

U.S. Department of Justice
Federal Bureau of

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In Reply, Please Refer to
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Washington, DC
March 15, 2007

**ABDUL MALIK
FBI Interview Summary
CTD-HOA**

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~~(S//OC/NF)~~ The following information constitutes a summary of FBI information provided during (b)(1),(b) FBI(b)(1) interviews of Abdul Malik (Malik), currently detained at Bagram Air Base in Afghanistan. Malik provided information during custodial intelligence interviews that included the following:

~~(S//OC/NF)~~ (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) last known location: Malik traveled with (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) and (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) from Mogadishu, Somalia to Ras Kamboni, Somalia and onward to Kiunga, Kenya. Malik maintains that he does not know where (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) went after the group separated in Kiunga, but believes that (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) may have split up and are probably hiding somewhere in Somalia. Malik maintained that he was not given a contingency plan.

(b)(1)

~~(S//OC/NF)~~ Explosives/Weapons: Malik participated in moving weapons from one house to another in Mogadishu (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) (b)(6),(b)(7)(C). The weapons included AK-47s, ammunition, and RPGs, which were loaded into Islamic Courts Union members' vehicles. In 2006, (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) acquired an anti-tank weapon from the CIC in Mogadishu; the weapon had a sophisticated guidance mechanism. Malik stated that (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) instructed him to move a

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large box from one house in Mogadishu to Malik's own house. The box contained tubes or cylinders and based on descriptions, was believed to contain MANPADS or surface-to-air missiles (SAMs).

~~(S//OC/NF)~~ Training Camps: Malik reported that (b)(1),(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) provided explosives training in 2006 at Ras Kamboni. Malik indicated that (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) was interested in setting up jihadist training camps in the Ogaden territory of Ethiopia. (b)(1),(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) was to oversee the training and coordination with other brothers located in the U.K. This camp would be used as a training area and staging area to launch attacks into Ethiopia. Malik advised that those who trained at camps in Somalia received basic weapons and tactics training. Malik reported that (b)(1),(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) was training his own group of jihadists in Mogadishu in 2005-2006. He provided training in weapons and tactics, document forgery, and explosives.

~~(S//OC/NF)~~ (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) training class: Malik and several UK jihadists (identified as the (b)(6),(b)(7)(C)) participated in the training led by (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) in Fall 2006. The training included basic weapons and tactics training and advanced training in document forgery, counter surveillance, surveillance of soft targets, personal security, weapons and tactics, computer training, and operations planning. Malik admitted to receiving training in counter surveillance from (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) in 2006.

~~(S//OC/NF)~~ Malik's role in facilitating (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) travel: Malik advised that after he arrived in Mombasa (after separating from (b)(6),(b)(7)(C)) he attempted to call (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) in the UK as well as (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) in Dubai and (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) in Mogadishu in order to obtain the whereabouts on everyone who was separated after fleeing Mogadishu. Malik later admitted that he contacted (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) in the UK via email requesting money. He also contacted (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) via email or telephone requesting money and admitted to emailing/calling (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) to arrange for money to be transferred or courier to him in Mombasa. Malik wanted to acquire enough money in Mombasa (approximately \$10000) so that he could pay for forged documents that would allow him to reach the UK, where he would apply for refugee status.

~~(S//OC/NF)~~ FBI Kenbon/Tanbon subject information: In 2003 or 2004, (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) sent a message via email to senior AQ

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leadership in Pakistan complaining about (b)(1),(b)(6),(b)(7)(C)
(b)(1),(b)(6), leadership and management of the East Africa AQ cell.
(b)(1),(b)(6),(b)(7)(C)

(b)(1),(b)(6),(b)(7) Malik believes that (b)(6),(b)(7) was in favor of having
(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) named as the new emir for AQ in East Africa.
When a new emir was not appointed, (b)(6),(b)(7) went his own way and
began conducting his own training. (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) reunited in
2006 but remained estranged from (b)(6),(b)(7)(C). The next time Malik
saw (b)(6),(b)(7) was in 10/06, upon (b)(6),(b)(7) emergence as a leader in the
Islamic Courts. Given (b)(6),(b)(7) need to continually bring in
willing supporters to conduct phone calls, e-mails, money
movements etc, on his behalf and Malik's need to find a patron,
the two shared a symbiotic relationship. Malik was soon involved
with tasks like collecting (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) at the airport and
conducting coordination on (b)(6),(b)(7) behalf. (b)(6),(b)(7) features have
changed from when Malik first met him in the 1990s. Today,
(b)(6),(b)(7) skin is much lighter.

