Screening of Passengers by Observation Techniques

Fiscal Year 2010 Report to Congress
March 15, 2010

Homeland Security
Transportation Security Administration

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Message from the Acting Administrator

March 15, 2010

I am pleased to present the following report, “Screening of Passengers by Observation Techniques,” which has been prepared by the Transportation Security Administration.

Pursuant to congressional requirements, this report is being provided to the following Members of Congress:

The Honorable David E. Price
Chairman, House Appropriations Subcommittee on Homeland Security

The Honorable Harold Rogers
Ranking Member, House Appropriations Subcommittee on Homeland Security

The Honorable Robert Byrd
Chairman, Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Homeland Security

The Honorable George V. Voinovich
Ranking Member, Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Homeland Security

Inquiries relating to this report may be directed to me at (571) 227-2801 or to the Department’s Acting Chief Financial Officer, Peggy Sherry, at (202) 447-5751.

Sincerely,

Gale D. Rossides
Acting Administrator
Transportation Security Administration

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Executive Summary

The Transportation Security Administration’s (TSA) Screening of Passengers by Observation Techniques (SPOT) program is a behavior observation and analysis program in which personnel are trained to identify anomalous behaviors that deviate from an established environmental baseline. SPOT is implemented in domestic airports through fielding Behavior Detection Officers (BDO) (i.e., specifically trained and certified Transportation Security Officers). This report provides a background of the program, from inception to current state, and explains how the program provides an additional layer of security vital to the successful protection of the Nation’s transportation systems, and supports the Department of Homeland Security mission to “prevent and deter terrorist attacks and protect against and respond to threats and hazards to the nation...” This report addresses the legislative requirement outlined in Section I of this document.

TSA developed and implemented the SPOT program based on behavior pattern recognition techniques utilized by law enforcement organizations and verified by scientific research. TSA is closely monitoring the effectiveness of the SPOT program and implementing measures to improve the performance of BDOs individually and the program as a whole.


[TSA] shall provide advanced training to transportation security officers for the development of specialized security skills, including behavior observation and analysis... in order to enhance the effectiveness of layered transportation security measures.

Additionally, the SPOT program complies with Title 49, United States Code, Section 114:

- Paragraph (d) gives TSA responsibility for security in all modes of transportation.
- Paragraph (f) requires that TSA:
  - Develop policies, strategies, and plans for dealing with threats to transportation security;
  - Coordinate countermeasures with appropriate departments and agencies;
  - Oversee the implementation, and ensure the adequacy, of security measures at airports and other transportation facilities; and
  - Enforce security-related regulations and requirements.

Screening of Passengers by Observation Techniques

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I. Legislative Language

This document complies with the reporting language set forth in Senate Report 111-31 and House Report 111-298 that accompanied the Fiscal Year (FY) 2010 Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act (P.L. 111-83). These directives state that:

From Senate Report 111-31, page 57:

The Committee directs TSA to report, no later than 60 days after the date of enactment of this act, on: (1) the scientific basis for using behavior pattern recognition techniques to observe airline passengers for signs of hostile intent; (2) the effectiveness of the SPOT program in meeting its goals and objectives; and (3) the justification for expanding the program. The report shall be made in a classified or unclassified format, as appropriate.

From House Report 111-298, page 77:

As discussed in the Senate report, no later than 60 days after the date of enactment of this Act, TSA shall report on the scientific basis for using behavior pattern recognition for observing airline passengers for signs of hostile intent, the effectiveness of this program in meeting its goals and objectives, and the justification for expanding the program.
II. Background

Since 2001, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has been mandated by law to, among other things, be responsible for day-to-day federal screening operations to enhance security of passenger air transportation. TSA is most visibly present through its approximately 47,000 trained and certified Transportation Security Officers (TSOs) stationed at more than 450 airports across the country. These professionals screen approximately two million passengers daily and deliver both world-class security and customer service at the Nation’s airports.

Recognizing the unique security requirements that post-9/11 presented, TSA developed a non-obtrusive score-based behavior security assessment program called Screening of Passengers by Observation Techniques (SPOT). SPOT is a program designed for passive observation by TSA personnel, typically in front of the security checkpoint, to identify potentially high-risk passengers exhibiting anomalous behaviors that deviate from an established environmental baseline, to include behavior cues associated with the fear of discovery. Passengers identified as displaying such behaviors are then referred for additional screening and/or directed for Law Enforcement Officer (LEO) intervention. SPOT provides Federal Security Directors with an additional layer of security based on proven behavior observation and analysis techniques, to make timely security risk assessments. TSOs certified in SPOT are known as Behavior Detection Officers (BDO).

