Exhibit 20
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(TS//NF) Incipiency of CTC/RDG Enhanced Interrogation Techniques and Program

(TS) Background: Late 2001, early 2002, Dr. Mitchell was under contract with DS&T to conduct research and write applied psychological papers. Dr. Jessen was at that time working for DoD as Senior DoD SERE Psychologist for the Executive Agency tasked with oversight for all DoD SERE training. He also assisted DS&T with various projects.

One of their tasks was to review recently captured al-Qa'ida documents describing how jihadists should resist questioning during interrogation. The paper the doctors wrote, as a result of this review, is called "Recognizing and Developing Countermeasures to Al Qaeda Resistance to Interrogation Techniques: A Resistance Training Perspective." It's a classified document available on the Agency System.

After review of the al-Qa'ida training manual, they identified resistance techniques likely to be used and recommended countermeasures based on their expertise and knowledge of interrogation approaches that had historically been used to overcome resistance. These countermeasures, none of which are coercive, are described in the paper.

(TS//NF) Program: In late March 2002, with the capture of Abu Zubaydah, Dr. Mitchell was deployed as a consultant, at the recommendation of CTC attorney at that time, to provide real-time recommendations to overcome Abu Zubaydah's resistance to interrogation. Dr. Mitchell stayed on site from circa March 2002 - June 2002, observing and consulting on the interrogations done by CIA and FBI personnel.

In circa June 2002, after approximately 4 months of interrogation, Abu Zubaydah reached a point where he refused to cooperate and shut down. He would no longer talk to FBI interrogators and, although he was still talking to CIA, no significant progress was being made. It was obvious as was effective employing classical resistance to interrogation techniques which were unlikely to be overcome without significant intervention.

C/CTC at the time called Dr. Mitchell back to HQS to discuss next steps with Abu Zubaydah's interrogation. Arrangements were also made for Dr. Jessen to attend that meeting. C/CTC requested their input with respect to what
approaches would be necessary to obtain information from Abu Zubaydah and other uncooperative al-Qa'ida detainees judged to be withholding time-sensitive, perishable intelligence.

Other attendees suggested a variety of coercive approaches. After lengthy discussion, Dr. Mitchell suggested using the interrogation approaches that had been safely employed at DoD SERE schools for resistance to interrogation training. These techniques had been used for approximately 50 years with no significant injuries. Dr. Mitchell knew this because in 1996 he completed a DoD wide review for the Commander of the US Air Force Survival School of injury rates associated with use of the various physically coercive techniques used for resistance to interrogation training. He found that when used by properly trained interrogators all but one technique produced no significant or lasting injuries. The one technique that rarely produced injuries (manhandling) was not recommended for use by CIA.

The list of techniques recommended by Drs. Mitchell and Jessen to C/GTC for use with High Value Detainees were selected from the larger list of safe and effective interrogation techniques used at DoD SERE schools.

At the circa June 2002 meeting where the techniques were recommended, C/GTC requested that Drs. Mitchell and Jessen travel to the site to conduct the interrogation of Abu Zubaydah once DOJ approval was granted. At the time, Dr. Jessen left the DoD and became an Independent Contractor for CIA.

This list of recommended techniques went to DOJ for their opinion regarding whether or not the techniques constituted torture. DOJ returned the legal opinion that 13 of the techniques requested did not constitute torture, and hence could be employed for CIA interrogations.

These techniques were reviewed and approved twice by DOJ. They continued to be used until Director Goss suspended the use of any Enhanced Interrogation Techniques until a third DOJ review (still pending) was completed.