# Table of Contents

## COVER

## CHANGE 1

## PREFACE

## Chapter 1  MILITARY POLICE OVERVIEW
- Introduction
- Military Police Functional Areas
- Threat
- Military Police Platoon Organization and Leadership
- Force Protection (FP) Measures
- Military Police Platoon Mission, Capabilities, and Limitations
- Peacetime Training

## Chapter 2  BATTLE COMMAND
- Overview
- Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP)
- Troop-Leading Procedures
- Orders and Reports
- Rules of Engagement and Rules of Interaction (ROI)
Chapter 3  SHOOT, MOVE, AND COMMUNICATE
Shoot
Move
Communicate

Chapter 4  COMBAT OPERATIONS
Prepare for Combat
Construct Fighting and Survivability Positions
Defend a Site
Patrols
Clearing Techniques

Chapter 5  MANEUVER AND MOBILITY SUPPORT
Maneuver Support
Mobility Support

Chapter 6  AREA SECURITY
Reconnaissance Operations
Area Damage Control
Base Defense
Air Base Defense
Enemy Delay
Battle Handover to a Tactical Combat Force
Critical Site, Asset, and High-Risk Personnel Security

Chapter 7  INTERNMENT AND RESETTLEMENT
Overview
Enemy Prisoners of War and Civilian Internee
United States Military Prisoner Handling (Field Detention Facilities)
Populace and Resource Control (PRC)
Dislocated Civilian Resettlement
Evacuation Operations

Chapter 8 LAW AND ORDER
Overview
Law and Order Augmentation Detachment
Company and Platoon Level Law and Order Operations
United States Customs Support
Multinational Law and Order Operations

Chapter 9 POLICE INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS
Overview
Police Information Assessment Process
Police Information Responsibilities

Appendix A METRIC CONVERSION CHART

Appendix B MEDIA RELATIONS
Overview
Media Interaction

Appendix C TRAINING EXECUTION MODEL
Overview
Task Identification

Appendix D ORDERS AND REPORTS
Orders
Reports

Appendix E  PRECOMBAT INSPECTIONS
Modified Precombat Inspection Checklist
Precombat Inspection Checklist

Appendix F  FRATRICIDE AVOIDANCE
Fratricide
Fratricide Effects
Fratricide Causes
Fratricide Risk Assessment
Preventive Measures
Friendly Fire Incidents
Leader Responsibilities

Appendix G  MK19 QUALIFICATION TABLES
Primary Gunner, MK19 Qualification and Zero/Practice Tables
Assistant Gunner, MK19 Firing Table, Mounted
MK19 Scorecard G-15

Appendix H  COUNTERMINE OPERATIONS
Overview
Detect
Report
Mark

Appendix I  ROUTE CLASSIFICATION AND SIGNING SYSTEM
Overview
Route Classification Formula
Appendix J  NUCLEAR, BIOLOGICAL, CHEMICAL DEFENSE
Overview
Hazard Detection and Reporting
Contamination Marking
Radiological Contamination Detection and Monitoring
Chemical Agent Detection
Biological Agent Detection
Self-Defense Measures
Military Police Leaders' Responsibilities
Mission-Oriented Protection Posture Levels, Alarms, and Signals
Biological Defense
Nuclear Attack Defense
Chemical Attack Defense
Symptoms and Treatment of Casualties
Unmasking Procedures

Appendix K  CIVIL-DISTURBANCE MEASURES
Overview
Civil Disturbances on Department of Defense Installations Outside the Continental United States
Crowd Behavior
Crowd Tactics
Company Level Operations
Nonlethal Munitions

Appendix L  WEAPONS AND EQUIPMENT
Friendly Vehicles
Friendly Weapons
Friendly Nonlethal Equipment and Munitions
Friendly Communication, Single-Channel, Ground-to-Air Radio System (SINCGARS)

Threat Weapons and Equipment

GLOSSARY

BIBLIOGRAPHY

AUTHENTICATION

**DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION**: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

* This publication supersedes FM 19-4, 7 May 1993.
FM 3-19.4
(Formerly FM 19-4)

MILITARY POLICE LEADERS’ HANDBOOK

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION: Approved for public release: distribution is unlimited.

DODDOA-009757
Military Police
Leaders' Handbook

1. Change FM 3-19.4, 4 March 2002 as follows:

   Remove Old Pages          Insert New Pages
   G-7 through G-12           G-7 through G-12
   G-15                       G-15

2. A star (★) marks new or changed material.

3. File this transmittal in front of the publication.

DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

By Order of the Secretary of the Army:

ERIC K. SHINSEKI
General, United States Army
Chief of Staff

Official:

JOEL B. HUDSON
Administrative Assistant to the
Secretary of the Army

FM 3-19.4
C1
2 AUGUST 2002
DISTRIBUTION: Active Army, Army National Guard, and U.S. Army Reserve: To be distributed in accordance with the initial distribution number 111047, requirements for FM 3-19.4.

This publication is available on the General Dennis J. Reimer Training And Doctrine Digital Library at www.adtdl.army.mil
Preface

This field manual (FM) addresses military police (MP) maneuver and mobility support (MMS), area security (AS), internment and resettlement (I/R), law and order (L&O), and police intelligence operations (PIO) across the full spectrum of Army operations. Although this manual includes a discussion of corps and division MP elements, it primarily focuses on the principles of platoon operations and the tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) the platoon uses to accomplish its mission.

This FM provides the capabilities and organization of the MP, demonstrates the flexibility and diversity of MP in adapting to any mission throughout the full spectrum of Army operations, and characterizes the MP as a combat-force multiplier. Additionally, this manual identifies the fact that the Army will not conduct operations alone and defines the role of the MP in support of joint, multinational, and interagency operations.

The MP TTP are organized by the MP functions of MMS, AS, I/R, LO, and PIO with supporting tasks, both individual and collective, to help illustrate the functions.

NOTE: United States (US) policy regarding the use and employment of antipersonnel land mines (APLs) outlined in this FM is subject to the convention on certain conventional weapons and executive orders (EOs). Current US policy limits the use of non-self-destructing APLs to (1) defending the US and its allies from armed aggression across the Korean demilitarized zone and (2) training personnel engaged in demining and countermine operations. The use of the M18A1 claymore in the command-detonation mode is not restricted under international law or EO.

Appendix A complies with current Army directives which state that the metric system will be incorporated into all new publications. Appendix B deals with media relations.

The proponent of this publication is Headquarters (HQ) United States Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC). Send comments and recommendations on Department of the Army (DA) Form 2028 directly to Commandant, US Army Military Police School, ATTN: ATSJ-MP-TD, 401 MANSCEN Loop, Suite 2060, Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri 65473-8926.

Unless this publication states otherwise, masculine nouns and pronouns do not refer exclusively to men.
Chapter 1

Military Police Overview

This chapter provides information about how MP are organized, equipped, and trained to provide combat support (CS) across the full spectrum of Army operations.

INTRODUCTION

1-1. As a flexible economy-of-force organization, MP provide a wide range of diverse support because of their agility and versatility to adapt to any mission or environment. As a combat multiplier, they support the maneuver commander through the five MP functions. MP contribute to the commander's overall combat power by integrating efforts with those of other combat, CS, and combat service support (CSS) elements.

1-2. In addition to single-service operations, MP also support joint, multinational, and interagency activities. MP support air base defense in concert with Air Force Security Forces, operate joint and multinational checkpoints, conduct combined police patrols, and exchange police information and criminal intelligence with the host nation (HN), military, and civilian police agencies.

1-3. MP have the capability to expedite the movement of combat resources, provide critical asset security and protection, conduct I/R, contribute to force protection efforts through L&O operations, and gather and disseminate police information and intelligence.

MILITARY POLICE FUNCTIONAL AREAS

1-4. With the old battlefield missions, the term "operations" was used extensively and carried too broad of a meaning. To clarify the specific tasks of the MP, the battlefield missions have been redefined into the following five functional areas:

- MMS
- AS
- I/R
- L&O
- PIO

1-5. Each of these MP functions have task areas and tasks that support them. MP functions are the broadest areas for which tasks are placed. Some of these tasks will require groupings that might not be related to the entire function. Therefore, task areas were created to group specific tasks. Specific tasks consist of two types—collective and individual. Individual tasks are further divided into leader and soldier tasks (Figure 1-1). The collective and individual tasks that support the MP task areas are found in the MP mission training plans (MTP) and MP soldier's manuals (SMs).
1-6. MP procedures are the lowest level of detail. They explain the "how to" at the task level. Procedures include the standing methods used by a unit to accomplish tasks, weapon and equipment operating steps, crew drills, and staff action and coordination. They are the building blocks of individual and collective task accomplishment and serve as the foundation of tactics and techniques. Procedures are explained in the unit standing operating procedures (SOPs), MTPs, SMs, and similar publications.

MANEUVER AND MOBILITY SUPPORT

1-7. The MMS function involves the measures necessary to enhance combat movement and the ability to conduct movement of friendly resources in all environments. MP conduct MMS to ensure that the commanders receive personnel, equipment, and supplies when and where they are needed. The task areas that support the function of MMS include—

- MP support for river crossings, breaching, and passage-of-line operations.
- Straggler and dislocated civilian control.
- Route reconnaissance and surveillance.
- Main supply route (MSR) regulation enforcement.

1-8. The security and viability of the operational and tactical lines of communications (LOC) will be critical to continuous sustainment and recovery operations. MP ensure that logistics and supply operations are kept on time and arrive at the right place. Refer to Chapter 5 for more information about MMS.

AREA SECURITY

1-9. The AS function consists of those security measures designed to give commanders freedom of maneuver and flexibility to conduct operations. The task areas that support AS include—

- Reconnaissance operations.
- Area damage control (ADC).
- Base and air base defense.
• Response force and tactical combat force (TCF) operations.

• Critical site, asset, and high-risk personnel security.

• Force protection and physical security.

• Antiterrorism.

1-10. MP performing AS contribute to securing and protecting the force and preserving combat power. Refer to Chapter 6 for more information about AS.

INTERNMENT AND RESETTLEMENT

1-11. The I/R function consists of those measures necessary to provide shelter, sustain, guard, protect, and account for people (enemy prisoners of war [EPWs] and civilian internees [CIs], US military prisoners, and dislocated civilians [DC]). The task areas that support I/R include—

• EPW and CI handling.

• Populace and resource control.

• US military prisoner confinement.

• DCs control.

1-12. The international community, media, and public perceptions have increased sensitivity to the protection of human rights and the need for absolute accountability of interned, detained personnel, and refugees in military operations. Refer to Chapter 7 for more information about I/R.

LAW AND ORDER

1-13. Task areas and tasks that minimize the effects of a criminal threat on friendly forces support the L&O function. MP conduct L&O to remove the conditions and opportunities that promote crime, thereby preventing diversion of military resources and maintaining military discipline. The task areas include—

• Law enforcement.

• Criminal investigations.

• US customs operations.

• Related L&O training.

1-14. Whether patrolling an installation’s housing area, conducting counterdrug operations, enhancing security, or investigating war crimes, MP L&O capabilities are invaluable to the commander. Refer to Chapter 8 for more information about L&O.
POLICE INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS

1-15. The PIO function supports, enhances, and contributes to the commander's protection program, situational awareness, and battlefield visualization by portraying relevant threat information that may affect the operational and tactical environment. The task areas that support PIO include—

- Intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB).
- Active and passive roles.
- Police assessment process.

1-16. Whether in support of peacetime installation L&O or detecting threat forces in the battle space, the MP force employment provides the commander with substantial information and an intelligence source, particularly where the criminal element is the same as or closely aligned with the opposing forces (OPFOR) and government. Refer to Chapter 9 for more information about PIO.

THREAT

1-17. Today, friendly forces encounter a broad range of traditional and nontraditional threats. No single dominating threat will be the undisputed focus of US security policy. Although overt attacks on the US and its strategic interests may be less common, stability operations and support operations will likely increase. Economic development and demographics, as well as the progression of social and cultural movements, will encompass an array of threat forces including nonnation forces (ethnic conflicts and terrorist activities) which challenge traditional nation and state environments. Additionally, nation and state forces (internal security forces and infantry-based and armor-mechanized-based armies) continue to present a global threat. These forces possess varying levels of military and advanced technology capabilities.

1-18. In recent military operations, a nontraditional criminal threat has emerged. The evolving criminal threat operates most often in the rear area, near ports, in built-up areas, and where troop populations are high. This threat is most likely to be detected at border crossings trying to disrupt the relocation efforts of DCs. They may commit crimes against particular ethnic groups or be at checkpoints and roadblocks trying to position weapons, explosives, or personnel in sustainment areas in order to disrupt military operations or kill friendly forces. Such a threat requires commanders to minimize its negative impact on friendly forces, resources, and operations. The MP continue to respond to nonmilitary threats including famine, health epidemics, illegal immigration, illegal drug traffic, and population dislocation.

MILITARY POLICE PLATOON ORGANIZATION AND LEADERSHIP

1-19. There are two basic MP platoon organizations, corps and division. Corps MP Platoons are organized and equipped basically the same. Each division MP platoon supporting a different kind of division (such as heavy, light, airborne, or air assault) is designed under a
different table(s) of organization and equipment (TOE).

CORPS MILITARY POLICE

1-20. Depending on the nature of the operation, corps MP are usually among the first forces deployed to support military operations around the world. They deploy early to areas devastated by natural or man-made disasters to assist disaster relief and damage assessment efforts. They provide security and force protection to friendly forces, critical facilities, and resources as units organize for military operations. In a developing theater, corps MP concentrate mission support to the main effort. Units whose assistance to the main effort is vital normally receive the highest priority for protection. Key facilities, such as traffic choke points, critical tunnels and bridges, and ammunition and fuel storage points may require special protection. As the theater matures, the focus may quickly change to other functions as MP adjust priorities to accommodate the change.

DIVISION MILITARY POLICE

1-21. Division MP are organized somewhat different depending on the type of division they are supporting. For example, a heavy division has one MP platoon providing direct support (DS) to each maneuver brigade and two MP platoons providing general support (GS) to the division's rear. Both airborne and air assault divisions have four MP platoons providing GS. A light infantry division is supported by three MP platoons.

1-22. In heavy divisions, where highly mobile forces are designed to move quickly over open ground, the overall need for MMS is significant. Division MP are likely to focus on expediting the forward movement of the critical combat resources into the division area. However, the priority could change quickly to removing EPWs from forward areas to freeing maneuver forces from guarding and caring for captives.

1-23. In airborne and air assault divisions, priority of MP support is most often needed for EPW operations and then for MMS to speed the movement of CS vehicles within the airhead.

1-24. For MP supporting any division, certain employment considerations remain constant. MP provide dedicated security for assets deemed critical by the division commander. This includes the division's main command post (CP) where MP operate outside the CP perimeter conducting screening missions designed to detect, disrupt, and delay enemy forces from disrupting the division's primary CP. Another consideration is MP accepting EPWs from capturing troops as far forward as possible.

SEPARATE BRIGADES

1-25. MP support to a separate brigade is normally provided by a four-squad MP platoon. The platoon is assigned to the brigade headquarters and headquarters company (HHC). The brigade has a separate provost marshal (PM) cell that serves as the command and control (C^2) element for the platoon. The brigade PM cell has operational control (OPCON) of all MP assets the same way the division PM has OPCON of the division MP assets. The brigade HHC provides sustainment support for both the PM cell and the MP platoon. The PM advises the separate brigade commander on matters pertaining to MP operations. The platoon leader directs the execution of the platoon's missions based on the priorities set.
forth by the PM and the supported commander.

1-26. The platoon can perform any of the five functions. The platoon leader may task organize the squads according to mission, enemy, troops, terrain, time available, and civilian considerations (METH-TC), and provide one squad to operate the EPW collecting point, one squad to provide a mobile security screen and occupy observation posts (OPs) around the brigade's CP, and two squads to conduct MMS and AS throughout the brigade's rear area.

INITIAL BRIGADE COMBAT TEAMS (IBCTS)

1-27. MP support to an IBCT may differ from that of other separate brigades. The IBCT is a preconfigured, ready-to-fight, combined-arms package. It is designed and optimized primarily for employment in small-scale contingencies operations (SSCO) in complex and urban terrain, confronting low-end and mid-range threats: The IBCT participates in war, with augmentation, as a subordinate maneuver component within a division or corps, in a variety of possible roles. It also participates in stability and/or support operations as an initial entry force. Civil unrest or complete turmoil normally characterizes these environments.

1-28. Organically, MP support to the IBCT is a two-person PM planning cell. The PM planning cell is located with the HHC's maneuver support cell and under the direct supervision of the brigade Operations and Training Officer (US Army) (S3). The role of the PM cell is significantly different from that of a traditional division PM or separate brigade PM. The main difference is the lack of organic or habitual MP assets in the IBCT. The absence of organic MP assets makes the job of the PM much more critical. The PM must—

- Understand the organization, capabilities, and limitations of the IBCT.
- Conduct effective liaison with higher HQ PM elements.
- Become an effective planner and anticipator of MP requirements.
- Task organize MP units effectively and efficiently.

DODDOA-009766

- Assume $C^2$ of incoming MP forces or, if operating under a division, relinquish $C^2$ to a division or corps PM (if appropriate for effective employment of MP forces).

1-29. Depending on METT-TC, the IBCT may be augmented by MP elements ranging from a platoon to a battalion. Once the brigade receives MP augmentation, the PM then becomes a staff planner and coordinator for all MP activities.

1-30. Since the IBCT is a divisional brigade, the division PM and the IBCT PM play an important role in developing an optimum MP force package to support the brigade commander's concept of the operation. Despite the brigade's early time lines, the PM must consider and plan for MP augmentation forces as early as possible to free up valuable combat resources. SSCO that result in numerous EPWs, CIs, and refugees will hamper the maneuver force's freedom of movement.

1-31. Initially, MP priority of effort during the offense may be providing MMS for ground
combat, CS, and CSS forces and taking control of EPWs and CIs. During the defense, the priority of MP support may shift to conducting AS and counterreconnaissance along the LOC, C^2 centers, and CSS bases. MP may also be required to conduct response force operations or become part of the TCF.

1-32. During stability and support operations, MP support may include—

- Order restoration.
- Crowd control.
- AS or force protection.
- DC operations.
- Noncombatant-evacuation operations.

**PLATOON LEADER**

1-33. The MP platoon leader is responsible to the company commander for the platoon's combat readiness, training, and discipline and the maintenance of its equipment. To be successful, the platoon leader must demonstrate an ability to lead soldiers and manage an organization, material, and time. He must be able to articulate the capabilities and limitations of the platoon to various non-MP staff sections. In combat, the platoon leader is responsible for accomplishing all the missions assigned to the platoon according to the commander's intent and preserving the platoon's fighting capability.

**PLATOON SERGEANT (PSG)**

1-34. The PSG leads elements of the platoon as directed by the platoon leader and assumes command of the platoon in the absence of the platoon leader. He directs the day-to-day activities of the platoon and ensures that the platoon has individual and team training and logistics needed to accomplish its mission. During tactical operations, he may assist in the control of the platoon.

**TEAM AND SQUAD LEADER**

1-35. The MP team leader is responsible to the squad leader for individual and team training and team discipline. He is responsible for the tactical employment and control of the team and the maintenance and operation of all vehicles and equipment organic to the team. During combat operations or anytime there is a threat, the team leader quickly assesses the situation, reports to his superiors, and takes appropriate action to protect the team according to the rules of engagement (ROE). A squad leader has the same responsibility for the squad as the team leader has for the team.

**FORCE PROTECTION (FP) MEASURES**

1-36. MP leaders at all levels must examine FP requirements and integrate FP measures throughout all the operations. Once higher HQ has established local FP policies, leaders set
the example by complying with them. Leaders reduce the soldiers' exposure to hazards by strictly enforcing all the protective postures that may include—

- Traveling with at least two vehicles armed with at least one automatic weapon.
- Hardening of the vehicles.
- Wearing Kevlar® and body armor.
- Not driving off the road or cross-country.
- Placing off-post facilities off limits during nonduty hours.

1-37. MP leaders analyze and compensate for other threats such as disease, weather, crime, complacency, terrorism, morale, safety, and other considerations.

1-38. At the operational level, team and squad leaders establish a safety zone around their teams. The safety zone is the immediate area around the team where threat forces or events could harm the team or inflict casualties. In open terrain, the safety zone may extend out to the maximum effective range of the team's organic-weapon systems. However, when searching vehicles at a checkpoint or conducting crowd control, the safety zone may only be an arm's length from the team.

1-39. Team and squad leaders remain alert to threats that enter the team's safety zone. They must quickly assess any threat to the team and take appropriate action within the ROE to reduce the threat or move the team.

1-40. When required to operate in crowds, maintain eye contact with team members. Establish and maintain a safe distance between the team and the crowd. Never allow the team to become separated or surrounded.

1-41. When patrolling in built-up areas, the gunner scans the upper floors of the buildings and the streets to the vehicle's front, rear, and flanks and immediately reports any suspicious activity. The driver concentrates on the area directly in front of the vehicle looking for any unexploded munitions, scatterable mines, or other road hazards. All team members should stay awake, alert, and ready to react to danger.

MILITARY POLICE PLATOON MISSION, CAPABILITIES, AND LIMITATIONS

1-42. The platoon has one critical wartime mission which is to provide MP CS to an assigned area of operations (AO). MP CS consists of all five MP functions. The platoon performs its missions primarily mounted, taking full advantage of the high mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicle's (HMMWV's) versatility and the added protection and firepower of the armor security vehicle (ASV).

CAPABILITIES
under all weather and visibility conditions. Their mode of operation is possible through the deployment and employment of the three-person team throughout the battlefield. However, it is dependent on its parent unit for sustainment support. The platoon has self-protection capabilities such as nuclear, biological, chemical (NBC) detection equipment and a Platoon Early-Warning System (PEWS). The platoon's radio transmission range is increased with an OE-254 antenna. Because of extensive police training and law enforcement missions, the MP are highly skilled in the use of force and the employment of lethal and nonlethal technologies, information-collecting and dissemination, observation and surveillance, and crowd control. The MP platoon has a tremendous combat and noncombat information-collecting capability. This capability is the result of extensive area, zone, and route reconnaissance; daily contact with local nationals; conducting combined police patrols with HN military and civilian police agencies; and conducting field interviews. An MP platoon is capable of covering 500 square kilometers in rolling terrain; however, more severe terrain such as mountains, METT-TC, and mission objectives will affect this capability. For example, consider one mobile MP team per 10 kilometers of route coverage. For area coverage, begin with an estimate of one mobile MP team per 55 square kilometers.

1-44. Unlike most combat arms platoons, which maneuver together in formation, the MP platoon most often operates independently and dispersed over a large area. The platoon conducts combat operations, when required, through the employment of mobile combat systems containing three-man teams operating independently or in concert, and having vehicle crew-served and individual weapons capable of defeating a Level II threat and defending a position against dismounted threats.

1-45. Based on METT-TC, the platoon leader may task organize the platoon for certain missions. Normally, MP are employed as squads; however, individual teams may execute many MP tasks.

LIMITATIONS

1-46. During combat operations, the platoon is not organized and equipped to fight for extended periods unless it is augmented with indirect fire or close air support (CAS). Although the MP team is a lethal and highly mobile platform, it is not structured or equipped for prolonged autonomous missions. Leaders must use the MP team as a task organizational building block and avoid over tasking based solely on the number of teams available. The platoon has limited antiarmor capability and normally uses antiarmor weapons for self-protection and to break contact.

PEACETIME TRAINING

1-47. MP units train as they will fight. Peacetime training must replicate battlefield conditions and conform to Army doctrine. Leaders and soldiers must understand standardized doctrinal principles found in applicable manuals to ensure that training is conducted to standard. The following manuals provide the basic foundation for Army training:

- FMs.
- Training circulars (TCs).

DODDOA-009769

• MTPs.
• Drill books.
• SMs.
• Army regulations (ARs)

1-48. FM 25-100, FM 25-101, and TC 25-10 provide MP leaders with established training doctrine and assist the leaders in the development and execution of the training programs. These manuals introduce the concept of lane training and define it as a technique for training company, team, and smaller units on a series of selected soldier, leader, and collective tasks using specific terrain.

1-49. Lane training uses multiechelon techniques to maximize the efficient use of limited terrain and control conditions for formal or informal evaluations. Lane training is externally supported, resourced, and evaluated. It enables similar units to simultaneously or sequentially train on mission-related scenarios. Lane training is resource intensive, so commanders must maximize its benefit. Commanders narrow the focus and select only the most critical mission-essential task lists (METLs) items or collective tasks for training. Lane training is especially valuable for conducting specific METL tasks, situational training exercises (STXs), and other training events. It is often associated with training requiring movement over terrain; for example, movement to contact or conducting a route reconnaissance. Lane training can be modified to achieve benefits in L&O scenarios, such as special-reaction team (SRT) incidents, patrol incidents, traffic accidents, and so forth.

1-50. The lane training doctrine outlined in FM 25-101 and TC 25-10 can be tailored for small MP units by using the training execution model (TEM). The TEM follows the Army doctrine and training philosophy of hands-on METL training as outlined by FMs 25-100 and 25-101. Before the TEM can be implemented, the concept of the operation must be approved, evaluated, and directed from two levels up. For example, a squad leader must receive approval through the chain of command from his company commander to execute the training event; a platoon leader gets approval from the battalion commander and so forth.

1-51. The TEM incorporates the combined-arms training methodology and adjusts it to meet the MP training requirements. The TEM focuses the unit on the time available during the training cycle to train the most critical collective and individual tasks. The TEM consists of an eight-step training methodology that is based on leader certification of the lane expert and an observer/controller (OC) as well as subordinate unit leaders. For more information about TEM refer to Appendix C.
Chapter 2

Battle Command

This chapter provides the techniques and procedures used by MP leaders at company and platoon level to C^2 their organizations.

OVERVIEW

2-1. Battle command is the art of battle decision making, leading, and motivating soldiers and organizations into action to achieve victory with the least cost to the organization. Commanders must visualize the current and future state of both friendly and enemy forces. The commander positions himself where he can guide and motivate the soldiers and influence the outcome of the missions.

2-2. The company commander is responsible for all that the unit does or fails to do. He cannot delegate this responsibility, and the final decision and responsibility rest with him. He discharges his responsibility through an established chain of command and holds each subordinate leader responsible for the actions of the platoon or the section.

2-3. The commander must be proficient in the tactical employment of the unit. He must know the capabilities and limitations of the soldiers and the equipment. A commander does this through a continuous cycle of planning, executing, and assessing training. Through this training, the commander gets to know the soldiers.

2-4. MP commanders prioritize, assign missions, and allocate resources where they can best support the higher echelon commander's intent. The company commander makes most of the tactical decisions. Technological advances in today's operational environments have reduced the time available for decision making, while increasing the possibilities that must be considered.

2-5. Thorough and sound operational planning is the key to successful combat and CS operations. Commanders must identify the opportunities and anticipate and avoid problems. They must analyze their options before making the decisions on which subordinate leaders will base their actions. Commanders balance competing risks and then identify and develop the best course of action (COA).

MILITARY DECISION-MAKING PROCESS (MDMP)

2-6. The MDMP is a single, established, and proven analytical process used at all the echelons of the commands. This is a seven-step process used when adequate planning time and enough staff support are available (Table 2-1). This process is a detailed, deliberate, sequential, and time-consuming process that helps the commander and his staff examine a battlefield situation and reach logical decisions. The commander uses the entire staff during the process to explore the full range of probable and likely enemy and friendly COAs and to analyze and compare his own organization's capabilities with the enemy's.

Table 2-1. MDMP

2-7. At company level, the commander normally uses the MDMP in a time-constrained environment without enough staff. A unit can shorten the process if it fully understands the role of each step of the process and the requirements to produce the necessary products. The application of the MDMP at company level and below is called the troop-leading procedures (TLP). Figure 2-1, page 2-4 shows the relationship between MDMP and TLP.

**Figure 2-1. Relationship Between TLP and the MDMP**

2-8. MP commanders plan successful operations by anticipating possible future events and planning contingencies. MP leaders enhance both planning and execution of the operations when they—

- Use the military planning and decision-making process.
- Develop short- and long-range goals.
- Identify goals and objectives with a recognizable end-state.
- Coordinate goals and actions internally and externally.
- Base their plans on objective planning factors.
- Review their plans, continuously, in light of the METT-TC and updated information.
- Assign responsibilities and express expectations.
- Identify the options that may develop during an operation.
- Stand ready to accommodate the changes.

MILITARY PLANNING

2-9. Commanders select and carry out the developed COAs using military planning. Military planning guidelines include—

- Forecasting requirements by analyzing and evaluating facts and trends to predict what may occur.
- Examining probable requirements and establishing priorities for further preparation.
- Studying implications and interrelationships of probable requirements.
- Analyzing the mission to determine tasks, their complexity, and their relative importance.
- Establishing guidance for further planning that will help keep all the elements focused on the commander's intent.
- Preparing studies and estimates to help formulate the COA and assess its feasibility.
- Selecting the COA, identifying the best course, and retaining other feasible courses for use in contingencies as alternate plans.
- Preparing the plan in detail and conducting rehearsals when time, resources, and security permit.

2-10. Use the following military planning guidelines to answer the three key questions of operational planning:

- What military condition must be produced to achieve the goal?
- What sequence of actions is most likely to produce that condition?
How should resources be applied to accomplish that sequence of actions?

2-11. If the plan is not implemented immediately, retain it for later use. As events occur or new information becomes available, review and revise the plan accordingly.

ANALYSIS, FORECASTING, AND RISKS

2-12. Conducting a mission analysis is crucial to planning. The process begins by gathering facts and ascertaining current conditions, such as the—

- Higher-level mission and the commander's intent (one and two levels up).
- Current task organization (two levels down).
- Current unit status (locations, operation capabilities, and activities).
- Logistics situation (refer to FM 101-5 for the logistic estimate format).

2-13. When facts are not available, the commander will need to develop assumptions. Assumptions must substitute for fact where information is not known. Keep in mind that as time passes between the receipt of a mission and the execution of a plan, facts are increasingly likely to have changed. Develop sound assumptions that can be used in place of facts.

2-14. Analyzing the higher-level mission and the commander's intent will help identify what tasks are required to accomplish the mission. As the mission is analyzed, identify both the specified and the implied tasks to be performed. Specified tasks are those stated in higher HQ orders and plans. Implied tasks (like crossing a river or passing through the lines of a unit lying between you and the objective) are not so stated, but must be accomplished to satisfy the overall operation. From among the specified and implied tasks, essential tasks that are crucial to the mission's success must be identified.

2-15. Integral to mission planning is the analysis of mission requirements in terms of time, space, and personnel. If MP are to balance the benefits of detailed planning against the need for immediate action, they must—

- Determine how much time there will be between receiving the mission and the deadline for having completed it.
- Know how long it will take to obtain and process information, make decisions, and issue orders.
- Know how long it will take subordinates to execute the orders, complete the mission, or carry out the operation.

2-16. Because each unit involved in an operation performs its planning based on the plans of the next higher level, allocation of adequate time for subordinate units to plan is a consideration at each level. Publishing SOPs reduces the number of details to be explained. It also promotes understanding and teamwork among commanders, staff, and troops.
2-17. When doing reverse planning, consider the classic allotment of one-third time for planning and two-thirds time for execution (Table 2-2). Move backward from the time of execution to—

- Allocate time to accomplish each phase of an operation.
- Determine how much time is needed to rehearse.
- Determine how much time is needed for developing the plan.

Table 2-2. Reverse Planning Timetable

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Action</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2230</td>
<td>Execute the mission.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2130-2215</td>
<td>Conduct inspection(s).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1845-2130</td>
<td>Conduct rehearsal(s).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1815-1845</td>
<td>Issue an operation order (OPORD).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1745-1815</td>
<td>Complete the plan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1715-1745</td>
<td>Conduct the leaders' reconnaissance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1630-1715</td>
<td>Issue a tentative plan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1630</td>
<td>Issue a WO.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1600</td>
<td>Receive the mission.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2-18. When using terrain analysis, consider the layout of the battlefield. Appreciate the opportunities and limitations of the major terrain features, transportation networks, and built-up areas. Fit the operational concept and planning to that environment. Use the IPB to evaluate the area in terms of the military aspects of the terrain. Consider how to exploit the opportunities afforded by weather while minimizing its adverse effects.

2-19. Use current information on the threat to identify known enemy activities and threat capabilities that could affect this and future operations. Attempt to anticipate the enemy's objectives and intentions.

2-20. Consider available assets and determine acceptable levels of risk. At every echelon, MP disperse their assets and prioritize operations to meet the echelon commander's needs within the limits of the resources at hand. MP leaders must concentrate their efforts on key locations and accept risks elsewhere. When possible, recognize and moderate such risks in the choice of operations and in the contingency planning. The five steps to identify, analyze, and reduce risks are listed in FM 100-14.
COURSE OF ACTION IDENTIFICATION, DEVELOPMENT, AND SELECTION

2-21. The commander's selected COA will become the actual plan for accomplishing the mission. To ensure the best plan possible, identify several possible COAs, each significantly different from the others. In identifying COAs, do not overlook a check of the "basics" that include the—

- Commander's intent.
- Essential tasks.
- Effective use of C^2.
- Principles of war.
- Ethical considerations.
- Relative force ratio.

2-22. Consider preparing a COA statement (and sketch, if appropriate) for each option. The COA statement is the "how" of the operation. Ensure that it includes the following five elements:

- What - the type of action.
- When - the time the action will begin.
- Where - the assigned area.
- How - the use of available assets.
- Why - the purpose of the operation.

2-23. When developing the COA, analyze the relative combat power. Consider the initial array of the forces and develop the schemes of maneuver. Determine C^2 means and maneuver control measures.

2-24. Base doctrinal capabilities and planning on historical planning factors, and then relook the estimates in light of the available assets, the factors of METT-TC, the echelon commander's intent, and the mission's priorities. For example, when planning distribution of mobile assets for route coverage, begin with an estimate of one mobile MP team per 10 kilometers. For area coverage, begin with an estimate of one mobile MP team per 55 square kilometers.

2-25. When dispersing the assets into small combat elements, consider the classic ratios of friendly to enemy forces (3 to 1) to help ensure that the elements can concentrate enough combat power to accomplish the mission. Consider the speed and ease of reassembling the elements if dispersing them to distant sites.
2-26. Attempt to anticipate the enemy's likely moves. Consider ways to obstruct dangerous approaches to the area and avenues leading away from potential landing zones. Plan ways to combine the efforts of different resources, like enhancing the combat power for the base response and counterreconnaissance operations with fire support from field artillery or aviation. Attempt to determine the outcome of the operations by—

- Conserving unit strength through economy of force.
- Using terrain, weather, deception, and operations security (OPSEC) to your advantage.
- Focusing your efforts on enemy vulnerabilities.
- Ensuring unity of effort among subordinates and with your peers.

2-27. When planning for combat operations, whenever possible, develop a COA that avoids an enemy's strength and strikes at his weaknesses. Avoid head-on encounters with an enemy's forces. Seek to gain the element of surprise. When moving, plan to use indirect approaches and flank positions that do not attract immediate attention. Plan for fire support to increase MP combat power. Plan to operate on the enemy's flanks and rear, where direct fire is most effective, psychological shock is the greatest, and the enemy is least prepared to fight. Respond to and implement changes quickly and plan supplementary or alternative control measures to modify the plan as the situation dictates.

2-28. For a combat operation, the COA statement and sketches include the following:

- Allocated forces.
- Unit boundaries.
- Axes of advance.
- Routes for a forward or rearward passage of lines.
- Air axes for the maneuver of attack helicopters.
- Other control measures which may include—
  - Phase lines.
  - Assembly and holding areas.
  - Zones or sectors.
  - Battle positions.
  - Objectives.
  - Obstacles.
2-29. Assess all of the feasible COAs after developing them. Consider constraints and restrictions on each COA. Weigh the available COA for the AO, for the level of responsibility, the commander's intent, and the mission's priorities. Decide on the best COA. For more information about the MDMP process, refer to FM 101-5.

2-30. Once the commander decides on a COA, he announces it in the form of orders that include his intent and concept of the operation. Based on these orders, the platoon leader uses TLP to organize his time during planning and preparation for the mission. Time management is the key. The platoon leader normally uses one-third of the available time to plan, prepare, and issue the order. The squad leaders have the remaining two-thirds of the time to prepare the squads for the mission. Whenever possible, TLP are integrated and accomplished concurrently rather than sequentially. Relationships between TLP and the MDMP are shown in Figure 2-1, page 2-4.

TROOP-LEADING PROCEDURES

2-31. TLP begin when the platoon leader is alerted for a mission and starts again when he receives a change or a new mission. Conducting TLP is an eight-step process (Table 2-3). Steps 3 through 8 may not follow a rigid sequence. Several of the steps may be accomplished concurrently. In CS operations, platoon leaders rarely have enough time to go through each step in detail. However, the procedure must be followed, if only in abbreviated form. This ensures that nothing is left out of the planning and the preparation.

Table 2-3. The Eight Steps of TLP

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Step</th>
<th>Action</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Receive and analyze the mission.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Issue a WO.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Make a tentative plan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Chapter 3

Shoot, Move, and Communicate

The ability of an MP unit to shoot, move, and communicate ensures its ability to detect, disrupt, and defend against the enemy and immeasurably adds to its survivability and maneuverability. MP are structured to be strategically, operationally, and tactically agile to respond to the increased range of worldwide MP requirements.

SHOOT

3-1. It is important that MP understand their shooting capabilities and limitations. Just as important is the understanding of firing techniques and associated fire distribution, reacting to air and armor attacks, calling for fire, and obtaining various fire support.

UNDERSTAND FIRE TECHNIQUES

3-2. Fire techniques include fire from or at a moving vehicle, fire distribution and control, and suppressive fire.

Fire From or at a Moving Vehicle

3-3. The key to forward maneuver is firing on the enemy. When maneuvering, the fire element—

- Attempts to destroy or suppress the enemy.
- Covers and protects the maneuver element as it advances.
- Moves, when possible, into its firing position undetected. Fire from an unexpected direction has a greater effect than fire from a known position.

3-4. Firing on the move is less accurate than firing from a halt. However, to halt and fire takes more time and is more dangerous. A stationary vehicle is more likely to be hit than a moving vehicle. The team leader must decide whether to fire while moving or to fire from a short halt. He bases his decision on sound judgment and evaluation of the threat.

3-5. Crew-served weapons engage all targets on the move with free gunfire. To deliver this type of fire, the gunner removes the traversing and elevating (T&E) mechanism from the bottom of the receiver, allowing the gun to move freely in any direction. Accurate firing with crew-served weapons while moving is affected by—

- The terrain.
- The vehicle's speed.
- The team's proficiency.
3-6. When aiming from a moving vehicle or at a moving vehicle, or both, the gunner must lead the target. The speed of the firing vehicle, the time of flight, and the angle of engagement affect the amount of lead required. The time of flight is the required time it takes the projectile to move from the firing vehicle to the target. The angle of engagement is the angle found between the centerline of the vehicle and the gun when laid on the target. When a round is fired from the flank of a moving vehicle, the round drifts in the same direction and at the same speed as the vehicle. The longer the flight time and the larger the engagement angle, the greater the drift. Thus, the gunner must apply more lead to the shot. If a lead is required and the gunner is traversing left to keep on target, the gunner must lead left. If the gunner is traversing right to keep on the target, the gunner must lead right. This is true whether the firing vehicle is moving, the target is moving, or both are moving. Table 3-1 shows the responsibilities of an MP team when firing on the move.

Table 3-1. Team Responsibilities When Firing While Moving

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Actions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Team leader | • Directs the driver.  
• Keeps the gunner oriented.  
• Senses the impact of the rounds-long, short, left, or right of the target.  
• Identifies additional targets.  
• Assists the gunner with reloading, if required.  
• Observes the surrounding terrain. |
| Gunner | • Develops a feel for the moving vehicle.  
• Tracks the position of the target with the MK19 grenade machine gun (GMG) despite the movement of the vehicle.  
• Remains alert to the sounds of the engine and transmission. These sounds indicate the type of terrain over which the vehicle is traveling and helps the gunner anticipate vehicle movements. |
| Driver | • Tries to maintain a steady gun platform while the gunner engages the targets.  
• Attempts to time the gear and direction changes so they occur immediately after firing and do not interfere with accuracy.  
• Informs the gunner of obstacles in the vehicle's |
path that might affect the gun's accuracy.

- Announces "depression," "turn," and the like to warn the gunner of vehicle movements.
- Announces, "steady" to let the gunner know when the vehicle is once again on a stable platform. The gunner assumes he has a stable platform unless the driver informs him otherwise.

Distribute Fire

3-7. MP leaders must distribute the fires of their organic weapons to destroy or suppress enemy positions. The following are the two methods to distribute fire on a target:

- Point fire. Point fire (Figure 3-1) is directed against one target (such as a machine gun position) with all the troops firing at the same target. Spreading out the base-of-fire element makes this type of fire particularly effective because the fire is directed from many sources.

- Area fire. Area fire (Figure 3-1) permits rapid cover of an entire area with fire from the left to the right and in depth, even if the enemy cannot be seen. This method is used without command and is the quickest and most effective way to bring all parts of
a target under fire. Each member in the element is assigned a portion of the target. Fire is placed on likely locations for enemy positions rather than in a general area. If the leader wants fire on a wood line, he may shoot tracers to mark the center of the target. Soldiers to the left of the leader fire to the left of the tracers and soldiers to his right fire to the right of the tracers.

3-8. A rifleman fires his first shot on the part of the target that corresponds to his individual position. If he is left of the leader, he fires to the left of the leader's tracers. He then distributes his remaining shots over the part of the target extending a few meters right and left of his first shot. He covers the part of the target that he can hit without changing position.

3-9. A grenadier fires into the center of the target area of his team. He then distributes his shots over the remaining target area from the center to each side and from front to rear. A machine gunner covers part of the target depending on his position and how much of the target is in range. When possible, he covers the entire target of the team. When placing automatic suppressive fire on the enemy, the tendency is to shoot high. Therefore, he places the first bursts low and works up to the target. The squad leader tells the machine gunners where to shoot by assigning sectors of fire.

3-10. An MK 19 gunner engages area targets with traversing and searching fire after the leader designates the width and depth of the target. If one MK 19 GMG is being fired, the gunner engages the area target by adjusting his fire on the center of the mass, then traverses and searches to either flank. When he reaches the flank, he reverses direction and traverses and searches in the opposite direction. If two MK 19 GMGs are being fired as a pair, the point of the initial lay and adjustment for both guns is on the midpoint of the target. After adjusting the fire on the center of the mass, fire is distributed by applying direction and elevation changes that give the most effective coverage of the target area. Usually, the right gun (number 1) fires on the right half, and the left gun (number 2) fires on the left half. Appendix G describes the MK 19 qualification and familiarization tables and provides a sample scorecard.

Control Fire

3-11. Fire control is an essential component of fire distribution. A platoon leader must know what means he will direct the fire element to use when engaging the targets. He will communicate directly or use prearranged signals to identify the location of the target to the other units. He may use sound signals (such as voice, a horn, or a whistle), but must remember that they are only good for short distances and that their reliability and range are reduced by battle noise, weather, terrain, and vegetation. Use a radio to direct the base-of-fire element or adjust fires from reference points or landmarks, because a radio offers immediate voice communication. For example, he may say, "From the burning scout vehicle, northwest 50 meters, machine gun position." If portable radio equipment is not available, he uses prearranged visual signals, such as smoke or flares. A smoke round from a grenade launcher, unless it is being used for some other purpose, and a smoke canister can be used as a signal. Use these items during reduced visibility in addition to aiming stakes, illumination, night-vision devices, infrared chemical lights, and so forth.

Use Fire Commands
3-12. Leaders use fire commands to direct fire. A fire command has the following six parts:

- **Alert.** The leader alerts the soldiers to receive further instruction. He alerts the soldiers by name or unit designation, some type of visual or sound signal, personal contact, or any other practical way.

- **Direction.** The leader tells the soldiers the general direction to the target. In some cases, he pinpoints a target. The following are the three ways the leader can give the direction to the target:
  - Points with his armor rifle.
  - Fires tracer ammunition at a target.
  - Uses either target reference points (TRPs) or easily recognized man-made objects or terrain features. He gives the general direction just before giving the reference points.

- **Description.** The leader describes the target briefly but accurately and always gives the formation of the enemy soldiers.

- **Range.** The leader tells the soldiers the range to the target in meters.

- **Method of fire.** The leader tells the soldiers which weapons to fire, the type and amount of ammunition to fire, and the rate of fire.

- **Command to fire.** The leader tells the soldiers when to fire by using an oral command or visual signal. When he wants to control the exact moment of fire, he says, "At my command" (then pauses until ready to commence firing). When he wants to start firing on completion of the fire command, he just says, "Fire."

**Use Subsequent Fire Commands**

3-13. These commands adjust or change information given in the initial fire command. Only the elements that change are given.

**Terminate Fire**

3-14. Fire is terminated by the command or signal for cease fire, end of mission.

**Suppress Fires**

3-15. When the fire element is in position, it lays a heavy volume of fire on the enemy to suppress them. When the leader senses that the enemy is suppressed, he instructs the fire element to reduce its rate of fire as long as it keeps the enemy suppressed. As the movement element nears its objective, the fire element increases the rate of fire to keep the enemy down. This lets the movement element close enough to assault the enemy before the enemy can react. When the assault begins, or on a signal, the fire element stops firing, shifts its fire to another target, or walks its fire across the objective in front of the movement element, and then shifts or ceases fire.
3-16. Positions for fire elements are located so that movement of the maneuver element does not mask their fires. Fire element positions are often higher and usually to the flank of the maneuver element. The maneuver element neither masks the fire of the fire element nor moves outside the protective umbrella provided by the fire. A platoon or squad can point fire at one target or an area of several targets. In both cases, the leader must control the fire. He must ensure that the fire is directed on the enemy, not on the maneuver element.

Use Nonlethal Weapons (NLW)

3-17. The Department of Defense (DOD) defines NLW as weapons that are explicitly designed and primarily employed to incapacitate personnel or material while minimizing fatalities, permanent injury to personnel, and undesired damage to property and the environment. Unlike conventional weapons that destroy the targets principally through blast, penetration, and fragmentation, NLW employ means other than gross physical destruction to prevent the target from functioning.

3-18. NLW doctrine and concepts of operation are designed to reinforce deterrence and expand the range of options available to commanders. They enhance the capability of US forces to accomplish the following objectives:

- Discourage, delay, or prevent hostile actions.
- Limit escalation.
- Take military action in situations where use of lethal force is not the preferred option.
- Protect US forces.
- Disable equipment, facilities, and personnel temporarily.

NOTE: The zero probability of producing fatalities or permanent injuries is not a requirement of NLW. However, while complete avoidance of these effects is not guaranteed or expected, when properly employed, NLW significantly reduce them as compared with physically destroying the same target.

3-19. When drafting the ROE, it must be clearly articulated and understood that the role of NLW is an additional means of employing force for the particular purpose of limiting the probability of death or serious injury to noncombatants or belligerents. However, the use of deadly force must always remain an inherent right of individuals in instances when they, their fellow soldiers, or personnel in their charge are threatened with death or serious bodily harm. NLW add flexibility to the control of disturbances within the I/R facility and provide an environment where guard forces can permissively engage threatening targets (Figure 3-2) with limited risk of noncombatant casualties and collateral damage. Refer to FM 90-40.
3-20. The use of lethal force, employed under the standing ROE, will never be denied. At no time will forces be deployed without the ability to defend themselves against a lethal threat, nor will they forego normal training, arming, and equipping for combat. Nonlethal options are a complement to, not a replacement for, lethal force and seek to expand a proactive response across the range of military operations. Refer to FM 90-40.

3-21. The decision to use NLW against an adversary during a confrontation is delegated to the lowest possible level, preferably to the platoon or the squad. However, this requires that all personnel, not just the leaders, have a clear understanding of the ROE and the commander's intent. Refer to FM 90-40.

3-22. Commanders and public affairs officers must be prepared to address media questions and concerns regarding the use and role of NLW, and they must make it clear that the presence of NLW in no way indicates abandoning the option to employ deadly force in appropriate circumstances.

3-23. **Advantages of Employing Nonlethal Weapons.** NLW provide the commander with the flexibility to influence the situation favorably with reduced risk of noncombatant fatalities and collateral damage.

3-24. NLW can be more humane, b
Chapter 4

Combat Operations

This chapter provides the MP leader with the information needed to successfully complete a combat mission. When MP platoons conduct the tasks addressed in this chapter, they will mirror the actions of the company.

