I. Purpose

This Directive serves as the principal reference for integrating and managing National and Departmental Intelligence Functions throughout the Department, including but not limited to the Intelligence activities of Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Intelligence Components. The policies and requirements described in this Directive are implemented and all terms in this Directive are as defined in DHS Instruction 264-01-001, DHS Intelligence Enterprise, and in any subsequent policy guidance issued by the Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis.

II. Scope

This Directive applies throughout the Department¹.

III. Authorities


C. DHS Delegation No. 08503, “Delegation to the Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis/Chief Intelligence Officer,” August 10, 2012

D. Executive Order 12333, “United States Intelligence Activities,” December 1981, as amended

IV. Responsibilities

A. The Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis (USIA) serves as the Chief Intelligence Officer (CINT) for the Department, exercising leadership and authority over intelligence policy and programs throughout the Department, and, acting in conjunction with, and without preempting the authorities of, the

¹ Nothing in this Directive shall affect or diminish the authority and responsibilities of the Commandant of the Coast Guard to command or control the Coast Guard as an armed service, the authority of the Director of National Intelligence with respect to the Coast Guard as an element of the Intelligence Community, or in the conduct of the non-Homeland Security missions of the Coast Guard as defined in Title 6, U.S.C., Section 468, “Preserving Coast Guard Mission Performance.”

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DHS Chief Information Officer and the DHS Chief Security Officer, exercising leadership and authority over information sharing and safeguarding throughout the Department. This role incorporates within it the roles separately delegated to the Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis as the DHS Senior Information Sharing and Safeguarding Executive; the Executive Agent for the DHS State, Local, and Regional Fusion Center Initiative; the DHS Counterintelligence Executive; the Designated Intelligence Disclosure Officer for the Department; the Executive Agent for DHS’s Centralized Terrorist Watchlisting Process; and the Executive Agent for development of an integrated DHS Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) Capability. The CINT manages the execution of this Directive.

B. The **Heads of DHS Intelligence Components** support the CINT as required by Title 6, U.S.C., Section 124d, “Intelligence Components.”

C. The **Heads of All DHS Components** implement and execute all applicable policies and procedures set forth in this Directive and any implementing instructions or other policy guidance to the extent permitted by and consistent with those Component Heads’ authorities and any restrictions imposed by statute, executive order, regulation, presidential or other directive, or national or departmental policy.

V. **Policy and Requirements**

A. **Policy:**

1. The DHS Intelligence Enterprise (DHS IE), which is led by the CINT, is the primary mechanism for the integration and management of the Department’s intelligence programs, projects, and activities (including counterintelligence programs, projects, and activities). Through the DHS IE, the CINT, acting in conjunction with the Heads of all DHS Components, coordinates and deconflicts the National and Departmental Intelligence Functions of the Department. The USIA, as the DHS Chief Intelligence Officer, issues instructions, processes, standards, guidelines, procedures, strategies, or other policy guidance on behalf of the DHS IE. The intelligence priorities of the DHS IE are integrated through the Homeland Security Intelligence Priorities Framework, which informs departmental input to the National Intelligence Priorities Framework.

   a. The DHS IE is comprised of Component Intelligence Programs (CIPs), which consist of any organization within a DHS Intelligence Component, a significant purpose of which is the collection, gathering, processing, analysis, production, or dissemination of intelligence, regardless of whether such intelligence is counterintelligence, foreign intelligence, or homeland security intelligence, and regardless of whether such information is National or Departmental Intelligence.
b. All CIPs within the DHS IE are represented by Key Intelligence Officials (KIOs), who are senior intelligence officials, designated by the Heads of their respective Components with the approval of the CINT.2 If a Component has one or more CIP(s), the Component Head, in coordination with the CINT, designate a single KIO to be accountable for all of the CIPs in that Component. If a Component Head prefers to designate multiple KIOs, the Component Head may do so with the concurrence of the CINT. KIOs are accountable to their respective Component Heads for the execution of the National and Departmental Intelligence Functions of their respective CIPs and to the CINT for the implementation and execution within their respective CIPs of all directives, instructions, processes, standards, procedures, strategies, and other policy guidance concerning the DHS IE.