~~(S//OC/NF)~~ 2002 Kikambala attacks (Paradise Hotel and Israeli
Airliner): Malik is familiar with the weapons systems he saw in
a weapons cache in Mogadishu because he was part of a three man
team that attempted to shoot down an Israeli jet liner in 2002
with a similar weapon (SA-7). Malik was also able to identify a
house that was used to house jihadists who trained in Somalia in
2005-2006. Malik advised that (b)(6),(b)(7) constructed the device that
was used in the 2002 hotel attack in Kikambala. He was fully
involved in 2002 attacks, living in the Mombasa safe house (b)(6),(b)(7)(C)
(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) others.
He fled with them after the attack and spent the next five years
under the patronage of the (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) influenced, Somali jihad
elements.

~~(S//OC/NF)~~ Pending attacks: Malik advised that he knew a group of
Muslim brothers from Kenya who came to Somalia and trained in
(b)(1),(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) in late 2006 or early 2006. They wanted to attack
Kenya's Antiterrorism Police Unit (ATPU) and other police in
Nairobi because the police were abusing Muslims. Malik denied
knowing information concerning impending attacks in Nairobi.
Malik maintained that the Ethiopian invaders drove him and (b)(1),(b)(6),(b)(7)(C)
and their families out of Mogadishu. The circumstances did not
allow for advanced planning of an operation in Kenya.

~~(S//OC/NF)~~ Covert Techniques: Malik admitted to using secretive methods
(b)(1),(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) to send and receive messages and

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described several code words used by the EAAQ group including the nickname (b)(6),(b)(7)(C),(b)(7)(D),(b)(7)(E) as code for (b)(6),(b)(7)(C),(b)(7)(D),(b)(7)(E) to describe security concerns or safety issues, and the words (b)(6),(b)(7)(C),(b)(7)(D),(b)(7)(E) as code for money.

~~(S//OC/NF)~~ Americans in Somalia: Malik provided information concerning two Americans in Somalia. (b)(1),(b)(6),(b)(7)(C)
(b)(1),(b)(6),(b)(7)(C)
(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) Malik also recognized a separate photograph of FBI Houston subject (b)(1),(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) Malik recalled seeing (b)(1),(b)(6),(b) or someone very similar near Kismayo or Jilib in December 2006.

~~(S//OC/NF)~~ Other Foreigners in Somalia: Malik identified many foreigners in Somalia who are close to (b)(6),(b) including information concerning twelve individuals who are believed to be part of the (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) cell. Malik identified an ethnic Somali, (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) who was responsible for recruiting the (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) Malik believes that the (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) must have all attended the same Masjid as (b)(6), since (b)(6) was able to recruit such a large group with similar interests and skills.

~~(S//OC/NF)~~ Malik's biographical information and time/activities in Somalia: Malik was initially persuaded to attend jihad training in (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) Somalia after coming under the influence of Mombasa-based radical Imam Aboud ROGO in the mid 1990s. He spent the next five years on the Somali coast. He eventually met up with (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) (unindicted co-conspirator from the 1998 Embassy bombings) and (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) (sentenced in Kenya for his role in the 2002 Mombasa attacks) and joined them in a fishing business. These individuals soon fell into the ranks of (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) network. Although MALIK did not have any exceptional skills, intelligence or leadership ability, he served to facilitate a number of low-end tasks for this group. He was fully involved in 2002 attacks, living in the Mombasa safe house (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) others. He fled with them after the attack and spent the next five years under the patronage of the (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) influenced, Somali jihad elements. Malik maintained that he was not an operational planner. MALIK stated that he was someone who could be trusted because of his role in the 2002 attacks in Kenya. Malik supported the ideology of the CIC and was a supporter of

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the CIC in Mogadishu. In 09/2006 and 10/2006, after (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) returned to Mogadishu, an CIC member named (b)(6),(b) gave MALIK an allotment of money, which MALIK budgeted for (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) from the UK while they trained at the Beyt Jinn house under (b)(6),(b)(7) in the fall of 2006. The money was used for day to day expenses for the (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) as they trained with (b)(6),(b) in the fall of 2006. (7)(C)

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Update on Malik

As of 061400ZMAR07

(b)(1)

- 5 interrogations have been conducted since his arrival at BAF.

(b)(1)

- Anticipate (b)(1) interrogations to be completed by 11 March, pending additional SDRs

- FBI clean team will not begin interviews

(b)(1)

(b)(1)

- 1 of 2 FBI agents from Clean Team departs NY tonight for Doha

- ETA Doha Wednesday night.

- Earliest arrival at BAF expected Thursday/Friday

- 2nd FBI agent experienced death in family, delaying departure until Saturday. Should not impact legal interviews

- FBI Clean Team will advise Malik of his modified Miranda rights (no right to attorney present because he isn't CONUS) and hope that he provides enough incriminating evidence that we can secure an indictment