In 2003, TSA initiated a study on the feasibility of an additional security measure to identify suspect travelers in airports using Behavior Recognition and Analysis (BR&A). Law enforcement, security agencies, and academia have acknowledged for decades that all individuals, no matter their race, gender, age, or religion, may exhibit particular behaviors when in situations of stress, fear and/or deception. Likewise, individuals pursuing illegal, dangerous, or possibly terrorist activities may unintentionally exhibit such behaviors in the process of accomplishing their objective. The ability to recognize such behaviors increases the potential for identifying those individuals.

BR&A is a highly successful security measure that has been employed by Israeli security services for at least thirty years. After the terrorist attacks of 9/11, BR&A concepts were adapted and modified by the Massachusetts State Police (MSP) Troop F assigned to Logan International Airport (BOS). MSP named this program Behavior Assessment Screening System and trained all LEOs assigned to BOS in its use as an enhanced security measure to the newly instituted security checkpoint screening system of TSA.

The unique SPOT program was developed by TSA, with assistance from MSP, to meet TSA-specific security and public service needs, with particular emphasis on the protection of individual civil rights, privacy, and to mitigate the possibility of racial profiling. SPOT is the only program that uses a behavior scoring system that assigns a numerical value to passenger
behaviors and then uses the score(s) to determine the type of risk mitigation response (e.g., additional screening and/or LEO intervention). Other BR&A programs use behavior recognition, but rely on a lower threshold to trigger suspicion and a more intrusive and lengthy interview process that is impractical in the U.S. commercial aviation environment and also raises legal concerns. The SPOT scoring system has the following advantages over other BR&A programs:

- Allows for the use of a two-tiered response to high-risk passengers using additional screening and/or direct LEO intervention, based upon the passenger’s scores;
- Ensures that only the highest-risk passengers are subjected to higher, more intrusive scrutiny thereby maximizing limited resources;
- Helps minimize or prevent screener subjective-based assessments of risk that could be based on flawed assumptions or racial/ethnic bias, by utilizing objective criteria that ensure uniform and unbiased results and that must be documented;
- Partners BDOs to perform SPOT in pairs in order to validate each others’ observation and to prevent the use of unlawful racial/ethnic profiling; and
- Uses a quantitative, non-biographical behavior based tracking system that will help prevent unlawful racial/ethnic profiling, thus defending the program from claims of unlawful profiling. It also allows the program to be fine-tuned periodically to ensure optimal results.

In order for SPOT to be the most effective, TSA and local law enforcement must work together in a coordinated response to high-risk passengers. This approach:

- Maximizes the effectiveness of the LEO and TSA elements at the airport or other transportation facility through a teamwork concept in which each component has clearly identified responsibilities; and
- Ensures that the highest-risk passengers are interviewed and evaluated by a LEO.

Operational test-bed assessment of the SPOT program began in 2003 at Logan International Airport (BOS) in Boston, Massachusetts. A SPOT working group was created in February 2004, comprised of various TSA and DHS components (including offices of Civil Rights, Chief Counsel, Privacy, Policy and Tech Lab), MSP, the FBI Behavioral Sciences Unit and the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center. Through the working group, SPOT standard operating procedures for both aviation and mass transit venues were developed and finalized.

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In October 2004, pilot programs were initiated at Portland International Jetport (PWM) in Portland, Maine and T.F. Green Airport (PVD) in Providence, Rhode Island. In October 2005, pilot programs were initiated at Minneapolis/St. Paul International Airport (MSP) in Minneapolis, Minnesota and Bangor International Airport (BGR) in Bangor, Maine. Eight additional airports began performing SPOT as a pilot program from 2005 to 2006. In FY 2007, SPOT became an “official” program with FTE specifically allotted for BDOs.
III. Discussion

A. Scientific Basis for Using Behavior Pattern Recognition Techniques

Each of the behaviors the TSA Behavior Detection Officers are trained to observe is garnered from both the scientific and law enforcement community.

