The Honorable Patrick M. Shanahan
Page 6

Impacts of Construction on the Effectiveness and Efficiency of the Border Security Mission

As DHS works to reduce the flow of illegal immigration and the corresponding strain on the immigration system, evidence over the last few decades demonstrates that physical barriers deter illegal immigration, channel migrants to POEs or areas where they can be apprehended more easily, and allow USBP to cover greater stretches of land with fewer agents. This, in turn, allows USBP agents to engage in other critical activities, including drug interdiction activities at POEs.

Following the construction of border barriers in San Diego, Yuma, and Tucson, the number of illegal crossings and apprehensions in each area dropped appreciably. By contrast, areas without physical barriers saw an increase in apprehensions during the same timeframe. For example, following the construction of barriers in San Diego, apprehensions in San Diego decreased by 95 percent. Tucson Sector, by contrast, did not receive a barrier and saw a significant increase in apprehensions. In 1992, Tucson Sector apprehended approximately 71,000 individuals. By 2000, apprehensions in that sector had increased by 768 percent to over 616,000. Such a dramatic shift in apprehensions clearly show the impact barriers have on the flows of illegal crossings.

Relatedly, physical barriers assist CBP with channeling migrants to POEs, where they can be processed based on available resources or to areas of the border where they can be apprehended more easily. This is especially true for family units and Unaccompanied Alien Children, who often do not have the ability to attempt to breach the border barrier. This channeling function helps ease the strain on CBP and Immigration and Customs Enforcement detention capacity and allows USBP to more effectively and strategically deploy its resources to maximize apprehensions.

The physical barrier, along with the corresponding infrastructure and technology, increases USBP’s interdiction effectiveness rate — that is, the rate at which USBP apprehends aliens that have illegally crossed the border. Barriers along the southern border, such as a steel bollard wall, are most effective when constructed with complementary investments in technology and lighting to alert agents of approaches or attempts to breach the wall, in conjunction with a road or other form of infrastructure that allows USBP to respond more quickly when the sensor is triggered.

DoD’s Support to DHS and Reasons Why Barrier Construction Will Help The Armed Forces

USBP has relied on DoD to accept and execute critical missions that work towards achieving improved national security. Currently, DoD provides a wide range of support functions in support of CBP. One of its critical support functions is aviation support, which provides increased detections of illegal entries and increased situational awareness, resulting in improved operational control of the border, all of which assists troops and USBP agents on the ground. It also increases the effectiveness of agents and troops on the ground, thereby allowing DHS and DoD to better focus resources. DoD air support has also been used to move CBP personnel to rapidly respond to migrant movements.
The Honorable Patrick M. Shanahan
Page 7

In addition to air support, DoD monitors remote video surveillance system cameras and conducts radio communications with agents in the field. This, along with the vegetation removal provided by DoD, maintains clear fields of vision, increasing the safety of troops and USBP agents, which reduces transnational criminal illicit activity. Similarly, DoD assists with infrastructure maintenance and was critical in quickly deploying concertina wire when needed — this engineering work impedes and denies the ability to enter the United States illegally. DoD likewise assists with motor transport operations and maintenance to increase vehicle readiness rates. DoD provides numerous types of administrative support which increases the operational effectiveness of USBP and improves national security. DoD assists with observation and monitoring at checkpoints and setting up, maintaining, and monitoring ground imaging sensors with USBP agents. Finally, DoD provides medical support and protection to CBP.

In general, the missions that DoD has accepted at our request can be classified in two broad categories. First, some of the DoD’s support provides critical assistance at a time when it’s most needed, but does nothing to fundamentally change the dynamic that creates the need for military assistance (i.e., surveillance).

The second category of support received by DoD facilitates a fundamental and enduring change to the USBP’s operational capability as well as to the border environment. This type of support, once completed, allows USBP agents to achieve their mission in specific geographic areas with either no military support or with significantly reduced support in those areas. For example, large sections of the San Diego Sector’s barrier system (to include the physical barriers, roads, lights, earth work, etc.) were constructed by military units. These enduring border enhancements fundamentally changed the border dynamic so profoundly that the USBP has since been able to manage border security in that targeted area without comparable military personnel support.