PREPARE FOR COMBAT

4-1. Units that are not directly engaged in combat often find it necessary to travel in order to position themselves for combat operations. During these movements, the battalion supports the company and the company supports and monitors the platoons with the movement plan. The move's success depends on the unit's discipline and ability to execute the plan. (Refer to Appendix E for precombat inspection checklists.)

MAINTAIN AND MOVE A COMBAT LOAD

4-2. Combat load is the quantity of supplies, in all classes, that the company must have on hand to sustain operations for a prescribed number of days. The company must be capable of moving the combat load, using organic transportation assets, into combat in a single delivery. To save time, the company combat loads vehicles while the quartering party readies the new site. The combat load ensures that a unit is ready for combat even when it is on the move.

4-3. The principles of combat loading are standard. All equipment, ammunition, and gear are loaded on the vehicles in a logical order and put in predesignated places. Knowing the location of each item allows for quick retrieval during the move. Combat loading also lends to a fast set up at the new site. Like the basic load, the company's combat load is mission-dependent. No single load plan can satisfy all the situations. MP leaders must consider the following:

- METT-TC.
- Vehicle and trailer capacities.
- Weight limits of the unit's vehicles and trailers, being careful not to overload them.
- Whether or not the equipment will fit (cube out). For equipment data, see the applicable technical manual (TM).

4-4. Unit SOPs have load plans tailored for various mission activities. Having a choice of load plans for various deployments reduces the load time. Load plans and diagrams are modified to suit METT-TC and vehicle and trailer capacities. The modifications are shown on the load diagram in the vehicle. HMMWVs may be loaded in many configurations, which include—

- Loading the basic equipment in the mounted standard brackets on the vehicle.
• Modifying and moving the brackets to meet mission or unit requirements.

PLAN A TACTICAL ROAD MARCH

4-5. The basic considerations in planning any road march are the METT-TC factors (especially the enemy situation and the mission); the march order; and the type, number, and characteristics of vehicles available for the movement. A company conducts a tactical road march for relocating and facilitating rapid movement of the vehicles with a prescribed speed and interval between the vehicles. When preparing for a tactical road march, the company uses the following planning sequence when time permits:

• Prepare and issue the WO as early as possible to allow maximum time for preparation.

• Prepare an estimate of the situation, specifying the organization of the march column.

• Organize and dispatch reconnaissance and quartering parties.

• Prepare detailed movement plans based on the organization of the march column and a review of the available reconnaissance information.

• Use the reconnaissance information to—
  - Choose sites for halts and RPs.
  - Spot problem areas along the route.
  - Select bypasses or alternate routes.

• Select fairly secure locations for halts.

• Choose areas that provide cover and concealment.

• Avoid choosing highly populated areas, curves in the road, or other hard-to-secure areas.

• Plan the timing so that the unit arrives at the SP just before it is scheduled to cross it. The time a unit must cross the SP is provided to the unit. As other units may be planning to use the route, each unit must cross the SP on time.

• Prepare and issue the march order.

• Prepare the overlays and issue them to the vehicle commanders and subordinate leaders. The road march overlay includes, at a minimum, the location of the SP, RP, scheduled halts, and checkpoints at critical points along the route.

COORDINATE AND DIRECT THE MARCH

4-6. The chain of command controls the column. The march leader—
- Coordinates the road march through the chain of command with the local movement control unit.

- Determines if the convoy needs a movement credit or a clearance to use the given route. If so, the march leader submits a Department of Defense (DD) Form 1265 through the appropriate movement control center.

- Informs higher HQ and the supported units of the dates and times that the operations will stop at the old site and begin at the new site.

- Tasks subordinate leaders to attend a briefing to discuss unit readiness and load plans and forecast support requirements.

- Submits requests for support based on the forecast developed during the briefing. Requests may include fire support, refueling, vehicle recovery operations, and other support needed to complete the march.

- Issues an OPORD for the movement.

- Requests HQ personnel to prepare a movement table. Refer to Appendix E of FM 55-10 for detailed information on the movement tables.

- Requires unit personnel to analyze the route reconnaissance information looking for likely enemy ambush sites.

- Ensures that a strip map, which may be included as an annex to the OPORD, is prepared. The strip map shows SPs; RPs; route numbers; place names; critical points; directional arrows; distances between the points; scheduled halt locations; and petroleum, oils, and lubricants (POL) refill points. Give copies to the unit drivers.

- Ensures that the drivers and assistant drivers are briefed.

- Ensures that radio communication is kept to a minimum during movement.

- Tasks subordinates to ensure that the road march plan is followed.

- Ensures that safety briefings are conducted and understood.

CONDUCT THE MARCH

4-7. The commander sets the conditions under which military traffic moves at night. The march leader ensures that personnel are aware of and abide by the set lighting conditions when the company moves at night. Conditions that are more restrictive may be imposed contingent on the threat environment (such as air raids). Lighting conditions may include normal lighting, reduced lighting, or blackout. If the situation warrants, travel by total blackout (use of night-vision goggles [NVGs]) may be prescribed. More often, travel is under partial blackout, using only enough light to see the road and to be seen by other road users. Minimal lighting reduces visibility from the air while it permits drivers to—

- Travel as quickly and safely as possible.
• Apply brakes in time.
• See the side of the road.

Movement Techniques

4-8. During a tactical road march, the unit leaders (such as the march leader and the platoon sergeant) travel in separate vehicles. This decreases the chance of a unit’s primary leaders being lost in one enemy action. The convoy moves en route by close or open column march or by infiltration. In dusty conditions, space the vehicles so that the dust from one vehicle does not blind the driver of the next.

4-9. Close Column. In a close column, the elements are close together. Use a close column for marches during limited visibility, blackout conditions, and radio silence. Under these conditions, space the vehicles so that the driver can see the two lights in the blackout marker of the vehicle ahead. Visibility determines the set distance between the vehicles. A close column—

• Reduces the time it takes for the column to pass points on the route.
• Requires fewer guides, escorts, and markers for control than an open column does.
• Enhances movement through congested areas or over poorly marked routes.

4-10. Open Column. In an open column, elements are widely spaced as a passive defense measure. Generally, an open column is used during daylight, but may be used at night with infrared lights, blackout lights, or night-vision equipment. A distance of 50 to 100 meters or more may be designated between vehicles depending on METT-TC. Use an open column—

• When enemy contact is likely.
• To enhance security.
• Over dusty roads. Reducing dust is especially important when moving through areas contaminated by radioactive fallout.

4-11. Infiltration. Infiltration is the best passive defense against enemy observation and attack, although it may be difficult to control. To move by infiltration, vehicles are dispatched one at a time or in small groups at irregular intervals to keep traffic density low and to prevent undue massing of vehicles. Use infiltration—

• When time and road space allow.
• When maximum security, deception, and dispersion are needed.
• To maintain security during the march. When the unit approaches likely danger areas (such as bridges and tunnels), have one or more teams dismount. The teams check both sides of the road before the vehicles pass. This is critical when only a map reconnaissance was conducted before the move.
Movement Considerations

4-12. Consider events and control measures that are used during the move in order for the tactical road march to be successful. These measures include the SP and RP, checkpoints, restrictions, speed control, halts, disabled vehicles, and mined areas.

4-13. Start Point. A SP gives the vehicles of a march column a common point for starting their movement. When vehicles use more than one route, each route has an SP. The SP is a recognizable place along the route of march (such as a road intersection). It should not be in a defile, on a hill, or at a sharp curve in the road that could cause movement to slow. Ensure that the SP is far enough away from the AAs to allow the vehicles to be organized and move at the prescribed speed when they reach it. Elements of the company reconnoiters the route to the SP to determine the times needed for the serial to arrive at and clear the SP before starting the march.

4-14. Release Point. A RP provides all the vehicles of the march column with a common point for reverting to the commander’s control. It is a point on the march route that is easy to recognize on the map and on the ground. Guides meet the vehicles as they arrive at the RP and lead them to their new positions, usually in an AA. Multiple routes and cross-country movement from the RP to the assembly areas allow vehicles to disperse rapidly. When leaders select a RP, avoid hills, defiles, and sharp curves that may cause elements to slow or stop on the route. Ensure that vehicles are not required to countermarch or pass through another element to reach their new position.

4-15. Checkpoints. Use checkpoints on a route for reference when providing instructions and identifying places where interference with movement might occur or timing may be critical.

4-16. Restrictions. Restrictions are points along the march route where the movement may be limited or obstructed during certain time periods (such as bridges, intersections, ferries, or bypasses). The march planner—

- Starts the move early enough to pass such a point before a restr...
Chapter 4

Combat Operations

This chapter provides the MP leader with the information needed to successfully complete a combat mission. When MP platoons conduct the tasks addressed in this chapter, they will mirror the actions of the company.

PREPARE FOR COMBAT

4-1. Units that are not directly engaged in combat often find it necessary to travel in order to position themselves for combat operations. During these movements, the battalion supports the company and the company supports and monitors the platoons with the movement plan. The move's success depends on the unit's discipline and ability to execute the plan. (Refer to Appendix E for precombat inspection checklists.)

MAINTAIN AND MOVE A COMBAT LOAD

4-2. Combat load is the quantity of supplies, in all classes, that the company must have on hand to sustain operations for a prescribed number of days. The company must be capable of moving the combat load, using organic transportation assets, into combat in a single delivery. To save time, the company combat loads vehicles while the quartering party readies the new site. The combat load ensures that a unit is ready for combat even when it is on the move.

4-3. The principles of combat loading are standard. All equipment, ammunition, and gear are loaded on the vehicles in a logical order and put in predesignated places. Knowing the location of each item allows for quick retrieval during the move. Combat loading also lends to a fast set up at the new site. Like the basic load, the company's combat load is mission-dependent. No single load plan can satisfy all the situations. MP leaders must consider the following:

- METT-TC.
- Vehicle and trailer capacities.
- Weight limits of the unit's vehicles and trailers, being careful not to overload them.
- Whether or not the equipment will fit (cube out). For equipment data, see the applicable technical manual (TM).

4-4. Unit SOPs has load plans tailored for various mission activities. Having a choice of load plans for various deployments reduces the load time. Load plans and diagrams are modified to suit METT-TC and vehicle and trailer capacities. The modifications are shown on the load diagram in the vehicle. HMMWVs may be loaded in many configurations, which include—

- Loading the basic equipment in the mounted standard brackets on the vehicle.
- Modifying and moving the brackets to meet mission or unit requirements.

PLAN A TACTICAL ROAD MARCH

4-5. The basic considerations in planning any road march are the METT-TC factors (especially the enemy situation and the mission), the march order, and the type, number, and characteristics of vehicles available for the movement. A company conducts a tactical road march for relocating and facilitating rapid movement of the vehicles with a prescribed speed and interval between the vehicles. When preparing for a tactical road march, the company uses the following planning sequence when time permits:

- Prepare and issue the WO as early as possible to allow maximum time for preparation.
- Prepare an estimate of the situation, specifying the organization of the march column.
- Organize and dispatch reconnaissance and quartering parties.
- Prepare detailed movement plans based on the organization of the march column and a review of the available reconnaissance information.
- Use the reconnaissance information to—
  - Choose sites for halts and RPs.
  - Spot problem areas along the route.
  - Select bypasses or alternate routes.
- Select fairly secure locations for halts.
- Choose areas that provide cover and concealment.
- Avoid choosing highly populated areas, curves in the road, or other hard-to-secure areas.
- Plan the timing so that the unit arrives at the SP just before it is scheduled to cross it. The time a unit must cross the SP is provided to the unit. As other units may be planning to use the route, each unit must cross the SP on time.
- Prepare and issue the march order.
- Prepare the overlays and issue them to the vehicle commanders and subordinate leaders. The road march overlay includes, at a minimum, the location of the SP, RP, scheduled halts, and checkpoints at critical points along the route.

COORDINATE AND DIRECT THE MARCH

4-6. The chain of command controls the column. The march leader—
• Coordinates the road march through the chain of command with the local movement control unit.

• Determines if the convoy needs a movement credit or a clearance to use the given route. If so, the march leader submits a Department of Defense (DD) Form 1265 through the appropriate movement control center.

• Informs higher HQ and the supported units of the dates and times that the operations will stop at the old site and begin at the new site.

• Tasks subordinate leaders to attend a briefing to discuss unit readiness and load plans and forecast support requirements.

• Submits requests for support based on the forecast developed during the briefing. Requests may include fire support, refueling, vehicle recovery operations, and other support needed to complete the march.

• Issues an OPORD for the movement.

• Requests HQ personnel to prepare a movement table. Refer to Appendix E of FM 55-10 for detailed information on the movement tables.

• Requires unit personnel to analyze the route reconnaissance information looking for likely enemy ambush sites.

• Ensures that a strip map, which may be included as an annex to the OPORD, is prepared. The strip map shows SPs; RPs; route numbers; place names; critical points; directional arrows; distances between the points; scheduled halt locations; and petroleum, oils, and lubricants (POL) refill points. Give copies to the unit drivers.

• Ensures that the drivers and assistant drivers are briefed.

• Ensures that radio communication is kept to a minimum during movement.

• Tasks subordinates to ensure that the road march plan is followed.

• Ensures that safety briefings are conducted and understood.

CONDUCT THE MARCH

4-7. The commander sets the conditions under which military traffic moves at night. The march leader ensures that personnel are aware of and abide by the set lighting conditions when the company moves at night. Conditions that are more restrictive may be imposed contingent on the threat environment (such as air raids). Lighting conditions may include normal lighting, reduced lighting, or blackout. If the situation warrants, travel by total blackout (use of night-vision goggles [NVGs]) may be prescribed. More often, travel is under partial blackout, using only enough light to see the road and to be seen by other road users. Minimal lighting reduces visibility from the air while it permits drivers to—

• Travel as quickly and safely as possible.

- Apply brakes in time.
- See the side of the road.

**Movement Techniques**

4-8. During a tactical road march, the unit leaders (such as the march leader and the platoon sergeant) travel in separate vehicles. This decreases the chance of a unit's primary leaders being lost in one enemy action. The convoy moves en route by close or open column march or by infiltration. In dusty conditions, space the vehicles so that the dust from one vehicle does not blind the driver of the next.

4-9. Close Column. In a close column, the elements are close together. Use a close column for marches during limited visibility, blackout conditions, and radio silence. Under these conditions, space the vehicles so that the driver can see the two lights in the blackout marker of the vehicle ahead. Visibility determines the set distance between the vehicles. A close column—

- Reduces the time it takes for the column to pass points on the route.
- Requires fewer guides, escorts, and markers for control than an open column does.
- Enhances movement through congested areas or over poorly marked routes.

4-10. Open Column. In an open column, elements are widely spaced as a passive defense measure. Generally, an open column is used during daylight, but may be used at night with infrared lights, blackout lights, or night-vision equipment. A distance of 50 to 100 meters or more may be designated between vehicles depending on METT-TC. Use an open column—

- When enemy contact is likely.
- To enhance security.
- Over dusty roads. Reducing dust is especially important when moving through areas contaminated by radioactive fallout.

4-11. Infiltration. Infiltration is the best passive defense against enemy observation and attack, although it may be difficult to control. To move by infiltration, vehicles are dispatched one at a time or in small groups at irregular intervals to keep traffic density low and to prevent undue massing of vehicles. Use infiltration—

- When time and road space allow.
- When maximum security, deception, and dispersion are needed.
- To maintain security during the march. When the unit approaches likely danger areas (such as bridges and tunnels), have one or more teams dismount. The teams check both sides of the road before the vehicles pass. This is critical when only a map reconnaissance was conducted before the move.
Movement Considerations

4-12. Consider events and control measures that are used during the move in order for the tactical road march to be successful. These measures include the SP and RP, checkpoints, restrictions, speed control, halts, disabled vehicles, and mined areas.

4-13. Start Point. A SP gives the vehicles of a march column a common point for starting their movement. When vehicles use more than one route, each route has an SP. The SP is a recognizable place along the route of march (such as a road intersection). It should not be in a defile, on a hill, or at a sharp curve in the road that could cause movement to slow. Ensure that the SP is far enough away from the AAs to allow the vehicles to be organized and move at the prescribed speed when they reach it. Elements of the company reconnoiters the route to the SP to determine the times needed for the serial to arrive at and clear the SP before starting the march.

4-14. Release Point. A RP provides all the vehicles of the march column with a common point for reverting to the commander's control. It is a point on the march route that is easy to recognize on the map and on the ground. Guides meet the vehicles as they arrive at the RP and lead them to their new positions, usually in an AA. Multiple routes and cross-country movement from the RP to the assembly areas allow vehicles to disperse rapidly. When leaders select a RP, avoid hills, defiles, and sharp curves that may cause elements to slow or stop on the route. Ensure that vehicles are not required to countermarch or pass through another element to reach their new position.

4-15. Checkpoints. Use checkpoints on a route for reference when providing instructions and identifying places where interference with movement might occur or timing may be critical.

4-16. Restrictions. Restrictions are points along the march route where the movement may be limited or obstructed during certain time periods (such as bridges, intersections, ferries, or bypasses). The marcn planner—

- Starts the move early enough to pass such a point before a restriction begins.
- Delays the start of the move to pass a restriction after it has ended.
- Plans to halt the column along the route until the restriction is lifted.

4-17. Speed Control. Vehicles in a column of any length may simultaneously encounter different types of routes and obstacles. This causes sections of the column to move at different speeds at the same time, producing an undesirable accordion or whip effect. The movement order specifies the march speed, march rate, and the maximum safe catch-up speed to reduce column whipping. The lead vehicle must not exceed the authorized maximum speed of the slowest vehicle in the column. To minimize vehicle congestion on the nearside of an obstacle, vehicle commanders and drivers must be alert and maintain the prescribed minimum following distance. Vehicles should make only gradual speed changes while maintaining their prescribed interval. Vehicle commanders must constantly be aware of the vehicle interval to their front and rear and adjust their speed accordingly.

4-18. Halts. Halts are conducted for various reasons. They—
- Allow following traffic to pass.
- Provide time for rest, mess activities, and personal comfort and relief.
- Permit refueling and maintenance of vehicles.
- Provide for maintenance and inspection of equipment.
- Allot time for adjustments in the schedule.

4-19. The time and duration of the halts are usually specified in the movement order or prescribed in the unit SOP. The SOP prescribes actions to take during halts. A short rest halt of 15 minutes is usually taken after the first hour of marching. A 10-minute short halt is taken every 2 hours thereafter. The prescribed march rate includes the time required for short halts. When possible, march elements using the same route should stop at the same time. Route characteristics may make it necessary to halt at a particular point on the route rather than simultaneously at a fixed time.

4-20. Long halts are planned in advance. The length of the halt is added to the total travel time. Locations for long halts are normally selected to allow all the vehicles to clear the road and permit proper dispersion. The unit commander schedules halts for refueling in advance.

4-21. The herringbone formation is used to provide security for the march column during temporary halts. During temporary halts, the MP teams move their vehicles to alternate sides on or off the road in a herringbone pattern that lets vehicles pass down the center of the column. Movement commanders give permission for execution of unscheduled halts. The first priority at any halt is local security. OPs are established and sectors of fire are assigned to each vehicle. These actions should be automatic and part of the unit SOP.

4-22. Disabled Vehicles. Disabled vehicles must not obstruct traffic. Their crews must move them off the road and report their status immediately to the PSG. Crews must immediately signal the follow-on vehicles to bypass and continue movement. They then establish security and post guides to direct traffic. If possible, crews repair their vehicles and rejoin the rear of the column just ahead of the trail element. Vehicles that have dropped from the column return to their positions only when the column has halted. The trail party recovers vehicles that cannot be repaired by their crews.

4-23. Mined Areas. When a company encounters mined areas, it must remember that the safety of the unit is the most important factor. It bypasses mined areas whenever possible, but considers how the delay will affect the outcome of the mission. Remember to—

- Be cautious. Mines may be used to force an element to take an alternate route into an ambush site.
- Screen the bypass route, if possible, before diverting an element.

NOTE: Refer to Appendix H for countermine operations.

DODDOA-009796

4-24. Ensure that all efforts are made to bypass mined areas; however, if the element must
cross a mined area when engineer assets are not available to breach the minefield, act quickly and cautiously. Mined areas, like other obstacles, are often covered by enemy fire. Before crossing—

- Detonate mines from a protected position.
- Detonate mine trip wires by rigging an object near the trip wire to fall on the wire.
- Use a hand grenade or direct fire to detonate mines.
- Detonate pressure-sensitive mines by rigging an A-frame over the mine and placing a heavy object, attached to a rope, over the mine. Take cover and allow the object to fall on the mine.
- Devise other methods to detonate the detected mines.
- Send a report to the next higher command when mines have been neutralized. Refer FM 20-32 and FM 21-75 for information on mines and countering mines.

ESTABLISH A NEW OPERATIONAL SITE

4-25. MP elements most often will collocate as part of an established base or base cluster. On occasion, MP may need to set up a base of their own. To set up at a new location, whether as part of an established base or base cluster or separately as a company or a platoon base, you must—

- Reconnoiter new sites.
- Pick the most favorable site and its alternate. Choose a site that—
  - Is easily accessible.
  - Can accommodate all the unit's vehicles and equipment.
  - Has a firm, well-drained surface.
  - Has some natural cover and concealment.
  - Is relatively easy to defend.
- Prepare and secure the site.
- Complete the move and establish communication.
- Establish local security to sustain survivability.

USE A QUARTERING PARTY

4-26. A quartering party is needed whenever a unit relocates. The quartering party's mission
is to—

- Reconnoiter the area for enemy presence, booby traps, NBC contamination, and other hazards.
- Establish the dismount point and perimeter security.
- Establish communication.
- Identify the company CP.
- Designate vehicle locations.
- Position guides at the RP to meet the main party.
- Prepare the area for occupation and assist the units with occupation.

4-27. The platoon leader or PSG designates vehicles and personnel from the platoon that will be part of a battalion or company quartering party. The entire platoon may serve as the battalion or company quartering party.

4-28. While the unit loads for deployment, the quartering party moves to and readies the new site. The quartering party's job ends when the last vehicle in the main body arrives at the new site. The size of a quartering party is based on the tactical situation and the amount of work required to prepare the site for occupancy. A quartering party for platoon relocation would be smaller than that of a company. A company quartering party is likely to have personnel from the unit's HQ, each platoon, the maintenance and dining sections, and communications.

4-29. The quartering party leader ensures that the equipment and supplies are available to clear, secure, and set up the new site. A quartering party may need—

- NBC detecting and monitoring equipment.
- Mine detectors.
- Saws or axes to clear the wooded areas.
- White engineer tape.
- Portable route signing material.

4-30. The quartering party leader assigns tasks to the teams based on the size of the quartering party, the work to be done, and METT-TC. He ensures that each team has the equipment needed to complete its tasks (refer to FM 7-10) and that they are at the proper mission-oriented protection posture (MOPP) level if they are operating in an NBC environment.
4-31. At march halts, quartering party teams set up local security. If the vehicles can leave the road, the teams form a 360-degree perimeter around the convoy. If the vehicles cannot leave the road, they are parked at an angle so alternate vehicles face opposite sides of the road. Each team is assigned a sector to observe, with sectors overlapping between the vehicles. Each team member has a specific area of responsibility. The troops remain alert and ready to take action on contact with the enemy. All personnel watch for enemy aircraft.

Site Arrival

4-32. When the quartering party arrives at the site, it clears and then secures the site. One or more teams, after dismounting their vehicles, search the area for mines, booby traps, items of intelligence value, or other signs of enemy presence.

4-33. If nuclear weapons have been used, at least one team using radiation detection, indication, and computation (RADIAC) meters monitors the site for radioactive contaminants. Monitoring for chemical and biological agents must be continuous because it is difficult to detect their first dispersal.

4-34. In urban areas, team members clear buildings that will be used by the unit. Team members clear the structures outside the perimeter if there is a possibility of enemy presence. The priority of buildings to be cleared and the number of teams needed are based on METT-TC. Refer to FM 90-10-1.

4-35. When the area is cleared, one or more teams perform the following functions:

- Set up the OPs and the LPs.
- Set up defensive positions on likely enemy avenues of approach. These positions provide early warning and limited protection during the occupation of the new site.
- Prepare the new site for the main body's arrival.

Company Move

4-36. When setting up a company site, the quartering party—

- Chooses a tentative location for the company CP.
- Sets up the company CP where it can best control the company, be well defended, and have LOC to the subelements.
- Uses buildings (in an urban area) to conceal the CP.
- Considers cover and concealment when choosing the CP location.
- Makes use of natural cover and concealment when possible.
- Uses camouflage screens and man-made cover and concealment where needed.
- Sets up the wire communication net. Marks those areas where other unit elements will
be positioned, using signs or materials that cannot be easily seen by the enemy.

- Picks roads and trails that permit an easy flow of traffic.

- Chooses alternate exits and marks them for use as emergency exits.

- Designates parking areas for the heaviest, most awkward vehicles, such as 5-ton trucks.

- Selects a troop area and—
  
  ■ Marks the areas where latrines, garbage dumps, and tents will go.
  
  ■ Uses ground guides for vehicle movement in areas where troops are sleeping. (For safety, unit personnel should sleep only in the troop area).
  
  ■ Chooses a structure (in an urban area) that protects the troops from natural elements and has adequate latrine facilities.

- Locates the following:
  
  ■ The food service section inside the perimeter, well away from interior roads to keep dust from contaminating the food. Locate the serving line to take advantage of cover and concealment. In urban areas, select a building for service and meal activities.
  
  ■ The latrines away from the bivouac area. Place latrines at least 30 meters down slope from wells or other water sources, and at least 100 meters from the dining facility, downwind and down slope, if possible. In urban areas, use existing latrines if they can serve at least 8 percent of the unit at one time.
  
  ■ The maintenance section where vehicles can arrive easily from the main road through the site. Ensure that vehicles are able to enter the maintenance tent at one end and exit at the other. Use existing garages for maintenance operations in urban areas.
  
  ■ The supply section to meet space, roadway access, and drainage needs. In urban areas, use warehouse-type buildings for supply operations.
  
  ■ The tactical communication section where it has space enough to support the whole operation. Usually it collocates with the maintenance section or the operations section.

4-37. When the main body arrives, the quartering party—

- Maintains security as the main body moves into the site.

- Maintains noise and light discipline.

- Ensures that the vehicles rapidly clear the approach route while maintaining vehicle
intervals.

- Dismounts all personnel except drivers at the dismount point.
- Briefs the leader of the main body on the situation and the operational status.

4-38. The leader of the main body informs the higher HQ that the move has been completed. He reports the location coordinates for both the CP and the alternate CP by messenger or other secure means. The leader ensures that the entire party prepares fighting positions and other defensive measures.

**Platoon Relocation**

4-39. A quartering party, in advance of the platoon's relocation, has the same considerations scaled to size and need, as one in advance of a company. An MP platoon may collocate with a company HQ or an existing base. However, more often, a platoon's base must be set up where a platoon HQ can best—

- **C^2** its squads.
- Communicate easily with its squads and higher HQ.
- Link squads, the company CP, and the supported unit.

4-40. The platoon HQ can operate from a static base or vehicles. If the platoon elements are going to operate in one location (as they would for an EPW holding area), the platoon leader sets up a static platoon HQ base. If the platoon elements must operate dispersed over a large area, the platoon leader must remain mobile. In such cases, a platoon leader could elect to set up a temporary platoon base as a rally point to report, resupply, and reorganize the platoon's resources.

4-41. The platoon bases are set up the same. The PSG selects a site that offers good cover and concealment. The site must be defendable and allow the HQ vehicle to be located near the tent. A small tent houses the platoon's HQ. Use a radio set control group to relay remote communication into the tent. An antenna increases the transmission distance and is located based on OPSEC principles. Wire communication is limited to the platoons that can hook into an existing wire net.

**CONDUCT MILITARY POLICE BASE SELF-DEFENSE**

4-42. When collocated with a base or a base cluster, the platoon is integrated into that base's or base cluster's self-defense planning and operations. Although bases and base clusters are more prevalent at corps and echelon above corps (EAC), the same principle applies to MP located at the division or brigade support areas. When an MP base is set up on its own, the base is responsible for its own security and protection.

**Collocated**

4-43. An MP platoon collocates with a base or a base cluster for logistical support and a means to conduct operations. When collocated, the platoon leader coordinates with the base
defense operations center (BDOC) and the base cluster operations center (BCOC) to integrate the platoon's efforts with the base's and base cluster's efforts. The platoon's portion of the base's or base cluster's defense is to help provide early warning of the threat by area security and/or maneuver and mobility support in the area near the base or the base cluster. Because MP resources are austere, the platoon only shares sector efforts on the base's perimeter. MP are used as static posts (such as gates) only under extreme conditions. An MP platoon may be tasked to serve or augment the base cluster's response force. Before the platoon leader accepts this tasking, he consults with the company commander to—

- Ensure that the company commander knows that he may have one less platoon if he is tasked for the TCF or response force for the battalion.
- Allow the company commander to advise the base commander that the MP platoon could serve as a response force to the base if it is not committed.

4-44. Each base has a BDOC that plans, coordinates, and supervises base defense operations. The BDOC initiates contingency planning that enables the base to—

- Increase the manning posture of the base contingent on the threat.
- Detect and defeat the threat within their capabilities.
- Hold against heavier enemy forces until response forces arrive.
- Maintain control of the fight within the base.
- Support the fire and movement of the response force operating outside the base.

4-45. Each base cluster has a BCOC to monitor base defense plans and establish the base cluster reaction force. The BCOC—

- Provides C^2 of the resources for planning, coordinating, and supervising the base cluster's defense.
- Coordinates base defense operations.
- Maintains communication with bases within the cluster as well as MP, BDOCs, and the sustainment area operations center. A great deal of intelligence is provided to a BDOC and BCOC through the rear operations net, which helps in planning the defense.

4-46. The platoon's plans for the interface of MP support into the base's self-defense plans address—

- Cover and concealment of personnel and equipment.
- Signal security.
- Reliable and redundant communication systems at all guard locations (such as land lines, radio links to the BDOC, and telephone hookups to the center switch).
- Deception.
- Contingency planning.
- Improvement of base defense positions.
- Assistance of the area MP.
- Coordination with the BCOC or rear-area operation center (RAOC), as required.
- OPs/ LPs.
- Noise and light discipline.
- Immediate reaction to enemy threat or attack.
- Rehearsals of defense measures.

4-47. All plans and overlays depicting MP support are forwarded to the BCOC. There they are consolidated and forwarded to the RAOC. (If a base is not part of a base cluster, the base forwards all the plans and overlays directly to the RAOC.)

Separate Setup

4-48. Set up an MP platoon separately only when there is no other alternative. This is the least desirable means for a platoon to set up. When the platoon sets up as a base separately, it must be able to defend against a wide range of enemy activity. It integrates the defense of its base (including indirect-fire systems, air defense artillery, and tactical aircraft) with the defense efforts of other bases in the sustainment area. Engineers, dismounted troops, armored vehicles, and helicopters contribute to the overall security of the bases. Bases coordinate and synchronize their defense efforts to enhance their strengths and reduce their vulnerabilities. A base's defense priorities include—

- Establishing initial base security.
- Positioning crew-served weapons and troops on assigned sectors of fire.
- Clearing fields of fire and preparing range cards.
- Preparing fighting positions.
- Installing communication.
- Emplacing obstacles and mines.
- Improving primary fighting positions to include overhead cover.
- Preparing alternate and supplementary positions.
- Stockpiling ammunition, food, and water.
• Preparing routes and trenches between positions.

• Developing a counterattack plan.

4-49. Using the IPB process can help the platoon predict threats to base security. Platoons must be aware of the enemy's location, organization, direction of movement, and strength. In the same regard, platoons must have effective OPSEC to deny similar friendly information to the enemy. Platoons can continually improve base defenses by considering what avenues of approach and methods of attack the enemy could use, given the vulnerabilities of the platoon's base. The base defense plan must have overlays depicting weapons positions, sectors of fire, final protective fires, and reaction force contingencies. Plans are updated as often as possible.

4-50. The base's reaction force efforts are coordinated with the designated-area response force. Platoon leaders develop detailed employment plans and exchange as much information as possible with the response force and TCF commander before they are needed. Although the base's reaction force usually would not fight beyond the perimeter of the base, the reaction force must be ready to assist the response force or TCF when it arrives. The following should be considered:

• Command relationships before, during, and after linkup.

• Coordination of fire support before, during, and after linkup.

• Recognition signals and communication procedures to be employed.

• Follow-on operations required.

• Area damage control.

Setup in a Hide Position (Temporary Defensive Position)

4-51. If the platoon steps down from sustained continuous operations and cannot return to its base or base cluster, it may need to operate briefly from a temporary defensive position. When used properly, a temporary defensive position can enable the platoon to rest, recover, repair damaged equipment, and plan for future operations. It offers concealment with little chance of detection by the enemy. Platoons want to get the best security they can while tasking a minimum of soldiers to provide security. When the platoon leader decides to operate from a temporary defensive position, he notifies the company HQ.

4-52. Locate the position in or near the area of normal operations so that sustained operations can be resumed immediately, on order. METT-TC should be a primary concern. Easily defendable positions are preferred over those that are more difficult to defend. Ensure that the position has more than one exit route and provides communication with the next higher HQ that are enhanced or at least not interfered with by terrain. While built-up, urban areas afford suitable concealment for temporary defensive positions, it is essential that the capability to communicate be assessed before the selection of such a site. Other considerations of a temporary defensive position include—

• Keeping vehicles secure and available in a nearby location.
- Positioning vehicles so that key equipment can be moved or removed without displacement of the entire unit.

- Concealing equipment from the sides and overhead. This prevents detection from aerial observers and some side-looking airborne radar.

- Covering and concealing to reduce security and/or defense requirements.

- Providing enough space between vehicles to allow a vehicle to bypass another vehicle that is inoperable.

- Ensuring that the platoon follows signal security and uses noise and light discipline.

- Setting up fighting positions if the situation calls for them.

SET UP LOCAL SECURITY

4-53. Self-defense planning and coordination is done as soon as the base is set up. Prior planning and mission analysis are essential elements of a base defense. MP must be able to defend the site even before occupation is complete. When an MP element is located as part of an established base, it helps defend a portion of the larger unit's perimeter. Elements that set up separately usually defend their sites by deploying in a 360-degree perimeter. The techniques and principles of defense are the same for defending a separate squad, platoon, company, or base. To plan a perimeter defense, evaluate the situation. Analyze the terrain in terms of observation and fields of fire, cover and concealment, obstacles, key terrain, and avenues of approach (OCOKA). Defenses are placed where the threat is greatest.

4-54. The platoon leader establishes the CP and the OP. He locates the CP and the OP where he can best see and control the platoon. If this is not possible, he locates it where it can cover the most likely avenue of enemy approach. An alternate CP and OP, operated by the PSG, is placed where it can control the portion of the perimeter that cannot be seen or controlled by the main CP and OP. The platoon leader then decides what other security measures and means of communication to use.

4-55. Platoon leaders must plan more than cover and concealment to counteract threat infrared, radar, thermal, and other sensors. The platoon leader uses the principles of camouflage and counters the recognition factors that make an object stand out from its background by—

- Locating soldiers, equipment, or structures where they are least discernible. This alone can reduce or eliminate many recognition factors.

- Using any mix of hiding, blending, disrupting, or disguising that conceals visibility.

- Maintaining camouflage discipline continuously.

4-56. When the number of soldiers that will defend a 360-degree perimeter is small, the platoon leader must—

- Vary the size of the defensive sectors.
• Identify alternate fighting positions.
• Retain flexibility of thinking.
• Decide what equipment—
  ■ Is needed to set up a perimeter defense.
  ■ Should stay in the vehicles.
  ■ Must be requisitioned or picked up later.

4-57. The equipment to improve defensive positions includes concertina wire, sandbags and tape (for cover and concealment), trip flares, pyrotechnic devices, mines, or PEWS, and other lethal and nonlethal technologies.

4-58. Platoons must be able to defend during day or night, in reduced visibility, and in a variety of weather conditions. The platoon leader or sergeant ensures that the platoon has the equipment it needs to defend under these conditions. The platoon must know how and when to use the equipment. During reduced visibility—

• Take steps to keep the enemy from observing or surprising the platoon.
• Require OPs and LPs. There should be at least one OP and one LP per squad. OPs and LPs report the enemy's advance and call for illumination and supporting fire. As in a daylight defense, MP manning OPs and LPs withdraw before they become engaged in close combat.
• Use patrols, illumination, PEWSs, and NVDs to help detect the enemy's advance.
• Use trip flares to provide warning and give some illumination. As a rule, do not fire until the targets are visible.
• Use camouflage, movement control, and light and noise discipline.
• Limit radio traffic to essential information.
• Ensure strict fire control to keep from disclosing the fighting positions.
• Ensure that gunners with crew-served and antiarmor weapons use NVDs.
• Provide illumination by using handheld flares or grenade launchers with illuminating rounds. Added light may be provided by fire support.
• Ensure that platoon leaders plan the use of messengers, visual signals, personal contact, or whistles to communicate with the squad leaders. Squad leaders plan to communicate with their team leaders and teams using personal contact or sound and visual signals.
CONSTRUCT FIGHTING AND SURVIVABILITY POSITIONS

4-59. Fighting positions help protect soldiers and their equipment from the enemy and from the enemy's small-arms fire and fragmentation weapons, while allowing soldiers full weapon system engagement. A fighting position provides cover and concealment from which to engage or defend against the enemy. See FM 7-8 for individual fighting position construction.

4-60. Fighting positions do not protect against the destructiveness of artillery and other area weapons. Nevertheless, a dug-in fighting position may be the key to survivability. Digging in cannot remove a soldier's vulnerability by itself. It does reduce exposure to the enemy's acquisition, targeting, and engagement systems. Platoons must be able to construct their survivability positions, often without engineer assistance.

4-61. Locate fighting positions for crew-served weapons where gunners can stop dismounted attacks. The sectors of fire must cover infantry avenues of approach and provide the most grazing fire across the platoon or squad front. Overlap the sectors of fire with each other and those of adjacent squads. Prepare fighting positions so that their primary sectors of fire have the guns firing across the front of the unit. Prepare secondary sectors of fire so that the guns fire to the front.

4-62. Usually, one MP team occupies an M249 or MK19 fighting position. One member is the gunner, one is the assistant gunner, and one is the ammunition bearer or rifleman. Each gunner has a primary and a secondary sector of fire. The gunner fires in the secondary sector only on order or when there are no targets in the primary sector. Each gunner uses aiming stakes to set his weapon for a final protective line (FPL) or a principal direction of fire (PDF) within the primary sector. The FPL and PDF are control measures to help defend a position. In an attack, the gunner knows the primary areas. He engages the greatest threat and, on the order of the platoon leader or PSG, fires the FPL.

PREPARE SECTOR SKETCHES

4-63. After the crew-served weapons are in position, the squad leader positions the remaining MP to protect the gunners and to cover areas not covered by the gunner's. Using the range cards, the squad leader makes a squad sector sketch. He includes a rough sketch of the terrain around the weapon (Figure 4-1). The squad sector sketches are used to plan defense and to control fire. Squad sector sketches show the following:

- The main terrain features in each sector of fire and the ranges to the features.
- Each primary fighting position.
- The primary and secondary sectors of fire for each position.
- MK19 and M249 FPL or PDF.
- The type of weapon at each position.
4-64. The squad leader checks the range cards and the squad sector sketch for gaps or other flaws in the fire plan. He adjusts the weapons or the sectors as necessary. If the squad leader finds dead space, he takes steps to cover it with mines, grenade-launcher fire, or indirect fire. He then prepares two copies of the squad sector sketch. He keeps one copy and forwards the other copy to the platoon leader who makes a platoon sector sketch (Figure 4-2). The platoon sector sketch shows the following:

- Squad sectors of fire.
- The crew-served and antiairrmor weapons positions and sectors of fire, including FPL or PDF for the crew-served weapons and target reference points for the antiairrmor weapons.
- Positions of the mines and the obstacles.
- Indirect fire planned in the platoon's sector of fire.
- The OP and LPs and patrol routes (if any).
- The platoon CP and OP.
The platoon leader coordinates with the nearby units. He usually coordinates from left to right and from front to rear. The fires of units within the perimeter must be closely coordinated with the platoon's defensive fire plan. Squad leaders coordinate their fire plans with adjacent squads. All positions and units near the platoon are mutually supporting. The platoon leader makes sure gaps between the units are covered by fire, observation, patrols, OPs and LPs, or sensors. The units exchange information on:

- The location of dead space between the elements and how to cover it.
- The locations of primary, alternate, and supplementary positions and sectors of fire for automatic weapons, antiarmor weapons, and subordinate elements.
- The locations of the OPs and LPs.
- The locations and types of obstacles and how they are covered by fire.
- Any patrols to be conducted, giving their size, type, times of departure and return, and routes.

PREPARE RANGE CARDS

The FPL for the M249 is the line where an enemy assault is to be checked by interlocking fire from all weapons. Use the M249 on the FPL for grazing fire no more than 1 meter above the ground, about hip high, across the front of the element. Use the MK19 or M203 to cover the dead space. To figure the dead space on the FPL, the gunner watches a person walking down the FPL and marks spaces that cannot be grazed. The gunner records all the dead space data on the range card (Figure 4-3). He prepares at least two copies of the range card, keeping one card at the position and giving one copy to the squad leader. Fire on a gunner's FPL is its final protective fire (FPF). FPF is usually used as a last resort to stop
an enemy assault. All weapons fire on command, continuously, until the call to stop FPF is given.

Figure 4-3. Standard Range Card

4-67. When terrain prevents the use of an FPL, the gunner uses a PDF instead. He directs his fire toward the most threatening avenue of approach that leads to his position. His weapon is positioned to fire directly on this approach rather than across the squad's front.

4-68. Construct fighting positions for the MK19 like M249 fighting positions. However, be aware that it takes added effort to keep the M3 tripod from moving because of the recoil of the MK19. If gunners are using the M249 machine gun, they should use the tripod when firing at an angle and the bipod when firing to the front. When gunners change their fires from the oblique to the front, they must move the machine gun, but leave the tripod in place. If gunners are using the MK19, they position the tripod toward the primary sector of fire. However, because there is no bipod for the MK19, gunners must be prepared to adjust
both the weapon and the tripod to the secondary sector, if required. After a crew is positioned and is assigned an FPL or a PDF, the team—

- Marks the tripod's position and the limits of their sectors of fire with aiming stakes.
- Outlines the hole.
- Digs the firing platform first. This lessens their exposure if they have to shoot before the position is completely constructed. Dig the firing platform at a level that allows the gun to traverse the sectors of fire.
- Lowers the gun to reduce the gunner's profile. This also reduces the height of the frontal cover needed.
- Digs the hole deep enough to protect itself and still allow the gunner to shoot in comfort (usually about armpit deep).
- Places the dirt where frontal cover is needed.
- Uses the rest of the dirt to build the flank and rear cover when the frontal cover is high enough and thick enough. Sandbags, wire, hatchets, or saws can be useful for building overhead cover or improving the fighting positions.

4-69. The ammunition bearer digs a one-man fighting position to the flank. He positions himself where he can see and shoot to the front and the oblique. Usually the ammunition bearer is on the same side as the FPL or the PDF. From there he can see and shoot into the machine gun's secondary sector. He can also see the gunner and the assistant gunner. The ammunition bearer connects his position to the machine gun position by a crawl trench. This allows him to provide ammunition or replace one of the gunners.

SELECT FIGHTING POSITIONS IN BUILT-UP AREAS

4-70. Planning a defense of a platoon on urban terrain is similar to planning a defense in the countryside. Defensive positions must cover likely enemy avenues of approach, be mutually supporting, and provide cover and concealment. Use AT weapons on mounted avenues of approach. Machine guns cover dismounted approaches. AT4s and M203 grenade launchers work well in built-up areas. They are likely to hit enemy armored vehicles on the top or the side where armor is thin:

4-71. The method of defense (such as in-depth or linear) in the two areas is based on the same considerations. Use obstacles to canalize the enemy into kill zones or to deny key terrain. Orders must be very specific. Due to limited resources, use obstacles to channel, divert, or impede movement.

Position Locations

4-72. Select defensive positions in urban areas based on METT-TC. Often a squad occupies a building, but larger buildings may be defended by a platoon. Select buildings that—

- Are well built. Concrete and steel construction is preferred.
- Have strong floors to keep the structure from collapsing under the weight of debris.

- Have thick walls and floors so that the enemy cannot shoot through roofs and walls to kill defenders.

- Are constructed of nonflammable material. Avoid wood. Strong, fireproof construction provides protection from a nuclear attack as well as conventional firepower.

- Have few glass windows (or break and remove the glass).

- Provide good fields of fire. Buildings located next to vacant lots, alleys, and parks allow better fields of fire than buildings located next to other buildings.

- Allow mutual support between the buildings. No building should be subject to attack without troops in another building being able to provide supporting fire.

4-73. Locate positions so as not to establish a pattern. Avoid obvious firing locations like church steeples (remember the elements of OCOKA) by—

- Placing MK19s in the building where they can cover assigned sectors of fire and FPL.

- Having the squad automatic riflemen and grenadiers cover enemy approach routes to the building.

- Placing most rifle positions at or near ground level to have overhead protection and provide grazing fire on approaches.

- Positioning some MK19 gunners higher to get a longer range. In addition, they can fire into areas that would be dead space for ground-level weapons.

- Positioning AT4s (remember the back blast) so that they can fire down on tracked infantry fighting vehicles and wheeled scout reconnaissance vehicles.

**Building Improvement**

4-74. Change the outside of the building as little as possible, but inside the building—

- Improve the fighting positions to provide overhead and frontal cover. Use firing ports to avoid enemy observation.

- Cut or blow holes between rooms and floors so the soldiers can move quickly by a covered and concealed route to other firing positions in the building.

- Seal off unused basements to prevent enemy entry.

- Barricade doors, halls, and stairs and take down fire escapes to keep the enemy out of the building.

- Reinforce positions with sandbags, solid debris, beds, furniture, and so forth.
- Screen or block windows and other openings. This keeps the enemy from seeing which windows are manned and throwing hand grenades into the building. When firing from the windows or holes in the walls, be sure the muzzle of your weapon does not protrude beyond the wall. This conceals the muzzle flash.

- Remove combustible materials to limit the danger of fire.

- Turn off electricity and gas.

- Stockpile water and dirt to fight fires.

- Wear armored vests, earplugs, and goggles for protection from dust and debris.

Other Considerations

4-75. Operating in urban terrain can be challenging, so consider the following:

- The employment of weapons is different (shorter ranges).

- The position locations are different, such as LAWs and AT4s go on the upper floors of the buildings (refer to FM 23-25 for the safety considerations).

- The target acquisition is more difficult (such as, aiming stakes and layered fires are used extensively).

- The CSS will center more on stockpiling materials in positions rather than on traditional resupply methods.

- Controlling indirect fire is more difficult.

- Primary communication must be by messenger, wire, or visual signs rather than radio.

- Avenues of approach are more canalized.

- The three dimensions of the enemy (aboveground, ground level, or below ground) may be in use. The enemy can easily isolate subordinate units.

- Civilians and fire hazards may be present.

ESTABLISH AND OPERATE AN OBSERVATION POST/LISTENING POST

4-76. OPs/LPs are selected locations from which to look and listen for enemy activity within an assigned area of observation. The OPs/LPs, the primary means of maintaining surveillance of an assigned avenue or a named area of interest (NAI), are positions from which MP observe the enemy and direct and adjust indirect fires against him. From the OPs/LPs, MP send SALUTE reports (Figure 4-4) to the commander when observing enemy activity. Use OPs/LPs for the following:

- On key terrain when the surveillance of a specific area is required.
To prevent the enemy from a surprise attack on other friendly forces.

- As an early warning security measure in a defensive perimeter.
- For the monitoring of likely enemy avenues of approach, drop zones (DZ), and landing zones (LZ).

Figure 4-4. Salute Report

4-77. OPs/LPs can be performed either mounted or dismounted. A dismounted OP provides maximum stealth and has the greatest likelihood of remaining undetected by the enemy. The disadvantage of the dismounted OP is the time it takes to remount and move if necessary. If rapid movement or displacement is anticipated, the OP mounts or remains mounted.

4-78. A mounted OP/LP offers the advantages of rapid movement and protection because the enemy can easily detect them; however, it is potentially much less effective than a dismounted OP/LP.

SELECT OBSERVATION POST/LISTENING POST SITES

4-79. The platoon leader selects the general location for the platoon's OP/LP after analyzing METT-TC factors. From his analysis, he determines how many OPs and LPs to establish. He decides where they must be positioned to allow long-range observation along the avenues of approach assigned by his commander and to provide depth through the sector.
Section and squad leaders select the exact positions for each OP/LP on the ground. The OP/LP must have the following characteristics:

- Covered and concealed routes to and from the OP/LP. Ensure that MP can enter and leave their OP/LP without being seen by the enemy.

