the NCOIC of each tier. The detainee interrogation plans are classified and kept in the ICE log. Detainee files are secret. QUESTIONS BY THE INTVESTIGATING OFFICER (MAJ UMW To prod and go down is a technique, such as getting a captured officer, making them tired, and calling them a coward. 002633 11 of 19 You exploit how they were captured and use it to your advantage. An example of fear up would be, "okay, as long as you don't cooperate, you will just stay in here". Approval is need for these two techniques. With neither side having anything further, the witness was warned not to discuss his testimony with anyone other than the parties present, and permanently excused. The Article 32 proceeding recessed at 1315, 1 May 2004. The Article 32 proceeding reconvened at 1412, 1 May 2004, with all parties present. SGM 1111.1.111111111M418th MP Det (CLD), was called as a witness, sworn, and testified in substance as follows: QUESTIONS BY THE DEFENSE COUNSEL (CPT...1p I first arrived to Iraq 1 February 2004. My mission was to work a BLD/CLD versus a EPW mission. CLD is Camp Liaison Detachment; BLD is Brigade. The 16 th MP BDE (ABN) gave us our mission. We replaced the 381 st BLD. There were no EPWs, except for a handful at Camp Bucca. We took on the detainee operations role. The definition of detainee and EPW is in the Geneva Convention, Article 4. Our mission falls under the 16th MP BDE (ABN). I have not aware of allegations of abuse and mistreatment of detainees. I have heard of the rumors. I don't know what training was given in the past; I am aware that training is going on now. There are 30 corrections personnel from Fort Knox, Fort Leavenworth here to train soldiers at the prison. There is training on the Arab culture, ROE, and the Geneva Conventions. I visit the prison often. I am aware of the prison breakdown; 1A and 1B houses MI holds, females and juveniles. Juveniles were moved recently. The Hard Site is fairly secure. Normally, females would be separated. We use the Geneva Convention as a guideline. Changes are going on in Ganci and Vigilant to make conditions safer for the detainees. The 16th MP BDE (ABN) is refining policies, and SOPs. I do not know of the officer involvement prior; but COL Quantock frequently visits the prison. 002634 12 of 19 We have MPs and MI personnel in the inprocessing center at the prison. I do not know of any cross over training. When we made our assessment, we noted that the nutrition and sanitation conditions were not within the Geneva Convention. I do not know if the Geneva Conventions was followed before the 16 th MP BDE (ABN) arrived. It is being followed now. There are weigh ins, and the meals are nutritional. The Geneva Convention recommends that female detainees be guarded and searched by female MPs. When a detainee arrives, they are assessed and inprocessed within 72 hours. I do not know of any SOPs being left behind or given to the 372d MP CO. We at the BLD look at the prison from a Geneva Convention standpoint. We ensure that prisoners are treated properly, and that environmental conditions are correct. The 372d MP CO was previously at Mosul. I am not'aware of anyone else performing the prison mission before them. We brought our regulations and documentation with us. I have walked throughout the compound and had casual conversations with the soldiers. We have a big switch of 01F1 and OIF 2 personnel. With neither side having anything further, the witness was warned not to discuss his testimony with anyone other than the parties present, and permanently excused. The Article 32 proceeding recessed at 1435, 1 May 2004. The Article 32 proceeding reconvened at 1459, 1 May 2004, with all parties present. SAININNIMmi, U. S. Army CID, Fort Jackson, SC, was called as a witness, sworn, and testified telephonically in substance as follows: QUESTIONS BY THE DEFENSE COUNSEL I first became involved in the detainee abuse case when we received a anonymous letter and cd-rom containing pictures. In the preliminary stage of the investigation, I was the case manager. I left in February 2004. Our CID detachment was located at Abu Ghraib; we were three agents conducting interviews of prisoners. We also had three translators. In order to find out who the detainees were that were abuse, we obtained logs of the prisoners that were in the isolation wing at the time of 7November and a couple of other days. 0026 3'5 13 of 19 Initially, the person who came forward with the letter and cd-ram provided the names of the main persons involved. This was SPC Ahe went through the pictures with us and identified the military personnel involved. He identified the majority of the personnel, and knew who they were. Others, he did not know. We interviewed every single MI and military personnel that worked in the prison; we sent numerous requests for assistance to other CID offices worldwide to interview all other persons that were ever at the prison and identified in the photographs. I have no idea of any UCMJ. action. The case is still open. I interviewed several hundred people, but I cannot remember a S PONIMMIlk I believe SPCJIllarame forward because he knew this stuff was wrong, and that CPL einglwould go back to work in the isolation wing and continue the abuse. He wanted the abuse to stop. He received the pictures approximately one week before he came forward. He was weighing his conscience, and decided to do the right thing. I think several people suspected abuse but did not report it. I don't know the status of any UCMJ against anyone. CID does not recommend what action be taken against subjects of our investigations. We just gather facts; the chain of command decides what to do.. We briefed the Company and Battalion commanders about our progress during the investigation. I remember my interview with SGT F .he was interviewed twice. He lied in his first statement, and told the truth in his second statement; admitting to stepping, stomping, and jumping on the detainees. After talking with the detainees and personnel, the names of the main perpetrators of the abuse were CPL and. The ones taking pictureswere SPC Ambuhl, P. an ano er I cannot recall. These names are based on the interviews, and who was there. I recall the detainees mentioning SPC Ambuhl; they would refer to her as Missal.' I can't recall if she helped a detainee by giving him an inhaler. When I interviewed a detainee, I explained why I was there, and just gave them a pen and a sworn statement form in Arabic or English; and they would write what they knew about the incidents. Their statements were later translated. If something wasn't clear, we had follow up questions. If they did not know someone's name, they were told to just describe that person using as much detail as possible. I remember SGT .but not his statement. I remember SSG allionce being a suspect; I thought he observed the abuse; he was later cleared of any wrongdoing. This was all based on our interviews of the personnel that were there. SFC. as I remember was not involved. It became a arent throw h the course of the investigation, that the nightshift-- SPC Ambuhl, CPL ., SSG., PFC 002636 14 of 19 .11111p, and on occasion SPCI.would do these acts after SFC. ad left; and after the chain of command FadWianged shifts and gone home. It became clear to me that they knew that SFC .would not tolerate these acts. There was one incident when SFC elawas on the upper tier and saw an incident and ordered them to stop immediately; I believe he observed SGT guesteppin g on a detainee. They were shocked at how angry he was when he told them to stop. I don't believe that SFC iligareported that incident. I have no recollection of SGTIIIIIIIIMMIrnagain, I spoke with several hundred personnel. SPC.was identified as one of the people in the photos, but I don't recall his statement. He' never came forward to report any misconduct to the CID office. SPC wand SPC.were MI soldiers identified in one of the photographs. I am not sure of any UCMJ action pending on anyone; I left Iraq in February 2004, and until very recently, I did not know of anyone pending any UCMJ action. I turned the investigation over to SA 1.1111111111.1 I don't know if he did any follow up interviews. We gave the 15-6 Investigation Staff a copy of our case file; we also provided the photos and statements we gathered. I do not recall a SGT 1111.11Dagain, I spoke with hundreds of personnel. Our main purpose was to identify the personnel in the photos; we also wanted to find out if MI told the MPs to do these acts. If so, we wanted to know who told them; that's why we interviewed everyone. No one said do this to that person, or anything specific. Our second purpose was to have the most thorough Investigation that we could. We wanted to talk with each and every porton mentioned in the interviews. Most of the interrogatdrs did not wear nametags. You knew who they were, if you knew them. We would figure out who was working, and interview all the handlers, interrogators, and guards. I do not recall if there are any civilians involved in the investigation; several people were interviewed. I remembereallinrWe listed someone as a subject if there was reasonable belief that they committed a crime. The investigative file is a working document, and the status of personnel involved may change. Like when SSG111.1was listed as a subject, and later taken off of the status report. There are numerous things involved when determining if someone is derelict in their duty; if they inform their chain of command, then they are not derelict in my mind, and the way the. UCMJ puts it, as I know. No one reported any abuse up until January 15, 2004, to CID; however, there was one individual who reported the abuse to his chain of command—his NCOIC. . 002637 15 of 19 The NCOIC then went to SSG isorto report the abuse; and because SSG 1111111.was the perpetrator in this incident, it did not go anywhere. The individual that reported it did the right thing. Had SPC Ambuhl reported the abuse to SFC MD she would not be a subject of the investigation. It would be different if she hAd reported it to SSG 1111111R, I am not a law er. This was an ongoing incident. The NCOIC that reported the incident to SSG I believe, did not report it to anyone else. When he reported to SSG he did not know that SSG 111.11was the perpetrator. I do not recall interviewing SPC .or SPC mar The investigation is still open, and pending a few requests for assistance. You can add and remove subjects as credible information becomes known. I worked at Abu from October 2003 to February 2004; I would visit the Hard 'Site at leas once or twice a week. We would interview suspects of crimes against U.S. Forces, or ' individuals who knew of deaths of U.S. Forces. On occasion, I visited with CP11111.1 in tier 1a and 1B. I had no involvement with the Red Cross. I heard of a deceased individual that was being stored at the facility, but I don't know the specifics. Our focus was Iraqis committing crimes against U.S. soldiers. Based on our proximity and the amount of time, the 12 th CID came over to help with the investigation. There were a lot of people to be interviewed. They were initially investigating hostile fire incidents. It was a higher priority to work the logistics of this case. I had no interaction with SPC Ambuhl; I would see her when I went to the Hard Site. I did not see her commit any abuse. I only went there during the day in the morning; the alleged abuse happened in the evening or nighttime. • I never saw the detainees do any PT. I believe a SPCINIMor someone else hung a detainee in handcuffs for over six hours. I don't recall SPC Ambuhl letting the detainee down. I don't recall if I interviewed PFC .I read every document when I was there, but I cannot remember any statements that s e made. I do not remember if she changed her stories; she may have. There were a lot of people and documents in this case. We do criminal record checks on our subjects. I believe PFC .received an Article 15 for a improper relationship with CPL 1111111 I believe CPL .was admonished, and they were told to stay away from each other. I don't remember if CPL 11111I was recommended to take anger management by his commander. When I interviewed the detainees, I did not provide any names. I would not ask, for instance, "Did CPL ashit you?"---I would simply ask 'Were you in the isolation . 16 of 19 0026'38 wing-- and What happened when, you were there?" We wanted a clear and unbiased environment. 1 don't know if they wore their BDU Tops while in the isolation wing. I don't know if they were told to not use their first names; or to even use fake names. The MI personnel I interviewed never told me they told the MPs what to do to the prisoners. In some of the incidents, some of the detainees being abused were not actively scheduled for interrogation. They were rioters. This appeared to me as just retaliation against the rioters. The riots were in separate camps. We interviewed all of the MI personnel. No one admitted to telling the MPs to soften up any detainees; if they had, they would have been violating the UCMJ and the Geneva Convention. No one ever admitted to "good job, keep doing what you are doing". MI had their very specific interrogation plan. It detailed things they could and could not do. No one I interviewed said they were abused during an interrogation. I am not aware of any MI investigation. There was absolutely no evidence that the MI or MP chain of command authorized any of this kind of maltreatment. These individuals were acting on their own. The photos I saw, and the totality of our interviews, show that certain individuals were just having fun at the expense of the prisoners. Taking pictures of sexual positions, the assaults, and things along that nature were done simply because they could. It all happened after hours. The fear instilled in the prisoners after these incidents may have been a benefit, but I don't know for sure. These individuls wanted to do this for fun. QUESTIONS BY THE GOVERNMENT COUNSEL (CPT' !" Benefiting the interrogators did not come out in our investigation. The abused individuals were not going to be interrogated. The rioters would have been in another camp if they had military intelligence value. It is clear to me that the abuse was retaliation after the riot. I know I am here today to help clarify the allegations against SPC Ambuhl. My investigatiiiiiiimined that she was present and took pictures. She is in the pictures with PFC.holding a leash around a detainee's neck. She is described as being present by some of the detainees during the abuse. I do not recall her present at the riot incident. Our investigation did not determine her committing any abuse; nor did it determine that she stopped the abuse or reported the abuse. I don't remember a statement from allMalf he described a tall white female with green eyes named alisimms he would be talking about SPC Ambuhl. I did not give the detainees any names. 002639 17 of 19 I told them to use the names if they knew them, and to describe what happened. Air, would also be SPC Ambuhl. In the Arab dialect, they have a hard time am pronouncing,, and end up saying.* QUESTIONS BY THE DEFENSE COUNSEL (CPT 41111111111 There was an amnesty period during the course of our investigation, ordered by the FOB Commander. We did not collect any of this evidence; none of it pertained to our investigation. We reviewed cds and media as requested by the chain of command. The commander had access to the amnesty boxes; it entirely a command function. The commander would have kept all the other contraband. We returned the stuff we reviewed to the chain of command to be destroyed. The detainee statements were tranalAed. stated that all the guards were goodexcept for SSG 111111111, CPL./. and SGT , as I specifically recall. He also said that despite all the abuse, he realized that the majority of U.S. soldiers did not abuse detainees. He only pointed out SGT gm and CPL abusing him. With neither side having anything further, the witness was warned not to discuss his testimony with anyone other than the parties present, and permanently excused. The Article 32 proceeding recessed at 1608, 1 May 2004. The Article 32 proceeding reconvened at 1617, 1 May 2004, with all parties present. PFC. HHC 16th MP BDE (ABN) (REAR), Fort Bragg, NC, SC, was called as a witness, sworn, and testified telephonically in substance as follows: The witness was read her Article 31 rights; she acknowledged and understood them, and stated that she would participate in the proceedings without a lawyer. Upon discussion wit all parties present, the Defense Team decided that they did not wish to question PFC England. The Article 32 proceeding recessed at 1640, 1 May 2004. The Article 32 proceeding reconvened at 1643, 1 May 2004, with all parties present. The following exhibits wore presented by the Gdvernment Counsel and admitted into evidence as follows: Prosecution Exhibit 5: Sworn Statements of PFC Prosecution Exhibit 6: Sworn Statement of SPC 002640 18 of 19 The Article 32 proceeding recessed at 1643, 1 May 2004. The Article 32 proceeding reconvened at 0713, 3 May 2004, with all parties present except for the Assistant Government Counsel. The Government Counsel asked that the members of the 372d MP CO be declared unavailable since they could not make their convoy to Victory Base. The following exhibits were presented by the Government Counsel and admitted into evidence as follows: Prosecution Exhibit 7: CD Rom containing photos and video clips; with objection; the Defense objects to photos that do not pertain to SPC Ambuhl's charges. Prosecution Exhibit 8: Sworn Statement of SPC Prosecution Exhibit 9A — 90(oscar): Sworn Statemeht of detainees; with objection; the Defense objects to the statements of detainees that have been released. THE GOVERNMENT RESTS The following exhibits were presented by the Defense Counsel and admitted into evidence as follows: Defense Exhibit A: 15-6 Investigation of 800 th MP Bde Defehse Exhibit B: Rebuttal to 15-6, by SFC41.1111111, Defense Exhibit C: Rebuttal to 15-6 by 1SG MOW Defense Exhibit D: Rebuttal to 15-6 by CPT= Defense Exhibit E: Sworn Statement of CPT THE DEFENSE RESTS The Government Counsel made a closing statement. The Defense Counsel made a closing statement. The Article 32 proceeding adjourned at 0814, 3 May 2004. 002641 19 of 19 UNITED STATES ) ) v. ) GOVERNMENT'S RESPONSE ) TO DEFENSE MOTION TO ) DISMISS AMBUHL, Megan M. ) SPC, U.S. Army ) HHC, 16th MP BDE (ABN), ) II/ Corps ) APO AE 09342 ) 21 AUGUST 2004 ***************************************************************** RELIEF SOUGHT The accused requests that this Court dismiss Additional Charge I and its specification and Additional Charge II and its specifications for alleged failure of compliance with Rule for Courts-Martial (R.C.M.) 405(a). The government objects to the accused's motion and maintains that the accused was afforded a thorough and impartial investigation that fairly embraced the two additional charges. Consequently, the government requests that this Court deny the accused's motion to dismiss the additional charges. BURDEN OF PROOF AND PERSUASION The defense has the burden of persuasion since it is the moving party. R.C.M. 905(c)(2). The burden of proof that the defense must meet is a preponderance of the evidence. R.C.M. 905(c)(1). FACTS The accused, a military police enlisted soldier, was the noncommissioned officer in charge (NCOIC) of Tier IB at the Baghdad Central Correctional Facility (BCCF), Abu Ghraib, Iraq during the latter part of 2003. The accused, along with a number of other, co-accused, allegedly maltreated and assaulted foreign national detainees while acting as prison guards at the BCCF. The maltreatment was brought to light when a fellow soldier; Specialist (SPC)11111101111110 delivered a compact disk to CID containing multiple pictures of detainee abuse. A co-accused, SPC Charles Graner, had given SPC 111111the compact disk and the accused appears in a large number of these pictures. Captain (CPT) 4111111101111111ftwpreferred charges of conspiracy to maltreat subordinates, dereliction of duty, maltreatment of subordinates, and indecent acts against the accused on 20 March 2004. On 24 March 2004, the Special Court- . 002647APPELLATE EXHIBIT Recognized R. k Martial Convening Authority, Colonel (COL) 031111111 11b appointed Major (MAJ).as the Article 32 investigating officer. The Article 32 investigation was held on 1 May 2004 and re­opened on 3 May. MAJ.heard testimony from four witnesses and admitted nine government exhibits and five defense exhibits (See Summarized Transcript, attachment, Defense Motion). Of those exhibits, government exhibit #4 contained 18 photos (A-R), government exhibit #7 (a copy of the CD-ROM SPC Darby turned over to CID that contained numerous photos and video clips), exhibit #9 contained sixteen translated, sworn statements from the abused Iraqi detainees, and defense exhibit A was the lengthy Army Regulation (AR) 15-6 report prepared by Major General (MG) Antonio Taguba. Subsequent to the Article 32 investigation, CPT preferred two additional charges. The first additional charge was conspiracy to maltreat subordinates on 8 November 2003.* This charge ip connected to conduct that the accused was previously charged With in the first set of charges (See Charge Sheet, Charge III, specification 1, dated 20 March 2004). The second additional charge carried two specifications for maltreatment of subordinates on 23 October 2003 and 8 November 2003. Both of these specifications involve misconduct associated with the charges found on the original charge sheet (See Charge Sheet, Charge I and its specification and Charge III, specification 2, dated 20 March 2004). LAW Under Article 32, Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) and R.C.M. 405, no charge or specification can be referred to a general court-martial until all the matters set forth in those charges and specifications have been thoroughly and impartially investigated by an investigating officer whose function is to inquire into the truth and form of the charges and to make a recommendation as to the disposition of those charges. When reviewing an alleged error in an Article 32 investigation, substantial compliance is the appropriate legal standard. R.C.M. 405(a). ARGUMENT The accused complains that the additional charges were not subject investigation under Article 32, UCMJ. While it is true that the Article 32 investigation was not re-opened to specifically look at these additional charges, the subject matter of these offenses is the exact same as what was previously impartially investigated by MAja1111111a The additional charges 2 are integrally connected to the original charges and are substantially similar to the charges and specifications MAJ 11111111Minvestigated on 1 and 3 May 2003. Consequently, R.C.M. 405 has been substantially complied with in the accused's case. Stepping out of order and addressing the last of the additional charges first, additional Charge II, specification 2 is a violation of Article 93, UCMJ, maltreatment of subordinates. This charge is a clear outgrowth of Charge I and its specification, conspiracy to maltreat subordinates, on the original Charge Sheet. The Article 32 officer was presented with pictures showing the accused standing mere feet away as her co­conspirator, Private First Class (PFC).holds a naked detainee with a leash wrapped aroun t e e ainee's neck. See Attachment 1, Article 32 - Exhibit 4A. In addition, MAJ willleftwas also presented the sworn statement of PFC Imp acknowledging the accused's complicity that night. See Attachment 2, Article 32 - Exhibit 5. It is well settled law that a co-conspirator is also legally liable for the substantive offense that is the object of the conspiracy. Furthermore, as the accused admits in her motion, in order for•the government to be successful in proving the conspiracy charge both at trial and during the Article 32 investigation, all of the elements of underlying offense of maltreatment of subordinates must be proved. Additional Charge II, specification 2 merely adds this underlyingoffense to th6 , listed charges against the accused. Since the accused was present at the Article 32 investigation, knew of the conspiracy charge and the underlying misconduct that was the object of the conspiracy, was afforded the right to representation and cross- examination, and did present evidence concerning this misconduct, R.C.M. 405 and Article 32, UCMJ has been substantially complied with in relation to this charge. R.C.M. 405(a). The other two additional charges stem from the same night of abuse, 8 November 2003, that is the subject matter of Charge III and Charge IV on the original Charge Sheet.' During the Article 32 investigation, MAJ.- received into evidence numerous photographs documenting the subject matter of additional Charge I and additional Charge II, specification 1 as well as the sworn statements of several coaccused that detailed the events of that - night to include those of SPC 0.111111111, 'Sergeant (SGT)11111, 1 While it is true that MAJ Wm= stated that he did not believe there were reasonable grounds to believe that the accused committed these offenses, the convening authority was appraised of this recommendation prior to referral of both the original and additional charges.. See Attachment 3, Pretrial Advice, dated 21 July 2004. The convening authority disagreed with MAJ UMW recommendation and, within his due discretion, decided to refer these charges to general court-martial. 3.002644 11111V SPC 1111111111111. and PFC gillimp See Attachment 4-9, Article 32 - Exhibits 4J-O. It can hardly be said that the series of abuses that occurred the night of November 8 were not thoroughly investigated by MAJ milmOMMN Moreover, like additional Charge II, specification 2, these additional charges have a clear relation to the original charges. Additional Charge I and its specification is a conspiracy charge directly related to Charge III in that Charge III is the underlying offense of newly preferred conspiracy charge. Throughout the Article 32 investigation, it was clear that a number of soldiers acted in concert to maltreat and abuse soldiers on the night of 8 November. ,Additional Charge II, specification 1 deals with the same sexual in nature misconduct as Charge IV, the forced masturbation of the detainees in her care. This is not a case where the misconduct was not investigated or the accused was not on notice of the conduct being investigated. The amount of evidence that MAJMINMOMMpreviewed, to include the large number of photographs, statements of co-accused, and the lengthy AR 15-6 investigation completed by MG Antonio Taguba, and the detail of his report clearly shows the absolute thoroughness of his investigation. The Article 32 investigation took in so much evidence that the government could determine no discernable benefit to re-opening the investigation for the additional charges that were fairly raised by the evidence adduced and which dealt with the same matter that had been investigated. This point is underlined by the inability of the accused to identify any witness or evidence that she would present in a re-opened Article 32 investigation. The accused's inability to identify any benefit that she might receive from a re-opened Article 32 investigation forces her to take the untenable position that the only appropriate remedy is dismissal of the additional charges. However, if this Court should determine that the government erred in not re­opening the Article 32 investigation prior to referring these additional charges, the proper remedy would be to order the re­opening of the Article 32 investigation for a number of reasons. First, all of the cases that the accused cited in support of the proposition that dismissal is the only fitting remedy are cases that deal with remedying a defect to a pretrial right after trial on the merits. The accused's case is in a different trial posture altogether. A trial date has to be set. Discovery for the accused's case has been voluminous and is still underway. Evidence and investigations that the accused has specifically 4 .002645 requested is'still being compiled and have yet to be released. 2 Even if this discovery is finalized and released in short order, a trial date for the accused is still at least two months away. This realistic assessment of the accused's case shows that there is ample time to re-open the Article 32 investigation and not unduly the accused's trial in the least. The accused goes on to allege that "there was over two months of inactivity" in her case. Defense Motion at 8. However, this allegation belies reality. The actions of the accused and her co-accused have been the subject of numerous and wide-ranging investigations to include the AR 15-6 investigation conducted by MG Taguba, an AR 15-6 investigation conducted by MG George Fay and LTG Anthony Jones, and the extensive investigation being conducted the Criminal Investigation Division. As the Court and all of the participants in this case are well aware, these investigations, with the exception MG Taguba's investigation, have been active and have taken longer than originally expected to complete. Of particular interest to both the government and the accused, the AR 15-6 investigation being conducted by MG Fay and LTG Jones studying the role that military intelligence played in the abuses at the BCCF originally had a suspense date of 1 June that has been extended on a number of occasions so as to continue to interview relevant witnesses. It was only after the deadline for that investigation was extended yet again was the decision made to recommend and prefer the additional charges at issue. 2 While trial counsel has yet to see the investigation, it has been reported that the AR 15-6 investigation conducted by MG George Fay and LTG Anthony Jones into the role that military intelligence played in the abuses will consist of over 8,000 pages of witness statements and supporting documents. 002646 5 CONCLUSION In sum, the accused received a thorough investigation into the charges that have been brought against him. Therefore, the defense's motion to dismiss should be deni7,d. CPT, JA Trial Counsel Delivered to defense counsel, by email, this 22nd day of August 2004. CPT, JA Trial Counsel 002647 6 OFFICE OF THE CLERK OF COURT US ARMY JUDICIARY ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA 22203-1837 THE RECORD OF TRIAL HAS BEEN REVIEWED FOR RELEASE UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT. THE DOCUMENT[S) DESCRIBED AS FOLLOWS HAS [HAVE] BEEN REMOVED FROM THIS COPY OF THE RECORD BECAUSE THE RELEASE WOULD BE IN VIOLATION OF THE DOD FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT PROGRAM, DOD 5400.7-R, EXEMPTION 6 and 7(C): Photographic Exhibit 002648 UNITED STATES MOTION FOR EXPERT ASSISTANCE v. Megan M. AMBUHL SPC, U.S. Army Headquarters & Headquarters Company 16th Military Police Brigade (Airborne) 16 August 2004 III Corps, Victory Base, Iraq APO AE 09342 COMES NOW the accused, SPC Megan M. Ambuhl, by and through counsel, to request that Dr.11111M1111111114 a psychologist, be appointed to the defense team, pursuant to Rule for Courts-Martial [R.C.M.] 703(d). A. RELIEF SOUGIIT The defense respectfully requests that the defense Motion for Expert Assistance be ganted and that Dr. . appointed to the defense team as an expert consultant with the expectation that Dr. .will also become an expert witness for the defense at trial. In lieu of Dr..the defense wit 1 accept a comparable substitute ex ert witness, if once can be identified by the government. The defense further requests that Dr. e designated as a member of the defense team under U.S. v. Toledo, 25 M.J. 270 (C.M.A. 1987), Military Rule of Evidence [M.R.E.] 502(a), and Article 46, UCMJ. B. BURDEN OF PROOF & STANDARD OF PROOF The defense, as the moving party, bears the burden of this motion by a preponderance of the evidence. R.C.M. 905(c). The current legal standard for employment of a defense expert is a convincing showing of a compelling need. See U.S. v. Cameron, 21 M.J. 59 (C.M.A. 1985). C. FACTS SPC Megan M. Ambuhl entered the U.S. Army Reserves in early 2002. SPC Ambuhl never served on active duty prior to this initial enlistment. In October 2002, SPC Ambuhl was notified that she would be activated in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom. As a civilian, SPC Ambuhl worked as a technician in a medical laboratory. She had no law enforcement training or experience prior to her joining the military as a Military Police Officer. As an MP, SPC Ambuhl was trained to conduct combat support operations, not relocation and interment operations. During her time in the military, she has never received any training on how to conduct detainee operations or how to work in a prison. 002649 APPELLATE EXHIBIT .. Recognized R. 40 United States v. SPC Megan .,h1 Motion for Expert Assistance In October 2003, while deployed to Iraq, SPC Ambuhl and members of her unit were relocated from Hillah, to Abu Ghraib Prison or Baghdad Central Correctional Facility (BCCF). SPC Ambuhl was assigned to work at Tier 1B of the maximum security section of the prison. The command gave SPC Ambuhl this assignment because they needed a female soldier to work on the wing to assist with the female detainees housed on Tier 1B. SPC Ambuhl worked at BCCF until January 2004. On 20 March 2004, CPT. referred charges against SPC Megan M. Ambuhl for violations of the Uni orm Code of Military Justice (UCMJ). The charges and specifications alleged the following UCMJ violations: Article 81 (conspiracy to commit maltreatment), Article 92 (dereliction of duty), Article 93 (maltreatment), and Article 134 (indecent acts). All of these offenses are alleged to have occurred at BCCF during the time of SPC Ambuhl's assignment to the prison. On 6 July 2004, the defense submitted a Request for Expert Assistance, regarding Dr. 1111111111.1.11r to MG Thomas Metz, Commander, III Corps. Dr.• a Professor of Psychology at the University of California ; Santa Cruz. As one of the original researchers in the ground-breaking "Stanford Prison Experiment," Dr. Illalitas dedicated over 30 years of research to the unique subject-area of prison psychology. Dr. .research has shown that prisons are powerful social settings and that much of what people do inside of them is shaped by the conditions that exist therein. On 13 July 2004, CPTION11111111111treferred additional charges against SPC Ambuhl. The following violations were alleged: Article 81 (conspiracy to commit maltreatment); and Article 93 (x2) (maltreatment). These additional charges are alleged to have occurred at BCCF while SPC Ambuhl worked on Tier 1B. On 21 July 2004, MG Thomas Metz, Commander, III Corps, referred the 20 March 2004 and the 13 July 2004 charges and specifications to a General Court-Martial. On 14 August 2004, MG Metz denied the defense's 6 July 2004 Request for Expert Assistance. However, MG Metz indicated that the government would detail a military expert of suitable training, education, and experience to assist the defense. On 16 August 2004, the government notified the defense of MG Metz's decision. The defense immediately requested that the government identify who they deemed as a suitable alternative prior to 23 August 2004. D. LAW The defense relies on the following authorities in support of its motion: a. U.C.M.J. Article 46 b. R.C.M. 703(d) 1102:650 2 DOD 001551 United States v. SPC Megan Motion for Expert Assistance c. M.R.E. 502 d. Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985) e. United States v. Ford, 51 M.J. 445 (C.A.A.F. 1999) f. United States v. Gonzalez, 39 M.J. 459 (C.M.A. 1994) g. United States v. Burnette, 29 M.J. 473 (C.M.A. 1990) h. United States v. Toledo, 25 M.J. 270 (C.M.A c 1987) i. United States v. Garries,.M.J. 288 (C.M.A. 1986) j. United States v. Cameron, 21 M.J. 59 (C.M.A. 1985) E. EVIDENCE & WITNESSES The defense requests argument on this Motion fqv Expert Assistance. The defense requests consideration of th6following documents: a. Memorandum through SJA, III Corps, for CG, III Corps, SUBJECT: Request for Expert Assistance in United States v. SPC Megan M. Ambuhl, dated 6 July 2004 b. Curriculum Vitae oPINIIIIIIIMIMPh.D. c. Interpersonal Dynamics in a Simulated Prison, 1 International Journal of Criminology and Penology 69-97 (1973) [the "Stanford Prison Experiment"] d. Memorandum for Defense Counsel for SPC Ambuhl, SUBJECT: Request for Expert Assistance in United States v. SPC Megan M. Ambuhl, dated 14 August 2004 The defense may call SPC Megan Ambuhl to testify for the limited purpose of litigating this motion. F. ARGUMENT A military accused has, as a matter of Equal Protection and Due Process, a right to expert assistance when necessary to present an adequate defense. See' Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985); U.S. v. Garries, 22 M.J. 288 (C.M.A.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 985 (1986). Failure to employ this expert consultant could effectively deprive SPC Ambuhl of her ability to present a defense in this case and would deny her "[m]eaningful access to justice." Ake 470 U.S. at 77. Servicemembers are entitled to the assistance of investigative and other expert assistance when necessary for an adequate defense. See Garries, 22 M.J. at 290-91. To be entitled to investigative and expert assistance at government expense, the accused must demonstrate "a proper showing of necessity." U.S. v. Burnette, 29 M.J. 473, 475 (C.M.A. 1990). The defense request must satisfy the three-pronged test for determining whether investigative and/or expert assistance is necessary: first, why the expert assistance is needed; second, what would the expert assistance accomplish for the accused; third, why is the defense counsel unable to gather and present the evidence that the expert assistant would be able to develop. U.S. v. Gonzales, 39 M.J. 459, 461 (C.M.A.