

TERRORISM & POLITICAL ISLAM ORIGINS, IDEOLOGIES, AND METHODS

A Counterterrorism Textbook
2nd Edition

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The views expressed in this book are solely those of the authors and not of the U.S. Military Academy, the Department of the Army, the Federal Bureau of Investigation or any other agency of the U.S. Government.

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Foreword

September 11, 2001, will be a defining moment in history for generations to come. It was on this Tuesday morning that four units of specially trained jihadists, members of al-Qaeda, attacked the United States. They struck simultaneously at the financial, military, and political centers of our country. As a direct result, nearly 3,000 productive human lives were extinguished. The airline industry was shut down. The financial markets were closed. The cities of New York and Washington, DC were temporarily evacuated. The borders to the United States were closed. The American public and its leadership braced for the next attack. No one understood the enemy, their plans, their intentions, or their capacity to carry out their strategic vision of a new world order. The men who carried out this mission executed one piece of a long-term strategy developed by al-Qaeda's leadership and designed to inflict massive suffering and significant economic pain on our country and our economy. As the 9/11 Commission pointed out in its final report (p. 4), "By September 11, 2001, al-Qaeda possessed:

- Leaders able to evaluate, approve, and supervise the planning and direction of a major operation;
- A personnel system that could recruit candidates, indoctrinate them, vet them, and give them the necessary training;
- Communications sufficient to enable planning and direction of operatives and those who would be helping them;
- An intelligence effort to gather required information and form assessments of America's strengths and weaknesses; and
- The ability to raise and move the money necessary to finance an attack."

On the day of this horrifying attack against our homeland, FBI Director Robert S. Mueller III established two priorities for the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). The first centered on identifying those responsible for the attack and bringing them to justice. The second priority was to prevent an attack of this scale from occurring again. Fulfilling the Director's second priority required an institutional reengineering of the FBI's counterterrorism

mission, strategy, and operational and intelligence processes. At the core of the FBI's counterterrorism strategy is the investment of critical resources in the development of a workforce second to none. This development effort begins with the understanding that a well-educated workforce will be our greatest asset in the Global War on Terrorism.

The value of a highly trained and experienced workforce has been identified and is being carried out by Director Mueller, Deputy Director John Pistole, National Security Branch Executive Assistant Director Arthur M. Cummings II, and Counterterrorism Division Assistant Director Michael J. Heimbach as a priority. This identification has served as a catalyst in the FBI's effort to develop a competency-based education program. The FBI is committed to being a "learning organization" which learns from successes as well as from mistakes. The chapters in this book draw from publicly available information and provide the public's view of these topics — an important perspective for any organization that requires the public's trust.

Since September 11, 2001, the United States homeland, Iraq, and Afghanistan have been some of the most visible battlefields in the war on terror. However, America's presence—and specifically the FBI's presence—in the Pacific Rim, the Horn of Africa, Europe, and the tri-border region of South America, are part of a coordinated strategy to deny terrorists the freedom of movement and sanctuary. This fight is global, and the FBI, in partnership with our law enforcement and intelligence community partners, are leading the way to detect, penetrate, and dismantle terrorist enterprises. In this joint endeavor, the FBI brings to bear its unique and specialized training, interview and investigative skills, and success at integrating intelligence and investigations. To succeed in preventing the next terror attack, intelligence and enforcement elements at all levels of government must understand our enemies, must be mobilized, and must demonstrate an unprecedented level of cooperation. The FBI, along with all intelligence and law enforcement agencies, must work diligently as a team to successfully integrate investigations and intelligence collection.

Intelligence is a core competency of the FBI, and it has been intrinsic to the FBI's investigative mission throughout the Bureau's 100-year existence. Spurred on by the events of September 11, the FBI has moved from being a case driven organization to an intelligence driven organization in order to develop a greater awareness of the threats and vulnerabilities facing our nation. The FBI continues moving forward with efforts to develop our intelligence apparatus to meet the extensive mission requirements imposed by the American public and to gain further acceptance as an equal partner within the intelligence community. To achieve equal footing within the intelligence community—including in the areas of personnel and financial resources—the FBI must demonstrate the value, timeliness, and impact of the intelligence products we provide to our partners and the nation as a whole.

This book reflects the combined work of experts who are committed to understanding the threats we face from terrorism and the development of solutions to counter these threats. It represents the collective work of academics and counterterrorism practitioners and will serve as the cornerstone for key discussions by our Special Agents, Intelligence Analysts, Staff

Operations Specialists, and other professional Support personnel as they begin their formal training.

The essays are short, easy to read, and well organized. There is much to be learned, and it is our hope that this book will inform as well as develop an understanding of new perspectives and stimulate new ideas on the study of terrorism and counterterrorism. The book provides a foundation on the origins of Islam and will provide the reader with a clear understanding of the Sunni and Shi'a sects within Islam. The contributing authors will guide you through their thoughts on the radicalization process, the growth of suicide bombing as a terror tactic and methods of financing terrorism through criminal operations. The challenge of terrorism is global, and the reader will gain insights on various regions of the world, the diaspora communities of Europe and the United States, along with an understanding of the threat posed by several terrorist organizations abroad.

This book was prepared as an investment in the FBI's Counterterrorism workforce. Our workforce remains the centerpiece of our counterterrorism system comprised of adaptive, confident and competent counterterrorism personnel. This force has been infused with the FBI's values and a combined law enforcement and intelligence culture. We must expand that workforce to include new levels of professional development directed by National Security matters and FBI guidance. It must be strategically responsive, networked, and dominant across the range of law enforcement and intelligence operations. This vision, married with subject matter experts, represents the future of the global security environment. Within this culture, the FBI will be prepared to successfully execute the counterterrorism strategy and prevent terrorist acts before they occur.

This counterterrorism textbook could not have been assembled without our collaborative relationship with the Combating Terrorism Center at the United States Military Academy at West Point. Many thanks are due to the commitment of the dedicated staff of the Combating Terrorism Center, especially General John P. Abizaid and Lieutenant Colonel Joseph Felter.

Preface

The Combating Terrorism Center is pleased to present the 2nd Edition of the FBI-CTC Education Collaborative text book. This edition is intended to provide an overview of the field, similar to the 1st edition, while mirroring more closely the CTC instruction provided at the various FBI training venues. CTC lectures, and this text book, are centered on the origins, ideologies and methods that define the current manifestation of the terrorist threat.

The second edition will allow New Agents at the FBI Academy and Special Agents attending Stage II or Regional JTTF Training to prepare for upcoming lectures by reading the associated text book chapters. Our goal is to foster more interactive discussions by providing read-ahead material prior to the lecture. The text book will also serve as a useful reinforcement tool for individuals attending a CTC event.

Organization of the book

The first chapter of the book is intended to put the most significant contemporary manifestation of the terrorist threat, Islamic terrorism, in its historical context. The reader should come away with the understanding that terrorism is a human phenomenon, not an Islamic phenomenon, and that the contemporary terrorist threat is not too foreign for the law enforcement community to combat effectively. Contemporary terrorists borrow heavily from previous waves of terrorism which have been addressed effectively by security practitioners.

Chapters 2-6 provide a baseline understanding of Islam and Islamism. To engage effectively with Muslim communities, our greatest allies in the fight against terrorism, it is essential that the counterterrorism community gain an understanding of Islamic religion and culture. It is equally essential that practitioners understand the way in which militant ideologues and actors have used their divergent interpretation of political Islam to justify and inspire violent action in both the local and global contexts.

Muslims, and the individuals that wage violence in the name of Islam, are not part of a monolithic culture. Geography, culture, history and politics have impacted the Muslim world, including those that use terrorism as a tactic, in innumerable ways. Chapters 7-14 take the reader to several regions of the globe, providing insight into various cultures and the terrorist organizations originating from or operating within those cultures.

Chapters 15-19 provide a closer look at four of the most prominent terror organizations in the world today. Chapters 20-24 introduce various topics in terrorism and counterterrorism of interest to the counterterrorism community.

A note on terminology: Articles commissioned by the CTC use a standardized academic transliteration of Arabic into English. However, several of the articles in this volume were originally written for other texts, resulting in some variation from article to article.



United States Military Academy
West Point, New York

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Chapter 1

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Chapter 2

[redacted] "Understanding Islam and Islamism." Written for 1st Edition of this textbook.

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Chapter 17

Matthew Levitt, " Hamas Social Welfare: In the Service of Terror." In *The Making of a Terrorist: Recruitment, Training and Root Causes* (Vol. 1), edited by James Forest. Westport, CT: Praeger, 2005.

Chapter 18

Richard Wrona, Jr., "Lebanon, Hizbollah, and the Patrons of Terrorism." In *Countering Terrorism and Insurgency in the 21st Century* (Vol. 3), edited by James Forest. Westport, CT: Praeger, 2007.

Chapter 19

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Chapter 20

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Chapter 23

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Chapter 1

Modern Terror: The Four Waves¹

David C. Rapoport

September 11 is the most destructive day in the long bloody history of terrorism. The casualties, economic damage, and outrage were unprecedented. It could be the most important day too, because it led President Bush to declare a "war (that) would not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped and defeated."²

However unprecedented the day was, President Bush's declaration was not altogether unique. Exactly 100 years ago, when an Anarchist assassinated President William McKinley in September 1901, his successor Theodore Roosevelt called for a crusade to exterminate terrorism everywhere.³

Will we succeed this time? No one knows, but we can more fully appreciate the difficulties ahead better by examining features of the history of rebel (non-state) terror. That history shows how deeply implanted in our culture terrorism is, offers parallels worth pondering, and provides a perspective for understanding the uniqueness of 9/11 and its aftermath.⁴ To this end, I will examine the course of modern terror from its initial appearance some 125 years ago, emphasizing continuities and change, particularly with respect to international ingredients. I lack space to discuss the domestic sphere, which offers important parallels too.⁵

The Wave Phenomena

Modern terror began in Russia in the 1880s, and within a decade appeared in Western Europe, the Balkans, and Asia. A generation later the wave was completed. Anarchists initiated the wave and their primary strategy, assassination campaigns against prominent officials, was adopted by virtually all the other groups of the time, even those with nationalist aims in the Balkans and India.

Significant examples of secular rebel terror existed earlier, but they were specific to a particular time and country. The Ku Klux Klan (KKK), for example, made a striking contribution to the decision of the federal government to end Reconstruction, but the KKK had no contemporary parallels or emulators.⁶

The "Anarchist Wave" was the first global or truly international terrorist experience in history⁸; and subsequently three similar, consecutive, and overlapping expressions followed.

The "Anti Colonial Wave" began in the 1920s and lasted about 40 years. Then came the "New Left Wave", which diminished greatly as the century closed leaving only a few groups active still today in Nepal, Spain, the UK, Peru and Columbia. In 1979 the "Religious Wave" emerged, and if the pattern of its three predecessors is relevant it could disappear by 2025 and make way for a new wave.⁸ The uniqueness and persistence of the wave experience indicates that terror is deeply rooted in modern culture.

The concept of wave as employed here is an unfamiliar notion and worth more attention before we examine the historical examples. Academics focus on organizations for good reasons. Organizations launch terror campaigns, and governments always are primarily concerned to disable those organizations.⁹ Academics, moreover, study contemporary groups and on contemporary event, those facts make us less sensitive to waves¹⁰ because every wave requires time, a good deal of time, to complete its cycle.

What is a wave? It is a cycle of activity in a given time period, a cycle characterized by expansion and contraction phases. A crucial feature is its international character; similar activities occur in many countries driven by a common predominant energy shaping participating groups and their mutual relationships. As their names suggest a different energy drives each wave.

The name a wave bears reflects a dominant but not its only feature. Nationalist organizations, for example appear in all waves. But each wave shapes its national elements differently. In the first wave nationalist and Anarchist groups used the same tactics the latter often trained the former too. Third wave nationalist groups displayed profoundly left-wing aspirations, and nationalism serves or reactions to religious pressures in the fourth wave. All groups in the second wave had nationalist aspirations but we call the wave "Anti-Colonial" because those groups struggled against colonial powers that had become ambivalent about retaining their colonial status. That ambivalence explains why the second wave produced the first terrorist successes. In other waves that ambivalence is absent or very weak and nationalist groups always failed. In the fourth wave, nationalist elements emerge in reaction to religious pressures or they serve to limit the religious element.

A wave is composed of organizations, but the two have different life rhythms. Organizations normally break up before the initial wave associated with them does. "New Left" organizations were particularly striking in this respect, generally lasting two years. Nonetheless the wave contained sufficient energy to create new successor groups. When its energy cannot inspire new organizations a wave disappears. Resistance, political concessions and changes in the perception of generations are critical factors in explaining the disappearance.

Occasionally, an organization survives its original wave. The Irish Republican Army (IRA) is the oldest modern terrorist organization emerging first in 1916; though not as a terror organization.¹¹ It then fought five campaigns (the 1950 struggle used guerrilla tactics)¹² in two successive waves. At least two of its various offshoots, the Real IRA and Continuity IRA are still active. The Palestine Liberation Organizations (PLO) founded in 1964 became

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active in 1967. Later it became the pre-eminent body of the New Left wave because of its international connections even though it was primarily a nationalist group. More recently, PLO elements (i.e. Farah) became active in the fourth wave, even though the organization began as a wholly secular group. When an organization transcends a wave, it reflects the new wave's influence, a change that may pose special problems for the group and its constituencies, as we shall later see.

The first three waves lasted about a generation each- a time frame, which is suggestive of a human life cycle where dreams inspiring parents lose their attractiveness for children.¹³ Although the resistance of those attacked is crucial in explaining why terror organizations rarely succeed, the time span of the wave also suggests that the wave has its own momentum. Over time there are fewer organizations because the enterprise's problematic nature becomes more visible. The pattern is familiar to students of revolutionary states, i.e., France, Soviet Union, and Iran. The inheritors of the revolution do not value it in the same way that its creators did. In the anti-colonial wave, the process also seems relevant to the colonial powers. A new generation found it much easier to discard the colonial idea. The wave pattern calls our attention to crucial political themes in the general culture, themes that distinguish the ethos of one generation from another.

Why did the first wave occur when it did? There are many reasons, but two critical factors are conspicuous and facilitate successive waves. The first is the transformation in communication and transportation patterns. The telegraph, daily mass-newspapers, and railroads flourished during the last quarter of the 19th century. Events in one country were known elsewhere in a day or so. Prominent Russian Anarchists traveled extensively helping to inspire sympathies and groups elsewhere, sometimes as the journeys of Michael Bakunin indicate they had more influence abroad than at home. Peter Proudhon spent more time in France than in Russia. Mass transportation made mass emigrations possible and created diaspora communities, which then became significant, both in the politics of their "new" and "old" countries. Subsequent innovations continued to shrink time and space. Finally, there was the development of dynamite which "was rapidly and widely introduced for peaceful engineering and industrial purposes, thus becoming quite easily accessible for other purposes. The production of dynamite involved a comparatively simple process...and bombs were easily portable safe to use, and their effects were controllable".¹⁴

A second factor is doctrine or culture. Russian writers created a strategy for terror, which became an inheritance for successors to use, improve and transmit. Sergei Nechaev was the leading figure in this effort; Nicholas Mozorov, Peter Kropotkin, and Serge Stepniak, and others made contributions.¹⁵ Why was this project significant? The KKK had no emulators partly because it made no effort to explain its tactics. The Russian achievement becomes even more striking when we compare it to the practices of the ancient religious terrorists who always stayed within their own religious tradition, the source of their justifications and binding precedents. Each religious tradition produced its own kind of terrorist,

and sometimes the tactics within a tradition were so uniform that they appear to be a form of religious ritual.¹⁶

A comparison of Nechaev's Revolutionary Catechism with Bin Laden's training manual, *Military Studies in the Jihad Against The Tyrants* shows that they share one very significant feature—a paramount desire to become more efficient by learning from experiences of friends and enemies alike.¹⁷ The major difference in this respect is the role of women. Nechaev considers them "priceless assets"; and indeed they were crucial leaders and participants in the first wave. Bin Laden dedicates his book to protecting the Muslim woman, but he ignores what experience can tell us about female terrorists.¹⁸ Women do not participate in his forces, and are virtually excluded in the fourth wave except in Sri Lanka, Chechnya, and Palestine.

Each wave produces major technical works that reflect the special properties of that wave and contribute to a common modern effort to formulate a "science" of terror. Between Nechaev and Bin Laden, there were, *inter alia*, Georges Grivas, *Guerrilla War* and Carlos Marighella, *Mini-Manual of the Urban Guerrilla*, in the second and third waves respectively.

"Revolution" is the over-riding aim in every wave, but revolution is understood in different ways.¹⁹ Revolutionaries create a new source of political legitimacy, and more often than not that meant national self-determination. The anti-colonial wave was dominated by this quest, but it was present always. This principle, a people should govern itself, was bequeathed by the American and French Revolutions. (The French Revolution also introduced the term terror to our vocabulary.)²⁰ But since the definition of "the people" has never been (perhaps never can be) clear and fixed, it is a source of recurring conflict even when the sanctity of the principle is accepted everywhere. Revolution can also mean a radical reconstruction of authority to eliminate all forms of inequality, a cardinal theme in the first and a significant one in the third wave. A new source of legitimacy, a sacred text or revelation dominates the fourth wave.²¹

Our discussion treats the great political events precipitating each wave and the aims and tactics of participating groups. The international context is our focus, where we distinguish five principal ingredients: terrorist organizations, diaspora populations, states, sympathetic foreign publics, and supra-national organizations. The last appears first in the second wave.

The First Wave: The Creation Of A Doctrine

The creators of modern terrorism inherited a world where traditional revolutionaries, who depended on pamphlets and meetings, suddenly seemed obsolete. The masses, Nechaev said, really regarded them as "idle word spillers!"²² A new form of communication (the Italian Anarchist Carlo Cafiero, 1880, named it "Propaganda by the Deed" was needed, one that

would be heard and command respect because the rebel took action which involved serious personal risks signifying deep commitment.

The Anarchist analysis of modern society contained four major points. 1) Society has huge reservoirs of latent ambivalence and hostility. 2) Social conventions were devised to muffle and diffuse antagonisms by generating guilt and providing channels for settling grievances and securing personal amenities. 3) But if one can demonstrate that these conventions are simply historical creations, acts now perceived as immoral our children will hail as noble efforts to liberate humanity. 4) Terror is the quickest and most effective means to destroy conventions. The perpetrators free themselves from the paralyzing grip of guilt to become different kinds of people, and force those who defend the government to respond in ways that undermine the rules governments claim to respect.²³ Dramatic action repeated again and again would invariably polarize the society and revolution would inevitably follow.

An incident, which inspired the turbulent decades to follow, illustrates the process visualized. Vera Zasulich wounded a Russian police commander (1878) who abused political prisoners. Throwing her weapon to the floor, she proclaimed that she was a "terrorist not a killer".²⁴ The ensuing trial quickly became that of the police chief. When the court freed her, crowds greeted the verdict with thunderous applause.²⁵

A successful campaign entailed learning how to fight and how to die, and the most admirable death occurred as a result of a court trial in which one accepted responsibility and used the occasion to indict the regime. Stepniak, a major figure in the history of Russian terrorism, described the Russian terrorist as "noble, terrible, irresistibly fascinating uniting the two sublimities of human grandeur, the martyr and the hero."²⁶ Dynamite was the weapon of choice. Criminals did not use it partly because the weapon was very dangerous to use and the assailant ran a great risk of killing himself also.²⁷

Terror was violence beyond the moral conventions used to regulate violence, the rules of war and those of punishment. The first distinguishes combatants from non-combatants and the second the guilty from the innocent. Invariably, most onlookers would label acts of terror atrocities or outrages. The rebels described themselves as terrorists, not guerrillas, tracing their lineage to the French Revolution. They sought political targets or those that could affect public attitudes.²⁸ Terrorism was a strategy not an end. The tactics used depended upon the group's political objective and on the specific context faced. Judging a context constantly in flux was both an art and a science.

The creators of this strategy took confidence from contemporary events. In this case, and in all subsequent ones, major unexpected political events occurred which dramatized new government vulnerabilities. Hope was excited, and hope is always an indispensable lubricant of rebel activity.²⁹ The turn of events that suggested Russian vulnerability was the dazzling effort of the young Czar Alexander II to transform the system virtually overnight. In one stroke of the pen (1861), he freed the serfs (one-third of the population) and promised them funds to buy their land. Three years later he established limited local self-government,

“westernized” the judicial system, abolished capital punishment, relaxed censorship powers and control over education. Hopes were aroused but could not be fulfilled quickly enough; as indicated by the fact that the funds the serfs received to buy the lands were insufficient. In the wake of inevitable disappointments, systematic assassination strikes against prominent officials began, culminating in the death of Alexander II himself.

Russian interests in encouraging and training other groups, even those with different political aims, bore fruit quickly. Armenian and Polish nationalist groups emerged in Russia committed to assassination and robbing banks to finance their activities. Then the Balkans exploded, where many groups found the boundaries of states recently torn out of the Ottoman Empire unsatisfactory.³⁰ In the West, where Russian Anarchists fled and found refuge in diaspora colonies and among other elements hostile to the Czarist regime, a campaign of Anarchist terror developed that influenced activities in India too.³¹ The efforts did produce some surprising results for groups still struggling in Russia. The Terrorist Brigade in 1905 had its headquarters in Switzerland, launched strikes from Finland, an autonomous part of the Russian Empire, got arms from an Armenian terrorist group Russians helped train, and were offered funds by the Japanese to be laundered through American millionaires!³²

The high point of international terrorist activity in first wave occurred in the 1890s, sometimes called the “Golden Age of Assassination”, when monarchs, Prime ministers, and presidents were struck down one after another usually by assassins who moved easily across international borders to assassinate foreign leaders.³³ The most immediately affected governments clamored for international police cooperation and for better border control, a situation President Theodore Roosevelt thought ideal for launching the first international effort to eliminate terrorism.

Anarchy is a crime against the whole human race, and all mankind should band together against the Anarchist. His crimes should be made a crime against the law of nations...declared by treaties among all civilized powers.³⁴

But the consensus lasted three years only. The U.S. refused to send a representative to a St. Petersburg signing ceremony for a German/Russian sponsored protocol to meet these objectives. In a second chapter of this story, the Americans refused to adhere to it even when asked to do so later. They feared that an extensive involvement in European politics might be required and had in any case no federal police force. Italy refused, too, for a very different and revealing concern. If Anarchists were returned to their original countries, Italy's domestic troubles might be worse than its international ones!

The first great effort to deal with international terrorism failed because the interests of states pulled them in different directions, and the divisions developed new expressions as the century developed. Bulgaria gave Macedonian nationalists sanctuaries and bases to aid operations in the Ottoman Empire. The suspicion that Serbia helped Archduke Franz Ferdinand's assassin precipitated World War I. An unintended consequence of the four terrible years that followed was a dampened enthusiasm for the strategy of assassination.

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The Second Wave: Mostly Successful and Finding a New Language

A wave by definition is an international event; oddly, however, the first one was sparked by a domestic political situation. A monumental international event, the Versailles Peace Treaty that concluded World War I, precipitated the second wave. The victors applied the principle of national self-determination to break up the mostly European empires of the defeated states. The non-European portions of those defeated empires, which were deemed not yet ready for independence, became League of Nations "mandates" administered directly by victorious powers until the territories were ready for independence.

Inadvertently, the victors undermined the legitimacy of their own empires. The IRA achieved limited success in the 1920s,³⁵ and terrorist groups developed in all empires after World War II except the Soviet Union, which did recognize itself as a colonial power. Terrorist activity was crucial in establishing new states Ireland, Israel, Cyprus, Algeria, etc. As empires dissolved, the wave receded.

Most successes occurred some 25 years after Versailles, and the time lag requires explanation. World War II reinforced and enlarged the implications of Versailles. Once more the victors compelled the defeated to abandon empires, and this time the colonial territories were overseas (Manchuria, Korea, Ethiopia, Libya, etc.) and not made mandates. The victors began liquidating their own empires as well, and in doing so they generally were not responding to terrorist activity, i.e., India, Pakistan, Burma, Ceylon, Tunisia, Egypt, Morocco, the Philippines, Ghana, Nigeria, etc., which indicated how firmly committed the Western world had become to the principle of self-determination. The U.S. had become the major Western power and pressed hardest for eliminating empires. As the Cold War developed, the process was accelerated because the Soviets were always poised to help would-be rebels.³⁶

The terror campaigns were fought in territories where special political problems made withdrawal a less attractive option. Jews and Arabs in Palestine, for example, had dramatically conflicting versions of what the termination of British rule was supposed to mean. The considerable European population in Algeria did not want Paris to abandon its authority, and in Northern Ireland the majority wanted to remain British. In Cyprus, the Turkish community did not want to be put under Greek rule, the aim of EOKA, and Britain wanted to retain Cyprus as a base for Middle East operations.

The problem of conflicting aspirations was reflected in the way the struggles were or were not settled. The terrorists did get the imperial powers to withdraw, but that was not the only purpose of the struggle. Menachem Begin's Irgun fought to gain the entire Palestine mandate but settled for partition.³⁷ IRA elements have never accepted the fact that Britain will not leave Northern Ireland until the majority of the territory's population consent. EOKA fought to unify Cyprus with Greece (enosis), but accepted an independent state that EOKA tried to subvert it for the sake of an ever-elusive enosis. Algeria seems to be the chief exception, because the Europeans all fled. But the initial manifesto of the Front de Liberation Nationale Algeria (FLN) proclaimed that it wanted to establish a democratic state and to retain the Europeans; and neither objective was achieved.³⁸

Second wave organizations understood that they needed a new language to describe themselves because the term terrorist had accumulated so many negative connotations that those who identified themselves as terrorists incurred enormous political liabilities. The Israeli group Lehi was the last self-identified terrorist group. Begin, leader of the Irgun (Lehi's Zionist rival), concentrating on purpose rather than means, described its members as "freedom fighters" struggling against "government terror".³⁹ So appealing was this self-description that all subsequent terrorist groups followed suit; and because the anti-colonial struggle seemed more legitimate than the purposes served in the first wave the "new" language became attractive to potential political supporters as well. Governments appreciated the political value of "appropriate" language too, and began to describe all violent rebels as terrorists. In an effort to avoid being seen as blatantly partisan the media corrupted language further. Major American newspapers, for example, often described the same individuals alternatively as terrorists, guerrillas, and soldiers in the same account.⁴⁰

The tactics changed also. Because diaspora sources contributed more money bank robberies were less common. The first wave demonstrated that assassinating prominent political figures could be very counterproductive, and few assassinations occurred in the new wave. The Balkans was an exception, an odd place when one considers where World War I started.⁴¹ Elsewhere, only Lehi (the British renamed it the Stern Gang) remained committed to a strategy of assassination. Lehi was much less effective, however than its two competitors, which may have been an important lesson for other anti-colonial movements. Martyrdom often linked to assassination seemed less significant as well.

The new strategy was more complicated than the old, because there were more sorts of targets chosen, and it was important to strike them in proper sequence. Eliminate the police a government's eyes and ears, first through systematic assassinations of officers and/or their families. The military units replacing them would prove too clumsy to cope without producing counter atrocities that would increase social support for the terrorists. If the process of atrocities and counter-atrocities was well planned, it could favor those perceived to be weak and without alternatives.⁴² (By way of contrast, one should note that Anarchists in the Latin countries of Europe did have support of the working classes by the 1890s, but during the Golden Age of Assassination Anarchists were seen more often as simply bizarre and unable to live in peace in any society.)

Major energies went into guerrilla-like (hit and run) actions against troops, attacks that still went beyond the rules of war because weapons were concealed and the assailants had no identifying insignia.⁴³ Some groups (i.e. the Irgun) made efforts to give warnings in order to limit civilian casualties. In some cases (i.e., Algeria), terror was one aspect of a more comprehensive rebellion that included extensive guerrilla forces.

Second wave terrorists used the four international ingredients in much more productive ways than their predecessors did. Leaders of different national groups still acknowledged the common bonds and heritage of an international revolutionary tradition, but the heroes

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invoked in the literature of specific groups were overwhelmingly national heroes.⁴⁴ The underlying assumption seemed to be that if one strengthened ties with foreign terrorists, other international assets would become less useful.

Diaspora groups regularly displayed abilities not seen earlier. 19th century Irish rebels received money, weapons, and volunteers from the Irish-American community, but in the 1920s the exertions of the latter went further and induced the U.S. government to exert significant political influence on Britain to accept an Irish state.⁴⁵ Jewish diaspora communities, especially in the U.S., exerted similar leverage as the horror of the Holocaust was finally revealed.

Foreign states with kindred populations were also active. Arab states gave the Algerian FLN crucial political support and those adjacent to Algeria offered sanctuaries from which groups could stage attacks. Greece sponsored the Cypriot uprising against the British and against Cyprus when it became a state. Frightened Turkish Cypriots in turn looked to Turkey for aid. Turkish troops then invaded the northern part of the island (1974) and are still there.

Outside influences obviously change when the purpose of the terrorist activity and the local context are perceived differently. The different Irish experiences illustrate the point well. The early effort in the 1920s was seen simply as an anti-colonial movement, and the Irish American community had its greatest or most productive impact.⁴⁶ The diaspora was less interested in the IRA's brief campaigns to bring Northern Ireland into the Republic during World War II and in 1950 during the Cold War. Conflicting concerns weakened overseas enthusiasms and influences.

As the second wave progressed, the new fifth ingredient, i.e. supra-national organization, came into play. When Alexander I of Serbia was assassinated in Marseilles (1934), the League of Nations tried to contain international terror by drafting two conventions, including one for an international court (1937). Neither came into effect. Two League members (Hungary and Italy) apparently encouraged the assassination and blocked the anti-terror efforts.⁴⁷ After World War II, the UN inherited the League's ultimate authority over the colonial mandates, territories now scenes of extensive terrorist activity. When Britain decided to withdraw from Palestine, the UN was crucial in legitimizing the partition; and subsequently all anti-colonial terrorists sought to interest the UN in their struggles. The new states admitted to the UN were nearly always former colonial territories, and they gave the anti-colonial sentiment in that body more structure, focus, and opportunities. More and more participants in UN debates regularly used Begin's language to describe anti-colonial terrorists as "freedom fighters".⁴⁸

Third Wave: Excessive Internationalism?