The border barrier projects that DHS recommends that DoD undertake pursuant to 10 U.S.C. § 2808 will fundamentally change the border dynamic, give a distinct and enduring advantage to USBP as a force multiplier, and provide agents capabilities to respond more quickly to illicit activities. The construction of the above listed projects will improve the effectiveness and efficiency of DoD personnel by allowing DoD and CBP to shift away from responding to frequent, low risk border incursions and instead concentrate a smaller, more focused set of supporting resources on monitoring, tracking, and responding to high risk activities being undertaken by TCO.

Because the requested projects will serve as force multiplier, it will also likely reduce DHS’s reliance on DoD for force protection, surveillance support, engineering support, air support, logistical support, and strategic communications assistance. In other words, providing border barriers and the accompanying roads and technology will allow DoD to focus its efforts on a smaller, more focused area.
The Honorable Patrick M. Shanahan
Page 8

Conclusion

The 10 U.S.C. § 2808 support actions being recommended by DHS today will fundamentally change the border dynamic and, as required by 10 U.S.C. § 2808, and will improve the effectiveness and efficiency of DoD personnel supporting CBP. The recommended projects facilitate the accomplishment of the border security mission by reducing the amount of support that the military would otherwise need to provide and by allowing the military to reduce the geographical and materiel scope of its support and concentrate its capabilities in ever-decreasing geographical areas.

Best Regards,

[Signature]

Kirstjen M. Nielsen
Secretary
FOR: ACTING SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Joseph F. Dunford Jr., CJCSC

SUBJECT: (U) Assessment of Whether the Construction of Barriers at the Southern Border Is Necessary to Support the Use of Armed Forces in Securing the Border

- (U) Summary.
  - (U) In response to your tasking memo dated April 11, 2019, this memorandum provides the Joint Staff's views on whether and how military construction projects could support the use of the armed forces in addressing the national emergency at the southern border.
  - (U) Our analysis validates and expands upon the Preliminary Assessment that I provided you on February 11, 2019. The Preliminary Assessment's main findings remain valid, and form the underlying basis of analysis upon which this current assessment was built.
  - (U) Based on the findings of the Preliminary Assessment and this analysis, I have concluded that military construction projects can support the use of the armed forces at the southern border. The following analysis will demonstrate how.

- (U) Assessment Considerations. In conducting this assessment, we considered the following factors:
  - (U) The 2808 projects as proposed by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in their March 20, 2019 response to your February 18, 2019 request to then Secretary Nielsen (contained in Appendix 1).
  - (U) The 284 projects as requested by DHS in their February 25, 2019 request for assistance (RFA), including the projects selected by you for construction in tranche 1 (contained in Appendix 1).
  - (U) The projects DHS plans to complete using their FY19 appropriations and Treasury asset forfeiture funds (TFF).
  - (U) Past and current DoD support to DHS at the southern border.

- (U) Consultations. The Joint Staff consulted with DHS, Customs and Border Protection (CBP), USBP, U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM), and the US Army Corps of Engineers (USACE).
(U) Current Situation. Since my preliminary assessment in February, the situation at the border has continued to deteriorate. The following information is taken from DHS statistics, and the USBP Operations and Intelligence briefing to J35 on April 29, 2019.