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 965 (1994); see also U.S. v. Ford, 51 M.J. 445, 455 (C.A.A.F. 1999).. 002651 3 United States v. SPC Megan •.,..11 Motion for Expert Assistance I. Why is expert assistance needed? Expert assistance is needed to explore and develop possible defenses involving the psychological impact of prison environments on prison guards. An expert is needed to explore a defense to all of the charges, with specific reference to SPC Ambuhl's complacency or inability to act. Dr. aspis a Professor of Psychology at the University of California, Santa Cruz. As one of the original researchers in the ground-breaking "Stanford Prison Experiment," Dr. 41111P has dedicated over 30 years of research to the unique subject-area of prison psychology. Dr. valffileNtvill analyze the situational pressures that may have existed at Abu Ghraib that may help to account for a person's behavior or inaction inside the prison. In addition to emphasizing the ways in which correctional officers must be elaborately trained to handle these pressures, Dr. twill analyze the way prisons can create potentially destructive tensions and psychological forces that must be controlled in order t9 prevent disint6gration of an otherwise orderly prison environment. Granting expert assistance at government expense will provide the defense with equal access to the type of expertise that the government alreadylas utilized in this case. The first annex to the government's AR 15-6 report, conducted by MG Taguba, is a "Psychological Assessment" conducted by COL.USAF psychiatrist. This annex provides for the government an overview of life at Abu Ghraib and the effects on Military Police of working at the prison. The defense is asking for the same access to expert assistance as that provided to the government. Dr. illalashould be appointed to the defense team because there is no adequate substitute in the Armed Forces who has the same quantity or quality of experience as DraningDrearlpholds a Master's Degree, a Juris Doctor degree, and a Ph.D. in psychology, all from Stanford University, one of the premier academic institutions in the United States. He has dedicated over 30 years of his professional career to conducting research in this unique psychological field. For over 22 court cases, DrAlliainas provided evaluations of prison conditions and their psychological effects. 2. What would the expert assistance accomplish for SPC Ambuhl? For SPC Ambuhl's case, Dr. would provide invaluable insight and expert assistance. Dr.11111111011 share insight with the defense team about how corrections officers are affected by living and working in prison environments. He will interview military police who worked at Abu Ghraib during the relevant time period, detainees who were held at Abu Ghraib, and SPC Ambuhl, to develop a psychological profile of those that worked at the facility. In addition to meeting with SPC Ambuhl to obtain a first-hand account of day-to-day life and operations at Abu Ghraib, Dr. .will visit Abu Ghraib for a first-hand evaluation of the facility. He will review training documents and evaluate the training given to soldiers prior to their work at the prison. He will review the standard operating procedures at the prison. Essentially, he will evaluate anything that might bear on the situational pressures that were created inside the facility that might have influenced and affected those that worked there. Should SPC Ambuhl be convicted of any of the charged offenses, Dry„-can also assist the 02652 4 United States v, SPC Megan M‘, ..111 Motion for Expert Assistance defense in developing evidence in extenuation or mitigation, in effect, "why good people do bad things." 3. Why is the defense team unable to gather and present the evidence that the expert assistant would be able to develop? Finally, the defense is unable, on its own, to gather and present the evidence that the Dr. would be able to develop. Neither counsel maintains any type of degree or background in psychology. Neither counsel has researched the psychological or social impacts of prisons on the corrections guards that work there. Dr. mover-30-years of experience can not be replicated even with the most diligent of efforts by counsel. Further, Dr.!mis anticipated to testify at SPC Ambuhl's court-martial, a task clearly beyond the ethical boundaries permitted by any defense bar. If this motion is granted, the defense further requests that Dr.11111111hbe bound by the attorney-client privilege under Military Rule of Evidence 502. The defense requests that Dr. 11.116,Assist in the investigation of the case, and, if requested, be present with SPC Ambuhl at trial as a member, of the defense team. It is also requested that confidentiality extend to all research assistants that may assist Dr. .in his work with the defense. For his assistance, Dr. Haney charges $175 per hour. He anticipates spending between 100 and 200 hours in preparation of SPC Ambuhl's defense. Once Dr..is appointed to the defense team and is able to speak with SPC Ambuhl and to begin to review discovery documents, he can provide a more accurate cost/time estimate. Once Dr.ftwysis appointed, funding will be required so that DrT .can travel to Iraq to consult with SPC Ambuhl and to visit the Abu Ghraib prison. Dr..latent is to visit Iraq in early September 2004 to minimize disruption to his academic duties at UCSC caused by approximately 10-days of travel to Iraq. G. CONCLUSION The defense requests that the government appoint Dr.111111111ks an expert assistant on the defense team with confidentiality. Additionally, the defense requests that the court's order includes a determination that the government fund the travel of Dr. .to the crime scene at Abu Ghraib Prison, Iraq. This travel will be necessary for Dr.3111111111p properly analyze all of the physical, social, and psychological factors that may have contributed to SPC Ambuhl's action or inaction in the charged offenses. RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED: vim111106 CPT, JA Trial Defense Counsel 5 . 002653 United States v. SPC Megan W._ ,;hl Motion for Expert Assistance CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I certify that this defense Motion for Expert Assistance was served on the government via e-mail to. vemain.hq.c5.army.mil and vemain.hq.c5.army.mil and on and on the military judge via e-mail on 16 August 2004. CPT, JA Trial Defense Counsel . 002654 6 DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY UNITED STATES ARMY TRIAL DEFENSE SERVICE REGION IX, FOB DANGER BRANCH OFFICE APO AE 09392 REPLY TO ATTENTION OF: . 4 AETV.13GJA-TDS 6 July 2004 MEMORANDUM THRU Staff Judge Advocate, III Corps, Victory Base, APO AB 09342-1400 FOR Commanding General, III Corps, Victory Base, APO AE 09342-1400 SUBJECT: Request for Expert Assistance in United States v. SPC Megan M. Ambuhl 1. The defense requests that the government appoint Dr.GIIIIIMIIIps a confidential expert consultant to the defense team to provide advice on the psychological and sociological impact of working in a prison, areas of expertise that fall outside the experience of defense counsel. 2. A military accused has, as a matter of Equal Protection and Due Process, a right to expert assistance when necessary to present an adequate defense. See Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985); U.S. v. Garries, 22 M.J. 288 (CMA), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 985 (1986). Failure to employ this expert consultant could effectively deprive SPC Ambuhl of her ability to present a defense in this case and would deny her "[m]eaningful access to justice." Ake, 470 U.S. at 77. 3. Servicemembers are entitled to the assistance of investigative and other expert assistance when necessary for an adequate defense. See Garries, 22 M.J. at 290-91. To be entitled to investigative and expert assistance at government expense, the accused must demonstrate "a proper showing of necessity." U.S. v. Burnette, 29 M.J. 473, 475 (CMA 1990). The defense request must satisfy the three-pronged test for determining whether investigative and/or expert assistance is necessary: first, why the expert assistance is needed; second, what would the expert assistance accomplish for the accused; third, why is the defense counsel unable to gather and present the evidence that the expert assistant would be able to develop. U.S. v. Gonzales, 39 M.J. 459, 461 (CMA), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 965 (1994). a. First, expert assistance is needed to explore and develop possible defenses involving the psychological impact of prison environments on prison guards. An expert is needed to explore a defense to all four charges, with specific reference to SPC Ambuhrs complacency or inability to act. Dr. inlipa Professor of Psychology at the University of California, Santa Cruz. As one of the original researchers in the ground-breaking "Stanford Prison Experiment," Dr. 1111111as dedicated over 30 years of research to the unique subject-area of prison psychology. Di.research has shown that prisons are powerful social settings and that much of what people do inside of them is shaped by the conditions that exist therein. Dr. ' will analyze the situational pressures that may have existed at Abu Ghraib that may help to account for a person's behavior or inaction inside the prison. In addition to emphasizing the ways in which correctional officers must be elaborately trained to handle these pressures, Dr. VIIIkvill analyze the way prisons can create potentially destructive tensions and psychological 002655 AETV-BGJA-TDS SUBJECT: Request for Expert Assistance in United States v. SPC Megan M. Ambuhl forces that must be controlled in order to prevent disintegration of an otherwise orderly prison environment. b. Second, for the accused, Dr. .would provide invaluable insight and expert assistance. DrAllalltwill share insight with the defense team about how corrections officers are affected by living and working in prison environments. He will interview military police who worked at Abu. Ghraib during the relevant time period, detainees who were held at Abu Ghraib, and SPC Ambuhl, to develop a psychological profile of those that worked at the facility. In addition to meeting with SPC Ambuhl to obtain a first-hand account of day-to-day life and operations at Abu Ghraib, Dr. .Will visit Abu Ghraib for a first-hand evaluation of the facility. He will review documents about the training that personnel were provided before beginning work at the prison and standard operating procedures at the prison. Essentially, he will evaluate anything that might bear on the situational pressures that were created inside the facility that might have influenced and affected those that worked tiere. Should SPC Ambuhl be convicted of any of the charged offenses, DLOIIII.can also assist the defense in developing evidence in extenuation or mitigation, in effect, why good people do bad things. c. Finally, the defense is unable, on its own, to gather and present the evidence that the Dr. .wouldbe able to develop. Neither counsel maintains any type of degree or background in psychology. Neither counsel has researched the psychological or social impacts of prisons on the corrections guards that work there. DLIMIllipover-30-years,of experience can not be'replicated even with the most diligent of efforts by counsel. Further, Dr. . is anticipated to testify at SPC Ambuhl's court-martial, a task clearly beyond the ethical boundaries permitted by any defense bar. 4. Authorizing expert assistance at government expense will provide the defense with equal access to the type of expertise that the government already has utilized in this case. The first annex to the government's AR 15-6 report is a "Psychological Assessment" conducted by COL 1111.1111100USAF psychiatrist. This annex provides for the government an overview of life at Abu Ghraib and the effects on Military Police of working at the prison. The defense is asking for the same access to expert assistance as that provided to the government. :hould be appointed to the defense team because there is no adequate substitute in 5. Dr..the Armed Forces who has the same quantity or quality of experience as .Dr. OM holds a Master's Degree, a Juris Doctor degree, and a Ph.D. in psychology, all from Stanford University, one of the premier academic institutions in the United States. He has dedicated over 30 years of his professional career to conducting research in this unique psychological field. For over 22 court cases, Dr.1.1110as provided evaluations of prison conditions and their psychological effects. 6. If this request is granted, the defense further requests that Dr iallallipe bound by the attorney-client privilege under Military Rule of Evidence 502. The defense requests that Drillniressist in the investigation of the case, and, if requested, be present with SPC Ambuhl at trial as a 2 AETV-BGJA-TDS SUBJECT: Request for Expert Assistance in United States v. SPC Megan M. Ambuhl member of the defense team. It is also requested that confidentiality extend to all research assistants that may assist Dr. matin his work with the defense. 7. For his assistance, Dr.111111pt hargep $175 per hour. He anticipates s ending between 100 is appointed to the and 200 hours in preparation of SPC Ambuhl's defense. Once Dr. . defense team and is able to speak with SPC Ambuhl and to begin to review discovery documents, he can provide a more accurate cost/time estimate. 8. Once Drailleris appointed, funding will be required so that Dr. 'an travel to Iraq to consult with SPC Ambuhl and to visit the Abu Ghraib prison. Please inform us of your decision intent is to visit as quickly as possible so there will be no undue delays in this case. Dr. . Iraq in late August or early September 2004 to minimize disruption to his academic duties at UCSC caused bey approximately 10-days of travel to Iraq. 9. Thank you for your prompt consideration of this request. If I may be of further assistance in this matter, please contact me via unsecured email atallialMaiWus.army.mil or by phone at DNVT: 553-111, "1111111.- CPT, JA Trial Defense Counsel Ends 1. Curriculum Vitae 2. Interpersonal Dynamics in a Simulated Prison, 1 International Journal of Criminology and Penology 69-97 (1973) [the "Stanford Prison Experiment"' 3 002657 DOD 001558 CURRICULUM VITAE • ro essor o syc o ogy Department of Psychology University of California, Santa Cruz 95064'. home address Santa Cruz, California 95062 phone: fax email: birthdate: 3/8/47 citizenship: U.S.A. spouse: Aida Hurtado PREVIOUS EMPLOYMENT 1985-.University of California, Santa Cruz, Professor of Psychology University of California, Santa Cruz, Associate Professor of Psychology 1981-85. 1978-81.University of California, Santa Cruz, Assistant Professor of Psychology 1977-78.University of California, Santa Cruz, Lecturer in Psychology 1976-77.Stanford University, Acting Assistant Professor of Psychology EDUCATION 1978.Stanford Law School, J.D. 1978.Stanford University, Ph.D. 1971.Stanford University, M.A. 1969.University of Pennsylvania, B.A. 002658 1 HONORS AWARDS GRANTS 2004.National Science Foundation Grant to Study Capital Jury Decisionmaking 2002 ,.Santa Cruz Alumni Association Distinguished Teaching Award, University of California, Santa Cruz. United States Department of Health & Human Services/Urban Institute, "Effects of Incarceration on Children, Families, and Low-Income Communities" Project. American Association for the Advancement of Science/American Academy of Forensic Science Project: "Scientific Evidence Summit" Planning Committee. Teacher of the Year (UC Santa Cruz Re-Entry Students' Award). 2000.White House Forum on the Uses of Science and Technology to Improve Crime and Prison Policy. Excellence in Teaching Award (Academic Senate Committee on Teaching). Joint American Association for the Advancement of Science-American Bar Association Science and Technology Section National Conference of Lawyers and Scientists. 1999.American Psychology-Law Society Presidential Initiative Invitee ("Reviewing the Discipline: A Bridge to the Future") National Science Foundation Grant to Study Capital Jury Decisionmaking (renewal and extension). 1997.National Science Foundation Grant to Study Capital Jury Decisionmaking. 1996.Teacher of the Year (UC Santa Cruz Re-Entry Students' Award). 1995.Gordon Allport Intergroup Relations Prize (Honorable Mention) Excellence in Teaching Convocation, Social Sciences Division 1994.Outstanding Contributions to Preservation of Constitutional Rights, California Attorneys for Criminal Justice. . 002659 2 1992.Psychology Undergraduate Student Association Teaching Award SR 43 Grant for Policy-Oriented Research With Linguistically Diverse Minorities 1991.Alumni Association Teaching Award ("Favorite Professor") 1990.Prison Law Office Award for Contributions to Prison Litigation 1989.UC Mexus Award for Comparative Research on Mexican Prisons 1976.Hilmer Oehlmann Jr. Award for Excellence in Legal Writing at Stanford Law School 1975-76.Law and Psychology Fellow, Stanford Law School 1974-76.Russell Sage Foundation Residency in Law and Social Science 1974.Gordon Allport Intergroup Relations Prize, Honorable Mention 1969-71.University Fellow, Stanford University 1969-74.Society of Sigma Xi 1969.B.A. Degree Magna cum laude with Honors in Psychology Phi Beta Kappa 1967-1969 University Scholar, University of Pennsylvania UNIVERSITY SERVICE AND ADMINISTRATION 1998-2002 Chair, Department of Psychology 1994-1998 Chair, Department of Sociology 1992-1995 Chair, Legal Studies Program 1995 (Fall) Committee on Academic Personnel 1995-1996 University Committee on Academic Personnel (UCAP) 1990-1992 Committee on Academic Personnel 002660 3 1991-1992 Chair, Social Science Division Academic Personnel Committee 1984-1986 Chair, Committee on Privilege and Tenure WRITINGS AND OTHER CREATIVE ACTIVITIES IN PROGRESS Books.Limits to Prison Pain: Using Psychology to Improve Prison Policy, American Psychological Association, forthcoming, circa 2005. Articles "Indifferent as They Stand Unsworn?: Pretrial Publicity, Fairness, and the Capital Jury," (with NNW in preparation. "Death Penalty Attitudes, Selective Memory, and Instructional Incomprehension in Capital Jury Decisionmaking," (within!'" in preparation. "Race and Capital Sentencin : Another Look at Discriminatory Death Sentences," (with., in preparation. PUBLISHED WRITINGS AND CREATIVE ACTIVITIES Monographs and Technical Reports 1989.Employment Testing and Employment Discrimination Technical Report for the National Commission on Testing and Public Policy. New York: Ford Foundation. Articles in Professional Journals and Book Chapters ificiiisue on the Death Penalty in the United States" (co-edited with 2004.), for Psychology, Public Policy, and Law, in press. . 002661 4 "Condemning the Other in Death Penalty Trials: Biographical Racism, Structural Mitigation, and the Empathic Divide," DePaul Law Review, 53, 1557-1590. 2003."Mental Health Issues in Long-Term Solitary and Supermax' Confinement," Crime & Delinquency (special issue on mental health and the criminal justice system), 49, 124-156. "The Psychological Im act of Incarceration: Implications for Post-Prison Adjustment," in. . (Eds..), Prisoners Once Removed: The Impact of Incarceration and Reentry on Children, Families, and Communities (pp. 33-66). Washington, DC: Urban Institute Press. "Comments on "Dying Twice": Death Row Confinement in the Age of the Supermax," Capital University Law Review, in press. 2002."Making Law Modern: Toward a Contextual Model of Justice, Psychology., Public Policy, and Law, 7, 3-63. "Psychological Jurisprudence: Takin Ps cholo and Law into the went irst Century," (with . , d.), Taking Psychology and Law into the Twenty-First enturY (pp. 35-59). New York: Kluwer Academic/Plenum Publishing. kilielnu Beyond," (with., in , The Handbook of Psycho .(pp. 184-201). Chicago, IL: American Bar Association. [CD-ROM format] "Science, Law, and Psychological In' :Daubert Standards and •tber r 2001."Vulnerable Offenders and the Law: Treatment Ri hts in Uncertain Legal Times" (with .In. (Eds.), Treating Adult and Juvenile Offenders with Special Needs (pp. 51-79). Washington, D.C.: American Psychological Association. "Afterword," in J. Evans (Ed.), Undoing Time (pp. 245-256). Boston, MA: Northeastern University Press. 2000."Discrimination and Instructional Comprehension: Guided Discretion, Racial Bias, and the Death Penalty" (with .Law and Human Behavior, 24, 337-358. 002662 5 "Cycles of Pain: Risk Factors in the Lives of Incarcerated Women and Their Children," (with 11111111111111111111, Prison Journal, 80, 3­ 23. 1999."Reflections on the Stanford Prison Experiment: Genesis, Transformations, Conse uences (`The SPE and the Analysis of Ed.), Obedience to Authority: Current Institutions')," In. Perspectives on the Milgram Paradigm (pp. 221-237). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. "Ideology and Crime Control," American Psychologist, 54, 786-788. 1998"The Past and Future of U.S. Prison Policy: Twen -Five Years After the Stanford Prison Experiment," (with ., American Psychologist, 53, 709-727. [Reprinted in special issue of Norweigian journal as: USAs fen sels olitikk i fortid og fremtid, Vardoger, 25, 171­ 183 (2000); in.(Ed.), Debating Points: Crime and Punishment. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, in press; and in Annual Editions: Criminal Justice. Guilford, CT: Dushkin/McGraw-Hill, in press; UMW The American Prison System (pp. 17-43) (Reference'Shelf Series). New York:.(2001).] "Riding the Punishment Wave: On the Origins of Our Devolving Standards of Decency," Hastings Women's Law Journal, 9, 27-78.,' "Becoming the Mainstream: "Merit," Chan 'n Demo a hies, and Higher Education in California" (with . , La Raza Law Journal, 10, 645-690.[Reprinted in "Regulating Prisons of the Future: A s chological Analysis of Supermax 1997. and Solitary Confinement," (with ., New York University. Review of Law and Social Change, 23, 477-570. "Psychology and the Limits to Prison Pain: Confronting the Coming Crisis in Eighth Amendment Law," Psychology, Public Policy, and Law, 3, 499- 588. "Commonsense Justice and the Death Penalty: Problematizing the 'Will of the People,"' Psychology, Public Policy, and Law, 3, 303-337. "Violence and the Capital Jury: Mechanisms of Moral Disengagement and the Impulse to Condemn to Death," Stanford Law Review, 49 1447-1486. 002663 6 et "Mitigation and the Study of Lives: The Roots of Violent Criminality and the Nature of Capital Justice." In, America's Experiment with Capital Punishment: Reflections on t, Present, and Future of the Ultimate Penal Sanction. Durham, NC: Carolina Academic Press, 343-377. "Clarifying Life and Death Matters: An Analysis of Instructional Comprehension and Penalty Phase Arguments" (withIMIPP, Law and Human Behavior, 21, 575-595. "Psychological Secrecy and the Death Penalty: Observations on 'the Mere Extinguishment of Life,"' Studies in Law, Politics, and Society, 16, 3-69. "The.Social Context of Capital Murder: Social Histories and the Logic of 1995. Capital Mitigation," Santa Clara Law Review, 35, 547-609. "Taking Capital Jurors Seriously," Indiana Law Journal, IQ, 1223-1232. "Death Penalty Opinion: Myth and Misconception," California Criminal Defense Practice Report6r, 1995(1), 1-7. 1994."The Jurisprudence of Race and Meritocracy: Standardized Testing and `Race-Neutral' Racism in the Workplace," (with., Law and Human Behavior, 18, 223-248. "Comprehending Life and Death Matters: A Preliminary Study of California's Capital Penalty Instructions" (with 1111111, Law and Human Behavior, 18, 411-434. "Felony Voir Dire: An Exploratory Study of Its Content and Effect," (with 1111.1t, Law and Human Behavior, 18, 487-506. mi. "Broken Promise: The Supreme Court's Response to Social Science Research on Capital Punishment" (with .Journal of Social Issues (special issue on the death penalty in the nited States), 50, 75-101. "Deciding to Take a Life: Capital Juries Sentencin Instructions, and the Jurisprudence of Death" (with . , Journal of Social Issues (special issue on the death penalty in the United States), 50, 149-176. [Reprinted in.(Ed.), Capital Punishment. New York: Garland Publishing (1995).] "Modern' Death Qualification: New Data on Its Biasing Effects," (with fi, 11.1111111.1111111Law and Human Behavior, 18, 619-633. D02664 7 "Processing the Mad, Badly," Contemporary Psychology, 39, 898-899. "Language is Power," Contemporary Psychology, 39, 1039-1040. 1993."Infamous Punishment: The Psychological Effects of Isolation " National Prison Project Journal, 8, 3-21. [Reprinted in Eds.), Correctional Contexts: Contemporary and assica ea trigs p. 428-437). Los Angeles: Roxbury Publishing (Eds.), Correctional (1997);. naM7en=717actitioners, and Prisoners (pp. Perspectives: .ro 161-170). Los Angeles: Roxbury Publishing (2001).] "Psychology and Legal Change: The Impact of a Decade," Law and Human Behavior, 17, 371-398. "Death Penalty Attitudes: TThe Beliefs of Death-Qualified Californians," 1992. (with. . Forum, 19, 43-47. "The Influence of Race on Sentencing: A Meta-Analytic Review of Experimental Studies." (with .. Special issue on Discrimination and the Law. Be aviora cience' and Law, 10, 179-195. 1991"The Fourteenth Amendment and Symbolic Legality: Let Them Eat Due Process," Law and Human Behavior, 15, 183-204. 1988"In Defense of the Jury," Contemporary Psychology, 33, 653-655. 1986"Civil Rights and Institutional Law: The Role of Social Psychology in Judicial Implementation," (With ., Journal of Community Psychology, 14, 267-277. 1984."Editor's Introduction. Special Issue on Death Qualification," Law and Human Behavior, 8, 1-6. "On the Selection of Capital Juries: The Biasing Effects of Death Qualification," Law and Human Behavior, 8, 121-132. "Examining Death Qualification: Further Analysis of the Process Effect," Law and Human Behavior, 8, 133-151. . 8 ' D24365 DOD 001566 "Evolving Standards and the Capital Jury," Law and Human Behavior, 8, 153-158. "Postscript," Law and Human Behavior, 8, 159. "Social Factfinding and Legal Decisions: Judicial Reform and the Use ofds.), Social Science." In. Perspectives in Psyc io ogy an aw. ew .ey, pp. 43-54. "The Future of Crime and Personality Research: A Social Psychologist's 1983. .(Eds.), Personality Theory, MoralView," in Development, and Criminal Behavioral Behavior. Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, pp. 471-473. "The Good, the Bad, and the Lawful: An Essay on Psychological Injustice," in. (Eds.), Personality Theory, Moral Development, and Criminale awn Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, pp. 107-117. "Ordering the Courtroom, Psychologically," Jurimetrics, 23, 321-324. 1982."Psychological Theory and Criminal Justice Policy: Law and Psychology in the Formative Era " Law and Human Behavior, G, 191-235. [Reprinted in -ids.), Law and American History: Cases and Materials. Minneapolis, N: West Publishing, 1989.] "Data and Decisions: Social Science and Judicial Reform," in 1111111/ (Ed.), The Analysis of Judicial Reform. Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath, pp. 43-59. "Employment Tests and Employment Discrimination: A Dissenting Psychological Opinion," Industrial Relations Law Journal, 5 pp. 1-86. "To Polygraph or Not: The Effects of Preemlo y m ent Polygraphing on Work-Related Attitudes," (with . , Polygraph, 11, 185-199. 1981."Death Qualification as a Biasing Legal Process," The Death Penalty Reporter, 1 GB, pp. 1-5. [Reprinted in Augustus: A Journal of Progressive Human Sciences, 9(3), 9-13 (1986).] 1980."Juries and the Death Penalty: Readdressing the Witherspoon Question," Crime and Delinquency, October, pp. 512-527. . 002666 9 DOD 001567 "Psychology and Legal Change: On the Limits of a Factual Jurisprudence," Law and I-human Behavior, 6, 191-235. [Reprinted in mr .), Social Research and the Judicial Process. New York: Russel age, 1983.] "The Creation of Legal Dependency: Law School in a Nutshell" with ,. (Ed.), The People's Law Review. Reading, Mass.:Imo'son-7777T. 36-41. : Network Illusions of Criminal Justice Realities""Television Criminolo (Ed.), Readings on the Social Animal. (with San ranctsco, pp. 125-136. "A Psychologist Looks at the Criminal' Justice System," in fid.), 1979. Challenges and Alternatives to the Criminal Justice System. Atm Arbor: Monograph Press, pp. 77-85. "Social Psychology and the Criminal Law," in (Ed.), Social Psychology and Modem Life. New York: Random House, pp. 671- 711. "Bargain Justice in an Unjust World: Good Deals in the Criminal Courts" Law and 'Society Review, 13, pp. 633-650. [Reprinted in (with. ds.), Criminal Law and Its Processes. Boston: Litt e, rown, 1983.] 1977."Prison Behavior" (with 111.11), in B. Wolman (Ed.), The Encyclopedia of Neurology, Psychiatry, Psychoanalysis, and Psychology, Vol. IX, pp. 70-74. "The Socialization into Criminali : On Becoming a Prisoner and a ds.), Law, Justice, Guard" (withMillili, inr. and the Individual in Society: Psycho °peal an . egal Issues (pp. 198­223). New York:11.111111111.111111111 1976 "The Play's the Thing: Methodological Notes on Social Simulations," in P. Golden (Ed.), The Research Experience, pp. 177-190. Itasca, IL: Peacock. "The Blackboard Penitentiary: It's Tough to Tell a High School front a 1975. Prison" (with aignik Psychologya Today, 26ff. . 002667 10 "Implementing Research Results in Criminal Justice Settings," Proceedings, Third Annual Conference on Corrections in the U.S. Military, Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences, June 6-7. "The Psychology of Imprisonment: Privation, Power, and Pathology", in D. Rosenhan and P. London (with. (Eds.), Theory andResearch in norma Ps chology. New York: Holt Rinehart, and Winston. [Reprinted in: .(Ed.), Doing Unto Others: Joining, Molding, Conformin .Loving. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1974. (Eds.) Contemporary Issues in octal Psychology. Third Edition. Monterey:1111111.111, 1977. Calhoun, James Readings, Cases, and Study Guide for sychology of Adjustment and Human Relationships. New York: Random House, 1978.] 1973."Social Roles, Role-Playing, and Education" (with., The Behavioral and Social Science Teacher, Fall, 1(1), pp. 2 - . .eprinted (Eds. Ps cholo For Our Times. in:. 977.. (Eds.) Glenview,. Current Perspectives m ocia sychology. Third Edition. New York: Oxford University Press, 1978.] "The Mind is a Formidable Jailer: A Pirandellian Prison" (with., The New York Times Magazine, April 8, ection 6, 38-60. [Reprinted in 11.111(Ed.), Psychology Is Social: Readings and Conversations in Social Psychology. Glenview, Ill.: Scott, Foresman, 1982.] . "Interpersonal Dynamics in a Simulated Prison" (with International Journal of Criminolo and Penolo , 1, pp. 69-(Eds.) epnnted in : Examinin Deviance Experim n a y. ew or : lfred Pu lishing, 1975; Ed.) The Research Experience. Itasca, Ill.: Peacock 1976; (Ed.) The Sociology of Corrections. New York: 1977; A kiserleti tarsadalom-lelektan foarma. Buda est, Hungary:Justice 1977; an orrec ions. New York: John Wiley, 1978; Methods in Education and Social Sciences. The Open University, 1979; (Ed.), Modern Sociology. British Columbia: Open Learning Institute, (Ed.) Prison Guard/ Correctional Officer: The Use 1980;. and Abuse o uman esources of Prison. Toronto: Butterworth's 1981; ds.), Social Science in Law: ases, a eria s, an ro ems. o I1 dation Press, 1985: (Ed.), The Context of Human Behavior. Jagiellonian University Press, Ed.), Mapping the Social Landscape: Readings in 2001;. Sociology. St. Enumclaw, WA: Mayfield Publishing, 2001.] 00266 11 "A Study of Prisoners and Guards" (with eadings Naval Research Reviews, 1-17. [Reprinted in. , 1980; MINN About the Social Animal. San Francisco:. (Ed.) Key Studies in Psychology. Third Edition. London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1999;011=Vd.), Basic Themes in Law and Jurisprudence. Anderson Publishing, 20001 MEMBERSHIP/ACTIVITIES IN PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATIONS American Psychological Association American Psychology and Law Society Law and Society Association National Coun6il on Crime and Delinquency INVITED ADDRESSES AND PAPERS PRESENTED AT PROFESSIONAL ACADEMIC MEETINGS AND RELATED SETTINGS (SELECTED) 2003."Crossing the Empathic Divide: Race Factors in Death Penalty Decisionmaking," DePaul Law School Symposium on Race and the Death Penalty'in the United States, Chicago, October. "Supermax Prisons and the Prison Reform Paradigm," PACE Law School Conference on Prison Reform Revisited: The:unfinished Agdnda, New York, October. "Mental Health Issues in Supermax Confinement," European Psychology and Law Conference, University of Edinburgh, Scotland, July. "Roundtable on Capital Punishment in the United States: The Key Psychological Issues," European Psychology and Law Conference, University of Edinburgh, Scotland, July. "Psychology and Legal Change: Taking Stock," European Psychology and Law Conference, University of Edinburgh, Scotland, July. . 12 002669 "Economic Justice and Criminal Justice: Social Welfare and Social Control," Society for the Study of Social Issues Conference, January. "Race, Gender, and Class Issues in the Criminal Justice System," Center for Justice, Tolerance & Community and Barrios Unidos Conference, March. "The 14ychological Effects of Imprisonment: Prisonization and Beyond." 2002. Joint Urban Institute and United States Department of Health and Human Services Conference on "From Prison to Home." Washington, DC, January. "On the Nature of Mitigation: Current Research on Capital Jury Decisionmaking." American Psychology and Law Society, Mid-Winter Meetings, Austin, Texas, March. "Prison Conditions and Death Row Confinement." New York Bar Association, New York City, June. "Supermax and Solitary Confinement: The State of the Research and the2001. State of the Prisons." Best Practices and Human Rights in Supermax Prisons: A Dialogue. Conference sponsored by University of Washington and the Washington Department of Corrections, Seattle, September. "Mental Health in Superrnax: On Psychological Distress and Institutional Care." Best Practices and Human Rights in Supermax Prisons: A Dialogue. Conference sponsored by University of Washington and the Washington Department of Corrections, Seattle, September. "On the Nature of Mitigation: Research Results and Trial Process and Outcomes." Boalt Hall School of Law, University of California, Berkeley, August. "Toward an Integrated Theory of Mitigation." American Psychological Association Annual Convention, San Francisco, CA, August. Discussant: "Constructing Class Identities--The Impact of Educational Experiences." American Psychological Association Annual Convention, San Francisco, CA, August. "The Rise of Carceral Consciousness." American Psychological Association Annual Convention, San Francisco, CA, August. . 13 002670 2000."On the Nature of Mitigation: Countering Generic Myths in Death Penalty Decisionmaking," City University of New York Second International Advances in Qualitative Psychology Conference, March. "Why Has U.S. Prison Policy Gone From Bad to Worse? Insights From the Stanford Prison Study and Beyond," Claremont Conference on Women, Prisons, and Criminal Injustice, March. "The Use of Social Histories in Capital Litigation," Yale Law School, April. "Debunking Myths About Capital Violence," Georgetown Law School, April. "Research on Capital Jury Decisionmaking: New Data on Juror Comprehension and the Nature of Mitigation," Society for Study of Social Issues Convention, Minneapolis, June. "Crime and Punishment: Where Do We Go From Here?" Division 41 Invited Symposium, "Beyond the Boundaries: Where Should Psychology and Law Be Taking Us?" American Psychological Association Annual Convention, Washington, DC, August. 1998."Psychology and the State of U.S. Prisons at the Millennium," American Psychological Association Annual Convention, Boston, MA, August. "Spreading Prison Pain: On the Worldwide Movement Towards Incarcerative Social Control," Joint American Psychology-Law Society/ European Association of Psychology and Law Conference, Dublin, Ireland, July. 1998."Prison Conditions and Prisoner Mental Health," Beyond the Prison Industrial Complex Conference, University of California, Berkeley, September., "The State of US Prisons: A Conversation," International Congress of Applied Psychology, San Francisco, CA, August. "Deathwork: Capital Punishment as a Social Psychological System," Invited SPPSI Address, American Psychological Association Annual Convention, San Francisco, CA, August. "The Use and Misuse of Psychology in Justice Studies: Psychology and Legal Change: What Happened to Justice?," (panelist), American 14. 