The major political event stimulating the "New Left wave" was the agonizing Vietnam War. The effectiveness of the Vietcong's "primitive weapons" against the American

Goliath's modern technology rekindled radical hopes that the contemporary system was vulnerable. Groups developed in the Third World and in the Western heartland itself, where the war stimulated enormous ambivalence among the youth about the value of the existing system. Many Western groups (i.e., American Weather Underground, the West German RAF, the Italian Red Brigades, the Japanese Red Army, the French Action Directe,) saw themselves as vanguards for the Third World masses. The Soviet world encouraged the outbreaks, and offered moral support, training, and weapons.

As in the first wave, radicalism and nationalism often were combined, i.e., the Basques, Armenians, Corsicans, Kurds, and Irish.⁴⁹ Every first wave nationalist movement failed, but the linkage was renewed because ethnic concerns always have larger constituencies than those with radical aspirations. Although self-determination ultimately obscured the radical programs, and nationalist groups were much more durable than other groups in the third wave, none succeeded and those still struggling are likely to fail. The countries concerned (i.e. Spain, France, UK, and Turkey) simply do not consider themselves as colonial powers now, and the ambivalence necessary for nationalist success is absent.

When the Vietnam War ended (1975), the PLO replaced the Viet Cong as the heroic model. Originating after the extraordinary collapse of three Arab armies in the Six-Day War (1967), its existence and persistence gave credibility to supporters who argued that only terror could remove Israel. Its centrality for other groups was strengthened because it got strong support from Arab states and the Soviet Union, and made training facilities in Lebanon available to the other groups.

The first and third waves had some striking resemblances. Women in the second wave had been restricted to the role of messengers and scouts; but now they became leaders and fighters again.⁵⁰

"Theatrical targets," comparable to those of the first wave, replaced the second wave's military targets. International hijacking is one example. Terrorists understood that the some foreign landing fields were accessible. Some seven hundred hijackings occurred during the first three decades of the third wave.⁵¹

Planes were hijacked to secure hostages. There were other ways; however, to generate hostage crises, and the hostage crisis became a wave characteristic. The most memorable was the 1979 kidnapping of former Italian Prime Minister Moro by the Red Brigades. When the government refused to negotiate, Moro was brutally murdered and his body dumped in the streets. The Sandinistas took Nicaragua's Congress hostage in 1978; an act so audacious that it sparked the popular insurrection that brought the Somoza regime down a year later. In Columbia (1985) the M-19 tried to duplicate the feat by seizing the Supreme Court, but the government refused to yield and in the struggle nearly a100 people were killed, including 11 justices.

Kidnappings occurred in 73 countries, especially in Italy, Spain, and Latin America. From 1968 to 1982 there were 409 international kidnappings incidents yielding 951 hos-

ages.⁵² Initially, hostages gave their captors political leverage, but soon another concern became more dominant. Companies insured their executives, and kidnapping became lucrative. When money was the principal issue kidnappers found that hostage negotiations were easier to consummate on their terms too. Informed observers estimate the practice "earned" \$350 million.⁵³

The abandoned practice of assassinating prominent figures was revived. The IRA and its various splinter organizations, for example, assassinated two British ambassadors Christopher Ewart-Briggs (Ireland 1976, Sir Richard Sykes (Netherlands 1979), Lord Mountbatten (1979), and attempted to kill Prime Ministers Thatcher (1984) and Major (1991).⁵⁴ The Palestinian Black September assassinated the Jordanian Prime Minister (1971) and attempted to assassinate Jordan's King Hussein (1974). Black September killed the American Ambassador when it took the Saudi Embassy in Khartoum (1973). ETA killed the Spanish Prime Minister in the same year.

First and third wave assassinations had a different logic however. A first wave victim was assassinated because he/she held a public office. New Left wave assassinations more often were "punishments". Jordan's Prime Minister and King had forced the PLO out of their country in a savage battle. Similarly, the attempt against the British Prime Minister Thatcher occurred because she was "responsible" for the death of the 9 IRA hunger strikers who refused to be treated as ordinary criminals.⁵⁵ Aldo Moro was assassinated because the Italian government refused to enter hostage negotiations. The German Red Army Faction provided another common pattern. 15% of its strikes involved assassination. Although the RAF did not seek most prominent public figures, it did kill the head of the Berlin Supreme Court and a well-known industrialist.⁵⁶

For good reason, the abandoned term "international terrorism" was revived. Again the revolutionary ethos created significant bonds between separate national groups; bonds that intensified when first Cuban and then PLO training facilities were made available. The international dimensions were reflected by the targets chosen too. Some groups conducted more assaults abroad than on their home territories; the PLO, for example, were more active in Europe than on the West Bank, and sometimes more active in Europe than many European groups themselves were! Different national groups cooperated in attacks, i.e. the Munich Olympics massacre (1972), the kidnapping of OPEC ministers (1975) and hijacking Air France flight (Tel-Aviv-Paris) and taking it to Uganda (1976) and a Lufthansa flight (Majorca to Frankfurt) and taking it to Somalia (1977).

On their own soil, groups often chose targets with international significance. Strikes on foreign embassies began when the PLO attacked the Saudi Embassy in Khartoum (1973). The Peruvian group Tupac Amaru, partly to gain political advantage over its rival Sendero Luminoso (The Shining Path) held 72 hostages in the Japanese Embassy for more than four months (1996-7) until a rescue operation killed every terrorist in the complex.

One people became a favorite target of most groups. One third of the international attacks involved American targets, a pattern reflecting the United States' new importance.

American targets were visible in Latin America, Europe, and the Middle East, where the U.S. supported most governments under terrorist siege.⁵⁷

Despite its pre-eminent status as a victim, Cold War concerns led the U.S. sometimes to ignore its stated distaste for terror. In Nicaragua, Angola, and elsewhere the U.S. supported terrorist activity, an indication of how difficult it was to forgo a purpose deemed worthwhile even when deplorable tactics had to be used.

Third wave organizations discovered that they paid a large price for not being able to negotiate between the conflicting demands imposed by various international elements.⁵⁸ The commitment to a revolutionary ethos alienated domestic and foreign liberal elements, particularly during the Cold War. The IRA forfeited significant Irish-American diaspora support during the third wave. Its initial goal during the third wave was a united socialist Ireland and its willingness to accept support from Libya and the PLO created problems. Most of all, the Cold War had to end before the Irish diaspora and an American government showed sustained interest in the Irish issue again and assisted moves to resolve some conflict.

Involvement with foreign groups made some terrorist organizations neglect domestic constituencies. A leader of the 2nd of June, a German Anarchist body suggests that its obsession with the Palestinian cause induced it to attack a Jewish synagogue on the anniversary of Kristall Nacht; a date often considered the beginning of the Holocaust. Such "stupidity" he says alienated potential German constituencies.⁵⁹ When the power of the cooperating terrorist entities was very unequal, the weaker found that its interest did not count. Thus, the German Revolutionary Cells, hijacking partners of the Palestine Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), could not get help from their partners to release German prisoners. "(D)ependent on the will of Wadi Haddad and his group," whose agenda was very different than theirs after all, the Revolutionary Cells terminated the relationship and soon collapsed.⁶⁰

The PLO, always a loose confederation, often found international ties expensive because they complicated serious existing divisions within the organization. In the 1970s, Abu Iyad, PLO founding member and intelligence chief, wrote that the Palestinian cause was so important in Syrian and Iraqi domestic politics that those states felt it necessary to capture organizations within the PLO to serve their own ends. That made it even more difficult to settle for a limited goal, as the Irgun and EOKA had done earlier.

Entanglements with Arab states created problems for both parties. Raids from Egyptian occupied Gaza helped precipitate a disastrous war with Israel (1956), and the fidayeen were prohibited from launching raids from that territory ever again. A Palestinian raid from Syria brought Syria into the Six-Day War, and ever afterwards Syria kept a tight control on those operating from its territories. When a PLO faction hijacked British and American planes to Jordan (1970) in the first effort to target non-Israelis, the Jordanian army devastated the PLO, which then lost its home. Finally, an attempted assassination of an Israeli diplomat in Britain sparked the 1982 invasion of Lebanon forcing the PLO to leave the

home that gave it so much significance among foreign terrorist groups. (Ironically, the assassination attempt was organized by Abu Nidal's renegade faction associated with Iraq, which had made two previous attempts to assassinate the PLO's leader Arafat!) Afterwards Tunisia (the PLO's new host) prohibited the PLO from training foreign groups and to a large extent the PLO's career as an effective terrorist organization seemed to be over. Paradoxically, the Oslo Accords demonstrated that the PLO could achieve more of its objectives when it seemed less dangerous.⁶¹

The activities of an independent terrorist group like the PLO operating from the territories of a state could easily generate war conditions, to maintain control over their own destiny states began to exercise tight control over foreign groups. The term used to describe the practice was "state sponsorship". (The practice was known in the first wave but abandoned in the second); and once more the sponsors found the practice costly. In the 1980s, Britain severed diplomatic relations with Libya and Syria for sponsoring terrorism on British soil, and France broke with Iran when it refused to let the French interrogate its embassy staff about assassinations of Iranian émigrés. Iraq's surprising restraint during the 1990 Gulf War highlighted the weakness of state sponsored terror. Iraq did threaten to use terror, a threat that induced Western authorities to predict that terrorists would flood Europe.⁶² If terror had materialized, however, it would have made bringing Saddam Hussein to trial for crimes a war aim, and the desire to avoid that result is the most plausible explanation for the Iraqi dictator's uncharacteristic restraint.

The third wave began to ebb in the 1980s. Revolutionary terrorists were defeated in one country after another. Israel's invasion of Lebanon (1982) eliminated PLO facilities to train terrorist groups, and international counter-terrorist cooperation became increasingly effective.

As in the first wave states cooperated openly and formally in counter terror efforts. The U.S. with British aid bombed Libya (1986) its role as a state sponsor, and the European Community imposed an arms embargo. The international cooperation of national police forces sought at (1904) began to materialize as Trevi was established in the 1970s and Europol in 1994. Differences between states remained; even close allies could not always cooperate. France refused to extradite PLO, Red Brigade, and ETA suspects to West Germany, Italy, and Spain respectively. Italy spurned American requests to extradite a Palestinian suspect in the seizure of the Achille Lauro cruise ship (1984), and Italy refused to extradite a Kurd (1988) because Italian law forbids capital punishment whereas Turkish law does not. The U.S. has refused to extradite some IRA suspects. Events of this sort will not stop until that improbable day when the laws and interests of separate states are identical.

The UN's role changed dramatically. Now "new states", former colonial territories, found terrorism threatened their interests and they particularly shunned nationalist movements. Major international and UN conventions from 1970 through 1999 made hijacking, hostage taking, attacks on senior government officials, "terrorist bombings" of a foreign

state's facilities, and financing of international activities crimes. A change of language is some indication of the changed attitude. "Freedom Fighter" was no longer a popular term in UN debates, and the term terrorism actually was used for the title of a document. i.e., "International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombing" 1977.⁶³ Evidence that Libya's agents were involved in the Pan Am Lockerbie crash produced a unanimous Security Council decision obliging Libya to extradite the suspects (1988), and a decade later when collective sanctions had their full effects Libya complied. In 2003 Libya paid compensation to the families of victims. (It should be noted that Libya was being pressured from another source. Nine years earlier in 1994 two German nationals were murdered on Libyan soil and there was an attempt to assassinate Col. Qaddafi. A Libyan religious group associated with Bin Laden was responsible for both acts, and Libya was the first state in the world to issue a warrant for his arrest.)⁶⁴

Yet very serious ambiguities and conflicts remain and the absence of an agreement of a UN definition reflects that ever-present fact that terror serves different ends and some of those ends are prized. Ironically, the most important concerned the third wave's major organization the PLO. It received an official UN status and was given diplomatic recognition by more than a hundred states. The explicit reason was that in 1974 the Arab League finally decided that the PLO (and not Jordan or Egypt) was entitled to receive a share of the Palestine Mandate, a share understood destined ultimately to be the territory for a sovereign state.

The Fourth Wave: How Unique and How Long?

As its predecessor began to ebb, the "religious wave" gathered force. Religious elements have always been important in modern terror because religious and ethnic identities often overlap. The Armenian, Macedonian, Irish, Cypriot, French Canadian, Israeli, and Palestinian struggles illustrate the point.⁶⁵ In these cases, the aim however, was to create secular states.

Today, religion has a vastly different significance, supplying justifications and organizing principles for a state. The religious wave has produced an occasional secular group, a reaction to excessive religious zeal. Buddhists in Sri Lanka tried to transform the country, and a terrorist response among the largely Hindu Tamils aims at creating a separate secular state.

Islam is at the heart of the wave. Islamic groups have conducted the most significant deadly and profoundly international attacks. Equally significant, the political events providing the hope for the fourth wave originated in Islam, and the successes achieved apparently influenced religious terror groups elsewhere.⁶⁶ Although there is no direct evidence for the last connection, the chronology is suggestive. After Islam erupted, Sikhs sought a religious state in the Punjab. Jewish terrorists attempted to blow up Islam's most sacred shrine in Jerusalem, and waged an assassination campaign against Palestinian mayors. One Jew mur-

dered twenty-nine Muslim worshippers in Abraham's tomb (Hebron, 1994), and another assassinated Israeli Prime Minister Rabin (1995). Aum Shinrikyo, a group that combined Buddhist, Hindu, and Christian themes, released nerve gas on the Tokyo subway (1995) killing 12 and seriously injuring 40, creating a worldwide anxiety that various groups would soon use chemo-bio weapons too.

Christian terrorism, based on racist interpretations of the Bible, emerged in the amorphous American "Christian Identity" movement. In true medieval millenarian fashion, armed rural communes composed of families withdrew from the state to wait for the Second Coming and the great racial war. Although some observers have associated "Identity" with the Oklahoma City bombing (1995), the Christian level of violence has still been minimal—so far.

Three events in the Islamic world provided the hope or dramatic political turning point that was vital to launch the fourth wave. 1979 was the significant date. In that year the Iranian Revolution occurred, a new Islamic century began, and the Soviets made an unprovoked invasion of Afghanistan.

Iranian street demonstrations disintegrated the Shah's secular state. The event also was clear evidence to believers that religion now had more political appeal than did the prevailing third wave ethos, because Iranian Marxists could only muster meager support against the Shah. "There are no frontiers in Islam" Ayatollah Khomeini proclaimed, and "his" revolution reshaped relationships among all Muslims as well as between Islam and the rest of the world. Most immediately, the Iranians inspired and assisted Shiite terror movements outside of Iran, i.e., Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Lebanon. In Lebanon Shiites (influenced by the self-martyrdom tactic of the medieval Assassins) introduced suicide bombing with surprising results, ousting American and other foreign troops who had entered the country on a peace mission after the 1982 Israeli invasion.

The monumental Iranian Revolution was unexpected, but some Muslims had always believed that the year would be very significant because a new Islamic century began then. One venerable Islamic tradition is that a redeemer would come when a new century started, an expectation that had regularly sparked uprisings at the turn of Muslim centuries earlier.⁶⁷ Several hundred Muslims stormed the Grand Mosque in Mecca in the first minutes of the new century in 1979, and it took several weeks to dislodge them occasioning many casualties. Whatever the specific local causes, it is striking that so many examples of Sunni terrorism appeared at the same time in Egypt, Syria, Tunisia, Morocco, Algeria, the Philippines, and Indonesia.

The Soviet invaded Afghanistan in 1979. Resistance, strengthened by volunteers from all over the Sunni world subsidized by U.S. aid, forced the Soviets out by 1989—a crucial step in the stunning and unimaginable disintegration of the Soviet Union itself. Religion had eliminated a secular super-power, an astonishing event with important consequences for terrorist activity.⁶⁸ The third wave received a decisive blow. Lands with large Muslim popula-

tion formerly part of the Soviet Union, (i.e., Chechnya, Uzbekistan, Kirgizstan, Tajikistan, Azerbaijan, etc.) became important new fields for Islamic rebels. Conflict in Bosnia attracted Islamic forces from the outside. Kashmir again became a critical issue and the death toll since 1990 has been more than 50,000.⁶⁹ Trained and confident Afghan veterans were major participants in both the new and on-going conflicts.

"Suicide bombing", reminiscent of Anarchist bomb-throwing efforts, was the most deadly tactical innovation. Despite the conventional wisdom that only a vision of rewards in Paradise could inspire such acts, the secular Tamil Tigers were so impressed by the achievement in Lebanon that they used the tactic in Sri Lanka to give their movement new life. From 1983 to 2000 they used "suicide bombers" more than all Islamic groups put together, using women often, a very unusual event in the fourth wave.⁷⁰ Partly to enhance their political leverage at home, Palestinian religious elements began to use "suicide bombing", compelling secular PLO elements to emulate them.

The fourth wave has displayed other distinctive international features. The number of terrorist groups declined dramatically. About 200 were active in the 80s but in the next decade the number fell to 40.⁷¹ The trend appears to be related to the sizes of the primary audiences (nation vs. religion). A major religious community such as Islam is much larger than any national group. Different cultural traditions also may be relevant. The huge number of secular terrorist groups came largely from Christian countries; and the Christian tradition always generates many more religious divisions than the Islamic tradition has.⁷²

Islamic groups are more durable than their third wave predecessors; the major groups in Lebanon, Egypt and Algeria have persisted for some two decades and are still functioning.⁷³ These groups are large organizations and Bin Laden's Al-Qaeda was the largest, containing 5,000 members perhaps with cells operating in 72 countries.⁷⁴ Larger terrorist groups earlier usually have nationalist aims with a few hundred active members and a few thousand available for recruitment. The PLO was a special case at least in Lebanon where it had around 25,000 members and was trying to transform itself into a regular army. Likewise, most al-Qaeda recruits served with the Taliban in the Afghan civil war.

The American role changed too. Iran called America the "Great Satan." Al Qaeda regarded America as its chief antagonist immediately after the Soviet Union was defeated, a fact not widely appreciated until 9/11.⁷⁵ From the beginning, Islamic religious groups sought to destroy their American targets usually military or civilian installations, an unknown pattern in the third wave. The aim was U.S. military withdrawal. U.S. troops were driven out of Lebanon and forced to abandon a humanitarian mission in Somalia. Attacks on military posts in Yemen and Saudi Arabia occurred. The U.S.S. Cole (2000) experienced the first terrorist strike against a military vessel ever. The attacks on the military in the Arabian Peninsula and Africa drew military responses and the Americans did not withdraw. After the strikes against American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania (1998) inflicted heavy casualties, futile cruise missile attacks were made against al Qaeda targets, the first time missiles were

used against a group rather than a state. In Peter Bergen's words, "The attacks had a major unintended consequence: they turned Bin Laden from a marginal figure in the Muslim world to a global celebrity".⁷⁶ Strikes on American soil began in 1993 with a partially successful effort on the World Trade Center. A mission to strike on the millennial celebration night seven years later was aborted.⁷⁷ And then there was 9/11.

Al Qaeda was responsible for attacks in Arabian Peninsula, Africa and the American homeland. Its initial object was to force evacuation of military bases in Saudi Arabia, the land containing Islam's two holiest sites. The Prophet Muhammad had said that only one religion should be in the land, and Saudi Arabia became a land where Christians and Jews could reside only for temporary periods.⁷⁸ Al Qaeda's aim resonates in the Sunni world and is reflected in its unique recruiting pattern. Most volunteers come from Arab states, especially Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Algeria, and the Afghan training camps received Sunnis from at least sixty countries Muslim and non-Muslim. Every previous terrorist organization, including Islamic groups, drew its recruits from a single national base. The contrast between PLO and al-Qaeda training facilities reflects this fact; the former trained units from other organizations and the latter received individuals only.

Beyond the evacuation of bases in Islam's Holy Land, Al-Qaeda later developed another objective a single Islamic state under the Sharia. Bin Laden gave vigorous support to active Islamic groups in various states of the Sunni world, states that many Muslims understand as residues of collapsed colonial influence. The U.S. refused to leave Saudi Arabia, and helped the states attacked. Could 9/11 be understood as a desperate attempt to rejuvenate a failing cause, by triggering indiscriminate reactions?⁷⁹

The response to 9/11 was as unprecedented as the attack itself was. Under UN auspices, more than 100 states (including Iran) joined the attack on Afghanistan in various ways. Still, no one involved expected the intervention to be so quick and decisive. Afghanistan had always been difficult for invaders. Moreover, terrorist history demonstrates that even when anti-terrorist forces were very familiar with territories containing terrorists (this time they were not) entrenched terrorists had considerable staying power, i.e., Cyprus, Algeria, Northern Ireland, and Sri Lanka.

Why did al-Qaeda collapse so quickly in Afghanistan? There are many reasons. It violated a cardinal rule for terrorist organizations, which is to remain underground always. Al Qaeda stayed visible to operate its extensive training operations,⁸⁰ and as the Israelis demonstrated in ousting the PLO from Lebanon, visible groups are vulnerable ones. Also Al Qaeda and the PLO were foreign elements in lands uncomfortable with their presence. Moreover, al Qaeda and the PLO were foreign elements in lands that resisted their presence. Finally al-Qaeda did not plan for an invasion possibility. The reason is not clear, but there is evidence that its contempt for previous American reactions convinced it that the "paper tiger" would avoid difficult targets and not go to Afghanistan.⁸¹

The PLO regrouped in Tunisia, on condition that it would abandon its extensive training mission. Could al Qaeda could accept such limits; and if it did would any state risk playing Tunisia's role? Pakistan's revolving door policy suggests a much more likely reaction. Once al Qaeda's principal supporter, Pakistan switched under U.S. pressure to give the Coalition indispensable aid.

As of this writing, the world does not know what happened to al-Qaeda's leadership, but even if the portion left can be re-assembled, how can the organization function without a protected sanctuary? Al Zawahiri, Bin Laden's likely successor, warned his comrades before the Afghan training grounds were lost that "the victory... against the international alliance will not be accomplished without acquiring a... base in the heart of the Islamic world,"⁸² a point emphasized by Peter Bergen's admirable study.⁸³

The disruption of al Qaeda in Afghanistan has altered the organization's previous routine. Typically sleeper cells remained inactive until the moment to strike materialized, a moment normally designated by the senior leadership. Operations were planned from above and then rehearsed several times back in Afghanistan. The process both increased the probability of success against difficult or "hard" targets and lengthened the time necessary between strikes. A precondition was having sleeper cells inactive until the moment to strike materialized. It was an unusual pattern in terrorist history. Normally, cells are active and, therefore, need more autonomy so that police penetration in one cell does not go beyond that unit. "Normal" cells have more freedom to strike and they generally do so more quickly and frequently. But the numbers and resources available to a cell constantly in motion limit it to softer or less protected targets. If the supervision from the top can no longer be a feature of al Qaeda, the striking patterns will necessarily become more "normal". Since the Afghan rout, strikes have been against "softer" or largely unprotected civilian targets. As the destruction of tourist sites (i.e. the ancient synagogue in Tunisia and the resort club in Indonesia 2002) suggests, however, the organization displays its trademark by maximizing casualties.

Concluding Thoughts and Questions

Unlike crime or poverty, international terrorism is a recent phenomenon. Its continuing presence for 125 years, however, means that it is rooted in important features of our world. We discussed the relevance of technology and doctrine. The latter reflects a modern inclination to rationalize activity or make it efficient, which Max Weber declared a distinctive feature of modern life. A third and only briefly noted factor is the spread of democratic ideas, which shapes terrorist activity in different ways and suggested by the fact that nationalism or separatism is the most frequently espoused cause.⁸⁴ To explain that, one must remember that the principle democracy is based on a conception of "the people" principle that cannot be made permanently clear, one produced by the French Revolution which also first conceptualized the idea and vocabulary of terror as well.

The failure of a democratic reform program inspired the first wave, and the main theme of second was national self-determination. A dominant, however confused, third wave theme was that existing systems were not truly democratic. The spirit of the fourth wave appears explicitly anti-democratic, because the democratic idea is inconceivable without a significant measure of secularism.

For many reasons, terrorist organizations often have short lives; sometimes their future is determined by devastating tactical mistakes. A decision to become visible is rare in the history of terror, and the quick success of the Coalition's Afghan military campaign shows us why. If Al Qaeda successfully reconstructs itself, it may discover that it must become an "ordinary" terrorist group living underground among a friendly local population. That suggests, but alas does not demonstrate, that its strikes will become more "ordinary" too.

No matter what happens to Al Qaeda, this wave will continue but how long will it last? The life cycle of its predecessors may mislead us. Each was inspired by a secular cause, and a striking characteristic of religious communities is how durable some are. Thus, the fourth wave may last longer than its predecessors did, but the course of the Iranian Revolution suggests something else. If history repeats itself, the fourth wave will be over in two decades. But, alas, that history also demonstrates that the world of politics always throws up large issues to stimulate terrorists who regularly invent new ways to deal with them. What makes the pattern so interesting and frightening is that the issues emerge unexpectedly, or at least no one has been able to anticipate their tragic course.

The Coalition assembled after 9/11 was extraordinary for several reasons. 9/11 was not only an American catastrophe, but the World Trade Center housed numerous large foreign groups, and there were many foreign casualties. The UN involvement climaxed a transformation; it is hard to see it as the same organization that regularly referred to terrorists as freedom fighters 40 years ago.

The only other Coalition against terrorism was initiated a century ago. It aimed to make waves impossible by disrupting vital communication and migration conditions. Much less was expected from its participants, but it still fell apart in a decade (1914).⁸⁵ Will ours last longer? 9/11 will not be forgotten easily⁸⁶, and our effort is focused on an organization, a much easier focus to sustain. If al Qaeda collapses will its special vision survive? Can such an extraordinary organization be reproduced easily?

When the present campaign against al-Qaeda and the small groups in Asia loosely associated with it concludes, what happens next? No organization has been identified as the next target, and until that happens one suspects that the perennial inclination for different states to distinguish groups according to the ends sought rather than the means used may reappear. Kashmir and Palestine are the two most important active scenes for terrorist activity now. In Kashmir, Islamic insurgents are seriously dividing two important members of the Coalition. India considers them terrorists, but Pakistan does not. War between those states, both possessing nuclear weapons, will push the Coalition's war against terror aside.

Successful outside mediation may produce a similar result, because that would require some acceptance of the insurgents' legitimacy. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict has a similar meaning; so many important states understand the issue of terror there differently.

Islam fuels terrorist activity in Kashmir, but the issue is a local one as it is in Palestine where religious elements are less significant. To what extent are other organizations in the 4th wave local too? How deeply can the Coalition afford to get involved in situations where it will be serving the interests of local governments? Our experience supporting governments dealing with "local" terrorists has not always served our interests well especially in the Islamic world.

When the war against terror began, governments aiding terrorists were warned that they would share the fate of those they helped. In the Afghanistan context, that meant one thing. But the warning now seems to mean something very different, and is much more troubling. Initially, an "evil axis" was identified of governments that "might" aid terrorists and should therefore be struck before "their" terrorists struck us. Those governments (North Korea, Iran, and Iraq) have weapons of mass destruction, weapons we believe terrorists want. Each aided terrorists earlier, and more recently Iraq and Iran aided Palestinian terrorists. Iraq is the focus now, but the argument for attacking it because it might help terrorists has convinced few allies and potential supporters; and if an attack becomes the second phase of the campaign, will the Coalition survive?

The efforts of Aum Shinrikyo to use weapons of mass destruction has made American officials feel that the most important lesson of this wave is that those weapons will be used by terrorists against us.⁸⁷ 9/11 intensified this anxiety even though that catastrophe was produced by "suicide-bombers" armed with box cutters, and the history of terrorism demonstrates that cheap, easy to produce, and simple to use weapons have always been the most attractive.

The fourth wave's most distinctive weapon is the "suicide bomber". The victory in Lebanon was impressive, and the tool that made it possible has been enormously destructive in Sri Lanka and Israel as well. Driving foreign troops out of a country, however, is one thing, compelling a people to give a portion of its own country (Sri Lanka) or leave its own land (Israel) and the supporters of the "suicide bombers" in both cases seem to be suffering much more than their enemies are.

How does 9/11 effect our understanding about foreign threats, a serious question, which needs more discussion than it has received? Nechaev stressed that the fear and rage rebel terror produced undermined a society's essential moral conventions or ways of thinking. He was thinking of the domestic context, and indeed the history of terror shows that domestic responses are very often indiscriminate and self-destructive.⁸⁸ Can the same theme be observed on the international scene?

The recent invasion of Iraq suggests that Nechaev's observation is apt for international politics too. The justifications were that Iraq might give terrorists weapons of most destruc-

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tion and/or use them itself against the U.S., considerations applicable to a variety of stases as the odd term 'axis of evil' suggests. The deterrence doctrine, which served us well for fifty years, was scrapped. Preemption was deemed to fit the new age better. Deterrence worked because states knew that they were visible and would be destroyed if they used the dreaded weapons. Underground terrorist groups do not have this vulnerability, which is why preemption has always been an important part of police strategy since the first wave. Deterrence is linked to actions, while preemption is more suitable when assessing intentions are the crucial issue, a task shrouded in grave ambiguities. But is there any reason to think the crucial distinction between states and terrorist groups has disappeared, and that we should put war and peace decisions largely in the hands of very imperfect intelligence agencies?

The significance of the invasion of Iraq for the war against terrorism is still unclear. The Coalition's cohesion has been weakened and the flagging fortunes of Islamic groups could be revived. Both possibilities are more likely if preemption is employed against another state and/or if the Iraq victory is understood ultimately as an occupation.