- (U) Statistics for USBP apprehensions at the southern border between ports of entry (POE) include single adults, unaccompanied children, and family units. The number of apprehensions between POEs increased from 47,984 in January 2019, to 66,884 in February 2019, to 92,607 in March 2019. For context, the total USBP apprehensions between POEs in March 2016, 2017, and 2018 combined was 113,259.¹
- (U) Of the 92,607 USBP apprehensions in March 2019, 62,507 were unaccompanied children and family units, or 63% of the total.² Of those, 83% came from the northern triangle countries of Honduras, El Salvador, and Guatemala.³
- (U) USBP FY19 apprehensions through March 2019 is 361,087. USBP apprehensions for all of FY18 was 396,579⁴, and FY17 was 303,916⁵.
- (U) The sectors with the highest apprehension totals in FY19 through March 2019 are Rio Grande Valley (136,675) and El Paso (71,063). Yuma, San Diego, and Tucson all had approximately 32,000 apprehensions.⁶
- (U) CBP anticipates April 2019 numbers to approach 100,000. While apprehensions typically decrease in the summer months, CBP anticipates approximately 4,000-5,000 apprehensions per month per sector through the summer. This is in keeping with historical averages and trends over the past 5 years.
- (U) Recent surge in monthly apprehension levels have placed considerable strain on CBP detention facilities, and CBP has had to dedicate more agents to migrant processing. Approximately 40% of USBP agents are assigned to processing and detention duties every shift, with another 54% conducting administrative duties, training, or off duty. This leaves approximately 6% for operations and patrol, which equates to 330 agents to cover all 9 sectors per 8 hour shift, or 37 per sector per 8 hour shift.⁷

(U) Summary of Conclusions in Preliminary Assessment. The following summarizes the key conclusions from the Preliminary Assessment.

- (U) “Military construction projects can reasonably be expected to support the use of the armed forces by enabling the more efficient use of DoD personnel, and may ultimately reduce the demand for military support over time. The construction of

¹ Statistics taken from CBP’s Southwest Border Migration Statistics website, https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/stats/sw-border-migration
³ USBP Threat Brief: Southwest Border, USBP Intelligence Division, briefing to J35, April 29, 2019.
⁴ https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/stats/sw-border-migration/fy-2018
physical barriers should reduce the challenges to CBP and, therefore, can be reasonably expected to reduce DHS requirements for DoD support.”

- (U) “DHS cites a number of positive operational impacts of physical barriers. In general, physical barriers: contain incursions to the immediate border protecting communities; effectively reduce the enforcement footprint and compress USBP operations to the immediate border area; improve the ability to detect, identify, classify, and respond to illegal activity; physically deny terrain and increase vanishing times; provide a force multiplication effect by allowing an agent to cover a greater area of patrol more effectively.”

- (U) The Preliminary Assessment concluded four main ways how military construction projects at the southern border can support the use of the armed forces.
  - (U) “Constructing physical barriers in areas where military personnel are deployed could allow those forces to be re-prioritized to other mission in support of DHS.” Additionally, they could allow the DoD to re-prioritize military personnel to other NDS priority missions.
  - (U) “According to DHS, over time military construction projects along the southern border may allow for a reduction of the Title 10 force footprint and a reallocation of National Guard personnel as CBP adjusts its force allocation across the southern border to account for changes created in the flow of illegal immigration.”
  - (U) “Border barrier projects undertaken in areas where DoD personnel are not currently deployed could also support the use of armed forces along the southern border.” Specifically, “barriers aid in directing migrant flow, assisting in making illegal immigration flows more predictable, and serve to channel illegal immigrants towards locations that are operationally advantageous to DHS,” such as ports of entry that is safer and more orderly for both the migrants and DHS agents.
  - (U) “Military efforts to improve existing barriers have already had a positive impact on the use of the armed forces at the southern border.” This will be expanded upon in the following analysis.

- (U) Project Analysis Approach. Considering the above conclusions in the Preliminary Assessment, the team identified four key factors with which to conduct this analysis. These additional factors, as requested by you for us to consider, are necessary to determine which
construction projects could best support the armed forces in addressing the national emergency at the southern border. The four factors are described below.

- (U) First, we considered DHS’s prioritization of projects. DHS conducted an exhaustive analysis of Impedance and Denial (I&D) Strategy as contained in Appendix B to the DHS Border Security Improvement Plan. I&D remains a priority capability gap for USBP. As a mechanism for informing investment decisions, USBP developed a tool to score and rank each potential I&D investment across three pillars: ability to achieve USBP strategic objectives; analysis of border census data; operational and engineering feasibility of each project. Each potential I&D investment project (a total of 197 individual border segments of varying lengths across the nine southern border sectors) was scored across these three pillars, resulting in a comprehensive list of 33 border groups. These border groups, ranked 1-33, contain all 197 individual segments. DHS’ recommended 2808 projects are all highly ranked, contained in border groups 4-12 (with two projects in priority 27 and 30). For context projects in border groups 1-3 are all in Rio Grande Valley Sector, many of which planned to be executed using DHS appropriations.