Dr. Paul Ekman, a leading expert in deception detection, performed an evaluation of the SPOT program in August 2006. The following conclusions are garnered from his document titled “Evaluation of the TSA SPOT Program by Paul Ekman, August 24, 2006”:

1) I strongly endorse the SPOT program after having read their checklist and given recommendations about it, and observed the program in operation at [Boston] Logan airport last January.

2) The behavioral observations incorporated within SPOT are based on both law enforcement experience and the most recent scientific findings. In my judgment it involves NO element of racial or ethnic profiling.

Additionally, the work of Dr. David Givens, Director of the Center for Nonverbal Studies, was utilized in selecting the SPOT behaviors. Dr. Givens is recognized as an expert in nonverbal behavior who has worked with agencies within the intelligence and defense community to analyze non-verbal behavior cues of known terrorists. Behaviors outlined in his Nonverbal Dictionary were selected on the basis of their relationship to stress, fear and deception cues associated with the fear of discovery and integrated into the SPOT program.

Beginning in FY 2009, TSA introduced the Additional Behavior Detection Training course (ABDT) as an additional training tool for BDOs. ABDT is a two-day class emphasizing non-verbal behavioral detection. This class teaches BDOs how to recognize possible red flags in terms of deception that may manifest itself in micro-expressions and other non-verbal gross motor behavior movements. The main focus is with micro-expression detection during the Casual Conversation portion of the SPOT process and helps direct questions asked of the passenger in order to resolve the situation. The expressions emphasized in the course are universal, meaning that micro-expression detection is culturally independent.

TSA is also seeking additional training opportunities for Behavior Detection Officers. One initiative will provide BDOs and TSOs with continual on-line training in microfacial expression with an objective of providing BDOs and TSOs an additional detection tool that can help identify information indicating a potential security threat through recognition of deceptive behaviors. This information would allow TSOs to target their screening efforts more precisely through more directed searches or by requesting the assistance of a BDO to further understand the anomalous

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behaviors. Because behavior detection is more threat-agnostic—it focuses on people rather than threat objects, which can and have changed to exploit vulnerabilities in our screening system—the capability will better enable the TSA screening workforce to identify existing and novel security threats introduced by a dynamic, adaptive adversary. This training is scheduled to be developed in FY 2010.

The SPOT Program has also begun a validation study of the program. This joint TSA-DHS study, being conducted by the American Institutes of Research (AIR), an independent not-for-profit organization, will evaluate the SPOT Program using a random protocol. This effort is the first such effort to validate a behavioral based security program in the world. The validation process will assess the base rates of screening by introducing a random component to the BDO process. In doing this, it measures the rate of BDO referrals compared to randomly selected passengers for screening. Based on the in-depth statistical analysis from the data collected, the determination of whether the BDO referral process is better, about the same, or less than a random process can be surmised. The end results will lead to a more precise understanding of the success of the program.

The validation process consists of systematically selecting individuals for random screening and completing a SPOT referral score sheet for each. The BDO will conduct SPOT screening for each randomly selected passenger regardless of their SPOT score. The end results will be collected for each person and can be compared to actual SPOT score sheets. The most important aspect in doing the validation study is to establish baseline false positive and false negative rates within the traveling public. False positives are those individuals who are screened using the SPOT process and are not a threat; those that are basically inconvenienced. False negatives are those individuals that are missed by the SPOT process and who do pose a security threat. These are the passengers we are most concerned about and want to increase their detection. The validation process using the randomly screening protocol will assess these rates and gather this data.

The study is being conducted at 24 airports nationwide. These vary in size, location and throughput in order to gain an overall understanding. All these locations have SPOT already in progress with experienced BDOs. The data collection process has already started.

B. Effectiveness of the SPOT Program in Meeting its Goals and Objectives

SPOT was designed to train Behavior Detection Officers in identifying anomalous behaviors that deviate from an established environmental detection baseline, with the ultimate goal of preventing an attack against the Nation’s transportation systems. Through a cadre of approximately 3,000 certified BDOs, the program provides an additional layer of security to mitigate this threat. As previously stated, the program partners closely with the airport and other law enforcement entities in investigating and resolving suspicious activity reported by BDOs.

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Although the program has lacked formal performance measures in the past, the program now has performance measures that it is currently utilizing and is working diligently to develop additional measures to quantify the effectiveness of the program. It is imperative to note that this program is a deterrent by nature and, as the courts have noted, “deterrence by definition results in the absence of data.” This lack of data has presented challenges for the SPOT program office when developing performance measures. The current performance measures are outlined in the following section.