c. Any organization within a Component that employs intelligence professionals (0132 job series) to perform National or Departmental Intelligence Functions is a CIP; however, intelligence professionals assigned to other Components (e.g., for liaison purposes) remain subject to the supervision and control of the KIO for the CIP from which they are assigned, and the assignment of the intelligence professional to the receiving Component does not create a CIP within the receiving Component.

d. In leading the DHS IE, the CINT is supported by the Homeland Security Intelligence Council (HSIC), an advisory body chaired by the CINT and consisting of other senior officials within the Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A), the KIOs, and other Department officials as invited by the CINT. In coordination with the HSIC and any other applicable governance bodies such as the Information Sharing and Safeguarding Governance Board, the CINT issues instructions, processes, standards, guidelines, procedures, strategies, budget guidance, and other implementing policy guidance for the DHS IE including any activities within the scope of the DHS IE.

e. The Deputy Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis/State and Local Program Office provides overall strategic oversight of field intelligence activities for the DHS IE, serves as the primary conduit for engagement between the DHS IE and Domestic Director of National Intelligence (DNI) Representatives, and coordinates the sharing of intelligence between the DHS IE and Federal, State, local, tribal, territorial, and private sector partners.

f. The Office of the General Counsel, Intelligence Law Division serves as legal advisor and counsel for the National and

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2 Except the U.S. Coast Guard, as an independent member of the Intelligence Community. The Commandant of the U.S. Coast Guard nominates the Assistant Commandant for Intelligence and Criminal Investigations, who is confirmed by the Senate.
Departmental Intelligence Functions of the DHS IE in coordination with counsel for the DHS Intelligence Components.

2. In addition to leading the DHS IE, the CINT provides guidance and general direction on behalf of the Secretary for the entire Department concerning (1) the promulgation of procedures concerning National Intelligence Functions (including counterintelligence functions) that involve the collection, analysis, retention, and dissemination of personally identifiable information about United States persons; (2) departmental-level coordination with elements of the intelligence community, including the entry into agreements or arrangements with elements of the intelligence community (with the exception of protective intelligence agreements entered into by the United States Secret Service, or the United States Coast Guard when operating under Title 14, U.S.C., Section 3, or as an independent National Intelligence element of the intelligence community); (3) Department-level intelligence support from the Department to Federal, State, local, tribal, territorial and private sector entities and officials, including intelligence and operational support to the National Network of Fusion Centers; (4) the disclosure of National Intelligence to foreign governments, including foreign intelligence services; (5) the synchronization of DHS intelligence requirements in non-intelligence or joint intelligence acquisitions by DHS Components; (6) the DHS Counterintelligence Program; (7) the DHS Watchlisting Process; and (8) the DHS Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Capability.

   a. To the extent the activities and programs described in Section V.A.2 of this Directive fall within the scope of the DHS IE, they are governed by the instructions, processes, standards, guidelines, procedures, strategies, or other implementing policy guidance for the DHS IE issued by the CINT in coordination with the HSIC. To the extent such activities and programs fall under other departmental authorities, this governance is nonexclusive.

   b. To the extent the activities and programs described in Section V.A.2 of this Directive fall outside the scope of the DHS IE, they are governed by instructions, processes, standards, guidelines, procedures, strategies, or other implementing policy guidance issued by the CINT in accordance with applicable departmental policy.

B. Requirements:

1. Consistency with National Intelligence Policy: Any instructions, processes, standards, guidelines, procedures, strategies, or other implementing policy guidance issued by the CINT pursuant to this Directive is consistent with any applicable guidance issued by the President or, as applicable, the DNI.

2. Unclassified and Open-Source Products: To the greatest extent
possible, reports and analytic products by members of the DHS IE are produced and disseminated in an unclassified format and based on open-source Information. Such reports and analytic products are produced and disseminated contemporaneously with reports or analytic products concerning the same or similar information that the Department produced and disseminated in a classified format.

3. Intelligence Program Review: The intelligence programs, of the DHS IE, are reviewed periodically by the CINT, who recommends program improvements and corrective actions based upon those reviews. Such reviews may encompass, among other things, the workforce requirements for the intelligence personnel of the DHS IE. These assessments are incorporated into an annual evaluation of the DHS IE to be provided by the CINT to the Secretary, the Deputy Secretary, and the Component Heads of the Department.