- (U) Second, the team considered current migrant flow as measured by monthly apprehensions in the sectors corresponding to the recommended construction projects. History has shown migrants flows to be variable, however since the current requests for DoD support are based in large part on current and projected near future migrant flows, their inclusion for analysis was key.

- (U) Third, the team considered current troop dispositions and support missions per CBP border sector. DoD personnel are currently performing a wide range of tasks and missions, and number approximately 4,500. T32 ground support is designed to alleviate non-operational tasks from CBP agents, freeing up more to perform law enforcement duties at the border. T32 aviation support assists CBP in detection and monitoring of migrants. T10 support is primarily in a detection and monitoring role through the mobile surveillance camera (MSC) site operators. Since the inception of this mission in mid-February 2019, DoD MSC sites have assisted CBP in 7,690 migrant apprehensions, and the seizure of 2,232 lbs of illicit drugs. T10 personnel have also helped harden multiple POEs and install over 100 miles of concertina wire. Near future T10 support will also include assisting CBP in their migrant processing mission.

- (U) Finally, the team considered the type of land (federal or private) upon which the proposed projects were to be undertaken. Additional processing is required by DHS to procure land or obtain approval to construct projects on private land. This process can vary by project, by state, and by sector, which can increase the time to the start construction. The team considered the temporal implications of federal versus private land, and the impact of a potential delay in the ability to re-prioritize DoD support and concentrate CBP resources.

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15 While the analysis used in USBP I&D Strategy included an assessment of migrant flow, however that flow has shifted significantly since that assessment, this assessment considered current and projected migrant flow as a standalone factor. All apprehension data taken from the official DHS US CBP Southwest Border Migration statistics website (https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/stats/sw-border-migration).
(U) **Summary of Project Analysis by Sector.**

- (U) In general, construction projects in one sector of the border have ripple effects across all other sectors. This recognition drives our conclusion that any border barrier construction supports the use of the armed forces on the border to some extent, regardless of where the construction occurs relative to the current location of DoD operations. However, given finite resources, certain construction projects are more beneficial than others. To that end, you asked that I identify factors that would inform your determination that construction is necessary to support the use of the armed forces, to include providing you which specific projects to undertake. The below section summarizes the findings of our analysis and presents our recommended prioritized list of projects. The complete sector by sector analysis of each project is included in Appendix 2.

- (U) The results of our analysis considering all recommended 2808 projects and remaining 284 projects are presented in Table 1 below. We considered the CBP Border Group Priority, apprehensions, DoD force disposition, and land type. The table, prioritized by Joint Staff rank, displays the Border Group Priority of each project, the length in miles of each project, the apprehension totals for the associated sector, DoD force totals per sector, land type for each project, and projected cost of each project. We prioritized the projects in El Paso Sector first (3 total), followed by projects in San Diego Sector (3 total), Yuma Sector projects third (6 total), the Laredo Sector project fourth (1 total), and El Centro Sector projects fifth (2 total). As requested, we also considered cost of each project, arriving at a recommended project list of 15 total projects, for 169 miles, totaling $3.6B.
**UNCLASSIFIED/FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>CBP Border Group Priority</th>
<th>Sector / Project</th>
<th>Miles</th>
<th>Appropriation FY19TD (FY18 Total)</th>
<th>Troops in Sector / MSC Sites</th>
<th>Lead Type</th>
<th>Projected Cost (SM)</th>
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<td>EPT 8 Proj 1</td>
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<td>10</td>
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<td>12</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>PRI</td>
<td>$294M</td>
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**Total Projects: 15; Total Miles: 169; Total Cost: $3.6B**

Table 1. Recommend 2808/284 Project List 1.