- Unobstructed observation of the assigned area or sector. Ideally, the fields of observation of adjacent OPs/LPs overlap to ensure full coverage of the sector.

- Covered and concealed positions that are effective. MP select positions with cover and concealment to reduce their vulnerability on the battlefield. MP may need to pass up a position with favorable observation capability, but with no cover and concealment, to select a position that affords better survivability.

- Located where they will not attract attention. Do not locate OPs/LPs in such locations as a water tower, an isolated grove of trees, or a lone building or tree; these positions draw enemy attention and may be used as enemy artillery TRPs.

- Located where they are not silhouetted. Avoid hilltops and position OPs/LPs further down the slope of the hill or on the side, provided there are covered and concealed routes into and out of the position.

**MAN THE OBSERVATION POST/LISTENING POST**

4-80. Ideally, an MP team should man an OP/LP to maintain team integrity. Position OPs/LPs down the slope or on a flank of a hill, if there are covered withdrawal routes. Each of the OP's/LP's fields of observation overlap those of adjacent OPs/LPs. MP may have to selectively clear fields of observation. Ensure that MP are not seen when entering and leaving an OP/LP. Equip OP/LP teams to observe the area, report information, protect themselves, and call for and adjust indirect fire. OPs/LPs on a defensive perimeter need secure communications. Use of field phones or secured radios are usually best. However, messengers can be used. OPs/LPs may use portable radios to supplement wire communication. One MP observes the area while a second MP provides local security and records and reports information. The third MP rests or provides backup security. The team members switch jobs every 20 to 30 minutes because the observer's effectiveness decreases quickly after that time. The observer needs—

- A map of the area.

- A compass.

- Communication equipment (wire and radio).

- Observation devices, such as binoculars, observation telescope, and NVDs.

- An SOI extract.

- The report formats contained in the SOP.

- A radio (this may be the only means of communication from a remote site like a DZ.)
or an LZ).

POSITION OBSERVATION AND LISTENING POSTS

4-81. Place OPs/LPs either in a linear configuration or in-depth. Linear placement (Figure 4-5) allows the platoon to observe the assigned sector from several OP/LP sites, reducing the chance of the enemy entering the sector without being observed. This method works well when the platoon has been assigned a large sector with few avenues of approach or is in desert-type terrain. In-depth OP/LP placement (Figure 4-6) allows the platoon to observe the entire sector by placing OP/LP sites where the platoon can observe the most likely avenues of approach in the sector as well as along the sector flanks. This method works well when the platoon is assigned a sector with several avenues of approach or is in heavily wooded terrain. In-depth placement allows for redundancy in observation and better sector coverage.

Figure 4-5. Linear OP/LP Placement

Figure 4-6. In-Depth OP/LP Placement
4-82. OP/LP team emplacement at night depends on METT-TC factors. The platoon leader places OPs/LPs close to the perimeter and within direct fire range of the defensive perimeter for protection. The team leader designates a specific location and primary direction of fire for the crew-served weapon. The OP/LP team builds a hasty-fighting position or a prepared-fighting position depending on METT-TC. The team leader designates a covered and concealed location behind OPs/LPs for the vehicle. The OP/LP team has a covered and concealed withdrawal route to the vehicle from the fighting position. The team camouflages the OP/LP and their vehicle while the gunner clears a field of fire and prepares a range card. The squad leader establishes communication with higher HQ and tells the team when and how to report. He tells them—

- If and when they should fire at the enemy.
- How to get back to the squad if they must withdraw.
- What reentry signals to use.
- When they will be replaced, if known.
- To fight or withdraw according to his instructions.
- To be careful not to be drawn away by a small enemy element while the main element attempts to penetrate the perimeter.
- When to pull back or under what conditions they can withdraw without his order.

4-83. The frequency of relief for the OP/LP team depends on the team's physical condition and morale, the weather, the number of troops available, and the next operation. The squad leader carefully plans how each soldier receives rest. When OP/LP team is part of a defensive perimeter, it—

- Ensures that it has rearward cover.
- Builds fighting positions for protection and concealment.
- Uses trip flares, noisemaking devices, and NVDs to detect the enemy.
- Emplaces claymore mines for added protection.
- Coordinates with the perimeter on the reentry procedures to the perimeter from the withdrawal route.

**DEFEND A SITE**

4-84. Vigilance is the watchword for local security. When the OPs/LPs detect enemy elements, they notify their superior who calls for indirect fire, if it is available. When the enemy's advance threatens the OP/LP, order the OP/LP to withdraw. As the enemy approaches platoon positions, have the platoon increase its volume of fire. The platoon leader determines if the platoon can destroy the enemy from its assigned positions. If the
platoon leader determines that the platoon can destroy the enemy, the platoon continues to fight with the following actions:

- The platoon leader or the FO continues to call for indirect fire as the enemy approaches. The platoon normally begins engaging the enemy at the maximum effective range. It attempts to mass fire and initiate them at the same time to achieve surprise. Long-range fire should disrupt enemy formations, channelize the enemy toward engagement areas, prevent or severely limit the enemy's ability to observe the location of friendly positions, and destroy the enemy as it attempts to breach tactical obstacles.

- The leaders control fire using standard commands, pyrotechnics, and other prearranged signals. The platoon increases the intensity of fire as the enemy closes within range of additional weapons. Squad leaders work to achieve a sustained rate of fire from their positions by having buddy teams fire their weapons so that both are not reloading them at the same time.

- The platoon and squad leaders consider the following when controlling and distributing fires:
  - The enemy's range.
  - The priority of the targets (what to fire at, when to fire, and why).
  - The nearest or most dangerous targets.
  - Shifts to concentrate fires on their own or as directed by higher HQ.
  - The ability of the platoon to engage dismounted enemy with grazing fires, and flank shots against enemy vehicles.

- The platoon leader initiates FPF as the enemy closes on the platoon's perimeter. The following actions occur at the same time:
  - The automatic weapons fire along interlocking PDF or FPLs. Other weapons fire at designated PDF. The M203 grenade launchers engage enemy in dead space or against enemy attempts to breach the protective wire.
  - The platoon continues the fight with claymore mines and hand grenades.
  - The platoon leader requests indirect FPF in support of his positions, if applicable.
  - The platoon continues to defend until the enemy is repelled or until the platoon is ordered to disengage.

4-85. If the platoon leader determines that the platoon can not destroy the enemy, he—

- Reports the situation to the company commander.
Repositions the platoon to—

- Continue fires into the platoon sector (engagement area).
- Shift to alternate or supplementary positions.
- Reinforce other parts of the company.
- Counterattack locally to retake lost fighting positions.
- Withdraw from an untenable position using fire and movement to break contact. (The platoon leader should not move his platoon out of position if it will destroy the integrity of the company's defense.)

NOTE: In any movement out of a defensive position, the platoon must employ all direct and indirect fire means available to suppress the enemy long enough for the platoon to move.

4-86. The platoon reorganizes after it has completed the initial battle with the enemy or relocated. The platoon positions key weapons, reestablishes security, provides first aid and prepares wounded soldiers for evacuation, and redistributes ammunition and supplies. The platoon relocates selected weapons to alternate positions if the leaders believe that the enemy may have pinpointed them during the attack and adjusts other positions to maintain mutual support. The platoon also reestablishes communication. It reoccupies and repairs positions and prepares for renewed enemy attack. The platoon repairs damaged obstacles and replaces mines and booby traps. When the platoon reorganizes, it performs the following actions:

- The squad and section leaders provide ammunition, casualty, and equipment (ACE) reports to the PSG. Team leaders provide fuel status. The PSG consolidates the ACE reports, reviews the consolidated ACE report with the platoon leader, and forwards it to the company commander.

- The platoon leader reestablishes the platoon's chain of command.

- The PSG coordinates for resupply and supervises the execution of the casualty and EPW evacuation plan.

- The platoon continues to improve positions. The platoon quickly reestablishes the OP/LP resumes patrolling as directed.

4-87. If the enemy gets through the FPF, repel it by close combat. If the perimeter is penetrated, move teams to block the penetration and cover friendly troops moving to alternate or supplementary positions. Even though the counterattack capability is limited, try to restore the perimeter. When the enemy is repelled—

- Reestablish security.

- Send patrols forward to maintain contact.
- Call for indirect fire on areas where the enemy is likely to regroup.
- Reorganize squads.
- Evacuate seriously wounded MP.
- Redistribute and resupply ammunition.
- Repair positions and continue to improve them.
- Keep the next higher commander informed throughout the conduct of the defense.

**LAY HASTY PROTECTIVE MINEFIELDS**

4-88. When possible, lay a hasty protective minefield as part of the unit's defensive perimeter. It can stop, delay, or restrict movement. MP often lay mines to restrict enemy movement near a defensive perimeter or at ambush sites. In the defense, platoons and squads lay hasty protective minefields to supplement weapons, prevent surprise, and give early warning of enemy advance. Hasty minefields must be covered by fire. Ensure that adjacent units are informed of the mine locations.

4-89. Platoons and squads must have permission from higher HQ to install hasty protective minefields. Higher HQ may, however, delegate approval authority to the company commander for emplacement of a hasty protective minefield. Requests for permission go through the normal chain of command.

4-90. If the company is not authorized mines in its basic loads, a special request may be needed. The enemy threat to the rear area requires commanders to issue mines as an additional protective measure. The M18A1 antipersonnel mine (claymore) and the M21 AT mine are the two mines most likely to be available to rear-area units for a hasty protective minefield. Refer to FM 20-32 and FM 21-75.

4-91. MP generally will have claymores available to them, which is mainly a defensive weapon. However, the ways in which the claymore is used is limited only by the imagination. Plan the use of claymore mines to suit METT-TC. Emplace the mines—

- On likely dismounted avenues of approach.
- To cover dead space not covered by FPF of crew-served weapons.
- Outside the hand grenade range, but within the range of small-arms weapons.
- Where they are covered by observation and fire.
- Where back blast will not injure friendly forces.
- Beside buildings or other sturdy structures in urban terrain.
- Strapped to boards (for detonation from around corners).
4-92. MP record the exact location of the mines on DA Form 1355-1-R (Figure 4-7) when emplacing the minefield. This enables anyone to recover them. If possible, the unit should recover the mines before the unit relocates, and the same persons who emplaced them should recover them.

![Figure 4-7. Sample DA Form 1355-1-R](image)

**PATROLS**

4-93. MP are organized and equipped to conduct mounted operations. The primary offensive weapon system is the MK19. It is designed as a mounted or static position weapon. However, an MP platoon may conduct limited dismounted operations with its other organic weapons. Refer to FM 7-8 for more information about patrol operations, including organization, planning, and execution. In general, an MP platoon may be required to conduct reconnaissance and combat patrols.

**RECONNAISSANCE PATROLS**

4-94. Dismounted reconnaissance patrols are directed by higher HQ and conducted to gather detailed information on the enemy, terrain, specific NAIs, or avenues of approach. When executed as part of a screen or other security mission, a reconnaissance patrol can ensure the security of an OP/LP or the platoon's defensive perimeter. This is also referred to as a security patrol. Refer to Chapter 6 for area and zone reconnaissance.
COMBAT PATROLS

4-95. An MP platoon may conduct a combat patrol to establish an ambush on a dismounted enemy avenue of approach.

Ambush

4-96. MP elements, normally no smaller than a platoon, use an ambush along suspected enemy routes and elsewhere against Level II threats in the rear area. An ambush enables a small unit with light weapons to harass or destroy a larger, better-equipped unit. An ambush may be a surprise attack from a concealed position on a moving or temporarily halted target or an attack by fire only. A successful ambush requires the following:

- Surprise. The platoon must seize and maintain control of the situation.
- Coordinated fire. The platoon must deliver a large volume of fire into the kill zone, using individual and crew-served weapons, mines, demolitions, and indirect fire (if available), and isolate the kill zone to keep the enemy from escaping or being reinforced.
- Control. Before, during, and after the ambush all elements must be able to communicate effectively with the platoon leader, primarily by using hand and arm signals.

4-97. The platoon leader organizes the platoon into assault, support, and security elements. An ambush is laid on an enemy's expected approach route. The platoon leader selects the site and members are positioned to provide—

- Good visibility of the avenues of approach and the kill zone.
- Good fields of fire into the kill zone.
- Cover and concealment.
- Obstacles between the teams and the kill zone.
- Covered and concealed withdrawal routes.

4-98. A good ambush site restricts the enemy's movement to one flank by natural or man-made obstacles. Natural obstacles include cliffs, steep embankments, swamps, steep grades, sharp curves in the road, narrow trails, streams, and heavily wooded areas. Man-made obstacles can include mines, booby traps, and roadblocks. The ambush is configured to suit the—

- Type of ambush.
- Terrain.
- Troops available.
• Weapons.

• Equipment.

• Ease of control.

• Overall combat situation.

4-99. To conduct an ambush, the platoon leader is positioned so he can best control the ambush elements, normally with crew-served weapons or the AT4, especially if the enemy has armor. The platoon leader—

• Positions the flank security elements.

• Emplaces obstacles and mines.

• Improves fighting positions, if time permits.

• Places a crew-served weapon to cover the left and right limits of the kill zone. These weapons must ensure that once an element is in the kill zone, it cannot leave it laterally.

• Reports to higher HQ when the ambush is in place.

4-100. The platoon leader initiates the ambush with a casualty-producing weapon, such as a claymore mine or a crew-served weapon. He ensures that there is a back-up method in case the primary means fails. The remainder of the platoon opens fire once the ambush has begun.

4-101. Most often, platoons will deploy a squad-size element for an attack on a single kill zone (a point ambush). If the company is deploying a platoon-size force to conduct a number of coordinated, related ambushes (an area ambush), the principles are the same. An area ambush works best where close terrain keeps enemy movement largely limited to trails or roads. For an area ambush—

• Choose one central ambush site around which you can control and organize the outlying ambushes.

• Select outlying ambush sites on the enemy's possible avenues of approach and escape from the central site.

• Set up and maintain communication with all the outlying sites.

• Assign the general locations of the outlying sites to the squad leaders. They will each set and conduct a point ambush.

• Direct the squad leaders to let the enemy pass through the kill zones until the central ambush begins.

• Provide specific instructions to the squad leaders in case the enemy detects an
outlying site before the central ambush begins.

Ambush Types

4-102. There are three types of ambushes. They are the line and L-shaped ambush formations and the antiarmor ambush (refer to FM 7-8 for more information).

4-103. **Line Ambush Formation**. A line formation (refer to FM 7-8 for more information) is easy to control and is useful in all levels of visibility. The assault and support elements parallel the long axis of the kill zone to engage the enemy with flanking fire. The target may be so dispersed that it extends beyond the kill zone. Leaders must—

- Position the assault and support elements parallel to the enemy's movement route (such as on a road or trail or at a stream).
- Limit the kill zone to the size area that the ambush can cover with a great volume of fire.
- Place obstacles (such as claymore mines or existing natural obstacles) between the kill zone and the ambush element to prevent counter-ambush actions.
- Leave access lanes through the obstacles so the kill zone can be assaulted (if directed).

4-104. **L-Shaped Ambush Formation**. An L-shaped formation is useful on a straight stretch of a trail, road, or stream. It also works well at a sharp bend in a trail, road, or stream. The assault element is the long leg of an "L," paralleling the kill zone to provide flanking fire. The support element is the short leg, capping the end of the kill zone at a right angle to the assault element. The support element provides enfilade fire to interlock with fire from the other leg.

4-105. **Antiarmor Ambush**. The principles for an antiarmor ambush are the same as for an area or point ambush. MP are likely to encounter bypassed enemy armor in the rear area. The primary antiarmor weapon for MP is an AT4. This is a light antiarmor weapon with limited capability against medium and heavy armor vehicles. However, MP may be required to set up a hasty antiarmor ambush to destroy one or two light enemy armor vehicles. An antiarmor ambush is best performed by a platoon. The platoon leader positions the antiarmor weapons where they can engage the target from the rear, flank, or top. Multiple AT4s are used to ensure destruction. The platoon provides support and security.

CLEARING TECHNIQUES

HIGH-INTENSITY VERSUS PRECISION CLEARING TECHNIQUES

4-106. Precision clearing techniques do not replace other techniques currently being used to conduct building and room clearing during high-intensity combat. Specifically, they do not replace the clearing technique in which a fragmentation or concussion grenade is thrown into a room before US forces enter. Use precision room clearing techniques when the tactical situation calls for room-by-room clearing of a relatively intact building in which
enemy combatants and noncombatants may be intermixed. They involve increased risk in order to clear a building methodically, rather than using overwhelming firepower to eliminate or neutralize all its inhabitants.

4-107. From a conceptual standpoint, standard high-intensity room-clearing drills can be thought of as a deliberate attack. The task is to seize control of the room, with neutralization of the enemy in the room the purpose. The fragmentation or concussion grenade can be thought of as the preparatory fire used before the assault. As in a deliberate attack against any objective, the assaulting element moves into position using covered and concealed routes. The preparatory fire is initiated when the assaulting element is as close to the objective as it can get without being injured by the enemy. The assault element follows the preparatory fire (fragmentation or concussion grenade) onto the objective as closely as possible. A rapid, violent assault overpowers and destroys the enemy force and seizes the objective.

4-108. Compared to the deliberate attack represented by high-intensity room-clearing techniques, precision room-clearing techniques are more conceptually akin to a reconnaissance in force or perhaps an infiltration attack. During a reconnaissance in force, the friendly unit seeks to determine the enemy's locations, dispositions, strength, and intentions. Once the enemy is located, the friendly force is fully prepared to engage and destroy it, especially if surprise is achieved. The friendly force retains the options of not employing preparatory fire (fragmentation or concussion grenades) if it is not called for (the enemy is not in the room) or if it is inappropriate (there are noncombatants present also). The attacking unit may choose to create a diversion (use a stun-hand grenade) to momentarily distract the defender while it enters and achieves domination of the objective.

4-109. The determination of which techniques to employ is up to the leader on the scene and is based on his analysis of the existing set of METT-TC conditions. The deliberate attack (high-intensity techniques), with its devastating suppressive and preparatory fire neutralizes everyone in the room and is less dangerous to the assaulting troops. The reconnaissance in force (precision techniques) conserves ammunition, speeds up the clearing process, reduces damage, and minimizes the chance of noncombatant casualties. Unfortunately, even when well executed, it is very stressful and hazardous for friendly troops.

4-110. Certain precision room-clearing techniques, such as methods of squad and fire team movement, the various firing stances, weapon positioning, and reflexive shooting, are useful for all combat in confined areas. Other techniques, such as entering a room without first neutralizing the known enemy occupants by fire or explosives, are appropriate in only some tactical situations.

4-111. Generally, if an alerted enemy force that is determined to resist occupies a room or building, and if most or all noncombatants are clear, employ overwhelming firepower to avoid friendly casualties. In such a situation, use supporting fires, demolitions, and fragmentation grenades to neutralize a space before friendly troops enter.

4-112. In some combat situations, the use of heavy supporting fire and demolitions would cause unacceptable collateral damage or unnecessarily slow the unit's movement. In other situations, often during stability and support operations, enemy combatants are so intermixed with noncombatants that US forces can not in good conscience use all available supporting fire. At such times, room-by-room clearing may be necessary and precision
room-clearing techniques are most appropriate.

**PRINCIPLES OF PRECISION ROOM-CLEARING**

4-113. Battles that occur at close quarters, such as within a room or hallway, must be planned and executed with care. Units must train, practice, and rehearse precision room-clearing techniques until each fire team and squad operates smoothly. Each unit member must understand the principles of precision room-clearing, such as surprise, speed, and controlled violence of action.

**Surprise**

4-114. This is the key to a successful assault at close quarters. The fire team or squad clearing the room must achieve surprise, if only for seconds, by deceiving, distracting, or startling the enemy. Sometimes stun grenades are used to achieve surprise. These are more effective against a nonalert, poorly trained enemy than against alert, well-trained soldiers.

**Speed**

4-115. This provides a measure of security to the clearing unit. Speed allows soldiers to use the first few vital seconds provided by surprise to their maximum advantage. In precision room clearing, speed does not mean incautious haste. It can best be described as a careful hurry.

**Controlled Violence of Action**

4-116. This eliminates or neutralizes the enemy while giving him the least chance of inflicting friendly casualties. Controlled violence of action is not limited to the application of firepower only. It involves a soldier’s mind-set of complete domination. Each of the principles of precision room-clearing has a synergistic relationship to the others. Controlled violence coupled with speed increases surprise. Hence, successful surprise allows increased speed.

**FUNDAMENTALS OF PRECISION ROOM-CLEARING**

4-117. The ten fundamentals of precision room-clearing address actions soldiers take while moving along confined corridors to the room to be cleared, while preparing to enter the room, during room entry and target engagement, and after contact. Team members should—

- Move tactically and silently while securing the corridors to the room to be cleared. Carry only the minimum amount of equipment.

**NOTE:** Rucksacks and loose items carried by soldiers tire them, slow their pace, and cause noise.

- Arrive undetected at the entry to the room in the correct order of entrance and be prepared to enter on a single command.

- Enter quickly and dominate the room. Move immediately to positions that allow complete control of the room and provide unobstructed fields of fire.
- Eliminate the entire enemy in the room by fast, accurate, and discriminating fires.

- Gain and maintain immediate control of the situation and all personnel in the room.

- Confirm whether enemy casualties are wounded or dead. Disarm and segregate the wounded. Search all enemy casualties.

- Perform a cursory search of the room. Determine if a detailed search is required.

- Evacuate all wounded and any friendly dead.

- Mark the room as cleared using a simple, clearly identifiable marking according to the unit SOP.

- Maintain security and be prepared to react to more enemy contact at any moment. Do not neglect rear security.

**COMPOSITION OF THE CLEARING TEAM**

4-118. Execute precision room-clearing techniques by the standard four-man fire team. Because of the confined spaces typical of building- and room-clearing operations, units larger than squads quickly become unwieldy. When shortages of personnel demand it, conduct room-clearing with two- or three-man teams; four-man teams are preferred. Using fewer personnel greatly increases the combat strain and risks.

**BREACHING**

4-119. An integral part of precision room-clearing is the ability to gain access quickly to the rooms to be cleared. Breaching techniques vary based on the type of construction encountered and the types of munitions available to the breaching element. Techniques range from simple mechanical breaching to complex, specialized demolitions.

**Shotgun Ballistic**

4-120. A useful method of breaching is the shotgun ballistic breach for forced entry of standard doors. Use a 12-gauge shotgun loaded with buckshot or slugs to breach most standard doors quickly. When done properly, the shotgun breach requires only a few seconds. The two standard techniques of shotgun breaching are the doorknob breach and the hinge breach. When attempting either technique, the gunner approaches the door from an angle, avoiding standing in the area directly in front of the door. While holding the stock of the shotgun in the pocket of his shoulder, the gunner places the muzzle tightly against the door, and aims down at a 45-degree angle.

4-121. **Doorknob Breach**. For the doorknob breach, (Figure 4-8) the aim point is a spot halfway between the doorknob and the frame, not at the doorknob itself. The gunner fires two quick shots in the same location, ensuring that the second shot is aimed as carefully as the first. Weak locks may fly apart with the first shot, but the gunner should always fire twice. Some locks that appear to be blown apart have parts still connected that will delay entry. If the lock is not defeated by the second shot, the gunner repeats the procedure.
4-122. **Hinge Breach.** The hinge breach technique is performed much the same as the doorknob breach, except the gunner aims at the hinges. He fires three shots per hinge—the first at the middle, then at the top and bottom (Figure 4-8). He fires all shots from less than an inch away from the hinge. Because the hinges are often hidden from view, the hinge breach is more difficult. Regardless of which technique the gunner uses, immediately after he fires, he kicks the door in or pulls it out. He then pulls the shotgun barrel sharply upward and quickly turns away from the doorway to signal that the breach point has been cleared. This rapid clearing of the doorway allows the following man in the fire team a clear shot at any enemy who may be blocking the immediate breach site.

**WARNING**

Do not use small arms (5.56 or 7.62 millimeters) as a ballistic breach on doorknobs and hinges except as a last resort. It is unsafe and could result in death.

4-123. Demolitions are often needed to defeat more elaborate barriers or to produce a desired effect to aid the initial entry.
Chapter 5

Maneuver and Mobility Support

MMS, formerly known as battlefield circulation control, consists of those measures necessary to enhance combat movement and the ability to conduct movement of friendly resources in all environments. These measures ensure that commanders receive personnel, equipment, and supplies as needed. MMS is conducted across the full spectrum of military operations. The primary focus of MP during MMS is to ensure swift and uninterrupted movement of combat power and logistical support.

MANEUVER SUPPORT

5-1. Maneuver is the employment of forces on the battlefield in combination with fire (direct or indirect) or fire potential. It is the movement of combat forces to gain a positional advantage, usually to deliver or threaten delivery of direct and indirect fires. MP tasks that support maneuver include—

- MP support to river crossings.
- MP support to breaching operations.
- MP support to a passage of lines.
- Straggler control.
- DC control (refer to Chapter 7 for more information about DC operations).

SUPPORT FOR RIVER CROSSINGS

5-2. A river is a significant obstacle that may slow, stop, or impede a unit's ability to maneuver. Units are restricted to moving in column formations along limited routes that come together at crossing sites. Friendly forces are vulnerable while crossing water obstacles. The challenge is to minimize the river's impact on the commander's ability to maneuver. The three types of river crossings include—

- Hasty.
- Deliberate.
- Retrograde.

5-3. MP traffic control is essential to help reduce exposure time and speed units across any obstacle. In addition, effective traffic control contributes to the flexibility of the crossing plan by enabling commanders to change the sequence, the timing, or the site of the crossing units. MP can switch units over different routes or hold them in waiting areas as directed by the tactical commander. This support is vital in reducing congestion, speeding the crossing of any obstacle (not just water), and enabling the maneuver forces to maintain momentum.
Hasty River Crossing

5-4. A hasty river crossing is a decentralized operation using organic, existing, or expedient crossing means. It is the preferred river crossing method. Conduct a hasty river crossing as a continuation of an attack to ensure little or no loss of momentum by the attacking force. The MP platoon in direct support of a crossing maneuver brigade, may be required to support the crossing without additional support.

Deliberate River Crossing

5-5. A deliberate river crossing requires planned and augmented MP support. Conduct a deliberate river crossing when a hasty crossing cannot be made successfully, normally when offensive operations must be renewed at the river, and when enemy forces must be cleared from the area. A buildup of firepower and equipment is needed on both entry and exit banks. Normally, MP support from corps is required to augment the division MP company.

Retrograde Crossing

5-6. Closely plan and control a retrograde crossing. Massed crossing forces could slow momentum or exceed bridge classification limits. Forces moving to the rear may retrograde to defensive positions beyond the water obstacle and may be slowed as they set up to defend the exit bank. MP support retrograde crossings the same as they do deliberate crossings.

River Crossing Planning

5-7. The crossing force commander plans the river crossing operation. He prepares an OPORD and specifies what support is required. The PM, based on the OPORD, plans MP support for the river crossing. The plan includes how MP assets will be used and what additional resources are needed. The MP commander supporting the operation plans and supervises the mission based on the OPORD and guidance from the PM. The OPORD normally gives OPCON of all units entering the crossing area to the crossing commander.

5-8. The MP leader supporting the crossing site develops a traffic control plan to support the circulation control plan. He must plan for—

- Traffic control posts (TCPs) and temporary route signs at—
  - Major crossroads on the MSR and near crossing sites and lateral boundaries to control traffic from adjacent unit areas that could interfere with division surface movements.
  - Staging areas and engineer regulating points (ERPs) to provide directions and information, control movement to and from staging areas according to planned times, and relay messages between traffic HQ and the moving unit.
  - Holding areas on the entrance bank to direct traffic to crossing sites; on the exit bank, inside the traffic regulating line (TRL), to control movement; and on the exit bank, outside the TRL, to temporarily hold sections of a convoy or a unit until it can reassemble and continue its movement.
- Mobile patrols to operate along primary routes to control traffic, spot problems, guide and escort vehicles, and reroute traffic when necessary.

- Temporary EPW collecting points. Set up the collecting points outside the TRL. Evacuate EPWs through the crossing areas as quickly as possible so their transit does not impede the movement of friendly forces.

5-9. For brigade crossings, the MP leader may collocate with the brigade staff to form a small, temporary traffic control cell located at the brigade main CP or the brigade TOC. The brigade main CP controls the maneuver support force that consists of corps engineers, bridge companies, MP, and chemical units.

Control Measures

5-10. To ease control of large, fast-moving forces, the river crossing plan usually allots one crossing area for each maneuver brigade. The commander uses control measures to delineate areas of responsibility for subordinates and to ease traffic control. Figure 5-1 shows the following control measures.

![Figure 5-1. River Crossing Control Measures](image)

5-11. **Release Line (RL)**. As used in river crossing operations, RLs are used to delineate the crossing area. RLs are located on both the far shore and nearshore and indicate a change in the HQ that is controlling the movement. RLs are normally located within 3 to 4...
kilometers of the river and on easily identifiable terrain features, if possible.

5-12. **Crossing Areas**. Crossing areas are controlled-access areas that decrease congestion at the river. This permits swift movement of the forces. Each lead brigade has a crossing area on both sides of the river that is defined by brigade boundaries and the RL. Crossing areas normally extend 3 to 4 kilometers on each side of the river, depending on the terrain and the anticipated battle.

5-13. **Waiting Areas**. Waiting areas are located adjacent to the routes or axes of advance. Commanders use the following waiting areas to conceal vehicles, troops, and equipment while waiting to resume movement or make final crossing preparations:

- **Staging areas.** These are battalion-size waiting areas outside the crossing area where forces wait to enter the crossing area. The brigade traffic control cell handles the units' movement into the staging areas. The crossing area commander (CAC) controls movement from the staging areas into the crossing areas. MP operate TCPs at the staging areas according to the crossing and traffic circulation plans. They emplace temporary signs along the route from the staging area through the crossing area to guide the convoys. Units make crossing preparations and receive briefings on vehicle speed and spacing in the staging areas. Staging areas—
  - Are located to support the crossing concept.
  - Are far enough back to permit the rerouting of the battalion along other roads or to alternate crossing sites.
  - Are easily accessible from major routes.
  - Have enough area for dispersing a battalion-size unit.
  - Provide concealment.

- **Call-forward areas.** These areas are company-size waiting areas located within the crossing area. Engineers use them to organize units into raft loads; crews use them to make final vehicle crossing preparations. The CAC controls movement from the staging area to the call-forward area. The crossing site commander (CSC) directs movement from the call-forward area to the crossing site and on to the far-shore attack position. As a minimum, each CSC operates his own call-forward area. Call-forward areas—
  - Located to support the crossing plan.
  - Company size within the crossing area.
  - Easily accessible from routes.
  - Planned with a minimum of one per crossing site.
  - Collocated with ERPs.
- Used to organize units into raft loads.
- The final preparation areas before going to the crossing site.
- Normally operated by engineers.

- Holding areas. These areas are waiting areas that forces use during traffic interruptions. Units move into these areas when directed by TCP personnel and disperse rather than stay on the roads. Holding areas are battalion size outside of the crossing area and company size within it. Far-shore holding areas are used to organize return traffic. MP operate holding areas according to the crossing and traffic circulation plans and—
  - Are used as call-forward areas for return traffic from the far shore.
  - Are located to support the crossing plan.
  - Are easily accessible from routes.
  - Have enough area for dispersion.
  - Provide cover and concealment.
  - Are defensible.
  - Maximize traffic flow with minimum control.

- Attack positions. The attack positions are the last positions occupied or passed through by the assault echelon or the attacking force before crossing the line of departure. Within the bridgehead, the attack position is the last position before leaving the crossing area or bridgehead line.
  - Assembly areas. These are the areas where forces prepare or regroup for further action.

5-14. **Engineer Equipment Parks (EEPs)**. These are areas located a convenient distance from bridging and rafting sites for assembling, preparing, and storing bridge equipment and material. They are at least 1 kilometer from the river and hold spare equipment and empty bridge trucks that are not required at the crossing sites. EEPs should be located where they do not interfere with the traffic to the crossing sites and where equipment can be concealed and dispersed. Ideally, routes leading from the EEPs to the crossing sites are not the same routes used by units crossing the river.

5-15. **Traffic Control Posts**. In river crossings, TCP personnel assist the crossing-area HQ in traffic control by reporting and regulating the movement of units and convoys. TCP personnel relay messages between the crossing-area HQ and the moving units. The PM identifies locations that need or require TCPs. MP operate TCPs on both banks of the river to control traffic moving toward or away from it. TCPs are operated at major or critical crossroads and road junctions, staging areas, holding areas, and ERP.
5-16. **Engineer Regulating Point**. ERPs are technical checkpoints used to ensure that vehicles do not exceed the capacity of the crossing means. They help maintain traffic flow. Vehicles not allowed to cross are removed so that they do not cause a traffic backup at the actual crossing site. Engineers man the ERPs and report to the CSC. TCPs are collocated with the ERP to ensure that all vehicles clear the call-forward areas. An additional duty of ERP personnel is to give the drivers final instructions on site-specific procedures and other information, such as speed and vehicle intervals. As a minimum, each crossing site requires an ERP at its own call-forward area. If enough engineer assets are available, an ERP may be established at far-shore holding areas to regulate rearward traffic.

**Route Execution**

5-17. MP must be prepared to establish holding areas along movement routes on order. If the road network sustains damage, vehicles will need to be routed into the holding areas until traffic can be restored or rerouted. Refer to paragraph 5-104 for more information about holding areas.

5-18. MP mobile patrols operate along primary routes, monitoring traffic, spotting problems, and rerouting traffic as necessary and conducting AS around the crossing area. They make frequent checks of temporary signs to prevent the enemy from tampering with them.

5-19. MP may be directed to screen the crossing unit's flanks and rear. The size of such an element is determined by METT-TC. In most environments this mission requires at least a squad. MP conduct screening missions to provide early warning of enemy approach and to provide real-time information, reaction time, and maneuver space for the crossing unit. The squad fights only for self-protection and remains within its capabilities. Refer to Chapter 6 for more information about screening missions.

5-20. Include at each crossing site a temporary EPW collection point. Initially the collection point will be on the entry bank. Once MP cross as part of the support force, a temporary collection point may be established on the exit bank. A division central collection point is established outside of the crossing area. Refer to Chapter 7 for more information about division forward collection points.

5-21. Rigid control of civilian movement is necessary to preclude congestion on movement routes. The PM coordinates for HN police support to ensure that the civilians who live in the crossing area are kept in place or, if necessary, quickly moved to designated areas away from the river. Normally, civilians are not allowed to cross the river or move along the edge of the river during the river crossing operation. Refer to Chapter 7 for more information about DC resettlement.

**MILITARY POLICE SUPPORT TO BREACHING OPERATIONS**

5-22. Breaching operations are conducted to allow maneuver despite the presence of obstacles. Obstacle breaching is the employment of a combination of tactics and techniques to advance an attacking force to the far side of an obstacle that is covered by fire. Breaching operations begin when friendly forces detect an obstacle and begin to apply the breaching fundamentals. Breaching operations end when the battle handover has occurred between the follow-on forces and a unit conducting the breaching operation.
Support Planning

5-23. MP support to breaching operations is similar to MP support to river crossing operations. The employment of MP is based on METT-TC, available resources, and the commander's priorities. MP support to breaching operations includes—

- Operating TCPs at the breaching site and along routes leading to or departing from the breaching site.
- Operating holding areas.
- Providing mobile guides to escort the units.

5-24. The platoon leader coordinates with higher HQ and the engineer forces conducting the breach for essential information that includes the—

- Azimuth and distance to the final-approach marker or the 8-digit grid coordinate of the final-approach marker that is entered into the teams Global Positioning System (GPS) receiver.
- Lane marking pattern currently emplaced.
- Type of final-approach marker used.
- Traffic control plan and march order.

5-25. A combined-arms breach is a complex operation and requires precise synchronization. Breaching operations normally require the maximum use of TCPs to assist support, breach, and assault forces to move along various lanes. Refer to paragraph 5-88 for more information about TCPs. Lanes are marked to safely pass units through the obstacle. The three levels of lane marking are—

- Initial.
- Intermediate.
- Full.

5-26. MP may provide TCPs and guide support to lanes at any level of marking. However, the main effort of MP support may come in later phases of the operation, when larger units (battalion and above) are passed to subsequent objectives, and time permits marking improvements to be made. The increase in traffic and the more diverse forces with different levels of driver experience will increase the need for MP traffic control operations. MP guides are simply mobile MP teams that escort units from one control measure or point to another. Guides and TCPs are essential when there are multiple lanes. Figure 5-2 shows the flexibility that the combinations of multiple lanes and guides or TCPs provide the commander.
Figure 5-2. Multiple Lanes (Two-Way Traffic)

Movement Execution

5-27. The commander sets the priority of movement based on the situation. MP may concentrate their efforts on assisting the immediate passage of larger combat forces. Or their priority may quickly shift to ground evacuation of casualties or vehicle recovery operations. MP traffic control operations give the commander the ability to make last-minute changes in the traffic flow or lane usage.

5-28. MP may be required to establish unit holding areas (battalion and company size) in the event that traffic is disrupted on the lanes due to enemy activity or the need to do maintenance or upgrade a lane. Refer to paragraph 5-104 for more information about holding areas.

5-29. The commander collocates guides or TCPs at the far recognition marker when he feels the situation requires more positive control.

5-30. Guides and TCPs are briefed on this information and are kept up to date on changes to the traffic control plan and enemy activity in the AO.

5-31. The platoon leader plans for the possible need to establish a forward EPW collection point near the breaching operation. Refer to Chapter 7 for more information about division forward collection point. He must also plan for an increase in the number of TCPs needed during limited visibility or in restrictive terrain. Refer to FM 3-34.2 for more information about breaching operations.

PASSAGE OF LINES SUPPORT
5-32. This area describes how an MP leader is to plan and conduct MP support to the passage of lines. The MP elements described in the following paragraphs are supporting the passing and stationary units. MP conducting a battle handover or passage of lines to a TCF is discussed in Chapter 6.

5-33. A passage of lines is a tactical event normally associated with a battle handover. A passage may be designated as a forward or rearward passage of lines. Moving a maneuver unit through the positions of an emplaced unit that is in contact with the enemy is a critical action. It requires detailed coordination; planning; and close, continuous supervision of the movement.

5-34. The main focus of MP support to a passage of lines is normally employing special traffic control measures that include—

- TCPs.
- Temporary route signing.
- Checkpoints and roadblocks.
- Defiles.

5-35. MP may also provide guides to escort the passing unit en route to a release point or AA. Similar to MP support to breaching operations, guides provide the commander a means to change the sequence, timing, or lanes of the passing units.

Passage of Lines Planning

5-36. MP support the passage of lines operation to assist a maneuver unit in contact with the enemy to maintain movement. Depending on the scope of the operation, a division MP company may not be enough to support a passage of lines operation. METT-TC may necessitate the need for additional corps MP support.

Control Measures

5-37. When planning control measures for a passage of lines, MP leaders must consider the placement of the following:

- AAs where units prepare for further action.
- The battle handover line (BHL) where the stationary force assumes responsibility for the sector from the covering force.
- The forward edge of the battle area.
- Passage lanes along which the passing units move to avoid stationary units and obstacles.
- Passage points where units will pass through one another. They are located where the commanders want the units to execute the passage of lines. Designate multiple
passage points to help eliminate congestion.

- Contact points (designate an easily identifiable terrain feature) where the units will physically meet.

- SPs where unit elements com
Chapter 7

Internment and Resettlement

I/R consist of those measures necessary to guard, protect, and account for people that are captured, detained, confined or evacuated by US forces. In any military operation involving US forces, accountability and the safe and humane treatment of detainees are essential. US policy demands that all persons who are captured, interned, evacuated, or held by US forces are treated humanely. This policy applies from the moment detainees become the responsibility of US forces and continues until the time they are released or repatriated. (Refer to the Geneva Conventions and AR 190-8, AR 190-14, AR 190-47, FM 3-19.40, and FM 27-10.)

OVERVIEW

7-1. The task areas that support the I/R function are EPW and CI handling, US military prisoner handling, and populace and resource control.

7-2. Captured, detained, and protected persons fall into several different categories that include the following:

- Enemy prisoners of war. EPWs are members of an enemy armed force or militia who must be guarded to prevent escape.

- Civilian internees. CIs are persons who have committed an offense against or poses a threat to friendly forces and must be guarded to prevent escape, but are kept separate from the EPWs.

- Dislocated civilian. DCs are persons that have been removed from their home because of war, disaster, or other reasons. They may be refugees, evacuees, stateless persons, or war victims. DCs are provided sustenance, safety, and humanitarian assistance. They are kept separate from EPWs and CIs. DCs are controlled to prevent interference with military operations and to protect them from combat or to relocate them to safety. DC operations are discussed later in this chapter.

- US military prisoner. US military prisoners are members of the US armed forces being confined, awaiting trial, or waiting transportation to a confinement facility outside the AO. They must be guarded to prevent escape and cannot be confined in immediate association with EPWs and CIs, detainees, or other foreign nationals who are not members of the US armed forces. Refer to FM 3-19.40 for more information about field confinement of US military prisoners.

7-3. EPWs are more specifically defined in FM 3-19.40 and the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, August 1949.

ENEMY PRISONERS OF WAR AND CIVILIAN INTERNEE

7-4. MP receive EPWs and CIs as far forward as possible to prevent maneuvering units from being burdened with large numbers of prisoners. Prisoners are evacuated from the
battle area as quickly as possible. The capturing unit is responsible for guarding prisoners until relieved. They field process captives using the Five Ss-and-T method (Table 7-1).

Table 7-1. Five Ss-and-T Methods

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Procedure</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Search</td>
<td>Search each captive for weapons and ammunition, items of intelligence value, and other inappropriate items. <strong>NOTE:</strong> When possible, conduct same gender searches; however, this may not always be possible due to speed and security considerations. Therefore, perform mixed gender searches in a respectful manner using all possible measures to prevent any action that could be interpreted as sexual molestation or assault. The on-site supervisor must carefully control soldiers doing mixed gender searches to prevent allegations of sexual misconduct.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Silence</td>
<td>Do not allow the captives to speak or let anyone speak to them. Speak only to captives to give orders.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Segregate</td>
<td>Segregate captives by rank, gender, nationally, and status.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speed</td>
<td>Remove the captives from the battlefield as quickly as possible.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Safeguard</td>
<td>Safeguard the captives according to the Geneva Convention and US policy. Provide medical care as needed.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Tag       | Use DD Form 2745 and include at a minimum the following information:  
- Date of the capture.  
- Location of the capture (grid coordinates).  
- Capturing unit.  
- Special circumstances of capture (how the EPW was captured, for example, did he resist, did he give up, and so forth). |

7-5. The capturing unit is usually responsible for delivering the detainees to the collecting point and the nonwalking sick or wounded detainees to the nearest medical-aid station for evacuation through medical channels. Medically evacuated EPWs and CIs must be physically segregated from friendly forces. Detainees are normally turned over to MP at the nearest EPW collecting point or holding area. However, MP must be prepared to go forward to accept EPW from capturing units.

7-6. Traditionally, MP operate collecting points in a division AO and holding areas in a corps or EAC AO. However, collecting points and holding areas should be
Chapter 6

Area Security

MP conduct AS operations to protect critical functions, facilities, and forces. They synchronize efforts with base and base cluster defense planners within a specific AO to ensure that support and sustainment operations are not interrupted. The HN, when capable, retains responsibility for security of all areas outside US bases. However, US commanders are always responsible for the defense and security of US forces and bases regardless of HN support. AS is conducted by MP across the full spectrum of army operations to protect the force, impose order, and ensure freedom of movement. MP activities that support AS include reconnaissance operations, ADC, base and air base defense (ABD), response force operations, and critical site asset and high-risk personnel security.

RECONNAISSANCE OPERATIONS

6-1. MP plan and conduct area and zone reconnaissance, screening and surveillance missions, and counterreconnaissance.

6-2. MP conduct reconnaissance and screening missions to obtain information about the activities and resources of an enemy or potential enemy or to secure data concerning the characteristics of a particular area. MP reconnaissance, screening, and surveillance efforts include area, zone, and route reconnaissance and counterreconnaissance. These missions may be conducted primarily in the rear area, but may occur anywhere sustaining operations are conducted. Refer to Chapter 5 for more information about route reconnaissance. MP employ NBC detection equipment to determine the absence or presence and extent of NBC contamination. Refer to Appendix J for more information about NBC reconnaissance.

AREA RECONNAISSANCE

6-3. Area reconnaissance is performed to obtain detailed information concerning the terrain or enemy activity within a prescribed area, such as a town, ridgeline, woods, or any terrain critical to the operations. MP conduct area reconnaissance to help guard against unexpected enemy attack in the rear area. Area reconnaissance and surveillance are vital to maintaining AS and contribute to the commander's intelligence collection plan. MP area reconnaissance is a composite of actions. It is initiated from observations and reports gathered over time by MP patrols and information gained through coordination with HN police and other friendly forces. Refer to FM 7-8.

6-4. Reconnaissance patrols may differ slightly, depending on the type of reconnaissance to be performed. However, all reconnaissance patrols have a reconnaissance and security team. The size of the patrol is determined by METT-TC. Other considerations to determine the size of the patrol include—

- Size and number of reconnaissance objectives.

- Requirement to secure the objective rally point (ORP) and other points.

- Time allowed for conducting the mission.
6-5. MP leaders plan area reconnaissance based on the IPB and the commander's critical information requirements. Information on enemy activity and likely avenues of approach is coordinated with military intelligence (MI). MP monitor likely enemy avenues of approach and LZ and DZ in critical areas to give early warning of rear-area enemy activity.

6-6. MP area reconnaissance plans include areas near facilities that are designated as critical by the commander, such as—

- NAIs.
- Air bases.
- Bases and base clusters.
- Communications centers.
- Logistic support clusters.
- Key terminals, depots, and bridges.
- Critical terrain features.
- High-value assets.

6-7. When leading an area reconnaissance patrol, in addition to using troop-leading steps and following the general principles for making a reconnaissance, the patrol leader—

- Uses a scheme of maneuver.
- Secures and occupies an ORP.
- Conducts a leader's reconnaissance of the objective area to confirm or change the plan.
- Returns to the ORP, completes the plan, and briefs the soldiers.

6-8. The security elements leave the ORP before the reconnaissance element. The security element leader places security teams at the ORP and on enemy avenues of approach into the objective area. The reconnaissance element conducts the reconnaissance by moving to several vantage points around the objective.

6-9. The reconnaissance element leader may have a small reconnaissance team move to each vantage point instead of having the entire element move as a unit from point to point. This reduces the chances of being spotted.

6-10. After the objective has been reconnoitered for the details outlined in the order, all elements return to the ORP. Teams share their information, consolidate it, and report it, then return to the patrol HQ or continue to the next mission.
6-11. A zone reconnaissance is a directed effort to obtain detailed information concerning all routes, obstacles (to include chemical or radiological contamination), terrain, and enemy forces within a zone defined by boundaries. A zone reconnaissance is normally assigned when the enemy situation is vague or information concerning cross-country trafficability is desired. Zone reconnaissance techniques include the use of moving elements, stationary teams, or a series of area reconnaissance actions. Refer to FM 7-8 and FM 17-98.

6-12. The four methods used to conduct a zone reconnaissance are—

- Box method.
- Fan method.
- Converging routes method.
- Successive sector method.

**Box Method**

6-13. To use the box method (Figure 6-1), the leader sends his reconnaissance and security teams from the ORP along the routes that form a boxed-in area. He sends other teams along routes through the area within the box. All teams meet at a linkup point at the far side of the box from the ORP.


**Fan Method**

6-14. To use the fan method (Figure 6-2), the platoon leaders selects a series of ORPs throughout the zone. At the first ORP halt and set up security. After confirmation of the patrol's location, the platoon leaders selects reconnaissance routes out from and back to the ORP.
NOTE: These routes form a fan-shaped pattern around the ORP. They must overlap to ensure that the entire area has been reconnoitered.

Figure 6-2. Fan Method of Zone Reconnaissance

6-15. Once the routes have been selected, send out reconnaissance elements along the routes. Do not send out all the elements at once. The platoon leader keeps a reserve at the ORP. He sends elements out on adjacent routes to keep from making contact in two different directions.

6-16. After the entire area (fan) has been reconnoitered, report the information then move the patrol to the next ORP. Repeat this action at each successive ORP.