4. Budget Guidance: The budgets of the CIPs of the DHS Intelligence Components are reviewed annually by the CINT for the purpose of developing a recommended consolidated budget and guidance concerning those programs, which is presented to the Secretary together with any comments from the Heads of the DHS Intelligence Components.

5. Training: Employees, including officials and senior executives of the DHS IE, receive training and guidance from the CINT to develop knowledge of laws, regulations, operations, policies, procedures, and programs that are related to the functions of the Department relating to the collection, gathering, processing, analysis, production, and dissemination of homeland security intelligence.

VI. Cancellation


VII. Questions
Address any questions or concerns regarding this Directive to the Office of Intelligence and Analysis, Office of Plans, Policy, and Performance Management.
Introduction

The Department of Homeland Security ("DHS" or "Department") Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) is a member of the United States Intelligence Community. As such, I&A is subject to Executive Order 12333, "United States Intelligence Activities," which establishes the basic tenets of Intelligence Oversight. The purpose of Intelligence Oversight is to enable I&A intelligence professionals to effectively carry out their authorized functions while ensuring that their activities affecting U.S. persons are conducted in a manner that protects the constitutional rights and privacy of those U.S. persons and maintains the integrity of the intelligence profession.

Pending approval by the Attorney General of I&A’s formal implementing procedures for EO 12333, this document is designed to serve as interim guidance for all I&A personnel (employees, detailees, and contractors supporting I&A) involved in intelligence activities. The guidance contained herein, however, does not substitute for legal review of specific intelligence activities, and any questions on the applicability or interpretation of this guidance should be directed to the Office of General Counsel (Intelligence).

1 This memorandum revokes the memorandum, “Intelligence Oversight Basics” dated March 27, 2006.
2 http://www.intelligence.gov; See also, § 201(h) of the Homeland Security Act of 2002, as amended, the National Security Act of 1947, a amended, and Executive Order 12333, as amended by Executive Order 13284.
3 For purposes of Intelligence Oversight, the definition of a United States (U.S.) person includes: (a) a U.S. citizen; (b) an alien know by I&A to be a permanent resident alien; an unincorporated association substantially composed of (a) or (b); (c) a corporation incorporated in the U.S., except for a corporation directed and controlled by a foreign government(s). A corporation or corporate subsidiary incorporated abroad, even if partially or wholly owned by a corporation incorporated in the U.S., is not a U.S. person. A person or organization outside the U.S. shall be presumed not to be a U.S. person unless specific information to the contrary is obtained. A person or organization within the U.S. shall be presumed to be a U.S. person unless specific information to the contrary is obtained. However, an alien within the U.S. shall be presumed not to be a U.S. person unless I&A obtains specific information to the contrary.
In order to understand Intelligence Oversight, you must be familiar with the following core concepts:

- authorized I&A intelligence activities;
- collection of information about U.S. persons;
- retention of information about U.S. persons;
- dissemination of information about U.S. persons;
- minimization of information about U.S. persons;
- identification and reporting of Questionable Activities.

Each of these core concepts is explained below.

**Authorized I&A Intelligence Activities**

Employees, detailees, and contractors supporting I&A are expected to conduct only authorized intelligence activities necessary for the protection of national and homeland security and to support the mission of the Department. For I&A, authorized intelligence activities are derived primarily from Title II of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (as amended), EO 12333 (as amended), and the National Security Act of 1947 (as amended). These authorized intelligence activities can generally be understood as falling within one of the following areas:

1. **Specific Tasks Related to Terrorist Threats.** This category includes a number of specific activities explicitly authorized by law or presidential directive, such as conducting intelligence analysis, facilitating information and intelligence sharing, and establishing and managing collection priorities. All activities performed in this category must relate to terrorist threats to the homeland.

2. **General Tasks Related to Priorities for Protective and Support Measures.** This category includes general activities undertaken in furtherance of identifying priorities for protective and support measures by the Department, other agencies of the Federal Government, State and local government agencies and authorities, the private sector, and other entities. An example includes integrating relevant information, analyses, or vulnerability assessments from the Intelligence Community with those from within and outside the Department. All activities performed in this category must relate to actual or potential threats to homeland security.