- **(U) Overall Conclusion.** Based on this analysis, I have concluded that military construction projects are necessary to support the use of the armed forces. Construction of these projects will support those forces by enabling more efficient use of DoD personnel, and may ultimately reduce the demand for military support over time. Although military construction projects along the southern border may not alleviate all DHS requirements for DoD support, construction of the barrier systems should reduce the challenges to CBP and, therefore, can be reasonably expected to reduce DHS requirements for DoD support over time.

- **(U) Recommendation.** Consider the above analysis and recommended project list in making your decision as to whether construction projects are necessary to support the use of the armed forces at the southern border.

Prepared By: [PreparedBy]
Appendix 1 – 284 and 2808 Project Lists

- (U) Proposed Construction Projects under DHS, 284, and 2808 Authorities Considered in this Assessment.

  - (U) Construction projects under 284 authority as requested by DHS in their February 25, 2019 RFA. DHS requested DoD assist in the execution of 11 construction projects pursuant to authority under 10 U.S.C. 284. The total list contains 11 projects, all on federal property. You approved the three highest priority projects (Yuma 1 and 2, El Paso 1) on March 25, 2019, and modifications to those projects on April 9, 2019. The next four projects requested in the DHS RFA (El Centro 1, Tucson 1-3) have been proposed for construction using a second tranche of funding pursuant to Section 284 authority. The remaining four projects included in the DHS RFA (Tucson 4, Yuma 3, El Paso 2, and Tucson 5) have been included for consideration in this assessment, and are outlined in Table 2 below.

  - (U) Construction projects under 2808 authority as provided by DHS in their March 20, 2019 response to A/SD (Table 3). DHS requested an additional 10 projects be considered pursuant to authority under 10 U.S.C 2808. Of the 10 projects, five are on private land, and five are on federal land.

  - (U) DHS Construction Projects. Additionally, DHS has planned ten projects using their FY17/18 appropriations (three in Rio Grande Valley Sector, two in San Diego Sector, two in El Paso Sector, two in El Centro Sector, and one in Tucson Sector). DHS has also planned an additional four projects using their FY19 appropriations and Treasury Forfeiture Fund (TFF), all in Rio Grande Valley Sector and on private land.

### CBP 284 Projects For Consideration in 2018 Assessment – February 25, 2019 DHS RFA

<table>
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<tr>
<th>284 Memo Pri</th>
<th>Border Group Priority</th>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>Projects</th>
<th>Land Type</th>
<th>Notes</th>
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<td>DHS</td>
<td>For Considered in 2808 Assessment</td>
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<td>DHS</td>
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Total For Consideration: 4 Projects, 4 segments, 3 Sectors

Table 2. Proposed Projects under 284 Authority
## CBP Prioritized 2808 Projects – March 20, 2019 DHS Memo

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<th>Memo Pri</th>
<th>Memo Priority</th>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>Segments</th>
<th>Land Type</th>
<th>Troops in Sector / MSCs</th>
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<td>5</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>PRI</td>
<td>246 / 5</td>
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<tr>
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<td>6</td>
<td>YUM 6</td>
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<td>FED/PRI</td>
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Total For Consideration: 10 Projects, 15 segments, 5 Sectors

Table 3. Proposed Projects under 2808 Authority
Appendix 2 - (U) Project Analysis by Sector