0 02671 Psychological Association Annual Convention, San Francisco, CA, August. "Twenty Five Years of American Corrections: Past and Future," American Psychology and Law Society, Redondo Beach, CA, March. "Deconstructing the Death Penalty," School of Justice Studies, Arizona 1997.State University, Tempe, AZ, October. "Mitigation arid the Study of Lives," Invited Address to Division 41 (Psychology and Law), American Psychological Association Annual Convention, Chicago, August. "The Stanford Prison Experiment and 25 Years of American Prison 1996. Policy," American Psychological Association Annual Convention, Toronto, August. "Looking Closely at the Death Penalty: Public Stereotypes and Capital 1995. Punishment," Invited Address, Arizona State University College of Public Programs series on Free Speech, Affirmative Action and Multiculturalism, Tempe, AZ, April. "Race and the Flaws of the Meritocratic Vision," Invited Address, Arizona State University College of Public Programs series on Free Speech, Affirmative Action and Multiculturalism, Tempe, AZ, April. "Taking Capital Jurors Seriously," Invited Address, National Conference on Juries and the Death Penalty, Indiana Law School, Bloomington, February. "Mitigation and the Social Genetics of Violence: Childhood Treatment 1994. and Adult Criminality," Invited Address, Conference on the Capital Punishment, Santa Clara Law School, October, Santa Clara. "Social Science and the Death Penalty," Chair and Discussant, American 1992. Psychological Association Annual Convention, San Francisco, CA, August. "Capital Jury Decisionmaking," Invited panelist, American Psychological 1991. Association Annual Convention, Atlanta, GA, August. 15 . 002672 BATES PAGES 3711 - 5918 (PFC LYNNDIE R. ENGLAND COURTS- MARTIAL RECORD OF TRIAL) HAVE BEEN WITHHELD PURSUANT TO FOIA EXEMPTION B(7)(A) 1990."Racial Discrimination in Death Penalty Cases," Invited presentation, NAACP Legal Defense Fund Conference on Capital Litigation, August, Airlie, VA. "Psychology and Legal Change: The Impact of a Decade," Invited Address 1989.to Division 41 (Psychology and Law), American Psychological Association Annual Convention, New Orleans, LA., August. "Judicial Remedies to Pretrial Prejudice," Law & Society Association Annual Meeting, Madison, WI, June. "The Social Psychology of Police Interrogation Techniques" (with R. Liebowitz), Law & Society Association Annual Meeting, Madison, WI, June. "The Fourteenth Amendment and Symbolic Legality: Let Them Eat Due 1987. Process," APA Annual Convention, New York, N.Y. August. "The Nature and Function of Prison in the United States and Mexico: A Preliminary Comparison," InterAmerican Congress of Psychology, Havana, Cuba, July. 1986.Chair, Division 41 Invited Address and "Commentary on the Execution Ritual," APA Annual Convention, Washington, D.C., August. "Capital Punishment," Invited Address, National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers Annual Convention, Monterey, CA, August. 1985."The Role of Law in Graduate Social Science Programs" and "Current Directions in Death Qualification Research," American Society of Criminology, San Diego, CA, November. "The State of the Prisons: What's Happened to 'Justice' in the '70s and '80s?" Invited Address to Division 41 (Psychology and Law); APA Annual Convention, Los Angeles, CA, August. "The Role of Social Science in Death Penalty Litigation." Invited Address 1983. in National College of Criminal Defense Death Penalty Conference, Indianapolis, IN, September. 002673 16 1982."Psychology in the Court: Social Science Data and Legal Decision-Making." Invited Plenary Address, International Conference on Psychology and Law, University College, Swansea, Wales, July. 1982."Paradigms in Conflict: Contrasting Methods and Styles of Psychology and Law." Invited Address, Social Science Research Council, Conference on Psychology and Law, Wolfson College, Oxford University, March. 1982."Law and Psychology: Conflicts in Professional Roles." Invited paper, Western Psychological Association Annual Meeting, April. 1980."Using Psychology in Test Case Litigation," panelist, American Psychological Association Annual Convention, Montreal, Canada, September. 1980."On the Selection of Capital Juries: The Biasing Effects of Death Qualification." Paper presented at the Interdisciplinary Conference on Capital PuniShment. Georgia State University, Atlanta, GA, April. 1980."Diminished Capacity and Imprisonment: The Legal and Psychological Issues," Proceedings of the American Trial Lawyers Association, Mid-Winter Meeting, January. 1975."Social Change and the Ideology of Individualism in Psychology and Law." Paper presented at the Western Psychological Association Annual Meeting, April. SERVICE TO STAFF OR EDITORIAL BOARDS OF FOUNDATIONS, SCHOLARLY JOURNALS OR PRESSES 2000-present Reviewer, Society for the Study of Social Issues Grants-in-Aid Program. 2000-present Editorial Board Member, ASAP (on-line journal of the Society for the Study of Social Issues) 17 . 0 6"I 4 DOD 001576 1997-present Editorial Board Member, Psychology, Public Policy, and Law 1991 Editorial Consultant, Brooks/Cole Publishing 1989 Editorial Consultant, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 1988-Editorial Consultant, American Psychologist 1985 Editorial Consultant, American Bar Foundation Research Journal 1985-present Law and Human Behavior, Editorial Board Member 1985 Editorial Consultant, Columbia University Press 1985 Editorial Consultant, Law and Social Inquiry 1980-present Reviewer, National Science Foundation 1997 Reviewer, National Institutes of Mental Health 1980-present Editorial Consultant, Law and Society Review 1979-1985 Editorial Consultant, Law and Human Behavior 1997-present Editorial Consultant, Legal and Criminological Psychology 1993-1997 Psychology, Public Policy, and Law, Editorial Consultant GOVERNMENTAL, LEGAL AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE CONSULTING Training Consultant, Palo Alto Police Department, 1973-1974. Evaluation Consultant, San Mateo County Sheriffs Department, 1974. Design and Training Consultant to Napa County Board of Supervisors, County Sheriff's Department (county jail), 1974. Training Consultation, California Department of Corrections, 1974. Consultant to California Legislature Select Committee in Criminal Justice, 1974, 1980-1981 (effects of prison conditions, evaluation of proposed prison legislation). 18. 002675 DOD 001577 Reviewer, National Science Foundation (Law and Social Science, Research Applied to National Needs Programs), 1978-present. Consultant, Santa Clara County Board of Supervisors, 1980 (effects of jail overcrowding, evaluation of county criminal justice policy). Consultant to Packard Foundation, 1981 (evaluation of inmate counseling and guard training programs at San Quentin and Solcdad prisons). Member, San Francisco Foundation Criminal Justice Task Force, 1980-1982 (corrections expert). Consultant to NAACP Legal Defense Fund, 1982- present (expert witness, case evaluation, attorney training) Faculty, National Judicial College, 1980-1983. Consultant to Public Advocates, Inc., 1983-1986 (public interest litigation). Consultant to California Child, Youth, Family Coalition, 1981-82 (evaluation of proposed juvenile justice legislation). Consultant to California Senate Office of Research, 1982 (evaluation of causes and consequences of overcrowding in California Youth Authority facilities). Consultant, New Mexico State Public Defender, 1980-1983 (investigation of causes of February, 1980 prison riot). Consultant, California State Supreme Court, 1983 (evaluation of county jail conditions). Member, California State Bar Committee on Standards in Prisons and Jails, 1983. Consultant, California Legislature Joint Committee on Prison Construction and Operations, 1985. Consultant, United States Bureau of Prisons and United States Department of the Interior (Prison History, Conditions of Confinement Exhibition, Alcatraz Island), 1989-1991. Consultant to United States Department of Justice, 1980-1990 (evaluation of institutional conditions). Consultant to California Judicial Council (judicial training programs), 2000. 002676 19 Consultant to American Bar Association/American Association for Advancement of Science Task Force of Forensic Standards for Scientific Evidence, 2000. Member, Joint Legislative/California Department of Corrections Task Force on Violence, 2001. Consultant, United States Department of Health & Human Services/Urban Institute, "Effects of Incarceration on Children, Families, and Low-Income Communities" Project. PRISON AND JAIL CONDITIONS EVALUATIONS AND LITIGATION Hoptowit v. Ray [United States District Court, Eastern District of Washington, 1980; 682 F.2d 1237 (9th Cir. 1982)]. Evaluation of psychological effects of conditions of confinement at Washington State Penitentiary at Walla Walla for United States Department of Justice. Wilson v. Brown (Marin Country Superior Court; September, 1982, Justice Burke). Evaluation of effects of overcrowding on San Quentin mainline inmates. Thompson v. Enomoto (United States District Court, Northern District of California, Judge Stanley Weigel, 1982 and continuing). Evaluation of conditions of confinement on Condemned Row, San Quentin Prison. Toussaint v. McCarthy [United States District Court, Northern District of California, Judge Stanley Weigel, 553 F. Supp. 1365 (1983); 722 F. 2d 1490 (9th Cir. 1984) 711 F. Supp. 536 (1989)]. Evaluation of psychological effects of conditions of confinement in lockup units at DVI, Folsom, San Quentin, and Soledad. In re Priest (Proceeding by special appointment of the California Supreme Court, Judge Spurgeon Avakian, 1983). Evaluation of conditions of confinement in Lake County Jail. Ruiz v. Estelle [United States District Court, Southern District of Texas, Judge William Justice, 503 F. Supp. 1265 (1980)]. Evaluation of effects of overcrowding in the Texas prison system, 1983-1985. Atascadero State Hospital (Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act of 1980 action). Evaluation of conditions of confinement and nature of patient care at ASH for United States D epai.Intent of Justice, 1983-1984. 20. 002677 In re Rock (Monterey County Superior Court 1984). Appointed to evaluate conditions of confinement in Soledad State Prison in Soledad, California. In re Mackey (Sacramento County Superior Court, 1985). Appointed to evaluate conditions of confinement at Folsom State Prison mainline housing units. Bruscino v. Carlson (United States District Court, Southern District of Illinois 1984 1985). Evaluation of conditions of confinement at the United States Penitentiary at Marion, Illinois [654 F. Supp. 609 (1987); 854 F.2d 162 (7 th Cir. 1988)]. Dohner v. McCarthy [United States District Court, Central District of California, 1984­1985; 636 F. Supp. 408 (1985)]. Evaluation of conditions of confinement at California Men's Colony, San Luis Obispo. Invited Testimony before Joint Legislative Committee on Prison Construction and Operations hearings on the causes and consequences of violence at Folsom Prison, June, 1985. Duran v. Anaya (United States District Court, 1987-1988). Evaluation of conditions of confinement in the Penitentiary of New Mexico, Santa Fe, New Mexico [Duran v. Anaya, No. 77-721 (D. N.M. July 17, 1980); Duran v. King, No. 77-721 (D. N.M. March 15, 1984)]. Gates v. Deukmejian (United States District Court, Eastern District of California, 1989). Evaluation of conditions of confinement at California Medical Facility, Vacaville, California. Kozeak v. McCarthy (San Bernardino Superior Court, 1990). Evaluation of conditions of confinement at California Institution for Women, Frontera, California. Coleman v. Gomez (United States District Court, Eastern District of California, 1992-3; Magistrate Moulds, Chief Judge Lawrence Karlton, 912 F. Supp. 1282 (1995) ). Evaluation of study of quality of mental health care in California prison system, special mental health needs at Pelican Bay State Prison. Madrid v. Gomez (United States District Court, Northern District of California, 1993, District Judge Thelton Henderson, 889 F. Supp. 1146 (N.D. Cal. 1995). Evaluation of conditions of confinement and psychological consequences of isolation in Security Housing Unit at Pelican Bay State Prison, Crescent City, California. Clark v. Wilson, (United States District Court, Northern District of California, 1998, DistriCt Judge Fern Smith, No. C-96-1486 FMS), evaluation of screening procedures to identify and treatment of developmentally disabled prisoners in California Department of Corrections. Ruiz v. Johnson [United States District Court, Southern District of Texas, District Judge William Wayne Justice, 37 F. Supp. 2d 855 (SD Texas 1999)]. Evaluation of 21. 002678 current conditions of confinement, especially in security housing or "high security" units. Osterback v. Moore (United States District Court, Southern District of Florida (97-2806-CIV-MORENO) (2001) [see, Osterback v. Moore, 531 U.S. 1172 (2001)]. Evaluation of Close Management Units and Conditions in the Florida Department of Corrections. Valdivia v. Davis (United States District Court, Eastern District of California, 2002). Evaluation of due process protections afforded mentally ill and developmentally disabled parolees in parole revocation process. Ayers v. Perry (United States District Court, New Mexico, 2003). Evaluation of conditions of confinement and mental health services in New Mexico Department of Corrections "special controls facilities." 002679 22 International Journal of Criminology and Penology 1973, 1, 69-97 Interpersonal Dynamics in a Simulated Prison vatittafiffarfaiippitwitsammeor , epartment o syc o ogy, tan or mversi , California 94305, U.S.A. Interpersonal dynamics in a prison environment were studied experimentally by designing a functional simulation of a prison in which subjects role-played . prisoners and guards for an extended period of time. To assess the power of the social forces on the emergent behaviour in this situation, alternative explanations In terms of pre-existing dispositions were eliminated through subject selection. A homogeneous, "normal" sample was chosen after extensive interviewing and diagnostic testing of a large group of volunteer male college students. Half of the subjects were randomly assigned to role-play prison guards for eight hours each day, while the others role-played prisoners incarcerated for nearly one full week. Neither group received any specific • • training in these roles.• Continuous, direct observation of behavioural Interactions was supplemen­ted by video-taped recording, questionnaires, self-report scales and interviews.. All these data sources converge on the conclusion that this simulated prison developed into a psychologically compelling prison environment. As such, it elicited unexpectedly intense, realistic and often pathological reactions from many of the participants. The prisoners experienced a loss of personal identity* and the arbitrary control of their behaviour which resulted In a syndrome of passivity, dependency, depression and • helplessness. In contrast, the guards (with rare exceptions) experienced a marked gain in social power, gulls and group identification which made role-playing rewarding. The most dramatic.pf the coping behaviour utilised by half of the prisoners In adapting to this stressful situation was the development of acute emotional disturbance—severe enough to warrant their early release. At least a third of the guards were judged to have become far more aggressive and dehumanising toward the prisoners than would ordinarily be predicted In a simulation study. Only a very few of the observed reactions to this experience of Imprisonment could be attributed to personality trait differences which existed before the subjects began to play their assigned roles. 002680 DOD 001582 111111.11.1111111Mairt Introduction After he had spent four years in a Siberian prison the great Russian novelist Dostoevsky commented, surprisingly, that his time in prison had created in him a deep optimism about the ultimate future of mankind because, as he put it, if man could survive the horrors of prison life he must surely be a "creature who could withstand anything". The cruel irony which Dostoevsky overlooked is that the reality of prison bears witness not only to the resilience and adaptiveness of the men who tolerate life within its walls, but as well to the "ingenuity" and tenacity of those who devised and still maintain our correctional and reformatory systems. Nevertheless, in the century which has passed since Dostoevsky's imprison­ment, little has changed to render the main thrust of his statement less relevant. Although we have passed through periods of enlightened humanitarian reform, in which physical conditions within prisons have improved somewhat and the rhetoric of rehabilitation has replaced the language of punitive incarceration, the social institution of prison has continued to fail. On purely pragmatic grounds, there is substantial evidence that prisons in fact neither "rehabilitate" nor act as a deterrent to future crime—in America, recidivism rates upwards of 75% speak quite decisively to these criteria. And, to perpetuate what is additionally an economic failure, American taxpayers alone must provide an expenditure for "corrections" of 1.5 billion dollars annually. On humanitarian grounds as well, prisons have failed: our mass media are increasingly filled with accounts of atrocities committed daily, man against man, in reaction to the penal system or in the name of it. The experience of prison undeniably creates, almost to the point of cliche, an intense hatred and disrespect in most inmates for the authority and the established order of society into which they will eventually return. And the toll which it takes on the deterioration of human spirit for those who must administer it, as well as for those upon whom it is inflicted, is incalculable. Attempts to provide an explanation of the deplorable condition of our penal system and its dehumanising effects upon prisoners and guards, often focus upon what might be called the dispositional hypothesis. While this explanation is rarely expressed explicitely, it is central to a prevalent non-conscious ideology: that the state of the social institution of prison is due to the "nature" of the people who administer it, or the "nature" of the people who populate it, or both. That is, a major contributing cause to despicable conditions, violence, brutality, dehumanisation and degradation existing within any prison can be traced to some innate or acquired characteristic of the correctional and inmate population. Thus on the one hand, there is the contention that violence and brutality exist within, prison because guards are sadistic, uneducated, and insensitive people. It is the "guard mentality", a unique syndrome of negative traits which they bring into the situation, that engenders the inhumane treatment of prisoners. Or, from other quarters. comes the argument that violence and brutality in prison are the logical and predictable result of the • 002681 Interpersonal dynamics In a simulated prison{ 71 involuntary confinement of a collective of individuals whose life histories are, b9 definition, characterised by disregard for law, order and social convention and a concurrent propensity for impulsiveness and aggression. Logically, it follows that these Individuals, having proved themselves incapable of functioning satisfactorily within the "normal" structure of society, cannot do so either Inside the structure provided by prisons. To control such men as these, the argument continues, whose basic orientation to any conflict situation is to react with physical power or deception, force must be met with force, and a certain number of violent encounters must be expected and tolerated by the public. The dispositional hypothesis •has been embraced by the proponents of the prison status quo (blaming conditions on the evil In the prisoners), as well as by its critics (attributing the evil to guards and staff with their evil motives and deficient personality structures). The appealing simplicity of this proposition localises the source of prison riots, recidivism and corruption in those "bad seeds" and not in the conditions of the "prison soil". Such an analysis directs attention away 'from the complex matrix of social, economic and political forces which combine to make prisons what they are—and which would require complex, expensive, revolutionary solutions to bring about any meaningful change. Instead, rioting prisoners are identified, punished, transferred to maximum security Institutions or shot, outside agitators sought and corrupt officials suspended—while the system itself goes on essentially unchanged, its basic structure unexamined and unchallenged. However, a critical evaluation of the dispositional hypothesis cannot be made directly through observation in existing prison settings, since such naturalistic observation necessarily confounds the acute effects of the environment with the chronic characteristics of the inmate and guard populations. To separate the effects of the prison environment per se from those attributable to a priori dispositions of its inhabitants requires a research strategy in which a "new" prison is constructed, comparable in its fundamental social-psychological milieu to existing prison systems, but entirely populated by individuals who are undifferentiated in all essential dimensions from the rest of society. Such was the approach taken in the present empirical study, namely, to create a prison-like situation in which the guards and inmates were initially comparable and characterised as being "normal-average", and then to observe the patterns of behaviour which resulted, as well as the cognitive, emotional and . attitudinal reactions which emerged. Thus, we began our experiment with a sample of individuals who did not deviate from the normal range of the general population on a variety of dimensions we were able to measure. Half were randomly assigned to the role of "prisoner", the others to that of "guard", neither group having any history of crime, emotional disability, physical handicap nor even intellectual or social disadvantage. The environment created was that of a "mock" prison which physically constrained the prisoners in barred cells and psychologically conveyed the sense of imprisonment to all participants. Our intention was not to create a literal : 002682 DOD 001584 simulation of an American prison, but rather a functional representation of one. For ethical, moral and pragmatic reasons we could not detain our subjects for extended or indefinite periods of time, we could not exercise the threat and promise of severe physical punishment, we could not allow homosexual or racist practices to flourish, nor could we duplicate certain other specific aspects of prison life. Nevertheless, we believed that we could create a situation with sufficient mundane realism to allow the role-playing participants to go beyond the superficial demands of their assignment into the deep structure of the characters they represented. To do so, we established functional equivalents for the activities and experiences of actual prison life which were expected to produce qualitatively similar psychological reactions in our subjects—feelings of power and powerlessness, of control and oppression, of satisfaction and frustration, of arbitrary rule and resistance to authority, of status and anonymity, of machismo and emasculation. In the conventional terminology of experimental social psychology, we first identified a number of relevant conceptual variables through analysis of existing prison situations, then designed a setting in which these variables were made operational. No specific hypotheses were advanced other than the general one that assignment to the treatment of. "guard" or "prisoner" would result in significantly different reactions on behavioural measures of interaction, emotional measures of mood state and pathology, attitudes toward self, as well as other indices of coping and adaptation to this novel situation. What follows is the mechanics of how we created and peopled our prison, what we observed, what our subjects reported, and finally, what we can conclude about the nature of the prison environment and the experience of imprisonment which can account for the failure of our prisons. Method Overview The effects of playing the role of "guard" or "prisoner" were studied in the context of an experimental simulation of a prison environment. The research design was a relatively simple one, involving as it did only a single treatment variable, the random assignment to either a "guard" or "prisoner" condition. These roles were enacted over an extended period of time (nearly one week) within an environment which was physically constructed to resemble a prison. Central to the methodology of creating and maintaining a psychological state of imprisonment was the functional simulation of significant properties of "real prison life" (established through information from former inmates, correctional personnel and texts). The "guards" were free with certain limits to implement the procedures of induction into the prison setting and maintenance of custodial retention of the "prisoners". These inmates, having voluntarily submitted to the conditions of this total institution in which they now lived, coped in various ways with its . . • •:;%;;;•.1, 11 • 1) 002683 DOD 001585 Interpersonal dynamics In a simulated prison { 73 stresses and its challenges. The behaviour of both groups of subjects was observed, recorded and analysed. The dependent measures were of two general types: transactions between and within each group of subjects, recorded on video and audio tape as well as directly observed; Individual reactions on questionnaires, mood inventories, personality tests, daily guard shift reports, and post experimental interviews. Subjects The 21 subjects who participated in the experiment were selected from an initial pool of 75 respondents, who answered a newspaper advertisement asking for male volunteers to participate in a psychological study of "prison life"• in return for payment of $15 per day. Those who responded to the notice completed an extensive questionnaire concerning their family background, physical and mental health history, prior experience and attitudinal propensities with respect to sources of psychopathology (including their involvement in crime). Each respondent who completed the background questionnaire was interviewed by one of two experimenters. Finally, the 24 subjects who were judged to be most stable (physically and mentally), most mature, and least involved in anti-social behaviour were selected to participate in the study. On a random basis, half of the subjects were assigned the role of "guard", half to the role of "prisoner". The subjects were normal, healthy males attending colleges throughout the United States who were in the Stanford area during the summer. They were largely of middle class socio-economic status, Caucasians (with the exception of one Oriental subject). Initially they were strangers to each other, a selection • ••••••::::, precaution taken to avoid the disruption of any pre-existing friendship patterns and to mitigate against any transfer into the experimental situation of previously established relationships or patterns of behaviour. This final sample of subjects was administered a battery of psychological tests on the day prior to the start of the simulation, but to avoid any selective bias on the part of the experimenter-observers, scores were not tabulated until the study was completed. Two subjects who were assigned to be a "stand-by" in case an additional "prisoner" was needed were not called, and one subject assigned to be a "stand-by" guard decided against participating just before the simulation phase began—thus, our data analysis is based upon ten prisoners and eleven . guards in our experimental conditions. Procedure Physical aspects of the prison The prison was built in a 35-ft section of a basement corridor in the psychology building at Stanford University. It was partitioned by two fabricated walls, one of which was fitted with the only entrance door to the cell block, the other 1 002684 DOD 001586 contained a small observation screen. Three small cells (6 x 9 ft) were made from converted laboratory rooms by replacing the usual doors with steel barred, black painted ones, and removing all furniture. A cot (with mattress, sheet and pillow) for each prisoner was the only furniture in the cells. A small closet across from the cells served as a solitary confinement facility; its dimensions were extremely small (2 x 2 x 7 ft) and It was unlit. In addition, several rooms in an adjacent wing of the building were used as guards' quarters (to change in and out of uniform or for rest and relaxation), a bedroom for the "warden" and "superintendent", and an interview-testing room. Behind the observation screen at one end of the "yard" was video recording equipment and sufficient space for several observers. Operational details The "prisoner" subjects remained in the mock-prison 24 hours per day for the duration of the study. Three were arbitrarily assigned to each of the three cells; the others were on stand-by call at their homes. The "guard" subjects worked on three-man, eight-hour shifts; remaining in the prison environment only during their work shift, going about their usual lives at other times. Role Instruction All subjects had been told that they would be assigned 'either the guard or the prisoner role on a completely random basis and all had voluntarily agreed to play either role for $15.00 per day for up to two weeks. They signed a contract guaranteeing a minimally adequate diet, clothing, housing and medical care as well as the financial remuneration in return for their stated "intention" of serving in the assigned role for the duration of the study. It was made explicit in the contract that those assigned to be prisoners should expect to be under surveillance (have little or no privacy) and to have some of their basic civil rights suspended during their imprisonment, excluding physical abuse. They were given no other Information about what to expect nor instructions about behaviour appropriate for a prisoner role. Those actually assigned to this treatment were informed by phone to be available at their place of residence on a given Sunday when we would start the experiment. The subjects assigned to be guards attended an orientation meeting on the day prior to , the induction of the prisoners. At this time they were introduced to the principal investigators, the "Superintendent" of the prison (P.G.Z.) and an undergraduate 'research assistant who assumed the administrative role of "Warden". They were told that we wanted to try to simulate a prison environment within the limits imposed by pragmatic and ethical considerations. Their assigned task was to "maintain the reasonable degree of order within the prison necessary for its effective functioning", although the specifics of how this 002685 Interpersonal dynamics In a simulated prison { 75 duty might he implemented were not explicitly -detailed. They were made aware of the fact that while many of the contingencies with which they might be confronted were essentially unpredictable (e.g. prisoner escape attempts), part of their task was to be prepared for such eventualities and to be able to deal appropriately with the variety of situations that might arise. The "Warden" instructed the guards in the administrative details, including: the work•shifts, the mandatory daily completion of shift reports concerning the activity of guards and prisoners, the completion of "critical incident" reports which detailed unusual occurrences and the administration of meals, work and recreation programmes for the prisoners. In order to begin to involve these subjects in their roles even before the first prisoner was incarcerated, the guards assisted in the flnaf phases of completing the prison complex—putting the cots in the cells, signs on the walls, setting up the guards' quarters, moving furniture, water coolers, refrigerators, etc. The guards generally believed that we were primarily interested in studying the behaviour of the prisoners. Of course, we were equally interested in the effect which enacting the role of guard in this environment would have on their behaviour and subjective states. To optimise the extent to which their behaviour would reflect their genuine reactions to the experimental prison situation and not simply their ability to follow instructions, they were intentionally given only minimal guidelines for what it meant to be a guard. An explicit and categorical prohibition against the use of physical punishment or physical aggression was, however, emphasised by the experimenters. Thus, with this single notable exception, their roles were relatively unstructured initially, requiring each "guard" to carry out activities necessary for interacting with a group of "prisoners" as well as with other "guards" and the "correctional staff". • Uniform In order to promote feelings of anonymity in the subjects each group was issued identical uniforms. For the guards, the uniform consisted of: plain khaki shirts and trousers, a whistle, a police night stick (wooden batons) and reflecting sunglasses which made eye contact impossible. The prisoners' uniform consisted of loosely fitting muslin smocks with an identification number on front and back. No underclothes were worn beneath these "dresses". A chain and lock were placed around one ankle. On their feet they wore rubber sandals and their hair was covered with a nylon stocking made into a cap. Each prisoner was also issued a toothbrush, soap, soapdish, towel and bed linen. No personal belongings were allowed in the cells. The outfitting of both prisoners and guards in this manner served to enhance group identity and reduce individual uniqueness within the two groups. The khaki uniforms were intended to convey a military attitude, while the whistle and night-stick were carried as symbols of control and power. The prisoners' 002686 uniforms were designed not only to deindivlduate the prisoners but to be humiliating and serve as symbols of their dependence and subservience. The ankle chain was a constant reminder (even during their sleep when it hit the other ankle) of the oppressiveness of the environment. The stocking cap removed any distinctiveness associated with hair length, colour or style (as does shaving of heads In some "real" prisons and the military). The ill-fitting uniforms made the prisoners feel awkward in their movements; since these dresses were worn without undergarments, the uniforms forced them to assume unfamiliar postures, more like those of a woman than a man—another part of the emasculating process of becoming a prisoner. Induction procedure With the cooperation of Palo Alto City Police Department all of the subjects assigned to the prisoner treatment were unexpectedly "arrested" at their residences. A police officer charged them with suspicion of burglary or armed robbery, advised them of their legal rights, handcuffed them, thoroughly searched them (often as curious neighbours looked on) and carried them off to the police station in the rear of the police car. At the station they went through the standard routines of being fingerprinted, having an identification file prepared and then being placed in a detention cell. Each prisoner was blindfolded and subsequently driven by one of the experimenters and a subject-guard to our mock prison. Throughout the entire arrest procedure, the police officers involved maintained a formal, serious attitude, avoiding answering any questions of clarification as to the relation of this "arrest" to the mock prison study. Upon arrival at our experimental prison, each prisoner was stripped, sprayed with a delousing preparation (a deodorant spray) and made to stand alone naked for a while in the cell yard. After being given the uniform described previously and haVing an I.D. picture taken ("mug shot"), the prisoner was put in his cell and ordered to remain silent. Administrative routine When all the cells were occupied, the warden greated the prisoners and read them the rules of the institution (developed by the guards and the warden). They were to be memorised and to be followed. Prisoners were to be referred to only by the number on their uniforms, also in an effort to depersonalise them. The prisoners were to be served three bland meals per day, were allowed three supervised toilet visits, and given two hours daily for the privilege of reading or letterwrlting. Work • assignments were issued for which the prisoners were to receive an hourly wage to constitute their $15 daily payment. Two visiting periods per week were scheduled, as were movie rights and exercise periods. Three times a day all prisoners were lined up for a "count" (one on each guard 002687 Interpersonal dynamics In a simulated prison{ 77 work-shift). The initial purpose of the "count" was to ascertain that all prisoners were present, and to test them on their knowledge of the rules and their I.D. numbers. The first perfunctory counts lasted only about 10 minutes, but on each successive day (or night) they were spontaneously. increased in duration until some lasted .several hours. Many of the pre-established features of administrative routine were modified or abandoned by the guards, and some were forgotten by the staff over the course of the study. Data collection (dependent measures) The exploratory nature of this investigation and the absence of specific hypotheses led us to adopt the strategy of surveying as many as possible behavioural and psychological manifestations of the prison experience on the guards and the prisoners. In fact, one major methodological problem in a study of this kind is defining the limits of the "data", since relevant data emerged from virtually every interaction between any of the participants, as well as from subjective and behavioural reactions of Individual prisoners, guards, the warden, superintendent, research assistants and visitors to the prison. It will also be clear when the results are presented that causal direction cannot always be established in the patterns