3. **General Tasks Related to Departmental Support.** This category includes general intelligence and information analysis and support provided to other elements of the Department. All activities performed in this category must be undertaken in furtherance of a lawful activity of the component, such as border security, immigration, or protective activities.

4. **General Tasks Directed by the Secretary.** This category includes activities undertaken at the direction of the Secretary. All activities performed in this category must relate to a responsibility of the Department, such as serving as the Executive Agent for the National

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4 Threats to homeland security include all threats or hazards, regardless of origin, that relate to: critical infrastructure or key resources; a significant public safety, public health or environmental impact; political, societal and economic infrastructure; border security; the proliferation or use of weapons of mass destruction; or other potential catastrophic events including man-made and natural disasters.
Applications Office.

(5) Specific Tasks Directed by Statute or Presidential Directive. This category includes specific activities required by law or presidential directive, such as accessing and providing required information in response to a discovery request or providing training to Departmental or other personnel.

I&A personnel generally operate within a particular division of I&A with a discrete mission focus. I&A personnel are encouraged to develop a comprehensive understanding of how their intelligence activities align with the authorities framework above. Emphasis should be placed on understanding how the U.S. person rules discussed in this memo are related to the authorities that apply to their specific mission area. The Office of General Counsel (Intelligence) attorneys and the I&A Intelligence Oversight Officer are available to assist in this effort. This consultation is required when undertaking new initiatives under paragraphs 2-5, above, as well as whenever any initiative may impact constitutionally protected activities.

Collection of Information About U.S. Persons

Collection means the gathering or receipt of information, regardless of source, by I&A, coupled with an affirmative act demonstrating intent to use or retain that information for intelligence purposes.

In order to ensure both the acquisition of essential information and the protection of individual interests, I&A may collect information about U.S. persons only when 1) necessary for the conduct of an authorized I&A intelligence activity, and 2) the information is reasonably believed\(^5\) to fall within one of the following categories.

- **Information Obtained with Consent.** The voluntary agreement by a person or organization to permit a particular action that affects the person or organization. Consent may be oral or written unless a specific form of consent is required by a particular procedure. Consent may also be implied where there is adequate notice that a certain act (e.g., entering a federal building or facility, using a government telephone) constitutes consent to an accompanying action (e.g., inspection of briefcase, monitoring of communications).

- **Publicly Available Information.** Information that has been published or broadcast in some manner to the general public; is available upon request to a member of the general public; is accessible to the public; is available to the public by subscription or purchase; could lawfully be seen or heard by a casual observer; is made available at a meeting open to the public; or is obtained by visiting any place or attending any event that is open to the public. Open Source Information is a form of Publicly Available Information.

- **Foreign Intelligence.** Information relating to the capabilities, intentions or activities of foreign governments or elements thereof, foreign organizations or foreign persons, or international terrorist activities.

- **Counterintelligence.** Information gathered and activities conducted to protect against espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, or assassinations conducted by or on behalf of

\(^5\) A reasonable belief arises when the facts and circumstances are such that a reasonable person would hold the belief. Reasonable belief must rest on facts and circumstances that can be articulated; “hunches” or intuitions are not sufficient. Reasonable belief may be based upon experience, training and knowledge in intelligence or a related field, applied to the facts and circumstances at hand.
foreign governments or elements thereof, foreign organizations, or foreign persons, or international terrorist organizations.

- **Potential Sources of Assistance to Intelligence Activities.** Information necessary for the purpose of determining the suitability or credibility of individuals reasonably believed to be potential sources of information or of assistance to intelligence activities.

- **Protection of Intelligence Sources and Methods.** Information needed to protect foreign intelligence or counterintelligence sources or methods from unauthorized disclosure. Within the United States, intentional collection of such information shall be limited to present or former DHS employees or detailees, present or former contractors or their present or former employees, or applicants for employment at DHS or at a contractor of DHS.

- **Personnel, Physical or Communications Security.** Information arising out of lawful personnel, physical or communications security investigations.

- **Terrorism Information.** Information relating to the existence, organization, capabilities, plans, intentions, vulnerabilities, means of finance or material support, or activities of foreign or transnational terrorist groups or individuals, domestic groups or individuals involved in terrorism; to threats posed by such groups or individuals to the United States, United States persons, or United States interests, or to those of other nations; or to communications between such groups or individuals reasonably believed to be assisting or associating with them.