Notes

- 1 An earlier version of this essay was published in Current History. (Dec 2001) 419-25. Another version was delivered at the annual John Barlow Lecture, University of Indiana, Indianapolis. I am indebted to Jim Ludes, Lindsay Clutterbuck, Laura Donohue, Clark McCauley, Barbara Rapoport, and Sara Grdan for useful comments, even those I did not take. The problems in the essay are my responsibility.
2. On September 20, the President told Congress that "any nation that continues to harbor or support terrorism will be regarded as a hostile regime. (T)he war would not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped, and defeated." (My emphasis).
- 3 See Richard B. Jensen, "The United States, International Policing, and the War against Anarchist Terrorism", Terrorism and Political Violence (Hereafter TPV) 13:1, (Spring 2001) 5-46.
- 4 No good history of terrorism exists. Schmid and Jongman's monumental study of the terrorism literature does not even list a history of the subject! See Political Terrorism: A New Guide to Actors, Authors, Concepts, Theories, DataBases, and Literature, Revised Ed. (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1988).
- 5 The unusual character of terrorist activity made an enormous impact on national life in many countries beginning in the latter part of the 19th century. Every state affected in the first wave radically transformed its police organizations, as tools to penetrate underground groups The Russian Okhrana, the British Special Branch, and the FBI are conspicuous examples. The new organizational form remains a permanent, perhaps indispensable, feature of modern life. Terrorist tactics, inter alia, aim at producing rage and frustration, often driving governments to respond in unanticipated, extraordinary, illegal, socially destructive ways and shameful ways. Because a significant Jewish element, for example, was present in the several Russian terrorist movements, the Okhrana organized pogroms to intimidate Russian Jews, compelling

many to flee to the West and to the Holy Land. Okhrana fabricated The Protocols of Zion, a book that helped stimulate a virulent anti-Semitism that went well beyond Russia. The influence of that fabrication continued for decades, and still influences Christian and Islamic terrorist movements today

Democratic states "over-reacted" too. President Theodore Roosevelt (1901) proposed sending all Anarchists back to Europe. Congress was more restrained and simply barred foreign anarchists from entering the country. More than a decade later President Wilson's Attorney-General Palmer implemented a proposal similar to Roosevelt's and rounded up all Anarchists to ship them back "home", regardless of whether they had committed crimes. That event produced the 1920 Wall Street Bombing, which in turn became the justification for an immigration quota law making it much more difficult for persons from Southern and Eastern European states (the original home of most Anarchists) to immigrate for decades, a law Adolph Hitler praised highly.

It is still too early to know what the domestic consequences of 9/11 will be. The very first reactions suggested that we had learned from past mistakes. The federal government made special efforts to show that we were not at war with Islam, and it curbed the first expressions of vigilante passions. The significance of subsequent measures seems more problematic. Our first experience with terror led us to create important new policing arrangements. Congress established a Department of Homeland Security with 170,000 employees, clearly the largest change in security policy in our history. No one knows what that seismic change means. One casualty could be the Posse Comitatus law, which prohibits the military forces from administering civil affairs, a law that ironically was passed because we were unhappy with military responses to KKK terrorist activity after the Civil War! A policy of secret detentions, a common reaction to serious terrorist activities in many countries has been implemented. Extensive revisions of immigration regulations are being instituted. Prisoners taken in Afghanistan are not being prosecuted under the criminal law, reversing a long-standing policy in virtually all states including our own. Previous experiences suggest that it will take time for the changes to have their effect because so much depends upon the scope, frequency, and duration of future terrorist activity.

- 6 David M. Chalmers, Hooded Americanism: The History of the Ku Klux Klan 3rd Edition (Durham: Duke University Press, 1987) p. 19.
- 7 The activities of the Thugs and Assassins had international dimensions but were confined to specific regions; more important there were no comparable groups operating at the same time in this region or elsewhere. See my "Fear and Trembling" Terror in Three Religious Tradition" American Political Science Review (78:3) 1984 658-77.
- 8 The lineage of rebel terror is very ancient going back at least to the first century. Hinduism, Judaism and Islam produce the Thugs, Zealots, and Assassins respectively; names still used to designate terrorist. Religion determined every purpose and each tactic of this ancient form. See Rapoport "Fear and Trembling" (note 7).
- 9 By far most published academic articles on terrorism deal with organizations and counter-terrorism. Judged by my experience as an editor of TPV, the proportions are increased further in this direction if we consider the articles submitted for publication too.
- 10 See note 2

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- 11 The rebels fought in uniform and against soldiers. George Barnard Shaw said "My own view is that the men who were shot in cold blood...after their capture were prisoners of war ". Prime Minister Asquith said that by Britain's own standards, the rebel's were honorable, that "they conducted themselves with great humanity...fought very bravely and did not resort to outrage" The Manchester Guardian declared that the executions were "atrocities". See my Introduction to Part III of Morality of Terrorism Eds. with Yonah Alexander 2nd. Ed. (New York: Columbia University. Press) 219-27.
- 12 Guerrillas carry weapons openly and wear an identifying emblem, circumstances that oblige a state to treat them as soldiers.
- 13 Any one who has tried to explain the intensity of the 60s experience to contemporary students knows how difficult it is to transmit a generation's experience.
- 14 David Ronfeldt and William Sater, "The Mindsets of High-Technology Terrorists: Future Implication From an Historical Analog" Rand Note:1981 Santa Monica " Dynamite could be deployed selectively...for the assassination of a precise individual or the partial demolition of a building. p.3
- 15 Nechaev's "Revolutionary Catechism" is reprinted in my Assassination and Terrorism (Toronto: CBC, 1971). See Michael Bakunin and Peter Kropotkin, Revolutionary Pamphlets (New York: 1927, Benjamin Bloom) Nicholas Mozorov, Terroristic Struggle (London: 1880) Serge Stepniak, Underground Russia: Revolutionary Profiles and Sketches from Life (New York: 1892).
- 16 See Rapoport "Fear and trembling... (Note 7).
- 17 It took time for this attitude to develop in Islam. If one compares Bin Laden's work with Faraj's Neglected Duty a work primarily written at the beginning of the fourth wave to justify the assassination of Egyptian President Sadat (1981) the two authors seem to be in two different worlds. Faraj cites NO experience outside the Islamic tradition, and his most recent historical reference is to Napoleon's invasion of Europe! See my "Sacred Terror: A Case from Contemporary Islam" in Walter Reich ed. Origins of Terrorism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1990) pp.103-130. I am grateful to Jerry Post for sharing his copy of the Bin Laden treatise. An edited version is on the Department of Justice website, [Http://www.U.S.DaJgove/ag/training_manuals.htm](http://www.U.S.DaJgove/ag/training_manuals.htm)
- 19 Bin Laden's dedication reads
"Pledge, O Sister
To the sister believer whose clothes the criminals have stripped off:
To the sister believer whose hair the oppressors have shaved.
To the sister believer whose body has been abused by the human dogs.
...
Covenant, O Sister...to make their women widows and their children orphans....".
- 19 I ignore right-wing groups because more often than not they are associated with government reactions and single issue" groups, i.e., the contemporary anti-abortion and green movements.
- 20 The term terror originally referred to actions of the Revolutionary government that went beyond the rules regulating punishment in order to "educate" a people to govern itself.

- 21 Vera Figner, the architect of Narodnaya Volya's foreign policy identifies the first four ingredients. The fifth was created later. For a more extensive discussion of Figner, see my "The International World as Some Terrorists Have Seen It: A Look at a Century of Memoirs" in my Inside Terrorist Organizations (London: Frank Cass, 2001) 2nd Ed. pp. 125 ff.
- 22 "Revolutionary Catechism" in my Assassination and Terrorism, (note 14).
- 23 An equivalent for this argument in religious millennial thought is that the world must become impossibly bad before it could become unimaginably good.
- 24 Adam B. Ulam, In the Name of the People (New York Viking Press, 1977) p. 269., (emphasis added)
- 25 Newspaper reports in Germany the next day interpreted the demonstrations to mean that a revolution was coming. New York Times April, 4, 1878
- 26 Stepniak, Underground Russia. (note 14) pp. 39-40.
- 27 The bomb seems to have been most significant in Russia, although other terrorist groups used it extensively too. The Irish "Skirmishers" of the 1880s were the only ones who confined themselves to the bomb but they also aimed to avoid casualties. See note 19.
- 28 A guerrilla force has political objectives, as any army does, but it aims to weaken or destroy the enemy's military forces first. The terrorist, on the other hand, strikes directly at the political sentiments that sustain the enemy.
- 29 Thomas Hobbes may have been the first to emphasize hope as a necessary ingredient of revolutionary efforts. The first chapter of Menachem Begin's account of his experience in the Irgun, contains the most moving description of the necessity of hope in terrorist literature. The Revolt: Story of the Irgun, (Jerusalem: 1997 Steinmatzky's Agency).
- 30 There were many organizations, i.e., the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization, Young Bosnia, and the Serbian Black Hand.
- 31 See Peter Heehs, Nationalism, Terrorism, and Communalism: Essays in Modern Indian History (Delhi, Oxford University Press, 1998) Chapter 2
- 32 The Japanese offer to finance Russian terrorists during the Russo-Japanese War (1905) encouraged Indian terrorists to believe that the Japanese would help them too. Heehs, (note 8) p. 4. The Russians turned the Japanese offer down fearing that knowledge of a transaction during a time of war would destroy their political credibility.
- 33 Italians were particularly active as international assassins, crossing borders to kill four heads of state or holders of principal political offices in different countries, i.e. the French President Carnot (1894), Spanish Premier Casnovas (1896), and the Austrian Empress Elizabeth 1898. In 1900 an Italian Anarchist Gaetano Bresci a member of the Anarchist community in Patterson New Jersey, the capital of Italian Anarchism in North America returned to Italy to assassinate King Umberto I. Several other attempts failed. The "war" of the Italian Anarchists against the U.S. is described by Nunzio Pernicone, "Luigi Galleani and Italian Anarchist Terrorism in the United States" Studi Emigrazione/Edtudes Migrations, 30, n 111, 1993 pp. 469-89. See also Lowell Blaisdell, "The Assassination of Humbert I" Prologue. The Quarterly of the National Archives (Fall, 1995) Vol. 27, No. 3 241-247. Thanks to Richard Jensen who supplied the Blaisdell reference.
- 34 Jensen, (note 3) p. 19.
- 35 The IRA's success in 1921 occurred when the British recognized the Irish State. Northern Ireland, however, remained British, and the civil war between Irish factions over the peace

settlement ended in a defeat for those wanting to continue until Northern Ireland joined the Irish State.

- 36 For an interesting useful account of the decolonialization process, see Robert Hager Jr. and David A. Lake "Balancing Empires: Competitive Decolonization in International Politics" *Security Studies* 9:3. (Spring 2000) 108-48. They emphasize that the literature on decolonization "has ignored how events and politics within the core (metropolitan area) shaped the process." p. 145.
- 37 Begin said that his decision was determined by the fact that if he pursued it, a civil war among Jews, would occur, indicating that most Jews favored partition. *The Revolt* (note 31) pp.
- 38 Alistair Horne, *A Savage War of Peace* (London: 1977) Macmillan. pp. 94-6
- 39 Begin, *The Revolt* (note 31) Chapters 9 and 10 .
- 40 For a more detailed discussion of the definition problem, see David C. Rapoport. "Politics of Atrocity" in *Terrorism Interdisciplinary Perspectives*. Eds. Yonah. Alexander and Seymore Finger (New York:1987, John Jay Press) pp. 46 ff.-
- 41 Alexander I of Yugoslavia (1934) was the most prominent victim, and historians believe that Hungary and Italy were involved in providing help for Balkan terrorists. Begin points out in *The Revolt* that it was too costly to assassinate prominent figures.
- 42 The strategy is superbly described in the film "Battle of Algiers" based on the memoirs of Yaacev Saadi who organized the battle. Attacks against the police occur whose responses are limited by rules governing criminal procedure. In desperation, the police set a bomb off in the Casbah inadvertently exploding an ammunition dump killing Algerian women and children. A mob emerges screaming for revenge, and at this point the FLN has the moral warrant to attack civilians.
- There is another underlying element which makes rebel terrorism often has special weight in a democratic world. The atrocities of the strong always seem worse than those of the weak because people believe the latter have no alternatives.
- 43 See note 12
- 44 See my "The International World..." (note 34).
- 45 Irish-Americans have always given Irish rebels extensive support. In fact, the Fenian movement was born in the American Civil War. Members attempted to invade Canada from the U.S. and then went to Ireland to spark rebellion there.
- 46 World War I of course increased the influence of the U.S., and Wilson justified the war with the self-determination principle.
- Martin David Dubin, "Great Britain and the Ant-Terrorist Conventions of 1937", *TPV* (V, Spring 1993 p.1
- See John Dugard, "International Terrorism and the Just War" in *The Morality of Terrorism* Ed: David C Rapoport and Y. Alexander (New York: Columbia University Press, 1989) pp. 77-98
- The Basque Nation and Liberty (ETA), the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA), the Corsican National Liberation Front (FNLC), and the IRA.
- During the periods of the first and third waves the rights of women were asserted more continuously in the general society.

- 51 Sean Anderson and Stephen Sloan, Historical Dictionary of Terrorism (Metuchen, NJ Transaction Press, 1995) p. 136.
- 52 Although bank robbing was not as significant as in the first wave, some striking examples materialized. In January 1976 the PLO together with their bitter enemies the Christian Phalange hired safe breakers to help them loot the vaults of the major banks in Beirut. Estimates range between \$50 and a \$100 million stolen. "Whatever the truth the robbery was large enough to earn a place in the Guinness Book of Records as the biggest bank robbery of all time." James Adams, The Financing of Terror (New York: 1986, Simon and Schuster) p.192.
- 53 Adams, (note 51) p. 94.
- 54 The attack on Major actually was an attack on the cabinet, so it is not clear whether or not the Prime Minister was the principal target, Lindsay Clutterbuck tells me in a personal note.
- 55 The status of political prisoner was revoked in March 1976. William Whitelaw who granted it in the first place ranked it as one of his "most regrettable decisions."
- 56 Anderson and Sloan, (note 50) p. 303.
- 57 Sometimes there was American support for terrorist activity, i.e. the Contras in Nicaragua.
- 58 When a disappointed office seeker assassinated President Garfield, Figner's sympathy letter to the American people said that there was no place for terror in democratic states. The statement alienated elements of her radical constituency in other countries.
- 59 Michael Baumann, Terror or Love (New York: 1977, Grove Press) p. 61.
- 60 Interview with Hans J. Klein in Jean M. Bourguereau, German Guerrilla: Terror, Rebel Reaction and Resistance (Sanday, Orkney, U.K Cienfuegos Press 1981) p. 31.
- 61 Abu Nidal was himself on a PLO list of persons to be assassinated.
- 62 W. Andrew Terrill, "Saddam's Failed Counterstrike: Terrorism and the Gulf War", Studies in Conflict and Terrorism XVI (1993) 219-232.
- 63 In addition to four UN conventions there are eight other major multi-lateral terrorism conventions starting with The Tokyo Convention of 1963 dealing with the aircraft safety. <http://usinfo.state.gov/topical/pol/terror/conven.htm> and <http://untreaty.un.org/English/Terrorism.asp>.
- 64 Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda (note) pp. 142-3.
- 65 Khachig Tololyan, "Cultural Narrative and the Motivation of the Terrorist" in my Inside Terrorist Organizations, 2nd London: 2002, Frank Cass) pp. 217-33.
- 66 See David C. Rapoport, "Comparing Militant Fundamentalist Movements and Groups" in Martin Marty and Scott Appleby, Eds. Fundamentalisms and the State (Chicago: 1993, University of Chicago Press) pp.429-461.
- 67 To those in the West the most familiar was the 19th century uprising in the Sudan, which resulted in the murder of legendary British General "Chinese" Gordon.
- 68 This was not the first time secular forces would help launch the careers of those who would become religious terrorists. Israel helped Hamas to get started, thinking that it would compete to weaken the PLO. To check left-wing opposition, President Sadat released religious elements from prison who later assassinated him.
- 69 Peter Bergen Holy War Inc. Inside the Secret World of Osama Bin Ladin (New York: 2001. Free Press, p. 208


- 70 In the period specified, Tamils suicide bombers struck 171 times and the combined total for all 13 Islamic groups using the tactic was 117. Ehud Sprinzak cites the figures compiled by Yoram Schweitzer in "Rational Fanatics" Foreign Policy, Oct. p.69 2001. The most spectacular Tamil act was the assassination of Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Ghandi. (Religion did not motivate the notorious Kamikaze attacks during World War II either.) The example of the Tamils has other unusual characteristics. Efforts to make Sri Lanka a Buddhist state stimulated the revolt. Although Tamils largely come from India, there are several religious traditions represented in the population, and religion does not define the terrorists' purpose.
- 71 See Ami Pedahzur, William Eubank, and Leonard Weinberg, "The War on terrorism and the Decline of Terrorist Group Formation" TPV, (14:3) Fall 2002, 141-147.
- 72 The relationship between different religious terror groups is unusual. Groups from different mainstream traditions (i.e. Christianity, Islam, etc) do not cooperate. Even traditional cleavages within a religion- as in Shiite and Sunni Islam, for example, sometimes are intensified. Shiite terror groups generally take their lead from Iran regarding aid to Sunnis. Iran has helped the Palestinians and hostile to al-Qaeda and the Saudi religious state.
- 73 I have no statistical evidence on this point.
- 74 Rohan Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror, (New York: 2002) p. 97
- 75 The stated object of al Qaeda is to recreate a single Muslim state, and one could argue that if the US had withdrawn military units from the Muslim world, the attacks would have ceased. What if the issue was really the impact of American secular culture on the world?
- 76 Bergen, (note 66) p. 225
- 77 Those attacks, as well as the expected ones that did not materialize, are discussed in a special volume of TPV (14:1) Spring 2002 edited by Jeffrey Kaplan entitled Millennial Violence: Past, Present, and Future. The issue was also published as a separate volume with the same title by Frank Cass, London, 2002.
- 78 Bernard Lewis, "License to Kill, Foreign Affairs, November/December 1998
- 79 For a very interesting discussion of the circumstances which provoke American military responses to terrorist attacks, see Michelle Mavesti, "Explaining the United States' Decision to Strike Back at Terrorists" TPV, 13,2 (Summer, 2001) 85-106.
- 80 If the organization understood its vulnerability, it might have thought that an attack on the sovereignty of the state protecting it was unlikely. One reason the Taliban government refused a repeated UN demand to expel Al Qaeda because without al Qaeda support it could not survive local domestic opposition. Since most al Qaeda recruits served in the Taliban forces in the on-going civil war, the Taliban must have felt that it had no choice. Clearly there was no plan for an invasion possibility; the failure to resist is astonishing otherwise. Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda: (note 71)
- Quoted by Nimrod Raphaeli, "Ayman Muhammad Rabi Al-Zawahri: The Making of an Arch-Terrorist", TPV 14:4 (Winter 2002) 1-22.
- Bergen (note 66) p. 234
- We lack a systematic comparison of the aims sought by organizations in the history of modern terror.
- Austria-Hungary, Germany, and states they had diplomatic relations with in World War I continued the police cooperation.

- 86 9/11 has had an impact on at least one terrorist group The Tamils found diaspora financial support suddenly disappearing for suicide bombing, an opportunity the Norwegians seized to bring them to the bargaining table again.
- 87 See David C. Rapoport, "Terrorism and Weapons of the Apocalypse" National Security Studies Quarterly V, 3 (Summer 99) 49-69 reprinted in Sokolski, Henry and James Ludes, Twenty-First Century Weapons Proliferation (London: 2001 Frank Cass) pp.14-33.
- 88 See (note 5)

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Chapter 2

Understanding Islam and Islamism



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The Jihadi Movement (*al-haraka al-jihadiyya*) is an informal network of Sunni Muslims who want to overthrow secular states and replace them with Islamic theocracies. Since it is primarily a religious movement, it is incomprehensible without some knowledge of the history of Islam. Its participants are products of this history; they draw on it for religious inspiration and strategic guidance, and they employ it to win supporters and frame their violent struggle with secularism. Their fondness for comparing the past and present is not mere propaganda. For the Jihadis, the past—especially the life of Muhammad—is programmatic and provides a template for how to establish a religious political order. As we shall see, there is some truth in this perspective, although the current of Islamic history Jihadis focus on says as much about them as it does about Islamic history.

When Muhammad was born in Arabia at the end of the sixth century A.D., there were two superpowers in the Middle East: the Byzantine Empire and the Sassanian Empire. The Byzantine Empire was the eastern remnant of the Roman Empire; its western counterpart had long since collapsed. To the east was the Sassanian Empire, a Persian empire that covered much of today's Iran and Iraq. The Byzantine Empire was largely Christian; there were also many Christians in the Sassanian Empire, but it was ruled by Zoroastrians, adherents of an ancient religion that had its roots in India. The imperial ambitions of these two empires meant that they were often at war with each other.

South of these two superpowers was a large peninsula. Most of this peninsula was desert and could not support large-scale farming. As a result, its inhabitants, called Arabs, were not able to grow the food necessary to establish cities and to support a king and professional armies. Instead, they were spread out and clustered into small groups of families.

With no king to make laws and enforce them through an army, the Arabs lived according to local custom and a code of honor enforced by family members. The law of the land was "an eye for an eye" and every man was an enforcer. In a society based on kinship ties, the larger your family, the more justice you could exact:

When fighting comes, your kinsman alone is near;
your true friend your kinsman is,
who answers your call for aid with good will,
when deeply drenched in bloodshed are sword and spear.⁹⁸

Thus, many families often allied themselves with other kin to form clans and these clans would join to form massive tribes. If a man killed his cousin, the slain man's family would unite to seek his death or compensation. If a man killed someone in another clan of his same tribe, that clan would unite to seek his death or compensation. And if a man killed someone from another tribe, that tribe would mobilize to kill him or exact compensation. Once justice was done, the killer's family might then retaliate, renewing the cycle of revenge.

Before fighting, tribe members prayed to their local god to bring them victory. Members of other tribes would pray to their own god. Thus, religion in Arabian society reflected the social order: a multitude of gods represented a multitude of extended families. Arabs did believe there was one high god, whom they called al-ilah (lit. "the God"—commonly contracted to Allah). But unlike the Jewish and Christian tribes in Arabia who called God by the same Arabic name, they believed there were many other gods as well.

Although Arabs were divided by religion and a bewildering network of family obligations, they were united by a common tongue, Arabic. Arabic was a spoken, not a written language, and Arabs took great pride in their mastery of its intricacies. They particularly savored Arabic poems and poets of rival tribes would sometimes meet to insult each other in verse.

Arabs were also united by trade. Although they were spread out over great distances, Arabs would travel on camel or horse to congregate at trade fairs for exchanging goods and poetic insults. Some of this trade even extended into Syria in the north and Yemen in the south, where there was a better climate, and thus more agriculture and settled populations. Arabs would also raid cities to obtain resources.

Another agricultural region that attracted trade was the Hijaz, or western Arabia. Although its climate was not as good as that of Yemen, it could support semi-settled populations; thus its inhabitants were more urbane and looked down on the desert no-mads. Also like Yemen, the Hijaz was home to several Jewish tribes (either descended from Palestinian Jews or Arab converts) and Arab Christian tribes.

Although the traditional story of Islam's origins recognizes the existence of these monotheist tribes, it portrays most of the Hijaz's inhabitants as polytheists (people who believe in more than one god). Some modern scholars have convincingly argued that this was not the case; rather, many of the so-called Arab polytheists of this region were probably monotheists of some sort. But we will confine ourselves to the traditional account since that is what Muslims are familiar with and what matters to the Jihadis.

According to the traditional account, the tribes of the Hijaz and surrounding regions deposited their idols in a square temple called the Ka'ba, located in the village of Mecca. Every year they would come on pilgrimage to worship at the temple and then take the opportunity to engage in commerce. Thus, whoever controlled the temple controlled the revenues from the pilgrimage trade. When Muhammad was born, the powerful tribe that controlled the temple was the Quraysh.

The traditional story of Muhammad's life relates that he was born in 570 AD into the Quraysh tribe. However, his early life was not one of privilege: his parents belonged to a weak clan called Hashim and died when he was young, leaving his uncle to raise him. His uncle's son, 'Ali, was like a younger brother to him. When he was older, Muhammad engaged in trade and married one of his clients, a wealthy widow named Khadija. Their daughter Fatima later married 'Ali.

Muhammad is remembered as a pious man before taking up his prophetic calling. It is said that every year he went to a nearby mountain cave to pray and fast. On one of these retreats, he had a vision of the angel Gabriel who spoke several words to him. These words, the angel told him, were from God—the same God who had spoken to Abraham, Moses, Jesus, and other biblical prophets. Although Muhammad initially feared that he was possessed, he became more confident in the messages he received from Gabriel after his wife Khadija and her cousin Waraqa, a Christian, convinced him that he was having an authentic experience. Soon after, he began to share his revelations with others. Several years after Muhammad's death, these messages were written down and collected into the Qur'an ("the recitation"). For Muslims, these messages are literally the word of God, which is why non-Arabic speaking Muslims learn to recite them in Arabic even if they are ignorant of their meaning.

At first, Muhammad preached a message of personal morality. He called on the inhabitants of Mecca to worship God alone, accept Muhammad as His mouthpiece, live a righteous life, take care of the disadvantaged, and prepare themselves for the Day of Judgment when God would resurrect everyone and hold them accountable for their actions. Muhammad attracted a few followers, but the ruling clan of the Quraysh tribe, the 'Abd Shams, did not like Muhammad's preaching against the worship of the tribal gods, perhaps because it threatened the pilgrimage trade they relied on for revenue. The 'Abd Shams clan started to persecute the Muslims, so Muhammad sent some of them to shelter in Ethiopia. This was the first emigration (hijra) of Muslims. Nevertheless, the 'Abd Shams continued persecuting Muhammad's Meccan followers that remained behind.

One day at a local market, a group of Arab tribesmen from a city to the north called Yathrib heard Muhammad preaching and were impressed by his character. They invited him to come to Yathrib, later known as Medina, and help settle disputes among the quarreling tribes living around the oasis there. Muhammad agreed, but asked the men to first submit to his religious teachings (muslim is Arabic for "one who submits") and to swear an oath of loyalty (bay'a) to him that required them to defend him and other Muslims if they were attacked. By asking for this pledge, Muhammad began to change the basis of social relations in Arabia from kinship to religion: fighting was to be used to protect the community of believers rather than one's kin.

This process further crystallized after Muhammad and his followers emigrated to Medina—an emigration (hijra) that marks the beginning of the Muslim calendar. There he created a protection pact among all the tribes, including several Jewish tribes. He also mandated

that the new Muslims in Medina should help the Muslim emigrants (Muhaji-run) from Mecca and prefer them over their kin. Thus, the new Medinan Muslims came to be known as the Ansar (Helpers).

Since Muhammad was creating a new community (umma) that superseded tribal loyalties, he needed laws to regulate its behavior. This was important in a region that did not have fixed laws enforced by a state. Thus, the Qur'an specifies laws that govern activities we would consider to be outside the scope of religion, such as crime and punishment, as well as activities we would normally think of as religious, such as fasting once a year during the month of Ramadan, praying five times a day, going on pilgrimage to Mecca, and tithing. (These are four of the five so-called "pillars of Islam"; the fifth is declaring one's belief in God and His Prophet Muhammad.)

Jewish law in the Hebrew Bible also covers many of the same subjects and, like Islam, makes no distinction between religion and politics. This similarity is no accident. First, Islamic law developed in the Jewish environment of Medina and was deeply influenced by it. Second, both religions emerged from tribal societies where there was no state, which meant that a state had to be created to govern a large religious community. Compare this with the experience of Jesus, who preached in a society governed by both Roman law and Jewish law; thus his dictum "Render unto Caesar that which is Caesar's and unto God that which is God's...." In the Hebrew Bible and the Qur'an, rendering unto Caesar was the same as rendering unto God.

Like the Hebrew Bible, the Qur'an sanctions the use of violence in the service of religion, which naturally follows from the melding of religion and politics. Most of the verses in the Qur'an that deal with violence (sometimes calling it a jihad, or "struggle", for the sake of God) are largely about defensive warfare—not attacking unless the community of believers is attacked. Some, however, are about offensive warfare and call on the Muslims to fight polytheists until they convert and to fight the Jews and Christians until they pay a tax. But unlike the Bible, no historical context is offered for most of these verses, which makes it difficult to sort out the contradictions between the offensive and defensive verses. So when the author of the Qur'an calls on Muslims to fight polytheists, we do not know if he meant fight specific polytheists on a specific day or all polytheists for all time. The historical context was provided over one hundred years after Muhammad's death, when biographies of his life were finally written down. This was after a century of fighting and conquest, which was bound to color readings of the Qur'an and retellings of the Prophet's life.

By Muhammad's death in 632 AD, he controlled most of the Arabian Peninsula. He gained some of this control through fighting, particularly during his first few years in Medina; later, many tribes recognized the prevailing trend and joined his community of their own choosing. Since the political community they were joining was based on religion, they had to convert to Islam to have equal status.

At Muhammad's death, the community experienced the first of many leadership crises that came to characterize early Islamic history. While Muhammad's cousin and son-in-law

'Ali was preparing his body for burial, several of Muhammad's "Companions" (Muslims who converted during the Prophet's lifetime) gave their oath of loyalty to Muhammad's closest friend, Abu Bakr. When 'Ali found out, he was angry because he believed that he had a better claim to leadership. But he acquiesced because he did not want to fracture the fragile community.

Abu Bakr's new position as a stand-in (khalifa in Arabic or "caliph" in English) for Muhammad meant that he wielded the same spiritual and worldly authority as the Prophet (minus new revelations). Many of the Arab tribes did not agree and left the community, believing that its founder's death had ended their religious obligations. But since there was no distinction between religion and politics, their religious decision was also a political decision: their rejection of Islam was tantamount to secession from the new Arab Muslim state. Others did offer to return, but refused to tithe, which threatened the revenues of the new state. Abu Bakr launched a war against the tribes and forced them to rejoin the community.