of interaction where any given behaviour might be the consequence of a current or prior instigation by another subject and, in turn, might serve as impetus for eliciting reactions from others. Data collection was organised around the following sources: (1) Videotaping. About 12 hours of recordings were made of daily, regularly occurring events, such as the counts and meals, as well as unusual interactions, such as a prisoner rebellion, visits from a priest, a lawyer and parents, Parole Board meetings and others. Concealed video equipment recorded these events through a screen in the partition at one end of the cell-block yard or In a conference room (for parole meetings). (2) Audio recording. Over 30 hours of recordings were made of verbal interactions between guards and prisoners on the prison yard. Concealed microphones picked up all conversation taking place in the yard as well as some within the cells. Other concealed recordings were made in the testing-interview room on selected occasions—interactions between the warden, superintendent and the prisoners' Grievance Committee, parents, other visitors and prisoners released early. In addition, each subject was interviewed by one of the experimenters (or by other research associates) during the study, and most just prior to its termination. (3) Rating scales. Mood adjective checklists and sociometric measures were administered on several occasions to assess emotional changes in affective state and interpersonal dynamics among the guard and prisoner groups. (4) Individual difference scales. One day prior to the start of the simulation all subjects completed a series of paper and pencil personality tests. These tests 002688 were selected to provide dispositional indicators of interpersonal behaviour styles—the F scale of Authoritarian Personality [1], and the Machiavellianism Scale [2] —as well as areas of possible personality pathology through the newly developed Comrey Personality Scale [3] . The subscales of this latter test consist of: (a) trustworthiness (b) orderliness (c) conformity activity e) stability (f) extroversion (g) masculinity (h) empathy (5) Pers9nal observntlons. The guards made daily reports of their observa­tions after each shift, the experimenters kept informal diaries and all subjects completed post-experimental questionnaires of their reactions to the experience about a month after the study was over. Data analyses presented problems of several kinds. First, some of the data was subject to possible errors due to selective sampling. The video and audio recordings tended to be focussed upon the more interesting, dramatic events which occurred. Over time, the experimenters became more personally involved in the transaction and were not as distant and objective as they should have been. Second, there are not complete data on all subjects for each measure because of prisoners being released at different times and because of unexpected disruptions, conflicts and administrative problems. Finally, we have a relatively small sample on which to make cross•tabulations by possible independent and individual difference variables. However, despite these shortcomings some of the overall effects in the data are powerful enough to reveal clear, reliable results. Also some of the more subtle analyses were able to yield statistically significant results even with the small sample size. Most crucial for the conclusions generated by this exploratory study Is the consistency in the pattern of relationships which emerge across a wide range of measuring instruments and different observers. Special analyses were required only of the video and audio material, the other data sources were analysed following established scoring procedures. Video analysis There were 25 relatively discrete incidents identifiable on the tapes of prisoner-guard interactions. Each incident or scene was scored for the presence of nine behavioural (and verbal) categories. Two judges who had not been involved with the simulation study scored these tapes. These categories were defined as follows: 002689 DOD 001591 Interpersonal dynamics in a simulated prison { 79 Question. All questions asked, requests for information or assistance (excluding rhetorical questions). Command. An order to commence or abstain from a specific behaviour, directed either to individuals or groups. Also generalised orders, e.g. "Settle down". Information. A specific piece of information proffered by anyone whether requested or not, dealing with any contingency of the simulation. Individuating reference. Positive: use of a person's real name, nickname or allusion to special positive physical characteristics. Negative: use of prison number, title, generalised "you" or reference to derogatory characteristic. Threat. Verbal statement of contingent negative consequences of a wide variety, e.g. no meal, long count, pushups, lock-up in hole, no visitors, etc. Deprecation Insult. Use of obscenity, slander, malicious statement directed toward individual or group, e.g. "You lead a life of mendacity" or "You guys are really stupid." Resistance. Any physical resistance, usually prisoners to guards, such as holding on to beds, blocking doors, shoving guard or prisoner, taking off stocking caps, refusing to carry out orders. Help. Person physiCally assisting another (i.e. excludes verbal statements of support), e.g. guard helping another to open door, prisoner helping another prisoner in cleanup duties. Use of Instruments. Use of any physical instrument to either intimidate, threaten, or achieve specific end, e.g. fire extinguisher, batons, whistles. Audio analysis For purposes of classifying the verbal behaviour recorded from interviews with guards and prisoners, eleven categories were devised. Each statement made by the Interviewee was assigned to the appropriate category by judges. At the end of this process for any given Interview analysis, a list had been compiled of the nature and frequencies of the interviewee's discourse. The eleven categories for assignment of verbal expressions were: Questions. All questions asked, requests for information or assistance (excluding rhetorical questions). Informative statements. A specific piece of information proffered by anyone whether requested or not, dealing with any contingency of the simulation. Demands. Declarative statements of need or imperative requests. Requests. Deferential statements for material or personal consideration. Commands. Orders to commence or abstain from a specific behaviour, directed either to individuals or groups. Outlook, positivelnegative. Expressions of expectancies for future experiences or future events; either negative or positive in tone, e.g. "I don't think I can make It" v. "I believe I will feel better." 002690 DOD 001592 80aidwilmanilimp Criticism. Expressions of critical evaluation concerning other subjects, the experimenters or the experiment itself. Statements of Identifying reference, deIndIvIduatInglindivIduating. State­ments wherein a subject makes some reference to another subject specifically by allusion to given name or distinctive characteristics (individuating reference), or by allusion to non-specific identity or institutional number (deindividuating reference). Desire to continue. Any expression of a subject's wish to continue or to curtail participation in the experiment. Self-evaluation, positive/negative. Statements of self-esteem or self-degradation, e.g. "I feel pretty good about the way I've adjusted" v. "I hate myself for being so oppressive." Action intentions, posItIvelnegatIve Including "Intent to aggress". Statements concerning interviewees' intentions to do something in the future, either of a positive, constructive nature or a negative, destructive nature, e.g. "I'm not going to be so mean from now on" v. "I'll break the door down." Results Overview Although it is difficult to anticipate exactly what the influence of incarceration will be upon the individuals who are subjected to it and those charged with its maintenance (especially in a simulated reproduction), the results of the present experiment support many commonly held conceptions of prison life and validate anecdotal evidence supplied by articulate ex-convicts. The environment of arbitrary custody had great impact upon the affective states of both guards and prisoners as well as upon the interpersonal processes taking place between and within those role-groups. In general, guards and prisoners showed a marked tendency toward increased negativity of affect and their overall outlook became increasingly negative. As the experiment progressed, prisoners expressed intentions to do harm to others more frequently. For both prisoners and guards, self-evaluations were more deprecating as the experience of the prison environment became internalised. Overt behaviour was generally consistent with the subjective self-reports and affective expressions of the subjects. Despite the fact that guards and prisoners were essentially free to engage in any form of interaction (positive or negative, supportive or affrontive, etc.), the characteristic nature of their encounters tended to be negative, hostile, affrontive and dehumanising. Prisoners immediately adopted a generally passive response mode while guards assumed a very active initiating role in all interactions, Throughout the experiment, commands were the most frequent form of verbal behaviour and, generally, verbal exchanges were strikingly impersonal, with few references to individual identity. Although it was clear to all subjects that the experimenters would not 00269 1 { '`Interpersonal dynamics in a simulated prison 81 permit physical violence to take place, varieties of less direct aggressive behaviour were observed frequently (especially on the part of guards). In lieu of physical violence, verbal affronts were used as one of the most frequent forms of interpersonal contact between guards and prisoners. The most dramatic evidence of the impact of this situation upon the participants was seen in the gross reactions of five prisoners who had to be released because of extreme emotional depression, crying, rage and acute anxiety. The pattern of symptoms was quite similar in four of the subjects and began as early as the second day of imprisonment. The fifth subject was released after being treated for a psychosomatic rash which covered portions of his body. Of the remaining prisoners, only two said they were not willing to forfeit the money they had earned in return for being "paroled". When the experiment was terminated prematurely after only six days, all the remaining prisoners were delighted by their unexpected good fortune. In contrast, most of the guards seemed to be distressed by the decision to stop the experiment and it appeared to us that had become sufficiently involved in their roles so that they now enjoyed the extreme control and power which they exercised and were reluctant to give it up. One guard did report being personally upset at the suffering of the prisoners and claimed to have considered asking to change his role to become one of them—but never did so. None of the guards ever failed to come to work on time for their shift, and indeed, on several occasions guards remained on duty voluntarily and uncomplaining for extra hours—without additional pay. The extremely pathological reactions which emerged In both groups of subjects testify to the power of the social forces operating, but still there were individual differences seen in styles of coping with this novel experience and in degrees of successful adaptation to it. Half the prisoners did endure the oppressive atmosphere, and not all the guards resorted to hostility. Some guards were tough but fair ("played by the rules"), some went far beyond their roles to engage in creative cruelty and harassment, while a few were passive and rarely instigated any coercive control over the prisoners. These differential reactions to the experience of imprisonment were not suggested by or predictable from the self-report measures of personality and attitude or the interviews taken before the experiment began. The standardised tests employed indicated that a perfectly normal emotionally stable sample of subjects had been selected. In those few instances where differential test scores do-discriminate between subjects, there is an opportunity to, partially at least, discern some of the personality variables which may be critical in the adaptation to and tolerance of prison confinement. In&lal personality and attitude measures Overall, it is apparent that initial personality-attitude dispositions account for an extremely small part of the variation In reactions to this mock prison experience. However, in a few select instances, such dispositions do seem to be correlated with the prisoners' ability to adjust to the experimental prison environment. 002612 DOD 001594 82 . laINIIMMINNOIMemet Comrey scale The Comrey Personality Inventory [3] was the primary personality scale administered to both guards and prisoners. The mean scores for prisoners and guards on the eight sub-scales of the test are shown In Table 1. No differences between prisoner and guard mean scores on any scale even approach statistical significance. Furthermore, in no case does any group mean fall outside of the 40 to 60 centile range of the normative male population reported by Comrey. Table 1. Mean scores for prisoners and guards on eight Comrey subscales Scale Prisoners Guards Trustworthiness-high score indicates belief in the basic honesty and good Intentions of others .3? = 92.56 R=.89.64 Orderliness-extent to which person is meticulous and concerned with neatness and orderliness 75.67 R.73.82 Conformity-indicates belief In law enforcement, acceptance of society as it is, resentment of nonconformity in others 65.67 R=.63.18 Activity-liking for physical activity, hard work, and exercise R " 89.78 X = 91.73 Stability-high score indicates calm, optimistic, stable, confident individual R= 98.33 X = 101.45 Extroversion-suggests outgoing, easy to meet person 83.22 R=.81.91 Masculinity-"people who are not bothered by crawling creatures, the sight of blood, vulgarity, who do not cry easily and are not Interested in love stories" .88.44 R =.87.00 Empathy-high score indicates individuals who kre sympathetic, helpful, generous and interested in devoting their lives to the service of others 91.78 =.95.36 Table 2. Mean scores for "Remaining" v. "Early released" prisoners on Comrey subscales Scale Remaining prisoners Early released prisoners Mean difference Trustworthiness 93.4 90.8 +2.6 Orderliness 76.6 78.0 -1.4 Conformity 67.2 59.4 +7.8 Activity 91.4 86.8 +4.6 Stability 99.2 99.6 -0.4 Extroversion 98.4 76.2 +22.2 Masculinity 91.6 86.0 +5.6 Empathy 103.8 85.6 +17.2 DOD 001595 Interpersonal dynamics In a simulated prison { 83 Table 2 shows the mean scores on the Comrey sub-scales for prisoners who remained compared with prisoners who were released early due to severe emotional reactions to the environment. Although none of the comparisons achieved statistical significance, three seemed at least suggestive as possible discriminators of those who were able to tolerate this type of confinement and those who were not. Compared with those who had to be released, prisoners who remained in prison until the termination of the study: scored higher on conformity ("acceptance of society as it is"), showed substantially higher average scores on Comrey's measure of extroversion and also scored higher on a scale of empathy (helpfulness, sympathy and generosity). F-Scale The Ficale is designed to measure rigid adherence to conventional values and a submissive, uncritical attitude towards authority. There was no difference between the mean score for prisoners (4.78) and the mean score for guards (4.36) on this scale. Again, comparing those prisoners who remained with those who were released early, we notice an interesting trend. This intra-group comparison shows remaining prisoners scoring more than twice as high on conventionality and authoritarianism (X = 7.78) than those prisoners released early (X = 3.20). While the difference between these means fails to reach acceptable levels of significance, it is striking to note that a rank-ordering of prisoners on the F-scale correlates highly with the duration of their stay in the experiment (q= 0.898, P< 0.005). To the extent that a prisoner was high in rigidity, in adherence to conventional values, and in the acceptance of authority, he was likely to remain longer and adjust more effectively to this authoritarian prison environment. Machiavellianism There were no significant mean differences found between guards (g= 7.73) and prisoners (X" 8.77) on this measure of effective interpersonal manipulation. In addition, the Mach Scale was of no help in predicting the likelihood that a prisoner would tolerate the prison situation and remain in the study until its termination. This latter finding, the lack of any mean differences between prisoners who remained v. those who were released from the study, is somewhat surprising since one might expect the Hi Mach's skill at manipulating social interaction and mediating favourable outcomes for himself might be acutely relevant to the simulated prison environment. Indeed, the two prisoners who scored highest on the Machiavellianism scale were also among those adjudged by the experimenters to have made unusually effective adapatations to their confinement. Yet, paradoxically (and this may give the reader some feeling for the anomalies we encountered in attempting to predict in-prison behaviour from personality 002694 DOD 001596 measures), the other two prisoners whom we categorised as having effectively adjusted to confinement actually obtained the lowest Mach scores of any prisoners. Video recordings An analysis of the video recordings Indicates a preponderance of genuinely negative interactions, i.e. physical aggression, threats, deprecations, etc. It is also clear that any assertive activity was largely the prerogative of the guards, while prisoners generally assumed a relatively passive demeanour. Guards more often aggressed, more often insulted, more often threatened. Prisoners, when they reacted at all, engaged primarily in resistance to these guard behaviours. For guards, the most frequent verbal behaviour was the giving of commands and their most frequent form of physical behaviour was aggression. The most frequent form of prisoners' verbal behaviour was question-asking, their most frequent form of physical behaviour was resistance. On the other hand, the most infrequent behaviour engaged in overall throughout the experiment was "helping"—only one such incident was noted from all the video recording collected. That solitary sign of human cohcern for a fellow occurred between two prisoners. Although question-asking was the most frequent form of verbal behaviour for the prisoners, guards actually asked questions more frequently overall than did prisoners (but not significantly so). This is reflective of the fact that the overall level of behaviour emitted was much higher for the guards than for the prisoners. All of those verbal acts categorised as commands were engaged in by guards. Obviously, prisoners had no opportunity to give commands at all, that behaviour becoming the exclusive "right" of guards. Of a total 61 incidents of direct interpersonal reference observed (incidents in which one subject spoke directly to another with the use of some identifying reference, i.e. "Hey, Peter"; "you there", etc.), 58 involved the use of some deindividuating rather than some individuating form of reference. (Recall that we characterised this distinction as follows: an individuating reference involved the use of a person's actual name, nickname or allusion to special physical characteristics, whereas a deindividuating reference involved the use of a prison number, or a generalised "you"thus being a very depersonalising form of — reference.) Since all subjects were at liberty to refer to one another in either mode, it is significant that such a large proportion of the references noted in­volved were in the deindividuating mode (Z = 6.9, P <0.01). Deindividuating references were made more often by guards in speaking to prisoners than the reverse (Z = 3.67, P < 0.01). (This finding, as all prisoner-guard comparisons for specific categories, may be somewhat confounded by the fact that guards apparently enjoyed a greater freedom to initiate verbal as well as other forms of behaviour. Note, however, that the existence of this greater "freedom" on the part of the guards is itself an empirical finding since it was not prescribed 002695 Interpersonal dynamics In a simulated prison{ 85 priori.) It is of additional interest to point out that in the only three cases in which verbal exchange involved some individuating reference, it was prisoners who personalised guards. A total of 32 incidents were observed which involved a verbal threat spoken by one subject to another. Of these, 27 such incidents involved a guard threatening a prisoner. Again, the Indulgence of guards in this form of behaviour was significantly greater than the • indulgence of prisoners, the observed frequencies deviating significantly from an equal distribution of threats across both groups (Z = 3.88, P< 0.01). Guards more often deprecated and insulted prisoners than prisoners did of guards. Of a total of 67 observed incidents, the deprecation-insult was expressed disproportionately by guards to prisoners 61 times; (Z = 6.72, P< 0.01). Physical resistance was observed 34 different times. Of these, 32 incidents involved resistance by a prisoner. Thus, as we might expect, at least in this reactive behaviour domain, prisoner responses far exceeded . those of the guards (Z= 5.14, P< 0.01). The use of some object or instrument In the achievement of an intended purpose or in some interpersonal interaction was observed 29 times. Twenty-three such incidents Involved the use of an Instrument by a guard rather than a prisoner.. This disproportionate frequency is significantly variant from an equal random use by both prisoners and guards (Z = 316, P< 0.01). Over time, from day to day, guards were observed to generally escalate their harassment of the prisoners. In particular, a comparison of two of the first prisoner-guard interactions (during the counts) with two of the last counts in the experiment yielded significant differences in: the use of deindividuating references per unit time (gt = 0.0 and g t = 5.40, respectively; t = 3.65, P< 0.10); the incidence of dep recation-insult per unit time (g t, =0.3 and = 5.70, respectively; t = 3.16, P< 0.10). On the other hand, a temporal analysis of the prisoner video data indicated a general decrease across all categories over time: prisoners came to Initiate acts far less frequently and responded (if at all) more passively to the acts of others—they simply behaved less. Although the harassment by the guards escalated overall as the experiment wore on, there was some variation in the extent to which the three different guard shifts contributed to the harassment in general. With the exception of the 2.30 a.m. count, prisoners enjoyed some respite during the late night guard shift (10.00 p.m. to 6.00 a.m.). But they really were "under the gun" during the evening shift. This was obvious in our observations and in subsequent interviews with the prisoners and was also confirmed in analysis of the video taped interactions. Comparing the three different guard shifts, the evening shift was significantly different from the other two in resorting to commands; the means being 9.30 and 4.04, respectively, for standardised units of time (t = 2.50, P< 0.05). In addition, the guards on this "tough and cruel" shift showed more than twice as many deprecation-insults toward the prisoners (means of 5.17 and I 00269'6 2.29, respectively, P< 0.20). They also tended to use instruments more often than other shifts to keep the prisoners in line. Audio recordings The audio recordings made throughout the prison simulation afforded one opportunity to systematically collect self-report data from prisoners and guards regarding (among other things) their emotional reactions, their outlook, and their Interpersonal evaluations and activities within the experimental setting. Recorded interviews with both prisoners and guards offered evidence that: guards tended to express nearly as much negative outlook and negative self-regard as most prisoners (one concerned guard, in fact, expressed more negative self-regard than any prisoner and more general negative affect than all but one of the prisoners); prisoner interviews were marked by negativity in expressions of affect, self-regard and action intentions (including intent to aggress and negative outlook). Analysis of the prisoner interviews also gave post hoc support to our informal impressions and subjective decisions concerning the differential emotional effects of the experiment upon those prisoners who remained and those who were released early from the study. A comparison of the mean number of expressions of negative outlook, negative affect, negative self-regard and intentions to aggress made by remaining v. released prisoners (per interview) yielded the following results: prisoners released early expressed more negative expectations during Interviews than those who remained (t = 2.32, P< 0.10) and also more negative affect (t = 2.17, P< 0.10); prisoners released early expressed more negative self-regard, and four times as many "intentions to aggress" as prisoners who remained (although those comparisons fail to reach an acceptable level of significance). Since we could video-record only public interactions on the "yard", it was of special interest to discover what was occurring among prisoners In private. What were they talking about in the cells—their college life, their vocation, girl friends, what they would do for the remainder of the summer once the experiment was over. We were surprised to discover that fully 90% of all conversations among prisoners were related to prison topics, while only 10% to non-prison topics such as the above. They were most concerned about food, guard harassment, setting up a grievance committee, escape plans, visitors, reactions of prisoners in the other cells and in solitary. Thus, in their private conversations when they might escape the roles they were playing in public, they did not. There was no discontinuity between their presentation of self when under surveillance and when alone. Even more remarkable was the discovery that the prisoners had begun to adopt and accept the guards' negative attitude toward them. Half of all reported private interactions between prisoners could be classified as non-supportive and non-cooperative. Moreover, when prisoners made evaluative statements of or • . ••••:•I 002697 Interpersonal Onamics In a simulated prison { 87 expressed regard for, their fellow prisoners, 85% of the time they were uncomplimentary and deprecating. This set of observed frequencies departs significantly from chance expectations based on a conservative binominal Probability frequency (P< 0.01 for prison v. non-prison topics; P< 0.05 for negative v. positive or neutral regard). Mood adjective self-reports Twice during the progress of the experiment each subject was asked to complete a mood adjective checklist and indicate his current affective state. The data gleaned from these self-reports did not lend themselves readily to statistical analysis. However, the trends suggested by simple enumeration are Important enough to be included without reference to statistical significance. In these written self-reports, prisoners expressed nearly three times as much negative as positive.affect. Prisoners roughly expressed three times as much negative affect as guards.Guards expressed slightly more negative than positive affect. While prisoners expressed about twice as much emotionality as did guards, a comparison of mood self-reports over time reveals that the prisoners showed two to three times as much mood fluctuation as did the relatively stable guards. On the dimension of activity-passivity, prisoners tended to score . twice as high, indicating twice as much internal "agitation" as guards (although, as stated above, prisoners were seen to be markedly less active than guards in terms of overt behaviour). It would seem from these results that while the experience had a categorically negative emotional impact upon both guards and prisoners, the effects upon prisoners were more profound and unstable. When the mood scales were administered , for a third time, just after the subjects were told the study had been terminated (and the early released subjects returned for the debriefing encounter session), marked changes in mood were evident. All of the now "ex-convicts" selected self-descriptive adjectives which characterised their mood as less negative and much more positive. In addition, they now felt less passive than before. There were no longer any differences on the sub-scales of this test between prisoners released early and those who remained throughout. Both groups of subjects had returned to their pre-experimental baselines of emotional responding. This seems to reflect the situational specificity of the depression and stress reactions experienced while in the role of prisoner. Representative personal statements Much of the flavour and impact of this prison experience is unavoidably lost in the relatively formal, objective analyses outlined in this paper. The following quotations taken from interviews, conversations and questionnaires provide a more personal view of what it was like to be a prisoner or guard in the "Stanford County Prison" experiment. 002698 1 Guards "They (the prisoners) seemed to lose touch with the reality of the experiment—they took me so seriously." "... I didn't interfere with any of the guards' actions. Usually if what they were doing bothered me, I would walk out and take another duty." ..looking back, I am Impressed by how little I felt for them ..." "...They (the prisoners) didn't see it as an experiment. It was real and they were fighting to keep their Identity.' But we were always there to show them Just who was boss." "... I was tired of seeing the prisoners in their rags and smelling the strong odours of their bodies that filled the cells. I watched them tear at each other, on orders given by us." "... Acting authoritatively can be fun. Power can be a great pleasure." "... During the inspection, I went' to cell 2 to mess up a bed which the prisoner had made and he grabbed nit, screaming that he had Just made it, and he wasn't going to let me mess it up. He grabbed my throat, and although he was laughing I was pretty scared. I lashed out with my stick and hit him In the chin (although not very hard) and when I freed myself I became angry." Prisoners "...The way we were made to degrade ourselves really brought us down and that's why we all sat docile towards the end of the experiment." "...1 realise now (after it's over) that no matter how together I thought I was inside my head, my prison behaviour was often less under my control than I realised. No matter how open, friendly and helpful I was with other prisoners I was still operating as an Isolated, self-centied person, being rational rather than compassionate." "...I began to feel I was losing my identity, that the person I call ----, the person who volunteered to get me Into this prison (because it was a prison to me, It still is a prison to me, I don't regard It as an experiment or a simulation ...) was distant from me, was remote until finally I wasn't that person, I was 416. I was really my number and 416 was really going to have to decide what to do." . "I learned that people can easily forget that others are human." Debriefing encounter sessions Because of the unexpectedly intense reactions (such as the above) generated by this mock-prison experience, we decided to terminate the study at the end of six days rather than continue for the second week. Three separate encounter sessions were held, first, for the prisoners, then for the guards and finally for all participants together. Subjects and staff openly discussed their reactions and strong feelings were expressed and shared. We analysed the moral conflicts posed by this experience and used the debriefing sessions to make explicit alternative courses of action that would lead to more moral behaviour In future comparable situations. Follow-ups on each subject over the year following termination of the study revealed the negative effects of participation had been temporary, while the personal gain to the subjects endured. 