- **Vulnerabilities Information.** Information required for the protection of the key resources and critical infrastructure of the United States. Key resources under the Homeland Security Act, section 2(10), means “publicly or privately controlled resources essential to the minimal operations of the economy and government. Critical infrastructure is defined at 42 U.S.C. 5195(e) as “systems and assets, whether physical or virtual, so vital to the United States that the incapacity or destruction of such systems and assets would have a debilitating impact on security, national economic security, national public health or safety, or any combination of those matters.” These terms are further developed in Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7 “Critical Infrastructure Identification, Prioritization and Protection.”

- **International Narcotics Activities.** Activities to create, manufacture, distribute, or dispense, or possess with intent to create, manufacture, distribute, or dispense a controlled substance in violation of law, conducted at least in part outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.

- **Border Security Information.** Information necessary to protect the safety and integrity of our borders, including information about persons believed to be engaged in activities intended to violate immigration and customs laws and regulations.

- **Threats to Safety.** Information needed to protect the health or safety of any person or organization. Examples include information that may be necessary to identify priorities for either protective security measures or emergency preparedness and response activities, by the Department, other government agencies, the private sector, and other entities.

- **Overhead Reconnaissance.** Information collected from overhead reconnaissance not directed at specific U.S. persons. The collection, retention and dissemination of domestic Overhead Reconnaissance information raise numerous legal and policy issues. Any planned collection or dissemination of domestic Overhead Reconnaissance information must be approved by the Office of General Counsel (Intelligence).
• **Administrative Information.** Information necessary for the functioning of the Office of Intelligence and Analysis but not directly related to the performance of authorized intelligence activities. Such information would include DHS personnel and training records, reference materials, contractor performance records, public and legislative affairs files, and correspondence files maintained in accordance with applicable directives.

**Retention of Information About U.S. Persons**

Retention means the maintenance, storage, synthesis, analysis, production, and other uses short of dissemination, of information about United States persons that can be retrieved by reference to the U.S. person’s name or other personally identifying information.

I&A may retain information regarding U.S. persons, without their consent, only if the information was properly collected and only when it is necessary to the conduct of an authorized I&A intelligence activity. The following principles must be observed to ensure information is properly retained:

• **Temporary retention.** Information about U.S. persons may be retained temporarily, for a period not to exceed 180 days, solely for the purpose of determining whether that information may be permanently retained under these guidelines. Once the holder of the information determines that information may not be retained, the U.S. person identifying information is to be destroyed immediately.

• **Forwarding information.** If the information, although not authorized for retention by I&A, is potentially relevant to the responsibilities of another IC element, consideration should be given to forwarding the information to the other element, consistent with all applicable laws, executive orders, or regulations.

• **Incidentally acquired information.** Information about U.S. persons acquired incidental to authorized collection may only be retained if such information could have been collected intentionally and only when it is necessary to the conduct of an authorized I&A intelligence activity.

• **Access to retained information.** Access within I&A to information about U.S. persons shall be limited to those individuals who have a need for the information in order to perform their official duties.

• **Review of intelligence records.** All I&A personnel shall conduct an annual review of their intelligence records (in whatever form they may be maintained) in order to evaluate and ensure that continued retention of the U.S. person information is necessary to the conduct of an authorized I&A intelligence activity.

• **Exceptions.** The foregoing requirements do not apply to information retained solely for administrative purposes or information retained in compliance with an independent legal requirement.

• **Freedom of Information Act and the Privacy Act Applicability.** The Freedom of Information Act (5 U.S.C. § 552) and the Privacy Act (5 U.S.C. § 552a) apply to all U.S. person information retained by I&A.
Dissemination of Information About U.S. Persons

Dissemination means the transmission, communication, sharing, or passing of information outside of I&A, or to any individual not otherwise assigned to or directly supporting I&A.