Abu Bakr died after two years, and community leaders again passed over 'Ali and nominated another Companion, 'Umar, to succeed the caliph. It was with 'Umar that the conquests of the settled civilizations outside the Arabian Peninsula began in earnest. With the Arab tribes united for the first time in their history under a single leader, they posed a serious threat to the Byzantine and Sassanian empires—when battle-hardened tribes united in the premodern world, they were a potent fighting force. Exhausted from years of fighting with each other, the Sassanians and Byzantines were no match for the blitzkrieg attacks of the Arabs on horseback and camel. They quickly overthrew the Sassanian Empire and almost conquered the Byzantine Empire, seizing much of its territory along the way. In the following decades, the Muslims conquered North Africa and Spain in the West and pushed into Central Asia in the East. The conquerors viewed their military success as confirmation of their new religion; those they conquered—depending on their social positions under the previous regime—viewed it as either divine deliverance or as evidence of God's displeasure.

'Umar did not live to see the fruits of these early conquests—one of his Persian slaves assassinated him. After his death, a small group of Companions nominated 'Uthman to succeed him. 'Uthman was known as a pious man, but the Ansar distrusted him because he came from the Umayyā family, part of the 'Abd Shams clan which had persecuted Muslims in Mecca during Muhammad's early career. He contributed to this bad feeling by appointing several members of this extended family to prominent positions, overturning 'Umar's policy of awarding posts to the earliest converts to Islam. Because of this, 'Uthman eventually met the same fate as 'Umar.

After 'Uthman's death, the community finally elected 'Ali as caliph. Ever conciliatory, 'Ali did not pursue 'Uthman's killers. When several prominent Muslims led armed revolts against him, 'Ali decided to move the empire's capital from Medina to the new military town of Kufa in Iraq, where his supporters (shi'a, the Arabic word for "partisans" or "supporters") were numerous.

`Ali's failure to prosecute `Uthman's murderers angered one of `Uthman's Umayya appointees, Mu`awiya, the governor of the newly conquered Damascus. Mu`awiya refused to recognize `Ali's claim to leadership and marched against him. The two armies met at a place called Siffin, near the Euphrates River. During the battle, Mu`awiya sought to negotiate. `Ali agreed, but a small portion of his supporters did not. These men, who later became known as Kharijites, abandoned `Ali, charging that he had sinned by agreeing to arbitration when he had a rightful claim to rule. This, they contended, meant that he was no longer a Muslim: he was a kafir, or infidel (declaring a Muslim to be kafir is called takfir). Therefore, he could be slain without violating the Qur'an's prohibition on killing other Muslims. Three Kharijites put theory into practice and assassinated `Ali.

Again, the fact that there was no distinction between religion and politics meant that the Kharijites' religious judgment on the sincerity of the caliph's belief was also politically provocative—it justified revolt against him. Most Muslims did not like the social chaos this created and refused to pass judgment on the sincerity of any believer's faith. This was the attitude that prevailed throughout medieval Islam.

After `Ali's assassination, his supporters backed his eldest son Hasan as his successor. However, Hasan renounced his claim when he realized that he was overmatched by Mu`awiya's army, and Mu`awiya took the caliphal office for himself. Emboldened after Mu`awiya's death and furious that he had appointed his son Yazid to rule, `Ali's supporters in Kufa urged his younger son Husayn, then in the Hijaz, to declare himself caliph. They promised to fight with him if he joined them in Kufa, prompting Husayn to set out for the city with his family. The new caliph, Mu`awiya's son Yazid, heard of the plot and sent a large force to Kufa, where it killed many of `Ali's supporters. The caliph's army then intercepted Husayn and his small entourage on the plains of Karbala and massacred most of it. Husayn's shrine is located in Karbala where he was killed.

The death of Husayn marks the real beginning of Shi`ism as a distinct sect in Islam and the event forms its emotional core (similar to the crucifixion of Jesus in Christianity). Instead of the Sunni view of Islamic history as one of victory and conquest, the Shi`i view is one of oppression and justice denied. Without spiritual and political leadership by a descendent of the Prophet's family, the Muslim community was in error and all other rulers were usurpers. The various branches of Shi`ism differ over whether this leader (imam in Arabic) is to be Muhammad's immediate family (i.e. a direct descendent of his daughter Fatima and his cousin `Ali) or his extended family. The Shi`ism that pre-dominates in Iran and Iraq today is of the first type.

Shi`ism of the second type, however, dominated politics after the death of Husayn and culminated in a successful rebellion against the Umayya ruling clan in 750 AD led by descendents of Muhammad's uncle `Abbas. The `Abbasids drew on the resentment of new converts to Islam who felt they were not being treated as equals by the ruling Arab Muslims. They also drew on support from Arabs who had conquered Iran several decades earlier but

felt that the remote caliphs in Damascus ignored their grievances. To be closer to their base of support, the `Abbasids built a new capital city in Iraq called Baghdad.

Although it was a little over one hundred years after Muhammad's death when the `Abbasids seized power, the nature of Islam and its adherents had changed substantially. No longer was it the religion of a homogenous ethnic group living in the harsh and lawless desert. Now Arab Muslims were ruling large cities with people from diverse ethnic and religious backgrounds. Many of these people converted, even though the Arab elite discouraged them. Often, they converted to avoid paying the protection tax mandated by the Qur'an for nonbelievers and to be treated as equals in a political order that was based on religion. The growing diversity of the Muslim community created tension, but it also produced a more complicated Islam as religious leaders had to cope with new problems the founder of Islam had never considered.

The `Abbasid caliphs initially ruled as previous caliphs had: as spiritual and worldly leaders. Since their legitimacy rested on descent from the extended family of the Prophet, the greatest threat to their authority was Muslims who had an even better claim to direct descent. Why obey a distant cousin of Muhammad when men descended directly from `Ali were still alive? Fearing revolt, the `Abbasids persecuted these imams and their followers until the line finally died out. The Shia believe the final imam will one day return and assume his rightful place as ruler.

Over time, the religious authority of the `Abbasid caliphs was eroded by a new religious movement whose adherents called themselves "The People of the Way and the Community" (ahl al-sunna wa'l-jama`a). Followers of the movement did not believe the caliphs or the imams should make new laws or serve as a model for religious behavior; rather, Muslims should conform to the way (sunna) Muhammad lived his life. Adherents collected hundreds of thousands of reports (hadith) of Muhammad's words and actions, which they compiled into books. The men who knew these reports best became the center of Muslim religious life as the illiterate or uninformed turned to them for guidance on how to best conduct themselves as believers. People who identified with this approach were called "People of the Way (Sunna)," or Sunnis for short.

At the same time, another religious movement arose that further eroded the caliph's religious authority. This was Sufism, an ascetic movement that had both Sunni and Shi'i adherents. The authority of these ascetics rested on their claim to have received spiritual instruction and power from a chain of teachers stretching all the way back to the Prophet and `Ali. For Sufis, the local recipients of this spiritual charisma—people we might call saints—were the center of religious authority.

Just as the caliph's religious authority declined, so too did his political power. Local rulers in various parts of the Islamic Empire began governing autonomously while paying lip service to caliphal rule. As the political power of the office of the caliphate weakened, its various officeholders began to hire Turkish mercenaries to protect them. Finally, the Seljuqs,

Turks from Central Asia who had converted to Sunni Islam, seized power. They took the title of Sultan ("ruler") and allowed the caliphate to continue as a ceremonial office. Although they made no pretense to religious leadership, they set up local schools (madrasas) dedicated to religious training to appease the Sunni establishment. It was from this point that madrasas became the primary centers of religious education in Sunni Islam.

Like the 'Abbasid Dynasty, the Seljuqs had to worry about the Shia. First, there was a Shi'i dynasty, the Fatimids, that ruled Egypt. In the eleventh century, the Fatimids had taken Palestine from the Seljuqs and threatened to push further East. When the Christian Crusaders invaded Palestine and conquered Jerusalem, the Seljuqs were happy to let their Shi'i rivals deal with the problem. Eventually, a Seljuq ruler from Syria, Saladin, succeeded in overthrowing the Fatimids and then dislodged the Crusaders from Jerusalem. The Christians never recovered and the Crusades drew to a close in the thirteenth century.

The Seljuqs' second Shi'i headache was the Nizari Isma'ilis, a group of zealots who regularly assassinated political leaders. (They were known to the Latin West as the "Assassini," the source of our English word "assassin," who—according to legend—used hashish to prepare for their missions.) The final remedy for this headache was an unwelcome one: Mongol tribesmen from Central Asia swept through Iran, severely crippled the Nizari Isma'ilis, and marched on Baghdad. The Mongols had been vicious in their conquests, killing the inhabitants of towns that did not immediately surrender. They meted out the same punishment to the inhabitants of Baghdad when the caliph refused to surrender. They also executed the caliph. One of his descendents made his way to Egypt and the office continued, albeit diminished even further.

The Mongol invasion was far more devastating to Muslims in the Middle East than the Crusades had been. The Crusaders were a localized threat on the Mediterranean coast, whereas the Mongols had conquered almost all the central Islamic lands, had been far more ruthless than the Christian invaders, and worst, were pagans. Thousands of people fled west, including a conservative theologian named Ibn Taymiyya who settled in Damascus. Ibn Taymiyya was dismayed that much of the Islamic world was now ruled by pagans. What could be done? First, he argued, Muslims had to revive Islam by doing away with the opinions of learned men and some of the practices of the Sufis and the Shia; they had to return to the example of Muhammad and the first generations of Muslims ("the forefathers" or *salaf* in Arabic). Second, they had to get rid of the Mongols who now ruled much of the Islamic world. But two obstacles presented themselves. First, several Mongol rulers of his time had converted to Islam and the Qur'an is emphatic that Muslims cannot attack Muslims (see, for example, verse 4:93). Second, Ibn Taymiyya was a Hanbali, one of the four Sunni schools of Islamic law. Contrary to the wishes of Ibn Taymiyya, the school's founder, Ahmad b. Hanbal, had refused to sanction rebellion against Muslim rulers.

Arguing in a fashion similar to the Kharijites, Ibn Taymiyya contended that the Muslim Mongol rulers could be attacked. They were not really Muslims, he argued, because they

did not implement Islamic law properly and they were more interested in pursuing their own interests rather than the interests of the Muslim community. These arguments proved useful for justifying military campaigns against Mongol rulers; Ibn Taymiyya even participated in several battles.

Two centuries after Ibn Taymiyya, a group of Turks from Central Asia, the Ottomans, established a new Islamic empire after conquering much of the old Islamic heart-land that had once been united under the 'Abbasid Empire. They even conquered Egypt and their leaders took the title of caliph after they captured one of the descendants of the 'Abbasid caliphs. The Ottomans, based in Anatolia (today's Turkey) had a policy of constant imperial expansion, which brought great wealth. It also made Western Europe nervous as the Ottomans conquered much of Eastern Europe. However, the Ottomans were not able to pursue their imperial ambitions further West because they had to protect their rear to the East, where a new Shi'i dynasty, the Safavids, had gained control of Iran and much of Iraq. The Ottomans never defeated the Safavids, but they did manage to take control of Iraq (although many Shia remained behind).

Another Ottoman headache came from an unexpected quarter: the deserts of Arabia. There, an eighteenth-century puritan named Muhammad b. 'Abd al-Wahhab, inspired by the writings of Ibn Taymiyya, launched a revival of Islam. He called for a return to the example of Muhammad and his Companions and for a cleansing of Arabia from "corrupt" forms of Islam, including Sufi and Shi'i influences. Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab did not get much support for his doctrines until he made an alliance with the Saud family, who found his readiness to excommunicate all of their political opponents useful. The Saudis and the followers of Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab, who called themselves Muwahhidun (Unitarians), conquered much of the peninsula, even the pilgrimage sites of Mecca and Medina. They also went out of their way to destroy the Shi'i shrine of Husayn in Iraq. The threat was so serious the Ottomans enlisted the help of Muhammad 'Ali Pasha, the governor of Egypt, to crush the Wahhabis (as they were called by their enemies), which he did.

The reason Muhammad 'Ali Pasha was so successful in destroying the Wahhabis is that he had reorganized his military similar to that of France. France, and the rest of Western Europe, had surpassed the military might of the Ottomans by the eighteenth century. Napoleon had even conquered Egypt for a year in a bid to cut off the British supply route from India.

And what were the British doing in India? Initially, British businessmen were procuring tea leaves to feed a growing tea fad in England (which is why Napoleon wanted to cut off their shipping route through Egypt). The deals they struck with local rulers eventually entangled them in local politics and by the mid-1800s the British ruled much of the continent outright.

Many Indian Muslims chafed at the British presence, particularly since much of India had been under Muslim rule before their arrival. In the 1820s, a man named Sayyid Ahmad

declared a jihad against the British. Sayyid Ahmad had recently returned from a pilgrimage to Mecca in 1821, which the Wahhabis had just lost to the Egyptians. Influenced by their teachings, he determined that violent action against the British was the only way for Muslims to regain their dominance of the Subcontinent. To this end, he formed an organization for fundraising, proselytizing, and military operations which attracted a lot of support in northern India. Sayyid Ahmad was killed by Sikhs in 1831, but his call was echoed twenty-six years later by some Muslims during the 1857 revolt of Muslim and Hindu troops against the British.

Not all Muslim reactions to the British presence in India were so violent. Some religious leaders preferred to turn inward and reform the Muslim community, believing that its loss of political power indicated that it had strayed from true Islam. Ibn Taymiyya had had a similar reaction after the Mongol invasions (although he also advocated violence), and like his responses some of these reform movements tended in a conservative direction. The most influential of these movements began in a seminary in Deoband, a town to the north of Delhi. Although not as puritanical as Ibn Taymiyya or his Wahhabi interpreters, the Deobandis also interpreted the hadith conservatively, believing it to be the cornerstone of proper Muslim practice. In the early twentieth century, many adherents of the Deobandi School took a more activist turn. Some of them were peaceful, like the program of the missionary organization, the Tablighi Jama'at, while others were overtly political or even militant (the Taliban today is an offshoot of the Deobandi School).

The political turn of the Deobandi movement in India was part of a wider current of Islamic revivalism and anticolonialism swirling across the Muslim world. In Egypt, which the British ruled at the end of the nineteenth century, several Muslim intellectuals called for a revival of Islam as a necessary prelude to ending Western political interference in the region. Like Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab (as noted earlier), they rejected the authority of Muslim learned men and urged followers to return to the example of Muhammad and the Companions, the "forefathers" (salaf). This was the beginning of a Protestant-like movement its founders called Salafism. Unlike the reform movements of Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab, the Salafi Movement was initially liberal: its founders argued that there was no incompatibility between real Islam and modernity. By embracing true Islam, unencumbered by tradition, they argued that Muslims were embracing the best of the West. Once they had reinvigorated their faith, Muslims could unite politically across the Middle East and end Western political influence in the region.

Then came WWI. The Ottomans had backed the wrong side and their empire was dismembered by the British and the French, who assumed direct control of several regions. The heart of the Ottoman Empire, Anatolia, was in disarray after the Greeks invaded. However, a Turkish officer named Mustafa Kemal (later known as Ataturk) drove them out. Ataturk established the modern state of Turkey as a secular nation like countries in Western Europe. He also formally abolished the caliphate.

At the same time the Ottoman Empire was collapsing, there was a resurgence of the Wahhabis. As before, followers and descendants of Ibn `Abd al-Wahhab allied with the Saud family and conquered the Arabian Peninsula, which they have controlled until today (hence the name "Saudi" Arabia).

In Egypt, there was a secular nationalist movement that ended British rule. But once the nationalists came into power, they established a state along European lines and instituted European legal codes. The same pattern unfolded throughout much of the Middle East.

Despite these measures, the new Arab states were still unable to deliver on their promises to end Western dominance of the region. Rashid Rida, a disciple of Salafism's founders, was disillusioned with this turn and, impressed with the zeal and political power of the Wahhabis in Arabia, began to reorient the Salafi Movement in a more conservative direction (one is reminded of the puritanical turn of Protestantism). This, he argued, was the only way to save Islam from the political encroachment of the West and end its secular cultural influence, which in his view was sapping the vitality of Muslim societies. Since his time, the Salafi Movement has become indistinguishable from Wahhabism.

The touchstone of an authentic Islamic state, Rida asserted, was the implementation of Islamic law in every sphere of human activity. Never mind that medieval Islamic law was never a single law code, but rather a complex, contradictory collection of legal opinions from thousands of men (much like Rabbinic law); or that it did not cover many spheres of human activity; or that medieval Muslim rulers had enforced it unevenly. For Rida, it was a potent symbol of Islamic identity and its implementation would mark a clear rupture with man-made law and Western secularism. Today, Western academics call this ideology Islamism—the belief that Islamic law should be the primary source of law and cultural identity in secular countries.

One of the men influenced by Rida's vision was an Egyptian named Hasan al-Banna, who founded an organization called the Muslim Brotherhood dedicated to achieving Rida's goals. The Brotherhood was initially a peaceful organization that relied on pamphleteering and preaching to spread its message. But once it became clear that the Arab nationalists would not implement Islamic law, Banna created a secret organization to overthrow the government by assassinating key officials.

Economically and militarily exhausted after WWII, the British decided to leave Palestine, which they had governed since the First World War. When Israel declared its independence in 1948, Arabs in the surrounding countries criticized their leaders for allowing it to happen and urged them to intervene militarily. Among the most vocal critics were members of the Muslim Brotherhood. When Israel defeated Egypt and its Arab allies, the humiliated Egyptian government cracked down on its Muslim Brother critics and assassinated Hasan al-Banna in 1949.

Two years earlier, the British had also left India, which was partitioned into India and Pakistan (eastern Pakistan later broke away to become Bangladesh). The partition led to

sectarian violence and many Indian Muslims migrated to Pakistan. One of them was Abu A'la Mawdudi. Before the partition, Mawdudi had worked as a journalist and as a political organizer for a Deobandi organization. He had also written several influential books that criticized modernity as a new Jahiliyya (pre-Islamic paganism) and that called for revolutions, or "jihad" as he termed them, to establish states governed by Islamic law.

All of these streams of thought came together in an Egyptian political activist named Sayyid Qutb. As a young man, Qutb—who was an accomplished literary critic and widely read in European philosophy and political theory—worked for the Egyptian Ministry of Education. In the late 1940s, the Egyptian government sent him to the U.S. to learn about America's educational system. Qutb, who had admired the U.S. before his trip, was offended by the racism and sexual freedom he encountered. American support for the new state of Israel also angered him. Qutb returned to Egypt disillusioned with the West and joined the Muslim Brotherhood, for which he began to publish pamphlets about the dangers of modernity.

Qutb and the Muslim Brothers supported the 1952 military coup in Egypt. But when the new socialist government, eventually headed by Gamal Abdel Nasser, refused to implement Islamic law, the Brothers became openly critical, leading Nasser to imprison Qutb. There, disillusioned with conventional politics and repeatedly tortured, Qutb began to call for the violent overthrow of Muslim rulers who do not implement Islamic law. To justify violence against other Muslims, Qutb relied heavily on the works of Mawdudi, which had been translated into Arabic, as well as the writings of medieval scholars, especially Ibn Taymiyya.


Because of his writings, the Egyptian government eventually executed Qutb. But the influence of his books continues to be felt: he is quoted more than any other modern author by contemporary Jihadis. Thus, he is rightly viewed as the founding father of Jihadism, a violent subset of Islamism that has revived the old Kharijite doctrine of takfir to justify violence against Muslims—a necessity given the Jihadis' revolutionary agenda.

Like the doctrine of takfir, other strands of Islamic history and theology have proven useful to the Jihadis. Some are useful politically; for example, bay'a, the oath of loyalty Muhammad required of his followers, is frequently used by Jihadis to cement alliances between different groups and individuals. Some are useful polemically, such as naming a Jihadi group Ansar or Muhajirun after Muhammad's early Companions. And finally, some are useful analytically, such as comparing the U.S. and Soviet Union to the Byzantine and Persian Empires or characterizing Iran as a resurgent Safavid state. Of course, each of these examples has overlapping uses, which is what makes them such evocative analogies.

As for Western thinking about the Jihadi Movement, it gravitates toward one of two extremes. One extreme is the notion that the movement has nothing to do with Islam; it is an aberration. This stance may be polemically useful for more moderate Muslims or well-meaning academics, but clearly the Jihadis are a product of and inspired by the current of traditional Islam described above. The other extreme is to mistake this current for the entire

ocean. Jihadis would have us think so, as would some Western alarmists. Such tendentious readings of Islamic history and scripture are not only lazy; they give greater legitimacy to the ideology that is fueling the Jihadi Movement.

FIGURE 2.1: GENEALOGY OF MILITANT SALAFISM



Chapter 3

Growth of the Muslim Brotherhood and its Offshoots



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Although not a terrorist group, the Muslim Brotherhood is the most important Islamist organization in the Middle East. It is the original and the largest Islamist organization in the region and it boasts millions of members and sympathizers, far greater than any terrorist organization in the Middle East. In addition, it is the mother organization of various militant offshoots, as former members of the Brotherhood went to establish some of the most violent terrorist organizations in the region, including al-Jihad al-Islami and al-Jama`a al-Islamiyya. In the past century, the Muslim Brotherhood has been an incubator of militant Islamist ideologies, and the home of the foremost militant ideologues including Sayyid Qutb, the most influential jihadi ideologue in modern history. Equally important, during the past three decades the Muslim Brotherhood has become the largest and most legitimate opposition group in the Arab world, and it is viewed by many as the most noteworthy alternative to unpopular secular regimes in the region.

The following chapter will discuss the history and evolution of the Muslim Brotherhood from its inception up until recent years. It will also discuss its strategy of organization and its most noted ideologues. The bulk of the chapter will deal with the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood and will include an examination of its notable militant offshoots, namely al-Takfir wa'l-Hijra, al-Jihad al-Islami and al-Jama`a al-Islamiyya. Other branches of the Brotherhood in Syria, Jordan and Palestine will also be discussed briefly. It is the objective of this chapter to clarify for the reader the significant influence that the Muslim Brotherhood has had on Sunni Islamist trends in the Middle East and its current standing as a formidable political party in many Arab countries.

Hasan al-Banna (1906-1949) and the Founding of the Muslim Brotherhood

Hasan al-Banna, the eldest of five sons, was born in the small town of Mahmudiyya northwest of Cairo in October 1906. His father, Shaykh Ahmad al-Banna, was a local imam in Mahmudiyya and authored and collaborated on various books on Muslim traditions.

Young Hasan began his education at the age of eight, and at the age of 12 he joined a religious society. In 1919, at the age of 13, he witnessed the British occupation of his town, which had a profound impact on his thinking and deeply affected his worldview.¹ Three years later, at the age of 16, Hasan enrolled in Dar al-Ulum College in Cairo to become a teacher. During his education in Cairo, he met numerous influential Islamist thinkers including Yusef al-Dajawi from al-Azhar University and leading Salafi ideologue Rashid Reda.²

The 1920s were a time of great upheaval in the Middle East. In the preceding centuries, the Ottoman Empire ruled much of the region and portrayed itself as the Muslim caliphate, following in the footsteps of the original caliphate that was first established following the death of the Prophet Muhammad in 632 AD, and later, at the time of the al-Umayyads and Abbasids, evolved into a formidable empire that ruled the Muslim world for centuries up until its destruction by the Mongols in 1258 AD. In years preceding World War I, the Ottomans were in decline and were greatly weakened. Due to its alliance with Germany in WWI and its subsequent defeat, the Ottoman Empire was carved up by European colonial powers who opted to split control of the various areas of the Middle East that were previously provinces in the Ottoman Empire. The official demise of the Ottoman Empire came following Mustafa Kemal Atatürk's revolution and the establishment of modern Turkey. The ensuing European domination of the Arab world brought about the division of the Levant, Arabia and North Africa into newly founded nation-states that were initially dominated by artificial elites who were backed by colonial powers. During this time, various secular nationalist movements emerged in the Middle East that advocated opposition to colonial influences and independence.

During this harsh and rapidly evolving era, Hasan al-Banna was studying in the capital of Egypt, which also witnessed a large amount of political division under the British-backed rule of King Faruq. In the summer of 1927, at the age of 21, Hasan completed his academic study in Dar al-Ulum and became an Arabic teacher in Isma'iliyya.³ In Isma'iliyya he witnessed first hand the British political and economic domination of the Suez Canal community, and the considerable economic disparity between the Egyptian population, who lived in slums, and the British personnel, who lived in luxurious housing. Added to his unfavorable life experiences with Western influences and forces in the Middle East, al-Banna was also greatly influenced by the fundamentalist writings of the prominent Salafi ideologue Rashid Reda (1865-1935) in the official Salafi publication *al-Manar*.⁴

Salafism (*Salafiyya*) was originally founded as a movement of modernity at the turn of the 20th century in Paris by two prominent Islamic thinkers and clerics—Jamal al-Din al-Afghani and Muhammad Abdu—who were in exile and were enamored with Western progress. The name *Salafiyya* was derived from the phrase *al-Salaf al-Salihin*, meaning “the pious ancestors,” which refers to the early Muslim generations, the time of the Prophet Muhammad and the subsequent four rightly-guided caliphs. Salafism became a prominent trend in the early 20th century after Muhammad Abdu returned to Egypt and became an influential

mufti. Salafism, as envisioned by Abdu, was a movement of modernization and Islamic liberalism; it was greatly influenced by European humanism and progress. It advocated adapting Islamic laws to accommodate modern needs and realities. An influential mufti in early 20th century Cairo, Abdu accepted the theory of evolution and considered science to be more authoritative than the Qu'ran. He went so far as to call for the dissolution of the four Sunni schools of thought and the creation of a unified law that would comply with the demands of modern times. Following the death of Muhammad Abdu, his Syrian student Rashid Reda became the chief Salafi thinker and moved the movement in a very different direction. Unlike his teacher, Rashid Reda became disillusioned with Western influences and secular rule. Dismayed by European devastation of the Ottoman Empire and the subsequent division and domination of Muslim Arab lands by England, France and other European powers, and disenchanted by the corrupt and cruel rule of secular Arab leaders in Syria, Egypt and other countries, Reda became antagonistic to secular and Western influences in the Middle East. Furthermore, Reda was enamored with the strictness of Wahhabi ideology and in turn transformed Salafism into a fundamentalist revival movement.

By the late 1920s, Hasan al-Banna's experiences in life and his enthrallment with Salafi writings motivated him to pioneer a robust Islamist worldview and strategy for Egypt and the greater Muslim world. Al-Banna's worldview was similar to that of the 13th century Hanbali cleric Ahmad ibn Taymiyya, who in his childhood witnessed the fall of the Abbasid Caliphate following the Mongol invasions. He attributed the fall of the caliphate and the decline of Muslim might to society's deviation from genuine Islam. He further reasoned that Muslims were punished by God and that purification of Islam was necessary to solve political and social tribulations. Similar to Ibn Taymiyya, al-Banna also reasoned that the calamities that had befallen the Middle East during this period were rooted in the lack of piety among the Muslim masses and their deviation from the true path of Islam. He presented a modern vision in the form of Islamic unity, which quickly took root in Egyptian society. In March 1928, al-Banna and six Egyptians who worked in the British camp in Isma'iliyya launched the Muslim Brotherhood.⁵ In 1929, Hasan al-Banna officially founded the Muslim Brotherhood as the first modern, anti-imperialist and anti-nationalist group to take up arms in the Arab world. The Brotherhood advocated that Egypt should become an Islamic state and rejected Western imperialist countries and their values. Al-Banna was primarily concerned with Islamic disunity and the consequent weakening of the Islamic community and its vulnerability to foreign powers. He equally emphasized the importance of individual and personal reform among Muslims.⁶ His message was religious, national and social. The essence of al-Banna's message was to advocate the following points: the affirmation of the eternal relevance of Islam, even in the modern age; the need to purify the religion and to return to the fundamental puritan straight path of the Prophet Muhammad; that Islam is both a religion and a system of governance; and that all Muslims are part of one pan-Islamic umma.⁷

After establishing the Muslim Brotherhood, al-Banna was committed to expanding his movement and spent most of his time teaching both day and night classes in schools. He preached in mosques and even in coffee houses. For many Islamists in Egypt who equally objected to the predominant nationalist secular trends in the Middle East at the time, Hasan al-Banna became "a torch of light in a time where the darkness of secular thinking prevailed and preoccupied Egyptian intellect."⁸ Al-Banna preached that the main responsibilities of the Muslim Brotherhood were the revival and renaissance of Islam, change and revolution, and that the Muslim Brotherhood was a universal Islamic body that transcended national borders. General conditions of membership required the candidate to be 18 years old, upright and honorable, able to understand the ideas of the Brotherhood, and willing to pay the dues, including monthly fees and *zakat* (alms).⁹ The leader of the branch, however, could excuse poor members who genuinely could not afford to pay the monthly dues. In addition, members of the Brotherhood had to take a pledge (*bay'a*) consisting of 10 parts, including: Understanding, Sincerity, Action, Jihad, Sacrifice, Obedience, Steadfastness, Concentration, Brotherhood and Mutual Trust.¹⁰ The first criteria for membership emerged in the group's Third General Conference in March 1935, when Hasan al-Banna defined the three degrees of membership:

Assistant (*Musa'id*)

Related (*Muntasib*)

Active (*'Amel*)

A fourth degree, *Mujabid* (Struggler), was the ultimate stage and was only open to the select handful of the most dedicated members.¹¹

Al-Banna's message found a receptive audience in Egypt, which was ruled by King Faruq, a conduit of British interests. In the following two decades, the membership of the Muslim Brotherhood grew rapidly throughout Egypt. In 1929, the Brotherhood had four branches in Egypt, and within three years it had 15 branches. The membership of the Brotherhood expanded dramatically toward the end of 1938 when it had 300 branches, and by 1949 it is estimated that the Brotherhood had more than 1,000 branches all over Egypt. In 1949, the Muslim Brotherhood claimed to have 500,000 members and roughly 500,000 sympathizers, although this figure was probably exaggerated. In 1953, prior to its disbanding, it was estimated that the Muslim Brotherhood actually had 1,500 branches and 200,000-300,000 members.¹²

Coupled with its appealing ideology, the Muslim Brotherhood was able to gain significant acceptance within the Egyptian populace because it provided the masses with a formidable parallel social welfare network. In practice, by the 1950s the Muslim Brotherhood became a state within a state with its own mosques, hospitals, schools, charitable organizations, youth movements, centers and even a military arm.