002699 DOD 001601 Interpersonal dynamics in a simulated prison{ 89 Conclusions and Discussion It should be apparent that the elaborate procedures (and staging) employed by the experimenters to insure a high degree Of mundane realism In this mock prison contributed to its effective functional simulation of the psychological dynamics operating in "real" prisons. We observed empirical relationships in the simulated prison environment which were strikingly isomorphic to the internal relations of real prisons, corroborating many Of the documented reports of what occurs behind prison walls. The conferring of differential power on the status of "guard" and "prisoner" constituted, in effect, the institutional validation of those roles. But further, many of the subjects ceased distinguishing between prison role and their prior self-identities. When this occurred, within what was a surprisingly short period of time, we witnessed a sample of normal, healthy American college students fractionate into a group of prison guards who seemed to derive pleasure from insulting, threatening, humiliating and dehunianising their peers—those who by chance selection had been assigned to the "prisoner" role. The typical prisoner syndrome was one of passivity, dependency, depression, helplessness and self-deprecation. Prisoner participation in the social reality which the guards had structured for them lent increasing validity to it and, as the prisoners became resigned to their treatment over time, many acted in ways to justify their fate at the hands of the guards, adopting attitude$ and behaviour which helped to sanction their victimisation. Most dramatic and distressing to us was the observation of the ease with which sadistic behaviour could be elicited in individuals who were not "sadistic types" and the frequency with which acute emotional breakdowns could occur in men selected precisely for their emotional stability. Situational v. dispositional attribution To what can we attribute these deviant behaviour patterns? If these reactions had been observed within the confines of an existing penal institution, it is probable that a dispositional hypothesis would be invoked as an explanation. Some cruel guards might be singled out• as sadistic or passive-aggressive personality types who chose to work in a correctional institution because of the outlets provided for sanctioned aggression. Aberrant reactions on the part of the inmate population would likewise be viewed as an extrapolation from the prior social histories of these men as violent, anti-social, psychopathic, unstable character types. Existing penal institutions may be viewed as natural experiments in social control in which any attempts at providing a causal attribution for observed behaviour hopelessly confound dispositional and situational causes. In contrast, the design of our study Minimised the utility of trait or prior social history explanations by means of judicious subject selection and random assignment to roles. Considerable effort and care went into determining the composition of the 111 • 112700 DOD 001602 final subject population from which our guards and prisoners were drawn. Through case histories, personal interviews and a battery of personality tests, the subjects chosen to participate manifeste'd no apparent abnormalities, anti-social tendencies or social backgrounds which were other than exemplary. On every one of the scores of the diagnostic tests each subject scored within the normal-average range. Our subjects then, were highly representative of middle-class, Caucasian American society (17 to 30 years in age), although above average in both intelligence and emotional stability. Nevertheless, in less than one week their behaviour in this simulated prison could be characterised as pathological and anti-social. The negative, anti-social reactions observed were not the product of an environment created by combining a collection of deviant personalities, but rather, the result of an intrinsically pathological situation which could distort and rechannel the behaviour of essentially normal individuals. The abnormality here resided In the psychological nature of the situation and not in those who passed through it. Thus, we offer another instance in support of Mischel's [4) social-learning analysis of the power of situational variables to shape complex social behaviour. Our results are also congruent with those of MIIgram [5) who most convincingly demonstrated the proposition that evil acts are not necessarily the deeds of evil men, but may be attributable to the operation of powerful social forces. Our findings go one step further, however, in removing the immediate presence of the dominant experimenter-authority figure, giving the subjects-as-guards a freer range of behavioural alternatives, and Involving the participants for a much more extended period of time. Despite the evidence favouring a situational causal analysis in this experiment, it should be clear that the research design actually minimised the effects of individual differences by use of a homOgenous middle-range subject population. It did not allow the strongest possible test of the relative utility of the two types of explanation. We cannot say that personality differences do not have an important effect on behaviour in situations such as the one reported here. Rather, we may assert that the variance In behaviour observed could be reliably attributed to variations in situational' rather than personality variables. The inherently pathological characteristics of the prison situation itself, at least as functionally simulated in our study, were a sufficient condition to produce aberrant, anti-social behaviour. (An alternative design which would maximise the potential operation of personality or dispositional variables would assign , subjects who were extreme on pre-selected personality dimensions to each of the two experimental treatments. Such a design would, however, require a larger subject population and more resources than we had available.) The failure of personality assessment variables to reliably discriminate the various patterns of prison behaviour, guard reactions as well as prisoner coping styles is reminiscent of the inability of personality tests to contribute to an understanding of the psychological differences between American P.O.W.s in Korea who succumbed to alleged Chinese Communist brain-washing by 002701 Interpersonal dynamics In a simulated prison { 91 "collaborating with the enemy" and those who resisted [6]. It seems to us that there is little reason to expect paperand-pencil behavioural reactions on personality tests taken under "normal" conditions to generalise into coping behaviours under novel, stressful or abnormal environmental conditions. It may be that the best predictor of behaviour' In situations of stress and power, as occurs in prisons, is overt behaviour in functionally comparable simulated environments. In the situation of imprisonment faced by our subjects, despite the potent situational control, individual differences were nevertheless manifested both in coping styles among the prisoners and in the extent and type of aggression and exercise of power among the guards.. Personality variables, conceived as learned behaviour styles can act as moderator variables in allaying or intensifying the impact of social situational variables. Their predictive utility depends upon acknowledging the inter-active relationship of such learned dispositional tenden­cies with the eliciting force of the situational variables. Reality of the simulation At this point it seems necessary to confront the critical question of "reality" in the simulated prison environment: were the behaviours observed more than the mere acting out assigned roles convincingly? To be sure, ethical, legal and practical considerations set limits upon the degree to which this situation could approach the conditions existing in actual,prisons and penitentiaries. Necessarily absent were some of the most salient: aspects of prison life reported by criminologists and documented in the writing of prisoners [7, 8]. There was no involuntary homosexuality, no racism, no physical beatings, no threat to life by prisoners against each other or the guards: Moreover, the maximum anticipated "sentence" was only two weeks and, unlike some prison systems, could not be extended indefinitely for infractions of the internal operating rules of the.prison. In one sense, the profound psychological effects we observed under the relatively minimal prison-like conditions which existed In our mock prison make the results even more significant and force us to wonder about the devastating impact of chronic incarceration in real prisons. Nevertheless, we must contend with the criticism that the conditions whiCh prevailed in the mock prison were too minimal to provide a meaningful analogue to existing prisons. It is necessary to demonstrate that the participants in this experiment transcended the conscious limits of their preconceived stereotyped roles and their awareness of the artificiality and limited duration of imprisonment. We feel there is abundant evidence that virtually all of the subjects at one time or another experienced reactions which went well beyond the surface demands of role-playing and penetrated the deep structure of the psychology of imprisonment. Although instructions about how to behave in the roles of guard or prisoner were not explicitly defined, demand characteristics in the experiment obviously exerted some directing influence. Therefore, it is enlightening to look to 002702 DOD 001604 one* oliiiRC my,/ • i 'd:"..141414:1,:g1?LL'i • •. a.; 92 circumstances where role demands were minimal, where the subjects believed they were not being observed, or where they should not have been behaving under the constraints imposed by their rocs (as in "private" situations), in order to assess whether the role behaviours reflected anything more than public conformity or good acting. When the private conversations of the Prisoners were monitored, we learned that almost all (a full 90%) of what they talked about was directly related to immediate prison conditions, that is, food, privileges, punishment, guard harassment, etc. Only one-tenth of the time did their conversations deal with their life outside the prison. Consequerlly, although they had lived together under such intense conditions, the prisoners knew surprisingly little about each other's past history or future plans. This excessive concentration on the vicissitudes of their current situation helpdd to make the prison experience more oppressive for the prisoners because, instead of escaping from it when they had a chance to do so in the privacy of their cells, the prisoners continued to allow it to dominate their thoughts and social relations. The guards too, rarely exchanged personal information during their relaxation breaks. They either talked about "problem prisoners", or other prison topics, or did not talk at all. There were few instances of any personal communication across the two role groups. Moreover, when prisoners referre to other prisoners during interviews, i they typically deprecated each other, se mingly adopting the guards' negative i attitude. From post-experimental data, we discoOred that when individual guards were alone with solitary prisoners and out of ming of any recording equipment, as on the way to or in the toilet, harassment often was greater than it was on the "Yard". Similarly, video-taped analyses o total guard aggression showed a daily escalation even after most prisoners had ceased resisting and prisoner deteriora­ tion had become visibly obvious to them Thus guard aggression was no longer elicited as it was initially in response t. perceived threats, but was emitted simply as a "natural" consequence of being in the uniform of a "guard" and asserting the power inherent in that role. In specific instances we noted cases of a guard (who did not know he was being observed) in the early morning hours • pacing the "Yard" as the prisoners slop —vigorously pounding his night stick Into his hand while he "kept watch" o r his captives. Or another guard who detained an "incorrigible" prisoner in sol tary confinement beyond the duration set by the guards' own rules and then he conspired to keep him in the hole all night while attempting to conceal this in ormation from the experimenters who were thought to be too soft on the prison rs. In passing, we may note an additional point about the nature of role-playing and the extent to which actual behaviour s "explained away" by reference to it. It will be recalled that many guards cont nued to intensify their harassment and aggressive behaviour even after the second day of the study, when prisoner deterioration became marked and visibid and emotional breakdowns began to occur (in the presence of the guards). When questioned after the study about their persistent affrontive and harrassi . g behaviour in the face of prisoner . : . :. t.,•. 1 i".. .i.A;::,:?if, 002703 DOD 001605 { Interpersonal dynamics In a simulated prls4 { '93 emotional trauma, most guards replied tha t t they were "just playing the role" of a tough guard, although none ever doubtbd the magnitude or validity of the prisoners' emotional response. The reader may wish to consider to what extremes an Individual may go, how gr i et must be the consequences of his behaviour for others, before he can no to ger rightfully attribute his actions to "playing a role" and thereby abdicate respdnsibility. When introduced to a Catholic priest,' many of the role-playing prisoners referred to themselves by their prison number rather than their Christian names. Some even asked him to get a lawyer to help them get out. When a public defender was summoned to interview those prisoners who had not yet been released, almost all of them strenuously demanded that he "bail" them out immediately. One of the most remarkable incidents 4f the study occurred during a parole board hearing when each of five prisonerl eligible for parole was asked by the senior author whether he would be willing to forfeit all the money earned as a prisoner if he were to be paroled (rein* from the study). Three of the five prisoners said, "yes", they would be Williqg to do this. Notice that the original incentive for participating in the study had been the promise of money, and they were, after only four days, prepared to give this up completely. And, more suprisingly, when told that this possibility would have to be discussed with the members of the staff before a decision could be made, each prisoner got up quietly and was escorted by a guard back -o his cell. If they regarded themselves simply as "subjects" participating in an experiment for money, there was no longer any incentive to remain in the stu y and they could have easily escaped 1 this situation which had so clearly becom aversive for them by quitting. Yet, so powerful was the control which the situation had come to have over them, so much a reality had this simulated environment become, that they were unable to • see that their original and singular motive for remaining no longer obtained, and they returned to their cells to await a "panic" decision by their captors. The reality of the prison was also attested to by our prison consultant who had spent over 16 years in prison, as well as the priest who had been a prison chaplain and the public defender who we e all brought into direct contact with out simulated prison environment. Further, the depressed affect of the prisoners, the guards' willingness to work overtime for no additional pay, the spontaneous use of prison titles and I.D. numbers in non role-related situations all point to a level of reality as real as any other in the lives of all those who shared this experience. 1 To understand how an illusion of impiisonment could have become so real, we need now to consider the uses of powet by the guards as well as the effects of such power in shaping the prisoner mentality. Pathology of power Being a guard carried with it social status within the , prison, a group identity (when wearing the uniform), and above all, the freedom to exercise an unprecedented degree of control over the lives of other human beings. This 002704 control was invariably expressed in ter .of sanctions, punishment, demands and with the threat of manifest physic I power. There was no need for the guards to rationally justify a request as t y do in their ordinary life and merely to make a demand was sufficient to ha e it carried out. Many of the guards showed in their behaviour and revealed in post-experimental statements that this sense of power was exhilarating. The use of power was self-aggrandi •ing and self-perpetuating. The guard power, derived initially from an arbitrar label, was intensified whenever there was any perceived threat by the priso ers and this new level subsequently became the baseline from which further ostility and harassment would begin. The most hostile guards on each shift m ved spontaneously into the leadership roles of giving orders and deciding on p nishments. They became role models whose behaviour was emulated by other embers of the shift. Despite minimal contact between the three separate guard shifts and nearly 16 hours a day spent away from the prison, the absolute level f aggression as well as more subtle and "creative" forms of aggression manifested increased in a spiralling function. Not . to be tough and arrogant was to be seen a sign of weakness by the guards and even those "good" guards who did not g- as drawn into the power syndrome as the others respected the implicit norm of never contradicting or even Interfering with an action of a more hostile guard on heir shift. After the first day of the study, pra tically all prisoner's rights (even such things as the time and conditions of sleepi g and eating) came to be redefined by the guards as "privileges" which were o be earned for obedient behaviour. Constructive activities such as watching movies or reading (previously planned and suggested by the experimenters) e arbitrarily cancelled until further notice by the guards—and were subseq ently never allowed. "Reward", then became granting approval for prisoners to eat, sleep, go to the toilet, talk, smoke a cigarette, wear glasses or the tcmp•rary diminution of harassment. One wonders about the conceptual nature of 'positive" reinforcement when subjects are in such conditions of deprivation, a d the extent to which even minimally • acceptable conditions become rewarding when experienced in the context of such an impoverished environment. We might also question whether there are meaningful non-violent alternatives as models for behaviour modification In cal prisons. In a world where men are either powerful or powerless, everyone arns to despise the lack of power in others and in oneself. It seems to us, tha i prisoners learn to admire power for its own sake—power becoming the ultimat reward. Real prisoners soon learn the means to gain power whether through in ratiation, informing, sexual control of other prisoners or development of powerf I cliques. When they are released from prison, it is unlikely they will ever want o feel so powerless again and will take action to establish and assert a sense of p wer. The pathological prisoner syndrome Various coping strategics were employed by our prisoners as they began . to react to their perceived loss of personal Iden ity and the arbitrary control of their • •• ¦ ••-••••••••••••3:".:•:iii d1)1i)2,7 0 5 Interpersonal dynamics In a simulated prison lives. At first they exhibited disbelief at the t constant surveillance and atmosphere of oppress Their next response was rebellion, first by the us' subtle divisive tactics designed to foster distrust a tried to work within the system by setting up a When that collective action failed to produce existence, individual self-interests emerged. The b was the start of social disintegration which gav isolation but deprecation of other prisoners as prisoners coped with the prison situation by emotionally—as a passive way of demanding atte excessively obedient in trying to be "good" p guards against a solitary fellow prisoner who cope to eat. Instead of supporting this final and majo treated him as a trouble-maker who deser disobedience. It is likely that the negative self-re by the end of the study was the product of continued hostility toward all of them was justi [9]. As the days wore on, the model prisoner dependence and flattened affect. Let us briefly consider some of the relevant about these reactions. Loss of personal identity. Identity is, for m recognition of one's uniqueness, and establish appearance, behaviour style and history. Livin , know your name or history (who refer to you uniform exactly like all other prisoners, not w, self because of the unpredictable consequences weakening of self identity among the prisoners. and emotional responsivity, while acting ever prisoners became deindividuated not only to th also to themselves. Arbitrary control. On post-experimental quc mentioned aversive aspect of the prison experie to the apparently arbitrary, capricious decisi question by a prisoner as often elicited dcrog • rational answer. Smiling at a Joke could be puni to smile might be. An individual acting in d ' punishment to innocent cell partners (who bec controls"), to himself, or to all. As the environment became more unpre assumptions about a just and orderly world we ceased to initiate any action. They moved ab cells rarely engaged in any purposeful activity the functional equivalent of the learned help' 95 tal invasion of their privacy, on in which they were living. of direct force, and later with ong the prisoners. They then elected grievance committee. meaningful changes in their eakdown in prisoner cohesion rise not only to feelings of ell. As noted before, half the ecoming extremely disturbed tion and help. Others became isoners. They sided with the with his situation by refusing act of rebellion, the prisoners ed to be punished for his and among the prisoners noted eir coming to believe that the ted because'they "deserved it" reaction was one of passivity, processes involved in bringing st people, conferred by social d through one's name, dress, among strangers who do not only by number), dressed in a nting to call attention to one's it might provoke—all led to a As they began to lose initiative more compliantly, indeed, the guards and the observers, but tionnaires, the most frequently co was that of being subjugated s and rules of the guards. A tion and aggression as it did a hed in the same way that failing fiance of the rules could bring me, In effect, "mutually yoked ictable, and previously learned e no longer functional, prisoners ut on orders and when in their Their zombie-like reaction was ssncss phenomenon reported by 002'706 96 011111111111111liiiam Seligman and Groves [101. Since their beha contingent relationship to environmental conse gave up and stopped behaving. Thus the subjecti manipulated by the guards not in terms of ph controlling the psychological dimension of envir Dependency and emasculation. The net established by the guards not only promoted served to emasculate them as well. The arbitra prisoners at their mercy for even the daily, corn the toilet. To do so, required publicly obtain • and then a personal escort to the toilet while same was true for many other activities or without thought, such as lighting up a cigarette drinking a glass of water or brushing one's activities requiring permission and necessitatin These low level dependencies engendered prisoners. Their dependency was defined in ter control over all aspects of their lives which th guards and prison staff) to exercise. , As in real prisons, the assertive, indepen prisoners posed a threat which was overco prisoner uniforms resembled smocks or dresse• enabled the guards to refer to them as "s uniforms without any underclothes forced t unfamiliar, feminine postures. Any sign of in indicative of "incorrigibility" and resulted confinement, humiliation or punishment of ce were able to induce stronger prisoners to act f were encouraged to belittle each other publi ' other tactics all served to engender in the p masculinity (as defined by their external cultu the prisoners usually outnumbered the guards three) there never was an attempt to dircctl after the study was terminated, the prisoners for assignment to guard and prisoner groups the guards were "bigger", when, in fact, th height or weight between these randomly deter In conclusion, we believe this demonstrati social psychology of imprisonment worth addition, this research provides a paradigm a alternatives to existing guard training, as operating principles on which penal institutio generate the extent of pathology it did punishment of being imprisoned in a real pr lour did not seem to have any uences, the prisoners essentially e magnitude of aversiveness was sical punishment but rather by nmental predictability [1 1,1 . ork of dependency relations elplessness in the prisoners but control by the guards put the onpiace functions like going to permission (not always granted) lindfolded and handcuffed. The inarily practised spontaneously reading a novel, writing a letter, eeth. These were all privileged a prior show of good behaviour. regressive orientation in the s of the extent of the domain of y allowed other individuals (the ent, aggressive nature of male e by a variety of tactics. The , which made them look silly and ssies" or "girls". Wearing these e prisoners to move and sit in •ividual rebellion was labelled as In loss of privileges, solitary mates. Physically smaller guards olishly and obediently. Prisoners ly during the counts. These and Boners a lessened sense of their e). It follows then, that although uring line-ups and counts (nine v. overpower them. (Interestingly, xpressed the belief that the basis as physical size. They perceived re was no difference in average fined groups.) n reveals new dimensions in the pursuing in future research. In d information base for studying ell as for questioning the basic s rest. If our mock prison could n such a short time, then the son does not "fit the crime" for • • • •,• •:•.; 002707 Interpersonal dynamics In a simulated prison most prisoners—indeed, it far exceeds it! M are locked into a dynamic, symbiotic relatio human nature, guards are also society's prison Shortly after our study was terminated, Quentin and Attica occurred, emphasising tl recognise the dignity and humanity of bo constantly forced Into one of the most encounters known to man. Acknowledgments This research was funded by an ONR g Professor Philip G. Zimbardo. The ideas expressed in this paper are thos endorsement of ONR or any sponsoring agen and appreciation for the contributions to t served as "warden" and pre-tested some of situation. In addition, Greg White provided I reduction phase of this study. Many others Susie Phillips and Kathy Rosenfeld), helped with the construction of the prison, prisone data analysis—we extend our sincere thank Finally, we wish especially to thank Carlo Pre personal experience gave us invaluable insigh References Yi • • • I T. W. Adorno, E. Frenkel-Brunswick, D. J. Levin Personality. New York, Harper. 1950. 2 R. Christie & F. L. lais (Eds). Studies In Machl• 1970. 3 A. L Comrey. Comrey Personality Scales. San Di Service. 1970. 4 W. Mischel. Personality and Assessment. New Yo 5 S. Milgram. Some conditions of obedience a Relations 1965,18(1) 57-76. 6 G. Jackson. Soledad Brother: the Prison Letters Books. 1970. 7 E. Schein. Coercive Persuasion. New York, Nort• 8 H. Charriere. Paplilion. Paris, Robert Laffont. 19 9 E. Waister. Assignment of responsibility for a Social Psychology 1966,3(1), 73-79. 10 M. E. Seligman & D. P. Groves. Nontransient lea 1970,19(3), 191-192. 11 D. C. Glass & J. E. Singer. Behavioural after eff aversive events, American Scientist 1972, 6(4), 4 97 reover, since prisoners and guards ship which is destructive to their rs. the indiscriminate killings at San e urgency for prison reforms that h prisoners and guards who are intimate and potentially deadly nt: N00014-67-A-0112-0041 to of the authors and do not imply y. We wish to extend our thanks is reasearch by David Jaffe who the variables in the mock prison Jri valuable assistance during the data (most notably Carolyn Burkhart, t various stages of the experiment, arrest, Interviewing, testing, and to each of these collaborators. cott, our prison consultant, whose s into the nature of Imprisonment. on & R. N. Sanford. The Authoritatlan vellianism. New York, Academic Press. go, Educational and Industrial Testing k, Wiley. 1968. d disobedience to authority, Human of George Jackson. Now York, Bantam n. 1961. 9. accident, Journal of Personality and ned helplessness, Psychonomic Science cts of unpredictable and uncontrollable 7465. 1 0102768 DOD 001610 DEPARTMENT F THE ARMY Headquarter , III Corps Victory Ba e, Iraq APO AE 09 42-1400 AFZF-CG IALIG 1 4 ?(104 MEMORANDUM FOR Defense Counsel for S • ecialist Megan Ambuhl, Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 16th Military Poi ce Brigade (Airborne), Ill Corps, Victory Base, Iraq, APO AE 09342-1400 SUBJECT: Request for Expert Assistance in nited States v. SPC Megan M. Ambuhl Your request for Appointment of mompti s a confidential ex ert consultant is denied. You have not demonstra at t e ppointment of ecessarypursuant to RCM 703(d). I am prepared, how ver, to detail a milt ry expert of suitabletraining, education, and experience to assist y u if you so desire. T OMAS F. METZ Li utenant General, USA C mmanding 002709 UNITED STATES RESPONSE TO DEFENSE MOTION FOR EXPERT ASSISTANCE v. AMBUHL, MEGAN M. SPC, U.S. Army Headquarters & Headquarters Company 16th Military Police Brigade (Airborne) 17 August 2004 III Corps, Victory Base, Iraq APO AE 09342 RELIEF SOUGHT The Government moves the Court deny the Defense Motidn for Expert Assistance. BURDEN OF PROOF & STANDARD OF PROOF The Defense, as the moving party, bears the burden of this motion by a preponderance of the evidence. R.C.M. 905(c). The current legal standard for employment of a defense expert is discussed below. FACT The accused, along with a number of other o-accused, allegedly maltreated and assaulted foreign national detainees while acting as a prison guard at the Baghdad Central Correctional Facility, Abu Ghraib, Iraq. On 20 March 2004, CPT referred charges against the accused for violations of the Uniform Code of Military Justice CMJ). The charges and specifications alleged the following UCMJ violations: Article 81 conspiracy to commit maltreatment), Article 92 (dereliction of duty), Article 93 (maltreatment), nd Article 134 (indecent acts). All of these offenses are alleged to have occurred at BCCF duri g the time of the accused's assignment to the facility. On 6 July 2004, the Defense submitted a Re nest for Expert Assistance, regarding Dr. o the Convening Authority. The efense asserts the followin : Dr t.a ro essor of Psychology at the University of Calif° ia, Santa Cruz; D .oneofin' original researchers in the "Stanford Prison Experi ent"; D .s e icated over 30 years of research to the subject-area of prison psycholo ; Dr .research has shown that prisons are powerful social settings and that much f wha people do inside of them is shaped by the conditions that exist therein. 002710 APPELLATE EXHIBIT V Recognized R. 4-0 On 13 July 2004, CP refe The following violations werileilPir 81 ( Article 93 (x2) (maltreatment). These additional c while SPC Ambuhl worked on Tier 1B. On 21 July 2004, the Convening Authority, 2004 charges and specifications to a General Court On 14 August 2004, the Convening Authori for Expert Assistance. However, the Convening A detail a military expert of suitable training, educati On 16 August 2004, the Government notifi decision. The Defense immediately requested that a suitable alternative prior to 23 August 2004. On 17 August the Government notified the identify suitable individuals to be detailed to the D LAW A military accused has, as a matter of Equa assistance when necessary to present an adequate d (1985); U.S. v. Garries, 22 M.J. 288 (C.M.A.), cert the Manual for Courts-Martial (MCM) provides th, have equal opportunity to obtain witnesses and oth servicemembers are entitled to investigative or oth when necessary for an adequate Defense. See Uni (C.M.A. 1986). The necessity requirement exists b military accused has the resources of the Governor criteria for showing necessity: First, why the expert assistance is needed. [would] accomplish for the accused. Third, to gather and present the evidence that the develop. United States v. Ndanyi, 45 M.J. 315, 319 (C.A.A. demonstrating necessity, the accused must demons assistance from a requested expert, but instead mu probability that an expert would be of assistance to assistance would result in a fundamentally unfair t 32 (C.A.A.F. 2001). ed additional charges against the accused. onspiracy to commit maltreatment); and rges are alleged to have occurred at BCCF cferred the 20 March 2004 and the 13 July Martial. y denied the Defense's 6 July 2004 Request thority indicated that the Government would n, and experience to assist the Defense. d the Defense of the Convening Authority's e Government identify who they deemed as efense that efforts were underway to fense. Protection and Due Process, a right to expert fense. See Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 denied, 479 U.S. 985 (1986). Article 46 of t the trial counsel and defense counsel shall r evidence. As a matter of due process, r expert assistance at Government expense d States v. Garries, 22 M.J. 288, 290 cause, unlike the civilian defendant, the nt at his or her disposal. Id. There are three econd, what the expert assistance why the defense counsel [is] unable pert assistant would be able to . 1996) (emphasis supplied). Finally, in rate more than just the possibility of show that there exists a reasonable the defense and that the denial of expert al. United States v. Gunkle, 55 M.J. 26; 31- 002711 ARGUM DNT Applying the factors above, the Defense has not hown that the requested investigative assistance is necessary. First, the Defense has failed to show why the ex ert assistance is needed. The Defense asserts tha41111111111Pan provide insight into how the prison environment "may help to account for a person's behavior or inaction. The Defense her asserts that this expert is necessary to explore the defenses to all charges, specifically wit reference to the accused's complacency or inability to act. The expert will also be apparently tilized to demonstrate the "elaborate" training requirements necessary to handle the uniqu pressures of the prison environment. With respect to the accused's complacency or in bility to act, the Defense's ultimate contention appears to be that this expert is able to a swer the imponderable question of "why good people do bad things." This contention is sim ly speculative at best and falls short of the reasonable probability of assistance specified in Un ted States v. Gunkle. This is particularly true given the inordinate reliance upon the "Stanfor Prison Experiment," an experiment with a questionable foimdation. 'See Alan Zarembo, A Th ater ofInquiry and Evil, L.A. TIMES at 1, July 15, 2004 (attached). If the Defense's assertio were given credence then any offense within any prison involving a person's "action or inaction' would be entitled to expert assistance, a result that is both impractical and nonsensical. Second, the Defense has failed to show why the are unable to present the evidence that the expert assistant would be able to develop. The De nse has the ability to consult with a wide variety of experts, including ColonellgillikAs a annex to MG Taguba's investigation, COL initial report addresses many of the same ssues the Defense now seeks to present. report highlights the unique pressur s, lack of training, and other situation specific stressors that the Defense seeks to highlig . The Defense has access to Colonel as well as a wide variety of military and civilian ps chologist, and psychiatrist, all of whom may be called to testify on behalf of the Defense upon a proper showing of relevancy. Additionally, the two defense counsel representi g the accused, though nit trained as psychologists, have an identified duty to do the har I work necessary to understand the operative facts of their case. In this case, two attorneys (one ilitary and one civilian) represent the accused. Additionally, the Convening Authority p viously detailed a trained military police investigator to assist with other aspects of case pre aration. The Defense team is also aided by the work of other investigators including MG Tagu a's report, a Department of Army Inspector General's report (specifically identifying training i sues within a military context), as well as a number of other investigations. Together with thes reports, the Defense team has the means to adequately research the pertinent issues particularl given the wide variety of trained psychologists within the Department of Defense m de available to the all parties to this case. Finally, although not conceding that the Defense has met their requisite showing for necessity, the Convening Authority, at his discretion, is prep ed to appoint a specific psychologist or , psychiatrist of appropriately comparable training, ucation and experience. 002712 CONCLU ION While the appointment of Dr.1111.10may very well be helpful to the Defense, the standard for appointment of an expert to the Defense team is not whether the assistance is helpful, but rather expert's assistance is necessary. Because the Defense has failed to demonstrate either need or inability to gather and present the requisite evidence and thus failed to establish necessity, the Government requests that the Defense motion for appointment of Dr.allipts an expert assistant on the Defense team be denied. RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED: Nbw J, JA Trial Counsel CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I certify that this Government Response to Motion for Expert Assistance was served on the Defense via e-mail to CPTaillialliMil .1111/111011116@us.army.mil and to Mr. MINIMMIlapidiONNigsvg-law.com and to the military judge via e-mail on 17 August 2004. 4111.1114 MAJ, JA Trial Counsel 002713 4 UNITED STATES MOTION TO COMPEL v. DISCOVERY Megan M. AMBUHL SPC, U.S. Army headquarters & Headquarters Company 16111 Military Police Brigade (Airborne) 14 August 2004 III Corps, Victory Base, Iraq APO AE 09342 COMES NOW the accused, SPC Megan M. Ambuhl, by and through counsel, to move the Court to compel the government to release certain discovery that is relevant and necessary to the preparation of the defense's case. A. RELIEF SOUGHT The defense respectfully requests that the defense Motion to Compel Discovery be granted and that the government be ordered to produce discovery expeditiously in this case. B. BURDEN OF PROOF & STANDARD OF PROOF The defense, as the moving party, bears the burden of this motion by a preponderance of the evidence. Rule for Courts-Martial (R.C.M.) 905(c). C. FACTS On 20 March 2004, the government preferred charges against SPC Megan M. Ambuhi for four alleged violations of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ). (See Charge Sheet) On 10 April 2004, the defense requested production of certain relevant and necessary evidence. The government only partially complied with this request prior to the Article 32(b) 'hearing in the above-captioned case. On 7 May 2004, the defe re nested co ies of hArticle 32 hearin re orts for thefollowin . co-accused: SGT.CPL. , SPC., and SPC The government comp led with us request. On 11 May 2004, the defense requested copies of all of the individual rebuttals to MG Taguba's 15-6 investigation. The defense has not yet received all of the rebuttal documents. On 20 May 2004, the defens ested audio recordings of the Article 32 hearin s forthe following co-accused: SGT.SPC.and SSG.Thegovernment complied with this request. 002714 APPELLATE EXHIBIT V I Recognized R. .4 t United States v. SPC Megan Ns. .Juhl Motion to Compel Discovery On 22 May 2004, the defense re ues e co ies of certain case documents from the companion case of United States v. SPC mThe government complied with this request. On 24 May 2004, the defense requested production and declassification of MG Taguba's AR 15-6 Investigation and Annexes. To date, the government has failed to comply with this request. (On 1 July 2004, the government formally requested declassification of these documents by submitting a memorandum to the Commanding General, Coalition Forces Land Component Command.) On 17 June 2004, the defense submitted a formal request for discovery. The government has not responded and has failed to produce a significant portion of this request. On 26 June 2004, the defense requested .udio recording of the Article 32 hearing for the following co-accused: SPC . The government has failed to comply with this request. On 26 June 2004, the defense requested production and declassification of several memoranda issued by the Combined Joint Task Force Seven (CJTF-7) relating to International Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC) visits to the Baghdad Central Detention Facility and Special Detentions Facility in October 2003. The government has not responded to or complied with this request. On 28 June 2004, the defense requested the preservation of certain tangible evidence maintained by the government's Criminal Investigative Command (CID) pertaining to case number 0003-04-CID149. The government has not responded to this request. On 1 July 2004, the defense requested production of copies of certain tangible CID evidence. The government has not responded to or complied with this request. On 13 July 2004, the government preferred additional charges against SPC Megan M. Ambuhl for three alleged violations of the UCMJ. On 22 July 2004, the General Court-Martial Convening Authority referred all charges and specifications to a general court-martial. On 11 August 2004, the court arraigned SPC Ambuhl on the charges and specifications and the additional charges and specifications. D. LAW The defense relies on the following authorities in support of its motion: a. Article 46, UCMJ b. R.C.M. 701 c. R.C.M. 703 d. R.C.M. 905 e. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) f. United States v. Adens, 56 M.J. 724 (A.C.C.A. 2002) g. United States v. Mosley, 42 M.J. 300 (C.A.A.F. 1995) 002715 2 I , United States v. SPC Me an 1V.: .Ouhl Motion to Compel Discovery h. United States v. Eshalomi, 23 M.J. 12 (C.M.A. 1986) E. EVIDENCE The defense requests consideration of the following documents to establish a factual timeline of events in this case and to memorialize the exact content of each defense request: a. Memorandum, dated 10 April 2004, SUBJECT: Article 32 Request for Witnesses and Production of Evidence — United States v. SPC Megan M. Ambuhl b. Memorandum, dated 11 May 2004, SUBJECT: Request for Copies of 15-6 Rebuttals c. Memorandum, dated 24 May 2004, SUBJECT: Request for Production and Declassification of MG Taguba's AR 15-6 Investigation and Annexes — U.S. v. SPC Megan M. Ambuhl d. Request for Discovery, dated 17 June 2004 e. Memorandum, dated 26 June 2004, SUBJECT: Request for Declassification of Memoranda Reviewing ICRC Detention Facility Visits U.S. v. SPC Megan M. Ambuhl f. Memorandum, dated 28 June 2004, SUBJECT: Request for Preservation of Evidence — U.S. v. SPC Megan M. Ambuhl g. Memorandum, dated 1 July 2004, SUBJECT: Request for Production of CID Evidence — U.S. v. SPC Megan M. Ambuhl h. Memorandum, dated 1 July 2004, SUBJECT: Declassification of witness statements in AR 15-6 Investigation — 800th Military Police Brigade F. ARGUMENT An accused has a right as a matter of due process to favorable evidence. The United States Supreme Court held that "the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material to either guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution." Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). The military provides even more generous provisions for discovery in trials by Courts-Martial. In military trials, the defense "shall have equal opportunity to obtain witnesses and other evidence in accordance with such regulations as the President may prescribe." Article 46, UCMJ. Moreover, R.C.M. 703(f)(1) provides: "Each party is entitled to the production of evidence which is both relevant and necessary." The Discussion to this rule explains that, "Melevant evidence is necessary when it is not cumulative and when it would contribute to a party's presentation of the case in some positive way on a matter in issue." Upon defense request, the government shall permit the defense to inspect tangible objects that are material to the preparation of the defense. R.C.M. 701(a)(2). In United States v. Eshalomi, 23 M.J. 12 (C.M.A. 1986), the Court of Military Appeals held that Congress and the President enacted higher standards for discovery in trials by Courts- Martial. The Court noted that Article 46, UCMJ, provides for "equal opportunity" to obtain 002716 3 United States v, SPC Megan k.JAI Motion to Compel Discovery witnesses and evidence. See id. at 24. The Court, although not directly addressing the issue, noted that Article 46, UCMJ, may impose a heavier burden on the government to sustain a conviction than is constitutionally required when defense requested discovery is withheld. See id. In United States v. Mosley, 42 M.J. 300 (1995), the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces dealt with the issue of defense access to evidence. In that case, the accused was charged with wrongful use of cocaine. The defense made a request to the convening authority for retesting of the urine sample, which was denied. The defense then asked that the Court order the retesting. See id. at 301. Despite the Military Judge's order to retest the sample based upon R.C.M 703(0(1), the convening authority refused to comply. The Military Judge subsequently abated the proceedings. The Air Force Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the order of the Military Judge, holding that he abused his discretion. The Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces reversed and ordered a new trial, holding that the Military Judge relied upon the proper standard and did not abuse his discretion. See id. at 303. There is no requirement in military practice that the evidence be exculpatory in nature in order to be discoverable. See United States v. Adens, 56 M.J. 724 (A.C.C.A. 2002) (finding that neither the phrase "material to the preparation of the defense" in R.C.M. 701 nor Article 46, UCMJ, limits disclosure to exculpatory matters). 1. The Defense has a Right to Equal Access to Evidence in this Case The defense first requested discovery on 10 April 2004. To date the government has failed to provide a significant amount of discovery and documents. The requested materials should be provided in an expeditious manner to enable SPC Ambuhl's civilian and military counsel to have equal access. Government representatives control the release of discovery in this case and despite continued defense requests, submitted in a timely manner, the government continues to fail to comply with these requests. Civilian and military counsel must be granted equal access. Additionally, the defense has requested the declassification of a significant number of documents in this case. The government only made the classified documents available to the civilian defense counsel in July 2004 and has not yet provided redacted or declassified copies. The government has suspended SPC Ambuhl's security clearance pending the outcome of the pending charges. The government is also prohibiting SPC Ambuhl from viewing classified documents because of this now-suspended security clearance. Even with these government mandated decisions, the government still refuses to provide declassified or redacted documents for SPC Ambuhl's review. The government is effectively prohibiting SPC Ambuhl from fully participating in her own defense. Despite receiving a defense request for declassification of MG Taguba's 15-6 Investigation on 24 May 2004, the government did not act on that request until 1 July 2004. This failure to produce denies the defense equal access to evidence in this case. 4 . 002717 United States v. SPC Megan M... Motion to Compel Discovery 2. The Requested Evidence is Relevant and Necessary to the Defense The inspection of the requested evidence by the defense team is both relevant and necessary. SPC Ambuhl is charged with dereliction of duty. At issue in this case will be the exact extent of SPC Arnbuhl's duties and whether or not her alleged dereliction was actually sanctioned by those in her chain-of-command. Many of the requested documents are relevant and necessary to explore this possible defense. These documents may further assist the defense in presenting extenuation or mitigation if SPC Ambuhl is convicted. Further, SPC Ambuhl is charged with two specifications of conspiracy, three specifications of maltreatment and one specification of indecent acts. The defense has requested copies of the hard drives of various laptop computers seized by the government. These hard drives contain dozens, if not hundreds, of additional photographs that the Criminal Investigative Division deemed not relevant to its investigation. These photographs, specifically the dates and times these digital photos were taken, are relevant and necessary to SPC Ambuhl's defense. If deemed necessary by the court, the defense requests argument as to the relevance and necessity of eaci requested piece of evidence prior to the court's determination to compel production. At a minimum, the defense requests written government responses to each of the defense request submitted to date. 3. The Requested Evidence is Material to the Preparation of the Defense R.C.M. 701(a)(2) provides that upon defense request, the government shall permit the defense to inspect tangible objects that are material to the preparation of the defense. The defense team is unable to prepare adequately for trial without being able to examine certain documents and tangible evidence in this case. The defense has a good faith basis as to the materiality of each requested piece of evidence. Certain tangible evidence may prove exculpatory to SPC Ambuhl and is certainly material to preparation of her defense. G. CONCLUSION The defense respectfully request that this Court grant the defense's Motion to Compel Discovery and order expeditious production of the requested discovery in this case. RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED: PT, JA Trial Defense Counsel 5 . 002718 United States v. SPC Megan .uhl Motion to Compel Discovery CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I certify that this defense Motion to Compel Discovery was served on the government via e-mail to4111111101111100@vemain.hq.c5.anny.mil andaWarar@vcmain.hq.c5.army.mil and on and on the military judge via e-mail on 14 August 2004. CPT, JA Trial Defense Counsel 002719 6 DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY UNITED STATES ARMY TRIAL DEFENSE SERVICE REGION IX, FOB DANGER BRANCH OFFICE APO AE 09302 REPLY TO ATTENTION OF: . AETV-BGJA-TDS 10 April 2004 MEMORANDUM FOR MAJAILIIIIIIIIWAniele 32 Investigating Officer, Headquarters,420th Engineer Brigade, Victory ase, aq, .AE 09342 SUBJECT: Article 32 Request for Witnesses and Production of Evidence — United States v. SPC Megan M. Ambuhl I. The Defense requests that the following witnesses be produced at the Article 32 investigative hearing scheduled for 20 April 2004, IAW with Rules for Courts-Martial (R.C.M.) 405(f)(9) and • 405(g): a. CID Agents i. Special Agent. O th MP BN, Baghdad, Iraq, APO AE 09335. Agent 1111.11111testimony is relevant ecause he interviewed numerous alleged victims and made several visits to the Abu Ghraib prison facility during the period of the alleged offenses. Agent Pieron also interviewed several alleged co-conspirators. ii. Special ige.10th MP BN, Baghdad, Iraq, APO AE 09335. Agent gonktestimTny is relevant.use she interviewed several of the alleged victims and actively investigated the allegations in this case. b. Iraqi Detainees The Defense requests a certified interpreter to translate the testimony of the Iraqi detainee witnesses. The testimony of these witnesses is extremely relevant. These individuals may have potentially exculpatory information. The Defense has limited if any access to them based on their current status. For that reason, the Defense requests that the government produce the listed detainees to testify at the Article 32(b) Investigation. IAW R.C.M. 405(g)(4)(A) the Defense objects to consideration of the Sworn Statements of the listed alleged victims and Iraqi detainees. Such statements may not be considered by the IO over the objection of the Defense. All alleged victims and detainees reside at Abu Ghraib Prison in Abu Ghraib, Iraq. They are as follows: 002720 Enclosure 1 AETV-BGJA-TDS SUBJECT: Article 32 Request for Witnesses and Production of vidence United States v. SPC Megan Al. Ambuhl — c. Chain of Command — 372" MP Company i. CPT. rmer Company Co 6111111111aing@us.anny.mi I CPTIMIllkcan testif specifically any training regarding detention facilities. knowledge of the alleged abuses that occurred at Abu immunity for this witness to testify. ii.cpagaillik former Platoon Leader 401/1 1@us.army.mil) CPTIllawan MPs, speeifieirlYihe training regarding detention faci 4111ftwan testify as to his knowledge of the alleged necessary, the defense requests immunity for this witn iii. MSG 11111110111111asformer Company IS afallealll@us.army.mil) As the senior enlisted Lipinski can testify as to the training given to his MPs alleged abuses that occurred at Abu Ghraib. If necess witness to testify. iv. SFC mformer Platoon S 01121.101@us.army.mil ) SFC.supervis He conducted spot-checks of the facility, specifically witnessed at least one of the charges to which SPC A provide exculpatory testimony for SPC Ambuhl. His this case. If necessary, the defense requests immunity d. Co-Accused — 372 nd MP Company i. SGT ii. PFC iii. SSG iv. CP v. SPC vi. SPC 2 mander as to the training provided to his unit, CPTIIIIIIscan testify as to his hraib. If necessary, the defense requests testify as to the training given to reserve ities and control of detainees. CPT buses that occurred at Abu Ghraib. If ss to testify. ember of the 372" MP Company, ISG He can testify as to his knowledge of the ry, the defense requests immunity for this rgeant d many of the co-accused at Abu Ghraib. ell blocks 1 a and lb. SFC SIM buhl is facing court-martial. He can estimony is highly relevant and critical to for this witness to testify. 002721 AETV-BGJA-TDS SUBJECT: Article 32 Request for Witnesses and Production of Evidence — United States v. SPC Megan Al. Ambuhl e. Additional Witnesses — 372" MP Company i. MAJ .former S-3 for the 3 0' MP Battalion lwa us.army.mil) As the S-3 MA.as responsible for drafting and disseminating ROE guidance. The ROE and any training received by the 372nd MPs are extremely relevant to Charge II. • ii. SPC11011111.111161 analliflp@us.army.mil ) SPCIIII first repo ed the alleged offenses to CID. His credibility and motivation are highly relevant. Furth r, SPC .may provided exculpatory testimony regarding SPC Ambuhl. iii.sscommek innEmpus.army.rnio iv.surfaimamm,„ us.army.mil) SGT muv s the operations NCOIC of Abu Ghraib uring the time frame of the charged offenses. He w 11 testify that he never witnessed any abuse taking place at the prison. v. SSG imilliMpop wirametius.army.mil,) SSG Map was the Force Protection NCO of Abu Ghraib during the tinie frame of the charged offenses. He c, n testify as to the day-to-day operations of Abu Ghraib and what procedures were in place on c II blocks lb for interacting with detainees. vi. S GT 411.111.1111ill eaNIMIN11111116us.army.mil) SGT.pe t time at blocks la and lb during October, November, anct December 2003. EGTONMEIwor ed at la on evenings when CPL as " not working. He can provided testimony as,to the pr cedures used on the cell blocks and to training that he and his unit received. vii. SPC 11.1111111111014 (eagalliaaaus.army.mil) SPC worked on the same block as SPC Ambuhl. She can testify as to the nature of detainee that were held on lb and as to the types of training received by her reserved unit. She can testi as to the interaction between the MI representatives and the MP guards. viii. SGT111011111111r 4111.1111/M10@us.army.mil ) 'SGTalliminsvvorl ed at block la during October, November, and December 2003. He worked at la on evenings hen CPL alliwas not working. He can provided testimony as to the procedures used on the ell blocks and to training that he and his unit received. He can testify as to the general nature of detainees that were held on block I a and the procedures that MI used for interrogation. 3 002722 AETV-BGJA-TDS SUBJECT: Article 32 Request for Witnesses and Production o Evidence — United States v. SPC Megan M. Anibuhl ix. SGT 4111111111111110.us.army.mil ) SGTOMPIPovorked t block la during October, November, and December 20031. He can provided testimony as to th i procedures used on the cell blocks and to ,training that he,and his unit received. He can testify s to the general nature of detainees that were held on block la and the procedures that MI us d for interrogation. He will also testify to the lack of any standard procedure or accountability t Abu Ghraib. x. spcilmari, entigimagus.anny.mil ) SPC goomilwor ed at block la during October, November, and December 2003. He can provided testimony as t the procedures used on the cell blocks and to training that he and his unit received. He can testi y as to the general nature of detainees that were held on block la and the procedures that MI us d for interrogation. xi. SSGOINUM us.army.mil ) SSGANIDean testify as o the procedures used on the cell blocks and to training that he and his unit received. He will lso testify to the lack of any standard pirocedure or accountability at Abu Ghraib. f. Military Intelligence Witnesses i. SPC 11.11111111116 325 th MI Battalion ii. SCINII111011011111032Sith MI Battalion SPC MOM 325' MI Battalion iv. SGT. SINNInsi, 302nd MI Batta ion 40,0110/Mr@us. army.mi I) S GT inlaspwil testify that members of his chain of command told hirp to delete Abu Ghraib photos, off • f his computer hard drive prior to the CID investigation. v. CW2 11111.1111., formerly assigned o 325 th MI Battalion callONMI@us. arm y.m il) CW211.11,was an I Interrogator that worked daily at Abu Ghraib at blocks la and lb. CW24/sayvill testify bout authorized MI interrogation keehniques. CW2 Mgcan testify as to the hgeracti • n and coordination between the MI interrogators and the MP guards. CW211.11,11as be n transferred to the CPA in Baghdad. vi. COL .205 th MI Brigade u s a rm y.m i 1) COL.will tes ify as to his knowledge of allegations of abuse and/or mistreatment of detainees between 16 Sep 03' and 22 Dec 03. In command during the time of the afleged offenses, COL sniallinowl dge of misconduct at Abu Ghraib and the chain-of-commands response to such allegations is h ghly relevant. 4 002723 AETV-BGJA-TDS SUBJECT: Article 32 Request for Witnesses and Production oflEvidence — United States v. SPC Megan M. Ambahl g. Other Witnesses i. CPT 1111111111111111.11.1former Interrogatio 1 OIC, DNVT: moo divaimario@us.army.mil ) CPT Ulna Military' Intelligence officer, is familiar with the Camp Vigilant SOP and can testify as to CJTF-7 polijies regarding Interrogation Rules of Engagement for detainees at Abu Ghraib. CPTIMIlkik205th MI Brigade Operat onal Law, DNVT: i CPT.was the legal 4dvisor for the MI Group who ran Abu Ghraib prison. CP1111111can testify to the procedureis put into place for dealing with detainees and the training that was taught to the members of thel 372nd MP Company for their work at the facility. CPT.visited Abu Ghraib during the relivant time period and can testify to the conditions at the facility. iii. CPT. Ft. Sam Houston us.army.mil) CPT.vas one of several attorneys who provided advice on detainee operations and ROE at Abu Ghrailr. iv. SGM =NM 418 th MP Detachment us.army.mil ) t iii. LTCB CJTF-7, BIAP, Ba hdad, Iraq gollallMo@us.arm y.mi.1) LT(91.111rvi1l testi y as to his knowledge of allegations of abuse and/or mistreatment of detainees between 16 S p 03 and 22 Dec 03. ,.iv. MAJMNIBICHF-7.f LTC arartasked MAJ -torespond to inquiries by the ICRC during the fall of 2003. When called to testify he can explain the ICRC inqui4es and testify as to his response on behalf of CJTF-7. 2. If the Government contends that any Defense requ sted witness is not reasonably available under R.C.M. 405(g), the Defense requests that you ake a determination under R.C.M. 405(g)(2). Your determination should be made after he Government explains on the record the specific efforts made to locate and contact the witnes 4es and after consultation with your legal advisor as to whether or not the witness is reasonably available. If deemed reasonably unavailable, the Defense requests)that a specific factu I reason be stated on the record. 3. The Defense requests that the following documents and evidence be produced to the Defense at the Article 32 hearing, TAW with R.C.M. 405(0(10) and 405(g)(1)(B): a. All copies of CID reports (including 28s), military police reports, or any other reports made by a law enforcement agency relevant to this investigation to include the Agent Activity Reports and the Agent Activity Summaries compiled by the following investigators: 5 00272 . AETV-BGJA-TDS SUBJECT: Article 32 Request for Witnesses and Production &Evidence — United states v. SPC Megan M. ArnimId i. S S S xii. S SA S iv.SA iv. S v. SA v. S vi.S vi.SA vii. SA vii. SA viii. SA' viii. S ix: S ix.SA X. x. SA b. All evidence seized from the crime scene or a y related evidence be present or made available for inspection by the Defense and the Inves igating Officer including but not limited to any evidence seized as a result of the CID searches c nducted throughout this investigation; c. Any and all ROE/RUF guidance established b 372" MP Company from October 2003 to the present; d. Any and all OPORDs that pertain to the Abu hraib mission to include the ROETRUF card then in effect; e. Training records for SPC Megan Ambul and tike co-accused; '.f. Complete medical records for the Iraqi detainees listed .in paragraph lb of this Memorandum; g. Any and all unit level and/or IG complaints re arding the treatment of Abu Ghraib detainees lodgetl against any solider assigned to the 372" MP Company, the 800 ffi MP Brigade, the 205 th MI Company, the 325 1h MI Battalion, or the 20th MI Brigade; h. A complete copy of the unit counseling files tc1) include any records of nonjudicial punishment or administrative action for the following soldiers: i. SPC. r,iii. SS ii. SGT iii. SP t. SP iv. SP. xi. SPC v. SGT. ii. SGT vi. SS. ),iii. SP vii. PF. iv. SP i. Copies of any relief-in-place (RIP) schedules or training schedules between the 72" MP Company (Las Vegas, Nevada) and the 372" MP Co pany, to include any OPORDERs; 6 002725 AETV-BGJA-TDS SUBJECT: Article 32 Request for Witnesses and Production of Evidence — United States v. SPC Megan M. knbuld j. A copy of the final CM case file with exhibits, of case number 0005-04-CID149, as referenced in the AIR of Si4Eggita,dated 22 Jan 04, regarding a K-9 incident at Abu Ghraib; k. Copies of the two Working Papers referenced by 130 Karpinski in her 24` h Dec 03 letter to ICRC Protection Coordinator; 1. Copies of the [CRC reports dated Oct 03 and Dec 03 obtained by CID from CW4 1111111111* Sagallains referenced in SA dailliaimipkIR, dated 5 Feb 04; m. Copies of the official detainee file (as referenced in para..3-4 of the Camp Vigilant Operations Procedures SOP (draft)) of the detainees listed in para. lb of this Memoradum. At a minimum, the defense requests the name, detainee sequence number, capture number, capture date and crime charged with or suspected of for the detainees listed in para. lb of this Memorandum; n. A copy of the "Behavior Modification Plan" as referenced in para. 3-12 of the SOP; o. A copy of the draft of Chapter 4 as referenced on pages 9-10 of the SOP; p. A copy of the parallel AR 15-6 Investigation concerning the charged offenses and the actions and conduct of the leadership of the 372 nd MP Company and the 800 th MP Brigade (to include, any documents maintained by the AR 15-6 Officer to include his or her appointment memorandum); q. Copies of any Press Releases or PAO information disseminated by the command regarding the charges faced by SPC Ambuhl and her co-accused, to include documents drafted by the Office of the Staff Judge Advocate for release; r. Copies of any administrative action, relief-for-cause documents, letters of reprimand, and OERs/NCOERs for the members of the commands of 372 nd MP Company and 800 th MP Battalion who were in command from October 2003 through March 2004; s. Copies of any SIGACTS, FRAGOs, OPORDERs, or other similar documents related to the ICRC visits to Abu Ghraib from October to December 2003; t. Copies of any documents obtained or produced by MAJIMIMIr a result of his response by CJTF-7 to allegations of abuse and/or mistreatment of detainees between 16 Sep 03 and 22 Dec 03; u. Copies of all documents, including documents of UCMJ or administrative action, regarding 3 soldiers from the 519 th who ordered a female detainee to strip as referenced by CPT gailillirn the preferral packet; 7 002726 DOD 001628 AETV-BGJA-TDS SUBJECT: Article 32 Request for Witnesses and Production of Evidence — United States v. SPC Megan M. Ambuhl v. Copies of all documents, including documents of UCMJ or administrative action, regarding the 'Spence Incident,' as referenced by CW2 . min the preferral packet; w. Copies of all documents, including documents of UCMJ or administrative action, from the August 2003 incident where 2 or 3 soldiers were disciplined by LTC aim.after a CID investigation into abuse, as referenced by MAJ ., JIDC, MI, Operations Officer, as referenced in the preferral packet; .0 • x. Copies of all negative counselings, UCMJ records, and records of administrative action regarding the following soldiers from 4 6 Platoon, 372" MP Company: SPC .SPC sPcqammosp'SP@MIMIIIIFSPC MOM SPC JIIIIIIIband SSG y. Copies of all work schedules maintained by the 372" MP Company or higher headquarters showing which soldiers were scheduled to work which shifts at cell blocks la and lb during October, November and December 2003; z. The Defense reserves the right to ask for additional evidence, as it becomes known during the Article 32 investigation. 4. If the Government contends that any Defense requested evidence relevant to this case is not reasonably available under R.C.M. 405(g), the Defense requests that you make a determination under R.C.M 405(g)(2). This determination should be made after the Government counsel explains on the record the specific efforts made to locate and produce the evidence and consultation with your legal advisor as to whether the evidence is reasonably available. 5. The Defense objects to consideration by the IO of the following evidence: a. Various Documents (From Detainee Medical Records, 372" MP CO, Medical Section, Abu Ghraib). The case file contains approximately 16 pages of assorted medical documents obtained from Abu Ghraib. These documents do not purport to be connected to any alleged victims or to SPC Ambuhl. Further, several of these records are dated outside of the alleged time period of abuse and have no relevance to the charged offenses. b. Detainee Medical Records (From the 372" MP CO, Medical Section, Abu Ghraib). The case file contains approximately 30 pages of medical records that do not pertain to any of the alleged victims of the charged offenses. These records do not purport to have any connection to SPC Ambuhl or the charges she is facing. c. Hard-cell Medical Log (From the 372" MP CO, Medical Section, Abu Ghraib). The case file contains approximately 48 pages of a medical log. These documents do not purport to be connected to any alleged victims or to SPC Ambuhl. These documents do not go to any element of any of the charged offenses. 8 002727 AETV-BGJA-TDS. , SUBJECT: Article 32 Request for Witnesses and Production of Evidence — United States v. SPC Megan M. Ambuhl d. Treatment Logs (From B Company, 109 th Area Support Medical Battalion, BIAP). The case file contains approximately 61 pages of treatment logs. These documents do not purport to be connected to any alleged victims or to SPC Ambuhl, Further, a significant number of these documents (49 pages) are outside the time period for the charged offenses and are simply irrelevant to the pending Article 32(b) investigation. e. Canvas Interview Worksheets. The case file contains approximately 140 canvas interview worksheets that do not contain any pertinent information relevant to the ongoing investigation. Consideration of this collective piece of evidence is prejudicial to SPC Ambuhl. Any potential probative value does not outweigh the prejudice to the soldier under M.R.E. 40 13. if. Investigative Worksheets. The case file contains approximately 150 investigative worksheets that do not contain any pertinent or relevant information regarding the ongoing investigation. The investigative worksheets are not an exhibit to the CID report and are irrelevant to the Article 32(b) investigation. g. Photographs & Video Clips. The case file contains several hundred digital photographs and numerous digital video clips. The defense objects to the consideration of the images unless the relevant images can be tied specifically to SPC Ambuhl. None of the photographs were seized from SPC Ambuhl or from any electronic equipment belonging to her. Consideration of the photographs as a group is highly prejudicial to SPC Ambuhl. At a minimum the Government should be required to establish some nexus between SPC Ambuhl and the photographs the Government wishes to be considered. 6. The Defense expresses the following additional concerns regarding the Article 32 pretrial investigation in this case: a. Receipt of Legal Advice. The defense specifically requests that the 10 make all determinations on questions of law after referring to R.C.M. 405, DA Pam 27-17, and based on advice from your legal advisor. As per DA Pam 27-17, para.1-2e, SPC Ambuhl and defense counsel are entitled to be informed of any legal advice received by the IO and the opportunity to reply to that legal advice. The Defense proposes that both parties be present during receipt of legal advice, that you restate the legal advice on the record, and that both parties be given the opportunity to respond to that advice before you make a determination on a question of law. b. Marking Evidence. For record purposes, the Defense requests that you have the reporter mark each piece of evidence received and catalog the evidence. Please do not admit the "packet" as part of the record. This will prevent the parties and you from determining which evidence has been objected to and ruled upon. c. Delivery of Report to Defense Counsel. The Defense requests that the convening authority direct delivery of your report to the Defense Counsel instead of SPC Ambuhl. See, R.C.M. 405(j)(3). To effect this delivery, I ask that you state my request in your report, and request that 9 002'72 8 AETV-BGJA-TDS SUBJECT: Article 32 Request for Witnesses and Production of Evidence — United States v. SPC Megan M. Ambuhl the report be delivered with a personal certification and date annotation so that the Defense may comment on the report within five (5) days allocated UP R.C.M. 405 (j)(4). Defense counsel and SPC Ambuhl are located in different physical jurisdictions and service upon SPC Ambuhl can not be considered the same as service on Defense Counsel. d. Verbatim Testimony, The Defense requests a verbatim transcript of the testimony presented during the Article 32 hearing. Alternatively, and IAW R.C.M. 405(h) and its applicable discussion, the Defense requests that each witness swear to the truth of his or her testimony, after it is reduced to writing. 7. If I may be of further assistance in this matter, please contact me via email at 411111111111111pus.army.mil or by DNVT phone at: 1111111111or 1/111111111 CPT, JA Trial Defense Counsel 10 002729 DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY UNITED STATES ARMY TRIAL DEFENSE SERVICE REGION IX, FOB DANGER BRANCH OFFICE APO AE 09392 REPLY TO ATTENTION OF: . AETV-BGJA-TDS 11 May 2004 MEMORANDUM FOR CPT ‘1111111M1116 Trial Counsel, Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 16 th Military Police Brigade (Airborne), Victory Base, Iraq, APO AE 09342 SUBJECT: Request for Copies of 15-6 Rebuttals I. The defense requests copies of the rebuttals to the AR 15-6 Investigation completed by MGTaguba. As the 15-6 Investigation does not identify by name specific respondents, the defenserequests copies of all rebuttals. The request excludes the rebuttals bythe,following individualswhich previously were served on the defense: a. SFC b. 1SG c. CPT d. LTC This request specifically includes, but is not limited to, copies of the following: a. Notification of right to submit rebuttal matters b. Rebuttal Memoranda c. Exhibits or attachments to the rebuttal memoranda *3. Additionallyi the defense requests copies of any and all actions, to include Letters of Reprimand and Relief for Cause OERs and NCOERs, that were issued as a result of the findings of MG Taguba's 15-6 Investigation or as a result of the investigation into misconduct at Abu Ghraib. 4. If possible, the defense requests that these documents be served electronically on the defense at laine@svg-law.com and IMIRIMMINg@us.army.mil . Alternatively, a hard copy of the requested documents or a CD Rom of the requested documents may be served on the defense at the Camp Victory Trial Defense Service Office, Baghdad. Point of contact for this request is the undersigned at DNVTIIIIIMM CPT, JA Trial Defense Counsel 002730 Enclosure 2 DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY UNITED STATES ARMY TRIAL DEFENSE SERVICE REGION IX, FOB DANGER BRANCH OFFICE APO AE 09392 REPLY TO ATTENTION OF: AETV-BGJA-TDS. 24 May 2004 MEMORANDUM FOR CPT .121¦111111 Trial 'Counsel, Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 16th Military Police Brigade (Airborne), Victory Base, Iraq, APO AE 09342 SUBJECT: Request for Production and Declassification of MG Taguba's AR 15-6 Investigation and Annexes — U.S. v. SPC Megan M, Ambuhl 1. The defense requests government production of the entire AR 15-6 Investigation and Annexes completed .by MG Taguba regarding allegations of abuse at Abu Ghraib prison. 2. The 15-6 annexes are maintained together on a classified CD Rom. After having completed a preliminary review of the annexes, the defense now requests that the government conduct a document-by-document review to determine the proper classification for each annex. Many documents, to include relevant sworn statements, appear to be unclassified; however, by maintaining them with classified documents on a CD Rom, the government has deemed them "secret." The government is reminded that Executive Order Number 12958 prohibits the classification of documents solely to "conceal violations of law." Government documents should be classified only if revealing their contents would harm national security. A cursory review of the annexes reveals that national security would not be jeopardized by the release and/or declassification of the'.majority of the 15-6 annexes. 3. Prior to any disposition of the charges against the above-referenced accused, the defense requires production of all the 15-6 annexes and an' unredacted copy of the 15-6 Report. However, to facilitate and expedite the process, the defense requests immediate production of the annexes listed at the enclosure to this memorandum. 4. The defense requests that these documents be served eleCtronically on the defense at 011/a@svglaw.com and niN111111111111111111Mus,anny.mil . Alternatively, a hard copy of the - requested documents or a CD Rom of the requested documents may be served on the defense at the Camp Victory Trial Defense ervice Office, Baghdad. Point of contact for this request is the undersigned at DNVT: 553- Encl CII; Trial Defense Counsel 002731 Enelosurc 3 CONFIDENTIAL FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY MG Taguba's 15-6 Investigation Annexes Annex Annex Title No. 1 Psychological Assessment 8 15-6 Investigation, 24 Nov 03 19 MG Ryder's Report, .6 Nov 03 20 MG Miller's Report, .9 Sep 03 27 8001 MP Brigade Roster, .29 Jan 04 28 205" MI Brigade IROE, undated 30 Investigation Team's Witness List 37 Excerpts from log books, 320th MP Bn 38 310th MP Bn's Inprocessing SOP 40 Joint Interrogation and Debriefing Center (JIDC) Slides, undated 43 General Officer Memoranda of Reprimand (GOMORs) 45 BG Janis Karpinski, Commander, 800th MP BDE Summary Overview of life at Abu Ghraib and its effects on MP guards conducted by COL Henry Nelson, USAF Psychiatrist Contains 2 documents: (1) Memo from COIF dated 14 Feb 04, regarding corrective action from 24 Nov 03 incident; and (2) 25-page 15-6 Investigation about the riot and shootings from 24 Nov 03 — includes observations of conditions at hard site and Camp Ganci Contains 2 documents: (1) a 39-page unit roster; (2) another unit roster of 2-pages Contains 4 documents: (1) 205 th photos of IROE; (2) 3-pagd IROE and DROE; (3) LTC VIIMMIl plan (same as corrective plan in Annex 118); (4) unsigned request from COLONIES() CJTF-7 to use "fear­up harsh and isolation approaches," dated 30 Nov 03 List of interviewee names, dated interviewed, type of transcript (verbatim or summarized); 2-page document 11-pages of the Camp Ganci Log Book Al Hillah SOP by the 310th MP Bn; 36­page SOP Contains 3 cots of JIDC slides — 49 page slide show On 10 Nov 03, BG Karpinski reprimands LTCOMIllafor 8 Nov 03 escape at Abu Ghraib. Contains 2 documents: (1) Memo dated 17 Jan 04, issued by BG Karpinski regarding Fraternization and Memo dated 19 Jan 04, issued by BG Karpinski, regarding treatment of detainees; (2) BG Karpinski's 157 page verbatim deposition. CONRDAVI7A L FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 0,02732 CONFIDENTIAL FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Anne* Annex Title Suniamq .rith . Contitint .4.statements:IliatirCOL 46 COL illIMINIMINSi Crnrimande, 205 * Ml um inclUding a verbatim transcript ofillit interview 47 COL 411111110111.1111110 Verbatim deposition, dated' 10 Feb 04, 41.-CEI.C.3C Judge Advocate. pages. Questioned by COL MO CPA Ministry oflustice _11111111111CFLCC-SIA. 48 LTC lawmpapalup StuUmary..of Interview by MG Taguba's 5.6iand X0,800* MP Investigative Team .Brigade . 49 LTC11.41.11111 Summary of Interview by MG Taguba's Command likeAdvocate, Investigative Team -800"1 MP Bit rude 50 LTC Summary of Interview by MG Taguba's Commander, 165.I Investigative Team Battalion (Tactical Exploitation) 1 LTC11011111111111MIMPIR SummaryOf :Interview by MG Tagtibes 2020 MI Battalion Inv'ettiOive Tearn .. 52 LTC.\., 6.171R, Sammy of hi.terView'by MG Taguba's 3.1O' Ml .n InveStigative Tun:... 53 int grinio former Surnmary of Interview by MG Tal ubes Director JIDC ..... Lit vs.stiktiy'satiM 54 LTC.‹.';DR., Summary of Interview by MG Taguba's 724* 'MP.n. an.IC Arifjan loveitigative Teritn Detachment 8110 * MP` ODE 55 uregangligp, CDR; Sunutiary ofiliteiview LW MG Taguba's 740 MP Bn... . . .Investigritiv.e.Tearn .. 56 •NIA! MINIIWIP-1. ,ikurrunary. of Interview by MG Taguba's goo* MP Brigade Investigative Team 57 MAJ. Summary of Interview by MG Tagobals Deputy CIA, fi0.1317E Investigative Team 58 MMm-1 Summary of interview by MG Taguba's (forward), 800 MI' 13rigade Investigative Triilit 59 MMIIIIMINIV, 5-3, Simmary of Interview by MG Taguba's 32d* MP I n Investigative Tv mi 60 MAja11111110RIMPOINP, XO. Sniumary. of Interview by MG Taguba's 320* MP Mn Investigative Twin 61 MMONNWIIIIIPM, 5-3. Summary of Interview by MG Taguba's 800* .MP Brigade Inve5itutive Team... • 62 CPT Vingialja CDR, Summary of 'Interview by MG Taguba's 670* MP Corny:any . :Investigative !Lim.. ..... .. 