Converging-Routes Method

6-17. To use the converging-routes method (Figure 6-3) (which incorporates the fan method), select an ORP and reconnaissance routes through the zone and the rendezvous point.

NOTE: The rendezvous point is a place where patrol members link up after the reconnaissance.
Figure 6-3. Converging Routes Method of Zone Reconnaissance

6-18. Halt the patrol at the ORP and set up security. Confirm the patrol's location. Designate a route for each reconnaissance element, a location for the rendezvous, and a linkup time at the rendezvous point. Send a reconnaissance element to reconnoiter each route (usually using the fan method). The leader moves with the center element.

6-19. At linkup, the patrol secures the rendezvous point as it did the ORP. While at the rendezvous point, information gained by each member is exchanged with all the other members. This provides backup to ensure that all information is passed onto higher HQ. The patrol then returns to friendly lines or continues on to another mission.

Successive-Sector Method

6-20. To use the successive-sector method (Figure 6-4), build on the converging-routes method. Select an ORP and a series of reconnaissance routes and rendezvous points. Use the converging-routes method from each ORP to each rendezvous point.
6-21. Each rendezvous point becomes the ORP for the next phase. Designate reconnaissance routes, a linkup time, and the next rendezvous point when the patrol links up at the rendezvous point. Continue this action until the entire zone has been reconnoitered.

6-22. Regardless of the type of method used, report the information through proper MP channels as soon as possible. Commanders rely on fast, accurate reconnaissance information to plan successful operations.

SCREENING MISSIONS

6-23. Screening missions are defensive in nature and largely accomplished by establishing a series of OPs and conducting patrols to ensure adequate surveillance of the assigned sector. Division cavalry units normally conduct security missions that include a screen for maneuver units during offensive operations.

6-24. MP conduct screening missions for friendly forces in the rear area to provide early warning of enemy approach and to provide real-time information and reaction time for stationary units. In the event of a Level III threat, MP may come under the OPCON of a TCF, which is also referred to as a combined-arms maneuver unit. In this role MP may provide limited security missions, such as a screen to the flank or rear of the main body, with the primary mission of providing early warning and disrupting or destroying enemy reconnaissance vehicles.

6-25. Generally, MP are tasked to observe specific avenues of approach or, more precisely, NAI. The area to observe should be identified in either the reconnaissance and security plan that the platoon leader receives or in the OPORD from higher HQ. If the platoon does not receive an IPB product, the higher OPORD must specifically state where it must focus the screening operation. If the platoon is assigned multiple requirements, the higher HQ must prioritize them.

SURVEILLANCE
6-26. On order, MP maintain continuous surveillance of all the assigned NAIs or enemy reconnaissance avenues of approach into a particular sector. This is accomplished by setting up a series of OPs. MP may conduct active mounted patrols to extend their observation limits or to cover dead space and the area between OPs. Refer to Chapter 4 for more information about setting up OPs/LPs.

6-27. Once the platoon leader understands what his surveillance requirements are, he task organizes the platoon and any assigned assets to achieve the most effective surveillance of the avenue or NAI.

6-28. Unlike a scout platoon, MP focus on providing early warning of enemy reconnaissance elements rather than gaining and maintaining contact with the enemy's main body or destroying it. During screen missions, it is important to understand that an MP platoon by itself does not have enough assets to both acquire and kill an enemy reconnaissance larger than the engaging element. Generally, other assets will be given the specific mission of killing these forces. If MP are ordered to engage enemy forces, they do so by engaging at the maximum effective range of their organic weapons. If available, the platoon leader also plans for and uses CAS and indirect fire.

6-29. During surveillance the platoon's ability to report is critical. Effective early warning requires detailed planning for uninterrupted communications. The platoon leader considers communication distances and significant terrain features to identify potential wireless communication problems. If problems exist, he requests support from the higher HQ.

COUNTERRECONNAISSANCE

6-30. MP contribute to the commander's concept of operations by conducting security and reconnaissance missions designed to detect, disrupt, and impede enemy reconnaissance elements. Counterreconnaissance is not a distinct mission; rather, it is a combination of measures taken by friendly forces to reduce the threat's ability to gather information. It contains both active and passive elements and includes combat action to destroy or repel enemy reconnaissance units.

6-31. Counterreconnaissance prevents enemy reconnaissance forces from observing the main body of friendly forces by defeating or blocking the enemy forces. In the execution of counterreconnaissance, MP operate either offensively or defensively using whatever tactics best accomplish the mission. The principal techniques used are—

- A hasty attack.
- An ambush.
- Indirect fire support.

6-32. MP must task organize to defeat enemy reconnaissance forces. Enemy reconnaissance capabilities in any given situation must be compared to the MP unit's capabilities to determine if additional maneuver or CS assets are required.

6-33. Conventional reconnaissance elements are usually squad-size or smaller. However, special-purpose reconnaissance forces can consist of mechanized forces up to company size.
In all counterreconnaissance operations, the goal is to acquire, identify, and kill the enemy reconnaissance force after it has penetrated the initial screen line. Defeating such forces usually requires combined-arms forces, but this is dependent on the type, size, and capabilities of the reconnaissance element.

6-34. MP platoons are not organized or equipped to fight for extended periods or to destroy enemy armor vehicles. MP employ AT weapons, such as AT-4s, for defensive purposes (self-protection and breaking contact). However, MP teams are highly skilled at reconnaissance and surveillance and providing early warning of enemy activity.

6-35. A scout platoon acquires and identifies enemy reconnaissance forces along a screen line, which is a control measure usually named as a phase line, and is an established forward of the main body. MP conduct their counterreconnaissance efforts in a similar manner in the rear area or anywhere sustainment operations are taking place.

6-36. In most cases, the scout platoon cannot be expected to acquire, identify, and defeat enemy reconnaissance elements. As a CS asset, MP can assist a scout platoon by locating the enemy reconnaissance element, freeing the scouts or TCF to perform the killing function of counterreconnaissance on larger mechanized enemy reconnaissance elements. MP activities that contribute to counterreconnaissance include—

- Area reconnaissance.
- Zone reconnaissance.
- Route reconnaissance.
- OP operations.
- Physical security and vulnerability risk assessment.
- Critical asset security.
- OPSEC.
- Deception operations.

6-37. Conventional threat reconnaissance elements push far out in front of their combat unit to gain intelligence on their rear area objective. Unconventional threats such as terrorists, criminals, or gangs may try to observe installations, deep-water ports, or other facilities to obtain information. Conventional threat reconnaissance efforts are concentrated on gaining intelligence on the capability of friendly forces. Unconventional threats try to obtain information to plan sabotage or criminal activity, or to simply disrupt the efforts of friendly forces.

6-38. MP leaders plan measures to counter enemy reconnaissance by coordinating with various staff sections and agencies that include—

- MI for information on enemy capabilities, likely rear area targets and objectives, likely enemy reconnaissance avenues of approach, and the commander’s critical
information requirements (CCIR).

- The PM and criminal investigation division (CID) for HN police information on local gangs, known criminals, and criminal activity.

6-39. To assist commanders with their counterreconnaissance efforts, friendly forces such as MP, CID, engineers, and MI conduct physical security surveys and vulnerability and risk assessments of bases and base clusters, deep-water ports, and air bases. They advise commanders of these facilities on security measures designed to prevent the threat from gaining access to friendly forces and facilities.

6-40. During AS missions, MP conduct security activities around NAI; critical assets, such as communications nodes; and air bases. MP perform area and zone reconnaissance of all terrain that dominates critical facilities. They concentrate their efforts on locating enemy reconnaissance forces. MP deny the enemy the opportunity to observe friendly forces by reporting their location, maintaining surveillance, and assisting in their destruction if required.

6-41. Enemy reconnaissance forces are not likely to use primary reconnaissance avenues of approach to gather information on friendly forces. MP teams are more likely to come in contact with enemy reconnaissance forces operating on trails, rough terrain, and dead space that allows mounted movement. They use the cover of darkness for their operations. MP must make maximum use of NVDs and illumination to help detect their movement. They put the devices on key terrain and along avenues of approach to critical bases, and cover the area with crew-served weapons. Enemy reconnaissance teams are most vulnerable during the day. MP concentrate daytime mounted or dismounted operations on locating their base camp or hide positions. Once they are discovered, if ordered to do so, MP can lay ambushes on likely routes to destroy them. Refer to Chapter 4 for more information about ambush patrols.

6-42. Mounted MP patrols use overlapping search techniques to make it difficult for enemy reconnaissance teams to reach their objectives without being exposed. Overlapping searches provide random coverage not easily predictable by simp
Chapter 7

Internment and Resettlement

I/R consist of those measures necessary to guard, protect, and account for people that are captured, detained, confined or evacuated by US forces. In any military operation involving US forces, accountability and the safe and humane treatment of detainees are essential. US policy demands that all persons who are captured, interned, evacuated, or held by US forces are treated humanely. This policy applies from the moment detainees become the responsibility of US forces and continues until the time they are released or repatriated. (Refer to the Geneva Conventions and AR 190-8, AR 190-14, AR 190-47, FM 3-19.40, and FM 27-10.)

OVERVIEW

7-1. The task areas that support the I/R function are EPW and CI handling, US military prisoner handling, and populace and resource control.

7-2. Captured, detained, and protected persons fall into several different categories that include the following:

- Enemy prisoners of war. EPWs are members of an enemy armed force or militia who must be guarded to prevent escape.

- Civilian internees. CIs are persons who have committed an offense against or poses a threat to friendly forces and must be guarded to prevent escape, but are kept separate from the EPWs.

- Dislocated civilian. DCs are persons that have been removed from their home because of war, disaster, or other reasons. They may be refugees, evacuee, stateless persons, or war victims. DCs are provided sustenance, safety, and humanitarian assistance. They are kept separate from EPWs and CIs. DCs are controlled to prevent interference with military operations and to protect them from combat or to relocate them to safety. DC operations are discussed later in this chapter.

- US military prisoner. US military prisoners are members of the US armed forces being confined, awaiting trial, or waiting transportation to a confinement facility outside the AO. They must be guarded to prevent escape and cannot be confined in immediate association with EPWs and CIs, detainees, or other foreign nationals who are not members of the US armed forces. Refer to FM 3-19.40 for more information about field confinement of US military prisoners.

7-3. EPWs are more specifically defined in FM 3-19.40 and the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, August 1949.

ENEMY PRISONERS OF WAR AND CIVILIAN INTERNEE

7-4. MP receive EPWs and CIs as far forward as possible to prevent maneuvering units from being burdened with large numbers of prisoners. Prisoners are evacuated from the

battle area as quickly as possible. The capturing unit is responsible for guarding prisoners until relieved. They field process captives using the Five Ss-and-T method (Table 7-1).

**Table 7-1. Five Ss-and-T Methods**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Procedure</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Search</td>
<td>Search each captive for weapons and ammunition, items of intelligence value, and other inappropriate items. <strong>NOTE:</strong> When possible, conduct same gender searches; however, this may not always be possible due to speed and security considerations. Therefore, perform mixed gender searches in a respectful manner using all possible measures to prevent any action that could be interpreted as sexual molestation or assault. The on-site supervisor must carefully control soldiers doing mixed gender searches to prevent allegations of sexual misconduct.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Silence</td>
<td>Do not allow the captives to speak or let anyone speak to them. Speak only to captives to give orders.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Segregate</td>
<td>Segregate captives by rank, gender, nationally, and status.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speed</td>
<td>Remove the captives from the battlefield as quickly as possible.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Safeguard</td>
<td>Safeguard the captives according to the Geneva Convention and US policy. Provide medical care as needed.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Tag       | Use DD Form 2745 and include at a minimum the following information:  
- Date of the capture.  
- Location of the capture (grid coordinates).  
- Capturing unit.  
- Special circumstances of capture (how the EPW was captured, for example, did he resist, did he give up, and so forth). |

7-5. The capturing unit is usually responsible for delivering the detainees to the collecting point and the nonwalking sick or wounded detainees to the nearest medical-aid station for evacuation through medical channels. Medically evacuated EPWs and CIs must be physically segregated from friendly forces. Detainees are normally turned over to MP at the nearest EPW collecting point or holding area. However, MP must be prepared to go forward to accept EPW from capturing units.

7-6. Traditionally, MP operate collecting points in a division AO and holding areas in a corps or EAC AO. However, collecting points and holding areas should be established wherever they are needed. The evacuation chain normally moves from the division forward...
or the central collecting point to corps holding area, then to internment facilities. When circumstances permit, such as taking advantage of available transportation, EPW evacuation may bypass one or more stations and deliver the detainees directly to a corps holding area or an internment facility.

7-7. At collecting points and holding areas, MP work closely with MI determining if captives, their equipment, or their weapons have intelligence value. MI interrogation teams conduct interrogations during field processing. Other MI interrogations teams conduct interrogations once EPW have been evacuated to more permanent facilities.

**OPERATE A DIVISION FORWARD COLLECTING POINT**

7-8. The number of MP needed to operate a division forward collecting point is based on the number and rate of captives expected and the METT-TC. A division forward collecting point must be mobile and modular and able to set up, expand, and move quickly with little or no notice. The general location of a forward collecting point is given in the brigade OPPLAN or OPORD. It often is located near or in the brigade support area (BSA), but should not allow detainees to observe activities in the BSA. The collecting point should be situated close to an MSR. This makes it easier to get supplies, such as water, food, and barrier material from the BSA. Even a moderate number of detainees will put a strain on the equipment and supplies of an MP company. Minor medical treatment may come from the MP company's combat medical section. However, the company's medical resources are very limited and are primarily used to support medical needs within the company. Units needed to support the division forward collecting point should be specifically tasked in the brigade OPORD. MP leaders operating the division forward collecting point will—

- Conduct a reconnaissance before selecting an exact location for the collecting point.
- Locate the collecting point far enough from the fighting to avoid minor shifts in the main battle area (MBA) (normally 5 to 10 kilometers from the MBA).
- Notify the BSA TOC and the PM operations section of the selected location. The BSA TOC reports the exact location of the collecting point to the brigade TOC. The brigade TOC notifies subordinate units where the collecting point is located so capturing units with detainees can take them there.
- Coordinate with the MI interrogation team if they are to colocate their interrogation site with the division forward collecting point.
- Request transportation, additional medical supplies, and other support through the forward support battalion.
- Ensure that captives do not remain at the division forward collecting point more than 12 hours before being escorted to the division central collecting point.

7-9. A forward collecting point (Figure 7-1) should not be set up near local inhabitants. Existing structures like vacant schools, apartments, or warehouses should be used when possible. This reduces construction requirements and minimizes logistical requirements. If existing structures are not used, detainees, except officers, can be tasked to help construct the collecting point. Prisoners may dig or build cover to protect themselves from artillery.
mortar, or air attack. There is no set design for a forward collecting point. It can be anything from a guarded, roped off area to a secured, existing structure. The collecting point is built to suit the climate, the weather, and the situation. When selecting a collecting point, consider the following:

![Diagram of a division forward collecting point]

**Figure 7-1. Division Forward Collecting Point**

- The security of the detainees. The perimeters of the enclosure must be clearly defined and understood by the detainees.

- First aid. Injured or ill detainees require the same treatment that would be given to US casualties.

- Food and water. Detainees may have been without food or water for a long time before capture.

- Latrine facilities.

- Field sanitation. If possible, have detainees wash with soap and water to reduce the likelihood of disease.

- Shelter and cover.

- Language barriers. Provide interpreters and/or instructional graphic training aids (GTAs) in the EPW native language to compensate for the language differences.
7-10. MP at collecting points normally receive detainees directly from the capturing troops. MP then process the detainees using the stress method. The six principles of stress are search, tag, report, evacuate, segregate, and safeguard.

7-11. Search. Search and inspect every EPW and CI and their possessions. Use males to search male prisoners and females to search female prisoners wherever possible unless, in exceptional situations, an individual of the opposite gender must conduct the search. If this is the case, the search of the opposite sex must be performed in a respectful manner using all possible measures to prevent any action that could be interpreted as sexual molestation or assault. Captives may keep the following items found in a search:

- Protective clothing and equipment (such as helmets, protective masks and clothing) for use during evacuation from the combat zone.
- Retained property, such as identification cards or tags, personal property having no intelligence value, clothing, mess equipment (except knives and forks), badges of rank and nationality, decorations, religious literature, jewelry, and articles that have sentimental value.
- Private rations of the EPW or the CI (in the early stages of captivity).

7-12. Certain items are confiscated from the EPW or the CI and never returned even if the EPW or the CI is released or repatriated. MP confiscate the following items when searching a captive:

- Weapons and ammunition.
- Items of intelligence value (maps, orders, and so forth).
- Other inappropriate items.

7-13. MP will coordinate with the MI interrogation teams to determine which items that have been confiscated are of intelligence value. Personal items, such as diaries, letters from home, and family pictures may be taken by the MI teams for review, but are later returned to the MP for return to the proper owner.

7-14. Currency will only be confiscated on the order of a commissioned officer (AR 190-8) and will be receipted for using DA Form 4137.

7-15. Impounded articles are items taken from the EPW or the CI during his internment because the articles make escape easier or compromise US security interests. Items normally impounded are cameras, radios, and all currency and negotiable instruments found on the captives. Refer to AR 190-8 and Defense Finance and Accounting Service-Indianapolis (DFAS IN) 37-1 for more information about confiscated and impounded property.

7-16. MP prepare a receipt when taking property from a detainee. The MP leader ensures that both the EPW or the CI and the receiving MP sign the receipt (such as DA Form 4137). MP consider bundling a detainee's property or placing it in bags to keep each detainee's property intact and separate. They turn in cleared, confiscated property as far
forward as possible. MP maintain a strict chain of custody for all items taken from the EPW or the CI. They ensure that a receipt is obtained for any items you release to any other MP or agency. The escorting MP signs for and transports any remaining property that was taken from the EPW or the CI.

7-17. Tag. Each EPW or CI is tagged by the capturing troops using DD Form 2745 as a way of accounting for them. MP check each tag at collecting points and holding areas for—

- The date and time of the capture.
- The capturing unit.
- The place of the capture (grid coordinates).
- The circumstances of the capture (how the EPW was captured).

7-18. The remaining information on the tag will be included as it becomes available. DD Form 2745 is a perforated, three-part form which has an individual serial number. It is constructed of durable waterproof, tear-resistant material with reinforced eyeholes at the top of Parts A and C. The capturing unit attaches Part A to the captive with wire, string, or another type of durable material. They maintain Part B in their records and attach Part C to the confiscated property so that the owner may be identified later.

7-19. MP at division collecting points will ensure that DD Form 2745 has been placed on any captive arriving at the collecting point without it. MP may have to direct the capturing units to complete the capture tag before accepting prisoners into the CP. They ensure that the following is done:

- The tag is filled out with the minimum information listed above (also listed on the back of Part C of the form).
- A statement is on the tag if the captive arrived without a tag.
- The captive is instructed not to remove or alter the tag.
- The capture tag's serial number and the captive's name are annotated on a locally developed manifest.

7-20. MP receive detainees from capturing troops using DD Form 2708 or a similar document. They ensure that the receipt includes the following:

- The capturing unit.
- The time and date the detainee was received.
- The identification of the detainee. (Use the number on the capture tag when the detainee's name, service number, grade, or date of birth is unknown.)
- The name, service number, grade, unit, and signature of the MP who accepts custody of the detainee.
7-21. **Report**. The number of captives at each collecting point is immediately reported through MP channels. This aids in the transportation and security planning process.

7-22. **Evacuate**. Captives are humanely evacuated from the combat zone through appropriate channels as quickly as possible. MP do not delay evacuation to obtain name, rank, service number, or date of birth. When MP evacuate captives, they give them clear, brief instructions in their own language when possible. Military necessity may require a delay in evacuation beyond a reasonable period. When this occurs, MP leaders ensure that there is an adequate supply of food; potable water; and appropriate clothing, shelter, and medical attention available.

7-23. MP ensure that EPWs or CIs are not be exposed to unnecessary danger and are protected while awaiting evacuation.

7-24. Medical personnel determine if captives with serious wounds or sickness should be kept in the combat zone. Sometimes prompt evacuation would be more dangerous to their survival than retention in the combat zone.

7-25. **Segregate**. The senior officer or noncommissioned officer in charge (NCOIC) having responsibility for custody of the EPWs or CIs will designate how and at what level to segregate them to ensure their security, health, and welfare. EPWs and CIs are segregated into the following categories:

- Officers, noncommissioned officers (NCOs), enlisted, male, and female.
  - Deserters and those that gave up without a fight may be further segregated for their protection.
  - Nationality, ideologies, and recognized ethnic groups are used for further segregation.
- CIs and/or refugees are physically separated from the EPWs and CIs.
- US military prisoners are physically separated from EPWs, CIs, retained persons (RP), other detainees (OD), and refugees.

7-26. MP do not use coercion of any kind to obtain any information from the captives. This includes basic information, such as name, rank, service number, and date of birth, which they are required to provide under the Geneva Conventions. Coercion or inhumane treatment of any EPW, CI, RP is prohibited and is not justified by the stress of combat or with deep provocation. Inhumane treatment is a serious violation of international law and the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ).

7-27. MP must not speak to captives except to give orders or directions. Captives must not be allowed to talk to or signal each other. This prevents them from plotting ways to counter security and plan escapes. Uncooperative captives may require a gag in certain tactical situations.
situations. However, gags should be used for only as long as needed and should not harm the individual.

7-28. **Safeguard**. In order to safeguard captives according to the Geneva Convention and US policy, MP must—

- Provide first aid and medical treatment for any wounded or sick captive. The wounded and sick will be evacuated separately through medical channels using the same assets as those used to medically evacuate US and allied forces.
- Ensure that the detaining power provides their captives with food and water. These supplies must be the same as to that of US and allied forces.
- Provide firm and humane treatment.

7-29. Protecting detainees from attack, preventing their escape, and quickly removing them from the battle area further safeguards them. Detainees should not remain at the division forward collecting point more than 12 hours, if possible. MP from the division central collecting point move forward to escort detainees back to the central collecting points. When detainees are field processed and ready for evacuation, the MP at the division forward collecting point will—

- Report detainee status to the BSA TOC and through MP channels to the PM.
- Request transport, rations, and water for the detainees from the forward support battalion supply officer (US Army) (S4).
- Ensure that the receipts for the detainees are ready for signing by the escort guards.
- Ensure that items taken from detainees for security or intelligence reasons are signed over to the guards taking the detainees to the rear. Ensure that each item is tagged to identify the owner.

**ESTABLISH AND MAINTAIN A DIVISION CENTRAL COLLECTING POINT**

7-30. MP in GS are responsible for establishing and maintaining the division central collecting point. They collect detainees from the forward collecting points, then process and secure them until corps MP come forward to evacuate them to the rear. Detainees should be transferred to the corps holding area or directly to an internment facility within 24 hours, if possible. One or more GS MP platoons operate the division central collecting point. The MP platoons are augmented by the division band and/or by the corps MP. Augmentation is based on the number and rate of captives expected.

**Band Augmentation**

7-31. When necessary, members of the division, corps, or EAC band augment MP for EPW operations. They guard detainees, operate dismount points, and provide perimeter security. When band members are tasked to augment MP for EPW operations they are OPCON to the MP company for the duration of the mission and released at the earliest opportunity to return to their primary mission.
Division Central Collecting Point

7-32. A central collecting point (Figure 7-2) is larger than a forward collecting point, but the considerations for setting up and operating the collecting points are generally the same. The general location of the central collecting point is given in the division OPORD or OPLAN. It is located near the division support area (DSA), preferably close to an MSR. This makes it easier to obtain supplies, transportation, and additional medical support from the DSA. Non-MP units should be specifically tasked in the coordinating instructions of the division OPORD to provide the support needed for the division central collecting point. MP establishing the collecting point should—

- Coordinate with the unit responsible for the area.
- Conduct a reconnaissance before picking the exact location for the collecting point.
- Notify the PM and the operations cell of the division rear CP (through MP channels) of the collecting point location.
- Coordinate with MI for the location of their screening site.
- Use existing structures when possible.
• Request supplies through the division MP company.

EVACUATE DETAINERS FROM A DIVISION FORWARD COLLECTING POINT TO A DIVISION CENTRAL COLLECTING POINT

7-33. The MP platoon charged with operating the division central collecting point sends MP forward to the division forward collecting point to escort detainees back to the central collecting point. EPWs or CIs must be evacuated from the division forward collecting point as soon as possible, preferably within 12 hours. Before evacuating the detainees, MP checks with MI interrogation teams for any property to be returned to, or evacuated with, the detainees before they are moved.

PROCESS ENEMY PRISONERS OF WAR AND CIVILIAN INTERNEES FOR EVACUATION

7-34. MP consider the physical status of detainees before evacuating them. Categories for consideration are the sick and wounded EPWs and CIs and the able-bodied EPWs and CIs.

Sick and Wounded Enemy Prisoners of War and Civilian Internees

7-35. The MP unit's combat medical section will screen detainees and decide if they will be escorted within MP channels or medically evacuated. Generally, the walking wounded go with the other detainees. Litter patients go through medical channels. US forces provide the same medical care for sick or wounded detainees as that given to US and allied soldiers. Sick and wounded EPWs in the combat zone are either treated and returned to the MP for evacuation or stabilized and moved through medical channels to the rear as far and as quickly as possible. If medically evacuated, MP release the detainees to the medical authorities using DD Form 2708 or other receipt. The corps medical regulating officer (MRO) and the receiving hospital commander coordinate with the Internment Resettlement Information Center (IRIC) to account for detainees in medical channels.

7-36. MP determine when security is required for sick or wounded detainees. Normally, sick or wounded detainees requiring MEDEVAC are not likely to be a security risk. Detainees well enough to present a security risk can be treated by the combat medical section and evacuated through MP channels as soon as possible.

Able-Bodied Enemy Prisoners of War and Civilian Internees

7-37. Able-bodied detainees are escorted during movement to keep them from escaping. MP planning the movement of detainees consider the following:

• The factors of METT-TC.
• The number of detainees being escorted.
• The condition and morale of the detainees. Fatigued and cooperative detainees may not require as many guards as those who are fresher and more motivated.
• The type of transport to be used. The type of transport may influence the number of guards. A planning consideration is one guard per 5 to 10 detainees. Aircraft is loaded
according to the airplane crew's instructions.

- The terrain conditions along the route. Detainees are more likely to attempt escape in close terrain, like dense woods or jungle, and may require more guards than open terrain.

- The level of enemy activity along the route. The more enemy activity in the area, the greater the need for increased security precautions.

- The likelihood or presence of suspected sympathizers and hostile local nationals along the route.

- The scheduled arrival of the transport. Use backhaul transport whenever possible.

- Transportation considerations. Transportation depends on the availability of vehicles delivering cargo in the nearby area.

- The location of MP units or bases and base clusters along the route that could provide assistance during the movement.

- The number and locations of rest stops (based on the type of transportation, distance, and the type of terrain).

7-38. Detainees are evacuated on foot only as a last resort when transport is not available. Transportation for detainees is arranged through the company HQ. At division, the company HQ contacts the local movement control officer.

7-39. Before leaving for the collecting point, the MP in charge of the escort must—

- Conduct a route reconnaissance of the evacuation route.

- Verify the location of the collecting point shortly before departing, since BSAs move often.

- Plan to stop only during daylight and outside towns or installations if possible.

- Designate guards to dismount at halts and supervise the loading of the detainees.

- Segregate detainees by category, if possible.

- Secure the rations and the water. Use captured enemy rations for the detainees, if available. Do not allow the use of utensils or can openers.

- Search detainees and baggage before loading in any transport.

- Use hand irons, leg irons, or special restraining jackets on detainees, if necessary. If hand irons are used, restrain the detainees with their arms in front.

- If prescription drugs are needed, disperse according to the medical officer's instructions.
EVACUATE ENEMY PRISONERS OF WAR AND CIVILIAN INTERNEES FROM A DIVISION CENTRAL COLLECTING POINT

7-40. In order for MP to conduct successful evacuation of EPWs and CIs, MP brief the escorts and the detainees.

Brief the Escorts

7-41. MP or other military personnel may perform as guards in evacuating EPWs and CIs. Escort personnel are briefed on evacuation considerations and escape attempts. Considerations include the following:

- Procedures to ensure that the detainees follow instructions and orders. Escorts must be firm, but will not punish detainees who fail to obey.

- Requirements to inspect passenger areas, latrines, and other places that might be accessible to detainees during transport. Escorts should look for the means of escape or items that could be used as weapons and remove the latches from the latrine doors on transports, if possible.

- The necessity to talk to detainees only to give orders and maintain control.

- Emergency actions to secure and safeguard the detainees in case of enemy contact. Members of the escort element must know in advance which of them will control the detainees and which ones will react to the enemy.

Receive and Brief the Detainees

7-42. The senior MP in the escort element accepts custody of the detainees. Each detainee is tagged and field-processed before being accepted for evacuation. Each detainee is accounted for using DD Form 2708 or a similar receipt. The senior MP escort ensures that all the detainees (and any equipment) are listed on the custody receipt when custody is accepted. The escort retains a copy of the custody receipt.

7-43. Before moving, the senior MP ensures that the detainees have been briefed on movement discipline in a language understood by them. MP use locally produced GTAs to conduct the briefing. If available, an interpreter should give the instructions to the detainees. They are told—

- The meaning of the word halt.

- That the "silence rule" applies at all times (no talking to the guards, no talking to each other).

- The actions to take during an emergency.

COLLECT ENEMY PRISONERS OF WAR IN OTHER OPERATIONS

7-44. Some offensive operations are executed so rapidly that combat forces completely
overwhelm the enemy forces. These operations create special considerations when planning EPW operations.

River Crossing Operations

7-45. During river crossing operations, an EPW collecting point is established on the nearside of the river far enough to the rear to prevent interference with tactical operations and to afford reasonable protection against hostile fire. The EPWs are evacuated from the bridgehead area as soon as possible to prevent congestion. The movement of EPWs from the farside of the river must be coordinated with traffic control personnel at the crossing sites. Secondary crossing sites must be used if available.

Amphibious Operations

7-46. During amphibious operations, initially, the shore party or helicopter support teams operate EPW collecting points in the beach support areas or LZs. EPWs are evacuated from the collecting points to designated ships by landing craft, a helicopter, or amphibious vehicles. MP must coordinate with the support force for the handling of EPWs once they have been evacuated from the beachhead. EPWs are retained in the objective area when facilities, supplies, and personnel permit, consistent with the reasonable safety of EPWs from enemy action.

Airborne Operations

7-47. During an airborne operation, the METT-TC considerations for collecting EPWs include the geographical location of the airhead, the tactical plan, the availability of transportation, and plans for linkup with ground forces. EPWs are evacuated primarily by air, especially during the early stages of the operation. The EPW collecting point should be located near a LZ. Plans should provide for the attachment of MP escort guard units from the area EAC to the airborne force to guard EPW during evacuation.

Armored Operations

7-48. Armored units are able to quickly penetrate deep into hostile territory, possibly bypassing enemy strong points. They may leave isolated enemy groups, which would hinder the normal evacuation of EPWs. In this circumstance, it may be necessary to hold EPWs in the area of capture until they can be safely evacuated.

Air Assault Operations

7-49. During an air assault operation, organic military police elements accompany assault elements to the objective areas so that they can collect and evacuate captured EPWs. Collecting points are established as required near heliports or airfields. Arrangements must be made for nondivisional MP to accompany designated incoming or resupply aircraft to guard EPWs during their evacuation from the division.

UNITED STATES MILITARY PRISONER HANDLING (FIELD DETENTION FACILITIES)
7-50. Use field detention facilities (Figure 7-3) to hold US soldiers in custody until they can be tried. Use pretrial confinement only to ensure that an accused appears at trial or when the seriousness of the offense or the threat of violence makes confinement essential. Whenever possible, soldiers awaiting trial remain in their units. Only when they are a hazard to themselves or others are they detained in pretrial confinement under MP control.

![Field Detention Facility Diagram](image)

**Figure 7-3. Field Detention Facility**

7-51. Use field detention facilities to hold sentenced prisoners waiting for transfer to a theater's field confinement facility (FCF) or the continental US (CONUS). After trial, move convicted military prisoners, whenever possible, to confinement facilities outside the combat zone.

7-52. Each echelon commander sets procedures and policies for detaining and confining soldiers. Often US military prisoners in a combat zone are placed under the control of an MP unit operating an EPW collecting point. When small numbers of US prisoners are on hand, a squad operating an EPW collecting point can best take responsibility for the security of US prisoners. US military prisoners must be kept physically apart from EPWs. The policy and procedures for the care and treatment of prisoners and the safeguarding of their personal effects remain the same as that set for other Army confinement facilities.

7-53. When prisoners are retained in-theater, separate temporary detention facilities may be set up in the corps or division areas. US military prisoners should be held in the division rear area for the shortest possible time. At a division facility MP must—

- Safeguard US prisoners.
- Coordinate for their food and medical care.
- Sustain them until they can be evacuated to a corps facility.
- Transfer them to the corps facility as quickly as possible.

7-54. When the situation permits, MP from a detention facility at the corps come forward to pick up the prisoners at the request of the division's detention facility commander. From the corps, the prisoners are evacuated to the theater confinement facility.

7-55. If a temporary detention facility is set up in the corps, it usually is operated by confinement teams from the confinement battalion in a personnel command (PERSCOM). These teams are organized and trained to perform confinement operations. But when corps detention operations are limited to prisoners being evacuated to a confinement battalion in the PERSCOM, elements from a combat support company can operate a temporary facility.

7-56. A field detention facility usually is located near the MP company CP for food, transport, and supply support. MP request construction materials from the engineers to set up and run a facility. Equipment and supplies must include the following:

- Barbed wire (roll and concertina).
- Fence posts.
- Gates and doors.
- Floodlights and spotlights, complete with wiring.
- An emergency generator.
- Mess equipment and equipment for cleaning mess gear.
- Water cans or lyster bags.
- Computers.
- First aid equipment and supplies. Spare clothing and bedding.
- Hand restraints or leg irons.
- Heating equipment (cold climate).
- Field sanitation supplies.

7-57. MP leaders ensure that the facility is large enough to separate prisoners by prisoner status, custody grade, sex, and rank. They locate the facility away from a base's perimeter or any other area of increased risk.

7-58. The size of the facility is based on the number of prisoners being detained. It may be a room or a tent, as long as it provides shelter equal to that offered to other soldiers in the
combat zone. The physical criteria for permanent and temporary structures are the same. MP use existing structures if you can. Otherwise, they use tents. Field-expedient facilities must be approved and periodically inspected by a medical corps officer or a designated representative.

7-59. A team or a squad can operate a field detention facility. A team operating a facility may organize so that the team leader controls the operation and relieves the guards. The other team members perform guard duty in alternating 12-hour shifts. When operating a field detention facility, the team—

- Accepts sentenced soldiers on the written order (currently a DD Form 2707) of a court martial convening authority (or the authorized representative).
- Ensures that the order states the name, grade, social security number, organization of the prisoner, offense for which convicted, and the sentence.
- Accepts the accused soldiers on the written order (currently a DD Form 2707) of the accused's commanding officer.
- Signs a receipt for each prisoner and his property on the correct and current form.

**POPULACE AND RESOURCE CONTROL (PRC)**

7-60. PRC operations are the responsibility of the Assistant Chief of Staff, (Civil Affairs) (G5), the Civil Affairs Officer (US Army) (S5), and/or the HN authorities. (Refer to FM 41-10 for more information about PRC.) PRC is often conducted in stability and support operations where national authority has broken down and the government cannot control the population. MP support PRC by conducting L&O operations designed to restore order and protect the people and property.

7-61. Insurgent organizations often emerge in unstable regions. The aim of such groups is normally to overthrow the established government. The less control the government has, the greater the chance for insurgents to succeed. These organizations try to exploit the population, often through threat and intimidation. When insurgent organizations pose a threat to the population, US forces employ PRC operations that are designed to deny support and assistance to insurgents by controlling the movement of people and goods and restricting access to key facilities. Police activities, such as roadblocks, cordons, curfews, access control, and checkpoints are an important measure in counterinsurgency, but have a high potential for harm if used excessively or incorrectly. MP are specially trained to conduct these operations, as a force focused on security, protection, and assistance. MP are continually trained on the prudent use of force, crisis management, and operations requiring restrictive ROE.

7-62. PRC measures deprive insurgent organizations support and aid in identifying their supporters. Appropriate psychological operations (PSYOP) help make these measures more acceptable to the population by explaining their necessity. The government informs the population that, although its actions may cause inconvenience, the threat posed by the insurgents makes them necessary.

7-63. PRC is often conducted in urban areas. The best use of PRC comes before an
organized insurgent movement has the capability for armed conflict. MP intelligence operations support PRC programs. Criminal acts, such as robberies, kidnappings, terrorism, and extortion, may accompany insurgent propaganda or money-raising activities.

7-64. MP employ special control measures to aid populace control that include the following:

- Enforcing curfews.
- Enforcing movement restrictions.
- Verifying travel permits and registration cards.
- Assisting with rescue and evacuation operations.
- Assisting with crowd control.

7-65. MP also employ control measures to aid in resource control. They include—

- Operating roadblocks and checkpoints.
- Inspecting facilities.
- Enforcing local regulations and guidelines.
- Controlling rations.
- Assisting with amnesty programs.

7-66. PRC operations play a vital role in winning support away from the insurgent threat and encouraging support for the goals of the legitimate government.

7-67. MP leaders responsible for supporting PRC must plan for the protection of their forces as these types of operations have a history of turning violent very quickly.

**DISLOCATED CIVILIAN RESETTLEMENT**

7-68. International law recognizes the humanitarian practice of providing temporary refuge to anyone, regardless of nationality, who may be in imminent physical danger for the duration of the threat. It is US policy to grant temporary refuge in a foreign country to nationals of that country, or of a third nation, solely for humanitarian reasons when extreme or exceptional circumstances exist.

7-69. Civil affairs (CAs) units are trained to plan, coordinate resources for, and monitor the handling of DCs. (Refer to FM 41-10 for more information about DC operations.) Whenever possible, resources and control should be arranged with the HN, other governmental agencies, and nongovernmental and private organizations.

7-70. To assist in properly identifying DCs, the definition of the five subdivided categories...
Displaced person. A civilian who is involuntarily outside the national boundary of his country in time of conflict.

Refugee. A civilian who, because of real or imagined danger, has left home to seek safety.

Evacuee. A civilian removed from his place or residence by military order.

Stateless person. A civilian who has been denationalized, whose country of origin cannot be determined, or who cannot establish his right to the nationality claimed.

War victim. A classification that describes civilians suffering injuries, loss of a family member, or damage to or destruction of his home resulting from war.

7-71. DC operations are a special category of PRC. The goal of DC operations is to minimize civilian interference with military operations, relieve suffering, and protect civilians from combat operations or other threats. When the HN cannot or is unwilling to control DCs, MP may be required to collect, evacuate, and resettle them.

7-72. When directed to conduct DC operations, MP leaders coordinate with CA and the PM to establish a traffic control plan. The plan includes the primary and alternate routes used to move DCs and the location for—

- The TCP.
- Holding areas.
- Roadblocks and checkpoints.

7-73. Temporary route signing is not normally an effective control measure during DC operations. Even when the signs are posted in the local language, DCs usually ignore them.

7-74. MP collect and process DCs in the same manner as EPWs with regard to the difference in their status—they are detained personnel, not prisoners. As such, security of the I/R facility should not give the impression that it is a prison.

7-75. MP collect DCs at assembly points located away from the MSR and areas where combat operations are heaviest. They move DCs along selected routes that have the least military traffic. DCs will normally require frequent rest stops. When possible, holding areas for rest stops should be near a source of water and provide protection from the elements or hostile fire.

7-76. MP provide close-in and standoff security for DCs while en route to a civilian camp or collection point. When required, MP provide external and internal security at a DC camp. Within limits, DCs are allowed freedom of movement once they have been resettled. MP and CA must continue to closely monitor DCs at collection points and camps. Recent operations that involve large numbers of DCs have been known to turn violent very quickly.
Such a situation can be avoided when DCs are treated with respect and dignity.

**EVACUATION OPERATIONS**

7-77. In addition to EPWs, CIs, and DCs, MP are often required to evacuate other selected individuals or groups from collecting points, holding areas, or areas of hostility. The safe evacuation of noncombatants, US diplomats, or US military prisoners requires close coordination and extensive planning. This type of operation is referred to as noncombatant evacuation operations (NEO). Such missions require contingency plans and unit SOPs that are specifically designed for these special operations. Unit SOPs should cover the evacuation of designated personnel by ground, air, rail, and water. When directed to conduct evacuation operations, MP leaders task organize based on METT-TC and the availability of MP. They perform extensive rehearsals to successfully conduct evacuation operations.

7-78. When a HN can no longer ensure the safety of US civilians in a foreign nation, US military forces may evacuate them. MP are often required to provide security and escort for evacuees from their point of origin to their destination. A NEO is usually a joint operation conducted with other US and HN government agencies and CA.

7-79. An MP platoon is most likely employed for these operations. The platoon leader conducts direct coordination with CA and the higher HQ. The platoon leader begins TLP, issues a WO to the platoon, and requests information that includes the—

- Screening and identification system being used.
- Number of evacuees, their point of origin, and their anticipated direction of movement and destination.
- Location of marshalling areas, collection points, and AAs.

7-80. If time permits, the platoon and squad leaders conduct a reconnaissance of the evacuation route. The purpose of the reconnaissance is to prepare an overlay which is then used to plan control and special security measures at critical areas along the route. If helicopter support is available, platoon and squad leaders conduct an aerial reconnaissance of the evacuation route. An aerial reconnaissance will normally take less time and the observation of the terrain around the route is much better by air than from the ground. At a minimum, a map reconnaissance must be conducted.

7-81. During the reconnaissance, the platoon leader selects possible rest areas and identifies friendly units along the route. He identifies critical areas, such as defiles, bridges, and areas where enemy activity is likely. He marks these areas on the overlay and plans for special security measures at these locations.

7-82. The platoon leader coordinates with the movement control center to ensure that the evacuation route does not interfere with the movement of friendly forces. If available, he coordinates for fire support along the route, normally at critical sites that were identified during the reconnaissance.

7-83. The platoon leader coordinates for MEDEVAC and vehicle recovery. His plan
includes emergency reaction to the following:

- An air attack.
- An artillery attack.
- An ambush.
- A riot.

7-84. NEO are normally carried out according to the guidelines established by CA and US policy. MP may be required to screen for authorized personnel to determine who may actually be evacuated. There are generally three groups of personnel. They are—

- Group I. Group I includes US citizens, officials, dependents, tourist, business persons, and non-US family members when the father, mother or wife is a US citizen.
- Group II. Group II includes foreign nationals holding diplomatic papers, visas, or passports who receive Department of state approval.
- Group III. Group III includes all others, to include HN citizens, who do not fit into the first two categories.

7-85. Persons who fall into any of these groups and require immediate medical attention are always evacuated first. MP should give special consideration to the elderly and children.

7-86. MP brief the evacuees on discipline and the actions to take during emergencies. The briefing must be in a language that all the evacuees understand. The CA unit or HN agency should provide an interpreter. The briefing should cover all aspects of the evacuation. This will help calm the evacuees and instill confidence and cooperation.

7-87. The platoon provides security of the evacuees at the marshalling, evacuation, and holding areas and the reception station. The level of protection depends on the level of the threat. Methods of security depend on the type and location of the facilities used. At a minimum, MP must be prepared to provide interior guards for group areas, establish perimeter security, and operate a dismount point to restrict access to the evacuees.

7-88. During movement, the platoon escorts the evacuees by providing close-in security at the lead, middle, and end of the convoy or in front of and behind a single transportation vehicle. MP use a scout vehicle that travels 3 to 5 minutes ahead of the convoy to alert the main body to danger or delays. If a threat tries to disrupt the evacuation operation or destroy the evacuation vehicle, selected MP teams protect the evacuees as other teams counter the threat within the ROE. Throughout the evacuation operation, MP maintain all-around security, protection, and evacuee accountability.
Chapter 8

Law and Order

This chapter addresses the L&O function across the full spectrum of military operations. Refer to Appendix K for more information about civil disturbance control measures.

OVERVIEW

8-1. L&O operations consist of those measures necessary to enforce laws, directives, and punitive regulations; conduct criminal investigations; and control populations and resources that ensure commanders the existence of a lawful and orderly environment. MP enforce laws and appropriate commander directives. They maintain liaison and coordinate joint L&O operations with other DOD police organizations; HN military and civilian authorities; multinational police organizations; and US federal, state, and local police agencies. A coordinated law enforcement effort removes the conditions and opportunities that promote crime, thereby preventing diversion of military resources and maintaining military discipline.

8-2. The evolving criminal threat affects military operations and requires commanders to minimize that threat to preclude negative impacts on forces, resources, and operations. The importance of the criminal threat to military operations is a current, as well as future reality. Nationalist ideologies, the instability of a government to effectively govern and control its population, and the breakdown of government infrastructures will foster the linkage between criminal organizations and the government and its armed forces.

8-3. MP provide the capability to train foreign MP or assist in the reorganize of indigenous constabulary forces as part of stability and support post conflict operations. Under the provisions of and exceptions to Section 660 of the Foreign Assistance Act, MP provide initial assistance and training to foreign military and civilian police forces or assist in the creation of these forces where national authority has broken down. Additionally, MP forces provides short-term emergency L&O capabilities until the foreign military and civilian forces are functional.

8-4. MP and the USACIDC are the primary collectors of police information and criminal intelligence. They gather information through contacts made with the local populace and from conducting combined and joint patrols with HN military and civilian police agencies. MP and CID conduct field interviews and gather police information from surveillance operations. They investigate serious offenses and maintain a close liaison with the HN or allied civilian and military police agencies. This police information and criminal intelligence is collected, analyzed, and shared with the intelligence community and contributes to the police information assessment process (PIAP).

8-5. The police activities that support L&O operations include the following:

- Criminal investigations.
- Police information collection and dissemination of the information.
8-6. The enforcement of military laws, orders, and regulations is a command responsibility, as well as an MP responsibility. Each commander is responsible for maintaining order and discipline in the unit. To support commanders, the PM plans the use of MP assets to help enforce military laws, orders, and regulations.

8-7. MP performing L&O operations enhance and extend the tactical commander's C² by—

- Aiding commanders in maintaining combat strength.
- Helping prevent diversion of military resources.
- Suppressing opportunities for criminal behavior by US and non-US personnel or elements.
- Assisting and protecting military forces.
- Helping ensure the discipline of US forces.
- Assisting intelligence organizations in obtaining a true tactical intelligence picture by providing criminal and operational data and intelligence.

LAW AND ORDER AUGMENTATION DETACHMENT

8-8. The technical and supervisory expertise to support L&O operations in a mature theater is provided by L&O teams organized under an L&O augmentation detachment. The L&O teams are designed to give the commander the additional flexibility and capability in any environment to conduct a wide range of force protection mission requirements, to include split-based operations. This enables the supported commander to perform needed L&O missions while other MP assets are conducting MMS, AS, or I/R.

8-9. When these teams are not available or have not arrived in theater, L&O missions are prioritized with other MP combat support missions and are usually not full-scale dedicated operations. The theater commander determines when he can afford to dedicate MP assets to L&O operations.

8-10. A complete 45-person L&O augmentation detachment includes a detachment C² team, an operations team, a desk team, five MP investigation (MPI) teams, five traffic accident investigation (TAI) teams, and two force protection teams. Refer to Figure 8-1.
8-11. When deployed, detachment and teams are under the overall operational C² of the PM deployed for the operation. Those teams may be attached to MP battalions and companies, as the situation requires. In war, the L&O augmentation detachment is assigned to an MP brigade and further attached to MP battalions and division MP companies as required. The L&O augmentation detachment consists of the following teams:

- **Operations.** The operations team provides C²; supervises traffic, force protection, and investigative operations; and provides an evidence custodian to ensure that the chain of custody for evidence is maintained.

- **Desk.** A desk team establishes and operates the MP desk and coordinates law enforcement patrol activity.

- **MPI.** MPI teams provide the technical personnel to investigate crimes that do not fall within the investigative purview of the CID and conduct surveillance operations. Each MPI team consists of two MP with additional skill identifier (ASI) V5. These teams have no organic vehicles or communications capabilities.

- **TAI.** TAI teams provide the technical personnel to conduct TAIs. Based on operational requirements, TAI teams augment PM and MP organizations to ensure unimpeded movement and regulation enforcement on the MSRs. Each TAI team consists of two MP with ASI Q9.