Hasan al-Banna outlined the following incremental stages of the Muslim Brotherhood's mission in *Risalat al-Ta'alim*:¹³

1) **Introduction Stage:** In this stage, the Brotherhood acquaints the population with the general idea of *da'wa* (outreach) and widens its appeal. In essence, they attempt to proselytize a large segment of the population. They accomplish this through speeches, sermons, publications, institutions and other practical means including welfare work. This stage is lengthy and incremental.

2) **Organization Stage:** In this stage, the Brotherhood forms organizations capable and worthy of military jihad. They do so by recruiting capable members, enacting military and arms training and by emphasizing obedience, discipline, patience, steadfastness, courage and removal of doubt or hesitation. In essence, they create a military vanguard that will, in the future, wage an armed jihad against the secular government.

3) **Enforcement Stage:** Following the introduction and organization stages, in the final stage the Muslim Brotherhood will lead an unrelenting armed jihad and call on the population to rise up and overthrow the ruling secular government. The Brotherhood has one objective ultimately: to replace secular governments in the Muslim world with Shari`a ones.

At the time of Hassan al-Banna, the Brotherhood was still in the introduction stage and continued to progress gradually toward the organization and enforcement stages.

Al-Nizam al-Khas—The Special Apparatus

The Muslim Brotherhood also operated a military wing called *al-Nizam al-Khas*, the "Special Apparatus."¹⁴ This military branch planned and carried out attacks against opponents of the Muslim Brotherhood and government officials deemed obstacles to the Brotherhood's goals. During the years following its creation, the apparatus assassinated security officials, judges, a prime minister and attempted to kill a popular Egyptian president, earning the Islamists the wrath of the secular government and causing a severe crackdown on members of the Muslim Brotherhood.

The Muslim Brotherhood gained increased credibility among the Egyptian masses by participating and fighting in the 1948 war alongside the Egyptian army in Palestine. Also in 1948, tensions between the Egyptian government and the Muslim Brotherhood increased following Brotherhood attacks on various un-Islamic influences in the country, including bars, nightclubs and cinemas. In March 1948, the Special Apparatus of the Muslim Brotherhood assassinated an Egyptian judge who had handed down numerous harsh sentences against group members. On December 8, 1948, a few months after the assassination, and due to increased violence by members of the Brotherhood, Egyptian Prime Minister Mahmud Fahmi Nuqrashi decided to crack down on the Brotherhood and ordered the dissolution of the organization and the confiscation of its properties and funds. Three weeks

later, Prime Minister Nuqrashi was assassinated by a member of the Brotherhood. Shortly thereafter, on February 12, 1949, and in response to the killing of Prime Minister Nuqrashi, secret agents of the Egyptian government killed Hasan al-Banna.¹⁵

In 1950, the unpopular King Faruq hoped to gain political favor by granting the Brotherhood limited permission to operate. At this juncture, the public's disapproval of the British-backed Egyptian monarch was overwhelming, and two years later he was overthrown in a military rebellion. When President Gamal 'Abd al-Nasir, a secular nationalist and pan-Arabist, came to power in 1954 he initially tolerated the Brotherhood's Islamist ideology and social activities, hoping to avoid a confrontation. Despite the Muslim Brotherhood's increased political acceptance and significant membership, in these revolutionary times the pan-Islamist ideology of the Brotherhood was no match for Nasir's popular, secular, pan-Arabist approach. Unlike King Faruq, who was largely viewed as a British conduit by the Egyptian street, the new Egyptian president was a free officer who was greatly admired in the 1950s and 1960s by the majority of Egyptians and Arabs for his unwavering opposition to Britain, France and Israel. Following his steadfast resilience in the 1956 Suez Canal war, and due to his popular land reforms within Egypt and his persistent championing of the Palestinian cause, Nasir was elevated to heroic status in the region. Even today, some 38 years following his death from a heart attack in September 1970, Gamal 'Abd al-Nasir is still regarded by many Arabs as the greatest Arab leader of the 20th century. By 1954, Nasir's hopes of avoiding a confrontation with the Brotherhood were shattered after a failed assassination attempt on his life and due to the Muslim Brotherhood's insistence on a theocracy rather than a secular system of reforms. In October 1954, following the assassination attempt, Nasir banned the Muslim Brotherhood, closed down its offices, executed five of its prominent leaders and arrested 4,000 of its members. As a result, many members of the group escaped to Saudi Arabia.¹⁶ These repeated crackdowns by the secular government further radicalized the Islamists who became even more militant during the time of Sayyid Qutb.

Sayyid Qutb (1906-1966)—Radicalization and Militancy

A prominent member of the Muslim Brotherhood and regarded by many as the most important Islamist ideologue of modern times, Sayyid Qutb inspired with his writings an entire generation of jihadis including the future leaders of al-Qa'ida. Sayyid Qutb was an Egyptian of Indian origin, born October 9, 1906. He was raised in the village of Musha, where he studied the Qur'an at a young age. He moved to Cairo in 1929 and lived with his uncle. From 1929 to 1933, he attended Dar al-Ulum College. In 1933, he started his career as a teacher of literature in the Egyptian Ministry of Public Education.¹⁷ He even wrote novels such as *Ashwak* (Thorns). In 1939, he became an administrator in the Ministry of Education. In 1949, Qutb studied in the United States at the Colorado State College of Education.¹⁸ His first major religious work was his book *Social Justice in Islam* that was published in Egypt in 1949 while Qutb was living in the United States. He resigned from the

Ministry of Education in the early 1950s and became the most persuasive publicist of the Muslim Brotherhood. Following the dissolution of the Muslim Brotherhood by President Nasir in 1954, Sayyid Qutb became its main spokesman. Prior to this, Qutb was the chief author of secret pamphlets, the head of the *da'wa* propagation section and the editor of the Brotherhood's newspaper.¹⁹ In the 1950s and early 1960s, he became more militant due to his repeated imprisonment from 1954-1964 and his witnessing of severe torture of Brotherhood members by the regime. He came to believe that the regime was non-Muslim because true Muslims would not torture each other. He also believed that only true belief in Islam could cure the ills of society (poverty, arrogance, tyranny, corruption, materialism, immorality and brutality). While in prison, Qutb wrote his two most influential books: *Fi Dhilal al Qur'an* (In the Shade of the Qur'an) and *Ma'alim Fi al-Tariq* (Milestones).²⁰

The book, *In the Shade of the Qur'an*, is a formidable multi-volume text that interpreted every chapter in the Qur'an with a militant twist.²¹ *Milestones* was published in 1964, and after the death of Qutb it became the most important and prevalent militant Islamist book. Millions of copies of *Milestones* have been printed, and since its publication it has become a central text for militant Sunni Islamists. In *Milestones*, Sayyid Qutb drew a sharp distinction between his vision and that of mainstream Islam. He specifically emphasized the following.²²

- Egyptian secular society in the 1960s was equivalent to the *jahiliyya*, the time of paganism and ignorance in Arabia that preceded the birth of Islam.
- The main function of the government is to implement the laws of God on earth.
- Secular laws and systems of governance are apostate laws and the Egyptian government should rule solely by Shari'a laws, which are ordained by God.
- There is an urgent need to bring about the rule of Shari'a and to impose religion on all aspects of life in Egypt.
- There should be no obedience of man-made authority, only the word of God. In essence, a government that does not rule by Shari'a is an apostate government that should not be obeyed.
- There is no room for *ijtihad* (learned interpretation of the Qur'an). He argued for *taqlid*, meaning a fundamentalist literal interpretation and immolation of the Qur'an and other holy texts.
- There is a contradiction between the accepted norms within the Muslim mainstream that armed jihad is defensive in nature, only to be called for when the Muslim community is under attack. Qutb argued contrarily, that the true intent of jihad is actually offensive. Moreover, he claimed that jihad is missing from mainstream Islamic thought and should be enacted to remedy the ills of an unbelieving nation and bring down the secular Egyptian government.
- Jihad should be the sixth pillar of Islam, and should be carried out offensively and ag-

gressively to remove tyrannies. This argument follows the 13th century teachings of Ahmad ibn Taymiyya.

- Qutb also revives Ibn Taymiyya's concepts of Dar Islam, vs. Dar al-Harb (House of Islam vs. House of War), and advocated *takfir* (excommunication) of secular Muslims and non-Muslims.
- Qutb further advocated for *Hakimiyat Allah* (God's rule on earth).

Qutb's revolutionary ideology, as portrayed in *Milestones* and his other writings, marked a radical break with the traditional gradual approach of the Muslim Brotherhood, which opted to establish an Islamic state in Egypt incrementally through long-term outreach (*da'wa*) and even favored inclusion and participation in the political system. Qutb called for the immediate destruction of the *jahili* order in Egypt through violent jihad, which was incumbent on all true believers. Qutb justified his call for violent jihad against the government by arguing that while the leaders of Egypt were overwhelmingly Muslim, the fact that they chose not to rule by Shari'a and rather by "heretical" secular laws (*akham al-kufri*) rendered them apostates. Qutb also claimed that other Muslims who refused to participate in the jihad against the government were also apostates and subject to *takfir*, in essence casting them as unbelievers.²³ By doing so, Sayyid Qutb revived Ahmad ibn Taymiyya's practice of *takfir* (excommunication)—casting Muslims who do not rule by Shari'a law as non-believers—and his call for jihad as the sixth pillar of Islam to be waged against such apostate governments. In 1300 AD, Hanbali cleric Ahmad ibn Taymiyya issued a famous *farwa* calling on Muslims to wage a jihad against the Mongol rulers who converted to Islam five years earlier but chose to rule by *Yasa*, the code of Genghis Khan, and not by Shari'a.²⁴ During the 1960s, Sayyid Qutb became the prominent spokesman for the Muslim Brotherhood and dramatically radicalized the movement. He was implicated in the assassination attempt on Egyptian President Gamal 'Abd al-Nasir and was hanged on August 29, 1966.²⁵

Relevance to al-Qa'ida

Although Sayyid Qutb was executed 22 years prior to the formation of al-Qa'ida in Pakistan in 1988, his writings and ideology had a monumental impact on the life and worldview of al-Qa'ida's foremost leaders Usama bin Ladin and Ayman al-Zawahiri.²⁶ The brother of Sayyid Qutb, Mohammed Qutb, also a prominent Salafi ideologue, fled to Saudi Arabia with other Muslim Brotherhood members following the hanging of Sayyid to escape the wrath of Gamal 'Abd al-Nasir. In Saudi Arabia, he lectured at Jeddah University when Usama bin Ladin attended that institution. In Jeddah, Mohammed Qutb unabatedly infused young Usama and other students with the militant and revolutionary ideology of his late brother Sayyid Qutb.²⁷ This education at a young age had a direct impact on how Usama bin Ladin viewed Arab regimes and the West, and it set him on a lifelong path of militancy. The legacy of Sayyid Qutb had an even greater effect on Ayman al-Zawahiri, al-Qa'ida's second-

in-command. At a very young age, Zawahiri was enamored by Qutb and joined the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood at the age of 13, when Qutb was the most influential thinker of the Brotherhood.²⁸ Zawahiri was also personally connected to Qutb since his uncle Mahfouz Azzam was Sayyid Qutb's lawyer.²⁹ Ayman al-Zawahiri was affected by Qutb's influential writings, and stated that *In the Shade of the Qur'an* had the foremost influence on his life. Zawahiri was deeply angered by the hanging of Sayyid Qutb, and shortly after he formed his first militant cell in 1967 at the young age of 15.³⁰

Post Qutb—Moderation and Political Inclusion

It is important to note that following Nasir's harsh crackdowns on the Muslim Brotherhood in the 1960s, including the execution of Qutb and the mass arrests of members, there was an exodus of radical group members to Saudi Arabia including Mohammed Qutb, Sayyid's brother. By the 1970s, the remaining Brotherhood leadership in Egypt took a more moderate, tempered and pragmatic tone, since many of the radical leaders were executed or imprisoned.³¹ In the 1980s and 1990s, the Brotherhood emerged as Egypt's largest and most influential Islamist organization by providing a comprehensive parallel social welfare system. Until recently, however, the movement was not allowed to participate openly in the political process, but due to its significant following within Egyptian society it was permitted by the Egyptian government to establish social welfare institutions. Currently, the Brotherhood draws most of its members from the middle and lower-middle classes, and its appeal is strongest among the poorest Egyptians. A good example of the Brotherhood's extensive welfare capability occurred in October 1992, when an earthquake hit central Cairo and left tens of thousands homeless. Following this tragedy, the Brotherhood was the quickest and most visible relief provider, furnishing the victims with medical care, food and shelter.³²

Currently, the Muslim Brotherhood is popular among businessmen, doctors, lawyers, bureaucrats and engineers. It has penetrated the boards of several professional bodies, including unions and professional syndicates of doctors, engineers and lawyers. In fact, they dominate numerous associations because they provide financial support for families—financing cars, homes and household goods.³³ In the past 25 years, the Muslim Brotherhood has become much less virulent and has been tempered by political inclusion; it still advocates that Egypt should become an Islamic state, but through peaceful means and not by armed revolution. Since 1984, the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood has participated in many municipal and national elections and has actually won numerous seats in the Egyptian parliament.³⁴ Although still officially banned from politics, individual members of the Muslim Brotherhood have run for national office as independents. In 2003, under the leadership of Abdul Monaim Abu al-Futuh, the Muslim Brotherhood won 17 seats in the lower house of the Egyptian parliament, the *Majlis al-Sha'ab* (The People's Assembly), out of a total of 454 seats. The current head of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood is Mohammed Mahdi Akef, and under his leadership the group won 19% of the seats in the People's Assembly in

Egypt's December 2005 elections.³⁵ Currently, the Muslim Brotherhood is the most influential opposition group in the Egyptian political landscape and has considerable sway among the populace. It is plausible to predict that the Muslim Brotherhood will continue to gain representation in national and municipal government if allowed to participate in free and unobstructed elections.

It is important to note that in spite of the group's significant social welfare network that administers and provides basic social services to many Egyptians, and enhances the credibility of the group among the Egyptian populace, the main indicator of the group's legitimacy has been the performance and the standing of the secular Egyptian government with the Egyptian masses. The success or failure of the secular Egyptian regime in domestic politics and regional relations has had a direct effect on the popularity and legitimacy of the Islamists. Islamists are generally strengthened and legitimized when secular governments prove unable to provide basic needs and reforms for the public or when they are viewed as weak in the face of external threats and are defeated in war. The Brotherhood flourished during the tenure of King Faruq, who was viewed by most Egyptians as a Western puppet, but was marginalized during the rule of the pragmatic and extremely popular Gamal 'Abd al-Nasir. The Brotherhood's gradually increasing influence and legitimacy proved no match for Nasir's overwhelming support in Egypt and the region during the 1950s and early 1960s. His fortunes turned, however, following Egypt's defeat in the 1967 Six-Day War, as many of the Islamists rose from the ashes following the failure of the secular forces. Anwar Sadat's successful war with Israel in October 1973 bolstered the regime's status in Egypt, but following his assassination in 1981 and since the 1980s the Muslim Brotherhood has again been growing in strength and influence in Egypt and the rest of the Arab world mainly due to secular Arab regimes' perceived inability to provide basic needs and political reforms to the masses.

Notable Offshoots of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt

In September 1970, new Egyptian President Anwar Sadat took power, and at the time the Muslim Brotherhood had a "gentlemen's agreement" with the regime. In lieu of the severe crackdown under Nasir, the Brotherhood wished to avoid the wrath of the government. As a result, numerous radical members of the Brotherhood were angered with the group's inaction and opted to pursue a more militant course against the government. In the 1970s, radical members of the group boycotted the *hukumi* (public) mosques and attended the new *ahli* (private) mosques, and they began planning how to wage armed jihad against the government. It was in these new, private mosques, away from the eyes of government observers and security services that radical members of the Muslim Brotherhood created new militant offshoots such as al-Takfir wa'l-Hijra, al-Jihad al-Islami and al-Jama' a al-Islamiyya.

Al-Takfir wa'l-Hijra—"Excommunication and Migration"

Al-Takfir wa'l-Hijra is the first notable offshoot of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. It was officially established in 1971 by Shukri Mustafa, a former member of the Brotherhood, following his release from prison. Shukri Mustafa was born in 1942 near Asyut.³⁶ He held a Bachelor of Science degree in agricultural sciences and started his group in 1965 while in prison, where he distributed leaflets. Initially the group was called *Jama'at al-Muslimin*, "The Society of Muslims." He recruited students, craftsmen, women and poor Egyptians. Mustafa was in prison at the same time as Sayyid Qutb and was influenced by Qutb's worldview and his call for militant jihad against the secular government. He advocated the establishment of a religious government and Shari'a law. Just like Qutb, al-Takfir condemned the regime and Egyptian society as a whole for living in *jahiliyya* (the period of pre-Islamic paganism). Al-Takfir wa'l-Hijra was perhaps the most radical of all Brotherhood offshoots; it believed in the restructuring of society and viewed the state clergy with hostility. It believed in an extremely puritan lifestyle. Mustafa advocated that the only salvation for Muslims was to join his group and to participate in a conscious separation from sinful society.³⁷ He pursued a long term strategy of creating a nucleus of believers patterned after the Prophet's early community. Although they despised the government, al-Takfir wa'l-Hijra abstained from a direct confrontation with the regime until they achieved sufficient size and capability. They opted to pursue a gradual strategy of *da'wa*, followed by *hijra* (migration) out of Egyptian society and eventually out of Egypt to pursue preparation and training, and finally to return to Egypt to wage an armed jihad and take over the government.³⁸

Unlike other groups, Mustafa and his followers actually withdrew physically from society and started their own community in the desert in Asyut near the location Markaz Abu al-Qurqas.³⁹ In that community, Mustafa isolated and ruled his followers in an extremely authoritarian manner, and under his leadership the group became a virtual cult. Members of the group were kept busy with prayer, athletics, military exercises, study and work in the group's enterprises, and were insulated from mainstream Egyptian society.⁴⁰ Al-Takfir wa'l-Hijra hit center stage on July 3, 1977, when its members kidnapped Shaykh Hussein al-Dhahabi, the former Egyptian minister of religious affairs and a symbol of mainstream official Islam in Egypt. The group demanded the release of its members from prison and a ransom of 200,000 Egyptian pounds.⁴¹ When they killed the shaykh a few days later, the government responded with a harsh crackdown. The leadership of the group and more than 200 members were arrested, and in March 1978 Shukri Mustafa was executed.⁴² Due to his authoritarian nature, following his death the membership and appeal of the group was reduced dramatically. Other members went underground or joined other groups in Egypt and the Middle East.

Al-Jihad [Gihad] al-Islami—"The Islamic Jihad"

In 1979, al-Jihad al-Islami (The Islamic Jihad) was founded by the young ideologue Muhammad 'Abd al-Salam Farraj. A former member of the Muslim Brotherhood, Farraj was born in Beheira in 1956. In his mid-20s, Farraj worked as an administrator at Cairo University after graduating from the engineering faculty. From 1979 through mid-1981, Farraj absorbed former members of other underground groups that were established throughout the 1960s and 1970s.⁴³ Farraj provided the ideological base for the new group, and the military expertise was provided by Abbud 'Abd el-Latif al-Zumor, a colonel in Egyptian army intelligence who joined Farraj in early 1980.⁴⁴ Lieutenant Khalid al-Islambouli joined the group in 1981, and was the brother of Muhammad Islambouli, a prominent member of another militant organization, al-Jama`a al-Islamiyya.⁴⁵ Another young man who joined al-Jihad was Ayman al-Zawahiri, a medical doctor from Cairo who hailed from a highly prestigious and religious family.⁴⁶ He practiced medicine in Maadi, a wealthy Cairo neighborhood, prior to, and during, his involvement with al-Jihad.

In its first year, al-Jihad functioned as a loose alliance of cells, and by the fall of 1980 a governing *Majlis al-Shura* (Consultative Council) was appointed, headed by Farraj. Below the *Majlis*, three subcommittees operated and dealt respectively with Preparation, Propaganda and Economics. Initially, al-Jihad al-Islami pursued an open door recruitment policy toward new members; however, sensitive information was only given to group members who had undergone extensive monitoring and testing.⁴⁷ The group was relatively small with only five to six cells operating in the area of Cairo, and a few members in Upper Egypt who worked alongside cells of al-Jama`a al-Islamiyya.⁴⁸ Recruitment and indoctrination responsibilities were "distributed among the members...according to their geographical location," and family ties and kinship became the most prominent mechanisms for recruitment into the organization.⁴⁹

Muhammad 'Abd al-Salam Farraj articulated the ideology of the group in his book *al-Faridah al-Gha`ibah* (The Neglected Duty). As the title implies, Farraj argued that violent jihad was neglected by mainstream clerics and was in fact an Islamic duty.⁵⁰ Farraj argued that jihad is *not* a popular struggle, for "Islam does not triumph by (attracting the support of) the majority."⁵¹ The primary goal of the organization was to establish an "Islamic State" in Egypt through a revolution brought about by a righteous vanguard of believers with the eventual goal of reestablishing the Muslim caliphate. Much of what was discussed in *al-Faridah al-Gha`ibah* was not new to the radical milieu; in fact, Farraj borrowed heavily from the ideology of Ahmad ibn Taymiyya and Sayyid Qutb. In line with the ideas put forth in Qutb's *Milestones*, Farraj believed that the liquidation of the "apostate" Egyptian government was the first priority.⁵² He acknowledged the alleged "wickedness" of the West, but maintained that "to fight an enemy who is near is more important than to fight an enemy who is far."⁵³

Prelude to Assassination—Causes of Islamist Hostility to Sadat

Although he was personally pious, Anwar Sadat carried on with Nasir's legacy of secular rule in Egypt and did not rule by Shari'a. More importantly, he carried out a series of domestic and international policies that greatly angered the Islamists. In 1974, he passed a law banning polygamy in Egypt and made divorce only permissible through legal proceedings. As a modernizer, Sadat wished to improve women's rights in the country. Furthermore, although Sadat initially released many Islamist prisoners in the early 1970s as a gesture of goodwill and in an attempt to placate the Islamist leadership, which was crushed ruthlessly under Nasir, he was not able to win favor. The Islamists vehemently opposed many of Sadat's initiatives, including his policy of *infitah* (opening) through which Egyptian society increased its consumption of Western products and saw a rise in nightclubs, discos, movies, alcohol consumption and other behaviors considered immoral by the Islamists. On the international scene, following his favorable performance in the 1973 war which earned him great popularity in Egypt, Sadat signed a peace treaty with Israel in the 1978 Camp David Accords and aligned with the United States. He also granted the shah of Iran refuge following his overthrow in 1979. Perhaps most important, on September 2, 1981 he ordered a mass arrest of 1,536 Islamists for undermining the security of the state. These arrests greatly angered Egyptian Islamists and practically signed his death warrant: one of the men detained was Muhammad Islambouli, who was arrested on his wedding night; his brother, Khalid Islambouli, led the team that assassinated Sadat on August 6, 1981.

Khalid Islambouli originally proposed to Farraj the plan to assassinate Sadat in late September 1981. He was put in command of a vehicle that was to take part in a military parade commemorating the 1973 October war, and saw this as an incomparable opportunity to kill Sadat.⁵⁴ When the *Majlis al-Shura* met on September 26 to discuss the feasibility and specifics of the plan to kill Sadat and take over the government, a heated debate ensued between Colonel al-Zumor and the ideologues on the council. As a military man, Col. al-Zumor opposed the timing of the assassination, arguing that al-Jihad al-Islami was too small and not yet capable of igniting a successful revolution against the government and stating that more time was necessary to recruit additional members and to better plan the coup. His objections fell on deaf ears as the ideologues were anxious to kill Sadat, and they overruled al-Zumor's practical concerns.⁵⁵ As planned, during the military parade on October 6, 1981, Khalid Islambouli and his accomplices burst out of their vehicle and shot the Egyptian president to death. Other elements of al-Jihad al-Islami's plan to bring down the Egyptian government—including seizing the television and telephone buildings, the Central Security Headquarters and the Egyptian army operations room—failed to materialize. The Asyut branch of al-Jihad was able to take over the city following the assassination as the council planned; within days, however, they were suppressed ruthlessly by the Egyptian army, and ultimately al-Jihad al-Islami failed to challenge the control of the government.⁵⁶

Aftermath of Sadat's Assassination

Sadat's second-in-command, Hosni Mubarak, became president following the assassination and instituted an immediate and ruthless response. In what became known as the "Jihad Case," Egyptian security services arrested 302 militants, including the vast majority of al-Jihad and al-Jama`a leaders and important operatives. They were all prosecuted by Egypt's Supreme Security Court. A total of 23 militants—including Muhammad `Abd al-Salam Farraj, Khalid Islambouli and their fellow assassins—were tried by a military court. Farraj, Islambouli and the other assassins were hanged in April 1982. Col. Abbud `Abd el-Latif al-Zumor, Ayman al-Zawahiri and many others were sentenced to lengthy prison terms.⁵⁷

While imprisoned during the 1980s, a division of loyalty emerged in al-Jihad al-Islami between al-Zumor and Zawahiri, who gained significant stature during his term in prison.⁵⁸ Due to lack of direct involvement in the assassination plot, Ayman al-Zawahiri was set free in 1984, after which he worked to recruit al-Jihad members loyal to the still imprisoned al-Zumor and to prepare for continued jihad against the Egyptian government. Concerned with the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, Zawahiri arrived at Peshawar, Pakistan in 1986 and worked with `Abd Allah `Azzam in coordinating recruitment, training and deployment of the Arab volunteers to the Afghan jihad against the Soviets. During this period, Zawahiri also established a professional and personal relationship with Usama bin Ladin. In 1987, Zawahiri renamed his branch of al-Jihad al-Islami to Tanzim al-Jihad (The Jihad Group), and in the next two years recruited many members of al-Jihad who were loyal to al-Zumor and brought them to Afghanistan to participate in the Afghan jihad against the Soviets to gain military experience.⁵⁹

In 1992, Zawahiri resumed armed jihad against the Egyptian government, focusing on the assassination of senior officials. Tanzim al-Jihad carried out three assassination attempts, against the information minister in April 1993, a former interior minister in August 1993, and former Prime Minister Atef Sidqi in December 1993.⁶⁰ During the last assassination attempt, a schoolgirl named Shayma was killed, which proved disastrous for Tanzim al-Jihad as the killing incited widespread public condemnation of their activities in Egypt.⁶¹ Moreover, Tanzim al-Jihad suffered a major setback in October 1993, when authorities captured a computer that contained the identities of most Tanzim members and arrested Ahmed Salama Mabruk, Zawahiri's second-in-command.⁶² In response to these attacks, President Mubarak decimated the Tanzim al-Jihad network in Egypt. These operational blunders, combined with popular condemnation of Tanzim activities, forced Ayman al-Zawahiri in 1995 to instruct his deputies to suspend armed operations in Egypt.⁶³

Al-Jama`a [Gama`a] al-Islamiyya—"The Islamic Group"

Al-Jama`a al-Islamiyya emerged in 1979 as Egypt's largest militant offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood. Al-Jama`a al-Islamiyya was initially comprised mainly of Islamic stu-

dent groups that began to form throughout Egypt's universities following the 1967 war, which is where it also derived its name—*jama'at*. Rather than seeking to suppress Islamist groups, as his predecessor had done, Anwar Sadat came to power and sought to ease tensions between the Islamists and the government, brokering a "gentleman's agreement" with them in order to counter their opposition.⁶⁴ He even went so far as to promise to make Shari'a the foundation of Egypt's legal code. In addition, Anwar Sadat offered support to the *jama'at* in order to prevent the spread of other socialist student groups on university campuses.⁶⁵ The *jama'at* quickly grew in size and influence during the mid-1970s, primarily on the campuses of Asyut University and its regional branches in the upper Egyptian cities of Minya, Sohaj, Qena and Aswan.⁶⁶ The influence of the *jama'at* was so great that between 1975 and 1979 its members held an overwhelming majority of student union seats at many Egyptian universities. It was not long, however, before Sadat realized the rapidly growing threat that the student Islamist groups were becoming to the security of Egypt, and support for the Islamists was therefore terminated in 1979. That same year, the *jama'at* was officially banned in Egypt.⁶⁷ Throughout the 1970s, the majority of *jama'at* members were closely tied to the Muslim Brotherhood; however, many eventually became dissatisfied with the Brotherhood's gradual approach to establishing an Islamic state.⁶⁸ Most of these more radical *jama'ats* were active in Upper Egypt, particularly in the city of Asyut, where, under the leadership of Karam Zuhdi, they became al-Jama'a al-Islamiyya in 1979.

Unlike al-Jihad al-Islami and al-Takfir wa'l-Hijra, al-Jama'a al-Islamiyya viewed itself as a popular movement and not as an exclusive vanguard aiming to establish a new Islamic order. As stated by a Jama'a member in 1994, "We are a social force that conducts our works through our mosques and our relations with the larger society."⁶⁹ This group combined both jihad and *da'wa* and opted to employ a bottom-up strategy of "open, widespread recruitment, the control of whole areas of territory seized from the state, and the imposition in those areas of the Islamic order."⁷⁰ In addition, al-Jama'a al-Islamiyya systematically harassed, vandalized and even attacked the Christian Coptic minority in Upper Egypt as a recruitment strategy.