The SPOT program office maintains a database of all passengers referred for additional SPOT screening by BDOs. This database does not contain any personally identifiable information on the passengers, but instead captures the behaviors of the passengers that led to the additional screening, as well as the resolution of the screening process (no further action taken, law enforcement notification, law enforcement investigation, arrested, reason for arrest, etc.). The SPOT program office monitors this data on no less than a weekly basis. Situation reports are generated from this data and distributed to TSA senior leadership as well as to individual airports on a weekly basis. Airports are then able to monitor the performance of their BDOs based on the information in the situation reports. The SPOT program office also sends out the “successes” of the program to the SPOT airports to inform them of the type of activity occurring at the airports. A sampling of SPOT successes is provided in this report (See Appendix 1). TSA uses all these reports to measure the effectiveness of the program in meeting its goals and objectives.

Additionally, TSA plans to migrate the SPOT database to TSA’s Performance Management Information System (PMIS) in March 2010. Migrating the database will greatly enhance the SPOT program’s capabilities. In its current configuration, only raw data can be gleaned from the SPOT database. Any manipulation of this data must be done manually. Under PMIS, data manipulation will be computerized and allow for more robust analyses. For example, we will be able to program trend analyses, better segregate data and create specific reports for certain data. We will be able to better track performance data at specific airports and categories of airports (threat or geographic location).

C. Justification for Expansion of the Program

The decision to expand SPOT nationwide to 161 of the Nation’s highest-risk airports was one based on risk mitigation. TSA operates on a layered security approach, with the BDOs being one of the security layers. Each one of these layers alone is capable of stopping a terrorist attack. In combination, their security value is multiplied, creating a much stronger, formidable system. A terrorist who has to overcome multiple security layers in order to carry out an attack is more likely to be pre-empted, deterred or to fail. In addition, SPOT adds an additional measure of

2 MacWade v. Kelly, 460 F.3d 269, 274 (2d Cir. 2006) ("The concept of deterrence need not be reduced to a quotient before a court may recognize a search program as effective. Indeed, expressing the phenomena in numeric terms often is impossible because deterrence by definition results in an absence of data.")
In FY 2007, TSA made the decision to further deploy the program beyond the pilot phase beginning, and ensured this was done in a risk-based manner. For the initial nationwide deployment in FY 2007, SPOT utilized the Current Airport Threat Assessment (CATA) list of the 40 airports identified as the most at risk for a terrorist attack. TSA successfully deployed SPOT programs at all of those airports by the end of FY 2007, to include all CAT X airports. The SPOT program was expanded in FY 2008, to include all CAT X, CAT I, CAT II and one CAT III airport (St. Croix). For the reporting period of FY 2009, over 97 percent of the flying public transited these airports (more than 500 million passengers alone transited CAT X and CAT I airports), all of which have a SPOT program.

Additional BDO allocations have been required as new security programs and threats emerge. The initial BDO allocations during deployment of SPOT were to augment checkpoint security operations at the Nation’s highest-risk airports. However, terrorists have demonstrated in recent years both a desire and ability to attack all modes of transportation. Examples include the Madrid train bombings of March 2004, the London bombings of July 2005 and the Glasgow Airport attack of 2007. Each of these attacks was focused on the transportation systems. Our Nation’s transportation systems will continue to be a highly visible target for terrorists as well.

Recognizing this threat and as specifically authorized in Section 1303 of the 9/11 Act, 6 U.S.C. § 1112, TSA has developed Visible Intermodal Prevention and Response (VIPR) teams to augment security in any mode of transportation at many locations within the United States. These teams provide a security presence to deter, detect and prevent the carriage of explosives and any other items specified as threat items into a transportation access area or aboard a conveyance.