- (U) El Paso Sector Projects: Joint Staff Priority 1-3
  - (U) Border Group Priority 8 project includes 12 total miles of new primary and secondary pedestrian fencing in vicinity of Antelope Wells POE. Additionally as requested, we also considered El Paso 2 (Border Group Priority 30) from the 284 RFA which includes 24 miles of vehicle barrier replacement on federal land. Although prioritized 30 of 33, the additive effect of replacing ineffective vehicle barriers with 36 miles of pedestrian fencing in the second highest apprehension sector is why we grouped these projects together. All of these projects are on federal land.
  - (U) USBP apprehensions in El Paso Sector currently rank second only behind Rio Grande Valley sector, with FY19 to date (71,063) already eclipsing FY17 and FY18 combined total (56,754). Priority 8 is expected to channel migrants to the Antelope Wells POE, and increase vanishing time associated with proximity to highway 81. The rugged terrain on both sides of the border presents numerous hazards for both migrants and agents; channeling migrants to the POE increases the safety of all personnel. Additionally, El Paso 2 from 284 RFA (Priority 30) the new pedestrian fencing in numerous non-contiguous locations along the border, including in vicinity of Antelope Wells POE, will decrease locations through which migrants can easily cross.
  - (U) The DoD currently has a total of 1,363 personnel in El Paso Sector (1,144 Title 10 and 219 Title 32). This total includes the Title 10 forces associated with RFA 7 Crisis Response Force, stationed at Fort Bliss on a 48hr prepare to deploy order. El Paso Sector also has the highest total number of MSC sites at Due to the rugged terrain presenting limited visibility, limited existing pedestrian fencing, and difficulty in CBP’s ability to both monitor wide areas and respond quickly, more MSC sites are required to augment CBP in vicinity of these projects. Additional fencing in this sector will reduce the areas that migrants can cross easily, lessening the areas CBP needs to continuously monitor, thus reducing high level of need for DoD to operate MSC sites and enabling CBP agents to concentrate on smaller geographic areas. DoD personnel also recently completed hardening of the Antelope Wells POE, potentially increasing the effectiveness these proposed projects.
  - (U) For historical context, in 1993, El Paso recorded approximately 285,000 migrant apprehensions. Operation Hold the Line infused personnel, technology, and physical barriers and by 1994 had reduced apprehensions by 72%. By 2015, apprehensions were down to 14,495, an overall reduction of 95% from 1993 levels. These projects are anticipated to contribute to the same effect of reducing overall between POE apprehensions.

- (U) San Diego Sector Projects: Joint Staff Priority 4-6
  - (U) Border Group Priority 4 project includes 3.5 miles of new primary and new secondary pedestrian fencing system in vicinity of the Otay Mesa POE. Border Group Priority 11 project includes 3 miles of new secondary pedestrian fencing system in vicinity of the Tecate POE. All of these projects are on federal land.
  - (U) USBP apprehensions in San Diego Sector have increased from FY17 to current, with FY19 apprehensions to date (31,071) set to eclipse FY18 total (38,591). San
Diego Sector is challenging due to the interspersion of highly urbanized areas and highly mountainous areas, presenting a low vanishing time in both types of terrain. Priority 4 is intended to add pedestrian fencing to rugged terrain east of the highly urbanized areas of Otay Mesa and Chula Vista. This terrain presents challenges both in detection and monitoring and apprehensions, creating a low vanishing time environment. Priority 11 adds new secondary pedestrian fencing on either side of the Tecate POE. While not highly urbanized north of Tecate, the terrain is rugged and migrants have access to highway 94, decreasing vanishing time.

- (U) The DoD currently has a total of 166 personnel (105 title 10 and 61 title 32), and operates mobile surveillance camera (MSC) sites in San Diego Sector. These projects are designed to channel migrants to existing POEs, reducing the need for DoD detection and monitoring between the POEs. This would also enable CBP agents to focus less on the rugged terrain to other areas presenting low vanishing time.

- (U) For historical context, in 1992, San Diego was the epicenter of illegal migration and drug trafficking, with apprehensions exceeding 560,000. Through Operation Gatekeeper, similar to Operation Hold the Line in El Paso, apprehension levels declined to 26,290 in 2015, a 95% decrease from the 1992 levels.

- (U) Yuma Sector Projects: Joint Staff Priority 7-10
  - (U) In the Yuma Sector, DHS recommended construction of multiple segments in three Border Group Priorities. Priority 6 (2 segments) includes 3 miles of new primary and secondary pedestrian fencing in vicinity of the Andrade POE and along the Colorado River (segment 1 is on federal land, but segment 2 is on private land). Priority 10/27 includes 31 miles of new secondary pedestrian fencing on the Barry M. Goldwater Range. Priority 10 (3 segments) includes a total of 27 miles in vicinity of San Luis POE and along the Colorado River. Additionally, as requested, we included Yuma 3 (Border Group Priority 27) from the 284 RFA which includes 31 miles of vehicle barrier replacement in the Cabeza Prieta National Wildlife Refuge. Priority 10/27, 10, and Yuma 3 are all on federal land.