I&A may disseminate information regarding U.S. persons, without their consent, only under any of the following three conditions:6

1. Where information, although not authorized for retention by I&A is potentially relevant to the responsibilities of another IC element, the information may be forwarded to the other element, consistent with all applicable laws, executive orders, or regulations;7 or
2. Where dissemination is required by an independent legal authority and is not undertaken as an intelligence or information sharing activity; or
3. To appropriate Federal, State, tribal, and local government agencies and authorities, the private sector, and other entities, so long as the information was properly collected and/or retained, and, there exists a reasonable belief that the intended recipient of the information has a need to receive such information for the performance of a lawful governmental or homeland security function, such as:

- An employee of a law enforcement intelligence or non-intelligence component of DHS who has a need to know the information to perform his or her official duties;
- A federal, state, tribal or local law enforcement entity when the information indicates violation of laws enforced by the law enforcement entity;
- An agency of a state or local government, or a private sector entity with responsibilities relating to homeland security, in order to assist in the deterrence, prevention, preemption of, or response to, terrorist attacks against the U.S.;
- A protective, immigration, national defense, or national security agency of the federal government authorized to receive such information in the performance of a lawful governmental function;
- A foreign government and dissemination is undertaken pursuant to an agreement or other understanding with such government in accordance with applicable foreign disclosure policies and procedures.

Non-publicly available information about U.S. persons obtained through court-authorized electronic surveillance and physical searches should not be provided to state, local, or private sector authorities unless it is confirmed that the information is not FISA-derived, does not concern a U.S. person, or is otherwise to be provided in conformance with court-approved procedures.

Any dissemination of U.S. person information that does not conform to the conditions set forth above requires the approval of the Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis after consultation with the Office of General Counsel (Intelligence).

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6 Any dissemination of classified intelligence must be done consistent with E.O. 13292, Further Amendment to Executive Order 12958, as Amended, Classified National Security Information, E.O. 12968, Access to Classified Information, and E.O. 13388, Further Strengthening the Sharing of Terrorism Information To Protect Americans.

7 This does not include information derived from signals intelligence or otherwise collected originally pursuant to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, which may only be disseminated in accordance with applicable directives and procedures, including any court-approved procedures, specifically addressing each of these types of information.
Minimization

I&A personnel shall not disseminate information identifying a U.S. Person unless such data is deemed necessary for the intended recipient to understand, assess, or act on the information provided. Prior to any dissemination of U.S. person information, the information is to be reviewed to determine whether inclusion is necessary for the intended recipient. This review process is called “minimization.” Products intended for multiple recipients may require tailored versions, each with varying degrees of U.S. person identifying information, based upon the respective intended audience for each product.

- When not necessary, the personally identifying information will be replaced with “a U.S. Person,” “USPER,” “a U.S. Corporation,” etc., as appropriate. The product will indicate through an advisory that the information has been minimized and inform recipients how they may obtain the U.S. person information should their mission require it.

- When it is necessary for a product to include U.S. person information, the product must indicate the presence of this information through an advisory such as “this product contains U.S. person information” or words to that effect. Additionally, the U.S. person information should be highlighted in some manner that clearly indicates that it is considered U.S. person information.

Identifying and Reporting Questionable Activities

A questionable activity is any conduct by I&A personnel that may constitute a violation of the law, any Executive Order or Presidential Directive, or these guidelines. It includes professional and personal violations of any federal criminal law.

I&A intelligence personnel are expected to maintain a high standard of professional and personal conduct. I&A intelligence personnel are authorized to conduct intelligence activities only in accordance with EO 12333 and these interim procedures. They are not to exceed the authorities granted to I&A by law, executive order, or regulation. To ensure the integrity of the intelligence profession and avoid exceeding I&A authorities, I&A personnel who are aware of an actual or potential questionable activity are required to immediately report the matter to either the I&A Intelligence Oversight Officer, the Office of General Counsel (Intelligence), or the Inspector General.

Conclusion

As mentioned above, these procedures are designed to serve as a reference tool for all I&A personnel involved in intelligence activities. It does not substitute for legal review of specific intelligence activities, and any questions on the applicability or interpretation of these procedures should be directed to the legal staff.

These procedures are set forth solely for the purpose of internal DHS I&A guidance. They do not create any rights, substantive or procedural, enforceable by law by any other party in any civil or criminal matter, nor does it place any limitation on otherwise lawful investigative and litigative prerogatives of the U.S. Government.