- **Force protection.** Force protection teams provide technical personnel to assist in the safeguarding of personnel and equipment according to the command policies and field operating procedures. The role of the force protection team is to assist, inspect, and educate. Force protection teams provide expertise for safeguarding personnel and PRC for refugees, displaced persons, and civil disturbance operations. They enhance the unit's ability to ensure that soldiers and units are aware of appropriate personal security safeguards. Additionally, force protection teams assist customs operations teams in the establishment of sterile areas. Each force protection team consists of MP NCOs.

8-12. MP brigade commanders employ L&O augmentation teams based on the METT-TC to support the US forces operating within the brigade AO. While the number of teams is based on the troop population supported, whenever possible the team AO should coincide
with the MP battalion and the division AO. The detachment HQ, operations, desk, and force protection teams should be collocated with the supported battalion HQ or division PM. If transportation requirements for these teams exceed the capabilities of the operations team, the supported unit must provide transport.

COMPANY AND PLATOON LEVEL LAW AND ORDER OPERATIONS

8-13. As previously stated, L&O augmentation teams may not arrive until a theater matures and L&O operations become the priority. Corps and division MP units must be prepared to conduct full-scale L&O missions. When ordered to establish L&O operations, the company commander determines mission requirements that include the following:

- Special equipment (vehicles, communications, and barricades or traffic cones).
- Specialized personnel support (a linguist, HN police, and PSYOPS or civil affairs personnel).
- CCIR.
- Threat assessments from MI and the CID.

8-14. The commander and platoon leaders conduct a map reconnaissance of the AO and determine the platoon areas of responsibility. When the tactical situation allows and adequate structures are available, the commander selects a building that is centrally located within the AO to establish the MP operations center. The facility should, at a minimum, offer areas for the following:

- An MP station desk.
- Offenders processing.
- Good radio transmissions.
- Arms, evidence, and property storage.
- Suspect detainment.
- Latrine facilities.

8-15. The company operations section operates the MP operations center and organizes it into MP sections that include—

- MP operations.
- Administration.
- Force protection.
MILITARY POLICE OPERATIONS AND ADMINISTRATION OPERATIONS

8-17. The company operations sergeant is in charge of the day-to-day activities of the MP operations center. He instructs platoons regarding patrol patterns and distribution and coordinates for specialized equipment and personnel. He reviews all MP reports and the MP blotter. The center maintains close liaison with HN and allied military and civilian police agencies. The operations sergeant directs and supervises the administration section and provides guidance to other sections.

FORCE PROTECTION

8-18. The company physical security NCO (ASI H3) coordinates and directs the efforts of force protection for the commander. The force protection section is responsible for reviewing the security measures of all critical facilities and assets within the AO. The force protection NCO reviews points designated as critical by the senior commander and identifies criminal and operational threats. He develops a draft mission-essential or vulnerable area (MEVA) list and submits the list to higher HQ for approval. Once the list is approved, he conducts vulnerability assessments of points on the MEVA list. He applies risk analysis procedures according to AR 190-51, AR 190-11, and DA Pamphlet 190-51 and ensures that appropriate army antiterrorism force protection standards are met according to AR 525-13. He reassesses assets for addition to or deletion from the MEVA list or changes in priority. The role of the physical security NCO is to assist, inspect, and advise commanders on force protection measures.

MILITARY POLICE DESK

8-19. The MP desk coordinates MP patrol activity, documents those activities, and reviews incident reports to ensure accuracy and completeness. The MP desk is also responsible for referring incidents to the appropriate investigative agency for further action.

8-20. The MP desk operates continuously during the conduct of L&O operations. It should be located as near as possible to the center of the L&O operational area, and have communications throughout the AO. When possible, existing facilities should be used for the MP station, but requirements for communications, transportation, and proximity to troops and facilities may rule out existing structures. The MP desk should be located within a reasonable distance of the HN police desk during stability, support, or other operations involving interaction with HN authorities. It may be necessary to establish substations if the
area covered or the volume of activity is large. The MP station should have, at a minimum, the following:

- Areas and lighting for preparing reports and other paperwork.
- Communications with the MP elements performing L&O and the command and populace that the L&O operations are supporting.
- Detention areas where persons can be secured by a guard and/or physical constraints, such as a detention cell.
- Latrine facilities.

8-21. MP establish joint service, multiagency, or multinational operations when appropriate for the populace being provided L&O support or as directed. The PM establishes agreements before initiating joint operations to prevent conflicts in jurisdiction, documentation, and communication. Those agreements may be informal at first but should be formalized as soon as the situation permits. Refer to FM 19-10 for more information about operating a MP desk.

MILITARY POLICE INVESTIGATIONS

8-22. Crimes occurring within an AO may require an in-depth investigation, depending on the seriousness of the offense and the availability of investigative personnel. Commanders report minor offenses within the unit area to the MP for statistical purposes, but may still investigate the offense themselves.

8-23. MPI investigators handle the most criminal offenses not investigated by CID or the unit commander. MPI normally investigate those offenses cited in AR 190-30. The commander ensures that only school trained (ASI V5) personnel are assigned to the MPI section to investigate crimes. Outside continental US (OCONUS) areas, MPI investigate off-post incidents according to SOFA and/or the US and HN agreements.

8-24. CID investigates serious offenses. It has elements in support of all echelons down to division level. CID operates across the full spectrum of army operations, with an emphasis on logistics security (LOGSEC) during wartime operations.

8-25. When MPI has purview to investigate a crime, they use the following investigation measures:

- Take control of the crime scene, ensuring that the crime scene is protected and secure.
- Identify the personnel involved, both suspects and witnesses.
- Identify the type of offense or offenses that have been committed.
- Process the crime scene using notes, sketches, and photographs.
- Collect and secure the physical evidence.
8-26. Once the investigator has processed the crime scene, he pursues leads and conducts investigation activities that include—

- Interviewing victims, suspects, subjects, and witnesses, and obtaining written statements from them.
- Preparing case documents and the required reports.
- Collecting related documents necessary to support the investigation.
- Coordinating with the Staff Judge Advocate (SJA).
- Submitting the final draft report for review by the MPI supervisor.

8-27. The commander appoints an evidence custodian to maintain evidence obtained during criminal investigations. The evidence custodian coordinates the needed laboratory examinations and ensures the proper disposition of evidence. It may be necessary to coordinate with the CID for this support.

8-28. Joint investigative activities, such as drug or black market suppression teams, may involve investigators from CID, MPI, or other US services or agencies. Such operations may require close liaison and cooperation with HN or allied civil or military agencies.

8-29. Refer to FM 19-20 for more information about criminal investigation techniques and procedures.

TRAFFIC ACCIDENT AND INVESTIGATION

8-30. MP help reduce nonbattle casualties and the loss of equipment by ensuring that vehicles are operated according to regulations and determining the cause of accidents. Traffic enforcement supports the commander's intent in HNs by reducing the likelihood that military traffic will be seen as a threat to the native population. Thorough investigations of traffic accidents can—

- Identify the personal, environmental, and equipment factors that caused or contributed to the accident.
- Document the facts of the incident for future criminal or civil actions.

8-31. Traffic enforcement measures vary according to the operational and political environment. Those measures may include the following:

- Operator license and dispatch checks.
- Safety inspection checkpoints.
- Vehicle load and route restrictions enforcement.
- Speed control measures.
8-32. Traffic accidents are investigated on the scene whenever the tactical situation permits. MP investigate traffic accidents involving military personnel or vehicles within their AO. When the HN or other authorities have primary responsibility for an accident investigation involving US forces or equipment, MP conduct a concurrent investigation.

8-33. The first MP that responds to a traffic accident is responsible for securing and protecting the accident scene. When necessary, they administer medical attention to the injured persons and implement traffic control measures. MP safeguard classified materials and take the appropriate action to identify and contain hazardous materials at the scene.

8-34. The TAI team takes control of the accident scene when it arrives. Whenever possible a school-trained (ASI Q-9) traffic accident investigator processes the accident scene.

8-35. Once the TAI team receives a briefing from the senior person present, it takes the following steps to investigate the accident:

- Collect physical evidence to include evidence of drug or alcohol involvement.
- Photograph the scene.
- Interview victims and witnesses.

8-36. Once the TAI team has the necessary information, it clears the scene. To do this it ensures that the vehicles and debris are removed and reestablishes traffic flow. The TAI team then prepares a final report and submits it to the proper authority.

8-37. Accidents involving fatalities or life-threatening injuries require a serious incident report (SIR) according to AR 190-40.

8-38. Refer to FM 19-25 for more information about traffic enforcement techniques and conducting TAI.

MILITARY WORKING DOGS

8-39. MWD teams further enhance L&O and customs operations with capabilities to detect explosive devices and residue and controlled substances, and detect, track, control, and apprehend personnel.

8-40. Mission support requirements determine the number of functional MWD teams that make up a wartime, mission-oriented MWD team. These mission-oriented MWD teams are assigned to the PM. MWD teams conducting explosive or narcotic detection are unable to provide security for themselves and require security by the supporting unit.

8-41. Explosive, narcotics, and patrol teams each consist of three handlers and three working dogs. This allows each team to provide 24-hour support for a mission that requires one MWD or up to three short-duration missions. There is also a kennel master team, which provides technical supervision and is responsible for establishing kennel operations.

8-42. The explosive or patrol team provides the capability to detect explosive devices or residue in support of personal protection, MOUT, health and welfare, crime scene, and
customs operations. When not required for explosive detection, this team functions as a patrol team.

8-43. The narcotic and patrol team provides the capability to detect controlled substances in support of the crime scene, health and welfare, and customs operations. When not required for narcotics detection, the team functions as a patrol team. The patrol team
Chapter 9

Police Intelligence Operations

The PIO support, enhance, and contribute to the commander's protection program, situational awareness, and battlefield visualization by portraying relevant threat information that may affect the operational and tactical environment. MP and the CID gather police, criminal, or combat threat information during the performance of their functions.

OVERVIEW

9-1. MP collect and share information during the conduct of their day-to-day operations. This information, which may be police, criminal, or combat, is provided as input to the intelligence collection effort and turned into action or reports. The PIO function ensures that information collected during the conduct of MMS, AS, I/R, and L&O is reported up through the proper channels so that it can be analyzed. MP perform PIO while conducting combat support tasks, such as—

- Checkpoints and roadblocks.
- TCPs.
- Field interviews.
- Criminal investigations.
- Reconnaissance (zone, area, and route).

9-2. Collecting police information during MP activities under the functions of MMS, AS, and I/R may result primarily in combat information, but may lend to police or criminal information. Likewise, the police collection efforts during full-scale L&O operations may result in combat information. MP apply lessons learned from peacetime, conflict, and war environments to the PIO function to gain the most advantage for performing the function. The MP platoon is capable of operating in all functions, day or night, and in various terrain, weather, and visibility conditions. An MP platoon operates independently over large, dispersed areas. MP, along with MI, engineers, and NBC reconnaissance, are key to the IPB (refer to FM 34-130 for more information about IPB). They are collectors of information in the rear area during sustaining operations or anywhere throughout the battlefield. MP gather police information from contacts that are often very valuable in substantiating or verifying other sources of information. These sources include the following:

- Daily contact with the local populace.
- Combined police patrols with HN military and civilian police agencies.
- Close liaison with local, HN, and multinational police agencies.
- Field interviews.
• Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs).
• Private volunteer organizations (PVOs).

9-3. Refer to FM 3-19.1 for more information about the processes discussed in this chapter.

POLICE INFORMATION ASSESSMENT PROCESS

9-4. The PIAP is a tool used to contribute to the PIO function. Information gained through the PIAP may contribute independently or simultaneously to the all-source analysis product (ASAP) and the IPB process. The PIAP, the ASAP, and the IPB enhance and support the commander's force protection program, situational awareness, and battlefield visualization. However, the PIAP independently or collectively—

• Provides the commander with information necessary to improve measures to protect the forces.

• Provides information that clarifies the threat and operational situation.

• Reduces opportunities for threat forces to disrupt military operations and inflict US or friendly casualties.

9-5. The commander and his staff continually monitor the environment at the tactical level consistent with the METT-TC. They apply the military aspects of terrain (OCOKA) as a means of protecting the force. PIO clarify the evolving criminal threat picture for commanders through the PIAP. This helps planners predict threat courses of action against our forces or protected populations.

9-6. MP use PIAP to continuously collect, organize, interpret, and report police and criminal information in support of the IPB. The PIAP consists of 6 steps. Refer to Table 9-1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Step</th>
<th>Action</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Determine the scope of the PIAP by—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Conducting a detailed mission analysis.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Reviewing the mission of the higher HQ and the commander's intent.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Reviewing the CCIR.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Reviewing mission priorities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Determining the AO and area of interest (AI).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
- Reviewing the IPB estimates of the higher HQ.
- Determining the required information products.

2. Assemble the working aids and—
   - Post the applicable maps.
   - Acquire crime statistics and other related data.
   - Obtain language aids, such as cultural references and interpreters.
   - Acquire the necessary automation equipment.

3. Determine information requirements and coordinate access to data by—
   - Coordinating with the CID for access to available criminal information developed by CID programs.
   - Determining police and criminal gaps in the designated geographical area.
   - Determining the requirement for information collectors to fill police and criminal gaps.
   - Coordinating with the Intelligence Officer, US Army (S2), the Assistant Chief of Staff, G2 (Intelligence), PSYOP, and other agencies to determine if the information is already available.

4. Recommend and supervise police and criminal collection efforts by—
   - Coordinating with the S2, the G2, the SJA, the CID, and other applicable police agencies before initiating a collection effort.
   - Determining which police and criminal information tasks will be assigned to the MP and the CID.
   - Determining the criteria to satisfy information requirements.
   - Providing collectors with reporting instructions (such as the reporting frequency and the report format).
   - Monitoring information collection efforts to prevent duplication of efforts.

5. Process police and criminal raw data by—
   - Assembling and assessing the reliability of the data (according to the assessment criteria established above).
Integrating information from the collectors (the MP and CID agents in the field).

Evaluating the data to determine if it meets the requirements.

Developing criminal trends and indicators.

### 6. Report and disseminate police and criminal information assessment by—

- Recommending MP and CID actions to improve and focus future collection efforts.
- Reporting police and criminal information assessments to the S2, the G2, and other MP units.
- Reviewing and ensuring that the release of police and criminal information assessments do not violate established guidelines and constraints.

**NOTE**: Refer to Appendix E of FM 3-19-1 for a further discussion of PIAP.

### POLICE INFORMATION

9-7. MP gather police information actively or passively. Active collecting efforts result from a direct tasking, and passive collecting efforts result from normal, daily MP operations.

### ACTIVE MODE

9-8. MP perform the PIO function in the active mode when directed by the higher HQ. In this mode, the MP platoon conducts specific missions with the intent to actively collect information. Specific MP activities (such as setting up a checkpoint or roadblock) are performed to specifically fulfill a requirement (such as looking for individuals who are in possession of or have knowledge of others in possession of weapons, US military property, and so forth). MP gain valuable police, criminal, and combat information while conducting these operations. A standardized checklist enhances the information collection effort and aids in the analysis of the information collected. The checklist indicates a pattern in the behavior of the local nationals. It shows what the local nationals are transporting, to where they are transporting the items, and so forth. The checklist may include—

- The number and types of vehicles stopped. Identifying marks, license plate numbers, and any signs displayed on the vehicles are recorded and reported.
- The number of passengers in the vehicle. The nationality, age, and sex mix of the passengers are recorded and reported.
- The type and quantity of cargo.
The vehicle's point of origin and destination.

- The stated reason for travel by the passengers.

- The description of arms, ammunition, explosives, and sensitive items found and confiscated from the vehicle.

- The possible or actual sightings of weapons, explosives, or threat forces by the passengers.

- The condition of the passengers.

- The reporting of anything unusual by the passengers.

PASSIVE MODE

9-9. Every MP conducts the PIO function in the passive mode during their normal day-to-day operations. In the passive mode, PIO are not a stand-alone function and, as such, it cannot be separated from the other MP functions. If while performing MMS, AS, I/R, and L&O, MP receive, observe, or encounter police, criminal, or combat information, they immediately submit a SALUTE; SPOTREP, or other appropriate report to relay information up the chain of command. The information is then integrated into the on-going PIAP and forwarded to the higher echelon S2 and G2 for IPB applications.

RESPONSIBILITIES

9-10. The responsibilities for the PIO function start with the MP company. The company has the overall responsibility of supervising the collecting and reporting of information to the higher HQ. (Refer to FM 34-2 for more information about the collection management process). Training scenarios can be developed to enhance the PIO information collecting process of both the active and passive mode. Additionally, the scenarios stress collective training (such as processing police information) and individual training (such as improving interpersonal communication and interview skills).

PLATOON LEADER

9-11. When the platoon leader is tasked to conduct PIO collecting and reporting, he initiates TLPs for the mission. The platoon leader—

- Coordinates with the higher HQ for the CCIR, police and criminal information requirements (PCIR), and threat estimates. The PCIR allows additional focus on local threats.

- Establishes liaison with civil and MP forces and law enforcement agencies in the AO.

- Coordinates with the local and HN police to determine the existence of organized crime in the AO and the identification of current and emerging criminal leaders and associates.
• Coordinates with the local and HN police and the populace to identify the types of
criminal activity (such as smuggling, counterfeiting, narcotics, extortion, and so forth)
in the AO.

• Reports information of potential intelligence value by—

  ■ Gathering collected information from squads and teams.

  ■ Consolidating original reports and sketches of potential intelligence value and
forwarding them through intelligence channels for analysis and a determination
of their intelligence value.

PLATOON MEMBERS

9-12. The platoon sergeant, squad, and team leaders, down to the junior member of the
platoon share in seeking out sources of information by—

• Collecting R&S information that supports the commander's overall PIOR and PCIR
collection efforts while on a routine patrol. They accomplish this by—

  ■ Noting terrain information pertaining to streets, roads, canals, subterranean
systems, built-up areas, cities and villages, and the impacts of weather on the
terrain.

  ■ Collecting information on progovernment and antigovernment individuals and
groups who might disrupt L&O during protests, strikes, riots, and other
spontaneous or organized efforts.

  ■ Identifying private establishments that may be a target or whose presence or
operations contribute to the disruption of L&O (such as gun shops, pawnshops,
and liquor stores).

  ■ Identifying critical infrastructures such as power stations, water works, radio
and television stations, telephone and communication facilities, public
transportation, and other establishments that may be critical to the sustenance
of the community.

• Identifying EPWs, stragglers, and DCs who may have information of potential
intelligence value and reporting it to the chain of command. Use a SPOTREP,
SITREP, or a SALUTE report or a format directed by the chain of command to report
information. SOPs may also be used. Refer to Appendix D for report formats.
**Appendix A**

**Metric Conversion Chart**

A-1. Use Table A-1 to convert from US to metric measurement and metric to US measurement.

**Table A-1. Metric Conversion Chart**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>US Units</th>
<th>Multiplied By</th>
<th>Equals Metric Units</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Length</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feet</td>
<td>0.30480</td>
<td>Meters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inches</td>
<td>2.54000</td>
<td>Centimeters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inches</td>
<td>0.02540</td>
<td>Meters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inches</td>
<td>25.40010</td>
<td>Millimeters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miles (statute)</td>
<td>1.60930</td>
<td>Kilometers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miles (nautical)</td>
<td>1.85320</td>
<td>Kilometers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yards</td>
<td>0.91400</td>
<td>Meters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Area</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Square inches</td>
<td>6.45160</td>
<td>Square centimeters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Square feet</td>
<td>0.09290</td>
<td>Square meters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Square yards</td>
<td>0.83610</td>
<td>Square meters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Volume</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cubic inches</td>
<td>16.38720</td>
<td>Cubic centimeters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cubic feet</td>
<td>0.02830</td>
<td>Cubic meters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cubic yards</td>
<td>0.76460</td>
<td>Cubic meters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gallons</td>
<td>3.78540</td>
<td>Liters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fluid ounces</td>
<td>29.57300</td>
<td>Milliliters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quarts</td>
<td>0.94600</td>
<td>Liters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weight</td>
<td>Metric Units</td>
<td>Multiplied By</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ounces</td>
<td>28.34900</td>
<td>Grams</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pounds</td>
<td>453.59000</td>
<td>Grams</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pounds</td>
<td>0.45359</td>
<td>Kilograms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Short tons</td>
<td>0.90700</td>
<td>Metric tons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Long tons</td>
<td>1.01600</td>
<td>Metric tons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Centimeters</td>
<td>0.39370</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meters per second</td>
<td>2.23700</td>
<td>Miles per hour</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Millimeters</td>
<td>0.03937</td>
<td>Inches</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kilometers</td>
<td>0.62137</td>
<td>Miles (statute)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kilometers</td>
<td>0.53960</td>
<td>Miles (nautical)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meters</td>
<td>3.28080</td>
<td>Feet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meters</td>
<td>39.37000</td>
<td>Inches</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meters</td>
<td>1.09360</td>
<td>Yards</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Square centimeters</td>
<td>0.15500</td>
<td>Square inches</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Square meters</td>
<td>10.76400</td>
<td>Square feet</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Square meters</td>
<td>1.19600</td>
<td>Square yards</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Volume</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cubic centimeters</td>
<td>0.06100</td>
<td>Cubic inches</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cubic meters</td>
<td>35.31440</td>
<td>Cubic feet</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cubic meters</td>
<td>1.30790</td>
<td>Cubic yards</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Milliliters</td>
<td>0.03380</td>
<td>Fluid ounces</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liters</td>
<td>1.05700</td>
<td>Quarts</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liters</td>
<td>0.26420</td>
<td>Gallons</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weight</td>
<td>Grams</td>
<td>Kilograms</td>
<td>Metric tons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.03527</td>
<td>2.20460</td>
<td>1.10200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ounces</td>
<td>Pounds</td>
<td>Short tons</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix B

Media Relations

Military operations are carried out, especially in the initial phases, under the full glare of public scrutiny. The press can distribute reports and pictures faster than the news can be released by the command by using satellites and modern communications technology. Incidents, sometimes embroidered or slanted towards a partisan viewpoint, are screened on the television the same day and in the countries that are parties to the dispute and their allies.

OVERVIEW

B-1. Journalists fall back on speculation when information is withheld. Such speculation, although usually inaccurate, is often near enough to the truth to be accepted as such by large sections of the public and even by the governments. Belligerents find it advantageous to leak part of a story to the press to build public support for their position. On occasion, such activities can grow into a fully orchestrated press campaign.

MEDIA INTERACTION

B-2. Establish procedures for media interaction and incorporate them into SOPs. Know what (such as a simple theme which they can tie their responses back to) to discuss with the media and what to refer to the PAO. Ensure that deploying units receive a predeployment briefing from the installation PAO to clarify what may or may not be discussed with the media. Ensure that this action occurs before any exposure to the media. Do not make off-the-record statements in briefings or discussions with the media. Public or media knowledge of any classified activity associated with an operation does not imply or mean that the information is unclassified or may be released or confirmed.

B-3. Ensure that MP are courteous, respond candidly, speak effectively, and continue the mission when interacting with broadcast and print reporters and photographers. This relationship with the media prevents any misgivings. The media will report more accurately and not feel that information is being withheld. The media provides its audiences with real-time information of varying accuracy and completeness.

B-4. The media can be a valuable tool or a lost asset during military operations. It can potentially have a quick and pervasive impact on the plans and operations of commanders, and can change the public’s opinions and perceptions about military operations. It can target audiences whose support is crucial to the desired end state of an operation. MP may be the centerpiece for humanitarian assistance or during operations to relieve suffering. A reporter or a photographer may show up at a checkpoint or a TCP where local nationals (belligerents) are refusing to cooperate. Ensure that the media is not only documenting the activities and behavior of the belligerents, but is also recording the military’s response to the incident.
Appendix C

Training Execution Model

The TEM allows numerous rehearsals and identification of the TTP required for mission accomplishment. It causes each soldier, regardless of position, to understand the unit leader's plan with contingencies and the TTP required. It allows junior leaders and soldiers to see the big picture and understand the tactical environment. Place the company as the OC for the subordinate platoons, and place the platoon leader as the OC for the subordinate squads during internal evaluations.

OVERVIEW

C-1. The TEM ensures that soldiers are trained to standard, not to time. It is derived from train-up or certification exercises (CERTEXs) before deploying to the National Training Center (NTC).

TASK IDENTIFICATION

C-2. The TEM takes place after the METL is approved. The approved METL, coupled with an assessment process (such as external or internal evaluations), determines the collective and individual tasks to be covered during training exercises. Once these tasks are identified, implement the following eight-step TEM:

   Step 1. Back brief number 1.
   Step 2. Back brief number 2.
   Step 3. Rock drill.
   Step 4. Subunit leaders walk-through.
   Step 5. Subunit leaders walk-through with troops.
   Step 6. Dry run on the actual lane.
   Step 7. Execution.
   Step 8. After-action review (AAR).

C-3. The TEM steps complement but do not replace the TLPs. The following outline explains the eight-step model applicable to an MP platoon. The TEM assumes that the platoon's collective task lists are approved at the appropriate level, the OCs are certified and trained, and all resources are available.

STEP 1: BACK BRIEF NUMBER 1

C-4. During step 1 (Figure C-1), the OC issues the mission order to the platoon leader. He
briefs the platoon's mission using a sand table, which the platoon built. The platoon leader provides a mission brief to the OC. The brief eliminates any confusion or misunderstanding at the very beginning of the mission or plan cycle. The platoon leader's brief is only with the OC. This allows the interaction between the OC and the platoon leader to take place while leaving the platoon leader's credibility intact. With no subordinate present, the environment to learn and ask questions is established.

![Diagram showing the process of briefing]

Figure C-1. Back Brief Number 1

C-5. In a nearby AA, leaders train soldiers on critical individual soldier tasks that support the platoon's collective tasks. Here, the PSG checks on the focus and progress of those individual tasks that have been assessed as weak. Additionally, AA actions in step 1 focus on PCIs.

STEP 2: BACK BRIEF NUMBER 2

C-6. During step 2 (Figure C-2), the platoon leader returns to the sand table area where the mission order is received from the OC. He briefs the tentative plan to the OC. Once the OC verifies the MTP standards and pertinent TTPs, the platoon leader briefs squad leaders on the same sand table. The OC remains present to hear the interaction among the platoon's leadership. After the squad leaders are briefed, the platoon leader conducts the leader's reconnaissance. If any modification to the tentative plan is required based on the reconnaissance, the platoon leader briefs the OC. He briefs the squad leaders again if changes are approved. The interaction and planning get more focused after the leader's reconnaissance.
STEP 3: ROCK DRILL

C-7. During step 3 (Figure C-3), the platoon leader and squad leaders conduct a rock drill on a terrain model that the platoon constructed of the actual training lane. The OC is in an overwatch position. He always assesses the interaction of the leadership and serves as the OPFOR for the rock drill. The platoon leader talks or walks through the plan on the terrain model with all the squad leaders.
C-8. In reaction to the OPFOR, leaders solidify contingencies based on the interaction on the terrain model. The OC's "what if " drills will usually trigger detailed planning. The credibility of the platoon leadership is still intact because the interaction and pertinent questions are not being asked in front of the soldiers. The soldiers are in the AA continuing their individual training and preparing equipment based on the WO received. Locate the PSG in the AA to coach team leaders in their AA activities. Once the OC is sure that the platoon leaders understand the plan, he releases them to conduct a walk-through.

**STEP 4: SUBUNIT LEADER'S WALK-THROUGH**

C-9. During step 4 (Figure C-4), the platoon leader displays all terrain features and control measures. During the walk-through, the platoon leadership imitates the movement selected, such as traveling, traveling overwatch, and bounding overwatch. The platoon leadership uses actual radio procedures and call signs according to the platoon's plan. The platoon's leadership demonstrates its grasp of the plan and the mission without troops, showing that credibility is still sound.

![Figure C-4. Subunit Leader's Walk-Through](image)

- The subleaders walk through the actions.
- The subleaders imitate the movements.
- The subleaders use actual radio call signs or procedures.
- The OC observes and releases leaders for the next step.
- The unit leader briefs the soldiers in the AA on the sand table or the terrain table.

C-10. Once the OC is satisfied that the platoon's leadership knows the tasks, he releases them to brief the soldiers on the sand tables previously mentioned. Squad leaders ensure that their team leaders and soldiers understand the mission by showing them on the sand table what their part of the mission is and how it fits into the overall scheme of maneuver.

**STEP 5: SUBUNIT LEADER'S WALK-THROUGH WITH THE TROOPS**

C-11. During step 5 (Figure C-5), the soldiers are assembled and briefed on the mission using sand tables. The MP teams walk and talk through the mission. The platoon walks through its action of the plan; and the soldiers react and dress on their team, squad, and platoon leaders. Shout commands out so that all can hear. Imitate movement as well as radio procedures, call signs, fire commands, calls for suppression, and so forth. The OC who plays the OPFOR and interacts with the platoon through its leaders observes the platoon. Often, while conducting the walk-through with the troops it will be necessary to stop and inform soldiers of any risk hazards and individual responsibilities. The platoon's interaction on the field is a critical component of mission accomplishment. The OC only releases the unit for the next step if he is satisfied that the unit understands the leader's plan.
and the required TTP.

Figure C-5. Subunit Leader's Walk-Through with the Troops

STEP 6: DRY RUN ON THE ACTUAL LANE

C-12. During step 6 (Figure C-6), the unit follows the leader's plan and conducts a dry run of the mission on the actual training lane. The OC observes to ensure that the platoon follows its plan and conducts the mission to MTP standards. The dry run identifies weak subtasks and allows the platoon to retrain or repeat the dry run. This is a full dress rehearsal and ensures that the platoon is meeting the standard. If the platoon performs satisfactorily on the dry run, the OC releases it to execute at full combat speed.

Figure C-6. Dry Run on the Actual Lane

STEP 7: EXECUTION

C-13. During step 7 (Figure C-7), the unit executes the mission at full combat speed against an unrestricted OPFOR that is controlled by the OC. This phase involves force on force, controlled by the OC, with a complete simulation system (such as multiple-integrated laser engagement system [MILES]). The OC ensures that soldiers adhere to MTP standards and TTPs. The OC calls for an end of exercise (ENDEX) when the training lane has run to
culmination (such as the mission is accomplished and all the training effects took place). The OC has enough information to assess the platoon's performance and initiate the next step—the AAR.

![Figure C-7. Execution](image)

**STEP 8: AFTER-ACTION REVIEW**

C-14. During step 8 (Figure C-8), the unit conducts an AAR of the lane. If possible, it conducts the AAR on the objective site that overlooks the lane. The OC facilitates the AAR. He or the platoon leader states the tasks, condition, and standards for the training objective. The OC ensures that the AAR becomes a review that is driven from the soldier level up toward the top. He elicits the soldiers to identify their actions, both right and wrong, and gets the leaders to do the same. The OC states what was right and wrong with the mission according to the MTP and the appropriate TTPs, always striving to leave the AAR on a positive note to improve soldier and unit morale and performance.

![Figure C-8. AAR](image)
Orders and Reports

Orders are written or oral communications directing action. They are based on plans or the receipt of a new mission. Use reports extensively to provide information to higher, lower, and adjacent commands. Although there are many, this appendix is limited to combat orders and reports. Refer to FM 101-5 for more information about orders.

ORDERS

D-1. Combat orders pertain to strategic, operational, or tactical operations and their service support. The combat orders used by MP are WOs, OPORDs, and FRAGOs.

WARNING ORDERS

D-2. Refer to FM 101-5 for an example of a WO. WOs provide advance notice of an action so that MP can use available time for preparations, and they—

- Are issued at each level down to the squad.
- Are issued to subordinates in as much detail as possible.
- Are issued as brief, oral, or written messages.
- Are a part of planning the use of available time. WOs should be kept simple.
- Describe the operation and the preparations to be made before the OPORD is issued.
- Include the situation, the mission, special instructions, and the time and place for issuing the OPORD.

OPERATION ORDERS

D-3. OPORDs coordinate actions to carry out the commander's plan for an operation, and they—

- Explain how leaders at different levels want the operation conducted. To ensure that maneuver and other non-MP units carry out actions or provide a form of support that MP plans and operations depend on, state the required actions or support in the coordinating instructions paragraph of the division and brigade OPORDs.
- Have a great impact on how subordinate leaders employ units and perform missions. For example, the MP platoon leader's latitude to employ the unit could be restricted, based on how the company commander wants the operation conducted.
- May be written, oral, graphic (such as traces and overlays), or a combination of these forms.
Are usually written when prepared at company level and above.

Have a standardized system of designating days and hours in relation to an operation or an exercise.

Follow a prescribed written format, that contains a classification, heading, body, and ending.

Have a prescribed five-paragraph format for the body of the order, which includes the following:
- Situation.
- Mission.
- Execution.
- Service support.
- Command and signal.

D-4. The risk management process is greatly enhanced by incorporating the risk assessment into the OPORD. The commander integrates risk management into the order, rather than treating it as an afterthought. Leaders at all echelons assess the effectiveness of their units by reviewing how well hazards are identified and risk controls are specified in oral and written orders. Refer to Figure D-1, for an example of an OPORD format. (Refer to FM 101-5, Appendix H, for further discussion of an OPORD.)

D-5. FRAGOs issue supplemental instructions to a current OPORD or OPLAN while the operation is in progress, and they—

- Contain missions of immediate concern to subordinate units.
- May be either written or oral.
- Provide brief, specific, and timely information without loss of clarity.
- Have no prescribed format. Prevent confusion OPORD.
- May be issued to change an OPORD that has already been issued. As such, only those items from the original OPORD that have changed are included in the FRAGO, as long as clarity is not sacrificed.

STANDING OPERATING PROCEDURES

D-6. SOPs prescribe routine methods to be followed in operations, and they—

- Supplement other combat orders.
• Reduce the number, length, and frequency of other orders. Because the SOP is a standing order, do not repeat the information contained therein in other orders unless emphasis is desired.

• Have no prescribed format. However, ensure that the subordinate unit SOPs follows the format of the next higher HQ SOP if possible.

• Prescribe actions of a recurring nature that lend themselves to definite or standardized procedures. Examples include the following items:
  ■ Troop safety matters
  ■ Methods of reporting unit locations.
  ■ Measures for handling captured personnel or equipment
  ■ Distribution of supplies.
  ■ Standard communication procedures for exercising C².
  ■ Other items that lend themselves to standardization.

NOTE: These items are generally the constants in what is otherwise a frequently changing set of circumstances.

-------------------
(Classification)

Place the classification at the top and bottom of every page of the OPORD.

(Change from oral orders, if any.)

This statement is applicable only if an oral order is issued by the commander. The phrases "No change from oral orders" or "No change from oral orders except paragraph --- " are necessary here.

Copy --- of --- copies
Issuing HQ
Place of issue (coordinates)
DTG of signature

Show the place of issue (location of the issuing HQ) on each copy. Show the name of the town or the place in capital letters, the coordinates in parentheses, and the country in capital letters. Both may encode.

The effective time for implementing the plan or order is the same as the DTG, unless coordinating instructions state otherwise. When orders apply to units in different time zones, use time zone Zulu (Z). In OPORDs and service support orders, list the time zone applicable to the operation in the heading of the order following the references. When an
order does not specify the actual date and hour for beginning an operation, apply the proper reference designations.

Message Reference Number

Message reference numbers are internal control numbers that the unit signal officer issues and assigns to all orders. The unit's SOP normally describes the number's allocation and use. Using the number allows an addressee to acknowledge receiving the message in the clear.

OPORD ------- (code name)
(Number)

Orders normally contain a code name and are numbered consecutively within a calendar year.

Reference(s): The heading of the order includes a list of maps, charts, datum, or other related documents the unit will need to understand the plan or order. The user does not need to reference the SOP but may refer to it in the body of the order. The user references a map using the map series number (and country or geographic area, if required), sheet number, name, edition, and scale, if required. Datum is the mathematical model of the earth used to calculate the coordinates on any map. Different nations use different datums for printing coordinates on their maps. Reference the datum in the marginal information of each map.

Time Zone Used Throughout the Order: The time zone used throughout the order (including annexes and appendixes) is the time zone applicable to the operation. Operations across several time zones use Z time.

Task Organization: Describe the allocation of forces to support the commander's concept. Show task organization in one of two places: preceding paragraph one or in an annex, if the task organization is long and complicated.

OPORD ------- - ---------------------
(Number) (Issuing HQ)

(Task Organization continues)

1. SITUATION.

a. Enemy Forces. Express this information down to two enemy echelons below yours (for example, battalions address platoons or companies address squads). Describe the enemy's most likely and most dangerous COA. When possible, provide a sketch of the enemy COA in lieu of verbiage (Appendix --- [sketch] to Annex --- [title]). Include an assessment of terrorist activities directed against US government interests in the AOs. Reference more sources using the final subparagraph to refer the reader to the documentation.

b. Friendly Forces. Include the mission, the commander's intent, and the concept of operations for HQ one and two levels up. Subparagraphs state the missions of the flank units (left, right, front, and rear) and other units whose actions would have a
significant bearing on the issuing HQ.

c. **Attachments and Detachments.** State when, and for how long, units are attached or detached to the operation. Do not repeat information already listed under task organization or in a task organization annex. State "See Annex --- (title)" here if a task organization annex is necessary.

2. **MISSION.** State the mission derived during the planning process. This statement describes the task and purpose of the operation and clearly indicates the action to be taken and its reason. There are no subparagraphs in a mission statement. The mission statement covers on-order missions.

3. **EXECUTION.**

Intent: State the commander's intent derived during the planning process. It is a clear, concise statement of what the force must do to succeed with respect to the enemy and the terrain. It provides the link between the mission and the concept of the operation, which provides the basis for subordinate initiative and decentralized mission execution. Always include the desired end state.

a. **Concept of Operations.** The concept of operations may be a single paragraph or divided into two or more subparagraphs. It is based on the COA statement from the decision-making process and, at a minimum, should address close, deep, rear, and security operations as well as designating the main effort. The commander uses this subparagraph when he feels he must supply enough detail to ensure appropriate action by subordinates in the absence of additional communications or further instructions. When an operation involves two or more clearly distinct and separate phases, the concept of operations may be prepared in subparagraphs describing each phase. Ensure that the concept statement is concise and understandable. The concept describes the following:

- The employment of maneuver elements in a scheme of maneuver.
- A plan of fire support or scheme of fires supporting the maneuver with fires.
- The integration of other major elements or systems within the operation, including reconnaissance and security elements, intelligence assets, engineer assets, and air defense.

NOTE: Depending on what the commander considers appropriate, the level of command, and the complexity of any given operation, the following subparagraphs are examples of what may be included within the concept of operations:

1. **Maneuver.** State the scheme of maneuver derived during the planning process. Ensure that this paragraph is consistent with the operation overlay. Ensure that this paragraph and the operation overlay is complementary and adds to the clarity of, rather than duplicating, each other. Do not duplicate information to be incorporated into the unit subparagraphs and coordinating instructions.
(2) **Fires.** State the scheme of fires to support the concept, and include priorities of and restrictions for fire support.

(3) **Reconnaissance and Surveillance.** Specify the reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S) plan and explain how it ties in with the basic concept of operations.

(4) **Engineer.** Clarify the scheme of engineer support to the plan, paying particular attention to the integration of engineer assets and obstacles, including the priorities of effort.

(5) **Air Defense.** State the overall concept of air defense in support of the scheme of maneuver if necessary.

(6) **Information Operations.** State the overall concept of information operations in support of the scheme of maneuver. Refer to the appropriate annexes if necessary.

**NOTE:** Units required to accomplish specific tasks for information operations and R&S are specified in the appropriate subparagraphs of 3b (tasks to maneuver [subordinate] units).

b. **Tasks to Maneuver (Subordinate) Units.** Clearly state the missions or tasks for each maneuver (or subordinate element) unit that reports directly to the HQ issuing the order. List the units in the same sequence as in the task organization, including attachments. Use a separate subparagraph for each subordinate element. State the tasks that are necessary for comprehension, clarity, and emphasis. Place tactical tasks that commonly affect two or more elements in subparagraph 3c (coordinating instructions).

c. **Coordinating Instructions.** List only those instructions applicable to two or more units (subordinate elements) and not routinely covered in unit SOPs. This is always the last subparagraph in paragraph 3.

**NOTE:** The following are examples of subparagraphs that are generally included as coordinating instructions. Subparagraphs 1 through 5 below are mandatory.

(1) Time or condition when an order becomes effective.

(2) **CCIR.**

   (a) Priority intelligence requirements (PIR).

   (b) Essential elements of friendly information (EEFI).

   (c) Friendly force information requirements (FFIR).

(3) Risk-reduction control measures may include such items as MOPP,
operational exposure guidance, vehicle recognition signals, and fratricide prevention.

(4) ROE. When lengthy and complicated, include ROE as a separate annex.

(5) Environmental considerations.

(6) Force protection.

(7) Any additional coordinating instructions.

4. SERVICE SUPPORT. Address service support in the areas shown below as needed to clarify the service support concept. Refer to any annexes, where necessary. Subparagraphs can include the following:

a. Support Concept. State the concept of logistics support necessary to support the operation. Include the concept for—
   - Support HQ or support area locations, including locations of logistical bases if not clearly conveyed in the overlay.
   - Commander's support priorities.
   - HN support.
   - Any significant sustainment risks.
   - Unique support requirements in the functional areas of manning, arming, fueling, fixing, moving, and sustaining the soldier and the systems.

b. Materiel and Services.

c. Medical Evacuation and Hospitalization. At a minimum, include frequencies, call signs, and locations of medical support facilities and units, as well as the plan for casualty evacuation (CASEVAC).

d. Personnel Support.

e. EPW.

f. Transportation.

5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL.

a. Command. State the map coordinates for the CP locations and potential future locations for each echelon CP applicable to the operation. Identify the chain of command if not clearly addressed in unit SOPs.

b. Signal. List signal instructions not specified in unit SOPs; and identify the specific
SOI addition in effect, required reports and formats, and the times the reports are submitted. List primary and alternate means of communications, as well as pyrotechnic signals and their meanings.

**Acknowledge**: Include instructions for the acknowledgement of the order by addressees. The word acknowledge may suffice or a message reference number. Acknowledgement of an order means that it has been received and understood.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Commander's last name</th>
<th>Rank</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

The commander or his authorized representative signs the original copy. If the representative signs the original, add the phrase "For the Commander." The signed copy is the historical copy and remains in the HQ files. It is always designated "Copy 1 of ------- copies."

**OFFICIAL**: 
(Authentication) Use only when applicable. If the commander signs the original, no further authentication is required. If the commander does not sign, authorization is required by the signature of the preparing officer or individual and only the last name and rank of the commander appear in the signature block.

**Annexes**: List annexes by letter and title and in the sequence by which they were referenced in the order.

**Distribution**: Furnish distribution copies either for action or for information. List in detail those who are to receive the order. If extremely lengthy, refer to an annex containing the distribution list or a standard distribution list or SOP.

Place the classification at the top and bottom of every page of the OPORD.

**Figure D-1. OPORD Format**

**REPORTS**

MP contribute to the commander's situational awareness by providing timely information to higher HQ. They collect and report information in the form of administrative, operational, or intelligence reports. These reports ensure that the commander receives continuous current information. Tables D-1 through D-3 are examples of reports used by MP when conducting CS operations. Refer to FM 101-5-2 for a complete listing of the standardized Army report and message formats.

**Table D-1. Administrative Reports**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Types</th>
<th>Who</th>
<th>What</th>
<th>When</th>
<th>Where</th>
<th>How</th>
<th>Content</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Casualty</td>
<td>The unit or</td>
<td>The</td>
<td>Upon</td>
<td>Higher HQ</td>
<td>By the</td>
<td>DA Form 1156 or</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Authority</th>
<th>Security</th>
<th>Form/Document</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Personnel</td>
<td>Submitted at company level and higher (input is needed from the squad or section)</td>
<td>Daily</td>
<td>Higher HQ</td>
<td>Most secure means and encoded if by unsecure radio</td>
<td>DA Form 5367-R</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Periodic Logistic</td>
<td>Submitted at company level and higher (input is needed from the squad or the section)</td>
<td>As supplies become depleted or as required by the SOP</td>
<td>Higher HQ</td>
<td>By the most secure means and encoded if by unsecure radio</td>
<td>DA Form 5367-R</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Journal</td>
<td>Units or sections operating independent of the parent organization</td>
<td>As events occur over the given or specified period</td>
<td>Maintained locally (provide to higher HQ on request)</td>
<td>Logistical situation, Supply, Maintenance, Transportation, Service</td>
<td>DA Form 1594</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Closing</td>
<td>The unit leader</td>
<td>Notice of change of the location</td>
<td>Higher HQ</td>
<td>Secure the radio</td>
<td>Unit, Date and time, CP location, Vehicles and radios</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table D-2. Operational Reports

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Who</th>
<th>What</th>
<th>When</th>
<th>Where</th>
<th>How</th>
<th>Content</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Situation and status</td>
<td>Commander or leader closest to the situation</td>
<td>Tactical situation or status</td>
<td>Immediately after a significant event or as specified</td>
<td>Higher HQ.</td>
<td>By the most secure means and encoded if by unsecured radio</td>
<td>• Enemy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Own situation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• CS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Commander's evaluation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Force tracking (diversion, holding, or passing)</td>
<td>Designated TCP and mounted patrols</td>
<td>Unit movement along the MSR</td>
<td>As requested or designated in the SOP</td>
<td>Local movement control unit</td>
<td>Secure voice or encoded</td>
<td>Division transportation office (DTO) or the Provost Marshal Office (PMO) adopted SOP format</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Offense</td>
<td>TCP and mounted patrols</td>
<td>Violation of MSR regulations</td>
<td>When tasked to conduct MMS and MSR regulations are in force</td>
<td>Through military channels to the driver's commander</td>
<td>Written report. (refer to FMs 55-10 and 101-5)</td>
<td>• Date</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Driver's name</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Name of vehicle commander</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Particulars of the offense observed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EPW</td>
<td>Platoon, squad, and team operating the collecting points</td>
<td>The number of EPWs collected and evacuated</td>
<td>As required</td>
<td>Higher HQ</td>
<td>By the most secure means and encoded if by unsecured radio</td>
<td>Per SOP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intention of laying a minefield</td>
<td>Platoon, squad, or team leader</td>
<td>Tactical objectives and</td>
<td>Before emplacing the mines</td>
<td>Higher HQ</td>
<td>Written or by a secure</td>
<td>• Purpose of the minefield</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table D-3. Intelligence Reports

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Who</th>
<th>What</th>
<th>When</th>
<th>Where</th>
<th>How</th>
<th>Content</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Spot  | Unit, section, or individual observing the enemy (all the echelons) | Enemy activity and area information of immediate value | Upon contact or as requested | Higher HQ     | By the quickest means and encoded if by unsecured radio | • Reporting unit  
• Date and time of the event  
• Location and grid coordinates (encoded)  
• Event (SALUTE)  
• Original source |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Remarks</th>
<th>Soldier experiencing electronic warfare (MIJI)</th>
<th>Correct report according to the type of interference</th>
<th>As soon as possible after the incident</th>
<th>Through signal channels to the higher HQ.</th>
<th>SOI defines the report and how to prepare it</th>
<th>Type of report</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NBC 1</td>
<td>Observer</td>
<td>Observation concerning suspected NBC attacks and resulting hazardous areas</td>
<td>Upon observing a suspected enemy NBC attack</td>
<td>Higher HQ.</td>
<td>Secure radio</td>
<td>Frequency or channel affected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NBC 4</td>
<td>Element in contact with radiation</td>
<td>Radiation dose rates</td>
<td>Upon contact with radiological contamination or as directed</td>
<td>To higher HQ</td>
<td>Secure radio</td>
<td>Type of emission or audio characteristics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patrol</td>
<td>Patrol leader</td>
<td>Pertinent information pertaining to the patrol's activity</td>
<td>Upon completion of the patrol</td>
<td>To higher HQ</td>
<td>Written</td>
<td>Coordinates of the affected station</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- Observer's location
- Direction from the observer
- Date-time group (DTG) of the attack
- Type of burst
- Location
- Dose rate
- DTG of the measurement

- Designation of the patrol
- Maps
- Terrain
- Enemy
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Enemy minefield location</th>
<th>Soldiers encountering an enemy minefield</th>
<th>Characteristics of the minefield</th>
<th>Upon locating a minefield</th>
<th>To higher HQ</th>
<th>Secure radio (refer to FM 20-32)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

- Results of encounters with the enemy
- Condition of the patrol
- Type of minefield
- Location and depth
- Enemy weapons or surveillance
- Routes for bypassing
- Coordinates of lane entry and exit
- Width of lanes, in meters
- Map sheet designation
- Date and time information collected
- Coordinates of minefield boundaries
- Estimated time to clear the minefield
- Estimated material and equipment required to clear the minefield

DODDOA-009907
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SALUTE</th>
<th>Observer</th>
<th>Enemy activity; for example, convoy, patrol vehicles, and aircraft</th>
<th>Upon encountering the enemy's activity</th>
<th>Higher HQ</th>
<th>By the most secure means and encoded if by unsecure radio (refer to FM 101-5)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

- Other, such as the type of the mine, new mines, or booby traps
Appendix E

Precombat Inspections

Combat missions start with PCIs. These PCIs are an essential part of every mission. The objective of PCIs is to confirm the combat readiness of the unit. Subordinate leaders conduct detailed checks, allowing the unit leader to conduct PCIs in an atmosphere of total preparedness. After the PCI, the unit is prepared to move on the receipt of orders.

