TIA may be the closest thing to a true "Big Brother" program that has ever been seriously contemplated in the United States. It is based on a vision of pulling together as much information as possible about as many people as possible into an "ultra-large-scale" database, making that information available to government officials, and sorting through it to try to identify terrorists. Since the amount of public and private information on our lives is growing by leaps and bounds every week, a government project that seeks to put all that information together is a radical and frightening thing.
TIA is run by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), a branch of the Department of Defense that works on military research. It is headed by John Poindexter, the former Reagan-era National Security Adviser known for his involvement in the Iran-Contra scandal, who famously said that it was his duty to withhold information from Congress.
No. There is another effort underway that could bring about a similar result: an airline profiling system called CAPS II. CAPS II would collect massive amounts of information about the tens of millions of American who fly each year and use that information to create profiles. Its use in the airline context gives it a lot more surface appeal, and it has been presented in a far less threatening manner, but it is based on the same faulty premise that terrorism can be prevented by collecting hoards of information about everyone and then subjecting them to a virtual dragnet.
Virtual dragnet programs like TIA and CAPS II are based on the premise that the best way to protect America against terrorism is to for the government to collect as much information as it can about everyone - and these days, that is a LOT of information. They could incorporate not only government records of all kinds but individuals' medical and financial records, political beliefs, travel history, prescriptions, buying habits, communications (phone calls, e-mails and Web surfing), school records, personal and family associations, and so on.
In the last decade we have witnessed an enormous explosion in the amount of tracking and information of individuals in the United States, due mainly to two factors:
The information that is generated and retained about our activities is becoming so rich that if all that information about us was put together, it would almost be like having a video camera following us around. Programs like TIA would make such "data surveillance" a reality.
There are five major problems with the concept behind programs like "Total Information Awareness" and CAPS II:
There is no question that if government agents track the lives and activities of everyone, they will probably experience some marginal improvement in their ability to stop terrorism - though even a perfect totalitarian society could not stop every attack (the Nazis were unable to stop attacks by the Resistance in France and other occupied nations during World War II, for example). And there is no question that many other, more direct steps that the U.S. is taking will significantly improve our security. The real question is how much additional safety would a TIA program bring us over and above all the other steps we're taking (tightened borders, improved overseas intelligence, increased airport security, etc).
There is good reason to think the answer is: not much at all. Some versions of TIA described by Defense officials are based on the dubious premise that "terrorist patterns" can be ferreted out from the enormous mass of American lives using techniques known as "data mining" that try to identify hidden patterns in large masses of data. What attracts proponents of this scheme is that data mining has proven very successful in some commercial contexts, such as the discovery of suspicious spending patterns that indicate credit card fraud. The problem is that in order to be effective, data miners need an enormous amount of sample data to work from. Credit card companies experience a vast amount of fraud, which allows them to go back and find patterns of behavior that are associated with it. But as horrific as the 9/11 attacks were, there have been very few overall incidents of terrorism within the United States in the recent past, so it is difficult to understand how these programs will be able to identify true patterns of suspicious behavior, and easy to imagine how they will simply end up reflecting the beliefs and prejudices of their programmers about what that behavior looks like (and there's no need to sift through data about millions of citizens to do that).
A debate appears to be underway within government over the utility of data mining to fight terrorism. Publicly, TIA officials have recently said that they never intended to carry out such data mining. Even their more modest descriptions of what TIA would do, however, are of questionable effectiveness and would devastate privacy. (See the May 2003 ACLU report on the questions TIA must answer for Congress: Total Information Compliance.)
In fact, a program like TIA could actually reduce our security by draining resources from more effective measures like improved collection of on-the-ground foreign intelligence.
In the wake of the September 11 attacks, numerous intelligence experts declared that the government's problem was a failure to sift targeted intelligence information from the masses of useless data. The TIA solution to that problem would be to exponentially increase the amount of junk data that the government collects. You don't find a needle in a haystack by bringing in more hay.
If TIA is implemented, it will probably fail at preventing the next terrorist attack. But once created, that kind of failure is unlikely to lead to the program being shut down. Instead, it will probably just spur the government into an ever-more furious effort to collect ever-greater amounts of personal information on ever-more people in a vain effort to make the concept work. We would then have the worst of both worlds: poor security and a super-charged surveillance tool that would destroy Americans' privacy and threaten our freedom.
There are at least four things you can do to help stop the blatantly un-American goal of "Total Information Awareness"