Another important aspect of al-Jama'a al-Islamiyya was its association with al-Jihad al-Islami. Karam Zuhdi, the founder of al-Jama'a, met Muhammad 'Abd al-Salam Farraj, the founder of al-Jihad al-Islami, in early 1980 and actually served on the ruling *Majlis al-Shura* of al-Jihad following its creation in the fall of 1980. Najih Ibrahim 'Abdallah Sayyid, another al-Jama'a leader, also served on the *Majlis* of al-Jihad.⁷¹ Furthermore, al-Jihad-affiliated members of al-Jama'a al-Islamiyya were also involved in al-Jihad's scheme to take over the government following the assassination of Sadat. On October 8, 1981, two days after the assassination, they stormed the central security building in Asyut, killing many police officers and eventually taking over the city.⁷² As mentioned previously, the takeover of Asyut was swiftly suppressed by the Egyptian army, and al-Jama'a's leaders and the majority of their cadres were arrested and prosecuted alongside members of al-Jihad. In prison, a dispute

emerged among al-Jama`a members who advocated for the leadership of blind Shaykh Umar Abdel Rahman, while al-Jihad members rejected the "rule of the blind" and opted to follow the leadership of al-Jihad's military commander, Col. Abbud 'Abd el-Latif al-Zumor.⁷³

The activities of al-Jama`a were limited through the end of 1987 in order to "deter government attacks on members."⁷⁴ During this time, however, the group was not entirely inactive; they focused their energies on reinforcing their strongholds in Minya and Asyut, and on building training camps and accumulating weapons stores.⁷⁵ Many of the al-Jama`a militants were also sent to Afghanistan where they received further military training while fighting alongside the Arab mujahidin. Al-Jama`a also worked intensely to expand its presence in Lower (Northern) Egypt, establishing operational headquarters throughout Cairo, in the neighborhood of `Ain Shams in particular. In late 1988, al-Jama`a radicals went so far as to attempt to enforce the Shari`a among the people of `Ain Shams, an ill-fated move that led to clashes with Egyptian security forces and the eventual arrest of 300 militant Islamists in December of that year. In April 1988, a similar rebellion was staged by al-Jama`a militants and other followers of Shaykh Rahman in Fayyum. Egyptian security forces blockaded Rahman's mosque, which ended in the arrests of 1,500 individuals.⁷⁶

Because the Egyptian government responded so forcefully to the uprisings, it "ignited a vendetta... among the traditional sectors of society in Upper Egypt."⁷⁷ This, in turn, caused leadership roles in the organization to be filled by a number of the 300 Afghan trained and radicalized al-Jama`a militants in the late 1980s and early 1990s.⁷⁸ The combination of all of these events caused al-Jama`a to re-initiate jihad in late 1989.⁷⁹ Then, in December 1992, al-Jama`a declared that the Cairo suburb of Imbaba was an Islamic "state within a state."⁸⁰ In response, the Egyptian military initiated a door-to-door operation, which lasted six weeks, and resulted in the arrests of approximately 5,000 Islamists.⁸¹

During the period 1989 to 1997, al-Jama`a launched a series of armed assaults targeting government officials, prominent secular liberal Egyptian writers, foreign tourists and Copts. These attacks resulted in numerous assassinations and assassination attempts. In 1990, the speaker of the People's Assembly was assassinated, followed by the assassination of liberal writer Farag Foda in 1992. Additionally, Nobel laureate writer Naguib Mahfouz and Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak narrowly missed assassination in 1993 and 1995, respectively. Shaykh Rahman also issued fatwas that led to the routine killings of Copts and the burning of their churches throughout Upper Egypt. Coptic jewelers and goldsmiths were also targeted, and the goods stolen from their shops were used as a primary source of financing.⁸² Al-Jama`a also sought to undermine the Egyptian economy by carrying out attacks on tourists and tourist sites.

By the end of the mid-1990s, many of al-Jama`a's leaders realized that their efforts were having the opposite of their desired effect. They had failed on the one hand to ignite a popular Islamist revolution, and the massive loss of tourism revenue caused by al-Jama`a's attacks worsened the economic situation for a vast number of Egyptians, causing their unem-

ployment or underemployment. As a result, the Egyptian public began to overwhelmingly condemn the group's actions. Then, in September 1995, Tal'at Fu'ad Qasem, al-Jama'a's "European Coordinator," disappeared, leaving the group's financial networks in disarray. Shaykh Rahman was also imprisoned in the United States in 1995 as well. Finally, by 1997 the majority of al-Jama'a's "most battle-hardened fighters...had been killed in combat, or arrested, condemned to death, and executed."⁸³ It was at that time that al-Jama'a's leaders realized that their aggressive militant tactics were leading to their destruction at the hands of the Egyptian government.

On July 5, 1997, al-Jama'a's Shura Council issued a statement called "The Initiative of Cessation of Violence," which announced the group's unconditional renunciation of armed operations.⁸⁴ A dissenting faction of the group's exiled leaders, led by al-Jama'a's amir in Afghanistan, Rifa'a Taha Ibrahim, refused to accept the decision. It was allegedly Taha who orchestrated the November 17, 1997 massacre that occurred in Luxor that left more than 60 men, women and children dead when masked gunmen opened fire on a crowd of foreign tourists.⁸⁵ As a result, Taha was expelled from the Shura Council of al-Jama'a al-Islamiyya. In 2002, the original leadership of al-Jama'a al-Islamiyya issued a formal apology for their actions, decrying their "flawed" interpretations of the Qur'an and hadith in a published four volume series entitled, "Correction of Concepts."⁸⁶ Al-Jama'a's central theoretician, Najih Ibrahim, has said of the 1981 assassination of Anwar Sadat that, "Yes, it was a sin and it didn't benefit Islam."⁸⁷

OTHER MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD BRANCHES OUTSIDE EGYPT

The Syrian Muslim Brotherhood

The Syrian Muslim Brotherhood is the first, most important and most active branch of the Muslim Brotherhood outside Egypt. It was established in 1937 by Dr. Mustafa al-Suba'i and Sheikh Muhammed al-Hamed in Aleppo. Dr. al-Suba'i was a personal friend of Hasan al-Banna, who he knew from his education at al-Azhar.⁸⁸ The group operated mainly in the north of the country, specifically in Homs, Hama and Aleppo. While the group was originally known by various names, its principal title was *Shabab Muhammad* (The Youth of Muhammad). In 1944, during the congress of Islamic groups in Aleppo, the group assumed the name *al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin*, the Muslim Brothers.⁸⁹ Despite the fact that the Egyptian and Syrian chapters considered themselves a single entity at the time, they operated independently and autonomously. From 1945-1961, Dr. Mustafa al-Suba'i cooperated closely with Hasan al-Banna and Sayyid Qutb. In 1958, Egypt and Syria formed the "United Arab Republic." The Syrian Muslim Brotherhood, however, opposed the union between Egypt

and Syria, and Dr. al-Suba'i was forced to dissolve the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood due to Nasir's insistence. The United Arab Republic only lasted for three years, and following its breakup in the early 1960s the Muslim Brotherhood participated in national elections and won 10 seats in the Syrian parliament. In March 1963, the secular Arab socialist Ba'ath Party returned to power in Syria and proceeded to suppress the Brotherhood. In the following two years from 1964 to 1965, a confrontation erupted between the two sides when the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood carried out acts of civil disobedience against the government and a minor revolt in Hama led by Marwan Hadid.⁹⁰ Hadid studied in Egypt in the late 1950s and early 1960s, and like many other Islamists he was influenced by Sayyid Qutb.⁹¹ This episode increased the militancy of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood by the late 1960s. In addition to the secular orientation of the Ba'ath, another factor that greatly contributed to the tensions between the ruling party and the Muslim Brotherhood was the predominance of *Alawites* (a minority Shi'a sect) within the ranks of the Ba'ath. The Sunni Islamists in the Muslim Brotherhood fiercely opposed the emerging dominance of this Shi'a sect within the Syrian government and military apparatus.

Prelude to Revolution

In the early- and mid-1970s, various events occurred that further angered the Syrian Islamists. In 1970, the Ba'ath government instituted a secular constitution in Syria that eliminated the preceding prerequisite that the president be a Muslim.⁹² This was in line with the secular ideology of the Arab socialist Ba'ath Party, which was founded by Christian thinker Micheal Aflaq, and according to the socialist tradition Syria opted to separate religion from politics and advocated a nationalist and pan-Arabist ideology. This move, however, greatly angered the Islamists who wished to base law and governance in Syria on Islamic principles and Shari'a law and subsequently accused the government of *kufir* (unbelief) and rioted. This domestic conflict was further complicated by the increasing popularity of the Ba'ath government following its favorable performance in the 1973 war against Israel, and the general increase in nationalist sentiments among the Syrian population, which greatly alarmed the Islamists. The Muslim Brotherhood also opposed Syrian President Hafez al-Assad's close relations with the shah of Iran, a prominent secular ruler in the Middle East and a close ally of the United States.⁹³ Most of all, the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood was deeply dismayed at Syria's entrance into the Lebanese civil war in June 1976 to save the Christian Maronite-dominated government from defeat and to prevent a victory by Sunni leftists and Palestinian PLO guerrillas. The Brotherhood, which was supportive of the Sunni militias in Lebanon, opposed the Ba'athist denial of their victory.⁹⁴ All of these events angered the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood deeply, and in the mid-1970s it elected Adnan Sa'ad al-Din as its new leader. In 1976, Sa'ad al-Din chose to initiate an armed jihad against the secular government in Damascus.

A Three Phased Jihad against the Government

In 1976, as part of the initial phase of its jihad against the Syrian government, the Muslim Brotherhood began to employ hit and run attacks against government facilities and personnel. The second phase of the jihad consisted of three parts.⁹⁵ First, in June 1979, Muslim Brotherhood militants attacked Syrian government offices, police stations, military facilities and other locations. Their most notable operation was their attack on the Syrian Artillery Academy in Aleppo and their killings of 83 artillery cadets.⁹⁶ Second, on June 26, 1980, members of the Muslim Brotherhood attempted to assassinate Syrian President Hafez al-Assad. In response, the next morning Syrian government forces were dispatched to Tadmur prison and they executed 600-1,000 imprisoned members of the Brotherhood.⁹⁷ Finally, the Brotherhood carried out large-scale demonstrations and boycotts in various Syrian cities. In addition, Brotherhood members attacked Soviet advisers who were stationed in Syria to train the Syrian armed forces.⁹⁸ The Brotherhood hoped to bring about a harsh reaction from the government, which it could exploit to ignite a popular revolution. In response to the Brotherhood's attacks, on July 8, 1980 the Syrian government passed emergency law 49 which made membership in the Muslim Brotherhood a capital offense.⁹⁹ The struggle against the government continued in the following months, and the Brotherhood executed multiple car bombs in Damascus that killed hundreds of Syrian civilians.

In the third phase of their jihad against the secular Syrian government, the Muslim Brotherhood executed an all out revolt from August 1981 until February 1982. By the end of January and early February 1982, the Islamists had gained control of Hama, at the time a city of 180,000 inhabitants located about 120 miles north of Damascus. In retaliation, Syrian President Hafez al-Assad moved swiftly to crush the Brotherhood's revolt and dispatched the Syrian military to surround the city. On February 2, the leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood announced on mosque microphones a popular jihad against the infidel government, calling on Syrian citizens to "rise up and drive the unbelievers from Hama."¹⁰⁰ Shortly after, Syrian Special Forces entered the city and engaged the Islamists in intense street battles. On February 17, Syrian forces killed Shaykh Adib al-Kaylani, the commander of the Muslim Brotherhood in Hama. In the following weeks, the Syrian army crushed the revolt by mercilessly shelling the city, and in the process demolishing Hama and killing 10,000-25,000 inhabitants including most members of the Muslim Brotherhood and countless innocent civilians who were unable to escape. The campaign ended in early March.¹⁰¹ Since 1980, membership in the Brotherhood has been banned in Syria under punishment of death. Following the failed revolt, many of the Syrian Islamists escaped to Lebanon and to Western European countries where some were granted political asylum.

The Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood

Since its inception in 1945, the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood has opted for a different path than its siblings in Egypt and Syria.¹⁰² During the past six decades, the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood has largely opted for inclusion in the Jordanian political system and favorable relations with the Hashemite monarchy, although on many occasions there were tensions beneath the surface. The Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood was established shortly after its sibling in Palestine. To this day, the Jordanian Brotherhood links itself to the Palestinian cause and considers the "liberation of Palestine" its top priority. Members of the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood participated in the 1948 and 1967 wars against Israel. In Jordan, the Brotherhood has sought political inclusion since its inception and participated in the parliamentary elections in 1956 and in 1963 and most other subsequent national elections.¹⁰³ In the 1970s, the Brotherhood became the primary venue for the spread of Islamist ideals and thought in Jordanian society. The Muslim Brotherhood carried out social welfare programs and opened numerous schools and medical centers. At this time, the Brotherhood's influence spread to trade unions and university campuses, and became prominent in Palestinian refugee camps in Jordan.¹⁰⁴ During the early 1990s, the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood won 22 seats in the Jordanian parliament.

In 1992, the Muslim Brotherhood created *Hizb Jabhat al-'Amal al-Islami* (The Islamic Action Front Party), which became its main vehicle for political participation.¹⁰⁵

The Brotherhood decided to abstain from the 1997 elections in protest of a reported 1994 government crackdown following the signing of the peace treaty with Israel, which the Brotherhood opposed. In 2003, the Islamic Action Front Party participated in the elections and won 17 seats in the parliament.¹⁰⁶ Similar to other political parties, the Islamic Action Front Party also suffers from factions among its members. In 2006, four members of the party declared Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi a martyr and were subsequently arrested by Jordanian authorities. Since 2006, the Muslim Brotherhood has claimed increased government pressure, including the arrest of a few of its members in May 2007.¹⁰⁷ The group also claims discrimination in election procedures and considered boycotting the 2007 elections.¹⁰⁸ In late May 2007, Jordanian officials met with the Islamic Action Front Party to discuss the latest developments and to hear their concerns, but has thus far denied their claims of discrimination.¹⁰⁹

The Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood¹

Originally established on October 26, 1945, the Palestinian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood has gone through numerous tribulations and eventually evolved into the mili-

¹ For a detailed discussion of the Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas, please consult the chapter on Hamas.

tant organization Hamas.¹¹⁰ The issue of Palestine has always played a prominent role in the ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood. Prior to 1948, the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood ardently opposed Jewish immigration to Palestine, and during the Israeli war of independence Muslim Brotherhood members participated in the fighting. While Brotherhood presence in the Gaza Strip dates back to the 1940s, when the strip was under Egyptian control, the Muslim Brotherhood took hold in the strip conclusively after 1967 and the Israeli occupation of Gaza and the West Bank. In 1973, the leader of the Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood, Shaykh Ahmad Yasin, established *al-Mujamma al-Islami* (The Islamic Center), a front for the Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood in Gaza. This center was established in a mosque, and there was also a clinic, a nursing school, a youth sports club and a festival hall attached to it, all in line with the Brotherhood's emphasis on social welfare services. Through this center, the Brotherhood managed most of its activities in Gaza. Israel granted the center a legal license in 1979.¹¹¹

Although many of the leading members of the Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood were educated in al-Azhar in Egypt in the 1970s, the Palestinian Islamists actually sought to emulate the Jordanian model of inclusion in the political system, and differed from the revolutionary aspirations and practices of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. From the onset of the Israeli occupation of Gaza and the West Bank, and up until the start of the Palestinian *intifada* (uprising), the Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood maintained cordial relations with Israel, which at the time was mainly concerned with the activities of the PLO and other secular militant organizations. This allowed the Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood to grow dramatically in these two decades and to acquire considerable influence, property and sway within the Palestinian populace, mainly due to its extensive social welfare network. By 1987, in Gaza alone the Muslim Brotherhood tripled the number of its mosques and came to own more than 10% of the real estate.¹¹²

From the Brotherhood to Hamas

Following the spontaneous eruption of the Palestinian popular uprising against the Israeli occupation on December 8, 1987, the position of the Muslim Brotherhood on the Palestinian street was put to the test. The Palestinian Islamic Jihad, an earlier offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood and the secular PLO, was in favor of the *intifada* and was extremely critical of the Muslim Brotherhood's inaction and general cordial relations with Israel. Due to increasing pressure on the Brotherhood to join the popular uprising, and out of fear of losing its powerbase with the Palestinian community, in December 1987, a mere few days after the eruption of the *intifada*, Shaykh Ahmad Yasin, the leader of the Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood, founded Hamas—The Palestinian Islamic Resistance Movement. On December 14, the Brotherhood issued a statement calling on the Palestinian people to rise up against the Israeli occupation; this became the first Hamas communiqué.¹¹³ On August 18, 1988, Hamas announced its official charter, which established the goals of the movement. The main points

in the charter were the opposition to the PLO's secular charter and opposition to Israel.¹¹⁴ Since then, Hamas has become the most prominent Palestinian terrorist organization and has carried out numerous attacks against Israeli soldiers and civilians. In the 1990s, Hamas adopted suicide bombings as its preferred tactic against Israel and has sought to hinder the Oslo peace process between the secular Palestinian National Authority and Israel.¹¹⁵

Rise to Power

In recent years, Hamas has also opted to capitalize on its growing popularity in the hopes of gaining power in the Palestinian territories and has participated in Palestinian national and municipal elections. During the last Palestinian elections on January 25, 2006, Hamas swept the Palestinian parliament, winning 76 of 132 seats.¹¹⁶ This made Hamas the new elected Palestinian government. It controlled the cabinet and appointed one of its leaders, Isma'il Haniyya, as the new Palestinian prime minister. This marked the first time that a branch of the Muslim Brotherhood had come to power through elections and formed a cabinet. Hamas' victory was followed by various tribulations and conflicts. Due to the group's terrorist history, the United States, Israel and the European Union refused to negotiate with the new government and imposed an economic embargo ending all aid to the Palestinians, hoping to force Hamas to renounce terrorism and to recognize Israel. The economic embargo of the West Bank and Gaza was compounded by increasing hostility in Gaza between Hamas and the secular Fatah, which culminated in an eruption of violence in Gaza in mid-June 2007 in which Hamas' "Executive Force" overwhelmed Fatah security forces and seized the Palestinian Presidential Compound and the headquarters of Fatah's Preventive Security Force on June 14. In the aftermath of the Hamas revolt and takeover in Gaza, Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas declared a state of emergency and dismissed the elected Hamas Prime Minister Isma'il Haniyya.¹¹⁷ Since June 2007, Hamas has maintained full control of Gaza, while Fatah maintains control of the West Bank.

Conclusion

In the aftermath of the September 11 attacks, it is proper to focus attention on al-Qa'ida and its affiliates. At the same time, however, other important Islamist organizations in the Middle East should not be ignored. In that regard, the Muslim Brotherhood is the most important and influential Islamist organization in the Middle East and should also be given attention. In the Arab world, it is estimated that the Muslim Brotherhood boasts millions of members and supporters, far greater than al-Qa'ida and its affiliates. The Muslim Brotherhood is not a terrorist organization, and unlike al-Qa'ida, Hezbollah and other terrorist groups, it has not intentionally attacked Americans in the region. Nevertheless, the Muslim Brotherhood has had a monumental impact on the rise and militancy of Sunni terrorist organizations in the Middle East.

First, the Muslim Brotherhood is the mother organization of numerous militant offshoots, including al-Jihad al-Islami and al-Jama'a al-Islamiyya, which were founded by former members of the organization. Second, since its inception in the 1920s, the Muslim Brotherhood has been an incubator for militant Islamist ideologies, and the home of the most important jihadi ideologues of the current time. Third, some branches of the Muslim Brotherhood have been involved in sustained asymmetric warfare and assassination campaigns in the Middle East; in Syria, in particular, the Muslim Brotherhood initiated a full blown revolution. Fourth, the Palestinian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood evolved into the militant organization Hamas, and it may be likely that other branches of the Brotherhood could follow a similar trajectory under the right circumstances. Finally, and equally important, the Muslim Brotherhood is much more than a political organization with a militant past. During the past three decades, the Muslim Brotherhood has become the largest and most legitimate political opposition party in the Arab world and is viewed by many as the most noteworthy alternative to unpopular secular regimes in the region. It has participated and won several elections in the region and, in the future, is likely to come to power through democratic elections as occurred with Hamas in January 2006. Due to these reasons it is important to analyze the different branches of the Muslim Brotherhood, for in the future they will continue to influence domestic Arab politics and regional dynamics.

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Chapter 4

Assessing Sunni Activism



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Sunni Muslim activism began in the late 19th century as a response to Western political and cultural dominance in the Middle East and the decline of Islam in public life.¹ Sunni activists work to protect the Muslim community from negative foreign influence (variously defined) and to increase the public role of Islam; however, they differ over the means for achieving this goal, which is reflected in their attitudes toward the state: missionaries opt out of the political system and seek to create alternative communities; politicians work within the system; and revolutionaries or jihadis want to violently overthrow the system.²

Politicians work within the political systems of their host countries to protect or increase the presence of Islam in public life. Much of their language and forms of political organization are inspired by Western political movements, especially the Western human rights tradition and Marxism.

The archetypal politician is a member of the Muslim Brotherhood, an organization created in 1928 by the Egyptian school teacher, Hasan al-Banna, to establish an Islamic state. The organization is highly organized and centralized, with local branches working to Islamize all facets of adherents' lives. Although at various times members of the Brotherhood have promoted revolutionary violence, the organization today is principally nonviolent and willing to work with parliamentary systems of government. The one exception to this nonviolent stance is the Arab-Israeli conflict; many Brotherhood members believe Palestinian violence is a legitimate response to Israeli occupation and they will thus lend their moral support to Palestinian militants and help them with fundraising. (Hamas is an offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood.)

- 1 It became increasingly popular after Israel's victory over several neighboring countries in 1967, which was viewed as a defeat for secular Arab nationalism. See David Cook, *Martyrdom in Islam*, pp.136-37.
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There are local chapters of the Brotherhood throughout the Middle East whose members sponsor candidates for national elections. The Brothers keep a low profile in the United States, but they have been responsible for founding several Muslim activist organizations, including the Muslim Students' Association.

Like the politicians, missionaries seek to create an alternative community through education; however, they usually refrain from engaging in parliamentary politics, which they believe is corrupt and un-Islamic. In their writings, missionaries focus on the pollution of Islamic values and the weakening of personal piety, both of which they attribute to Western influence and Muslim laxity and ignorance. They seek to convince Muslims of their error and to return them to authentic Islam, based on the practice of the Prophet Muhammad and his early followers.

There are two principal types of missionary movements in the modern Sunni world: the Tablighi Jama'at (The Society for Proselytizing) and Salafism. Like the Muslim Brotherhood, the Tablighi Jama'at began in the 1920s as a movement to create an alternative Muslim society (in this case, in a majority Hindu country). Also like the Brotherhood, it is very hierarchical, but focuses on proselytizing rather than political action.

Tablighis travel door-to-door in Muslim areas throughout the world inviting their audience to join them in their mission. They base their lives on the example of the Prophet, as summarized in two books, *Tablighi nisab (The Tabligh Curriculum)* and *Fazā'il-e a'mal (The Merits of Practice)*. Men and women are separated and members dress and groom themselves in a manner consistent with the Prophet's instructions.³

A newer missionary movement that also seeks to emulate the example of the Prophet and the pious "forefathers" (*Salaf*) is Salafism. Salafism began as a liberal, Protestant-type movement in Sunni Islam in the 19th century that sought to purify Islam from outside cultural influences and from allegiance to any of the traditional schools of Islamic law. Later disenchantment with the West, coupled with Saudi proselytizing, pushed Salafism into the Wahhabi orbit. Today, there is little difference between Salafism and Wahhabism, a puritanical Sunni reform movement founded in the 18th century by Muhammad ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab.

Salafism stresses strict adherence to the Prophet's example and promotes the shunning of non-Salafis. Although it is not organized like the Tablighi Jama'at, the fact that the movement is inspired by Wahhabi intellectuals means that Saudi Arabia, the homeland of Wahhabism, exercises the most influence over it. Moreover, the financial backing of the wealthy Saudi state means that Salafis can offer free literature, instructional videos and visiting scholars to poor Muslim schools around the world, which has led to the rapid spread of their teachings.⁴ This, coupled with Salafism's hostile attitude toward modernity and outsiders, makes it attractive to dispossessed or dislocated Muslims across the world who are looking

3 Barbara Mecalif, "Tablighi Jama'at," *Encyclopedia of Islam and the Muslim World*.

4 Khaled Abou El Fadl, *The Great Threat* (Harper: San Francisco, 2005), pp. 86-94.

for a powerful, supportive group to join in order to overcome their marginal status.⁵

Most jihadis share the puritanical beliefs of the Salafis and reject the nation-state and other features of modernity. Unlike the non-jihadist Salafis, however, they are willing to use violence to create a new political system based solely on Islamic law. Jihadis believe that Muslim rulers are illegitimate if they do not implement Islamic law, or if they ally with Western powers. Jihadis also believe that there is a Western-led conspiracy to destroy Islam; therefore, warfare against states involved in the conspiracy is an individual's duty until the threat ends. Since the threat is so dire, jihadis often argue that they do not have to abide by scriptural prohibitions against certain kinds of attacks or targets.

Jihadi groups can be separated into two types according to their political behavior. The first type is focused on toppling local governments they deem to be un-Islamic. An example of this is Egyptian Islamic Jihad. The second type focuses on restoring Muslim rule to historically Muslim-controlled lands. Hamas in the Occupied Territories is one example, while the mujahidin groups in Afghanistan during the 1980s is another one.

Some experts who study al-Qa`ida suggest that it represents a new, third type of Sunni jihadi group: an organization focused on liberating the entire umma, or Muslim community, from Western influence.⁶ Thus, jihadis of this type are called global jihadis. One could also argue, however, that al-Qa`ida is still pursuing the agenda of the nation-oriented jihadis (the first type) by a circuitous route: first remove Western influence in one's home country, then overthrow the local government.

Apart from the stated political goals for which jihadis fight, what else motivates someone to join a jihadi group? It depends on the individual. Some have psychological problems or come from bad homes, which make them prone to violence; others do not. Some are aggrieved by their lack of money or opportunities; others are not. Some fight for a chance to die a martyr and have their sins forgiven; others see martyrdom as a fringe benefit. Some fight purely out of a sense for adventure; some fight because it pays well. Some fight because it gives them an opportunity to practice their tradecraft (i.e., bomb-makers or former Special Forces officers); and some fight solely for religious reasons.

Apparently, the same mix of motivations held true at the time of the Prophet. According to several accounts, a man approached the Prophet and asked, "One man fights for booty, another fights for fame, and a third fights to show off. Which of them fights in the path of God?" The Prophet said, "He who fights for the word of God to be supreme is on the path of God."⁷ Here, the Prophet maintains that Muslim warriors should only be motivated by religion, but it is clear from the question that many of his followers were also fighting for more mundane reasons. The same is true today.

5 William McCants, "Reprimand with the Heart, the tongue, or the Hand? Salafi Values and Their Political Consequences" (unpublished).

6 Hegghammer, "Violent Islamism."

7 Bukhari, 4.52.65.

Distinguishing between the three kinds of activists surveyed above turns on three questions:

1. Do you think it is legitimate for Muslims to participate in parliamentary democracy?


- Politicos say yes, missionaries and jihadis say no.

2. Do you think it is legitimate for Muslims to violently overthrow a Muslim ruler?

- Jihadis say yes, politicians and missionaries say no.

3. Do you think education is enough to create authentic Islamic societies?

- Missionaries say yes, politicians and jihadis say no.



Graph 1. Activist Continuum

It is best to think of the three types of activism as points along a continuum (Graph 1). Where Sunni Muslims fall on this continuum (if at all) depends not only on their psychological makeup and reasoning, but also on the political situation in their host countries and the worldview of their peer network. The latter is particularly important, as peer pressure plays a powerful role in radicalizing or moderating the attitudes of an individual.

Chapter 5

**From Ali to Khomeini:
The Development of Shiite Islamism**

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Introduction

Since Iran's so-called "Islamic" revolution in 1979,¹ Shiite Islam² has become synonymous with the black beards, robes and turbans of Iran's clerical rulers and their antipathy toward the West. Iran's subsequent conflicts with the United States, its links to terrorism and the rise of Hizb Allah in Lebanon have all contributed to the notion of a Shi'a threat. Since the invasion of Iraq in 2003, however, the picture of Shiite Islam as a perpetual enemy of the West has been obscured. Among the most ardent supporters of the 2003 invasion and following occupation were Iraqi Shiites, and major Shiite parties—the Supreme Iraqi Islamic Council (formerly the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq) and the Islamic Da'wa Party—remain allied with the coalition. Yet, both of these groups maintain similar ideological commitments as Hizb Allah and Iran's ruling ayatollahs. These parties also share close relations with Iran's Islamist military, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (*Sepah-e Pasdaran*). This political spider web is further complicated by the fact that the Islamic Republic of Iran helped establish and continues to support Shiite groups that are both antagonistic (Hizb Allah) and friendly (Supreme Iraqi Islamic Council) to the United States.

As current conflicts have shown, Iran's influence on Shiite politics in the Middle East remains pronounced. Grasping the ideological underpinnings of Iran's ruling regime and its roots in Shiite Islam are crucial to understanding broader Shiite aspirations in the Middle East. To that end, this chapter discusses Shiite Islamism and its development in Iran. It begins with a brief overview of the formation of Shi'ism, drawing attention to the key events that have come to define the religion and its traditions. It then discusses the development of Shi'ism in the pre-modern period and the rise of its clerical class. Next, it explores the impact of Western imperialism on Iranian society and its effect on Shiite politics during the first half of the 20th century. Finally, it considers the influence of third world politics on the development of Shiite political ideologies. These ideologies—which I term *Shiite Islamism*—gave rise to the Shiite revolutionary movement in Iran, culminating in the 1979 revolution. After the revolution, the Islamist ideology of Ayatollah Khomeini came to dominate political life

in Iran and pervade Shiite politics throughout the region. Thus, understanding Shiite Islamism in Iran is central to understanding the role that militant Shiite ideologies play in the political landscape of the Middle East.

The Formation of Shiite Islam

After the death of Muhammad in 632 CE, there was a disagreement within the Muslim community on who would succeed the Prophet.³ The disagreement created a split in the Muslim community and two main factions arose: those who supported Abu Bakr and his successors Umar and Uthman, and those who supported Ali ibn Abi Talib—the Prophet's cousin, son-in-law and most trusted confidant—and his descendants. Those that supported Ali were known as the *shi'at 'Ali*, or the "partisans of Ali." Although this was a political distinction, it was from Ali's supporters (the Shi'a) that the Shiite religion gradually emerged as a separate and distinct variant of Islam. As the dispute over the succession to Muhammad is at the root of Shiite Islam, it is important to understand how Shiites understand this dispute and how it has influenced Shiite religion and culture.