MODIFIED PRECOMBAT INSPECTION CHECKLIST

E-1. A modified PCI checklist (Figure E-1) ensures that the team has the required equipment to conduct its mission when the unit is short on time. The modified PCI allows the team leader to focus on preparing the team for the mission, while the platoon leader issues the mission to the squad leader. Use the checklist as a recovery checklist when the team returns from the mission. Immediate, proper recovery ensures that the team is ready for the next mission. This checklist is only a guide and can be modified based on METT-TC and the unit SOP.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Steps</th>
<th>Actions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>The squad leader and the team leader receive the WO.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>The team leader prepares the squad for movement, while the squad leader is receiving the mission from the platoon leader.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>The team leader follows the same checklist, while the squad leader debriefs the platoon leader if recovering from a mission.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>The team leader inspects the communications equipment and ammunition in HMMWVs. He—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Conducts a communications check with the platoon CP.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Ensures that proper frequencies are set and that call signs are available.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Ensures that there is a Single-Channel, Ground-to-Air Radio System (SINCGARS), a manpack, accessories, and a battery case.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Ensures that there are batteries for the radios (automated net control device [ANCD], precision lightweight global positioning system receiver [PLGR], OE-254).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Ensures that the Class V basic load is accounted for.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>The driver conducts preoperation checks and services on the vehicle. He ensures that—</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The correct paperwork is completed, such as the dispatch, folder, and signature. Ensures that the correct TM is on hand.

He has a valid driver's license.

Preventive-maintenance checks and services (PMCS) are performed to a -10 standard.

A current DA Form 2404 is on hand.

The fire extinguisher is sealed, tagged, and dated.

The engine's coolant, oil, transmission fluid, and washer fluid are at the correct level.

The battery level is correct and that cables are secured.

Lights are operational.

Fuel and water cans are filled and that there are meals, ready-to-eat (MREs) available.

There are no exhaust leaks.

Basic-issue item (BII), on-vehicle material (OVM), pioneer tools, locks, and chains are present on the vehicle.

The load plan is followed and that the vehicle's interior is clean.

The gunner conducts preoperation checks and services on the crew-served weapon and NBC equipment. He ensures that—

A TM for the equipment (-10) is available.

The weapon is oiled, cleaned, and functional.

There is a spare barrel and BII.

There is a T&E mechanism.

There is a wrench.

There is a tripod mount with an adapter.

There are weapon cleaning kits present.

There are night vision devices (NVDs) present.
All the NBC equipment is present and serviceable.

**Figure E-1. Modified PCI Checklist**

**PRECOMBAT INSPECTION CHECKLIST**

E-2. This PCI checklist is extensive and time-consuming. Use it when the team has a lot of downtime and has a secure environment in which to work. Once combat operations begin, the secure environment and the downtime will be lost. **Figure E-2** is a draft checklist, which may be modified to meet the needs of the unit.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Steps</th>
<th>Actions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Soldiers. Soldiers should ensure that they—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Have a seasonal uniform. The uniform should include the following:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Load-carrying equipment (LCE) that is complete.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• First aid packet.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Canteens that are full and have a M17 drinking cap.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• M40 with a hood, M258A1 kit, M13 kit, and optical inserts (if required).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Kevlar with a camouflage cover and band.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Individual weapon with 6 magazines.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• ID tags around the neck and ID cards.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Ear plugs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Have been briefed on the current situation and the mission.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Possess a current driver's license.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Have been briefed on hot- and cold-weather injuries.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Leaders. Leaders should conduct a safety briefing, to include—

• Checking for hazards, such as ticks, chiggers, and spiders, and taking preventive first aid measures.

• Checking for snake hazards and ensuring that there is first aid.
• Checking for poisonous plants, such as oak, ivy, and sumac.

• Checking for hot- and cold-weather injuries and preventing them.

• Ensuring that correct driving practices are followed, to include—
  ■ Speed in relation to the weather.
  ■ Ground guides.
  ■ Seat belts.
  ■ Blackout driving.
  ■ Gunner positioning (goggles).

• Ensuring that equipment is set up, such as camouflage nets or tents.

• Ensuring that there are fire-prevention vehicles and tents.

• Taking appropriate actions during severe weather.

• Using pyrotechnics.

• Using the buddy system for safety and during the mission.

Vehicle commander, squad leader, or team leader. The vehicle commander, squad leader, or team leader ensures that—

• There is a map with a current overlay.

• There is a current SOI.

• Includes the following in the leader packet:
  ■ A unit tactical standing operating procedure (TACSOP).
  ■ Map markers.
  ■ Overlay sheets.
  ■ A notebook and a pen or a pencil.
  ■ A route reconnaissance GTA card.
  ■ A bridge classification GTA card.
  ■ A call for-fire GTA card.
- A rigging GTA card.
- An NBC GTA card.
- An EPW GTA card (GTA 19-7-1).
- Flex cuffs for EPWs.
- A DD Form 1408.
- A DA Form 4137.
- A DA Form 3975.
- A DD Form 2708.
- A DA Form 3881.
- A DA Form 2823.
- A compass and a wrist watch.
- Batteries for all the equipment.
- Binoculars.
- NVGs.
- A sensitive item serial number list (radio, weapons, NVGs, and so forth).

### Vehicles.

- Tie down all the items according to the load plan, and ensure that—
  - There is space left for ammunition.
  - The TA-50 is loaded.
  - The MOPP chemical protective overgarment (CPOG) is stored for ready access.
  - The gas tank is topped off.
  - There are POL package products and weapon oil.
  - Water cans are full.
- Spare fuel cans are full and tied down.
- MRE rations are inventoried and stored.
- There are weapon-cleaning kits.
- The OVM is stored and serviceable.
- There are chock blocks.
- That a complete first aid kit is available.
- A TM for the equipment (-10) on hand.
- A vehicle dispatch packet and a DA Form 2404 are available.
- There are tools and tool kits.
- There are tire chains.
- The spare tire is properly stowed.

- Perform a premovement inspection and ensure that—
  - There is a current TM (-10) on hand.
  - There are no fuel leaks.
  - The fire extinguisher is sealed, tagged, and dated.
  - The engine coolant level is correct.
  - The oil level is correct.
  - The transmission fluid level is correct.
  - The battery level is correct and the cables are tight.
  - The air filter is clean and secure.
  - The lights are operational.
  - There are no exhaust leaks.
  - The fuel filter is drained.
  - Warning triangles are on hand.
- The canvas is attached and tied down.
- The gauges are functional.
- The tire pressure is correct.
- The vehicle service is current.
- The interior of the vehicle is clean and orderly.

3 Crew-served weapons. Ensure that—
- All mounting equipment is present.
- The TM for the weapon (-10) is available.
- There is a spare barrel and BII (such as gloves, a T&E mechanism, a wrench, a blank adapter, a tripod mount with an adapter, and a cleaning kit).
- The NVDs are operational.
- The tripod is clean and serviceable.
- The weapons are mounted with pins.

4 Communications equipment. Ensure that—
- Radios (vehicles or manpacks)—
  - Are operational.
  - Are secure.
  - Have the proper frequency setting.
  - Have a matching unit operational/set.
  - Have an antenna with the tip protector tied down.
  - Have connectors that are clean and serviceable.
  - Have batteries available.
  - Have the TM for the equipment (-10) is on hand.
  - Have cleaning materials available (such as cotton swabs, alcohol, steel wool, and so forth).
The field telephone (TA 312) is operational.

The digital nonsecure voice terminal (DNVT) with wire is operational (communication).

The appropriate phone listing is available.

Radio antennas (OE 254s) are complete.

Communication test sets, including tools, are on hand.

Frequencies, call signs, challenges, and passwords are disseminated.

Each team has one SINCGARS manpack for quick-dismount operations.

NBC equipment.

- Ensure that protective clothing is complete and serviceable.

- Ensure that the M40 is complete, such as—
  - M13 deconnaissance kit.
  - M258A1 deconnaissance kit.
  - M256 detector kit.
  - M8 detector paper.
  - M9 detector paper.
  - Antifogging kit.
  - Hood.
  - Optical inserts, if needed.
  - Waterproof bag.

- Ensure that the mask and hood are serviceable.

- Implement the proper MOPP level.

- Brief the threat condition.

- Ensure that nerve agent antidotes are available.

- Issue and mount M11 deconnaissance apparatus, to include the following:
- Two DS2 cans per vehicle.
- An M8 alarm.
- An M229 refill kit for each M8.

- Ensure that NBC defense equipment is available, such as—
  - An M256 agent detector kit.
  - An M 174 RADIAC meter.
  - Two sets of batteries for the IM 174.
  - An IM 93/147 RADIAC meter (dosimeter).
  - A PP 157A RADIAC charger 1/IM 93/147.
  - NBC contamination signs (marking kits).

Figure E-2. Extensive PCI Checklist
Appendix F

Fratricide Avoidance

Fratricide is defined as the unforeseen or unintentional death, injury, or damage to friendly personnel or equipment. It is committed during the employment of friendly weapons and munitions with the intent to kill the enemy or destroy his equipment or facilities. Fratricide prevention is the commander's responsibility, and all leaders assist him across all operating systems to accomplish this mission.

FRATRICIDE

F-1. Friendly forces operating in the sustainment area are particularly vulnerable to fratricide due to the high concentration of soldiers. Most MP missions are conducted in the sustainment area in support of these friendly forces. During MP operations, it is critical that MP know where other friendly elements are operating. With this knowledge, they anticipate dangerous conditions and take steps to either avoid or mitigate them. The platoon leader is always aware of changes and developments in the situation that may place friendly forces in danger from MP long-range weapon systems.

F-2. It is important that other friendly forces operating in the AO know the location of MP to prevent them from becoming victims of fratricide. MP leaders constantly report the location of their forces to higher HQ. Higher HQ disseminates this information to other friendly forces. When the platoon leader perceives potential for fratricide, he quickly responds to prevent it.

FRATRICIDE EFFECTS

F-3. Fratricide results in unacceptable losses and increases the risk of mission failure; it usually affects the unit's ability to survive and function. Units experiencing fratricide suffer the following consequences:

- Loss of confidence in the unit's leadership.
- Increased self-doubt among the leaders.
- Hesitancy to employ deadly force.
- Oversupervision of units.
- Hesitancy to conduct night operations.
- Loss of aggressiveness.
- Loss of initiative.
- Disrupted operations.
- General degradation of unit cohesiveness, morale, and combat power.
FRATRICIDE CAUSES

F-4. The following paragraphs discuss the primary causes of fratricide. MP leaders must identify any of the factors that may affect their soldiers and strive to eliminate or correct them.

TARGET IDENTIFICATION

F-5. The primary cause of fratricide is the lack of positive target identification. MP must positively identify targets before engaging.

LAND NAVIGATION FAILURES

F-6. MP may stray into unknown locations, report wrong locations, and become disoriented. In this situation, they may unexpectedly encounter an errant unit, that may fire their weapons at the friendly force.

REPORTING AND COMMUNICATION FAILURES

F-7. Units at all levels may fail to generate timely, accurate, and complete reports as locations and tactical situations change. This distorts the tactical picture available at each level and can lead to erroneous clearance of supporting fire.

WEAPON ERRORS

F-8. Lapses in individual discipline can result in fratricide. These incidents include charge errors, accidental discharges, mistakes with explosives and hand grenades, and incorrect gun data use.

OPERATION HAZARDS

F-9. A variety of explosive devices and materiel may create danger on the battlefield, such as UXO, unmarked or unrecorded minefields (including scatterable mines), and booby traps. Failure to mark, record, remove, or otherwise anticipate these threats will lead to casualties.

FRATRICIDE RISK ASSESSMENT

F-10. Table F-1 shows an example of a work sheet for evaluating fratricide risk in the context of mission requirements. The work sheet lists six mission accomplishment factors that affect the fratricide risk, along with related considerations for each factor. Platoon leaders assess the potential risk in each area (low, medium, or high), and assign a point value to each (one point for low risk, two for medium risk, three for high risk), and add the point values to calculate the overall fratricide assessment score.

F-11. They use the resulting score only as a guide. The platoon leader's final assessment is based on observable risk factors, such as those listed on the work sheet, and on his feel for the intangible factors affecting the operation. Note that descriptive terms are listed only in
the low- and high-risk columns of the work sheet. The assessment of each factor determines whether the risk matches one of these extremes or lies somewhere between them as a medium risk.

Table F-1. Fratricide Risk Assessment Work Sheet

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factors Affecting Fratricide</th>
<th>Potential Risk Categories (With Variable Conditions and Point Values)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Low Risk (1 point)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Understanding of the Plan</td>
<td>Clear</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commander’s intent</td>
<td>Clear</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Complexity</td>
<td>Simple</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enemy situation</td>
<td>Known</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Friendly situation</td>
<td>Clear</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROE/ROI</td>
<td>Clear</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Environmental Factors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factors Affecting Fratricide</th>
<th>Potential Risk Categories</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intervisibility</td>
<td>Favorable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Obscuration</td>
<td>Clear</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battle tempo</td>
<td>Slow</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Positive target ID</td>
<td>100 percent</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Control Measures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factors Affecting Fratricide</th>
<th>Potential Risk Categories</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Command relationships</td>
<td>Organic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Audio communications</td>
<td>Loud/clear</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Visual communications</td>
<td>Easily seen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Graphics</td>
<td>Standard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOP</td>
<td>Standard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liaison personnel</td>
<td>Proficient</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Location/navigation</td>
<td>Sure</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Equipment (Compared to US Equipment)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Friendly</th>
<th>Similar</th>
<th>Different</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Enemy</td>
<td>Different</td>
<td>Similar</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Training

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Individual proficiency</th>
<th>MOS qualified</th>
<th>Untrained</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unit proficiency</td>
<td>Trained</td>
<td>Untrained</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rehearsals</td>
<td>Realistic</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Habitual relationship</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Endurance</td>
<td>Alert</td>
<td>Fatigued</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Planning Time (Based on the 1/3-2/3 Rule)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Higher HQ</th>
<th>Adequate</th>
<th>Inadequate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Own unit</td>
<td>Adequate</td>
<td>Inadequate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subordinate elements</td>
<td>Adequate</td>
<td>Inadequate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall risk assessment (by total point value)</td>
<td>26-46 points</td>
<td>42-62 points</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**NOTE:** Point values alone may not accurately reflect fratricide risk. The commander tailors the assessment to the unit's requirements. Refer to FM 100-14.

### PREVENTIVE MEASURES

F-12. These measures provide the platoon leader with a guide to actions he can take to reduce and prevent fratricide risk. These guidelines are not directive in nature, nor are they intended to restrict initiative. All MP leaders must learn to apply them as appropriate based on the specific situation and METT-TC factors. Platoon leaders must educate their soldiers on the following reduction and prevention of fratricide principles:

- Identifying and assessing the potential fratricide risks in the estimate of the situation. Express the risks in the OPORD and applicable FRAGOs.

- Maintaining situational awareness. Focusing on such areas as current intelligence, unit locations and/or dispositions, denial areas (minefields and scatterable mines; contaminated areas, such as improved conventional munitions [ICM] and NBC), SITREPs, and METT-TC factors.

- Ensuring positive target identification. Review vehicle and weapons ID cards.
Become familiar with the characteristics of potential friendly and enemy vehicles, including their silhouettes and thermal signatures.

- Establishing a command climate that emphasizes fratricide prevention. Enforce fratricide prevention measures, placing special emphasis on the use of doctrinally sound TTP. Ensure supervision in the execution of orders and in the performance of all tasks and missions to standard.

F-13. Additional considerations for fratricide reduction and prevention include the following:

- Reporting MP patrol locations accurately. The TOC and CP track the patrols' locations in relationship to friendly forces.
- Recognizing the signs of battlefield stress. Maintain unit cohesion by taking quick, effective actions to alleviate the battlefield stress.
- Conducting individual, leader, and collective (unit) training covering fratricide awareness.
- Giving complete and concise mission orders.
- Simplifying mission orders by using SOPs that are consistent with the doctrine. Periodically review and update SOPs as needed.
- Striving to provide maximum planning time for leaders and subordinates.
- Planning and establishing effective communications.
- Ensuring that ROE are clear and understood.
- Conducting rehearsals when the situation allows.
- Being in the right place at the right time. If an MP patrol becomes lost or misoriented, leaders must know how to contact higher HQ immediately for instructions and assistance.
- Including a discussion of fratricide incidents in all AARs.

FRIENDLY FIRE INCIDENTS

F-14. MP patrol's could become involved in a friendly fire incident in one of several ways: as the victim of the fire, as the firing element, or as an observer observing an attack of one friendly element on another. If a patrol encounters such a situation, it should follow the procedures for the various situations listed below:

FALL VICTIM TO FRIENDLY FIRES

F-15. When falling victim to friendly fire, react to contact until recognizing friendly fire,
then—

- Cease fire.
- Take immediate actions to protect soldiers and vehicles.
- Use a visual recognition signal directing the firing unit to cease fire.
- Report the following on the next higher unit net:
  - Announce that friendly fire has been received.
  - Request medical assistance as needed.
  - Give the location and direction of the firing vehicles.
  - Warn the higher unit not to return fire if the firing unit has been identified as friendly.

ENGAGE FRIENDLY FORCES

F-16. When engaging friendly forces, cease fire and report the following on the next higher unit net:

- The ID of the engaged friendly
Appendix G

MK19 Qualification Tables

The tables in this appendix are designed to enable the MK19 gunner and assistant gunner to qualify with the weapon.

NOTE: These tables are not for ASV qualification. The ASV tables are under development.

PRIMARY GUNNER, MK19 QUALIFICATION AND ZERO/PRACTICE TABLES

G-1. Table G-1 is a zero/practice table for the MK19 primary gunner.

Table G-1. Primary Gunner Zero/Practice Table

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Task</th>
<th>Condition</th>
<th>Standard</th>
<th>Ammunition</th>
<th>Time</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mount the MK19 on a vehicle or a M3 tripod</td>
<td>Given a mounted MK19, an M3 tripod, an M64 gun mount, a T&amp;E mechanism, an organic carrier, and a selected firing position</td>
<td>The gun crew must be able to mount the MK19 on a vehicle or a tripod.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2 minutes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zero the MK19 using a 400-meter vehicle target</td>
<td>Given a mounted MK19, a 400-meter vehicle target, a selected firing position, and 4 40-millimeter training practice (TP) rounds</td>
<td>The gunner must impact on the target with at least one of the 4 40-millimeter TP rounds.</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>No time limit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engage a stationary vehicle target at 1,100 meters</td>
<td>Given a mounted MK19, a vehicle target at 1,100 meters, a selected firing position, and 4 40-millimeter TP rounds</td>
<td>The gunner must impact on the vehicle target with at least 1 of the 4 rounds.</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>No time limit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engage a stationary vehicle target at 1,500 meters</td>
<td>Given a mounted MK19, a vehicle target at 1,500 meters, a selected firing position, and 4 40-millimeter TP rounds</td>
<td>The gunner must impact on the vehicle target with at least 1 of the 4 rounds.</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>No time limit</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Given a mounted MK19, a vehicle target at 600 meters, a selected firing position, and 4 40-millimeter TP rounds

The gunner must impact on the vehicle target with at least 1 of the 4 rounds.

No time limit

Dismount the MK19 from the vehicle or the tripod

Given a mounted MK19 and a selected firing position

The gunner must take the MK19 out of operation from the carrier or tripod.

1 minute

---

**PRIMARY GUNNER, INDIVIDUAL MK19 QUALIFICATION (DAY), DISMOUNTED**

G-2. Table G-2 is the MK19 qualification table for the primary gunner, dismounted. The commander may decide to fire using this table (mounted) based on the METT-TC.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Task</th>
<th>Condition</th>
<th>Standard</th>
<th>Ammunition</th>
<th>Time</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mount the MK19 on an M3 tripod or a vehicle</strong></td>
<td>Given a mounted MK19, an M3 tripod, an M64 gun mount, a T&amp;E mechanism, an organic carrier, and a selected firing position</td>
<td>The gun crew must be able to mount the MK19 on a vehicle or a tripod.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>120 seconds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Engage a stationary vehicle target at 800 meters</strong></td>
<td>Given a mounted MK19, a selected firing position, 6 40-millimeter TP rounds, and a vehicle target at 800 meters</td>
<td>The gunner must impact on the vehicle target with at least 2 of the 6 rounds.</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>90 seconds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Engage a stationary vehicle target at 600 meters</strong></td>
<td>Given a mounted MK19, a selected firing position, 4 40-millimeter TP rounds, and a vehicle target at 600 meters</td>
<td>The gunner must impact on the vehicle target with at least 1 of the 4 rounds.</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>90 seconds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Engage a stationary vehicle target at 1,100 meters</strong></td>
<td>Given a mounted MK19, a vehicle target at 1,100 meters, a selected firing position, and 6 40-millimeter TP rounds</td>
<td>The gunner must impact on the vehicle target with at least 2 of the 6 rounds.</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>120 seconds</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**PRIMARY GUNNER, MK19 QUALIFICATION, MOUNTED**

G-3. Table G-3 is the primary gunner's individual MK19 qualification table, mounted.

* Table G-3. Primary Gunner, Mounted

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Task</th>
<th>Condition</th>
<th>Standard</th>
<th>Ammunition</th>
<th>Time</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mount the MK19 on a vehicle or a M3 tripod</td>
<td>Given a mounted MK19, an organic carrier, an M3 tripod, an M64 gun mount, a T&amp;E mechanism, and a selected firing position</td>
<td>The gun crew must be able to mount the MK19 on a vehicle or a tripod.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>120 seconds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engage a stationary vehicle target at 400 meters</td>
<td>Given a mounted MK19, a selected firing position, 4 40-millimeter TP rounds, and a vehicle target at 400 meters</td>
<td>The gunner must impact on the vehicle target with at least 2 of the 4 rounds.</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>90 seconds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engage a stationary vehicle target at 1,100 meters</td>
<td>Given a mounted MK19, a selected firing position, 8 40-millimeter TP rounds and a vehicle target at 1,100 meters</td>
<td>The gunner must impact on the vehicle target with at least 2 of the 8 rounds.</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>120 seconds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engage troops at 600 meters</td>
<td>Given a mounted MK19, a selected firing position, 4 40-millimeter TP rounds, and a troop target at 600 meters</td>
<td>The gunner must impact within 5 meters of the troops with at least 1 of the 4 rounds.</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>60 seconds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Task</td>
<td>Condition</td>
<td>Standard</td>
<td>Ammunition</td>
<td>Time</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engage a stationary vehicle target at 1,500 meters</td>
<td>Given a mounted MK19, a selected firing position, 6 40-millimeter TP rounds, and a vehicle target at 1,500 meters</td>
<td>The gunner must impact on the vehicle target with at least 1 of the 6 rounds.</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>120 seconds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engage a stationary vehicle target at 1,100 meters and troops in the open at 600 meters</td>
<td>Given a mounted MK19, a selected firing position, 10 40-millimeter TP rounds, a vehicle target at 1,100 meters, and a troop target at 600 meters</td>
<td>The gunner must impact 2 rounds on the vehicle target and 2 rounds within 5 meters of the troop target.</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>180 seconds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dismount the MK19 from a vehicle or a tripod.</td>
<td>Given a mounted MK19 and a selected firing position</td>
<td>The gunner must take the MK19 out of operation from the carrier or tripod.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>60 seconds</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**PRIMARY GUNNER, MK19 QUALIFICATION (NIGHT)**

G-4. Table G-4 is the primary gunner's MK19 qualification table for night firing.

| Table G-4. Primary Gunner (Night) |
600 meters | firing position, 8 40-millimeter TP rounds, and a vehicle target at 600 meters | vehicle target with at least 4 of the 8 rounds. | |

**Engage troops in the open at 800 meters**

- Given a mounted MK19, a selected firing position, 8 40-millimeter TP rounds, and troops in the open at 800 meters
- The gunner must impact within 5 meters of the troops with at least 4 of the 8 rounds.

**Dismount the AN/TVS-5 from the MK19**

- Given an MK19 and an AN/TVS-5
- The gun crew must take the AN/TVS-5 out of operation.

### ASSISTANT GUNNER, MK19 FIRING TABLE, MOUNTED

G-5. Table G-5 is for familiarization only.

**Table G-5. Assistant Gunner, Mounted**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Task</th>
<th>Condition</th>
<th>Standard</th>
<th>Ammunition</th>
<th>Time</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mount the MK19 on a vehicle</td>
<td>Given a zeroed, mounted, MK19; a T&amp;E mechanism; an MK64 gun mount; an organic carrier; and a selected firing position</td>
<td>The gun crew must be able to mount the MK19 on a vehicle or a tripod.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>120 seconds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engage a stationary vehicle target at 400 meters</td>
<td>Given a mounted MK19, a vehicle target at 400 meters, a selected firing position, and 4 40-millimeter TP rounds</td>
<td>The gunner must impact the vehicle target with at least 2 of the 4 rounds.</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>90 seconds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engage troops in the open at 600 meters</td>
<td>Given a mounted MK19, a troop target at 600 meters, a selected firing position, and 4 40-millimeter TP rounds</td>
<td>The gunner must impact within 5 meters of the troops with at least 1 of the 4 rounds.</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>60 seconds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Task</td>
<td>Condition</td>
<td>Standard</td>
<td>Ammunition</td>
<td>Time</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engage a stationary vehicle target at 1,100 meters</td>
<td>Given a mounted MK19, a vehicle target at 1,100 meters, a selected firing position, and 8 40-millimeter TP rounds</td>
<td>The gunner must impact the vehicle target with at least 2 of the 8 rounds.</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>120 seconds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engage a stationary vehicle target at 1,100 meters and troops at 600 meters</td>
<td>Given a mounted MK19, a vehicle target at 1,100 meters, troops in the open at 600 meters, a selected firing position, and 10 40-millimeter TP rounds</td>
<td>The gunner must impact a minimum of 2 rounds on the vehicle target and 2 rounds within 5 meters of the troop target.</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>180 seconds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dismount the MK19 from a vehicle or a tripod</td>
<td>Given a mounted MK19 and a selected firing position</td>
<td>The gunner must take the MK19 out of operation from the carrier or tripod.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**ASSISTANT GUNNER, MK19 FIRING TABLE, DISMOUNTED**

G-6. Table G-6 is a dismounted firing table. The commander may decide to fire using Table G-5 based on the METT-TC.

**Table G-6. Assistant Gunner, Dismounted**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Task</th>
<th>Condition</th>
<th>Standard</th>
<th>Ammunition</th>
<th>Time</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mount the MK19 on a vehicle or an M3 tripod</td>
<td>Given a mounted MK19, an M3 tripod, an M64 gun mount, a T&amp;E mechanism, an organic carrier, and a selected firing position</td>
<td>The gun crew must be able to mount the MK19 on a vehicle or a tripod.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>120 seconds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engage a stationary vehicle target at 800 meters</td>
<td>Given a mounted MK19, a vehicle target at 800 meters, a selected firing position, and 6 40-millimeter TP rounds</td>
<td>The gunner must impact the vehicle target with at least 2 of the 6 rounds.</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>60 seconds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engage a stationary vehicle target at 600 meters</td>
<td>Given a mounted MK19, a vehicle target at 600 meters, a selected firing position, and 4 40-</td>
<td>The gunner must impact the vehicle target with at least 1 of</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>90 seconds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Task</td>
<td>Condition</td>
<td>Standard</td>
<td>Ammunition</td>
<td>Time</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engage a stationary vehicle target at 1,100 meters</td>
<td>Given a mounted MK19, a vehicle target at 1,100 meters, a selected firing position, and 6 40-millimeter TP rounds</td>
<td>The gunner must impact the vehicle target with at least 2 of the 6 rounds.</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>90 seconds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engage a stationary vehicle target at 1,500 meters</td>
<td>Given a mounted MK19, a vehicle target at 1,100 meters, a selected firing position, and 6 40-millimeter TP rounds</td>
<td>The gunner must impact the vehicle target with at least 2 of the 6 rounds.</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>120 seconds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engage a stationary vehicle target at 1,500 meters</td>
<td>Given a mounted MK19 vehicle target at 1,500 meters, a selected firing position, and 8 40-millimeter TP rounds</td>
<td>The gunner must impact the vehicle target with at least 2 of the 8 rounds.</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>120 seconds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dismount the MK19 from a vehicle or a tripod</td>
<td>Given a mounted MK19 and a selected firing position</td>
<td>The gunner must take the MK19 out of operation from the carrier or tripod.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>60 seconds</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

ASSISTANT GUNNER, MK19 FIRING TABLE (NIGHT)

G-7. Table G-7 is for night firing familiarization only.

Table G-7. Assistant Gunner (Night)
Appendix H

Countermine Operations

Military operations are often conducted in areas where warring factions have left unrecorded mines and minefields scattered across the landscape. In these environments, emphasize mine awareness at all levels of command and plan countermine operations into every military operation.

OVERVIEW

H-1. Undertake countermine operations to breach or clear a minefield. All the tasks fall under breaching or clearing operations and include detecting, reporting, reducing, proofing, and marking.

H-2. MP efforts in countermine operations are in detecting, reporting, and marking. They conduct countermine operations in conjunction with their other missions. Countermine operations include—

- Denying infiltrators, insurgents, and terrorist groups the opportunity to use mines.
- Using mine detection equipment.
- Detecting mines visually or by probing.
- Reporting the location of suspected mines and UXO.
- Marking the location of these devices.

H-3. MP patrols look for suspicious persons along MSRs; watch approaches to critical points like bridges or defiles; and maintain surveillance of MSRs, key terrain, and critical facilities. Check with the HN police and local nationals for information on unusual activity in a particular AO. Mines are usually emplaced at night. Use night vision and early warning devices to maintain surveillance and detect enemy activity.

H-4. Mine and UXO awareness involve soldier and leader skills. Soldier skills are a mix of individual and collective tasks that are required for an element to maintain its combat effectiveness in and around a mined environment. Soldier skills involve individual and collective tasks that are required for basic survival in a mined environment. They include minefield indicators, probing techniques, mine detector operations, extraction drills, survival rules, casualty treatment, and evacuation drills. The soldier's basic mine awareness skills are critical to his and the unit's survival. Leader skills involve planning missions, assessing situations, and tracking and disseminating mine information. Soldiers must be proficient in all mine awareness skills to effectively operate in a mined environment (refer to FM 20-32).

DETECT

H-5. Detection is the actual confirmation and location of the mines and may be
accomplished through reconnaissance or unintentionally (such as a vehicle running into a mine). Use mine detection in conjunction with intelligence-gathering operations, minefield bypass reconnaissance, and breaching and clearing operations. Use the following three methods to detect mines and UXO:

- Visual.
- Physical (probing).
- Electronic (mine detector).

VISUAL INDICATORS

H-6. Mine and UXO indicators are part of all combat operations. Understanding and recognizing mine indicators could determine whether or not a soldier becomes a casualty. The following may indicate the presence of mines and UXO:

- Trip wires.
- Signs of road repair (such as new fill or paving, road patches, ditching, or culvert work).
- Signs, usually understood only by local populace, placed on trees, posts, or stakes. Threat forces mark their minefields to protect their own forces.
- Dead animals.
- Vehicles that are damaged.
- Disturbances in previous tire tracks or tracks that stop unexplainably.
- Wires leading away from the side of the road. They may be firing wires that are partially buried.

H-7. Check for odd features in the ground or patterns that are not present in nature. Plant growth may wilt or change color, rain may wash away some of the cover, the cover may sink or crack around the edges, or the material covering the mines may look like mounds of dirt. Civilians may know where mines or booby traps are located in the residential area. Civilians staying away from certain places or out of certain buildings are good indications of the presence of mines or booby traps. Question civilians to determine the exact location of these devices.

H-8. Pieces of wood or other debris on a road may be indicators of pressure or pressure-release firing devices. These devices may be on the surface or partially buried. The enemy uses mines that are fired by command, so search road shoulders and areas close to the objects.

PHYSICAL INDICATORS

H-9. Physical detection (probing) is very time-consuming. Use it primarily for clearing
operations, self-extraction, and covert breaching operations. Detection of mines by visual or electronic methods should be confirmed by probing. Use the following procedures and techniques when probing for mines:

- Roll up your sleeves, and remove any jewelry to increase sensitivity. Wear a Kevlar helmet, with the chin strap buckled, and a protective fragmentation vest.

- Stay close to the ground, and move in a prone position to reduce the effects of an accidental blast. When moving into a prone position—
  - Squat down without touching your knees to the ground.
  - Scan forward up to 2 meters and to the sides up to 3 meters for mine indicators.
  - Probe the area around your feet and as far forward as possible.
  - Kneel on the ground after the area is found to be clear. Continue probing forward until you are in a prone position.

- Use sight and touch to detect trip wires, fuses, and pressure prongs.

- Use a slender, nonmetallic object as a probe, and—
  - Probe every 5 centimeters across a 1-meter front.
  - Push the probe gently into the ground at an angle that is less than 45 degrees.
  - Apply just enough pressure on the probe to sink it slowly into the ground.
  - Check the probe for resistance. If the probe encounters resistance and does not go into the ground freely, carefully pick the soil away with the tip of the probe and remove the loose dirt by hand. Take care to prevent functioning the mine.
  - Stop probing when you touch a solid object, and use two fingers from each hand to carefully remove the surrounding soil and identify the object. If the object is a mine, remove enough soil to show the mine type and mark its location.

**DANGER**

Do not attempt to remove or disarm the mine

H-10. Probing is extremely stressful and tedious. The senior leader sets a limit to the time a prober can actually probe in the minefield. To determine a reasonable time, the leader considers the METT-TC factors, weather conditions, the threat level, the unit's stress level, and the prober's fatigue level and state of mind. As a rule, 20 to 30 minutes is the maximum amount of time that an individual can probe effectively.
DANGER

Use extreme caution when probing. If the probe is pushed straight down, its tip may detonate a pressure fuse.

ELECTRONIC INDICATORS

H-11. Electronic detection is effective for locating mines, but this method is time-consuming and exposes personnel to enemy fire. Confirm suspected mines by probing.

H-12. The AN/PSS-12 mine detector can only detect metal, but most mines have metal components in their design. The detector locates and identifies plastic or wooden mines by a slight metallic signature. Refer to TM 5-6665-298-10 for more information about the employment and operation procedures for the AN/PSS-12. The detector is handheld and identifies suspected mines by an audio signal in the headphones.

H-13. As in probing, take consideration for the maximum amount of time an individual can operate the detector. The leader considers the METT-TC factors, weather conditions, the threat level, the unit's stress level, and the individual's fatigue level and state of mind. As a rule, 20 to 30 minutes is the maximum amount of time an individual can use the detector effectively.

REPORT

H-14. Intelligence concerning enemy mines and UXO is reported by the fastest means available. Report sightings of these devices using a SPOTREP format. SPOTREPs originate from patrols that have been sent on specific reconnaissance missions or from MP patrols that discover mine information in the course of their normal route operations.

MARK

H-15. When mines and UXO are detected, mark the location to prevent friendly follow-on forces and local nationals from accidentally encountering them. Mark the mines and UXO with standard North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) markers (a red triangle with white letters). Use concertina wire to construct a perimeter around the mined area and place markers on the fencing about waist-high.
Appendix I

Route Classification and Signing System

The military route classification system helps in planning and executing battlefield movements. Military engineers develop route classifications using a route classification formula. This formula consists of a series of numbers and letters that express, in standard sequence, the route width, the route type, the lowest MLC, overhead clearance, obstructions to the traffic flow, and special conditions on a given route. Findings are based on information extracted from route reconnaissance reports.

OVERVIEW

I-1. The first step in completing a route reconnaissance overlay is to understand what information must be included on it. As a minimum, include the following information on the overlay:

- The route classification formula.
- The name, rank, and social security number of the person preparing the overlay.
- The unit conducting the reconnaissance.
- The DTG that the overlay was conducted.
- The map name, edition, and scale.
- Any remarks necessary to ensure the complete understanding of the information contained on the overlay.

I-2. This appendix focuses on the route classification system and the methods necessary to determine the classification of a road. Refer to FM 5-170 for more information about route classification and reconnaissance.

ROUTE CLASSIFICATION FORMULA

I-3. The route classification is derived from the information gathered during the route reconnaissance. The formula is recorded on the route reconnaissance overlay (Figure I-1) and consists of the following:
Figure I-1. Route Reconnaissance Overlay

- The route width (in meters).
- The route type (based on the ability to withstand weather).
- The lowest MLC.
- The lowest overhead clearance (in meters).
- Any obstructions (OB) to traffic flow, if applicable.
- Any special conditions, such as snow blockage (T) or flooding (W).

I-4. The following are examples of route classification formulas:

- 6.1/Z/40/∞. A fair-weather route (Z) with a minimum traveled way of 6.1 meters and an MLC of 40. Overhead clearance is unlimited (∞), and there are no obstructions to traffic flow. This route accommodates both wheeled and tracked, single-flow traffic without obstruction.

- 7/Y/50/4.6 (OB) (W). A limited, all-weather route (Y) with a minimum traveled way of 7 meters, an MLC of 50, an overhead clearance of 4.6 meters, and an obstruction. This route width is not suitable for double-flow traffic (wheeled or tracked). This route is subject to regular, recurrent flooding.
I-5. Table I-1, gives route reconnaissance symbols used on a route reconnaissance overlay.

Table I-1. Route Reconnaissance Symbols

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Explanation</th>
<th>Symbol</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Abbreviated bridge symbol</td>
<td><img src="image" alt="Symbol" /></td>
<td>Use this symbol only when the map scale does not permit the use of the full NATO bridge symbol. If this symbol is used, submit DA Form 1249. Draw an arrow to the map location of the bridge. Show the bridge's serial number in the lower portion of the symbol and the MLC for single-flow traffic in the upper portion. If there are separate load classifications for tracked or wheeled vehicles, show the lesser classification. Underline the classification number if the width or overhead clearance is below the minimum standard.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Axial route</td>
<td><img src="image" alt="Symbol" /></td>
<td>Use a solid line and identify the route by an odd number.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Bypass difficult</td>
<td><img src="image" alt="Symbol" /></td>
<td>Use this symbol when the obstacle can be crossed in the immediate vicinity, but some work is necessary to improve the bypass.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Bypass easy</td>
<td><img src="image" alt="Symbol" /></td>
<td>Use this symbol when the obstacle can be crossed in the immediate vicinity by a US 2 1/2-ton truck (or NATO equivalent) without work to improve the bypass.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Bypass impossible</td>
<td><img src="image" alt="Symbol" /></td>
<td>Use this symbol when the obstacle can be crossed only by repairing or constructing a feature or by detouring around the obstacle.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Civil or military route</td>
<td><img src="image" alt="Symbol" /></td>
<td>Write the designation in parentheses along the route.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Concealment</td>
<td><img src="image" alt="Symbol" /></td>
<td>Show roads lined with trees by a single line of circles for deciduous trees and a single line of inverted Vs for evergreen trees. Show woods bordering a road by several rows of circles for deciduous trees and several rows of inverted Vs for evergreen trees.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Critical points</td>
<td><img src="image" alt="Symbol" /></td>
<td>Number, in order, and describe critical points on DA Form 1711-R. Use critical points to show the features not adequately covered by other symbols on an overlay.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Damage or destruction</td>
<td><img src="image" alt="Symbol" /></td>
<td>Damage or destruction that prevents movement along the route.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>90 Damage or Ferry type</td>
<td>11. Full NATO bridge symbol</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P - pedestrian</td>
<td>Indicate wheeled vehicles in the upper third of the symbol with the two-way wheeled classification on the left and the one-way wheeled classification on the right. Show tracked vehicles in the center third of the symbol with the two-way tracked classification on the left and the one-way tracked classification on the right. Place the bridge serial number in the lower third of the symbol. Draw an arrow to the bridge location and show the bypass conditions on the arrow shaft. Place the traveled-way width below the symbol, the overhead clearance to the left of the symbol, and the overall length to the right of the symbol.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V - vehicular</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>12. Grades</th>
<th>Show the actual percent of grade to the right of the symbol. Any grade of 7 percent or more is an obstruction. Include the obstruction in the route classification formula. Arrows should point uphill. The length of the arrow represents the length of the grade if the map scale permits.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>13. Lateral</th>
<th>Use a broken line, and identify the route by an even</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Seasonal limiting factors: X - none; Y - significant; ? - unknown information.

Bottom type: M - mud; C - clay, S - sand; G - gravel; R - rock; P - artificial paving.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Route</th>
<th>Symbol</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Route</strong></td>
<td><img src="image" alt="Symbol" /></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>15. Limits of sector</strong></td>
<td><img src="image" alt="Symbol" /></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Show the beginning and ending of a reconnoitered section of a route or road with this symbol.</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>16. MSR</strong></td>
<td><img src="image" alt="Symbol" /></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Label the route as MSR and assign a code name.</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>17. Obstacle</strong></td>
<td><img src="image" alt="Symbol" /></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>a. Proposed block</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>b. Prepared but passable</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>c. Completed block</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Place the center of the symbol over the location of the blocked part of the route. Use parallel broken lines for a proposed block, parallel lines for a prepared but passable block, and crossed lines for a completed block.</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>18. Clearance unlimited</strong></td>
<td><img src="image" alt="Symbol" /></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Use this symbol when overhead clearance is unlimited.</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>19. Parking area</strong></td>
<td><img src="image" alt="Symbol" /></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Designate parking areas.</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>20. Railroad crossing</strong></td>
<td><img src="image" alt="Symbol" /></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Use this symbol to show a level crossing where passing trains would interrupt the traffic flow. If there is a power line present, show its height, in meters, from the ground. Underline the overhead clearance if it is less than 4.3 meters.</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>21. Railway bridge symbol</strong></td>
<td><img src="image" alt="Symbol" /></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Place RL above the symbol to indicate a railway bridge. At the left of the symbol, show the overhead clearance. Show the overall length of the bridge on the right of the symbol. Indicate the traveled-way width below the symbol, and underline it if it is below standard for the classification. Inside the symbol, show the bridge classification in the upper half. If the class is different for single- and double-flow traffic, show single flow on the left and double flow on the right. Place the railway bridge serial number in the lower half of the symbol. Draw an arrow to the bridge location. On the arrow shaft, indicate the ease of adapting the bridge for road vehicle use. A zigzag line means it would be difficult to adapt, and a straight line means it would be easy to adapt. Place the bypass symbol on the arrow shaft to indicate the bypass conditions.</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>22. Route classification formula</strong></td>
<td><img src="image" alt="Symbol" /></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Express the formula in the order of the route width, the route type, MLC, minimum clearance, obstructions (if present), and special conditions. All measurements are in...</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23. Series of sharp curves</td>
<td>Write the number of curves and the radius of the sharpest curve of the series to the outside of the triangle.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24. Sharp curve</td>
<td>Point the vertex of the triangle to the curve location and indicate the radius of the curve, in meters, outside the triangle. A curve of 45 meters or less must be reported on the overlay, and a curve of 25 meters or less is an obstacle.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25. Traffic control HQ</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26. Traffic control post</td>
<td>Manned traffic control post.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27. Tunnel</td>
<td>Draw an arrow to the tunnel location. Place the bypass condition symbol on the arrow. Show the minimum and maximum overhead clearances to the left of the symbol, the tunnel serial number inside the symbol, and the total tunnel length to the right of the symbol. Below the symbol, show the traveled-way width. If sidewalks are present, follow with a slash and the total traveled way, including sidewalks. Underline the traveled way if the road entering the tunnel is wider than the traveled way of the tunnel. Use a question mark to show unknown information.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28. Turnout; the symbol may be amplified as follows: a. Wheeled vehicle b. Tracked vehicle c. A length of road exceeding 1 kilometer</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix J

Nuclear, Biological, Chemical Defense

The technology to produce and deliver chemical and biological agents and weapons of mass destruction is widely available. This technology provides military and nonmilitary leaders in unstable regions with a means to deter more technically advanced nations. Weapons of mass destruction can radically change the flow of battle, shift the balance of combat power, and place a superior force at risk. Areas targeted with these weapons may remain hazardous for days, even weeks after an attack. Additionally, nuclear reactor and chemical production facility accidents or sabotage can release radiological or chemical contaminants that can threaten friendly forces and military operations.

OVERVIEW

J-1. Enemy forces may threaten sustainment areas to seize and maintain the initiative, while degrading or eliminating a unit's flexibility and capability to support operations. Sustainment area activities are lucrative targets for enemy NBC attacks. Attacking sustainment nodes weakens the main battle area's force effectiveness without adversely affecting an enemy's immediate maneuver. To achieve these aims, threat activities in sustainment areas target key critical support and logistic facilities. These facilities include—

- Special-weapons storage sites and delivery systems.
- C² facilities.
- Air defense artillery sites.
- Air bases.
- Seaports.
- MSR.

HAZARD DETECTION AND REPORTING

J-2. The best units to perform NBC reconnaissance are those units with the M93 NBC Reconnaissance System (FOX). Planners consider the disadvantages of conducting NBC reconnaissance with HMMWV-equipped units. The disadvantages of using a HMMWV include the following:

- The crew conducts operations in MOPP 4 while in contamination.
- The vehicle stops to conduct survey and detection.
- The vehicle has difficulty keeping up with the maneuver force over rugged terrain.
- The readings obtained using an M256A1 kit, detector paper, and a chemical agent.
monitor (CAM) are not as reliable as readings from the M93 (FOX).

J-3. Planners use the IPB and the METT-TC to determine the type of NBC reconnaissance technique and the type of equipment to be used for the NBC reconnaissance.

J-4. Early detection of NBC hazards is required for timely warning of units and personnel in the affected areas. NBC reconnaissance is an active contamination avoidance measure that provides commanders with information on NBC hazards in an AO.

J-5. NBC reconnaissance contributes to the overall intelligence collection effort and consists of the following five critical tasks: detecting, identifying, marking, reporting, and sampling. The four types of NBC reconnaissance include search, survey, sample, and surveillance.

J-6. MP may be tasked to conduct NBC reconnaissance while conducting other reconnaissance operations. They are equipped to detect and identify radiological and chemical hazards, mark the contaminated area, and report the hazard. They are not equipped to collect or handle samples.

J-7. NBC surveillance activities are planned to support the intelligence collection effort. MP conduct NBC surveillance by monitoring MSRs, critical facilities, and key terrain. They employ NBC detector equipment and measures that include the following:

- M8A1 automatic chemical agent alarm system.
- AN/VDR-2 RADIAC set.
- CAM.
- Visual observation for unexplained artillery or spray.
- M256A1, M8, and M9 paper.

J-8. If MP observe the indications of an NBC attack, they may be ordered to conduct an NBC survey to define the boundaries of the contamination, locate and mark clean bypass routes, and occupy OPs to observe the designated area. MP conduct an NBC survey, on order, to obtain detailed information concerning a contaminated area, including the location of the general boundaries of the contaminated area and the intensity of the contamination (nuclear) or the type of agent (chemical).

J-9. MP locate the boundaries and place warning markers around the contaminated area at all the entry points. They report information using an NBC 4 report and inform the road users of the contaminated area, and direct the traffic to alternate routes to avoid the contaminated area.

J-10. At all echelons, MP provide continuous information to higher HQ using NBC 1 and NBC 4 reports (Figure J-1). These report formats provide a rapid means of disseminating information. Use the NBC 1 report to record the initial use and subsequent data concerning enemy NBC attacks. The initial NBC 1 report precedence is flash and all others are immediate. Table J-1 gives an explanation of the various lines in an NBC report.
Figure J-1. Example of NBC 1 and NBC 4 Reports

J-11. Use the NBC 4 report for radiation dose rate measurements. Usually, the unit submits two reports—one on initial contact and another for peak dose rate. Measure radiation dose rates in the open, 1 meter above the ground. If radiation dose rates are taken inside a vehicle or a shelter, at least one outside reading is necessary to determine the correlation factor. Other items of the report are optional. Refer to FM 3-3 for more information about NBC reports.