BDOs are utilized for VIPR team operations. The BDO resources needed to conduct these operations have been deployed from the airports. TSA has allocated additional BDOs to conduct SPOT in support of these operations so that airport coverage is not sacrificed.
IV. Independent Oversight and DHS Response

Beginning in May 2008, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) began conducting an audit of TSA’s Behavior-Based Security Programs (GAO Engagement 440715) at the request of the Honorable John Mica, Ranking Member of the House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee. TSA has received two draft Statements of Facts and is currently awaiting a draft report. At this time, no final recommendations have been made to TSA as a result of this audit.
V. Conclusion

TSA will continue to explore ways to establish the SPOT Program as the benchmark behavior detection and analysis program in the world. Initiatives such as the scientific validation of the program and ongoing participation and collaboration with our partners in the behavior analysis community will continue to allow TSA to make progress toward this goal. We will continue to seek additional guidance from leading experts in the scientific, academic and law enforcement communities as we further develop the program.
VI. Appendix: SPOT Successes

4/1/08 – MCO - BDO Referral Arrested and Found with Pipe Bomb-making Materials - At 1220 hours on April 1, 2008, the Orlando Supervisory Transportation Security Officer reported that at 1210 hours, the BDO observed a passenger behaving suspiciously during the check-in process. The passenger presented his checked baggage to the Air Midwest Screening area and the BDOs referred the bags immediately for secondary screening. The BDOs continued observing the passenger and notified Orlando Police Department and the BAO. During checked baggage screening, the Transportation Security Officers (TSOs) detected suspicious items. During a bag search the TSOs discovered a 6-volt battery, wires, 2 end cap pipes with holes in them, lighter fluid, and literature detailing how to build explosives. The passenger was monitored via closed circuit television and BDOs continued to observe him as LEOs responded. LEOs located and interviewed the passenger who stated he admitted to having suspicious items in his carry-on backpack. LEOs and the Assistant Federal Security Director-Law Enforcement (AFSD-LE) evacuated the public area including the sidewalk, the ticket counter, and the checked baggage area in the north side of Terminal A at Level 3 and established a 300-foot perimeter. Air Jamaica advised that the passenger had checked two bags on the flight. The second checked bag was located at the Air Midwest Screening area and, upon screening two bottles, a blue liquid were discovered. The two bottles were explosives trace detection screened and tested positive as a precautionary measure, the Federal Security Director (FSD) dispatched BDOs throughout the terminals. TSA Certified K-9 teams were also patrolling the terminals. The Bomb Squad, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and the Joint Terrorism Task Force responded. The Bomb Squad took possession of the passenger’s carry-on bag and conducted a physical inspection. The items that were discovered consisted of an umbrella, a bag of chips, and a laptop computer. At 1509 hours, the passenger was cleared with negative findings, placed in a LEO vehicle, and placed in the custody of the FBI. At 1510 hours, the perimeter was reduced to allow the ticket counters and the North A sidewalk to resume operational. The FSD ordered rescreening of all the checked bags and conducted gate screening of the flight’s passengers. Inbound aircraft Air Jamaica 81 (Montego Bay-Orlando) was met by TSA Certified K-9s, Customs and Border Protection (CBP), and BDOs. A security sweep of the aircraft was conducted before and after the flight was catered with negative findings. During the boarding process for Air Jamaica 80, the Aviation Direct Access Screening Program team, the TSI, and BDOs were placed in the Jetway and around the gate area. At 1529 hours, the Deputy Federal Security Director authorized the reopening of the Air Midwest checked baggage area and the BAO took possession of all items. At 2335 hours on April 1 the Orlando AFSD-LE reported that the FBI arrested the passenger on a charge of Attempting to Introduce an Explosive or Incendiary Device on an Aircraft (US Code 49 Sec. 46505).

3/11/08 - BOS - BDO Referral Linked to Travel Possibly Funded - At 1038 hours on March 11, a Boston BDO reported that at hours, two US Airways passengers were referred to secondary screening due to suspicious behaviors.
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During secondary screening, both passengers’ behaviors escalated to a threshold requiring a LEO intervention. TSOs notified Massachusetts State Police who responded and interviewed both passengers who did not give statements. Both passengers were allowed to continue on the flight, which did not incur a delay. There was no impact to airport operations or media attention.

TSA’s Office of Intelligence (TSA-OI) conducted government and commercial database checks on one passenger to include: No-Fly/Selectee, National Crime Information Center (NCIC) wants/warrants/criminal history, National Law Enforcement Telecommunications System (NLETS), the (b)(3);49 U.S.C. § 114(r).

3/13/08 – FLL - BDO Referral Arrested for Possession of 209 Grams of Ecstasy Worth $2.5 Million - At 0902 hours on March 13, 2008, a Fort Lauderdale Coordination Center Watch Officer reported that at [b](3) hours, a BDO team referred a passenger to secondary screening due to suspicious behavior. During secondary screening, 209 grams of MDMA (Methylenedioxymethamphetamine) “Ecstasy” was discovered in the passenger’s carry-on bag. Broward Sheriff’s Office responded and arrested the passenger on a State charge of Trafficking MDMA.