Numerous traditions (*hadith*) recognized (but understood differently) by both Sunnis and Shiites attest to Muhammad's favoring of Ali and the latter's unparalleled valor and morality.⁴ For Sunnis, these traditions simply reinforce the notion that Ali was a central figure in early Islam and should be revered as such. Shiites, however, point to these traditions as evidence that the Prophet had intended for Ali, and later Ali's sons, to succeed him in leadership of the Muslim community. Perhaps the most important tradition supporting the Shiites' claim is an account of the Prophet during the last year of his life. This account, recorded in a Sunni collection of traditions, states:

We [the Prophet's companions] were with the Apostle of God [Muhammad] in his journey and we stopped at Ghadir Khumm. We performed the obligatory prayer together and a place was swept for the Apostle under two trees and he performed the mid-day prayer. And then he took 'Ali by the hand and said to the people: "Do you acknowledge that I have a greater claim on each of the believers than they have on themselves?" And they replied: "Yes!" And he took 'Ali's hand and said: "Of whomsoever I am Lord [*mawla*], then 'Ali is also Lord. O God! Be Thou the supporter of whoever supports 'Ali and the enemy of whoever opposes him." And 'Umar met him ['Ali] after this and said to him: "Congratulations, O son of Abu Talib! Now morning and evening [i.e. forever] you are the master of every believing man and woman."⁵

To Shiites, the implications of this tradition are clear. It not only shows Muhammad's appointment of Ali as his successor, but it also indicates that Umar (the future second caliph) understood and acknowledged this fact. This is important to note because to Shiites it suggests that Umar's later nomination of Abu Bakr as caliph and first successor to the Prophet

not only betrayed the Prophet's wishes, but also went against Umar's understanding of those wishes.

Another significant episode involving the Prophet and Umar, known as the Episode of Pen and Paper, casts further doubt in the eyes of Shiites on Umar's faithfulness and on his role in usurping Ali's rightful successorship. This tradition, which is recognized (but also understood differently) by Sunnis and Shiites, recounts a conversation between the Prophet and his followers as he lay sick in bed during the final days of his life. The tradition states:

When the Prophet's illness became serious, he said: "Bring me writing materials that I may write for you something, after which you will not be led into error." 'Umar said: "The illness has overwhelmed the Prophet. We have the Book of God [the Qur'an] and that is enough for us." Then the people differed about this and spoke many words. And he [the Prophet] said: 'Leave me! There ought not to be quarrelling in my presence.'" And Ibn 'Abbas [the Prophet's cousin] went out saying: "The greatest of calamities is what intervened between the Apostle and his writing."⁶

Shiites understand this episode as Muhammad's attempt to write a will and testament that would have appointed Ali as his successor. Umar's interference in this matter marks him as dubious to Shiites, who consider him to be a chief conspirator against Ali.

Without a will, Muslims were forced to choose a leader after the Prophet's death. It was during a meeting at a hall called Saqifa in Medina where Umar nominated and pledged his allegiance to Abu Bakr as the Prophet's successor (*khalifa* or caliph). Ali, however, was not present at this meeting. Rather, he, his wife Fatima (the Prophet's daughter) and the rest of Muhammad's family were preparing the Prophet's body for burial. Although Ali was angered by Umar and the other Muslims for electing a leader in his absence, Shiites believe that Ali did not formally protest the decision for the sake of Muslim unity.

Ali continued to have his own supporters among the Muslims, yet there would be two more successors (Umar and Uthman) to the role of caliph before Ali held that office. Ali's ascension to the caliphate came on the heels of the controversial reign and murder of the third caliph, Uthman, in 656 CE. Uthman's rule had brought the powerful Banu al-Umayya clan to power for the first time. Under Uthman, the Umayyads, a native Meccan clan, had become entrenched in leadership roles throughout Muslim territory, including important governorships. This gave the Umayya clan a privileged and powerful position in the Muslim community, but also caused resentment among many Muslim tribes and eventually led to Uthman's murder. After Uthman's death, Ali's supporters urged him to accept the caliphate. Although reluctant, Ali ultimately accepted the role and became the fourth (and last) "rightly guided" caliph. For Shiites, this was the first and only time in the history of Islam that the Muslim community was led by a faithful and true successor to the Prophet.

The tumultuous political climate that led to Uthman's murder continued after Ali was brought to power. The Umayya clan and their supporters disputed Ali's election to the

caliphate and blamed his followers for Uthman's murder. Many of the Umayya relocated to Damascus to support their own candidate for caliph, Muawiya ibn Abi Sufyan, the military governor of Syria. After Muawiya refused to swear allegiance to Ali, a conflict erupted between the armies of the two Muslim leaders. A court of arbitration was called to settle the conflict diplomatically, though little progress was made. Instead, some of Ali's supporters, who thought his agreeing to arbitration compromised his claim to the caliphate, turned against him. This group, known as the Kharajites (*khawarij*), argued that Ali's choice of arbitration was against God's will, and thus for having gone against God, Ali was no longer a Muslim. This act of declaring Ali a non-Muslim (*kafir*) is known as *takfir*, and was the philosophical basis for the Kharajites' rebellion against Ali and their murder of him in 661.

The rebellion of the Kharajites and their murder of Ali ended the only period in Muslim history where a Shiite imam led the Islamic community. After Ali's death, the Umayyads extended their control over Muslim lands and Muawiya was declared caliph. Support for Ali and his descendents continued, although most of his supporters were isolated to the frontiers of Muslim territory, especially the garrison town of Kufa, Iraq. Many of these supporters turned to Ali's sons, Hasan and Husayn, to continue their father's rightful struggle for leadership of the Muslim community. Shortly after his father's murder, Hasan, the elder of the two, and the second imam in Shiite tradition, renounced his claim to the caliphate in order to avoid more bloodshed and disharmony between Muslims. Eight years after his abdication, Shiites believe that Hasan was poisoned to death by his wife on Muawiya's behalf.

It was not until the death of Muawiya and the ascension of his son Yazid to the caliphate in 680, that Husayn—Ali's second son and the third Shiite imam—would press his claim to the leadership of the Muslim community. Yazid's reputation as a morally lax drunkard made his successorship infuriating to many Muslims. Urged by his supporters in Kufa, Husayn decided to make a bid for his rightful claim to the caliphate. He led a small group of companions and family members toward the Umayya-ruled town of Kufa where he planned to join up with a few thousand of his supporters and lead a campaign against Yazid in Damascus. When the Umayya governor of Iraq, Ubaydallah ibn Ziyad, discovered news of the plot, he executed some of Husayn's leading supporters in Kufa and dispatched an army to block Husayn's access to the city. Despite being informed of this turn of events, Husayn continued on his mission toward Kufa, but was forced by the Umayya troops to go north of the city and decamp in the barren desert plains of Karbala. Ibn Ziyad's army prevented Husayn's troops from proceeding to Kufa and cut off their access to fresh water. On the 10th day of the Muslim month of Muharram, 680 CE, after several days of failed negotiations and Husayn's refusal to pay tribute to Yazid, nearly 4,000 Umayya troops stormed Husayn's camp and slaughtered his companions.

The Shiite recollections of this event—known as Ashura (literally the "tenth")—are tragic and brutal. Husayn and about 70 of his supporters were killed. His eldest son, Ali al-Akbar, died a valiant death fighting the Umayya forces. Husayn's half-brother, Abbas, was

killed after both his arms were cut off while he was bringing drinking water to the women and children of the camp. Husayn's nephew, Qasim, was killed on what was to be his wedding day in front of his bride. Perhaps the most tragic murder was that of Husayn's infant son, Ali al-Asghar, who was killed in his father's arms when an Umayyad archer took aim and shot hit him in the throat. In one popular Shi'ite oral tradition, Husayn is imagined to have lamented the deaths of his family and the tragedy that was to befall him:

The infidels [i.e. the Umayyads] are one side, and my sorrowful self on the other. The rose has fallen in one direction, and the thorns in the other. O friends, in one quarter Akbar fell by treachery, a martyr...Kasim [Qasim] the disappointed, has been killed on one spot, and on the other I myself experience the cruel oppression of the spheres. In one corner the mother of 'Ali Akbar is smiting her head, while the sorrowful bride of Kasim is moaning in another...I am sore distressed at the unkind treatment received at the hands of the cruel heavens. Pitiful tyranny is exercised towards me by a cruel, unbelieving army! All the sorrows and troubles of this world have overwhelmed me! I am become a butt for the arrow of affliction and trouble. I am a holy bird stripped of its quills and feathers by the hand of the archer of tyranny, and am become, O friends, utterly disabled, and unable to fly to my sacred nest. They are going to kill me mercilessly, for no other crime or guilt except that I happen to be a prophet's grandson.⁷

Husayn was killed, and his body was decapitated and mutilated. A few women and children—among them Husayn's son, Ali Zayn al-Abidin (the fourth Shi'ite imam) and his sister Zaynab—were captured, and along with Husayn's severed head taken to Yazid in Damascus. After the slaughter, the camp was burned.

The tragedy of Karbala is the single most important event in the formation of the Shi'ite religion. Before the martyrdom of Husayn, there was no religious element to the supporters of Ali and his descendants. Indeed, historian Heinz Helm suggests that the tragedy of Karbala "marked the 'big bang' that created the cosmos of Shi'ism and brought it into motion."⁸ It was through the mournful commemoration of Ashura that the Shi'a began to develop a separate religious identity. The tradition of commemorating Ashura began soon after the events themselves by a group of Husayn's supporters in Kufa. The Kufan Shi'a carried a particular shame because they had failed to rise up and assist Husayn and his companions in the battle at Karbala. Instead, out of fear of the Umayyad authorities, the Kufan Shi'a—who had encouraged Husayn to come to Kufa with their promise of joining his struggle—did not rebel and were left with a guilt that for many was worse than death.⁹ These Shi'a began the tradition of commemorating Ashura out of informal gatherings during which they would pray for Husayn and his companions and beg God to forgive their sins. A subset of these Shi'ites, led by Sulayman ibn Surad, looked for more extreme solutions to their suffering. This group, known as the Penitents (*sawwabin*), wanted to die as Husayn had died in an

attempt to absolve their sins for failing to come to their leader's aid. This group ultimately decided to lead a campaign against the Umayyads, which they intended to lose. In early 685 CE, the Penitents skirmished with a much larger Umayyad military contingent and most—as they had hoped—were killed. It has been argued that the movement of the Kufan Penitents marked the true beginning of the Shi'ite religion, as it “expressed all the essential elements and concepts of Shi'i piety. The willingness for self-sacrifice is the most outstanding feature, and it has remained unchanged to the present day...”¹⁰ The campaign of the Penitents can also be considered the first time self-martyrdom was employed by Shiites as a religious act.

After the “death march” of the Penitents, the Shi'a of Kufa became inspired and the ritualistic aspects of Shi'a piety, centering on the remembrance of the martyrdom of Husayn and his followers at Karbala, increased in popularity and spread throughout the community. What originated as a small redemptive act among the Shi'a of Kufa wherein the stories of the martyrs of Karbala, especially that of Husayn, were recounted, slowly spread to other Shi'a communities and became the central tradition of Shi'ite Islam.

The early events in Shi'ite history, especially those involving the Imams Ali and Husayn, are the foundation for contemporary Shi'ite symbolism, politics and activism.¹¹ For example, the events at Karbala have become the chief metaphor in Shi'ism for the battle against good versus evil, or justice against injustice. At times of political or social turmoil, the image of Husayn fighting against all odds at Karbala is evoked by clerics, politicians and lay-people to inspire the Shi'ite community into activism. The richness of this metaphor, its cultural and religious depth, as well as its eternal message, enables its use to describe virtually any conflict affecting the Shi'a world. This is especially true in post-revolutionary Iran, and in contemporary Lebanon and Iraq, where the metaphor of Karbala is a permanent fixture in activist rhetoric and propaganda. Thus, these metaphors are a critical dimension in the politicization of Shi'ite Islam, the development of which will be discussed in a later section.

Later Developments in Shi'ism and the Rise of the Clergy

Following the events of Karbala and the campaign of the Penitents, the majority of Shiites, first led by the remaining eight imams and later by Shi'ite religious scholars, or *ulama* (learned ones), turned inwards and practiced a quietist form of their religion for several centuries.¹² Husayn's defeat ended the period of imam-led military revolts and ushered in a period wherein the imams lived in virtual house arrest under Sunni rulers. This contributed to the depoliticization of the role of the imams in the Shi'ite community and to their marginalization in the political sphere of the Muslim world.¹³

Although understanding the lives of the eight imams subsequent to Husayn is important, providing adequate discussion of their careers is beyond the scope of this chapter. A few brief points, however, should be made. Each of these eight imams lived under some form of house arrest and none were able to exercise political control over the Shi'a community. They lived as political prisoners to the Sunni regimes that ruled the Islamic world during this pe-

riod. Although these imams remained the center of the Shiite community, they had limited political influence. In order to keep the Shi'a politically weak and oppressed, Shiites believe that all of the imams (except for the Twelfth Imam) were killed by Sunni political forces, with most (like Hasan, the second imam) murdered by way of poisoning.

The case of the Twelfth Imam is more complicated. Shiites believe that the final (Twelfth) Imam, Muhammad al-Mahdi, never died, but rather passed into a parallel plane of existence. This imam, Shiites contend, will one day return and lead the Shi'a in an apocalyptic battle against the forces of evil, purify Islam and restore justice to the world. A 10th century Shiite text serves as an example of how Shiites imagine the return of the "Hidden Imam":

[A] cry (will come) from the sky (in such a way) that all the people will hear it in their own languages; a face and a chest will appear in the sky before the people in the centre of the sun; the dead will arise from their graves so that they will return to the world and they will recognize one another and visit one another; that will come to an end with twenty-four continuous rain storms and the land will be revived by them after being dead and it will recognize its blessings; after that every disease will be taken away from those of the Shi'a of the Mahdi, peace be upon him, who believe in the truth; at that time they will know of his appearance in Mecca and they will go to him to support him...In his [the Mahdi's] time, injustice will be removed and the roads will be safe. The earth will produce its benefits and every due will be restored to its proper person. No people of any other religions will remain without being shown Islam and confessing faith in it...At that time, men will not find any place to give alms nor be generous because wealth will encompass all the believers.¹⁴

The disappearance or occultation (*ghayba*) of the Imam Mahdi ("the rightly guided one"), and the messianic expectations surrounding his return (*raj'a*) are significant elements of the Shiite religion. The absence of the Twelfth Imam ended the line of Shiite imams that began with Ali and led to a political and spiritual crisis within Shi'ism. The Shi'a believed that only an imam could rightfully lead the Muslim community. Also, the imam was the only one who had the authority to lead Friday prayers and declare an offensive jihad. Without a living, infallible imam interacting with Muslim society, Shiites were forced to question the very legitimacy of temporal Muslim rule. This quandary led to the rise of the Shiite ulama as the de facto leaders of the Shiite community in the absence of the imam.

The Shiite ulama, or clergy (as they are often called), were the first Shiites to grapple with the complexities of temporal rule without an imam. These scholars, trained in the religious sciences and Shiite jurisprudence, slowly emerged as the religious authorities within the Shiite community. During the next few centuries, the Shiite ulama established a similar legal system to that of their Sunni counterparts. Although these scholars developed a strong

intellectual tradition during this period, which focused on rationalist arguments and textual evidence, popular Shiite piety continued to be centered on the oral narratives of Imam Husayn and similar Shiite lore. By the 16th century, it was the power of these stories and the rituals surrounding their commemoration that continued to serve as the basis for popular Shiite identity and activism. Clerical influence remained marginal and mostly confined to the important Shiite centers of Iraq and Iran.

One of the major turning points for Shi'ism in the Middle East came in 1501, when Ismail Safavi, the spiritual leader of a Shiite Sufi brotherhood, led a tribal military conquest of Iran and established that country's first Shiite dynasty. Ismail, who had earlier claimed to be the Mahdi (or return of the Hidden Imam), declared himself *shah* (king) and decreed that Shi'ism would be the state religion of Iran. Although Ismail had originally claimed to be the return of the Hidden Imam, this fact was initially minimized and later ignored by his successors who instead claimed to rule on *behalf* of the Hidden Imam. In this way, the Safavid shahs, who claimed to be the representatives of the Hidden Imam on earth, found a unique solution to the question of temporal rule, where they ruled at the pleasure of the Hidden Imam but still awaited his return.

Iran was majority Sunni at this time with only a small Shiite minority. This made the spread of Shi'ism within Iran a difficult task for Shah Ismail and his successors. To help them in their effort, the Safavid shahs turned to Shiite scholars from the Arab world and offered them state patronage to relocate to Iran.¹⁵ The introduction of Shiite scholars to the political scene helped the Safavid state routinize Shiite practice, law and tradition within their territories. As the head of this campaign, Shiite ulama were granted a level of political authority they had not previously experienced.¹⁶ This created a type of power-sharing arrangement between the Shiite clerical class and the Safavid shahs, which granted the former jurisdiction over the religious affairs of the Safavid state while the latter ruled at the behest of the Hidden Imam.

The Safavid Empire, which ruled from 1501 to 1722, entrenched Shi'ism as the religion of Iran's majority. The process of converting Iran was slow and gradual, and ultimately owed more to the growing influence of Shiite popular culture—especially the spread of narratives about the Imams Ali and Husayn—than to the empowerment of the Shiite clergy.¹⁷ The clergy, however, gained unparalleled influence over their Shiite constituents during this time, which made them among the most powerful political actors in Iran.

By the 19th century, debates within the clerical ranks began to consider a way that would help centralize clerical control over the Shiite community. Up until this time, religious authority was dispersed among numerous clerics, who each had a limited (and often localized) amount of authority. The leading Shiite ulama wanted to establish a system of authority wherein the top ranking cleric would be the central authority for all the Shiites in the world. These debates gave birth to the institution of the *marja al-taqlid*, or the "point of emulation," which was an office to be held by the most senior Shiite cleric. This cleric, or

marja, would be the person who all other ulama and lay Shiites had to "emulate" or imitate in matters concerning religious life. In theory, there would be only one *marja* for the entire Shi'a world, and all Shiites would have to follow his decrees; however, the institution of the *marja al-taqlid* only lasted in this form through the tenures of the first two *marjas*. Afterwards, and through most of the 20th century, several of the day's top ranking ulama could hold the rank of *marja* simultaneously. Their influence, instead of being universal, would be more regional in nature.

The creation of the institution of the *marja al-taqlid* was an important turning point in Shiite clerical authority, as it expanded both the social and political influence of the ulama over Shiite society. An example of this increased political power came during Iran's Tobacco Revolt of 1890-91. This episode occurred at the end of the 19th century in the wake of growing Western intervention and imperialism in the Muslim world. The British were especially active in this era, establishing imperial control over the Indian subcontinent and initiating exploitative commercial ventures across the Middle East. In one such venture, a British businessman was granted a monopoly over the production, export and sale of all Iranian tobacco by the Qajar¹⁸ shah of Iran. News of this concession, which occurred in March 1890, was leaked to the public by anti-imperialist factions and caused popular protests across Iran. As historian Nikki Keddie explains, "The tobacco concession elicited far more protest than any other because it dealt not with areas that were unexploited, or almost so, by Iranian businessmen, but rather with a product widely grown in Iran, and profiting many landholders, shopkeepers and exporters."¹⁹ Thus, the tobacco concession affected nearly every strata of Iranian society. In December 1891, a fatwa attributed to the Shiite *marja al-taqlid* of the time, Mirza Hasan Shirazi, was issued calling for a nationwide boycott of tobacco. With the religious authority and legitimacy of the *marja al-taqlid* behind this order, Shiites of the region from every class and standing (reportedly including the shah's own wives) staged a successful boycott and massive protests that forced the shah to cancel the concession. This event is notable in that it marks the first time the Shiite populace was encouraged into political protest by a ruling *marja*, and signals the emergence of the Shiite ulama as a leading force against Western imperialism.

The Roots of Shiite Islamism in the 20th Century

The long 20th century saw the disintegration of empires, the rise of nation-states, the emergence of two superpowers and the fall of one. This ebb and flow of global political power drastically affected the Middle East. The European powers of Britain and France reinvigorated their imperialistic hold on the Middle East in the first half of the century only to see these adventures collapse in the second. Later, during the Cold War, Middle Eastern states were used as pawns in the global chess match between the United States and the Soviet Union. By the end of the century, the legacy of Western imperialism left much of the Middle East imbued in political and social instability.

The political impotence of Middle Eastern states and their leaders in resisting foreign domination caused unrest throughout the region. The influence of Western secularism drew the ire of religious traditionalists, while the political oppression of Western-backed dictators inspired the activism of progressive elements. Dissent was fueled by the introduction and development of numerous political ideologies. Communism, socialism and nationalism gained particular popularity among secular elements and certain ethnic and religious minorities. The spread of these ideologies also caused a backlash from the religious sector, which considered secularism (in all its forms) to be a major threat to Islam. In order to counteract the influence of these ideologies and Western secularism, Muslim intellectuals and religious leaders began to develop their own political ideologies, which put an emphasis on the superiority of Islam over all other political systems. These ideologies, commonly falling under the rubrics of Islamism, political Islam, or fundamentalism, gave motivation and religious legitimacy to political and militant organizations throughout the region. Although these ideologies have had a significant influence on both Sunni and Shiite societies, their impact on the latter, especially in Iran, has been more pronounced.

Muslim activism against the adoption of Western culture and forms of government was a powerful force in Iran during the first half of the 20th century. During Iran's Constitutional Revolution of 1905-1911—a popular movement that established a constitution and democratically elected parliament (*majles*) under Iran's Qajar regime—Muslim leaders denounced the idea of a parliamentary government as a secular threat to Islam. Leading the anti-parliamentarianism campaign was Shaykh Fazlollah Nuri, a Shiite cleric and the chief organizer of clerical opposition to the Iranian parliament. Nuri articulated his faction's objections to parliamentary government in a series of published letters distributed throughout Iran and the Shiite centers of Iraq. Many of his objections concerned provisions in Iran's constitution that expanded the rights of women, allowed for freedom of the press and gave equal rights to nationalities and religions. These innovations, Nuri argued, were against the "Sacred Law" of Islam and undermined the traditional authority of the ulama. Further, Nuri was troubled by the European trappings of the Iranian parliament and constitution (which was indeed based on the Belgian model), which seemed to devalue the divinity of Islam. On this, Nuri wrote: "Fireworks, receptions of the ambassadors, those foreign habits, the crying of hurrah, all those inscriptions of Long Live, Long Live! (*zendeḥ bad*)! Long Live Equality, Fraternity. Why not... Long Live the Sacred Law, Long Live the Qur'an, Long Live Islam?"²⁰

Nuri wanted to secure the centrality of traditional Islamic law (*Shari'a*) in Iran, which he felt was being weakened and replaced by Western-inspired civil law. To ensure the integrity of Islamic law in Iran, Nuri's camp pressed for and received changes to the constitution which made all parliamentary legislation subject to ratification by a committee of five top ranking clerics. In doing so, Nuri proved the power of the ulama in organizing resistance to any threat to Islamic law and traditional clerical authority in Iran. Although his faction

ultimately crumbled—and Nuri was later killed by constitutionalist supporters—he set a precedent within Iranian Shi'ism by giving the traditionally apolitical ulama a significant political role in the state government—a precedent that laid the foundation for Iran's current theocratic government.

Nuri's movement dwindled in the following years. The leading Shiite ulama returned to their traditional political quietism, while Iran underwent a coup that toppled the Qajar dynasty and brought Reza Shah Pahlavi and his family to power. The new Pahlavi regime, led by Reza Shah, instituted several modernizing and Westernizing reforms inspired by the secular nationalism of Kemalist Turkey. The new reforms took particular aim at the religious and social sectors. Veiling for women was banned and religious garb was restricted. Turbans were to be replaced by Western hats and traditional robes for the Western suit. Although Reza Shah was forced to abdicate his throne in 1941 by the Allied powers, his son and successor—the ineffectual Muhammad Reza Shah Pahlavi—bore much of the fallout for his father's policies.

One Shiite scholar, who was particularly vocal in opposition to the Pahlavi reforms, was the young Ruhollah Khomeini. Like Nuri before him, Khomeini's main concern at this time was the dilution of Islamic law and the ulama's traditional role in society. Khomeini not only saw the ulama's authority attacked by the secular Pahlavi regime, but also by intellectuals and Muslim reformists. Khomeini was particularly worried about reformists, such as the Iranian historian Ahmad Kasravi, who he accused of espousing similar anti-clerical ideas as the Wahhabis of the Arabian Peninsula. (Or, as Khomeini put it: the anti-clerical reformists who imitated "Ibn Taymiyya and the savages of Najd" and "the camel herders of Riyadh."²¹) Khomeini argued:

You [secular intellectuals and Muslim reformists] want to reduce the power of the clergy and to eliminate its honour among the people, you are committing the greatest treason to the country. The undermining of clerical influence produces defects in the country one hundredth of which hundreds of Ministers of Justice and Police Departments cannot repair.²²

Khomeini also took the Pahlavi regime to task for its reforms concerning dress, writing: "They have put chamber-pot-shaped hats over your heads and gladdened your hearts with naked [i.e., unveiled] women in the middle of the streets and swimming pools."²³ These statements articulate Khomeini's concern for defending Shiite traditionalism and clerical authority from the onslaught of secularism and foreign influence. In this regard, his political project can be seen as an extension of Nuri's during the Constitutional Revolution. They also mark Khomeini's entrance into the political sphere, an arena he would come to dominate later in his career.

World War Two brought increased foreign influence and intervention to Iran. Both the British and the Soviets had strategic and economic interests in Iran and used their politi-

cal might to undermine and weaken the Pahlavi regime's autonomy. The British and Soviet militaries occupied southern and northern Iran, respectively, during the war and continued to have troops on the ground for years to come. The Soviets used their supremacy in the north to instigate uprisings among the Azeri Turkish (1945) and Kurdish (1946) minorities of Iran's northwest. The United States also had a small presence in Iran during this time, sending advisers such as Col. Norman Schwarzkopf to help develop Iran's gendarmerie and internal security force along the American model.

Despite the political interests of the Soviets, their paramount concern centered on Iran's oil.²⁴ Although the Soviets (and Americans) were blocked from gaining oil concessions by Iran's *Majles*, the British had already established a monopoly over Iran's vast oil reserves in the south through the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC). Anglo-Iranian's control over Iran's southern oil fields was granted in a concession by the Qajar shah in 1909. Resentment against this concession had been growing steadily throughout Iran since before the war, and by the late 1940s it had become the number one issue among Iran's opposition factions. Iranian discontentment focused on two key issues: first, the exploitative financial arrangement between the Iranian government and AIOC, which resulted in Iran receiving less than 25% of AIOC's annual profits; second, the appalling working and living conditions of the Iranians employed by AIOC in its refinery in the southwestern Iranian city of Abadan. The director of Iran's petroleum institute, who witnessed life in Abadan, commented on the predicament of the AIOC workers:

Wages were fifty cents a day. There was no vacation pay, no sick leave, no disability compensation. The workers lived in a shantytown called Kaghazabad, or Paper City, without running water or electricity, let alone such luxuries as iceboxes or fans. In winter the earth flooded and became a flat, perspiring lake. The mud in town was knee-deep...When the rains subsided, clouds of nipping, small-winged flies rose from the stagnant waters to fill the nostrils, collecting in black mounds...and jamming the fans at the refinery...Summer was worse...The heat was horrid, the worst I've ever known—sticky and unrelenting—while the wind and sandstorms whipped off the desert hot as a blower. The dwellings in Kaghazabad, cobbled from rusted oil drums hammered flat, turned into sweltering ovens...In every crevice hung the foul, sulfurous stench of burning oil—a pungent reminder that everyday 20,000 barrels, or one million tons a year, were being consumed indiscriminately for the functioning of the refinery, and AIOC never paid the [Iranian] government a cent for it.²⁵

These comments echo the sentiments felt by Iranian activists during the period. While the nationalist faction—led by politician and *Majles* member Mohammad Mossadeq—spearheaded the campaign against the AIOC, activists connected to the senior Shiite leadership took the most drastic steps. The Fedai'yan-e Islam, a small group of young radicals associated with the prominent Shiite cleric Ayatollah Abu'l-Qasim Kashani, gained considerable notoriety for their terrorist acts and high-profile assassinations during the 1940s and 1950s. Formed in 1945 by Sayyed Mojtaba Navvab-Safavi, a young Shiite seminarian and former

AIOC employee, the Feda'iyān-e Islam was the first Shi'ite Islamist organization to employ terrorism as a primary method of political activism. Navvab-Safavi first came to public attention in 1945 for his outspoken public lectures in Abadan castigating the "evil" anti-clericalism promoted in Ahmad Kasravi's writings. A year later, Navvab-Safavi and two of his followers (with the blessings of Shi'ite religious leaders) assassinated Kasravi and his secretary. The assassination of Kasravi was hailed by Shi'ite religious leaders as a righteous act.²⁶ The Fada'iyān later articulated the motivation for murdering Kasravi in their newspaper *Manshur-e Baradari* (The Brotherhood Circular):

For the first time in 1324 [1946], the sparkling fire of these manly youth burned the life and existence of Ahmad Kasravi, who was the greatest tool of the British imperialists and who was the agent assigned to create division among Muslims and to prepare the grounds for exploitative domination... The bullet that struck his brain forced the British to retreat for a few years.²⁷

During the next few years, the Fada'iyān continued to assassinate prominent political figures. Their most notorious killing was that of Iran's prime minister, Ali Razmara. Razmara had been in charge of negotiating a new oil agreement with the AIOC, but the agreement he proposed to the *Majles* went against popular sentiment of the period, which favored nationalization of the oil industry. In 1951, Razmara, who was considered the main impediment to nationalization, was killed by a Fada'iyān member. Navvab-Safavi later took credit for the assassination in 1954 during a speech at a meeting of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, reportedly saying: "I killed Razmara."²⁸

After the assassination of Razmara, Ayatollah Kashani broke off support for the Fada'iyān. Kashani had entered into the National Front coalition of Mohammad Mossadeq, and once the latter had been installed as prime minister in April 1951, Kashani could no longer be an advocate for the Fada'iyān's anti-governmental violence. This split also signaled a growing divide between the traditionalist ideology of the senior ulama and the growing militancy of the younger generation. Even though the Fada'iyān saw their project as a continuation of Fazlollah Nuri's struggle, their militancy and use of terrorism marked their movement as the beginning of something new. Indeed, even a later militant Shi'ite Islamist organization, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, considers Navvab-Safavi the "pioneer of the Islamic movement" in Iran and one of their key ideological predecessors.²⁹ Thus, with the Fada'iyān a new ideological strand of Shi'ite Islamism began to emerge: an ideology that circumvented (at least outwardly) the leadership of the senior ulama by favoring direct activism through militancy and anti-state terrorism.