63 CPT tionew CDR, Summary of Interview by MG Tagubn !a* 372 NIP Campiny_ lavatigative il.e.arrt Summary ofAnterview by MG Taguba.'s 6• cerolliall.. Assistant 5-3 3•10th MP 1.3n. InVe5ligatiVe Tom 65 C.1>1.5-3, 3 to of Interview by MG Taguba's NIP Iln Investigative Team , 2 CONFIDENTIAL FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 002733 CONFIDENTIAL FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Annex No. 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 . 81 82 8.r " 85 80 7 Annex Title - CPT IlliiiiimmOS 2, 80e MP Brigade . LTC 111/11/111111.1. CDR, 320" MP In CPT JAMIIMIIIIIII CDR, 299"..MP Co. CPT vilimol..1111111111„ ' Jr; CDR, 3101/"IviPsmairly ..CPTH 10, 8013" MP 13rigade 11:r 1111111111111110 Plattiori Leader, 37214 MP Co 1.1,`P.Aitie-tit-Camp: m.1g ‘Karpitiski 1LT11110.1110111 CDRI III1C 32-0" MP Dn. 2LT.Vitamin Leader, 229' MP Company CW2931111.1111111111ft 205' MI Brigade CSM 011.110.1006 320" MP 1315 SGM allikilming 800" MP :Brigade CSM '01.10061.1.61 310", MP Bn . ISG 4111111101.01.0p 977'" MP Co St IM SGM,.320" MP LIattalion 'MSG .01.11111111/110 1SG, :172"1 MP Company MSG Operations Sergeant, 310' Ml' flu SFC i, Platoon Sergeant, 299' MP Company SFC la.Ib Platoon Sergeant, 372' MP , Company .. sirclummuimo 372" MP Company SSG I.Squad Leader, 372" MP Company SSG 01111111111111111.¦ Army Dog Handler 5.1toirriarY s Summary of InterView by MG Taguba's Investigative Team Summary of InterView by MG Taguba's InveStigati ye Team Summary bfliifortiew by MG Taguba's investigative Teatn Stiritinary of Interview by MG Taguba's Investigative Teach Summary of InterView by MG Taguba's Investigative Tearn Summary of Interview by MG Taguba's Investigative Teain Summary of InterView by MG Taguba's Investigative Tenth Summary of Interyiew by MG Taguba's Investigative Team Summary of Interview by MG Taguba's Investigative Team Summary of Interview by MG Taguba's Investigative Team Summary of Interview by MG Taguba's Investigative Team Summary otInierview by MG Taguba's Investigative Teain Summary of Interview by MG Taguba's Investigative Team Summary of Interview by MG Taguba's Investigative Team Summary of Interview by MG Taguba's Investigative Teain *mum of Intofvici,V by MG Taguba's Investigative Ttam.. ....... 'Sumniary offnturView by MG Taguba's• Investigative Team Summary of Interview by MG Taguba's Investi ative Team Summary of IntervieW by MG Taguba's Investigative Teton , Summary of Interview by MG Taguba's Investigative Team Summary of Interview by MG Taguba's Investigative Team Summary of Interview by MG Taguba's Investigative Team 3 CONFIDENTIAL FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 002734 Annex Annex Title No. 88 SGT 1111111LIMpArmy Dog Handler 89 MAI Waliall111110111111 USN Do handler 90 Mr.. Civ. Interrogator w/CACI, 205 th MI Briede.• 91 Mr. wowCiv. Interpreter wlTitan Corp., 205'h MI Brigade 94 CITF-7,Interrogation and Counter Resistance Policy, 12 Oct 03 t.. 101 2LTIIIIIIIMMIIIIMINIIRS-2, 320thAvrirtin..t .. 102 Mem .of Attmeriiisliinent from LTG Sanchez to BO Kar inkki, 17 Jars 04 104 205 Mi Brigade SITREP to MG Miller, 12 .Dec 03 105 SOT 41111.1110111011Mm 372Thi MP Corn, an 106' .1.1.T.111/1001.1mont Cdr, 870th MP Company CONFIDENTIAL FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Summary Summary of Interview by MG Taguba's Investigative Team Summary of Interiiew by MG Taguba's Investigative Team Verbatim transcript of interview conducted by MG Taguba's Investigative Team Verbatim transcript of interview conducted by MG Taguba's Investigative Team Describes "fear-up" and "pride and ego down" Summary of interview by MG Taguba's Inv.esti.iive.Tearri. . Annex contains 5 documents, to include secret briefings. ,. Summary of InterView by MG Taguba's Investi_ative Team Summary of InterView by MG Taguba's Investigative Team 4 CONFIDENTIAL FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 002735 UNITED STATES REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY v. Megan M. AMBUHL SPC, U.S. Ariny Headquarters & Headquarters Company 16th Military.Police Brigade, (Airborne) 17 June 2004 III Corps, Victory Base, Iraq APO AE 09342 1. In accordance with the Rules for Courts-Martial (R.C.M.) and the Military Rules of Evidence (M.R.E.), Manual for Courts-Martial, United Sta es, 2002 edition, the defense requests that the government produce and permit the defense to in pect, copy, or photograph each of the following items which are known, or should through the ex rose of due diligence be known, to the United States or its agents. The defense requests the goiernment to notify the defense in writing which specific items of requested information or evidenice will not be provided and the reason for denial of discovery. a. R.C.M. 701(a)(1)(A). All papers which accompanied the charges when they were referred to court-martial, including, but not limitdd to, the charge sheet, transmittals of charges from the commanders, law enforcement reports, laboratory reports, statements by the accused and witnesses, and the Staff Judge Advocate's pre-t41 advice. b. R.C.M. 701(a)(1)(B). The convening ?rder and all amending orders. c. R.C.M. 701(a)(1)(C). All statements a out the charged offenses which are in the possession of the government. The term "statem nts" includes statements of any person, not just the accused and potential government witnesses, taken by or given to any person or agency, to include all Reports of Investigation under Article ,32(b), UCMJ, civilian or military law enforcement agencies, Inspector General investigations, all AR 15-6 investigations, all commander's inquiries or investigations, Central Intelligence Agency investigations, congressional investigations, Department of Justice Investigations, internal CJTF-7 Memoranda and investigations, and any press releases or documents produced or maintained by the III Corps or CJTF-7 Public Affairs Offices and any such documents produced, maintained or disseminated by the press or public affairs offices of the White Ho Ise, the Office of the President of the United States, the Pentagon, the Department of Defense, the Department of the Army, the Office of the Vice President of the United States, the Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Office of die Secretary of the Army, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of Justice, the Office of the Attorney General, and the offices of the members of the Senate Armed Services CommitWe. d. R.C.M. 701(a)(2)(A). Any books, papdrs, documents, photographs, tangible objects, or copies of portions thereof, which are within the pcissession, custody, or control of military authorities, and which were obtained from or belong to the accused or co-accused or are intended for use by trial counsel as evidence in the government's case-in-chief or are material to the 00273 Enclosure 4 REQUEST FOR DISCOVEt.SPC Me an M. mbuhl preparation of the defense. Request permission t • inspect all buildings or places at which the alleged offenses occurred and any such place wi in government control that may be material to the preparation of the defense. e. R.C.M. 701(a)(2)(B). Any results or r ports of physical or mental examinations, to include those of government witnesses and the al eged victims of the charged offenses, and of scientific tests or experiments, or copies thereof, hich are within the possession, custody or control of military authorities, the existence of w 'eh is known to the trial counsel or should be known by the exercise of due diligence, and whi h are intended for use by the trial counsel as evidence in the government's case-in-chief or w ich are material to the preparation of the defense. f. R.C.M. 701(a)(3)(A). The names, add esses, home telephone numbers, work telephone numbers, mobile phone numbers, and e-mail ad esses of all witnesses the government intends to call in its case-in-chief. g. R.C.M. 701(a)(4). Notice and copies df the records of prior civilian or military convictions of the accused which may be offered )y the government during trial on the merits, impeachment, or presentencing proceedings. h. R.C.M. 701(a)(5)(A). Copies of all wr tten material to be presented by the government at the presentencing proceedings, to include the a cused's personnel records. i. R.C.M. 701(a)(5)(B). The names, addr 'saes, home telephone numbers, work telephone numbers, mobile phone numbers; and e-mail ad sses of all witnesses the government intends to call at the presentencing proceedings. j. R.C.M. 701(a)(6). All evidence which ay negate the guilt of the accused, reduce the degree of guilt of the accused, or reduce the punis ent. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); United States v. Agars, 427 U.S. 97 (197 ). This request includes the disclosure of any and all evidence affecting the credibility of gove.ent witnesses, alleged co-conspirators and alleged victims of the charged offenses, pursuant o United States v. Webster, 1 M.J. 216 (C.M.A. 1975). This request encompasses such document that may negate the guilt of the accused as maintained by the organizations, offices, agencies departments and entities listed in paragraph 1 c of this Request for Discovery. This request seeks he listed evidence for the following individuals: SSG Ivan L. Fiederick, Jr., SGT Javal S. Davis, C L Charles A. Graner, Jr., SPC Jeremy C. Sivits, SPC Sabrina D. Harman and PFC Lynndie R. En and. The list of individuals is non-exclusive. The following provides a non-exclusive list of ma ters subject to this request: (1) Prior civilian or court-martial onvictions or arrests of all government witnesses; request a check with the National Crim Information Center (NCIC), Criminal Records Center (CRC), and all local military criminal inve tigatory organizations; see United States v. Jenkins, 18 M.J. 583 (A.C.M.R. 1984). (2) Records of pending and/or co pleted nonjudicial punishment; adverse administrative actions, including but not limited t , discharge prior to expiration of term of service for any reason, relief for cause actions, letters of r primand, and letters of admonition; and all 002737 REQUEST FOR DISCOVEK ,.v. SPC Me • an M mbuhl documents or counseling statements which refer o or relate to any adverse or disciplinary actions against government witnesses, to include but not limited to, the counseling packets and 201 files of SSG Ivan L. Frederick, Jr., SGT Javal S. Davis, I PL Charles A. Graner, Jr., SPC Jeremy C. Sivits, SPC Sabrina D. Harman and PFC Lynndie R. En =land; see United States v. Green, 37 M.J. 88 (C.M.A. 1993). This request also encompasses t ie counseling records, OERs, letters of reprimand and letters of admonition for the following indivi • uals: MA MA MAJ M CP CPT CP LTC 1LT 2L )(xi. CW xxii. CSM xxiii. SG xxiv. MSG xxv. SFC xxvi. SFC xxvii. SSG 'mill. SG (3) Any evidence, including medi disease or defect, combat stress treatment, head in accused, government witnesses, and co-accused; s (C.M.A. 1986); United States v. Brickey, 8 M.J. 7 1983); United States v. Brakefield, 43 C.M.R. 82 (4) Evidence of character, conduct witnesses; see Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 1 (A.C.M.R. 1980), affd, 16 M.J. 258 (C.M.A. 198 information relating to any and all consideration o al records, of psychiatric treatment, mental ury, alcoholism, or drug addiction of the e United States v. Eshalomi, 23 M.J. 12 7 (A.C.M.R. 1980), aff'd, 16 M.J. 258 (C.M.A. (A.C.M.R. 1971). or bias bearing on the credibility of government 0 (1972); United States v. Brickey, 8 M.J. 757 ). This request includes, but is not limited to, promises of consideration given to or made on 002738 REQUEST FOR DISCOVER .v. SPC Megan M. mbuhl behalf of government witnesses. By considerati , the defense refers to anything of value and use, including but not limited to, plea agreements, im unity grants, witness fees, special witness fees, transportation assistance to members of a witnes family or associates, and any civil or favorable treatment with respect to any pending civil, crim al, or administrative dispute between the government and that witness, and anything else hich could arguably create an interest or bias in the witness in favor of the government or against the defense or act as an inducement to testify or to color or shape testimony. (5) The questions, answers, and rsults of any polygraph examination of the accused and government witnesses, including th Polygraph Examination Report (DA Form 2802­E) and related polygraph records, the Polygraph xamination Authorization, and the Polygraph Examination Quality Control Review; see Unite. States v. Mou enel, 6 M.J. 589 (A.F.C.M.R. 1978); United States v. Simmons, 38 M.J. 376 (e.m.A. 1993). This request includes those records maintained at the U.S. Army Crime Records Cen er, USACIDC, 6010 6 th Street, Fort Belvoir, Virginia, 22060-5585. (6) 201 files, unit files, and Milit Personnel Records Jacket (MPRJ) of all government witnesses; request a hard copy of thei Official.Military Personnel File (OMPF) for each government witness; copies of the DA Form 2A, I -1, and Enlisted Record Brief (ERB) for all enlisted government witnesses and ORBs for all fficer government witnesses. Request copies of the counseling packets, DA Form 2A, 2-1 and E Bs for the following: (7) Counseling/performance files f the investigators who have or are presently participating in the investigation of the allegation contained in the charges and specifications preferred against the accused, to include but not li led to the following: i. SPC Megan M. Ambuhl viii. SS ii. SMARM...1k ix. CP iii. SP x. SPC iv. SP xi. SP v. SGT xii. SG vi. SS xiii. SP vii. PFC xiv. SP i.S xi.S ii. SA xii. S iii. S xiii. SA iv. S xiv. SA v.S xv.SA vi. SA xvi. S vii. S xvii. S viii. S xviii. S ix. S xix.S x.S xx. S REQUEST FOR DISCOVER.v SPC Mc an M. rnbuhl (8) Contracts between the Dep .ent of Defense or any subsidiary or sub.:entity and Titan and/or CACI Corporations concerning Jthe employment of contractors at Abu Ghraib or Baghdad Central Correctional Facility (BCCF) b tween August 2003 and March 2004. Request copies of the employee files of all civilian contra tors, to include anyone involved in interrogation or intelligence gathering during the referenced ti e period. Specifically, the defense requests copies of any and all performance evaluations an Vor adverse actions clior counselings or ratings of Mr. Stephen Stephanowicz of CACI Corporat ion and Mr..of Titan Corporation. k. R.C.M. 912(a)(1). The defense reque•is that the government submit to each panel member the vvritten questions listed at R.C.M. 9 2 (a)(1) and provide copies of the signed ).. responses of each member to the defense; reques copies of the ORBs of officer panel members and DA Form 2A, 2-1, and ERB of enlisted pane members. 1. R.C.M. 912(a)(2). All written mattersprovided to the convening authority concerning the selection of members detailed to this court-mn ial or more broadly, selection of the members stated in the applicable Cout-Martial Convening ;Order. m. R.C.M. 914 (a)(2), 18 U.S.C. Section 3500, et. seq. The defense intends to move at trial for the production by the government of all iatements by government witnesses which relate to the subject matter of their testimony, to includ statements made by the co-accused; the government is requested to voluntarily disclose al such statements before trial. n. M.R.E. 201. Any matters the prosecut o. M.R.E. 301(c)(2). Any immunity or 1 on seeks to have judicially noticed. laiency granted or promised to any governmentwitness in exchange for testimony. p. M.R.E. 304(d)(1). The contents of all 'tatements, oral or written, made by the accused that are relevant to the case, known to the trial co nsel, and within the control of the armed forces, regardless of whether the government intends to se the statements at trial. See United States v. Dancy, 38 M.J. 1 (C.M.A. 1993). q. M.R.E. 304(d)(2)(B). Notice of gove ment intent to offer against the accused a statement, oral or written, made by the accused at was not disclosed prior to arraignment. r. M.R.E. 311(d)(1). Notice of all eviden e seized from the person or property of the accused or believed to be owned by the accused hich is intended to be offered at trial. s. M.R.E. 311(d)(2)(B). Notice of goverr Ment intent to offer evidence seized from the person or property of the accused that was not dis,losed prior to arraignment. I t. M.R.E. 321(c)(1). All evidence of the identification of the accused at a line-up, photo line-up, show-up, voice identification, or other id ntification process which the government intends to offer at trial; request disclosure of any nsuccessful efforts at identification by any witness. 002740 REQUEST FOR DISCOVEi .v. SPC Megan M. Arnbuhl u. M.R.E. 321(c)(2)(13). Notice of government intent to offer identification evidence that was not disclosed prior to arraignment. v. M.R.E. 404(b). Notice of whether the government intends to offer other crimes, wrongs, or acts of the accused; the defense requests copiCs of investigations, witness statements, and names and phone numbers of witnesses pertaining to such alleged crimes, wrongs, or acts. w. M.R.E. 507. Disclosure of the identity, including name, address, and phone number, of all informants and notice of any government exe::cise of privilege. x. M.R.E. 609(b). Notice of whether the, government intends to impeach a witness with a conviction older than ten years. y. M.R.E. 612. All writings or documen-s used by a witness to prepare for trial; the defense intends to move at trial for the productiol of any writings or documents used by any witness to refresh memory for the purpose of testifying, either while testifying or before testifying. z. M.R.E. 807. Notice of any hearsay statements, oral or written, intended to be offered at trial under M.R.E. 807, the particulars of the statements, and the names, addresses, and the phone numbers of the declarants. aa. Notification of testing upon any evidence which may consume the only available samples of the evidence and an opportunity to be present at such testing; an opportunity to examine all evidence, whether or not it is apparently exculpatory, prior to its release from the control of any government agency or agents. See United States v. Garries, 22 M.J. 288 (C.M.A. 1986), cert.denied, 479 U.S. 985 (1986); United States v. Mobley, 31 M.J. 273 (C.M.A. 1990). bb. All evidence in rebuttal which is exculpatory in nature or material to punishment. SeeUnited States v. Trimper, 26 M.J. 534 (A.F.C.M.a. 1988), aff'd, 28 M.J. 460 (C.M.A.), cert.denied, 493 U.S. 965 (1989). The government is reminded that trial by "ambush" is improper. SeeUnited States v. Dancy, 38 M.J. 1 (C.M.A. 1993) cc. All chain of custody documents generated by any law enforcement or military agency in conjunction with the taking of evidence during th.. investigation of the alleged offense. dd. All case notes of the agents involved n this case, investigation report entries, photographs, slides, diagrams, sketches, drawings, electronic recordings, handwritten notes, interview worksheets, or any other similar documntation made by such law enforcement personnel pertaining to this case. ee. • A list of, and the opportunity to view prior to trial, all physical, demonstrative, or other evidence and proposed exhibits the government it tends to introduce at trial. Please list the location of such evidence and a contact phone number to arrange for inspection of such evidence. ff. Names, addresses, and telephone numt ers of any expert witnesses whom the government intends to call at trial; copies of all re worts and statements of expert witnesses who 002741 REQUEST FOR DISCOVER.,„S, v. SPC Megan M. Ambuhl spoke with witnesses or otherwise participated in the investigation of this case, regardless of whether such reports or statements are included n any formal report. gg. Any statements, oral or written, made by the summary, special, or general court-martial convening authorities in this case or by any officr superior to the general courts-martial convening authority, or acting for the command, whether oral or written, which: (1) in any manner, withholds froth a subordinate commander the authority to dispose of the accused's case under the UCMJ, td impose nonjudicial punishment upon the accused, to order the accused's separation or release from active duty or active duty for training, or to order the accused into pretrial confinement. ' (2) provides guidance to any subirdinate commander concerning the appropriate level of disposition of the charged offenses and/dr punishment for the charged offenses, either made before or after the offenses at issue in this 4,ase. hh. United States v. Nix, 40 M.J. 6 (C.M 'A. 1994). Disclosure of any information known to government agents which in any manner indicates that a person who forwarded the charges with recommendations displayed bias or prejudice or had an other-than-official interest in the case. ii. Notice to the defense of the nature of raw past or present relationships, associations, or ties between any potential member of the court-martial panel and the trial counsel, assistant trial counsel, chief of military justice, or the Staff Judge Advocate; this request specifically includes, but is not limited to, any religious, social, busing's, professional, or recreational associations. 2. The defense renews its request of 10 April 200 for production of the following documents and evidence: a. All copies of CID reports (including 28s), military police reports, or any other reports made by a law enforcement agency relevant to this investigation to include the Agent Activity Reports and the Agent Activity Summaries compiled by the following investigators: b. All evidence seized from the crime scene or any related evidence be present or made available for inspection by the Defense and the In{'estigating Officer including but not limited to any evidence seized as a result of the CID searcheS conducted throughout this investigation; 1. S. xi. SA ii. S •. xii. SA iii. SA. xiii. S iv. S •. xiv. S v. S. xv. S vi. S. xvi. S vii. xvii. S viii. S •. xviii. S ix. SA. xix. x. SA. xx. S 002742 REQUEST FOR DISCOVER .v. SPC Megan M. mbuhl c. Any and all ROE/RUF guidance established by 372 nd MP Company from October 2003 to the present; d. Any and all OPORDs that pertain to the u Ghraib mission to include the ROE/RUF card then in effect`; e. Training records for SPC Megan Ambuhl d all of the co-accused; f. Complete medical records for the Iraqi de inees listed in paragraph lb of this Memorandum; g. Any and all unit level and/or IG complain regarding the treatment of Abu Ghraib detainees lodged against any solider assigned to the 372" P Company, the 800th MP Brigade, the 205 th MI Company, the 325 th MI Battalion, or the 20th MI rigade; h. A complete copy of the unit counseling til s to include any records of nonjudicial i. Copies of any relief-in-place (RIP) schedul s or training schedules between the 72" MP Company (Las Vegas, Nevada) and the 372" MP Company, to include any OPORDERs; j. A copy of the final CID case file with exhi i its, of case number 0005-04-CID149, as referenced in the AIR of .dated 22 J 04, regarding a K-9 incident at Abu Ghraib; k. Copies' of the two Working Papers referen i ed by BG Karpinski in her 24 th Dec 03 letter to Ms. MI. ICRC Protection Coordinator; punishment or administrative action for the folio ng soldiers: i. SPC Megan M. Ambuhl viii. SS ii. SG ix. CP iii. SPC x. SP iv. SP xi. S v. SG xii. SGT vi. SS xiii. S vii. PF xiv. SP 1. Copies bf the ICRC reports dated Oct 03 Dec 03 obtained by CID from referenced in SA ignew dated 5 Feb 04; m. Copies of the official detainee file (as refe enced in para. 3-4 of the Camp Vigilant Operations Procedures SOP (draft)) of the detaine s listed in para. lb of this Memorandum. At a minimum, the defense requests the name, detains sequence number, capture number, capture date and crime charged with or suspected of for the de inees listed in para. lb of this Memorandum; n. A copy of the "Behavior Modification P1 ' as referenced in para. 3-12 of the SOP; 002743 REQUEST FOR DISCOVEI .v. SPC Megan M. mbuhl o. A copy of the draft of Chapter 4 as refere ced on pages 9-10 of the SOP; p. A copy of the parallel AR 15-6 Investigat n concerning the charged offenses and the actions and conduct of the leadership of the 372' MP Company and the 800th MP Brigade (to include, any documents maintained by the AR 1 -6 Officer to include his or her appointment memorandum); q. Copies of any Press Releases or PAO info oration disseminated by the command regarding the charges faced by SPC Arnbuhl and her co-ac used, to include documents drafted by the Office of the Staff Judge Advocate for release; r. Copies of any administrative action, relief or-cause documents, letters of reprimand, and OERs/NCOERs for the members of the comman s of 372" MP Company and 800 th MP Battalion who were in command from October 2003 throu' h March 2004; s. Copies of any SIGACTS, FRAGOs, OPO ERs, or other similar documents related to the ICRC visits to Abu Ghraib from October to Dec ber 2003; t. Copies of any documents obtained or prod ced by MATIMMOPPas a result of his response by CJTF-7 to allegations of abuse and/or mistrea ent of detainees between 16 Sep 03 and 22 Dec 03; u. Copies of all documents, including docu nts of UCMJ or administrative action, regarding 3 soldiers from the 519th who ordered a female d itainee to strip as referenced by CP11111111111111* in the preferral packet; v. Copies of all documents, including documents of UCMJ or administrative action, regarding the 'Spence Incident,' as referenced by CW . n the preferral packet; w. Copies of all documents, including doe ents of UCMJ or administrative action, from the August 2003 incident where 2 or 3 soldiers were isciplined by LANitartiifter a CID investigation into abuse, as referenced by MA JIDC, MI, Operations Officer, as referenced in the preferral packet; x. Copies of all negative counselings, UCMJ ecords, and records of administrative action regarding the following soldiers from 4th Platoon 372" MP Company: SP.PC SPC, , SP PG.SP y. Copies of all work schedules maintained b the 372 nd MP Company or higher headquarters showing which soldiers were scheduled to work hich shifts at cell blocks la and lb during October, November and December 2003; 3. For any documents that fall within this discov ry request, the defense requests that the government begin to declassify such documents s they may be offered at trial by the defense. Alternatively, the defense requests that redacted pies of such documents be provided until such 002741 DOD 001646 REQUEST FOR DISCOVEM.v. SPC Megan M, Ariribuhl time as the documents can be unclassified. Provid enable the civilian defense counsel to begin to ide s review by the military defense counsel, who posse identification may narrow the scope of those docu i 4. This discovery request is continuing and shall a that may be preferred after this request for discove notification of new evidence and/or material is req items the government is unwilling or unable to prc obligation to provide full discovery in a timely ma not appropriate. See United States v. Adens, 561¦,/ ng redacted copies as early as possible will tify specific documents that require further uses adequate clearance. Further, such nents that the defense requests be unclassified. ply to any additional charges or specifications y is served upon the government. Immediate aested. A negative response is requested on all lice. The government is reminded of its mer. Gamesmanship and trial by ambush are .J. 724 (A.C.C.A. 2002). CPT JA I , Trial Defense Counsel CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I certify that on 17 June 2004 this defense Reques for Discovery was served on the government via e-mail t. @vcmain.hq.c5 army.mil and vcmam. q.c .army.mil . CPT`, JA Trial Defense Counsel 002745 CONFIDENTIAL F DEPARTMEN UNITED STATES ARMY REGION IX, FOB D APO ' REPLY TO ATTENTION OF: AETV-BGJA-TDS MEMORANDUM FOR M Headquarters Company, HI Corps, ietory Bas SUBJECT: Request for Declassification of Me Visits — U.S. v, SPC Megan M. Ambuhl 1. The defense requests declassification of the Force Seven (CJTF-7) memoranda relating to visits to the Baghdad Central Detention Facility a. Memorandum for Commander, 800th 7 DSJA, dated 27 November 2003 b. Me randum titled "Review of ICRC SJA Ops Law, dated 25 Nov 0 c. Memorandum titled "Review of ICRC Detention Facility," MA 2. These CJTF-7 SJA reviews of the ICRC wor to certain persons under the Geneva Conventio Abu Ghraib detention facility. At a minimum, alleged abuses at Abu Ghraib by the Command 3. The defense requests that redacted copies of defense electronically atfiNiksvg-law.com Alternatively, a hard copy of the requested docu may be served on the defense at the Camp Vict defense requests that an unredacted copy of the Washington, D.C. Point of contact for this requ C OFFICIAL USE ONLY OF THEARMY IAL DEFENSE SERVICE GER BRANCH OFFICE 09392 26 June 2004 ead Trial Counsel, Headquarters andAPO AE 09342 oranda Reviewing ICRC Detention Facility llowing Headquarters, Combined Joint Task ernational Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC) d Special Detentions Facility in October 2003: P Brigade from LTC41111111MillirJTF- etention Visits — Oct 03," from MAJ etention Visits — 18-24 Oct 03, Baghdad HVD SJA Ops Law, dated 25 Nov 03 ing papers indicate that the protections afforded did not apply to security detainees housed at ese documents indicate a level of knowledge of , 800th MP Brigade. hese documents be served immediately on the 141/111111111111111qus.anny.mil . cuts or a CD Rom of the requested documents Trial Defense Service Office, Baghdad. The documents be made available to counsel in st is the undersigned at DNVT: 553-1111 ,JA T I Defense Counsel CONFIDENTIAL F OFFICIAL USE ONLY 002146 Enclosure 5 DOD 001648 tiE0AFetrkiNr., .UNITED sTATEs Army. TRIAL I:)FENSE 'SERVIOE • REGION IX, FOR 'DANGER GRANCH OFFIOE APOAE 09392 REPLY TO , ATTENTION OF: : : .•••• ; • :" • miaNfORAOiluivi HeadqnartetS'COinPa0,111Corps; V„let0 ,., • .. . • : SUBJECT: Request for Preservation0 Ewcleiicb r . 1. The defense requests that the government a 949colalit410e government or its'4gpAts itlating to CJD C45e Number 0003-0 s !concerning iillegatioi:qd MP miscoiiduct or dctamce abuse:itt •, limb as there i fthal uction on . 2. The defense appeal, if &Lyon ppited. Statesv SPC 3: POC for this request is the undersigtte us.army.mil or civilian defense counSel;h4f. 1 4 aw.coth.. , , : • . . • ' ' • . • '..•.•.;•„. • •••. ::•••••.• I. •'•• ••J%''• •.• „ . „ .•. " • •••••••••'''''•••;:'... DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY UNITED STATES ARMY TRIAL DEFENSE SERVICE REGION IX, FOB DANGER BRANCH OFFICE APO AE 09392 REPLY TO ATTENTION OF: . AETV-BGJA-TDS 1 July 2004 MEMORANDUM FOR MAJOIMINallit, Lead Trial Counsel, Headquarters and Headquarters Company, III Corps, Victory Base, APO AE 09342 SUBJECT: Request for Production of CID Evidence — U.S. v. SPC Megan M. Ambuhl 1. The defense requests production of the following listed items of tangible evidence maintained by the U.S. Army Criminal Investigative Division, BIAP field office, as part of case number 003-04-C1D149: a. Document No. 405-04: Request declassification and production of the 4 memoranda included in this piece of evidence. b. Document No. 035-04: Request a copy of each page of the log book, excluding the blank unused pages at the back of the log book. Request that each page be scanned and provided to the defense on CD Rom. Only portions of this log book were provided to the defense in the preferral packet; the defense requests production of a copy of the entire book. c. Document No. 036-04: Request a copy of each page of the log book, excluding the blank unused pages at the back of the log book. Request that each page be scanned and provided to the defense on CD Rom. Only portions of this log book were provided to the defense in the preferral packet; the defense requests production of a copy of the entire book. d. Document No, 037-04: Request a copy of each page of the log book, excluding the blank unused pages at the back of the log book. Request that each page be scanned and provided to the defense on CD Rom. Only portions of this log book were provided to the defense in the preferral packet; the defense requests production of a copy of the entire book. e. Item No. 029-04: Request an exact mirrored-copy of the hard drive of this laptop computer. f. Item No. 031-04: Request an exact mirrored-copy of the contents of this USB thumb drive. g. Item No. 032-04: Request an exact mirrored-copy of the hard drive of this laptop computer. 002748 Enclosure 7 AETV-BGJA-TDS SUBJECT: Request for Copies of CID Evidence — U.S, v. SPC Megan M. Ambuhl h. Item No. 033-04: Request exact mirrored-copies of the two compact discs composing this piece of evidence. i. Item No. 034-04: Request exact mirrored-copies of the two compact discs composing this piece of evidence. j. Item No. 330-04: Request an exact mirrored-copy of the compact disc identified in this piece of evidence. k. Item No. 301-04: Request an exact mirrored-copy of the hard drive of this laptop computer. 1. Item No. 162-04: Request an exact mirrored-copy of the compact disc identified in this piece of evidence. m. Item No. 073-04: Request exact mirrored-copies of the two compact discs composing this piece of evidence. 2. On 22 June 2004, the 16th MP Brigade Trial Counsel seized two boxes of relevant documents, memoranda, schedules, log sheets and log books from the Commander, 301" MP Company at Abu Ghraib prison. The defense requests immediate production of copies of each document seized from the 301" MP Company. 3. At the Article 32 Hearing in U.S. v. SPC .held on 24 June 2004, CP111101111111111 dillicommander, 372"4 MP Company, testi le under oat that representatives from CID confiscated the hard drive of the government-issued laptop belonging to the 372" MP Company. The computer shell was returned to CP1111111111art the hard drive remained missing and presumably, in the custody of CID. The defense requests permission to inspect the original hard drive and production of a mirror-image copy of the contents of that hard drive. 4. This request for production of evidence is made in the interests of judicial economy and efficiency. Providing copies of the requested evidence ensures accessibility to civilian defense counsel located in Washington, D.C. and military defense counsel located in Tikrit. 5. If possible, the defense requests that the requested materials be served electronically on the defense a'svg-law.com antelaNOMMIMIIMPI©us.army.mil . Alternatively, a CD Rom of the requested evidence may be served on the defense at the Camp Victory Trial Defense Service Office, Baghdad. Point of contact for this request is the undersigned at DNVTalto MVP PT, JA Trial Defense Counsel 2 002749 DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY HEADQUARTERS, ti CORM VICTORY MIL RAO APO AE eolt424400 KM 10 Atligin . AFZF-JA-MJ 1 July 2004 LICAMINIMIODeputy Stuff Judge Advocate, Coalition Fortes Land Component Command, Camp Delia, Kuwait, APO AE 09104 MEMORANDUM FOR LTG David McKierran, Gmrimrmzditg General, Coalition Forces Land Component Command, Camp Doha, Kuwait, APO AE 09304 SUBJECT: Declassification. of witness statements in AR 15-6 Investigation — 800`11 Military Police Brigade 1. 1 am I le trial counsel currently prosecuting Staff Sergeant (SSG. .Sergeant (SG.is., Specialist (SPOIMINNalltr, Specialist Me tin Ambuhi, and Specialist in connection with detainee abuse Bir Baghdad Central Confinement Facility, u Cahra.ib, Iraq. In a pp:trial Article 39(4 Uniform Code of IvIllitary Justice (11CM1) session held on 21 June 2004, defense counsel for SSVIIIIIIIISGTialaand SPOiliMirequested that witness statements found in the annexes of the Amy Regulation (AR) 15-6 report of investigation (R01) Major General (MCI) Taguba conducted be declassified from secret/seeret­noforn to unclassified. The defense counsel stated that declassification would allow for easier access to these statements and•acilitate their ability; to photocopy and use these statements in questioning witnesses. The military judge withhektruling pending your response to this request. 2. Based upon the defense counsel's request and the need to allow for easier access to these witness statement and other documents collected by MG Taguha, the Government requests that you immediately declassify the annexes of the AR 15-6 ROI, that can be declassified without compromising vital national interests. In order to-Leilitate this process, the Government has reviewed the annexes and has identified specific annexes that contain documents marked as SECRET (1 1, 12, 13, 20, 28, 40, 41, 93, 94, 95, 97,99, 100, 103, and 105). In addition to these annexes that contain se=cret documents, 'the Government has identified two other annexes that may contain other sensitive material (44 and 104). At a minimum, the Government requests that the annexes containing witness statements be declassified and marked as "For Official Use Only". 3. The government believes that the declassification of the annexes to the AR 15-6 report, specifically those that contain witness statements, will assist in the expeditious resolution of these casts_ Thank you for your consideration in this matter. Trial Counsel. 0 0750 Enclosure 8 DOD 001652 UNITED STATES.) ) v. ) ) ) G, U.S. Army .) HHC, 16th MP BDE (ADN),.) III Corps.) Victory Base, Iraq,.) APO AZ 09342.) 28 JULY 2004 ****************************************************w*********** ***************************************************************** UNITED STATES ) ) v. ) ) ) SPC, U.S. Army ) HHC, 16th MP BDE (ABN), ) III Corps ) APO AZ 09342 ) 18 JUNE 2004 UNITED STATES.) • ) v.. ) ) ) 1111111111111. SGT, U.S. Army.) HHC, 16th MP BDE (ABN),.) III Corps.) Victory Base, Iraq,.) APO AE 09342.). 