J-12. As MP move throughout an AO, they monitor for the presence of an NBC hazard, mark contaminated areas, send NBC reports through operational channels, and direct traffic around or through hazards to ensure that the troops and the supplies get where they are needed on the battlefield.

Table J-1. Explanation of Line Items in NBC Report

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Line</th>
<th>Nuclear</th>
<th>Chemical and Biological</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>Strike serial number</td>
<td>Strike serial number</td>
<td>Assigned by the NBC center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>Position of the observer</td>
<td>Position of the observer</td>
<td>Grid coordinates (universal transverse mercator [UTM] or place).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>Direction of the attack from the observer, to include</td>
<td>Direction of the attack from the observer</td>
<td>Nuclear: Use degrees magnetic north (DGM), degrees true north (DGT), degrees grid north (DGG), mils</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Column</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Notes</td>
<td>Measurement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>the unit of measure</td>
<td>magnetic north (MLM), mils true north (MLT), or mils grid north (MLG)</td>
<td>Chemical: Measure clockwise from the grid or magnetic north (in degrees or mils)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>DTG of detonation</td>
<td>Nuclear: Use Zulu time. Chemical: Designate time zone used.</td>
<td>DTG for the start of the attack</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>Designate time zone used.</td>
<td>DTG of the end of the attack</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>Location of the area attacked</td>
<td>Use grid coordinates (or place). State whether the location is actual or estimated.</td>
<td>Location of the area attacked</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G</td>
<td>Suspected or observed event and the means of delivery or kind of attack</td>
<td>State whether the attack was by artillery, mortars, rockets, missiles, bombs, or spray.</td>
<td>Kind of attack</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H</td>
<td>Type of burst</td>
<td>Nuclear: Specify air, surface, or subsurface. Chemical: State whether by air, ground, or spray attack.</td>
<td>Type of agent and type of burst</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>If known.</td>
<td>Number of munitions or aircraft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J</td>
<td>Flash-to-bang time</td>
<td>Use seconds.</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K</td>
<td>Crater present or absent and the diameter</td>
<td>Nuclear: Sent in meters. Chemical: Sent in NBC 6.</td>
<td>Description of terrain and vegetation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L</td>
<td>Cloud width at H+5 minutes</td>
<td>State whether measured in degrees or mils.</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M</td>
<td>Stabilized cloud top or cloud bottom angle or cloud top or bottom height at H+10 minutes</td>
<td>Nuclear: State whether the angle is cloud top or cloud bottom and whether it is measured in degrees or mils. Chemical: State whether the height is cloud top or cloud bottom and whether it is measured in meters or feet.</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>Estimated yield</td>
<td>Sent as kilotons.</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O</td>
<td>Reference DTG for estimated contour line not H+1</td>
<td>Use when the contours are not plotted at H+1.</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P</td>
<td>For radar purposes only</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>Predicted hazard area (coordinates)</td>
<td>If the wind speed is 10 kilometers per hour or less, this item is 010 (the radius of the hazard area in kilometers).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>-----------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAR</td>
<td>Coordinates of external contours of the radioactive cloud</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>Six-digit coordinates. Letter R identifies RADAR set.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PB</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>Duration of the hazard in the attack and hazard area</td>
<td>State in days, hours, minutes, and so forth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PBR</td>
<td>Downwind direction of the radioactive cloud and the unit of measure</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>DGM, MLM, DGT, MLT, DGG, or MLG. The letter R identifies a RADAR set.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q</td>
<td>Location of the reading</td>
<td>Location of the sampling and the type of sample</td>
<td>Nuclear: UTM or the place. Chemical: UTM or the place. State whether the test was air or liquid.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R</td>
<td>Dose rate or actual value of decay exponent</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>State the dose rate in centigray per hour (cGyph).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S</td>
<td>DTG of the reading</td>
<td>DTG contamination detected</td>
<td>State the time of the initial identification test sample or when the reading was taken.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T</td>
<td>H+1 DTG</td>
<td>DTG of the latest contamination survey of the area</td>
<td>NBC 5 and NBC 6 reports only.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U</td>
<td>1,000-cGyph contour line</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>Plot in red.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V</td>
<td>300-cGyph contour line</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>Plot in green.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W</td>
<td>100-cGyph contour line</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>Plot in blue.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X</td>
<td>20-cGyph contour line (30 cGyph contour line is used by other NATO forces)</td>
<td>Area of actual contamination</td>
<td>Nuclear: Plot in black. Chemical: Plot in yellow.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Direction of the left and right radical lines</td>
<td>Downwind direction of the hazard and the wind speed</td>
<td>Nuclear: Direction measured clockwise from grid north (GN) to the left and then right radial lines (degrees or mils, state which), four digits each. Chemical: Direction is four digits (degrees or mils) and the wind speed is...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Z</td>
<td>Effective wind speed Downwind distance of Zone 1 Cloud radius Unit of measure for each category</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>three digits (kilometers per hour). Three digits—effective wind speed (kilometers per hour) Three digits—downwind distance of Zone 1 (kilometers or nautical miles) Two digits—cloud radius (kilometers or nautical miles) (the wind speed is less than 8 kilometers per hour, this line contains only a three-digit radius of Zone 1 [kilometers])</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>Significant weather phenomena</td>
<td>Air stability: Two digits Temperature in centigrade: Two digits Humidity: One digit Significant weather phenomena: One digit Cloud cover: One digit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZB</td>
<td>Used to transmit correlation factors or transmission factors</td>
<td>Remarks for additional chemical and biological attacks only.</td>
<td>Include any additional information.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**CONTAMINATION MARKING**

J-13. Mark contamination so that unsuspecting personnel will not be exposed to it. When detecting or suspecting NBC hazards, mark all likely entry points into the area and report the contamination to higher HQ. The only exception to this policy occurs when marking the area would help the enemy. If the commander makes this exception, report the hazard to protect friendly units.

**PROCEDURES FOR MARKING**

J-14. Face markers away from the contamination. For example, if markers are placed 50 meters from the outside edge of a contaminated area to mark a radiological hot spot, they face away from the point of the highest contamination reading. Place markers at roads, trails, and other likely points of entry. When time and mission permit, use additional markers. The distance between the signs varies. In open terrain, place them farther apart than in hilly or wooded areas. Soldiers should be able to stand in front of a marker and see the markers to the left and right of it.

J-15. Units discovering a marked, contaminated area do not have to conduct elaborate, time-consuming surveys. The new unit checks the extent of the contamination and alters its plans if necessary. If the size of the hazard has expanded or decreased, relocate the signs. If the hazard is gone, remove the signs and report changes to higher HQ.

**TYPES OF MARKERS**
J-16. US forces use standard NATO markers to make it easier for allies to recognize the hazards. These markers are in the standard NBC marking set. Colors and inscriptions on a marker indicate the type of hazard. Other contamination information is written on the front of the sign.

RADIOLOGICAL CONTAMINATION DETECTION AND MONITORING

J-17. Conduct radiological monitoring using an AN/VDR2, and start on the order of the commander or as set by the SOP. Mark the area with radiological contamination markers. Report radiation dose rates and the times and locations of the readings to higher HQ using the NBC 4 nuclear report. All units start continuous monitoring when—

- Moving from one area to another on the battlefield.
- Getting a fallout warning.
- Knowing that a nuclear burst was reported, seen, or heard.
- Detecting radiation of 1 centigray per hour by periodic monitoring.
- Being ordered by the unit commander.

J-18. Continuous monitoring stops on order from the higher HQ or when the dose rate falls below 1 centigray per hour, except for units on the move.

TECHNIQUES FOR MONITORING

J-19. Use both direct and indirect techniques when conducting radiological monitoring. Refer to FM 3-3 for more information on radiological monitoring.

Direct Monitoring

J-20. The direct technique is the simplest and the most precise. The soldier must—

- Stand at the desired location.
- Hold the RADIAC meter waist high and turn it slowly 360 degrees. Refer to TM 11-6665-251-10.
- Record the highest reading on DA Form 1971-R.
- Take the reading in the open, at least 10 meters from buildings or large structures, if possible.

Indirect Monitoring

J-21. Use the indirect technique inside shelters or vehicles. The soldier must—
• Stand at the center of the shelter.

• Hold the RADIAC meter 1 meter above the floor and slowly rotate it 360 degrees.

• Record the highest reading.

• Take all readings from one selected position when monitoring from inside a vehicle or shelter.

SURVEY TEAM

J-22. MP may be tasked to perform as part of a survey team. When essential contamination information cannot be obtained from monitoring reports, a radiological survey may be required. Radiological surveys are directed efforts to learn the extent and intensity of radiological contamination. A survey requires a control team and one or more survey teams. The HQ directing the survey usually provides the control team. In a team assigned to a survey—
Appendix K

Civil-Disturbance Measures

This appendix discusses the crowd control measures used when there is a civil disturbance.

OVERVIEW

K-1. The mission of the military forces in a civil disturbance is to apply the minimum force necessary to help local or HN authorities restore law and order. Most often, military personnel disperse unauthorized assemblages and patrol disturbed areas to prevent unlawful acts. Other missions assigned to MP or other military forces include—

- Maintaining the mechanics of essential distribution, transportation, and communications systems.
- Making a show of force.
- Setting up roadblocks.
- Cordonning off areas.
- Dispersing crowds.
- Releasing riot control agents (RCAs).
- Serving as security forces or reserves.
- Initiating needed relief measures, such as distributing food or clothing or establishing emergency shelter.
- Employing nonlethal munitions and equipment.

K-2. Military control force commanders must know what options are available to them. They select the option that is best for the specific physical and psychological environment. They must be able to reduce the intensity of the confrontation and restore order.

K-3. The commitment of military forces to civil-disturbance control operations does not automatically give these forces police power. There are legal and commonsense reasons to restrict the police power of military forces. All military leaders and planners must be familiar with laws, regulations, and policies that govern military involvement in civil disturbances.

K-4. In all contacts with the civilian population and the participants of the disturbance, military forces must display fair and impartial treatment and must adhere to the principle of minimum force. Whenever possible, civil police apprehend, process, and detain civil law violators. Military forces perform these functions only when necessity dictates and to the minimum extent required. The return these functions to civil authorities as soon as possible.
K-5. As the disturbance subsides, the commander takes steps to restore control to civil authorities. The control force gradually reduces the number and scope of its operations. It takes care not to give the impression that all controls have been removed. Withdrawal is not immediate. The disturbance may flare up again if the participants get the impression that authorities have abandoned the operations. The control force gradually withdraws in a phased return of control to civil authorities.

CIVIL DISTURBANCES ON DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INSTALLATIONS OUTSIDE THE CONTINENTAL UNITED STATES

K-6. On DOD installations overseas and at US embassies and consulates, HN forces generally control disturbances targeted at US facilities because of the possible international political ramifications of foreign civil disturbances. Status of Forces Agreements define the legal considerations that guide and constrain actions by US military commanders. Commanders must have an effective liaison with HN authorities. Through close coordination with HN authorities, US commanders can determine the level of visibility and the involvement, if any, of US forces.

CROWD BEHAVIOR

K-7. The presence or absence of social factors like leadership, moral attitudes, and social uniformity may influence crowd behavior. Leadership has a profound effect on the intensity and direction of crowd behavior. When blocked from expressing its emotions in one direction, a crowd's frustration and hostility can be redirected elsewhere. The first person to give clear orders in an authoritative manner is likely to be followed. Agitators can exploit a crowd's mood and convert a group of frustrated, resentful people into a vengeful mob. Skillful agitators using television, radio, and other communications media can reach large portions of the population and incite them to unlawful acts without having direct personal contact. In a civil-disturbance environment, any crowd can be a threat to law and order because it is open to manipulation.

K-8. Additionally, crowd behavior may be affected by emotional contagion or panic.

- Emotional contagion provides the crowd psychological unity. The unity is usually temporary, but it may be long enough to push a crowd to mob action. When emotional contagion prevails, normal law and authority are suppressed, increasing the potential for violence.

- Panic can occur during a civil disturbance when-
  - Crowd members perceive their safety is at risk and attempt to flee the area.
  - Crowd members cannot disperse quickly after exposure to RCAs.
  - Escape routes are limited.
  - Escape routes are blocked or congested.
K-9. Control force members are also susceptible to crowd behavior. They may become emotionally stimulated during a tense confrontation. Commanders must counteract this. Control force members must exercise restraint individually and collectively. Rigorous training, firm and effective supervision, and complete awareness and understanding of ROE and ROI are necessary to offset the effect of crowd contagion on the control force.

CROWD TACTICS

K-10. In civil disturbances, crowds employ any number of tactics to resist control or to achieve their goals. Tactics may be unplanned or planned and nonviolent or violent. The more purposeful the disturbance, the more likely the possibility of well-planned tactics.

K-11. Nonviolent tactics may range from name-calling to building barricades. Demonstrators may converse with control force members to distract them or to gain their sympathy. They may try to convince control force members to leave their posts and join the demonstrators. Demonstrators may use verbal abuse. Expect obscene remarks, taunts, ridicule, and jeers. Crowd members want to anger and demoralize the opposition. They want authorities to take actions that later may be exploited as acts of brutality.

K-12. Sometimes women, children, and elderly people are placed in the front ranks. This plays on a control force's sympathy to try to discourage countermeasures. When countermeasures are taken, agitators take photographs to stir public displeasure and embarrass the control force. Demonstrators may form human blockades to impede traffic by sitting down in roads or at the entrances to buildings. This can disrupt normal activity, forcing control personnel to physically remove the demonstrators. Demonstrators may lock arms, making it hard for the control force to separate and remove them. It also makes the control force seem to be using excessive force.

K-13. Groups of demonstrators may trespass on private or government property. They want to force mass arrests, overwhelm detention facilities, and clog the legal system. Demonstrators may resist by going limp and forcing control force members to carry them. They may chain or handcuff themselves to objects or to each other. This prolongs the demonstration. Agitators may spread rumors to incite the crowd and try to force the control force to use stronger measures to control or disperse the crowd. The agitators want to make the control force appear to be using excessive force. Terrorist groups may try to agitate crowds as a diversion for terrorist acts. They also try to provoke an overreaction by the control force.

K-14. Violent crowd tactics, which may be extremely destructive, can include physical attacks on people and property, fires, and bombings. Crowd use of violent tactics is limited only by the attitudes and ingenuity of crowd members, the training of their leaders, and the materials available to them. Crowd or mob members may commit violence with crude, homemade weapons, or they may employ sophisticated small arms and explosives. If unplanned violence occurs, a crowd will use rocks, bricks, bottles, or whatever else is at hand. If violence is planned, a crowd can easily conceal makeshift weapons or tools for vandalism. They may carry—

- Balloons filled with paint to use as bombs.
- Bolt cutters to cut through fences.
• Picket signs to be used as clubs.

• Pipes wrapped in newspapers to throw as deadly missiles.

• Firecrackers dipped in glue and covered with BBs or small nails to use as deadly grenades.

• Plywood shields and motorcycle helmets to protect against riot batons.

• Safety goggles to protect against tear gas.

K-15. A crowd may erect barricades to impede troop movement or to prevent a control force from entering certain areas or buildings. They may use vehicles, trees, furniture, fences, or any other material. In an effort to breach barriers, rioters may throw grapples into wire barricades and drag them. They may use grapples, chains, wire, or rope to pull down gates or fences. Long poles or spears may be used to keep control forces back while removing barricades or to prevent the use of bayonets. They also may crash vehicles into gates or fences to breach them.

K-16. Rioters can be expected to vent their emotions on individuals, troop formations, and control-force equipment. Rioters may throw rotten fruits and vegetables, rocks, bricks, bottles, improvised bombs, or other objects from overpasses, windows, and roofs. In the past, troops, firefighters, and utility workers on duty during a civil disorder have been beaten, injured, or killed. Vehicles have been overturned, set on fire, or otherwise damaged.

K-17. Rioters may direct dangerous objects like vehicles, carts, barrels, and liquids at troops located on or at the bottom of a slope. On level ground, they may drive wheeled vehicles at the troops, jumping out before the vehicles reach the target. This tactic is also used to breach roadblocks and barricades.

K-18. Rioters may set fire to buildings and vehicles to block the advance of troops. Fires are also set to create confusion or diversion, destroy property, and mask looting and sniping. Rioters may flood an area with gasoline or oil and ignite it. On the other hand, they may pour gasoline or oil down a slope or drop it from buildings and ignite it.

K-19. Weapons fire against troops may take the form of selective sniping or massed fire. The fire may come from within the ranks of the rioters or from buildings or other adjacent cover. The weapons used can vary from homemade one-shot weapons to high-powered rifles. Snipers may try to panic control force members into firing a volley into the crowd. Innocent casualties make a control force appear both undisciplined and oppressive.

K-20. Explosives may be used to breach a dike, levee, or dam. Bombs can be exploded ahead of troops or vehicles so rubble blocks a street. They can be used to block an underpass by demolishing the overhead bridge. In extremely violent confrontations, bombs placed in buildings may be timed to explode when troops or vehicles are near. Demolition charges can be buried in streets and exploded as troops or vehicles pass over them. Explosive-laden vehicles can be rolled or driven at troops. Rioters may attach explosives to animals and force them toward troops. They then detonate the explosives by remote control. Even harmless looking objects like cigarette lighters and toys can be loaded with explosives and used as weapons.
COMPANY LEVEL OPERATIONS

K-21. Normally, civil-disturbance operations are conducted at company level. The company operations section coordinates for special equipment that includes the following:

- Kevlar and face shield.
- Body armor.
- Shields, work gloves, and batons.
- Protective masks.
- Elbow pads.
- Shin guards.
- Weapons and bayonets.
- CS/OC spray.
- Smoke grenades.
- Breaching ramps.
- Scaling ladders.
- Portable radios.
- Portable lighting.
- Bullhorns.
- Video home system (VHS) cameras to videotape individuals in the crowd for identification.
- Transportation assets to move people to detention cells or detention areas.
- Hand and leg irons and flex cuffs.
- NVDs.

K-22. The MP operations center also coordinates for support, to include medical and emergency operations center (EOC) personnel, SRTs, hostage negotiators, MWD teams, PSYOP, civil affairs, local or HN law enforcement personnel, and apprehension or detention facilities for civilian personnel.

K-23. Rehearsals are imperative to the overall success of suppressing civil disturbances even before they occur. Rehearsals should cover the use and employment of nonlethal
munitions, practice situations in which ROE or the use of force is applied, the use of riot dispensers, hand and arm signals or voice commands, and formations.

K-24. MP use appropriate crowd control measures that include formations such as—

- Using the line formation to push or drive a crowd straight back.
- Using the echelon formation to turn or move crowds away from buildings, fences, or walls.
- Using the wedge formation penetrate and split a crowd.
- Using the diamond formation to enter a crowd.

K-25. When a small unit, normally a squad, moves a dignitary through a crowd or an apprehension team into a crowd, they generally use the diamond formation. The other formations are trained at squad level and above but are normally performed by a platoon or company. The line, echelon left or right, and wedge formations are the basis for platoon and company formations. A squad must be skilled in the basic formations before practicing in platoon-size or larger formations.

K-26. Refer to FM 19-15 for more information about civil-disturbance techniques and procedures.

NONLETHAL MUNITIONS

K-27. Nonlethal munitions are explicitly designed and primarily employed to incapacitate personnel or material, while minimizing fatalities, permanent injury to personnel, and undesired damage to property and the environment. Unlike conventional lethal munitions that destroy their targets through blast, penetration, and fragmentation, nonlethal munitions employ means other than gross physical destruction to prevent the target from functioning.

K-28. The doctrine and concepts of operation for nonlethal weapons are designed to reinforce deterrence and expand the range of options available to commanders. They enhance the capability of US forces to accomplish the following objectives:

- Discourage, delay, or prevent hostile actions.
- Limit escalation.
- Take military action in situations where the use of lethal force is not the preferred option.
- Protect our forces better.
- Disable equipment, facilities, and personnel temporarily.

K-29. Nonlethal munitions are not required to have a zero probability of producing fatalities or permanent injuries, and complete avoidance of these effects is not guaranteed or
expected. When properly employed, nonlethal weapons should significantly reduce these effects when compared with using lethal weapons to physically destroy the same target.

K-30. Nonlethal capabilities provide a wider range of options that augment but do not replace traditional means of deadly force. The option to resort to deadly force must always remain available when the commander believes it is appropriate to the mission.

K-31. MP normally use the lowest level of force necessary to control most incidents that involve noncombatants. RCAs, such as CS and MWD, and crowd control devices, such as the riot baton, are examples of nonlethal means currently used by MP forces. These options are currently listed in AR 190-29.

K-32. Training for the use of nonlethal munitions requires leaders and soldiers to understand the limited use of these systems in environments with restrictive ROE. Training will be continuous at all levels to ensure that nonlethal munitions are properly employed.

K-33. The countermeasures for thwarting virtually all nonlethal options are usually apparent, quickly learned, and readily available. Because they do not kill, nonlethal options teach an adversary what to avoid in the future. Commanders must be prepared to stay one step ahead of motivated belligerents. Many nonlethal options have both maximum effective and minimum safety ranges. Individuals struck short of the minimum safety range often suffer severe injuries or death, while the effects of most nonlethal devices are greatly mitigated at longer ranges. In order to be effective, an adversary must be engaged within the effective zone (beyond the minimum safety range and short of the maximum effective range).

K-34. Nonlethal munitions and equipment currently available are shown in Appendix L. Refer to Figure 3-2 for the range of the munitions.

NONLETHAL MUNITIONS EMPLOYMENT CONSIDERATIONS

K-35. Nonlethal munitions employment must be well documented in ROE. Leaders must constantly ensure that soldiers understand when and how to effectively employ them. Incorrect application of these munitions can have significant operational and political ramifications. Employment considerations include the following:

- Individual. When possible, do not change individual weapons. Designate individuals as nonlethal shooters. Nonlethal shooters carry lethal munitions only for personal protection. Carry lethal rounds in a place to avoid confusing nonlethal rounds with lethal rounds.

- Squad. Squad leaders carry stun grenades and maintain their weapon loaded with lethal ammunition. Ideally, the squad does not change their task organization to accommodate the addition of nonlethal equipment. They should designate nonlethal shooters instead.

- Patrols. Commanders do not plan a nonlethal patrol, but they plan a combat and security patrol with a nonlethal attachment when the mission dictates. Carrying a shotgun limits the flexibility an individual has because of the time it takes to transition from nonlethal to lethal. Use shotguns only from a fixed position where
adequate coverage is available.

- Static position. Individuals on static positions have their weapons loaded with lethal ammunition, and additionally they carry nonlethal munitions. Both shotguns and M203s work well from static positions and are used together when possible.

- Contact teams. Teams of personnel whose primary responsibilities are to make personal contact with the adversary are established before deployment. Train team members in unarmed self-defense, open-hand control, handcuffing, and flex cuffing. Equip contact teams with personal protection gear, 9-millimeter pistols, and flex cuffs. Due to the physical nature of contact teams, do not arm contact team members with long rifles. If security for the contact team is an issue, attach a security element. MWD teams may also augment contact teams to help locate the adversary. Refer to FM 90-40 for more information on nonlethal techniques and procedures.
Appendix L

Weapons and Equipment

MP must be rapidly deployable, versatile, and as lethal as the force that they support. MP are organized and equipped to provide functional battlefield capabilities that range from the deliberate attack (area security) to civil-disturbance control operations (L&O). Although not all inclusive, the listed data is intended to aid in planning MP operations. In any tactical situation, it is important that MP be able to properly identify threat weapons, vehicles, and aircraft. When threat is observed, MP report their location, activity, and direction of travel to higher HQ by the fastest means available.

FRIENDLY VEHICLES

L-1. Table L-1, gives MP leaders a quick look at the capabilities of the various vehicles in the Army inventory.

Table L-1. Vehicle Capabilities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Vehicle Capabilities</th>
<th>M998</th>
<th>M1025/1026</th>
<th>M1114</th>
<th>M1117</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Weight (gross vehicle weight [GVW]) (in pounds)</td>
<td>4,950</td>
<td>5,250</td>
<td>12,100</td>
<td>29,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Height (in inches)</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>73/73</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Length (in inches)</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>180/185</td>
<td>190,5</td>
<td>237</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Width</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>85/85</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fuel capacity (in gallons)</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maximum speed (in miles per hour)</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Range (in miles)</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>275</td>
<td>440</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fording Capabilities</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>With kit (in inches)</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Without kit (in inches)</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pay load (maximum pounds)</td>
<td>2,500</td>
<td>2,500</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>3,360</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

FRIENDLY WEAPONS

L-2. Table L-2 gives MP leaders a quick look at the capabilities of the weapons used by MP units.

Table L-2. Weapon Capabilities

DODDOA-009957
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Weapon Capabilities</th>
<th>M2</th>
<th>M4</th>
<th>M9</th>
<th>M16A2</th>
<th>MK-19</th>
<th>M136 (AT4)</th>
<th>M203</th>
<th>M249</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Weight (in pounds)</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>15.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Length (in inches)</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>29.75 closed, 33 open</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>41.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Range</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Maximum (in meters)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arming (in meters)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minimum safe (in meters)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Effective Range</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Area target (in meters)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Point target (in meters)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moving target (in meters)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rate of Fire (in Rounds Per Minute)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cyclic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rapid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sustained</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*With barrel change.

**FRIENDLY NONLETHAL EQUIPMENT AND MUNITIONS**

L-3. The following descriptions and illustrations describe nonlethal equipment and munitions that are currently available.

**NONLETHAL EQUIPMENT**

L-4. The following nonlethal equipment provides bodily protection for soldiers involved in a nonlethal operation and allows soldiers to capture the threat with a minimum of force.

**Nonballistic and Ballistic Riot Face Shields**

L-5. The riot face shield (Figure L-1) provides soldiers with improved facial protection from thrown objects. The face shield is lightweight, adaptable to the current helmet, transparent, and scratch-resistant. It is adjustable to up and down positions. The mechanism for attaching and removing the shield from the helmet is robust and simple and requires no tools in the field.
Figure L-1. Riot Face Shield

L-6. The ballistic riot face shield is similar in design, but it is heavier and provides facial protection up to a 9-millimeter full metal jacket (FMJ) or 124 grains at 1,400 feet per second. This face shield is primarily used by SRTs in force-entry scenarios and can also be used for MOUT operations.

Nonballistic and Ballistic Riot Body Shields

L-7. The nonballistic riot body shield (Figure L-2) is 24 inches by 48 inches by .157 inches. It provides soldiers with improved protection from frontal, side, and overhead assaults. This shield is lightweight, transparent, and scratch-resistant. The ballistic riot body shield (Figure L-3) is 24 inches by 36 inches with a 4- by 16-inch window for viewing the threat. It is similar in design to the nonballistic shield but is heavier. It provides ballistic protection up to a 9-millimeter FMJ or 124 grains at 1,400 feet per second. This shield is primarily used by SRTs in forced-entry scenarios and can also be used for selected MOUT operations.

Figure L-2. Nonballistic Riot Body Shield
Nonballistic and Ballistic Shin Guards

L-8. Nonballistic shin guards (Figure L-4) provide soldiers with improved protection from thrown objects. They are lightweight and black in color.

![Figure L-4. Nonballistic Shin Guards](image)

L-9. Ballistic shin guards are similar in design to nonballastic guards, but they are heavier and provide protection up to a 9-millimeter FMJ or 124 grains at 1,400 feet per second. They are primarily used by SRTs in forced-entry scenarios and can also be used in selected MOUT operations.

Baton

L-10. The standard 36-inch wooden riot baton (Figure L-5) is currently in use for riot control. It is used for self-defense and to keep rioters out of arm's reach of the soldiers conducting crowd control tactics.

![Figure L-5. Standard 36-inch Wooden Riot Baton](image)

Portable Bullhorn

L-11. The portable bullhorn (Figure L-6) is a critical communication device when conducting crowd control tactics. The bullhorn can facilitate communication with the crowd in conjunction with linguist or PSYOP support. It also assists in communicating commands to troops engaged in crowd control by projecting over the crowd's noise.
Individual Voice-Amplification System

L-12. The individual voice-amplification system (Figure L-7) is a critical communication device for conducting crowd control tactics when using RCAs and wearing a protective mask. This device facilitates oral communications and increases the user's ability to be heard on radios and other devices.

Individual Oleoresin Capsicum and M36 Individual Chlorobenzyl Malononitrile Dispersers

L-13. These individual RCA dispersers (Figure L-8) are used primarily for self-defense and to keep rioters out of arm's reach of soldiers conducting crowd control tactics or engaged in missions where noncombatant threat exists.

Midsize Riot Control Dispersers of Oleoresin Capsicum and Chlorobenzylidene Malononitrile

L-14. This RCA disperser (Figure L-9) is primarily used by formations conducting crowd control tactics, law enforcement, and I/R operations. It is lightweight, can be operated by
one person, and is easily refilled and pressurized with available maintenance equipment or 2- or 5-ton truck compressors. It is intended to provide a small unit with self-defense capabilities from large crowds out to 10 meters (more range is possible based on the wind) or offensively to clear crowds from critical areas (toward preplanned escape routes).

![Image of midsize riot control disperser]

**Figure L-9. Midsize Riot Control Dispersers of OC and CS**

**M33A1 Riot Control Disperser Filled With Chlorobenzylidene Malononitrile or Dibenz (B, f)-1, 4-Oxazepine (CR)**

L-15. This RCA disperser (Figure L-10) is primarily used by formations conducting crowd control tactics. It is twice as heavy as a midsized disperser, carries a larger payload, and dispenses powdered CS or liquid CR. One individual can operate it, and it can be refilled and pressurized with available M4 compressors. It is intended to provide a small unit with self-defense capabilities from large crowds out to 15 meters (100 meters is possible based on wind speed and direction). Use the M33A1 offensively to clear crowds from critical areas.

![Image of M33A1 riot control disperser]

**Figure L-10. M33A1 Riot Control Disperser Filled With CS or CR**

L-16. Some training is required to operate the dispenser. The unit NBC NCO may conduct this training. The device requires up to 2,000 pounds per square inch of pressure to function properly, and it is maintained with an M254 maintenance kit.

**High-Intensity Xenon Searchlight**

L-17. Use this individual, handheld searchlight (Figure L-11) for illumination in crowd control operations during darkness. Use it for general illumination of the operational area; to pinpoint agitators or threat, to reduce the ability of rioters to see troop formations and actions, and to enhance tactical deception techniques for units conducting crowd control.
operations.

Figure L-11. High-Intensity Xenon Searchlight

Lightweight Disposable Restraints

L-18. Lightweight disposable restraints (Figure L-12) are also known as flex cuffs. Individual soldiers can carry large quantities of these restraints to immobilize individuals being detained. When freeing a detainee, cut the restraints off him with the safe cutting device supplied with the restraints or with utility shears. A reusable, red restraint training device is available.

Figure L-12. Lightweight Disposable Restraints

Shotgun Munitions Carrier

L-19. The shotgun munitions carrier (Figure L-13) is a 12-gauge ammunition carrier that straps to the stock of the M12 shotgun. It allows the firer to carry nonlethal ammunition that is readily available.

Figure L-13. Shotgun Munitions Carrier

Portable Vehicle-Arresting Barrier (PVAB)

L-20. The PVAB (Figure L-14) is designed to assist with short-term physical security of
critical facilities and for use at checkpoints. Use the PVAB to augment a vehicle checkpoint. It adds the ability to stop any light vehicle (up to 7,500 pounds) that attempts to flee without killing the occupants. This device may be set up by 2 or 3 soldiers in less than an hour.

![Figure L-14. Vehicle Entrapped in a PVAB](image)

**L-21.** When emplaced, the PVAB resembles a standard speed bump. When armed, the device operates within 1.5 seconds and deploys a high-tensile net that catches the vehicle and slows it to a stop with internal braking mechanisms. The net and other features prevent occupants from fleeing the vehicle. The PVAB is best suited for mobile, short-term vehicle checkpoints in areas under US control where there is a threat of terrorist-type activity and where the threat uses the cover of noncombatants to infiltrate US AOs.

**NONLETHAL MUNITIONS**

**L-22.** The following munitions provide soldiers with a nonlethal way to break contact, enforce a buffer zone, or stun an individual.

**12-Gauge Nonlethal Point Target Cartridge Round (M1012)**

**L-23.** The point target cartridge round (Figure L-15) stuns individuals by delivering a strong blow to the body without penetrating it. This munition allows soldiers to enforce a buffer zone (standoff distance) with a violent crowd, break contact, or stun an individual target for possible detention by snatch teams. Fire the round at the center mass of an adult subject at ranges of 10 to 30 meters. Beyond 30 meters, the projectile loses accuracy and may no longer have the velocity required to stun an individual. This round has applications in law enforcement, I/R facilities, and US military detention facilities.

**DANGER**

Shots fired at subjects closer than 10 meters or shots to the head or groin may cause serious injury.
12-Gauge Aerial Diversionary-Device Round

L-24. The aerial diversionary-device round (Figure L-16) provides multishot nonlethal capability to distract individuals or crowds. In crowd control, it delivers a flash bang projectile over the heads of a violent or potentially violent crowd, and is used to distract the crowd (in combination with other distraction devices and troop maneuvers). It allows other troop formations to maneuver to positions that are more advantageous.

L-25. The round is designed to be fired at ranges of 75 to 100 meters and is placed about 5 meters above the crowd.

DANGER

Shots fired directly at subjects or in enclosed areas may cause serious injury.

12-Gauge Nonlethal Area Target Cartridge Round (M1013)

L-26. The area target cartridge round (Figure L-17) provides the capability to stun or deter
two or three threats by delivering a strong blow to the body without penetrating it. This round has a wide range of capabilities for tactical, law enforcement, I/R, and US military detention operations.

Figure L-17. 12-Gauge Nonlethal Area Target Cartridge Round

L-27. The round is designed to be fired at the center mass of an adult threat at ranges of 10 to 30 meters. Shots fired closer than 10 meters may cause serious injuries. The projectile loses accuracy when shot beyond 30 meters and may no longer be effective.

40-Millimeter Sponge Round (Point) (M1006)

L-28. The 40-millimeter sponge round (Figure L-18) delivers a strong, stunning blow to a threat's body without penetrating it. This round has a wide range of capabilities for tactical, law enforcement, I/R, and US military detention operations.

Figure L-18. M1006 40-Millimeter Sponge Round

L-29. The round is designed to be fired at the center mass of an adult threat at ranges of 10 to 50 meters.

WARNING

Shots fired closer than 10 meters may cause injuries.

40-Millimeter Crowd Dispersal Round (Area) (XM1029)

L-30. The 40-millimeter crowd dispersal round (Figure L-19) delivers a strong, stunning
blow to a threat's body without penetrating it. This round has a wide range of capabilities for tactical, law enforcement, I/R, and US military detention operations. In crowd control, it provides a nonlethal capability that can be used to break contact and enforce a buffer zone (standoff distance) with a violent crowd.

Figure L-19. 40-Millimeter Crowd Dispersal Round (Area)

L-31. The round is designed to be fired at the center mass of an adult threat at ranges of 10 to 30 meters. The projectile loses accuracy when shot beyond 30 meters and may not stun or deter the threat.

WARNING

Shots fired closer than 10 meters may cause injuries.

40-Millimeter Carrying Pouch

L-32. The 40-millimeter carrying pouch is slung over the shoulder of a soldier. It provides the ability to carry nonlethal ammunition separate from lethal rounds.

M84 Stun Grenade (Diversionary Device, Hand-Thrown)

L-33. The M84 (Figure L-20) is a hand-thrown, flash bang, stun device used primarily by SRTs in forced-entry scenarios. It is used for selected MOUT or crowd control operations.

Figure L-20. M84 Stun Grenade
L-34. The M84 is designed to be thrown into a room (through an open door, a standard glass window, or other opening). It delivers a loud bang and a brilliant flash that temporarily disorients and detracts the occupants. Because of its reusable metal body, do not throw it into a crowd, as it may be returned to friendly troops in the form of a projectile. Instead, throw it into a controlled area in conjunction with other deception and distraction techniques.

NONLETHAL, TURRET-MOUNTED, 66-MILLIMETER GRENADE LAUNCHER (M315) AND LIGHT VEHICLE OBSCURATION SMOKE SYSTEM, 66-MILLIMETER, NONLETHAL GRENADE (L96/97 XM98/99)

L-35. The LVOSS/M315 (Figure L-21) is a 66-millimeter smoke grenade-launching platform designed to give HMMWVs ASV M1117 the ability to obscure their position in the same manner as armored vehicles. These launchers can launch any of the smoke or nonlethal 66-millimeter munition.

Figure L-21. LVOSS and M315

L-36. The M315 turret-mounted, 66-millimeter, multipurpose...
Appendix L

Weapons and Equipment

MP must be rapidly deployable, versatile, and as lethal as the force that they support. MP are organized and equipped to provide functional battlefield capabilities that range from the deliberate attack (area security) to civil-disturbance control operations (L&O). Although not all inclusive, the listed data is intended to aid in planning MP operations. In any tactical situation, it is important that MP be able to properly identify threat weapons, vehicles, and aircraft. When threat is observed, MP report their location, activity, and direction of travel to higher HQ by the fastest means available.

FRIENDLY VEHICLES

L-1. Table L-1, gives MP leaders a quick look at the capabilities of the various vehicles in the Army inventory.

Table L-1. Vehicle Capabilities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Vehicle Capabilities</th>
<th>M998</th>
<th>M1025/1026</th>
<th>M1114</th>
<th>M1117</th>
<th>Light Medium Tactical Vehicle (LMTV)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Weight (g.v.w) (pounds)</td>
<td>4,950</td>
<td>5,250</td>
<td>12,100</td>
<td>29,500</td>
<td>16,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Height (in inches)</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>73/73</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Length (in inches)</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>180/185</td>
<td>190.5</td>
<td>237</td>
<td>251</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Width</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>85/85</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fuel capacity (in gallons)</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maximum speed (miles per hour)</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Range (in miles)</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>275</td>
<td>440</td>
<td>400+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fording Capabilities</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>With kit (in inches)</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Without kit (in inches)</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pay load (maximum pounds)</td>
<td>2,500</td>
<td>2,500</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>3,360</td>
<td>5,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

FRIENDLY WEAPONS

L-2. Table L-2 gives MP leaders a quick look at the capabilities of the weapons used by MP units.

Table L-2. Weapon Capabilities
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Weapon Capabilities</th>
<th>M2</th>
<th>M4</th>
<th>M9</th>
<th>M16A2</th>
<th>MK-19</th>
<th>M136 (AT4)</th>
<th>M203</th>
<th>M249</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Weight (in pounds)</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>15.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Length (in inches)</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>29.75 closed, 8.5</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>41.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Range</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Maximum (in meters)</td>
<td>6,765</td>
<td>3,600</td>
<td>1,800</td>
<td>3,600</td>
<td>2,212</td>
<td>2,100</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>3,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arming (in meters)</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>18 to 30</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minimum safe (in meters)</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Effective Range</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Area target (in meters)</td>
<td>1,830</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>2,212</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Point target (in meters)</td>
<td>1,200</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>580</td>
<td>1,500</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moving target (in meters)</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rate of Fire (in Rounds Per Minute)</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cyclic</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>700 to 970</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>700 to 800</td>
<td>375</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rapid</td>
<td>40*</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>200*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sustained</td>
<td>40*</td>
<td>12/15</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*With barrel change.

FRIENDLY NONLETHAL EQUIPMENT AND MUNITIONS

L-3. The following descriptions and illustrations describe nonlethal equipment and munitions that are currently available.

NONLETHAL EQUIPMENT

L-4. The following nonlethal equipment provides bodily protection for soldiers involved in a nonlethal operation and allows soldiers to capture the threat with a minimum of force.

Nonballistic and Ballistic Riot Face Shields

L-5. The riot face shield (Figure L-1) provides soldiers with improved facial protection from thrown objects. The face shield is lightweight, adaptable to the current helmet, transparent, and scratch-resistant. It is adjustable to up and down positions. The mechanism for attaching and removing the shield from the helmet is robust and simple and requires no tools in the field.
L-6. The ballistic riot face shield is similar in design, but it is heavier and provides facial protection up to a 9-millimeter full metal jacket (FMJ) or 124 grains at 1,400 feet per second. This face shield is primarily used by SRTs in force-entry scenarios and can also be used for MOUT operations.

Nonballistic and Ballistic Riot Body Shields

L-7. The nonballistic riot body shield (Figure L-2) is 24 inches by 48 inches by .157 inches. It provides soldiers with improved protection from frontal, side, and overhead assaults. This shield is lightweight, transparent, and scratch-resistant. The ballistic riot body shield (Figure L-3) is 24 inches by 36 inches with a 4- by 16-inch window for viewing the threat. It is similar in design to the nonballistic shield but is heavier. It provides ballistic protection up to a 9-millimeter FMJ or 124 grains at 1,400 feet per second. This shield is primarily used by SRTs in forced-entry scenarios and can also be used for selected MOUT operations.
Figure L-3. Ballistic Riot Body Shield

Nonballistic and Ballistic Shin Guards

L-8. Nonballistic shin guards (Figure L-4) provide soldiers with improved protection from thrown objects. They are lightweight and black in color.

Figure L-4. Nonballistic Shin Guards

L-9. Ballistic shin guards are similar in design to nonballastic guards, but they are heavier and provide protection up to a 9-millimeter FMJ or 124 grains at 1,400 feet per second. They are primarily used by SRTs in forced-entry scenarios and can also be used in selected MOUT operations.

Baton

L-10. The standard 36-inch wooden riot baton (Figure L-5) is currently in use for riot control. It is used for self-defense and to keep rioters out of arm's reach of the soldiers conducting crowd control tactics.

Figure L-5. Standard 36-inch Wooden Riot Baton

Portable Bullhorn

L-11. The portable bullhorn (Figure L-6) is a critical communication device when conducting crowd control tactics. The bullhorn can facilitate communication with the crowd in conjunction with linguist or PSYOP support. It also assists in communicating commands to troops engaged in crowd control by projecting over the crowd's noise.
Individual Voice-Amplification System

L-12. The individual voice-amplification system (Figure L-7) is a critical communication device for conducting crowd control tactics when using RCAs and wearing a protective mask. This device facilitates oral communications and increases the user's ability to be heard on radios and other devices.

Individual Oleoresin Capsicum and M36 Individual Chlorobenzyl Malononitrile Dispersers

L-13. These individual RCA dispersers (Figure L-8) are used primarily for self-defense and to keep rioters out of arm's reach of soldiers conducting crowd control tactics or engaged in missions were noncombatant threat exists.

Midsize Riot Control Dispersers of Oleoresin Capsicum and Chlorobenzylidene Malononitrile

L-14. This RCA disperser (Figure L-9) is primarily used by formations conducting crowd control tactics, law enforcement, and I/R operations. It is lightweight, can be operated by
one person, and is easily refilled and pressurized with available maintenance equipment or 2- or 5-ton truck compressors. It is intended to provide a small unit with self-defense capabilities from large crowds out to 10 meters (more range is possible based on the wind) or offensively to clear crowds from critical areas (toward preplanned escape routes).

![Figure L-9. Midsize Riot Control Dispersers of OC and CS](image)

**M33A1 Riot Control Disperser Filled With Chlorobenzylidene Malononitrile or Dibenz (B, f)-1, 4-Oxazepine (CR)**

L-15. This RCA disperser (Figure L-10) is primarily used by formations conducting crowd control tactics. It is twice as heavy as a midsized disperser, carries a larger payload, and dispenses powdered CS or liquid CR. One individual can operate it, and it can be refilled and pressurized with available M4 compressors. It is intended to provide a small unit with self-defense capabilities from large crowds out to 15 meters (100 meters is possible based on wind speed and direction). Use the M33A1 offensively to clear crowds from critical areas.

![Figure L-10. M33A1 Riot Control Disperser Filled With CS or CR](image)

**High-Intensity Xenon Searchlight**

L-17. Use this individual, handheld searchlight (Figure L-11) for illumination in crowd control operations during darkness. Use it for general illumination of the operational area; to pinpoint agitators or threat, to reduce the ability of rioters to see troop formations and actions, and to enhance tactical deception techniques for units conducting crowd control.
operations.

Figure L-11. High-Intensity Xenon Searchlight

Lightweight Disposable Restraints

L-18. Lightweight disposable restraints (Figure L-12) are also known as flex cuffs. Individual soldiers can carry large quantities of these restraints to immobilize individuals being detained. When freeing a detainee, cut the restraints off him with the safe cutting device supplied with the restraints or with utility shears. A reusable, red restraint training device is available.

Figure L-12. Lightweight Disposable Restraints

Shotgun Munitions Carrier

L-19. The shotgun munitions carrier (Figure L-13) is a 12-gauge ammunition carrier that straps to the stock of the M12 shotgun. It allows the firer to carry nonlethal ammunition that is readily available.

Figure L-13. Shotgun Munitions Carrier

Portable Vehicle-Arresting Barrier (PVAB)

L-20. The PVAB (Figure L-14) is designed to assist with short-term physical security of
critical facilities and for use at checkpoints. Use the PVAB to augment a vehicle checkpoint. It adds the ability to stop any light vehicle (up to 7,500 pounds) that attempts to flee without killing the occupants. This device may be set up by 2 or 3 soldiers in less than an hour.

Figure L-14. Vehicle Entrapped in a PVAB

L-21. When emplaced, the PVAB resembles a standard speed bump. When armed, the device operates within 1.5 seconds and deploys a high-tensile net that catches the vehicle and slows it to a stop with internal braking mechanisms. The net and other features prevent occupants from fleeing the vehicle. The PVAB is best suited for mobile, short-term vehicle checkpoints in areas under US control where there is a threat of terrorist-type activity and where the threat uses the cover of noncombatants to infiltrate US AOs.

NONLETHAL MUNITIONS

L-22. The following munitions provide soldiers with a nonlethal way to break contact, enforce a buffer zone, or stun an individual.

12-Gauge Nonlethal Point Target Cartridge Round (M1012)

L-23. The point target cartridge round (Figure L-15) stuns individuals by delivering a strong blow to the body without penetrating it. This munition allows soldiers to enforce a buffer zone (standoff distance) with a violent crowd, break contact, or stun an individual target for possible detention by snatch teams. Fire the round at the center mass of an adult subject at ranges of 10 to 30 meters. Beyond 30 meters, the projectile loses accuracy and may no longer have the velocity required to stun an individual. This round has applications in law enforcement, I/R facilities, and US military detention facilities.

DANGER

Shots fired at subjects closer than 10 meters or shots to the head or groin may cause serious injury
12-Gauge Aerial Diversionary-Device Round

L-24. The aerial diversionary-device round (Figure L-16) provides multishot nonlethal capability to distract individuals or crowds. In crowd control, it delivers a flash bang projectile over the heads of a violent or potentially violent crowd, and is used to distract the crowd (in combination with other distraction devices and troop maneuvers). It allows other troop formations to maneuver to positions that are more advantageous

L-25. The round is designed to be fired at ranges of 75 to 100 meters and is placed about 5 meters above the crowd.

DANGER

Shots fired directly at subjects or in enclosed areas may cause serious injury.

12-Gauge Nonlethal Area Target Cartridge Round (M1013)

L-26. The area target cartridge round (Figure L-17) provides the capability to stun or deter
two or three threats by delivering a strong blow to the body without penetrating it. This round has a wide range of capabilities for tactical, law enforcement, I/R, and US military detention operations.

Figure L-17. 12-Gauge Nonlethal Area Target Cartridge Round

L-27. The round is designed to be fired at the center mass of an adult threat at ranges of 10 to 30 meters. Shots fired closer than 10 meters may cause serious injuries. The projectile loses accuracy when shot beyond 30 meters and may no longer be effective.

40-Millimeter Sponge Round (Point) (M1006)

L-28. The 40-millimeter sponge round (Figure L-18) delivers a strong, stunning blow to a threat's body without penetrating it. This round has a wide range of capabilities for tactical, law enforcement, I/R, and US military detention operations.

Figure L-18. M1006 40-Millimeter Sponge Round

L-29. The round is designed to be fired at the center mass of an adult threat at ranges of 10 to 50 meters.

WARNING

Shots fired closer than 10 meters may cause injuries.

40-Millimeter Crowd Dispersal Round (Area) (XM1029)

L-30. The 40-millimeter crowd dispersal round (Figure L-19) delivers a strong, stunning
blow to a threat's body without penetrating it. This round has a wide range of capabilities for tactical, law enforcement, I/R, and US military detention operations. In crowd control, it provides a nonlethal capability that can be used to break contact and enforce a buffer zone (standoff distance) with a violent crowd.