3/25/08 - EWR – Two BDO Referrals Arrested as U.S. Army Deserters - At 1419 hours on March 25, 2008, a Newark BDO reported that at [b](3) hours, two individuals were referred by BDOs for additional screening due to suspicious behavior. During secondary screening, both passengers admitted to being Army deserters. Newark Airport Police Department responded, arrested both passengers, and held them until the military police arrived to take them into custody.

4/23/08 - HNL – Three BDO Referrals Arrested for Possession of a Large Amount of Undeclared Currency with Traces of Illegal Drugs - At 2130 hours on April 23, 2008, a Honolulu Screening Manager reported that at [b](3) hours, three passengers were referred for additional screening by BDOs due to suspicious behavior they exhibited. During secondary screening, $124,250 was detected artfully concealed taped to the bodies of the passengers and concealed in their carry-on baggage. LEOs and the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) responded and interviewed all three passengers who did not give statements. LEOs with K-9s inspected the money and detected traces of illegal drugs. All three were detained by the DEA pending further investigation.

7/22/08 – ONT - BDO Referrals Arrested on Multiple Charges - At 1540 hours on July 22, 2008, an Ontario BDO reported that at [b](3) hours, three individuals who were traveling together were referred to secondary screening by the BDO due to suspicious behavior. At the same time, three separate individuals who were also traveling together were referred to secondary screening by the BDO due to suspicious behavior. During secondary screening, all six individuals were discovered with suspected fraudulent ID cards. The ID cards were determined to be fraudulent by the BDO due to the lack of security markings. LEOs responded and conducted National Security Screening.
Crime Information Center (NCIC) checks, all with negative findings, and allowed the six individuals to continue. After being released and completing secondary screening, the first set of passengers walked out of the airport. A BDO followed them and made a second notification to LEOs. LEOs and CBP responded. The second set of passengers was also escorted back to ICE. CBP arrested all six selectees on a state charge of Fraudulent Identification.

4/4/09 BDO Referral Results in Hospitalization of Individual at Boston (BOS) At 1536 hours on April 4, 2009, a Boston BDO reported that at [b] hours, BDOs observed a passenger acting suspiciously while on the public side of Terminal B. Massachusetts State Police responded and interviewed the passenger who did not give a statement. LEOs conducted an NCIC check with positive results that the passenger is a Section-12 mental patient who had escaped McLean hospital. LEOs requested assistance from the Massachusetts Port Fire Rescue and Massachusetts General Hospital. Massachusetts General Hospital responded and took the passenger into protective custody.

4/6/09 Passengers Arrested after BDO Referral at Kansas City (MCI) At 1844 hours on April 6, 2009, a Kansas City Coordination Center Officer reported that at [b] hours, BDOs referred two passengers to LEOs due to suspicious behavior. The Midwest Ticket Agent reported that the two passengers appeared suspicious at the ticket counter after one of the passengers tried to change their scheduled flight [b](3):49 U.S.C. § 114(r) The ticket agent notified the gate agent who notified [b](3):49 U.S.C. § 114(r) Kansas City Police responded at the checkpoint and interviewed the passengers. LEOs conducted an NCIC check, which revealed that both passengers were wanted on outstanding warrants for Kidnapping and Robbery. LEOs arrested the passengers on the Outstanding Warrants.

05/04/09 Passengers Arrested After BDO Referral at San Juan At 1951 hours on May 4, 2009, a San Juan BDO reported that at 1645 hours, BDOs referred two passengers to secondary screening due to suspicious behavior. One passenger did not have a valid government issued identification and presented the TDC with a learner’s permit that had expired in 2003. TSA contacted the Identity Verification Coordination Center, who were able to verify the passenger’s identity. During the IVCC process, both passengers’ behavior escalated. The Puerto Rico Police responded and interviewed the passengers, but took no further action. The passengers missed the flight and were escorted into the public area. BDOs briefed undercover DEA agents, who conducted NCIC checks on the passengers, which revealed outstanding warrants related to drugs. DEA and BDOs located the passengers in a fast-food restaurant. DEA arrested the passengers on state charges for the outstanding warrants.