18 JUNE 2004 **************************************************************** UNITED STATES.) ) v..) ) AMBUHL, Megan.) SPC, U.S. Army.) HHC, 16th MP BDE (ABN) ,.) III Corps.) Victory Base, Iraq,.) APO AE 09342.). 18 JUNE 2004 ****t*********************************************************** 002751 APPELLATE EXHIBIT V I I Recognized R. q 3 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I HEREBY CERTIFY that copies of the foregoing Motion and proposed Order were emailed, as i strutted by Government Counsel, this / -"day of August 2004, to th Military Judge, Government Counsel, Defense Counsel, and Cou sel for CACI at the following email addresses: • Military Judge: • Defense Counsel:; • Government Counsel: 4111111111111 • Counsel for CACI: 1 ams & Connolly, LLP 725 elfth Street, N.W. Wash ngton, D.C. 20005 -voic : 202-434-5753 Fax:. 202-434-5029 August / , 2004 7 002752 OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 1950 DEFENSE PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 2030 1-1 950 ADMINISTRATION & November 9, 2001 MANAGEMENT Ref: 01 -CORRI 01 - MEMORANDUM FOR DOD FOIA OFFICES SUBJECT: Withholding of Personally Identifyihg Information Under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) The President has declared a national emergency by reason of the terrorist attacks on the United States. hi the attached memorandum, the Deputy Secretary of Defense emphasizes the responsibilities all DoD personnel have towards operations security and the increased risks to US military and civilian personnel, DoD operational capabilities, facilities and resources. All Department of Defense personnel should have a heightened security awareness concerning their day-to-day duties and recognition that the increasedisecurity posture will remain a fact of life for an indefinite period of time. This change in our security posture has implications for the Defense Department's policies implementing the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). Presently all DoD components withhold, under 5 USC § 552(b)(3), the personally identifying information (name, rank, duty address, official title, and information regarding the,person's pay) of military and civilian personnel who are assigned overseas, on board ship; or to sensitive or routinely deployable units. Names and other information regarding DoD persorinel who did not meet these criteria have been routinely released when requested under the FOIA. Now, since DoD personnel are at increased risk regardless of their duties or assignmeht to such a unit, release of names and other personal information must be more carefully scrutinized and limited. I have therefore determined this policy requit'les revision. Effective immediately, personally identifying information (to include lists ole-mail addresses) in the categories listed below must be carefully considered and the interests supporting withholding of the information given more serious weight in the analysis. This infotination may be found to be exempt under 5 USC § 552(b)(6) because of the heightened interest h the personal privacy of DoD personnel that is concurrent with the increased security awareness demanded in times of national emergency. • Lists of personally identifying information of DoDliersonnel: All DoD components shallordinarily withhold lists of names and other ilersonally identifying information of personnel currently or recently assigned withth a particular component, unit, organization or office with the Department of Defense in response to requests under the FOIA. This is to include active duty military personnel, civilian employees, contractors, members of the National Guard and Reserves, military dependents, and Coast Guard personnel when the Coast Guard is operating as a service in the Navy. If a articular r nest does not raise EXHIBIT 002753 security or privacy concerns, names may b released as, for example, a list of attendees ata meeting held more than 25 years ago. P icular care shall be taken prior to anydecision to release a list of names in any el ctronic format. • Verification of status of namedindividuals: DoD components may determine that release of personal identifying information about individual is appropriate only if the releasewould not raise security or privacy conce and has been routinely released to thepublic. • a s in s ocument hat don't fal int • an the • ecedin • cate:o 'es: Ordinarilynames of DoD personnel, other than lists of ames, mentioned in documents that are releasable under the FOIA should not be wi eld, but in special circumstances where therelease of a particular name would raise sub tantial security or privacy concerns, such a name may be withheld. When processing a FOIA request, a DoD co4onent may determine that exemption (b)(6) does not fully protect the component's or an i dividual's interests. In this case, please contact Mr. 1111.1ft&Directorate of Freedom of formation and Security Review, at (703) 111111110., or DSNJ This policy does not preclude a DoD component's discretionary release of names and duty information of personnel who, by the nature of their position and duties, frequently interact with the public, such as flag/general officers, public affairs officers, or other personnel designated as official command spokespersons. gal*RIE Director Attachment: As stated 002754 ASSISTANT SECRE 6000 DEFENS WASHINGTON, 0 December 2 COMMAND. CONTROL, COMMUNICATIONS. AND INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARIES OF CHAIRMAN OF THE UNDER SECRETARI DIRECTOR, DEFENS ASSISTANT SECRET .GENERAL COUNSE INSPECTOR GENE DIRECTOR, OPERA ASSISTANTS TO TH DIRECTOR, ADMINI DIRECTOR, NET AS DIRECTORS OF THE DIRECTORS OF THE ARY OF DEFENSE PgNTAGON C 20301.6000 8, 2001 E MILITARY DEPARTMENTS OINT CHIEFS OF STAFF S OF DEFENSE • RESEARCH AND ENGINEERING ES OF DEFENSE OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ONAL TEST AND EVALUATION SECRETARY OF DEFENSE TRATION AND MANAGEMENT ESSMENT DEFENSE AGENCIES OD FIELD ACTIVITIES SUBJECT: Removal of Personally Identifying nformation of DoD Personnel from Unclassified Web Sites In accordance with DoD 5400.7-R, "Do unclassified information which may be withhel of Information Act (FOIA) exemptions is consi DoD Web Site Administration policy de Deputy Secretary of Defoise memorandum, De information to publicly accessible web sites and on sites that do post FOUO materials (see Part The attached November 9, 2001, memor and Management (DA&M), citing increased ris personally identifying information regarding all Components under exemption (b)(6) of the FOI information which may be withheld FOUO and unclassified DoD web sites. Thus, all personally identifying informati to be withheld under the FOIA must be remove 'web pages with access restricted only by domai applies to unclassified DoD web sites regardles .gov) or sponsoring organization (e.g., Non-Ap Freedom of Information Act Program," from the public by one or more Freedom Bred For Official Use Only (MUD). nseli ebmasters , issued by ember 7, 1998, prohibits posting FOUO require's access and transmission controls Table 1). ndum from the Director, Administration s to DoD personnel, states.that oD Oersonnel may be withheld by the , 5 USC §552. This action makes the nappropriate for posting to most n regarding DoD personnel now eligible from publicly accessible web pages and or IP address (i.e., .mil restricted). This of domain (e.g., .com, .edu, .org, .mil, ropriated Fund/Morale, Welfare and 002 Recreations sites; DoD educational institutions). The information to be removed includes name, rank, e-mail address, and other identifying information regarding DoD personnel, including civilians, active duty military, military family members, contractors, members of the National Guard and Reserves, and Coast Guard personnel when the Coast Guard is operating as a service in the Navy. Rosters, directories (including telephone directories) and detailed organizational charts showing personnel are considered lists of personally identifying information. Multiple names of individuals from different organizations/locations listed on the same document or web page constitutes a list. Aggregation of names across pages must specifically be considered. In particular, the fact that data can be compiled easily using simple web searches means caution must be applied to decisions to post individual names. If aggregation of lists of names is possible across a single organization's web site/pages, that list should be evaluated on its merits and the individual aggregated elements treated accordingly. Individual names contained in documents posted on web 'sites may be removed or left at the discretion of the Component, in accordance with the DA&M guidance. This direction does not preclude the discretionary posting of names and duty information of personnel who, by the nature of their position and duties, frequently interact with the public, such as flag/general officers, public affairs officers, or other petsonnel designated as official command spokespersons. Posting such information should be coordinated with the cognizant Component FOIA or Public Affairs office. In keeping with the concerns stated in the referenced memorandum and in the October 18, 2001, DepSecDef memorandum, "Operations Security Throughout the Department ofDefense," the posting of biographies and photographs of DoD personnel identified on public and .mil restricted web sites should also be more carefully scrutinized and limited. Sites needing to post contact information for the public are encouraged to use organizational designation/title and organizational/generic position e-mail addresses (e.g., office@organization.mil ; helpdesk@organization.mil ; commander@base.mil ). Questions regarding Web Site Administration policy may be directed to Ms! eaoink She can be reached at (703)1111.1111Whnd e maiONVIRMftegALI - Questions regarding Component-specific implementation of the DA&M memorandum should be directed to the Component FOIA office. Attachment 002756 • As stated UNITED STATES V. 11111111111111111111/. SSG, U.S. Army HHC, 16th MP BDE (ABN), ) III Corps Victory Base, Iraq, ) ) APO AE 09342 28 JULY 2004 ) **************************************************************** UNITED STATES ) . ) V. ) ) SPC, U.S. Army ) ) HHC, 16th MP BDE (ABN), ) III Corps ) APO AE 09342 ) 18 JUNE 2004 UNITED STATES V. UMW SGT, U.S. Army HHC, le MP BDE (ABN), III Corps Victory Base, Iraq, APO AE 09342 18 JUNE 2004 UNITED STATES V. AMBUHL, Megan SPC, U.S. Army HHC, 16th MP BDE (ABN), HI Corps Victory Base,• Iraq, APO AE 09342 18 JUNE 2004 ****************** ********************************************** 002757 APPELLATE EXHIBIT 'V It Recognized R. CA 3 MOTION OF NONPARTY SOS INTERNATIONAL LTD FOR A PROTECTIVE ORDER COMES NOW nonparty SOS International Ltd ("SOSi" formerly named SOS Interpreting Ltd.), by and through undersigned counsel, and respectfully moves the Court for entry of a Protective Order pursuant to Rule for Court-Martial ("R.C.M.") 701(g) to prevent the public dissemination of names and other personally identifying information of SOSi's employees produced and/or used during the course of the above-captioned court-martial. For the reasons set forth below, a Protective Order is necessary to safeguard any employment records or other personally identifying information of SOSi employees supporting the U.S. military efforts in Iraq that may be produced by the Government or through subpoena to SOSi. BACKGROUND SOSi, through its counsel, has been informed (by counsel for Titan Corporation, its prime contractor for the work reflected in the documents at issue) that the Government intends to disclose, on or about August 13, 2004, approximately 26 pages containing sensitive "personally identifying" information concerning Titan and SOSi employees to defense counsel in this court-martial. Titan—as part of its ongoing efforts to fully cooperate with Government investigations—had earlier provided the Army Criminal Investigative Command access to these 26 pages of detailed confidential information concerning Titan and SOSi personnel with the belief it would be held as such. The 26 pages that the Government intends to disclose contain the following information about Titan and SOSi employees who are presently or were previously assigned to support the U.S. military in Iraq: name, social security number, home address, date of birth, citizenship, telephone number, email address, security clearance (including level and date of clearance), hire date, arrival date, employment category, language proficiency, unit assignment, identity of sitenanager, employment status, sex, vocational and educational history, 2 002758 employee number. These documents also identify names of close family members of the employees. In addition, Government Counsel has issued a subpoena seeking production of employment records of a particular SOSi employee that contains additional confidential personal information about the employee. ARGUMENT The legal framework for analyzing the need for protective orders in a situation such as this is fully set forth in the Motion of nonparty CACI International, Inc. ("CACI") for Appropriate Relief in the Form of a Protective Order which is pending in the captioned matters. Rather than burden the Court with a repetition of that framework and its applicability to SOSi's situation, SOSi joins and adopts the arguments and authorities contained in CACI's motion and relies on them in support of this motion. Turning to the particular situation of SOSi, there can be no question that the disclosure of the above-described sensitive information would constitute a severe and unwarranted intrusion upon the privacy interests of SOSi's employees and that SOSi has standing to move for such protection. Cf. United States v. RMI Co., 599 F.2d 1183, 1186 (3d Cir. 1979)("[I]t is settled law that persons affected by the disclosure of allegedly privileged materials may intervene in pending criminal proceedings and seek protective orders, and if protection is denied, seek immediate . appellate review."). Moreover, in addition to the privacy concerns, given the role of SOSi's employees in supporting the military's efforts in quelling the insurgency in Iraq, disclosure could unnecessarily endanger SOSi's employees and their families. The information at issue clearly warrants protection under R.C.M. 701(g). The Department of Defense has a long-standing policy of protecting from public disclosure "personally identifying" information of military and civilian personnel, including 3 002750 contractors, who are assigned overseas, on board ship, or to sensitive or routinely deployable units. 'See Exhibit A, Office of Secretary of Defense Memorandum for DOD FOIA Offices (Nov. 9, 2001). Personally identifying information protected under this policy includes name, rank, email address, along with rosters, directories (including telephone directories) and detailed organizational•charts — in short, precisely the type of information that the Government intends to disclose in this case. See Exhibit B, Assistant Secretary of Defense Memorandum, Removal of Personally Identifying Information from Unclassified Websites (Dec. 28, 2001). Such information is properly treated as "For Official Use Only" and protected from public disclosure. See id.; 32 C.F.R. § 505.4 (d)(3)("Ordinarily, personal information must be afforded at least the protection required for information designated Tor Official Use Only' (see Chapter IV, AR 340— 17)."). Since the President's declaration of a national emergency by reason of the terrorist attacks on the United States, DOD personnel, including DOD contractors, are considered at "increased risk" and "release of names and other personal information must be more carefully scrutinized and limited." See Exhibit A. Accordingly, DOD policy is now to give more serious weight to the "heightened interest in the personal privacy of DOD personnel that is concurrent with the increased security awareness demanded in times of national emergency." Id. The U.S. military's policy of protecting from disclosure the personally identifying information and unit affiliation of its Service members, civilian employees, and contractors should be fully respected in this proceeding. Accordingly, all information relating to the identity of SOSi employees and their families should remain protected and not subject to public disclosure during the course of these court-martial proceedings, except to the extent deemed necessary and appropriate by the military judge after permitting SOSi to 'respond, and only after 4 002760 considering all less intrusive means of proceeding. Such relief is necessary and appropriate in order to protect the compelling security and privacy interests of SOSi's employees and their families. CONCLUSION Accordingly, for the reasons set forth above and in CACI's motion, SOSi respectfully requests this Court GRANT its Motion for Protective Order and issue the attached proposed Protective Order. Given the emergency nature of the motion, SOSi requests telephonic argument on its Motion. Respectfully submitted, By: Oaranniti Washington, DC 20006 (202) 496 Counsel for SOS International Ltd. Dated: August IL, 2004 5 002761 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I HEREBY CERTIFY that copies of the foregoing Motion and proposed Order were emailed, as instructed by Government Counsel, thig (lay of August 2004, to the Military Judge, Government Counsel, Defense Counsel, and Counsel for CACI and Counsel for Titan at the following email addresses: • • Defense Counsewarigisirp@vemain.hq.c5.army.millaiNgagusa.net ; wojorkpope-firm.comialia@us.arm y.migiliiii@us.army.mil ; amillip@aol.comill.111111,0@us,army.milalliCsvg-law.com • oovernsemillionalk@us.annyanii ; • Counsel for CACIall iom • Counsel for Titan:laI I I I tawc.com August 1, 2004 002762 MOTION OF NONPARTY TITAN CORPORATION FOR A PROTECTIVE ORDER COMES NOW nonparty Titan Corporation ("Titan"), by and through undersigned counsel, and respectfully moves the Court for entry of a Protective Order pursuant to Rule for Court-Martial ("R.C.M.") 701(g) to prevent the public dissemination of names and other personally,identifying information of Titan's employees produced and/or used during the course of the above-captioned court-martial. For the reasons set forth below, a Protective Order is necessary to safeguard any employment records or other personally identifying information of Titan employees supporting the U.S. military efforts in Iraq that may be produced by the Government or through subpoena to Titan. DACKGRQUND On August 3, 2004, Titan, through its counsel, was infOrmed that the Government intends to disclose, on or about August 13, 2004, approximately 26 pages containing sensitive "personally identifying" information concerning Titan's employees to defense counsel in this court-martial. Titan—as part of its ongoing efforts to fully cooperate with Government investigations—had earlier provided the Army Criminal Investigative Command access to these 26 pages of detailed confidential information concerning its personnel with the belief it would be held as such. The 26 pages that the Government intends to disclose contain the following information about Titan employees who are presently or were previously assigned to support the U.S. military in Iraq: 2.004?p649 name, social security number, home address, date of birth, citizenship, telephone number, email address, security clearance • (including level and date of clearance), hire date, arrival date, employment category, language proficiency, unit assignment, identity of site manager, employment status, sex, vocational and educational history, employee number. These documents also identify names of close family members of the employees. In addition, Government Counsel has issued a subpoena seeking production of employment records of a particular Titan employee that contains additional confidential personal information about the employee. ARGUMENT The legal framework for analyzing the need for protective orders in a situation such as this is fully set forth in the Motion of nonparty CACI International, Inc. ("CACI") for Appropriate Relief in the Form of a Protective Order with regard to its information. Rather than burden the Court with a repetition of that framework and its applicability to Titan's situation, Titan joins and adopts the arguments and authorities contained in CACI's motion. Turning to the particular situation of Titan, there can be no question that the disclosure of the above-described sensitive information would constitute a severe and unwarranted intrusion upon the privacy interests of Titan's employees and that Titan has standing to move for such protection. Cf. United States v. 3 002764 RMI Co., 599 F.2d 1183, 1186 (3d Cir. 1979)("[I]t is settled law that persons affected by the disclosure of allegedly privileged materials may intervene in pending criminal proceedings and seek protective orders, and if protection is denied, seek immediate appellate review."). Moreover, in addition to the privacy concerns, given the role of Titan's employees in supporting the military's efforts in quelling the insurgency in Iraq, disclosure could unnecessarily endanger Titan's employees and their families. The information at issue clearly warrants protection under R.C.M. 701(g). The Department of Defense has a long-standing policy of protecting from public disclosure "personally identifying" information of military and civilian personnel, including contractors, who are assigned overseas, on board ship, or to sensitive or routinely deployable units. See Exhibit A, Office of Secretary of Defense Memorandum for DOD FOIA.Offices (Nov. 9, 2001). Personally identifying information protected under this policy includes name, rank, email address, along with rosters, directories (including telephone directories) and detailed organizational charts - in short, precisely the type of information that the Government intends to disclose in this case. See Exhibit B, Assistant Secretary of Defense Memorandum, 'Removal of Personally Identifying Information from Unclassified Websites (Dec. 28, 2001). Such information is properly treated as "For 4. 002165 Official Use Only" and protected from public disclosure. See id.; 32 C.F.R. § 505.4 (d)(3)("Ordinarily, personal information must be afforded at least the protection required for information designated 'For Official Use Only' (see Chapter IV, AR 340- 17)."). SinOc the President's declaration of a national emergency by reason of the terrorist attacks on the United States, DOD personnel, including DOD contractors, are considered at a "increased risk" and "release of names and other personal information must be more carefully scrutinized and limited." See Exhibit A. Accordingly, DOD policy is now to give more serious weight to the "heightened interest in the personal privacy of DOD personnel that is concurrent with the increased security awareness demanded in times of national emergency." Id. The U.S. military's policy of protecting from disclosure the personally identifying information and unit affiliation of its . Service members, civilian employees, and contractors should be fully respected in this proceeding. Accordingly, all information relating to the identity of Titan employees and their families should remain protected and not subject to public disclosure during the course of these court-martial proceedings, except to the extent deemed necessary and appropriate by the military judge after permitting Titan to respond, and only after considering all less intrusive means of proceeding. Such relief is necessary and appropriate in order to protect 5. 002166 the compelling security and privacy interests of Titan's employees and their families. CONCLUSION Accordingly, for the reasons set forth above and in CACI's motion, Titan respectfully requests this Court GRANT its Motion for Protective Order and issue the attached proposed Protective Order. Given the emergency nature of the motion, Titan requests telephonic argument on its Motion. Respectfully submitted, 1111111111111111111111111111111 By: 11111111111,- 1"-1111111111P Counsel for Titan Corporation Dated: August 7, 2004 6. 0 0 2 70 OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 1950 DEFENSE PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 2030 1-1 950 ADMINISTFIATION ec . November 9, 2001 MANAGEMENT Ref: 01-CORR-I 01 MEMORANDUM FOR DOD FOIA OFFICES SUBJECT: Withholding of Personally Identifying Information Under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) The President has declared a national emergency by reason of the terrorist attacks on the United States. In the attached memorandum, the Deputy Secretary of Defense emphasizes the responsibilities all DoD personnel have towards operations security and the increased risks to USmilitary and civilian personnel, DoD operational capabilities, facilities and resources. AllDepartment of Defense personnel should have a heightened security awareness concerning their day-to-day duties and recognition that the increased security posture will remain a fact of life for an indefinite period of time. This change in our security posture has implications for the Defense Department's policies implementing the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). Presently all DoD components withhold, under 5 USC § 552(bX3), the personally identifying information (name, rank, duty address, official title, and information regarding the person's pay) of military and civilian personnel who are assigned overseas, on board ship, or to sensitive or routinely deployable units. Names and other information regarding DoD personnel who did not meet these criteria have been routinely released when requested under the FOIA. Now, since DoD personnel arc at increased risk regardless of their duties or assignment to such a unit, release of names and other personal information must be more carefully scrutinized and limited. I have therefore determined this policy requires revision. Effective immediately, personally identifying information (to include lists of e-mail addresses) in the categories listed below must be carefully considered and the interests supporting withholding of the information given more serious weight in the analysis. This information may be found to be exempt under 5USC § 552(b)(6) because of the heightened interest in the personal privacy of DoD personnelthat is concurrent with the increased security awareness demanded in times of national emergency. • Lists of personally identifying information of DoD personnel: All DoD components shall ordinarily withhold lists of names and other personally identifying information of personnel currently or recently assigned within a particular component, unit, organizationor office with the Department of Defense in response to requests under the FOIA. This is to include active duty military personnel, civilian employees, contractors, members of the National Guard and Reserves, military dependents, and Coast Guard personnel when the Coast Guard is operating as a service in the Navy. If a articular re uest does not raise 00276 security or privacy concerns, names may be released as, for example, a list of attendees at a meeting held more than 25 years ago. Particular care shall be taken prior to any decision to release a list of names in any electronic format. • Verification of status of namedindividuals: DoD components may determine that release of personal identifying information about an individual is appropriate only if the release would not raise security or privacy concerns and has been routinely released to the public. • Nam s in documents. of theemmazI categories: Ordinarily names of DoD personnel, other than lists of names, mentioned in documents that arc releasable under the MIA should not be withheld, but in special circumstances where the release of a particular name would raise substantial security or privacy concerns, such a name May be withheld. When processing a FOIA request, a DoD component may determine that exemption (b)(6) does not fully protect the component's or an individual's interests. In this case, please contact Mr. Jim Hogan, Directorate of Freedom of Information and Security Review, at (703) 697-4026, or DSN 227-4026. This policy does not preclude a DoD component's discretionary release of names and duty information of personnel who, by the nature of their position and duties, frequently interact with the public, such as flag/general officers, public affairs officers, or other personnel designated as official command spokespersons. D. 0. Cooke Director Attachment: As stated 002769 ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 6000 DEFENSE PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-6000 December 28, 2001 • COMMAND. comma COMMUNICATIONS. AND INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF UNDER SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE DIRECTOR, DEFENSE RESEARCH AND ENGINEERING ASSISTANT SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DIRECTOR, OPERATIONAL TEST AND EVALUATION ASSISTANTS TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE DIRECTOR, ADMINISTRATION AND MANAGEMENT DIRECTOR, NET ASSESSMENT DIRECTORS OF THE DEFENSE AGENCIES DIRECTORS OF THE DOD FIELD ACTIVITIES SUBJECT: Removal of Personally Identifying Information of DoD Personnel from Unclassified Web Sites In accordance with DoD 5400.7-R, "DoD Freedom of Information Act Program," unclassified information which may be withheld from the public by one or more Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) exemptions is considered For Official Use Only (FOUO). DoD Web Site Administration policy (www.defenselink.mil/webmasters), issued by Deputy Secretary of Defense memorandum, December 7, 1998, prohibits posting FOUOinformation to publicly accessible web sites and requires access and transmission controls on sites that do post FOUO materials (see Part V, Table 1). The attached November 9, 2001, memorandum from the Director, Administration and Management (DA&M), citing increased risks to DoD personnel, states.that personally identifying information regarding all DoD personnel may be withheld by the Components under exemption (b)(6) of the FOIA, 5 USC §552. This action makes the information which may be withheld FOUO and inappropriate for posting to most unclassified DoD web sites. Thus, all personally identifying information regarding DoD personnel now eligible to be withheld under the FOIA must be removed from publicly accessible web pages and 'web pages with access restricted only by domain or IP address (i.e., .mil restricted). This applies to unclassified DoD web sites regardless of domain (e.g., .com, .edu, .org, .mil, .gov) or sponsoring organization (e.g.,'Non-Appropriated Fund/Morale, Welfare and 4wv n Recreations sites; DoD educational institutions). The information to be removed includes name, rank, e-mail address, and other identifying information regarding DoD personnel, including civilians, active duty military, military family members, contractors, members of the National Guard and Reserves, and Coast Guard personnel when the Coast Guard is operating as a service in the Navy. Rosters, directories (including telephone directories) and detailed organizational charts showing personnel are considered lists of personally identifying information. Multiple names of individuals from different organizations/locations listed on the same document or web page constitutes a list. Aggregation of names across pages mustspecifically..be considered. In particular, the fact that data can be compiled easily using simple web searches means caution must be applied to decisions to post individual names. If aggregation of lists ofnames is possible across a single organization's web site/pages, that list should be evaluated on its merits and the individual aggregated elements treated accordingly. Individual names contained in documents posted on websites may be removed orleft at the discretion of the Component, in accordance with the DA&M guidance. This direction does not preclude the discretionary posting of names and duty information of personnel who, by the nature of their position and duties, frequently interact with the public, such as flag/general officers, public affairs officers, or other personnel designated as official command spokespersons. Posting such information should be coordinated with the cognizant Component FOIA or Public Affairs office. In keeping with the concerns stated in the referenced memorandum and in the October 18, 2001, DepSecDef memorandum, "Operations Security Throughout the Department of Defense," the posting of biographies and photographs of DoD personnel identified on public and .mil restricted web sites should also be more carefully scrutinized and limited. Sites needing to post contact information for the public are encouraged to use organizational designation/title and organizational/generic position e-mail addresses (e.g., office@organization.mil ; helpdesk@organization.mil ; commander@base.mil ). Questions regarding Web Site Administration policy may be directed to Ms. Linda Brown. She can be reached at (703) 695-2289 and e-mail Linda.Brown@osd.mil . Questions regarding Component-specific implementation of the DA&M memorandum should be directed to the Component FOIA office. John P. Stenbit Attachment As stated 002771 UNITED STATES v. SSG, U.S. Army HHC, 16th MP BDE (ABN), III Corps Victory Base, Iraq, APO AE 09342 28 JULY 2004 **************************************************************** UNITED STATES ) v. ) ) ) ) gill..11. ) SPC, U.S. Army )HHC, 16th MP BDE (ABN), )III Corps ) APO AE 09342 ) . 18 JUNE 2004 ***************************************************************** UNITED STATES ) ) v. ) ) ) ) SGT, U.S. Army ) HHC, 16th MP BDE (ABN), ) III Corps ) Victory Base, Iraq, ) APO AE 09342 ) 18 JUNE 2004 **************************************************************** 0 02 772 FINALLY, IT IS ORDERED that nothing in this Order shall preclude entry of a further protective order as to particular items of discovery material. Dated: August ___, 2004 Military Judge Copy to: Civilian Defense Counsel Military Defense Counsel Trial Counsel Counsel for Titan Counsel for CACI Counsel for SOSi 4 002773 UNITED STATES ) ) v. ) ) ) AMBUHL, Megan ) SPC, U.S. Army ) 16th MP BDE (ABN), ) III Corps ) Victory Base, Iraq, )APO AE 09342 ) 18 JUNE 2004 **************************************************************** ORDER In consideration of the Motions for Protective Order filed by SOS International Ltd., Titan Corporation and CACI, the supporting briefs of and the arguments of counsel, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED pursuant to R.C.M. 701(g) that the Government and Defense shall identify and mark as "particularly sensitive material" all employment records of contractors supporting the U.S. military's mission in Iraq and any documents that contain "personally identifying information" of such contractors; IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that such particularly sensitive discovery materials shall not be further disseminated by the defendant or his counsel to any individuals, organizations or other entities, other than: (i) members of the defense team (co-counsel, paralegals, investigators, translators and secretarial staff) who have received clearance from the Government, which shall not unreasonably be withheld; and (ii) experts retained to assist in the preparation of the defense, who have been cleared to receive the materials. Each of the individuals to whom disclosure is 2 0023'7'4 made pursuant to the above provision shall be provided a copy of this protective order and will be advised that he or she shall not further disseminate the materials except by the express direction of counsel of record. They shall be further advised that by reviewing the particularly sensitive discovery materials, the individuals consent to the jurisdiction of this Court over them for the purposes of enforcing this order. It is expressly ordered that the attorneys of record for the defendant may not show any of such particularly sensitive discovery materials to witnesses or potential witnesses. The defendant may seek relief from these provisions as to a particular item of discovery by making a motion for such relief to the Court upon notice to the Government, the employee whose records are at issue and his employer. The notice shall identify the particular item(s) at issue. The motion shall be made under seal. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, for the purposes of this order, "personally identifying information" includes, but is not limited to the following information: name, social security number, home address, date of birth, citizenship, telephone number, email address, security clearance (including level and date of clearance), hire date, arrival date, employment category, language proficiency, unit assignment, identity of site manager, employment status, sex, vocational and educational history, travel history, history of residences, employee number, and names and addresses of family members. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any papers to be served upon the Court by either party which include or refer to the contents of particularly sensitive materials shall be filed under seal; IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any papers to be served upon the Court in response to papers served in conformity with the preceding paragraph also be filed under seal; 3