- (U) Based on the remote location not near an urban area or highway, low Border Group Priority, and OSD analysis of Yuma 3 included in the 284 assessment, we did not include Yuma 3 in our Joint Staff prioritized list of construction projects.

- (U) USBP apprehensions in Yuma Sector for FY19 to date (31,393) have already eclipsed FY18 total (26,244) and are on pace to eclipse FY18 and FY17 combined (39,091). Priority 6 and Priority 10 projects are intended to increase vanishing times associated with the urbanized areas near Yuma, San Luis, and proximity to interstate 8. Priority 10/27 along the Barry M. Goldwater range are expected to reduce the need for CBP patrols and limit potential impact to military training. However, impact to military training over the past five years has been negligible, as only 195 sorties out of a total of 255,732 sorties have been impacted (<0.1%) with only one training event cancelled.

- (U) The DoD currently has a total of 197 personnel (103 title 10 and 93 title 32), and operates MSC sites in Yuma Sector. Yuma Sector presents diverse challenges including very remote sections, and urbanized sections along the Colorado River.
These projects are designed to focus migrants towards the POEs, enabling CBP to concentrate its agents and reduce the overall need for DoD support.

- **(U) Laredo Sector Projects: Joint Staff Priority 11.**
  - **(U) Border Group Priority 7** includes 52 miles of new primary pedestrian fence system starting from the Laredo-Columbia Solidarity POE and extending north along the Rio Grande River. Border Group Priority 12 includes 75 miles of new primary pedestrian fence system starting from the Laredo-Texas Mexican Railway International Bridge POE and extending south. Both projects are on private land. Due to the cost of both of these projects, the Border Group Priorities, and the land status, the Joint Staff recommends Priority 7 only to maximize ability to construct projects in other sectors.
  - **(U) USBP apprehensions in Laredo Sector in FY19 to date (18,120) are on pace to eclipse FY18 total (32,641).** Based on the DHS construction projects in the Rio Grande Valley Sector, DHS anticipates migrant flows and illicit drug traffic to shift to areas in vicinity of Laredo. Therefore, construction projects are necessary in order to mitigate potential future increased migrant and drug flows.
  - **(U) The DoD currently has 403 personnel (85 title 10 and 318 title 32), with □ MSC sites in the sector.** DoD personnel recently completed hardening of the Laredo-Columbia Solidarity POE. Overall the terrain in this sector is flat, and the Rio Grande River section associated with Priority 7 affords numerous crossing sites. Building Priority 7 would enable DoD personnel and CBP agents to focus on lower vanishing time areas associated with Laredo city.

- **(U) El Centro Sector Projects: Joint Staff Priority 12-13**
  - **(U) Border Group Priority 5** includes 1 mile of new secondary pedestrian fence system at the Calexico West POE. Border Group Priority 9 includes 12 miles of new secondary pedestrian fence system in vicinity of Calexico West POE. Both projects are on private land.
  - **(U) USBP apprehensions in El Centro Sector have also increased from FY17, with FY19 apprehensions to date (18,492) on pace to eclipse FY18 total (29,230).** The highly dense urban area of Mexicali is directly across the border south of the Calexico West POE. According to USBP, El Centro has the lowest vanishing time of any sector along the southern border, and in vicinity of the Calexico West POE in particular. The urban areas of Calexico, El Centro, and access to numerous highways and interstate 8 present numerous apprehension challenges. Priority 5 and 9 are intended to channel migrants to the POE, reducing the numerous vanishing time threats along this section of border.
  - **(U) The DoD currently has a total of 246 personnel (53 title 10 and 193 title 32), and operates □ MSC sites in El Centro Sector.** Due to the flat terrain in this area, fewer MSC sites are able to cover a wider section of terrain. Additional fencing in this sector would enable DoD personnel to prioritize sectors with higher migrant apprehension rates.