![Figure L-19. 40-Millimeter Crowd Dispersal Round (Area)](image)

L-31. The round is designed to be fired at the center mass of an adult threat at ranges of 10 to 30 meters. The projectile loses accuracy when shot beyond 30 meters and may not stun or deter the threat.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>WARNING</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Shots fired closer than 10 meters may cause injuries.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

40-Millimeter Carrying Pouch

L-32. The 40-millimeter carrying pouch is slung over the shoulder of a soldier. It provides the ability to carry nonlethal ammunition separate from lethal rounds.

M84 Stun Grenade (Diversionary Device, Hand-Thrown)

L-33. The M84 (Figure L-20) is a hand-thrown, flash bang, stun device used primarily by SRTs in forced-entry scenarios. It is used for selected MOUT or crowd control operations.

![Figure L-20. M84 Stun Grenade](image)
L-34. The M84 is designed to be thrown into a room (through an open door, a standard glass window, or other opening). It delivers a loud bang and a brilliant flash that temporarily disorients and detracts the occupants. Because of its reusable metal body, do not throw it into a crowd, as it may be returned to friendly troops in the form of a projectile. Instead, throw it into a controlled area in conjunction with other deception and distraction techniques.

**NONLETHAL, TURRET-MOUNTED, 66-MILLIMETER GRENADE LAUNCHER (M315) AND LIGHT VEHICLE OBSCURATION SMOKE SYSTEM, 66-MILLIMETER, NONLETHAL GRENADE (L96/97 XM98/99)**

L-35. The LVOSS/M315 (Figure L-21) is a 66-millimeter smoke grenade-launching platform designed to give HMMWVs ASV M1117 the ability to obscure their position in the same manner as armored vehicles. These launchers can launch any of the smoke or nonlethal 66-millimeter munition.

![Figure L-21. LVOSS and M315](image)

L-36. The M315 turret-mounted, 66-millimeter, multipurpose, adjustable grenade launcher installation kit was developed to provide a vehicle-mounted nonlethal platform. The system is capable of delivering nonlethal payloads to support a variety of mission requirements and can be mounted on various vehicles (M1025, M1026, M966, M114, or ASV M1117) equipped with a machine gun or a TOW II missile system mount. The system electronically fires 66-millimeter cartridges from four adjustable firing tubes.

L-37. The LVOSS, 66-millimeter, nonlethal grenade (L96/97 XM98/99) is an area target munition that can be fired from the standard LVOSS/M315 launcher (Figure L-22). It can be mounted on selected armament carrier HMMWVs and can be fired from any 66-millimeter, smoke-launching system found on most armored vehicles.
L-38. These rounds are designed to be fired from 80 to 100 meters. They deliver a flash bang diversionary warning (M98), a payload of rubber nonpenetrating projectiles (M99) (affecting a 10- to 20-meter circular area), or CS/cinnamic acid (CA) practice below the point of burst (L96A1/L97A1). These munitions lack the ability to be precision-delivered and are meant to affect a large number of people at long standoff ranges. This provides convoys and crowd control formations a long range support weapon to affect crowds beyond the range of shoulder-fired nonlethal weapons. Use the rounds to provide supporting nonlethal fires to crowd control formations.

M5 Modular Crowd Control Munitions

L-39. The MCCM (Figure L-23) munition is similar in operation to a claymore mine, but it delivers nonlethal effects to the threat by delivering a strong, nonpenetrating blow to the body with multiple submunitions (600 rubber balls). This round has a wide range of capabilities for tactical, law enforcement, I/R, and US military detention operations. In crowd control, it provides a nonlethal counterpersonnel capability that can be used to break contact, enforce a buffer zone (standoff distance), or demonstrate a show of force.
Figure L-23. M5 MCCM

L-40. This round is designed to be fired at the center mass of adult threats at ranges of 5 to 15 meters. It has a shot arc covering between 60 to 80 degrees (laterally).

WARNING

Shots fired at subjects closer than 5 meters may cause injuries.

FRIENDLY COMMUNICATION, SINGLE-CHANNEL, GROUND-TO-AIR RADIO SYSTEM (SINCGARS)

L-41. SINCGARS is the primary communication system for MP. It is a series of 2-way FM radio sets that use an 18-element keypad for tuning 2,320 channels. This includes 8 preset channels in the single-channel mode and 6 preset channels in the jam-resistant, frequency-hopping mode. Table L-3 and Table L-4 provide the planning ranges for SINCGARS.

Table L-3. Voice Transmission Maximum Planning Ranges

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Radio</th>
<th>RF Switch Position</th>
<th>Planning Ranges</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Manpack or vehicular</td>
<td>LO</td>
<td>200 to 400 meters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M</td>
<td>400 meters to 5 kilometers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>HI</td>
<td>5 to 10 kilometers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vehicular only</td>
<td>PA</td>
<td>10 to 40 kilometers</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

L-42. To increase the transmission range of SINCGARS, connect the OE-254 antenna group. It is an omnidirectional, biconical antenna designed for broadband operation, without field adjustment, from 30 to 88 megahertz, up to 350 watts. The following is the tabulated data transmission range of the OE-254:

- Between two OE-254 antenna groups-
  - Average terrain: 36 miles (57.9 kilometers).
  - Difficult terrain: 30 miles (48.3 kilometers).

- Between an OE-254 antenna group and a vehicular whip antenna-
  - Average terrain: 30 miles (48.3 kilometers).
  - Difficult terrain: 25 miles (40.3 kilometers).

Table L-4. Data Transmission Maximum Planning Ranges

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Radio</th>
<th>Baud Rate Used</th>
<th>RF Switch Position</th>
<th>Planning Ranges*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(In Kilometers)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

DODDOA-009982
Manpack/vehicular | 600 to 4,800 baud per second (BPS) | HI | 3 to 5
(long range) | 16,000 BPS (16 kilobauds per second [KBPS]) | HI | 1 to 3
Vehicular | 600 to 2,400 BPS | PA | 5 to 25
(long range) | 4,800 BPS | PA | 5 to 22
16,000 BPS (16 KBPS) | PA | 3 to 10

*Ranges are based on the line of sight and are average for normal conditions. Ranges depend on the location, the sighting, the weather, and the surrounding noise level, among other factors. The use of the OE-254 antenna increases the range for both voice and data transmissions. Enemy jamming and mutual interference conditions degrade these ranges. In data transmission, the use of a lower baud rate increases the range.

THREAT WEAPONS AND EQUIPMENT

L-43. In any tactical situation, it is important that MP be able to properly identify threat weapons, vehicles, and aircraft. MP report threat location, activity, and direction of travel to higher HQ by the fastest means available.

L-44. Tables L-5 through L-12, outline the most common features of threat weapons, equipment, and vehicles that MP may encounter in a hostile environment. Special operations forces and airborne assault, reconnaissance, and insurgent units often use these weapons.

Table L-5. Small Arms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Small Arms Characteristics</th>
<th>9-Millimeter PM Pistol</th>
<th>5.45-Millimeter AK-74 Assault Rifle</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Range, effective and maximum (in meters)</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>500/1,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rate of fire, practical and cyclic (rounds per minute)</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>100/600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ammunition type</td>
<td>9- by 18-millimeter ball</td>
<td>5.45- by 39-millimeter ball, ball tracer, incendiary T</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fire mode</td>
<td>Semiautomatic</td>
<td>Selective semiautomatic or fully automatic</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table L-5. Small Arms (Continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Small Arms Characteristics</th>
<th>5.45-Millimeter Squad Machine Gun (RPK)-74 Light MG</th>
<th>5.45-Millimeter AKSU-74 Submachine Gun (SMG)</th>
<th>7.62-Millimeter Soviet Sniper Rifle (SVD)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Characteristics</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Range, effective and maximum (in meters)</strong></td>
<td>800/2,500</td>
<td>300/1,500</td>
<td>1,300 with scope, (800 without)/3,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Rate of fire, practical and cyclic (rounds per minute)</strong></td>
<td>150/600</td>
<td>150/600</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ammunition type</strong></td>
<td>5.45- by 39-millimeter ball, ball tracer, incendiary T</td>
<td>5.45- by 39-millimeter ball, ball tracer, incendiary T</td>
<td>7.62- by 54R-millimeter light or heavy ball, steel core, tracer, AT, incendiary &quot;rose&quot; sniper bullet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Fire mode</strong></td>
<td>Selective semiautomatic or fully automatic</td>
<td>Selective semiautomatic or fully automatic</td>
<td>Semiautomatic</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table L-5. Small Arms (Continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Machine Gun Characteristics</th>
<th>RPK-74</th>
<th>PKM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Characteristics</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Range, effective and maximum (in meters)</strong></td>
<td>800/2,500</td>
<td>1,000/3,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Rate of fire, cyclic and practical (rounds per minute)</strong></td>
<td>600/150</td>
<td>650/250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ammunition type</strong></td>
<td>5.45- by 39-millimeter, rimless</td>
<td>7.622- by 54-millimeter ball, ball tracer, API-T, incendiary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Fire mode</strong></td>
<td>Selective</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Armor penetration (in millimeters)</strong></td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>8 millimeters at 500</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table L-6. Grenade Launchers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristic</th>
<th>PG-VL</th>
<th>PG-7M</th>
<th>PG-VR</th>
<th>PG-7</th>
<th>OQ-7/V</th>
<th>PG-16</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Range, effective and maximum (in meters)</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>330</td>
<td>330</td>
<td>&gt;750</td>
<td>500/800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rate of fire, practical and cyclic (rounds per minute)</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>&gt;PG-7M</td>
<td>&gt;PG-VR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elevation (in degrees)</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traverse (in degrees)</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Platform</td>
<td>Tripod, vehicle, or helicopter</td>
<td>Under barrel grenade launcher</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fire mode</td>
<td>Selective, semiautomatic, or fully automatic</td>
<td>Single shot</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feed</td>
<td>29-round belt in drum magazine</td>
<td>Muzzle loaded</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ammunition type</td>
<td>30-millimeter, HE fragment</td>
<td>40-millimeter, HE fragment, bounding HE fragment</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caliber (in millimeters)</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crew</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Remarks</td>
<td>15-meter lethal area of burst</td>
<td>Bounding HE fragment strikes the ground and &quot;bounds&quot; up 1.5 to 2 meters before exploding</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table L-7. Rocket-Propelled Grenades

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AT Grenade Launcher Characteristics</th>
<th>Rocket-Propelled Grenade (RPG)-7V</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Projectile</td>
<td>PG-7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Range, moving and stationary target (in meters)</td>
<td>300/500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armor penetration (in millimeters)</td>
<td>330</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ammunition type</td>
<td>High-explosive, antitank (HEAT)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rate of fire (rounds)</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table L-7. Rocket-Propelled Grenades (Continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AT Grenade Launcher Characteristics</th>
<th>RPG-18</th>
<th>RPG-22</th>
<th>RPO-</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Projectile</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Range, moving and stationary target (in meters)</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>200 direct fire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armor penetration (in millimeters)</td>
<td>360</td>
<td>390</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ammunition type</td>
<td>HEAT</td>
<td>HEAT</td>
<td>FAE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rate of fire (rounds per minute)</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crew</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tube caliber (in millimeters)</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table L-8. Recoilless Rifles

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AT Gun and Rifle Characteristics</th>
<th>Self-Propelled Gun (SPG-9) Recoilless Rifle</th>
<th>84-Millimeter Carl Gustaf Recoilless Rifle</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Range, HEAT (in meters)</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HEAT, rocket assist (RA)</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HE</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indirect fire</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>1,000 HE, 1,300-meter smoke, 2,300-meter illumination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armor penetration (in millimeters)</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>500 HEAT, 900 HEAT, RA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rate of fire, maximum</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fire control</td>
<td>Direct-view optics II (DVO)</td>
<td>3x DVO</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table L-8. Recoilless Rifles (Continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Infantry Fighting Vehicle (IFV) Characteristics</th>
<th>Bronevaya Maschina Piekhota, Armored Vehicle, Infantry (BMP)-1P IFV</th>
<th>BMP-2 IFV</th>
<th>BMP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Main Armament (Caliber and Model)</td>
<td>73-millimeter 2A38 gun</td>
<td>30-millimeter 2A42 gun</td>
<td>100-millimeter 2A70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ammunition type</td>
<td>HEAT FS, HE fragment</td>
<td>High explosive incendiary (HEI), high explosive tracer (HET), APT</td>
<td>HE fragment, HE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Range, effective (in meters)</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>1,500 light armor, 3,000 air, 2,500 ground</td>
<td>4,000 HE fragment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rate of fire (rounds per minute) sustained/maximum</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>300/500</td>
<td>10/15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table L-8. Recoilless Rifles (Continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>IFV Characteristics</th>
<th>BMP-1P IFV (Continued)</th>
<th>BMP-2 IFV (Continued)</th>
<th>BMP-3 IFV (Continued)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Secondary Armament</td>
<td>AT-4a/5a ATGM</td>
<td>AT-4a/5a ATGM</td>
<td>AT-10 ATGM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Range, effective (in meters)</td>
<td>2,000/4,000</td>
<td>2,000/4,000</td>
<td>5,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rate of fire, cyclic and practical (rounds per minute)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Penetration (millimeters at meter range)</td>
<td>600/650</td>
<td>600/650</td>
<td>660</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### IFV Characteristics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Main Armament (Caliber and Model)</th>
<th>BMP-1 IFV (Continued)</th>
<th>BMP-2 IFV (Continued)</th>
<th>BMP-3 IFV (Continued)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>30-millimeter 2A42 gun</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ammunition type</td>
<td>APT, fragment T, HEI</td>
<td>APT, fragment T, HEI</td>
<td>HEAT FS, FE fragment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Range, effective (in meters)</td>
<td>1,500 light armor, 2,000 air, 4,000 soft skin</td>
<td>2,000 AP, 4,000 HE</td>
<td>800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rate of fire (rounds per minute) sustained and maximum</td>
<td>240/600</td>
<td>240/600</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary Armament</td>
<td>AT-4/5 ATGM</td>
<td>AT-4a/5a ATGM</td>
<td>7.62-millimeter PKT MG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Range, effective (in meters)</td>
<td>2,000/4,000</td>
<td>2,000/4,000</td>
<td>1,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rate of fire, cyclic and practical (rounds per minute)</td>
<td>650/250</td>
<td>650 at 650</td>
<td>650/250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Penetration (millimeters at 600 at 650)</td>
<td>600 at 650</td>
<td>600 at 650</td>
<td>8 at 500 meters</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Commander

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Speed, road and off road (kilometers per hour)</th>
<th>IR</th>
<th>IR</th>
<th>IR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>65/45</td>
<td>65/50</td>
<td>70/50</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table L-8. Recoilless Rifles (Continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>IFV Characteristics</th>
<th>BMP-1P IFV</th>
<th>BMP-2 IFV</th>
<th>BMP-3 IFV</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vehicle Characteristics (Continued)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Range, road and off road (in kilometers)</td>
<td>600/570</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ground clearance (in millimeters)</td>
<td>390</td>
<td>420</td>
<td>190 to 510</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armor, hull/turret (in millimeters)</td>
<td>19/23</td>
<td>19/23</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dimensions (length by width by height, in meters)</td>
<td>6.735 by 2.94 by 2.068</td>
<td>6.86 by 3.13 by 2.45</td>
<td>7.2 by 3.2 by 2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crew and passengers</td>
<td>3/8</td>
<td>3/7</td>
<td>3/7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## Table L-8. Recoilles Rifles (Continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>IFV Characteristics</th>
<th>BMD-2 (Continued)</th>
<th>BMD-3 (Continued)</th>
<th>BRM (Continued)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Auxiliary Armament</td>
<td></td>
<td>30-millimeter, AG-17 grenade launcher</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Model</td>
<td>2- by 7.62-millimeter PKT MG</td>
<td>7.62-millimeter PKT MG</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vehicle Characteristics</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Night sights</td>
<td></td>
<td>Active IR</td>
<td>Second generation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speed, road and off road (kilometers per hour)</td>
<td>60/35/10</td>
<td>70/45/10</td>
<td>70/10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Range, road and off road (in kilometers)</td>
<td>500/350</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armor, hull and turret (in millimeters)</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dimensions (length by width by height, in meters)</td>
<td>5.4 by 2.63 by 1.615</td>
<td>6.1 by 3.134 by 2.25</td>
<td>6.75 by 2.97 by 1.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crew and passengers</td>
<td>2/5</td>
<td>2/5</td>
<td>3/6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## Table L-9. Armored Personnel Carriers (APCs)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>APC Characteristics</th>
<th>BTR-60PB</th>
<th>BTR-70</th>
<th>BTR-80</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Main Armament</td>
<td>14.5-millimeter Soviet 14.5-millimeter, heavy, MG (KPVT)</td>
<td>14.5-millimeter MG (KPVT)</td>
<td>14.5-millimeter MG (KPVT)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Range, effective (in meters)</td>
<td>2,000 ground, 1,400 air</td>
<td>2,000 ground, 1,400 air</td>
<td>2,000 ground, 1,400 air</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rate of fire (rounds per minute) sustained and maximum</td>
<td>80/600</td>
<td>80/600</td>
<td>80/600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Range, effective (in meters)</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>1,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Penetration (millimeters at meter range)</td>
<td>8 at 500 meters</td>
<td>8 at 500 meters</td>
<td>8 at 500 meters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td>-----------------</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table L-9. APCs (Continued)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>APC Characteristics</th>
<th>BTR-60PB (Continued)</th>
<th>BTR-70 (Continued)</th>
<th>BTR-80 (Continued)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vehicle Characteristics</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commander</td>
<td>IR</td>
<td>IR</td>
<td>IR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Driver</td>
<td>IR</td>
<td>IR</td>
<td>IR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Range, road and off road (in kilometers)</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>450</td>
<td>800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armor, hull and turret (in millimeters)</td>
<td>10/7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dimensions (length by width by height, in meters)</td>
<td>7.5 by 2.8 by 2.23</td>
<td>7.85 by 2.8 by 2.45</td>
<td>7.62 by 2.9 by 2.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crew and passengers</td>
<td>3/7</td>
<td>2/8</td>
<td>3/7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table L-9. APCs (Continued)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>APC Characteristics</th>
<th>BTR-80A</th>
<th>BTR-D</th>
<th>BRDM-2 Reconnaissance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Main Armament (Caliber and Model)</td>
<td>30-millimeter 2A72 gun</td>
<td>2 by 7.62 PKT MG</td>
<td>14.5-millimeter KPVT MG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Range, effective (in meters)</td>
<td>2,000 APT, 4,000 HEI, 800 night</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>2,000 ground, 1,400 air</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rate of fire (rounds per minute) sustained and maximum</td>
<td>250/650</td>
<td>80/600</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary Armament</td>
<td>7.62-millimeter PKT MG</td>
<td>7.62-millimeter PKT MG</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Range, effective (in meters)</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rate of fire, cyclic and practical (rounds per minute)</td>
<td>650/250</td>
<td>650/250</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Penetration (millimeters at meter range)</td>
<td>8 at 500 meters</td>
<td>8 at 500 meters</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Vehicle Characteristics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Night sights</th>
<th>Range, road and off road (in kilometers)</th>
<th>Armor, hull and turret (in millimeters)</th>
<th>Dimensions (length by width by height, in meters)</th>
<th>Crew and passengers</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>800</td>
<td>5.883 by 2.63 by 1.67</td>
<td>5.75 by 2.262 by 2.31</td>
<td>2/8</td>
<td>Airborne assault. Can have AGS-17 grenade launcher. BTR-RD has 5 AT-4 antitank guided missiles (ATGMs), dismountable to 2 tripods.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table L-9. APCs (Continued)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>APC Characteristics</th>
<th>MTLB</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Main Armament (Caliber and Model)</td>
<td>7.62 PKT MG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Range, effective (in meters)</td>
<td>1,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rate of fire (rounds per minute) sustained and maximum</td>
<td>250/650</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Vehicle Characteristics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Night sights</th>
<th>Range, road and off road (in kilometers)</th>
<th>Armor, hull and turret (in millimeters)</th>
<th>Dimensions (length by width by height, in meters)</th>
<th>Crew and passengers</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>800</td>
<td>5.883 by 2.63 by 1.67</td>
<td>5.75 by 2.262 by 2.31</td>
<td>2/8</td>
<td>Airborne assault. Can have AGS-17 grenade launcher. BTR-RD has 5 AT-4 antitank guided missiles (ATGMs), dismountable to 2 tripods.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table L-10. ATGM**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ATGM Characteristics</th>
<th>AT-3c SAGGER 9K11 Malyutka</th>
<th>AT-4a/b SPIGOT 9K111/9K111M Fagot/Faktoriya</th>
<th>AT-5 a/b SPANDREL 9K133/9K133m Konkurs/Konkurs-M</th>
<th>AT-6 a/b/c SPIRAL 9K114 Shturm</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Range (in meters)</td>
<td>500 to 3,000</td>
<td>70 to 2,000/75 to 3,500</td>
<td>70 to 4,000/75 to 4,000</td>
<td>400 to 5,000/400 to 6,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>--------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flight time to maximum range (in seconds)</td>
<td>23 to 26</td>
<td>11/19.5</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>13.3/16/18.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guidance and command link</td>
<td>Wire MCLOS, 9M14-2: wire SACLOS</td>
<td>Wire SACLOS</td>
<td>Wire SACLOS</td>
<td>Radio frequency (RF) SACLOS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warheads</td>
<td>HEAT, 9M14-2: tandem HEAT</td>
<td>HEAT</td>
<td>HEAT/tandem HEAT</td>
<td>HEAT or FAE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Remarks</td>
<td>The AT-3 continues to be improved and proliferated worldwide. The M14-2 missile is effective against reactive armor.</td>
<td>Thermal sight detection range is 3,600 meters, with identification at 2,000 meters.</td>
<td>Thermal sight detection range is 3,600 meters, with identification at 2,000 meters.</td>
<td>FAE ranges 400 to 5,000 meters.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table L-10. ATGM (Continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ATGM Characteristics</th>
<th>AT-7 SAXHORN 9K115 Metis</th>
<th>AT-8 SONGSTER 9K112 Kobra</th>
<th>AT-9 9K120 Ataka</th>
<th>AT-10 STABBER 9K116-1/9K116 Bastion/Kastet</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Range (in meters)</td>
<td>40 to 1,000</td>
<td>100 to 4,000</td>
<td>400 to 6,000</td>
<td>100 to 5,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flight time to maximum range (in seconds)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>14.5</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Penetration (rolled hardened armor (RHA)/behind extended range artillery (ERA), in millimeters)</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>1,000/800</td>
<td>660</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guidance and command link</td>
<td>Wire SACLOS</td>
<td>RF (30 gigahertz) SACLOS</td>
<td>Laser beam rider SACLOS</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warheads</td>
<td>HEAT</td>
<td>HEAT</td>
<td>Tandem HEAT, blast, FAE,</td>
<td>HEAT</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The AT-3 continues to be improved and proliferated worldwide. The M14-2 missile is effective against reactive armor. The thermal sight detection range is 3,600 meters, with identification at 2,000 meters. Thermal sight detection range is 3,600 meters, with identification at 2,000 meters. FAE ranges 400 to 5,000 meters.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Remarks</th>
<th>antihelicopter</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Thermal sight detection range is 3,200 meters, with identification at 1,600 meters. Emplace and displace times are 12/20 seconds.</td>
<td>Fired through the main gun tube. Off BMP-3 range is 100 to 4,000 meters, but it can fire on the move.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table L-10. ATGM (Continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Range (in meters)</td>
<td>100 to 5,000</td>
<td>100 to 5,000</td>
<td>80 to 1,500</td>
<td>100-5,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flight time to maximum range (in seconds)</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>12 to 4,000</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Penetration (RHA/behind ERA in millimeters)</td>
<td>770 AT-11a, 1,050 AT-11b</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>1,000/800</td>
<td>1,200/980</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guidance and command link</td>
<td>Laser beam rider SACLOS</td>
<td>Laser beam rider SACLOS</td>
<td>Wire SACLOS</td>
<td>Laser beam rider SACLOS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warheads</td>
<td>HEAT/tandem HEAT</td>
<td>HEAT</td>
<td>Tandem HEAT, FAE</td>
<td>Tandem HEAT, FAE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Remarks</td>
<td>Fired through the main gun tube. T-72 variants have a 4,000-meter maximum range.</td>
<td>Fired from the halt through the main gun tube.</td>
<td>FAE has greater power than 152-millimeter artillery round.</td>
<td>Thermal sight range is 4,000-meter detection and 3,500-meter identification. Maximum altitude of engaged helicopters is 3,000 meters.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table L-10. ATGM (Continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ATGM Characteristics</th>
<th>AT-16 9K121 VIKhR</th>
<th>Milan (France [FR]) 1/2/T/3</th>
<th>Tow (US) 1/2TOW/2a/2b</th>
<th>HOT (FR/Germany [GE])</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Range (in meters)</td>
<td>1,000 to 10,000</td>
<td>20 to 2,000</td>
<td>3,750/3,750/65-3,750/200 to 3,750</td>
<td>75 to 4,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

DODDOA-009993
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Flight time to maximum range (in seconds)</th>
<th>23</th>
<th>12.5</th>
<th>2a: 20, 2b: 21</th>
<th>16.5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Penetration (RHA/behind ERA in millimeters)</td>
<td>1,050/900</td>
<td>600/1,060/1,200/1200</td>
<td>500, ITOW: 800, 2: 920, 2a 1,000</td>
<td>850, 2: 950</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guidance and command link</td>
<td>Laser beam rider SACLOS (lock on before launch)</td>
<td>1 and 2: SACLOS wire SACLOS IR</td>
<td>SACLOS wire</td>
<td>SACLOS wire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warheads</td>
<td>Tandem HEAT</td>
<td>Milan 3 medium range ATGM has IR command link resistant to jamming and tandem warhead.</td>
<td>TOW 2b is fly over, shoot down, top attack, with self-forming penetrant 2nd generation forward looking infrared (FLIR).</td>
<td>HOT 3 long-range ATGM has a tandem warhead, bispectral day and night sights, and may be mounted on posts, vehicles, or helicopters.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table L-11. Rotary Wing Aircraft

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rotary Wing Aircraft Characteristics</th>
<th>Mi-8 HIP</th>
<th>Mi-17 HIP H</th>
<th>Mi-24 HIND D/E/F</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mission</td>
<td>Utility, transport</td>
<td>Utility, transport</td>
<td>Attack, close support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gun</td>
<td>12.7 millimeter</td>
<td>12.7 millimeters</td>
<td>30-millimeter HIND F 12.7-millimeter HIND D/E</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATGM</td>
<td>AT-2c</td>
<td>AT-2c, AT-3c</td>
<td>4-16 AT-2c HIND D AT-6c HIND E/F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rockets</td>
<td>57 millimeters</td>
<td>57 millimeters</td>
<td>57 millimeters or 80 millimeters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bombs</td>
<td>250 kilograms, 500 kilograms</td>
<td>250 kilograms, 500 kilograms</td>
<td>250 kilograms, 500 kilograms</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table L-11. Rotary Wing Aircraft (Continued)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rotary Wing Aircraft Characteristics</th>
<th>Mi-8 HIP (Continued)</th>
<th>Mi-17 HIP H (Continued)</th>
<th>Mi-24 HIND D/E/F (Continued)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Range, normal payload (in kilometers)</td>
<td>460</td>
<td>495</td>
<td>480</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crew</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Passengers</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Remarks</td>
<td>Troops can fire personal weapons through windows. It has four external hard points.</td>
<td>Improved version of Mi-8MT, have upgraded engines and six external hard points.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mi-28N HAVOC</td>
<td>Gazelle (FR)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Ka-50 HOKUM &quot;Black Shark&quot; or &quot;Werewolf&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mission</td>
<td>Attack, close support</td>
<td>Light attack utility</td>
<td>Attack, close support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gun</td>
<td>23 millimeters</td>
<td>2 by 7.62 millimeters</td>
<td>2A42 30-millimeter cannon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>30 millimeters</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table L-11. Rotary Wing Aircraft (Continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rotary Wing Aircraft Characteristics</th>
<th>Mi-28N HAVOC</th>
<th>Gazelle (FR)</th>
<th>Ka-50 HOKUM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ATGM</td>
<td>16 AT-6/9/16</td>
<td>AT-3, HOT</td>
<td>AT-16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rockets</td>
<td>57 millimeters</td>
<td>5 millimeters</td>
<td>80 millimeters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>68 millimeters</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2.75 inches</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bombs</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>250 kilograms, 500 kilograms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Range, normal payload (in kilometers)</td>
<td>470</td>
<td>710</td>
<td>455</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1,100 with drop tanks</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crew</td>
<td>2 or 3</td>
<td>1 or 2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Passengers</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Remarks</td>
<td>This system is not operationally fielded in any armed force.</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>The armored cockpit withstands 23-millimeter fire and the windscreen withstands 12.7-millimeter fire.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table L-11. Rotary Wing Aircraft (Continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rotary Wing Aircraft Characteristics</th>
<th>MD 500 (US)</th>
<th>UH-1H (US)</th>
<th>BO-105 (GE)</th>
<th>Lynx (UK)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mission</td>
<td>General purpose, light attack</td>
<td>Utility</td>
<td>General purpose, light attack</td>
<td>General purpose, attack</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gun</td>
<td>7.62 millimeters</td>
<td>7.62 millimeters</td>
<td>20 millimeters</td>
<td>2 by 20 millimeters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATGM</td>
<td>TOW</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>HOT TOW</td>
<td>HOT Hellfire TOW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rockets</td>
<td>70 millimeters</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>Sura, 80 millimeters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Range, normal payload (in kilometers)</td>
<td>540</td>
<td>465</td>
<td>318</td>
<td>540</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crew</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Passengers</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table L-12. Combat Aircraft

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Combat Aircraft Characteristics</th>
<th>An-12 CUB</th>
<th>SU-25 FROGFOOT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mission</td>
<td>Medium transport aircraft</td>
<td>CAS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gun(s)</td>
<td>NR-23 23 millimeters in the tail turret</td>
<td>GSh-30-2, 30 millimeters (250 rounds), AO-17a, 30-millimeter pods</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATGMs</td>
<td>16x AT-16 or AT-9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rockets</td>
<td>57-millimeter S-5 pod, 80-millimeter S-8 pod (up to 8 pods)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air-to-surface missiles</td>
<td>AS-7, AS-10, AS-11, AS-14, AS-17</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bombs</td>
<td>100 kilograms, 350 kilograms, 500 kilograms (up to 4,000 kilograms)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combat radius (in kilometers)</td>
<td>1,500 to 1,800</td>
<td>495</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Payload, paratroops</td>
<td>90</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Remarks</td>
<td>It can operate from dirt strips.</td>
<td>SU-25M: AT, SU-25UB: trainer, ceiling 10,000 meters, 4,344 kilograms maximum payload, 6.5 gram limit.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table L-12. Combat Aircraft (Continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Combat Aircraft Characteristics</th>
<th>SU-27 Flanker B</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mission</td>
<td>Fighter/interceptor, fighter bomber variant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gun(s)</td>
<td>GSh-301, 30-millimeter cannon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATGMs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rockets</td>
<td>80-millimeter S-8 or 120-millimeter S-25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air-to-air missiles</td>
<td>R-27, R-73, AA-10, AA-11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bombs</td>
<td>100 kilograms, 250 kilograms, 500 kilograms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combat radius (in kilometers)</td>
<td>1,125/1,950 with tanks</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Glossary

∞ infinity symbol
" inch(es)
' foot; feet
> more than
< less than
° degree
? unknown information

AA assembly area
AAR after-action review
AB A map's reference point.
ABD air base defense
ACE ammunition, casualty, and equipment
ADC area damage control
AFJI Air Force joint instruction
AFM Air Force manual
AFSF Air Force security force
AGS armored gun system
AI area of interest
alt alternate
ammo ammunition
ANCD automated net control device
AO area of operation
AOE  Army of Excellence
AOR  area of responsibility
AP   armor piercing
APC  armored personnel carrier
APL  antipersonnel land mines
APT  armor piercing tracer
AR   Army regulation; automatic rifle (SAW)
AS   area security
ASAP all-source analysis product
ASCC Army service component command
ASI  addition skill identifier
ASP  ammunition supply point
ASV  armor security vehicle
AT   antitank
AT/FP antiterrorism/force protection
ATGM antitank guided missiles
ATTN attention
AWOL absent without leave
BCC  battlefield circulation control
BCOC base cluster operations center
BDOC base defense operations center
BDU battle dress uniform
BHL  battle handover line
BII  basic-issue item
bldg   building
BMP   Bronevaya Maschina Piekhota, armored vehicle, infantry
BPS   baud per second
BSA   brigade support area
BT    bomb trench
c    distance of the centerline of the road
C     clay; distance from the centerline
C²    command and control
C4    composition C4
CA    cinnamic acid; civil affairs
CAC   crossing area commander
CAM   chemical agent monitor
CANA  convulsant antidote for nerve agents
CAS   close air support
CASEVAC casualty evacuation
CCIR  commander's critical information requirements
cdr   commander
CERTEX certification exercise
cGyph centigray per hour
CI    civilian internee
CID   criminal investigation division
C    centerline
cm    centimeter
co    company
COA  course of action
COMMEX  communication exercise
COMMZ  communications zone
CONEX  container express
CONUS  continental United States
CP  command post
CPOG  chemical protective overgarment
CPU  chemical protective undergarment
CR  Dibenz (B, f)-1, 4-oxazepine
CS  combat support; chlorobenzul-malononitrile
CSC  crossing site commander
CSS  combat-service support
CTOC  corps tactical operations center
CTUS  customs territory of the United States
DA  Department of the Army
DAP  decontamination apparatus
DC  dislocated civilian
DCG  degrees grid north
DD  Department of Defense
Dec  December
DED  detailed equipment decontamination
DFAS-IN  Defense Finance and Accounting Service-Indianapolis
DFC  defense force commander
DGG  degrees grid north
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DGM</td>
<td>degrees magnetic north</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DGT</td>
<td>degrees true north</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DM</td>
<td>designated marksman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DNVT</td>
<td>digital nonsecure voice terminal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOD</td>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DS</td>
<td>direct support; decontamination solution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DS2</td>
<td>decontamination solution number 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DSA</td>
<td>division support area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DTD</td>
<td>detailed troop decontamination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DTG</td>
<td>date-time group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DTO</td>
<td>division transportation office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DVO</td>
<td>direct-view optics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DZ</td>
<td>drop zones</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E</td>
<td>east</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EA</td>
<td>engagement area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EAC</td>
<td>echelon above corps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EEFI</td>
<td>essential elements of friendly information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EEP</td>
<td>engineer equipment park</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EIC</td>
<td>end item code</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ENDEX</td>
<td>end of exercise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EO</td>
<td>executive order</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EOC</td>
<td>emergency operations center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EPW</td>
<td>enemy prisoner of war</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ERA</td>
<td>extended range artillery</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ERP engineer regulating points
FA field artillery
FAE fuel air explosive
FCF field confinement facility
FDC fire direction center
FEBA forward edge of the battle area
FFIR friendly force information requirements
FIST fire support team
FLIR forward looking infrared
FM field manual
FMFM fleet Marine force manual
FMJ full metal jacket
FN foreign nation
FO forward observer
FOX M93 NBC Reconnaissance System
FP force protection
FPF final protective fire
FPL final protective line
FR France
FRAG fragment
FRAGO fragmentary order
FSO fire support officer
G gravel; M203
G2 Assistant Chief of Staff, G2 (Intelligence)
<p>| G5       | Assistant Chief of Staff, G5 (Civil Affairs) |
| gal     | gallon                                       |
| GB      | guard bunker                                 |
| GE      | Germany                                      |
| GM      | grid to magnetic                             |
| GMG     | grenade machine gun                          |
| GN      | grid north                                   |
| GP      | general purpose                              |
| GPS     | Global Positioning System                    |
| GS      | general support                              |
| GTA     | graphic training aid                         |
| GVW     | gross vehicle weight                         |
| HAVOC   | Soviet mi-28 aircraft                        |
| Hd      | horizontal distance                          |
| HE      | high explosive                               |
| HEAT    | high explosive antitank                      |
| HEDP    | high explosive, dual purpose                 |
| HEI     | high-explosive incendiary                    |
| HET     | high-explosive tracer                        |
| HHC     | headquarters and headquarters company        |
| HI      | high                                        |
| HIND    | Soviet helicopter                            |
| HIP     | Soviet medium lift helicopter                |
| HMMWV   | high mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicle   |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HN</td>
<td>host nation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HOKUM</td>
<td>Soviet Ka-? aircraft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HOT</td>
<td>air-to-ground antitank missile, also call Euromi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HTS</td>
<td>highway traffic section</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bwv</td>
<td>highway</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HQ</td>
<td>headquarters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IBCT</td>
<td>initial brigade combat team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICITAP</td>
<td>International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICM</td>
<td>improved conventional munitions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ID</td>
<td>identification</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IEDK</td>
<td>individual equipment decontamination kit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IFV</td>
<td>infantry fighting vehicle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IPB</td>
<td>intelligence preparation of the battlefield</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IPC</td>
<td>interpersonal communication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I/R</td>
<td>internment and resettlement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IR</td>
<td>infrared</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRIC</td>
<td>Internment Resettlement Information Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JRA</td>
<td>joint rear area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jul</td>
<td>July</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KBPS</td>
<td>kilobaud per second</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>km</td>
<td>kilometers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KPVT</td>
<td>Soviet 14.5-millimeter heavy machine gun</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L</td>
<td>location</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L&amp;O</td>
<td>law and order</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
LAW  light antiarmor weapon
lb    pound(s)
LC    line of contact
LCE   load-carrying equipment
LD    line of departure
ldr   leader
LMTV  light medium tactical vehicle
LO    low
LOC   lines of communication
LOGSEC logistics security
LOTS  logistics over the shore
LP    listening post
LRA   local reproduction authorized
LVOSS Light Vehicle Obscuration Smoke System
LZ    landing zones
m     meter; perpendicular distance from the center of the tape to the centerline of the road
M     medium; mud
MANSCEN Maneuver Support Center
MBA   main battle area
MCCM  modular crowd control munitions
MCLOS manual command line of sight
MCO   Marine Corps orders
MCRP  Marine Corps warfighting publication

DODDOA-010006
MCT  movements control team
MCWP  Marine Corps warfighting publication
MDMP  military decision-making process
MEDEVAC  medical evacuation
MELIOS  mini eyesafe laser infrared observation set
MEVA  mission-essential or vulnerable area
METL  mission-essential task list
METT-TC  mission, enemy, troops, terrain, time available, and civilian considerations
MG  machine gun
MHZ  mega hertz
MI  military intelligence
MIJI  meaconing; intrusion; jamming; interference
mil  military
MILES  multiple-integrated laser engagement system
MILVAN  military-owned demountable container
min  minute
MLC  military load classification
MLG  mils grid north
MLM  mils magnetic north
MLT  mils true north
mm  millimeter
MMS  maneuver and mobility support
MOPP  mission-oriented protection posture
MOUT  military operations on urbanized terrain
MP    military police
mph   miles per hour
MPI   military police investigation
MRE  meal, ready-to-eat
MRO  medical regulating officer
MSR  main supply route
MTMC military traffic management command
MTF  medical treatment facility
MTP  mission training plan
MWD  military working dogs
N    north
NA   not applicable
NAAK nerve agent auto injector kit
NAI  named area of interest
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NBC  nuclear, biological, chemical
NBCWRS Nuclear, Biological, Chemical Warning and Reporting System
NCO  noncommissioned officer
NCOIC noncommissioned officer in charge
NE   northeast
NEO  noncombatant evacuation operations
NGO  nongovernmental organization
NLP  nonlethal procedure
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NLW</td>
<td>nonlethal weapons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>no</td>
<td>number</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NP</td>
<td>nonpersistent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSN</td>
<td>national stock number</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NTC</td>
<td>National Training Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NVD</td>
<td>night vision device</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NVG</td>
<td>night vision goggle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NW</td>
<td>northwest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NWP</td>
<td>Naval warfare publication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OB</td>
<td>obstruction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OC</td>
<td>observer/controller; oleoresin capsicum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCOKA</td>
<td>observation and fields of fire, cover and concealment, obstacles, key terrain, and avenues of approach</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCONUS</td>
<td>outside the continental United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct</td>
<td>October</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OD</td>
<td>other detainees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OEG</td>
<td>operational exposure guidance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OF</td>
<td>observed fire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OIC</td>
<td>officer in charge</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OP</td>
<td>observation post</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPCON</td>
<td>operational control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPFOR</td>
<td>opposing forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPLAN</td>
<td>operation plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPNAVINST</td>
<td>Chief of Naval Operations Instruction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Definition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPORD</td>
<td>operation order</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPSEC</td>
<td>operations security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ORP</td>
<td>objective rally point</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OVM</td>
<td>on-vehicle material</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P</td>
<td>pedestrian; artificial paving; persistent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PA</td>
<td>power amplifier</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAO</td>
<td>Public Affairs Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PC</td>
<td>point of curvature</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCI</td>
<td>precombat inspection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCIR</td>
<td>police and criminal information requirements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PDDE</td>
<td>power-driven decontamination equipment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PDF</td>
<td>principal direction of fire; portable document format</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PERSCOM</td>
<td>personnel command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PEWS</td>
<td>Platoon Early-Warning System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PIAP</td>
<td>police information assessment process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PIO</td>
<td>police intelligence operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PIR</td>
<td>priority intelligence requirements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PKT</td>
<td>The standard vehicle with a mounted light machine gun and is the basic Soviet coaxial AFV weapon.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PL</td>
<td>phase line</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PLGR</td>
<td>precision lightweight global positioning system receiver</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>plt</td>
<td>platoon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PM</td>
<td>provost marshal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PMCS</td>
<td>preventive-maintenance checks and services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PMO</td>
<td>Provost Marshals Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POE</td>
<td>port of embarkation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POL</td>
<td>petroleum, oils, and lubricants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRC</td>
<td>populace and resource control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSG</td>
<td>platoon sergeant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSYOP</td>
<td>psychological operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT</td>
<td>point of tangency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PVAB</td>
<td>portable vehicle-arresting barrier</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PVO</td>
<td>private volunteer organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pyro</td>
<td>pyrotechnics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R</td>
<td>radio; rock; radius of curve; radar set</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R&amp;S</td>
<td>reconnaissance and surveillance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RA</td>
<td>rocket assist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RADAR</td>
<td>radio detection and ranging</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RADIAC</td>
<td>radiation detection, indication, and computation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RAOC</td>
<td>rear-area operations center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RAP</td>
<td>rocket-assisted projectile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RCA</td>
<td>riot control agents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RES</td>
<td>radiation exposure status</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RF</td>
<td>radio frequency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RHA</td>
<td>rolled hardened armor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RL</td>
<td>release line; railroad bridge</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROE</td>
<td>rules of engagement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROI</td>
<td>rules of interaction</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
RORO  roll-on/roll-off
RP  release point; retained person
RPG  rocket-propelled grenade
RPK  squad machine gun
RTO  radio telephone operator
S  size; sand; south
S2  Intelligence Officer (US Army)
S3  Operations and Training Officer (US Army)
S4  Supply Officer (US Army)
S5  Civil Affairs Officer (US Army)
S&I  standardization and interoperability
SACLOS  semiautomatic command line of sight
SAGGER  An AT-3 ATGM.
SALUTE  size, activity, location, unit, time, and equipment
SAM  surface-to-air missile
SAW  squad automatic weapon
SAXHORN  A nickname for the Soviet AT-7-ATGM.
SE  southeast
SF  security forces
SINCGARS  Single-Channel, Ground-to-Air Radio System
SIR  serious incident report
SITREP  situation report
SJA  Staff Judge Advocate
SM  soldier's manual
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SMCI</td>
<td>senior military customs inspector</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SMG</td>
<td>submachine gun</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SNAP</td>
<td>size, nature, activity, protection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SONGSTER</td>
<td>The nickname for the Soviet AT-8 ATGM.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPANDREL</td>
<td>An AT-5 ATGM.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPIGOT</td>
<td>An AT-4 ATGM.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPIRAL</td>
<td>A Soviet AT-6 ATGM.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOC</td>
<td>security operations center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOFA</td>
<td>Status of Forces Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOI</td>
<td>signal operating instructions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOP</td>
<td>standard operating procedure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SP</td>
<td>start point</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPG</td>
<td>self-propelled gun</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPOTREP</td>
<td>spot report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sqd</td>
<td>squad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SRT</td>
<td>special-reaction team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSCO</td>
<td>small-scale contingencies operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSN</td>
<td>social security number</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STABBER</td>
<td>A nickname for the Soviet AT-10 ATGM.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STANAG</td>
<td>standardization agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STX</td>
<td>situational training exercise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SVD</td>
<td>Soviet sniper rifle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SW</td>
<td>southwest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T</td>
<td>time; snow blockage</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
T&E  traversing and elevating
TA  training area
TACSOP  tactical standing operating procedure
TAI  traffic accident investigation
TC  training circular
TCF  tactical combat force
TCMD  transportation control and movement document
TCP  traffic control post
TEM  training execution model
TL  team leader
TLP  troop-leading procedures
TM  technical manual
tm  team
TO  table of organization
TOC  tactical operations center
TOE  table(s) of organization and equipment
TOW  tube-launched, optically tracked, wire-guided missile
TP  training practice
TRADOC  United States Army Training and Doctrine Command
TRL  traffic regulating line
TRP  target reference point
TRS  transportation railway service
TSC  theater support command
TTP  tactics, techniques, and procedures
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>U</td>
<td>unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UCMJ</td>
<td>Uniform Code of Military Justice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UIN</td>
<td>unit identification number</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UO</td>
<td>urban operation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USACIDC</td>
<td>United States Army Criminal Investigation Division Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAF</td>
<td>United States Air Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAPA</td>
<td>United States Army Publishing Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USATSC</td>
<td>United States Army Training Support Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USCG</td>
<td>United States Coast Guard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USDA</td>
<td>United States Department of Agriculture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USDOJ</td>
<td>United States Department of Justice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UTM</td>
<td>universal transverse mercator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UXO</td>
<td>unexploded ordnance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V</td>
<td>vehicular</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vd</td>
<td>vertical distance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VHS</td>
<td>video home system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VP</td>
<td>both vehicle and pedestrian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W</td>
<td>flooding; west</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WO</td>
<td>warning order</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Y</td>
<td>limited, all-weather route, significant, serious, regular, or recurrent flooding or snow blockage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X</td>
<td>all-weather route</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Zulu; fair-weather route
Bibliography

AR 190-8. Enemy Prisoners of War, Retained Personnel, Civilian Internees and other Detainees {OPNAVINST 3461.6; AFJI 31-304; MCO 3461-1}. 1 October 1997.


AR 190-47. The Army Corrections System. 15 August 1996.


DA Form 1355-1-R. Hasty Protective Row Minefield Record (LRA) (Also available in pdf format at web site www.usapa.army.mil). 00 October 1997.

DA Form 1594. Daily Staff Journal or Duty Officer's Log. 1 November 1962.


DA Form 1911. Altitude and Azimuth (SIN-COS) (Also Available in PDF Format at Web Site: WWW.USAPA.army.mil). 00 February 1957.

DA Form 1971-R. Radiological Data Sheet-Monitoring or Point Technique (LRA). 00 September 1994.

DA Form 2028. Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms. 1 February 1974.

DA Form 2404. Equipment Inspection and Maintenance Worksheet. 1 April 1979.


DA Form 5517-R. Standard Range Cards (LRA). 00 February 1986.


DD Form 1265. Request for Convoy Clearance. 1 January 1959.


DD Form 1911. Material Courier Receipt. 00 May 1982.


DD Form 2708. Receipt of Inmate or Detained Person (Available on DOD Website). 00 November 1999.

DD Form 2745. Enemy Prisoner of War (EPW) Capture Tag. 00 May 1996.


FM 17-98. Scout Platoon. 10 April 1999.
FM 3-19.4 Bibliography


FM 3-5. NBC Decontamination {MCWP 3-37.3}. 28 July 2000.

FM 3-6. Field Behavior of NBC Agents (Including Smoke and Incendiaries) {AFM 105-7; FMFM 7-11-11}. 3 November 1986.

FM 3-34.2. Combined-Arms Breaching Operations. 31 August 00.


FM 5-170. Engineer Reconnaissance. 5 May 1998.


Section 660 of the Foreign Assistance Act.


TC 25-10. A Leader's Guide to Lan
By Order of the Secretary of the Army:

ERIC K. SHINSEKI
General, United States Army
Chief of Staff

DISTRIBUTION: Active Army, Army National Guard, and U.S. Army Reserve: To be distributed in accordance with the initial distribution number 111047, requirements for FM 3-19.4.