Mossadeq came to power on an anti-imperialist platform that advocated the nationalization of Iran's oil. With a broad coalition that included secularist, communist and religious parties, Mossadeq began his short-lived tenure as prime minister by signing a bill that nationalized Iran's oil industry. This move infuriated the British, who not only considered

Iranian oil to be their rightful domain, but also feared the precedent it could set for the rest of the colonized third world. The British set plans in motion to retake Iran's oil fields by force; however, U.S. President Harry Truman intervened and called a halt to British aggression. Truman, who was sympathetic to the demands of the Iranians, tried to solve the dispute diplomatically. The intransigence of both the British and Mossadeq hindered Truman's efforts from gaining any traction. The British and their allies organized a blockade against Iran's oil exports, which had a crippling effect on the Iranian economy and weakened Mossadeq's position at home. When President Dwight Eisenhower took office in 1953, his administration quickly turned against Mossadeq due to the (later unfounded) fear that the increasingly alienated Mossadeq would turn to the Soviets for support. Through a conspiracy between the CIA, MI6 and anti-Mossadeq elements in Iran, the CIA orchestrated a coup d'état that toppled Mossadeq and reinstated Mohammad Reza Shah on August 19, 1953. The coup marked an end to Mossadeq's popular anti-imperialist campaign and made the United States the new dominant foreign power in Iran.³⁰

Shiite Islamism & Revolutionary Ideology

After the 1953 coup, the ulama—who had turned against Mossadeq near the end of his tenure—briefly aligned themselves with the shah's regime and were allowed a limited degree of political freedom. The failed assassination attempt on the new prime minister in 1955 by a Fada'iyan member led to the arrests of several Fada'iyan activists and the execution of its top four leaders (including Navvab-Safavi) in 1956. For the next few years, anti-imperialist and religious activists remained underground. During this time, the third world was experiencing great upheaval. Egypt's nationalization of the Suez Canal (1956), the Cuban revolution (1959) and the Algerian war for independence (1954-1962) were monumental episodes that signified the power of anti-imperialist movements and the successes they could achieve. These movements, combined with the shah's repressive policies and the increasing political influence of the United States, continued to fuel anti-imperialist dissent in Iran. By the early 1960s, Iranian intellectuals and religious leaders began to develop their own revolutionary ideologies that used Shi'ism as a medium through which revolutionary ideals could be expressed.

The spread of revolutionary literature emanating from the third world influenced some of Iran's leading intellectuals. One of these, Ali Shariati, became familiar with revolutionary politics and ideology while pursuing a Ph.D. in sociology at the University of Paris. By 1962, Shariati had become convinced that only a revolutionary movement could topple the Pahlavi regime and liberate Iran from Western imperialism.³¹ In Paris, Shariati became familiar with the anti-colonialist works of Jean-Paul Sartre and Frantz Fanon. Frantz Fanon's writings had a particular effect on Shariati and caused him to translate Fanon's *Wretched of the Earth* (1961) into Persian, entitling the Persian edition *Oppressed (mostaz'afin) of the Earth*. In this book, Fanon addresses "natives" of the third world, encouraging them to rise

up against Western colonialism and create new societies, which instead of merely imitating the West would find their own path. Fanon, commenting on his experiences fighting for the Front de Libération Nationale (FLN) during the Algerian war against France, also wrote about the inherent violence of colonialism and of the violence required to overcome it:

The exploited man sees that his liberation implies the use of all means, and that of force first and foremost... [C]olonialism only loosens its hold when the knife is at its throat... [it] is not a thinking machine, nor a body endowed with reasoning faculties. It is violence in its natural state, and it will only yield when confronted with greater violence.³²

Inspired by Fanon, Shariati developed an entirely new interpretation of Shi'ism, reformulating the religion into a revolutionary ideology. Shariati argued that God had created Islam as a dynamic ideology that would lead the Muslim community (*umma*) to a classless utopia. In this schema, Islamic terms such as *tawhid* (monotheism) and *jihad* were recast as "social solidarity" and "liberation struggle." The Imams Ali and Husayn became revolutionary heroes, with the latter likened to a pre-modern Che Guevara.³³ Husayn's battle at Karbala became the ultimate metaphor for revolutionary struggle of the oppressed versus the oppressors. For Shariati, Islam was a complete ideology that was superior to all other political systems, especially Marxism and Capitalism. Shariati also considered the ulama and their centuries-old hold over Islam to be one of the main impediments to the progression of Muslim society. He suggested that there were two versions of Shi'ism: "red" Shi'ism—the true essence of revolutionary Islam—and "black" Shi'ism—the stagnant tradition under the ulama (i.e., what Shi'ism had become). In order to restore true, "red" Shi'ism, Shariati felt that it was incumbent upon intellectuals (*rowshanfekran*) to "rediscover and revitalize the original meaning of revolutionary Islam."³⁴ Thus, Shariati considered both his writings and teachings to be laying the groundwork for the revitalization of Shi'ite Islam and revolution in Iran.

Shariati's message inspired scores of activists during the 1960s and 1970s. He was considered by some leaders of the Iranian revolution of 1979 to be "the ideologue" of the revolution. His mix of Marxist ideology, Shi'ite symbolism and Iranian nationalism proved to be a powerful combination. Young activists, who could not find an ideological connection with the traditionalism of the clergy, were inspired by Shariati's leftist radicalism and its strong Islamic foundation. The clergy, however, were not impressed. Most considered Shariati dangerous to Islam and a Marxist in disguise. His pro-intellectual and anti-clerical stance further enraged the ulama, who accused him of "Wahhabist" tendencies. Mohsen Makhmalbaf, a teenage activist during this period, relates how after hearing Shariati denounced by the clergy at his local mosque he went to confront Shariati at the latter's school:

And so, it was around this time that Shari'ati was coming to be known. We were already beginning to think more seriously about armed resistance, and so when this

person Shari'ati came along and was starting to undermine Shiite causes, it seemed crucial to find him. I went with some of the other guys to investigate whether or not to kill Shari'ati [at his school]...I went [to his school] and listened to him speak, to hear what he was saying—I was thinking who is this person they [the clergy] say is attacking Imam Ali? He spoke for four hours, and I never returned to that [local] mosque. I became a devotee of Shari'ati...The next day I began distributing Shari'ati's books, and they barred me from the mosque, from the library, people from the neighborhood began to avoid me, and I was treated like an infidel. But I kept on buying Shari'ati's books and giving them to my friends...I read all of his books from beginning to end, twice over. I became a new person.³⁵

Shariati was particularly popular on university campuses, where young middle class intellectuals responded to his revolutionary call. Some of these students started their own revolutionary guerrilla organizations with the aim of toppling the Pahlavi regime. Perhaps the most important group to emerge at this time was the *Mojahedin-e Khalq Organization* (MKO).³⁶ The MKO, or People's Mojahedin, began in 1965 as a revolutionary guerrilla movement committed to the Islamic ideology of Shariati and inspired by the liberation movements and anti-imperialist thought of the third world. They wanted to end foreign control over Iran, and in particular sever America's support from the Pahlavi regime. After the 1953 coup, the United States had an increasingly visible presence in Iran, and consequently it was the United States (the shah's key ally) that bore much of the blame for the shah's anti-democratic oppression. Thus, in order to undermine the shah, the MKO decided to target American advisers in Iran. Like the Fedaiyan-e Islam before them, the MKO used targeted assassinations and terrorism as their method of activism, murdering several American servicemen and civilian contractors in the 1970s. Unlike the Fedaiyan, however, the MKO were removed from clerical influence and are an example of a militant Islamist organization that operated independently of traditional Shiite authority. By the mid-1970s, the shah had imprisoned and executed most of the MKO leaders, although a small cell dedicated to Islamist revolution³⁷ survived in prison under the leadership of Masud Rajavi and returned to activism once released from prison in the lead-up to the 1979 revolution.

Revolutionary ideas were also gaining steam within clerical circles during this period. The brief rapprochement between the clergy and the Pahlavi regime had fallen apart by the early 1960s when the clergy renewed its vocal criticism for the shah's social reforms. The shah responded with increased suppression of clerical activism, culminating in the violent sacking of Qom's main theological college, Fayziyyeh, in March 1963. This event further radicalized a number of leading clerics and seminary students and provoked public outcry against the Pahlavi regime. At the head of this dissent was Ayatollah Khomeini, who had become the leading clerical opponent to the shah. Khomeini considered the shah's crackdown on the ulama an attempt to destroy Islam in Iran. In June of that year, during the Shiite commemoration of Ashura, Khomeini delivered a speech which likened the shah's oppression of

the clergy to the violent oppression of the early imams by the Umayyads. Just as the Umayyads had tried to destroy the family of Muhammad, Khomeini argued the shah's actions proved the regime was "fundamentally opposed to Islam itself and the existence of the religious class." Khomeini also played on anti-imperialist themes evoking the memory of the British and Soviet occupations during World War II, and suggesting Israel had influenced the shah's attack.³⁸

By 1964, the increased political violence that followed clerical opposition to the shah resulted in Khomeini's exile. Traveling first to Turkey and then settling in the Shi'ite center of Najaf, Iraq for 13 years, Khomeini continued to criticize the Pahlavi regime and call for its overthrow. It was during this period that Khomeini articulated his solution to the current dilemma facing Muslim nations: the need for Islamic government. Khomeini identified that following the usurpation of Ali's rule by Muawiyah, Islamic society had been governed by monarchies that separated temporal authority from religious authority. It was this division—akin to the separation of church and state—that was the root of Islam's present predicament. For Islam to truly reach its potential, Islamic society must be led by the ulama. Khomeini termed this the *velayat-e faqih*, or the "government [lit. sovereignty] of the religious jurist." In Khomeini's estimation, this government must be headed by the most senior jurist of the day or by a committee of top ranking clergy (*fuqaha*). This role would give the ruling jurist the same temporal *function* (not status) as the imams. The jurist would be in charge of "the administration of the country, and the implementation of the sacred laws of the Shari'a."³⁹ Khomeini argued that establishing the government of the jurist would "deliver Islamic countries from the clutches of imperialism," and restore justice to Islamic society.⁴⁰

Although Khomeini's concept of the *velayat-e faqih* was unpopular among the leading clergy of the early 1970s, his influence over the revolutionary movement in Iran continued to grow. Through the distribution of audio tapes and publications containing his speeches, Khomeini's ideas reached every segment of Iranian society and his popularity became widespread. Khomeini used vague catchphrases—such as "Islam is for equality and social justice," "Islam will eliminate class differences" and "The duty of the clergy is to liberate the hungry from the clutches of the rich"—which played to populist sentiments.⁴¹ Khomeini employed similar slogans to inspire the Shi'ite masses. One of which—the often repeated "Every day is Ashura, every land is Karbala"—evoked the memory of Imam Husayn and equated the current upheavals with the imam's righteous struggle against injustice and oppression. By the revolutionary period of 1978-79, Khomeini had positioned himself as both a staunch anti-imperialist and a champion of Islam. This garnered him the support of the Islamist segments of the revolutionary guerrilla movement and many important revolutionary leaders. After the revolution, this support and that of the hopeful masses enabled Khomeini to seize leadership of the new Islamic Republic of Iran and institute the concept of *velayat-e faqih* as Iran's new form of government.

As Iran's supreme leader, Khomeini became the architect of the Islamic Republic's

reforms and policies. In order to secure his position and that of the clergy-aligned Islamist faction, Khomeini united the militants loyal to him under the banner of a new, single revolutionary militia: the *Sepah-e Pasdaran-e Enqelab-e Eslami* (or the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps). With their help, Khomeini was able to crush his political rivals and other dissenting factions. Khomeini took particular aim against leftist groups, such as the *Mojahedin-e Khalq*, crippling their organizations and killing their members. This crackdown on the revolutionary left was more than a post-revolutionary consolidation of power; it was the assertion of ideology. By crushing the leftist opposition, Khomeini was able to secure a virtual monopoly over ideological expression in the Islamic Republic, which allowed him and his faction to recreate Iran along their lines. Khomeini continued to employ elements of leftist rhetoric in his speeches and writings. Indeed, it is at the intersection of third-worldist idioms, national sentiments and traditional Shiite values that Khomeini's ideology can best be understood. The rhetorical elements of this ideology, Khomeini's own brand of Islamism, are expressed in his will and testament:

My advice to all the Muslims and the oppressed of the world is that you must not sit and wait expecting that the rulers and political leaders of your country or foreign powers bring you independence and liberty as a gift. You and I have witnessed the fact that in this century gradually the world-devouring big powers penetrated into all Islamic countries, as well as into other smaller countries. We saw...that none of the governments that ruled over these countries were ever concerned with the freedom, independence and welfare of their own people themselves and whatever they did was for their own self interests or for the higher income people who lived in complete comfort while the poor ghetto dwellers were deprived of all necessities of life...The ruling classes exploited them for the interests of the comfortable and pleasure-seeking classes...[and they] converted countries into markets for the East and the West...[and] led countries to backwardness and consumerism...O oppressed people of the world and you O Muslim countries and Muslims of the world, rise up, and with your teeth, demand your rights. Do not be afraid of the propaganda noise of the super powers and their mercenary agents. Kick out your criminal rulers who hand over your hard earned wealth and income to your enemies and the enemies of Islam and of the world's deprived classes. Move towards an Islamic government with free and independent republics with whose realization you will put all the arrogant powers of the world in their places and lead all the oppressed people to leadership and inheritance of the earth.⁴²

Endnotes

- 1 Many scholars have argued that Iran's 1979 revolution was multifaceted and involved groups spread across the political and religious spectrum. In this regard, the revolution itself was not purely Islamic. There is no debate, however, concerning the eventual outcome of the

- revolution, which created the *Islamic Republic of Iran* and instituted a theocratic system of government. For differing views on the Iranian revolution, see Ervand Abrahamian, *Iran between Two Revolutions* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982); S.A. Arjomand, *The Turban for the Crown: The Islamic Revolution in Iran* (New York & Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988); Michael M.J. Fischer, *Iran: From Religious Dispute to Revolution* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1980); Nikkie R. Keddie, *Modern Iran: Roots and Results of Revolution* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003).
- 2 In this chapter, the term Shiite Islam (or Shi'ism) refers to the "Twelver" (*ithna 'ashari*) branch of that sect. Twelver Shi'ism differs from other forms of Shi'ism in that only twelve imams (all descendants of Ali and his wife Fatima, the Prophet's daughter) are recognized. This sect comprises the majority of Shiites throughout the Middle East and South Asia, including the Shiites of Iran, Iraq and Lebanon. For more information on the minority sects of Shi'ism, such as the Zaydis and Isma'ilis, see Heinz Halm, *Shi'ism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004), pp. 154-206.
 - 3 For a more detailed account of this event and its aftermath, see William McCants' chapter "The Development of Islam and Islamism" in this collection.
 - 4 For an overview of these traditions, see Moojan Momen, *An Introduction to Shi'i Islam* (Oxford: George Ronald, 1985), pp. 12-17.
 - 5 Ibn Hanbal, *Musnad*, Vol. 4, p. 281. Translation provided in Momen, p. 15.
 - 6 Al-Bukhari, *Sahih*, Kitab al-'Ilm, Bab 40, Vol. 1, p. 41. Translation provided in Momen, pp. 15-16.
 - 7 *The Miracle Play of Hasan and Husain*, collected from oral tradition by Col. Sir Lewis Pelly, Vol. 1, London: W.H. Allen and Co., 1879, p. 66 and p. 88.
 - 8 Heniz Halm, *Shi'a Islam: From Religion to Revolution* (Princeton: Markus Weiner Publishers, 1999), pp. 8-16.
 - 9 S.H.M. Jafri, *The Origins and Early Development of Shi'a Islam* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 222-233.
 - 10 Halm, *Shi'a Islam: From Religion to Revolution*, p. 20.
 - 11 Denis McEoin, "Aspects of Militancy and Quietism in Imami Shi'ism," *Bulletin* (British Society for Middle Eastern Studies), 11:1 (1984): p. 18.
 - 12 This is not to say that other political revolts did not occur. See S.A. Arjomand, *The Shadow of the Hidden Imam: Religion, Political Order, and Societal Change in Shi'ite Iran from the Beginning to 1890* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984).
 - 13 McEoin, "Aspects of Militancy and Quietism in Imami Shi'ism," pp. 18-20.
 - 14 Shaykh al-Mufid, *Kitab al-Irshad*. Translation provided in Halm, *Shi'a Islam*, p. 37.
 - 15 On the emigration of Arab Shiite scholars to Iran, see Riba Abisaab, *Converting Persia: Religion and Power in the Safavid Empire* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2004).
 - 16 For more on the role of Shiite scholars in Safavid Iran, see Arjomand, *The Shadow of the Hidden Imam*, pp. 122-159.
 - 17 On the spread of Shi'ism through popular culture in Iran during the Safavid period, see Kathryn Babayan, *Mystics, Monarchs, and Messiahs: Cultural Landscapes in Early Modern Iran* (Cambridge, Mass.: Center of Middle Eastern Studies of Harvard University, 2002):
 - 18 The Shiite Qajar dynasty ruled Iran between 1796 and 1925.
 - 19 Keddie, *Modern Iran: Roots and Results of Revolution*, p. 61.

- 20 Translation provided in S.A. Arjomand, "Traditionalism in Twentieth-century Iran," in S.A. Arjomand, ed., *From Nationalism to Revolutionary Islam* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1984), p. 201.
- 21 Ruhollah Khomeini, *Kashf-e Asrar* (1943). Translation provided in Arjomand, "Traditionalism in Twentieth-century Iran," p. 205.
- 22 Ibid.
- 23 Ibid.
- 24 Keddie, *Modern Iran: Roots and Results of Revolution*, p. 110.
- 25 Interview cited in Stephen Kinzer, *All the Shah's Men: An American Coup and the Roots of Middle East Terror* (Hoboken: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 2003), p. 67.
- 26 Farhad Kazemi, "The Fada'iyan-e Islam: Fanaticism, Politics, and Terror," in S.A. Arjomand ed., *From Nationalism to Revolutionary Islam* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1984), p. 161.
- 27 Translation provided in Kazemi, "The Fada'iyan-e Islam: Fanaticism, Politics, and Terror," p. 162.
- 28 Richard P. Mitchell, *The Society of Muslim Brothers* (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), p.126, p. 60.
- 29 Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, "Talayehdar-e nehzat-e eslami," *Payam-e Enqelab* 4:102 (1984): p. 40.
- 30 For more on the 1953 coup d'état, see Kinzer, *All the Shah's Men: An American Coup and the Roots of Middle East Terror*.
- 31 Ali Rahnema, *An Islamic Utopian: A Political Biography of Ali Shariati* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2000), p. 104.
- 32 Frantz Fanon, *Wretched of the Earth*, translated by Constance Farrington (New York: Grove Press, Inc., 1968), p. 61.
- 33 Ervand Abrahamian, "The Islamic Left: From Radicalism to Liberalism," in Stephanie Cronin, ed. *Reformers and Revolutionaries in Modern Iran: New Perspectives on the Iranian Left* (London: Routledge, 2004), p. 269.
- 34 Ibid.
- 35 Interview with Mohsen Makhmalbaf, in Hamid Dabashi's *Close Up: Iranian Cinema, Past, Present and Future* (New York and London: Verso, 2001), pp. 167-68.
- 36 For more on the history and ideology of the MKO, see Ervand Abrahamian, *Radical Islam: The Iranian Mojahedin* (London: I.B. Tauris, 1989).
- 37 The MKO became split during this period resulting in competing Marxist-Maoist and Islamist revolutionary factions.
- 38 Ruhollah Khomeini, *Islam and Revolution: Writings and Declarations of Imam Khomeini (1941-1980)*, translated by Hamid Algar (North Haledon: Mizan Press, 1981), pp. 177-80.
- 39 Ibid., pp. 62-63.
- 40 Ibid., p. 149.
- 41 Ervand Abrahamian, *Khomeinism: Essays on the Islamic Republic* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), p. 31.
- 42 *Imam Khomeini's Last Will and Testament* (Washington D.C.: Embassy of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria, Interests Section of the Islamic Republic of Iran), p. 58.

Chapter 6

When the Shiites Rise

Vali Nasr

The war in Iraq has profoundly changed the Middle East, although not in the ways that Washington had anticipated. When the U.S. government toppled Saddam Hussein in 2003, it thought regime change would help bring democracy to Iraq and then to the rest of the region. The Bush administration thought of politics as the relationship between individuals and the state, and so it failed to recognize that people in the Middle East see politics also as the balance of power among communities. Rather than viewing the fall of Saddam as an occasion to create a liberal democracy, therefore, many Iraqis viewed it as an opportunity to redress injustices in the distribution of power among the country's major communities. By liberating and empowering Iraq's Shiite majority, the Bush administration helped launch a broad Shiite revival that will upset the sectarian balance in Iraq and the Middle East for years to come.

There is no such thing as pan-Shiism, or even a unified leadership for the community, but Shiites share a coherent religious view: since splitting off from the Sunnis in the seventh century over a disagreement about who the Prophet Muhammad's legitimate successors were, they have developed a distinct conception of Islamic laws and practices. And the sheer size of their population today makes them a potentially powerful constituency. Shiites account for about 90 percent of Iranians, some 70 percent of the people living in the Persian Gulf region, and approximately 50 percent of those in the arc from Lebanon to Pakistan—some 140 million people in all. Many, long marginalized from power, are now clamoring for greater rights and more political influence. Recent events in Iraq have already mobilized the Shiites in Saudi Arabia (about 10 percent of the population); during the 2005 Saudi municipal elections, turnout in Shiite-dominated regions was twice as high as it was elsewhere. Hassan al-Mutairi, the leader of the Saudi Shiites, encouraged them to vote by comparing Saudi Arabia to Iraq and implying that Saudi Shiites too stood to benefit from participating. The mantra "one man, one vote," which galvanized Shiites in Iraq, is resonating elsewhere. The Shiites in Lebanon (who amount to about 45 percent of the country's population) have touted the same formula, as have the Shiites in Bahrain (who represent about 75 percent of the population) who will cast their ballots in parliamentary elections in the fall.

Iraq's liberation has also generated new cultural, economic, and political ties among Shiite communities across the Middle East. Since 2003, hundreds of thousands of pilgrims, coming from countries ranging from Lebanon to Pakistan, have visited Najaf and other holy Shiite cities in Iraq, creating transnational networks of seminaries, mosques, and clerics that tie Iraq to every other Shiite community, including, most important, that of Iran. Pictures of Iran's supreme religious leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, and the Lebanese cleric Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah (often referred to as Hezbollah's spiritual leader) are ubiquitous in Bahrain, for example, where open displays of Shiite piety have been on the rise and once-timid Shiite clerics now flaunt traditional robes and turbans. The Middle East that will emerge from the crucible of the Iraq war may not be more democratic, but it will definitely be more Shiite.

It may also be more fractious. Just as the Iraqi Shiites' rise to power has brought hope to Shiites throughout the Middle East, so has it bred anxiety among the region's Sunnis. De-Baathification, which removed significant obstacles to the Shiites' assumption of power in Iraq, is maligned as an important cause of the ongoing Sunni insurgency. The Sunni backlash has begun to spread far beyond Iraq's borders, from Syria to Pakistan, raising the specter of a broader struggle for power between the two groups that could threaten stability in the region. King Abdullah of Jordan has warned that a new "Shiite crescent" stretching from Beirut to Tehran might cut through the Sunni-dominated Middle East.

Stemming adversarial sectarian politics will require satisfying Shiite demands while placating Sunni anger and alleviating Sunni anxiety, in Iraq and throughout the region. This delicate balancing act will be central to Middle Eastern politics for the next decade. It will also redefine the region's relations with the United States. What the U.S. government sows in Iraq, it will reap in Bahrain, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, and elsewhere in the Persian Gulf.

Yet the emerging Shiite revival need not be a source of concern for the United States, even though it has rattled some U.S. allies in the Middle East. In fact, it presents Washington with new opportunities to pursue its interests in the region. Building bridges with the region's Shiites could become the one clear achievement of Washington's tortured involvement in Iraq. Succeeding at that task, however, would mean engaging Iran, the country with the world's largest Shiite population and a growing regional power, which has a vast and intricate network of influence among the Shiites across the Middle East, most notably in Iraq. U.S.-Iranian relations today tend to center on nuclear issues and the militant rhetoric of Iran's leadership. But set against the backdrop of the war in Iraq, they also have direct implications for the political future of the Shiites and that of the Middle East itself.

The Iranian Connection

Since 2003, Iran has officially played a constructive role in Iraq. It was the first country in the region to send an official delegation to Baghdad for talks with the Iraqi Governing Council, in effect recognizing the authority that the United States had put in power. Iran extended financial support and export credits to Iraq and offered to help rebuild Iraq's en-

ergy and electricity infrastructure. After former Prime Minister Ibrahim al-Jaafari's Shiite-led interim government assumed office in Baghdad in April 2005, high-level Iraqi delegations visited Tehran, reached agreements over security cooperation with Iran, and negotiated a \$1 billion aid package for Iraq and several trade deals, including one for the export of electricity to Iraq and another for the exchange of Iraqi crude oil for refined oil products.

Iran's unofficial influence in Iraq is even greater. In the past three years, Iran has built an impressive network of allies and clients, ranging from intelligence operatives, armed militias, and gangs to, most visibly, politicians in various Iraqi Shiite parties. Many leaders of the main Shiite parties, the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) and Dawa (including two leading party spokesmen, former Prime Minister Jaafari and the current prime minister, Nouri al-Maliki), spent years of exile in Iran before returning to Iraq in 2003. (SCIRI's militia, the Badr Brigades, was even trained and equipped by Iran's Revolutionary Guards.) Iran has also developed ties with Muqtada al-Sadr, who once inflamed passions with his virulent anti-Iranian rhetoric, as well as with factions of Sadr's movement, such as the Fezilat Party in Basra. The Revolutionary Guards supported Sadr's Mahdi Army in its confrontation with U.S. troops in Najaf in 2004, and since then Iran has trained Sadrist political and military cadres. Iran bank-rolled Shiite parties in Iraq during the two elections, used its popular satellite television network al Aalam to whip up support for them, and helped broker deals with the Kurds. Iraqi Shiite parties attract voters by relying on vast political and social-service networks across southern Iraq that, in many cases, were created with Iranian funding and assistance.

The extent of these ties has displeased the U.S. government as much as it has caught it off-guard. Washington complains that Iran supports insurgents, criminal gangs, and militias in Iraq; it accuses Tehran of poisoning Iraqi public opinion with anti-Americanism and of arming insurgents. Washington failed to anticipate Iran's influence in Iraq largely because it has long misunderstood the complexity of the relations between the two countries, in particular the legacy of the war they fought during most of the 1980s. Much has been made of the fact, for example, that throughout that savage conflict—which claimed a million lives—Iraq's largely Shiite army resisted Iranian incursions into Iraqi territory, most notably during the siege of the Shiite city of Basra in 1982. But the war's legacy did not divide Iranian and Iraqi Shiites as U.S. planners thought; it pales before the memory of the anti-Shiite pogrom in Iraq that followed the failed uprising in 1991. Today, Iraqi Shiites worry far more about the Sunnis' domination than about Tehran's influence in Baghdad.

In addition to military and political bonds, there are numerous soft links between Iran and Iraq, forged mostly as a result of several waves of Shiite immigration. In the early 1970s, as part of his Arabization campaign, Saddam expelled tens of thousands of Iraqi Shiites of Iranian origin, who then settled in Dubai, Kuwait, Lebanon, Syria, and for the most part, Iran. Some of the Iraqi refugees who stayed in Iran have achieved prominence there as senior clerics and commanders of the Revolutionary Guards. A case in point is Ayatollah

Muhammad Ali Taskhiri, who is a senior adviser to Khamenei and a doyen of the influential conservative Haqqani seminary, in Qom, where many of Iran's leading security officials and conservative clerics are educated. Taskhiri briefly returned to Najaf in 2004 to oversee the work of his Ahl al-Bayt Foundation, which has invested tens of millions of dollars in construction projects and medical facilities in southern Iraq and promotes cultural and business ties between Iran and Iraq. He is now back in Tehran, where he wields considerable power over the government's policy toward Iraq.

Throughout the 1980s and after the anti-Shiite massacres of 1991, some 100,000 Iraqi Arab Shiites also took refuge in Iran. In the dark years of the 1990s, Iran alone gave Iraqi Shiites refuge and support. Since the Iraq war, many of these refugees have returned to Iraq; they can now be found working in schools, police stations, mosques, bazaars, courts, militias, and tribal councils from Baghdad to Basra, as well as in government. The repeated shuttling of Shiites between Iran and Iraq over the years has created numerous, layered connections between the two countries' Shiite communities. As a result, the Iraqi nationalism that the U.S. government hoped would serve as a bulwark against Iran has proved porous to Shiite identity in many ways.

Ties between the two countries' religious communities are especially close. Iraqi exiles in Iran gravitated toward Iraqi ayatollahs such as Mahmoud Shahroudi (the head of Iran's judiciary), Kazem al-Haeri (a senior Sadrist ayatollah), and Muhammad Baqer al-Hakim (a SCIRI leader, killed in 2003), who oversaw the establishment of Iraqi religious organizations in Tehran and Qom. Those organizations have wielded great influence in Iran since the 1980s thanks to the role they played then in opening up the Shiites of Lebanon, who had traditionally been turned toward Najaf, to Iranian influence. Many senior clerics and graduates of the Iraqi Shiite seminaries in Iran have joined Iran's political establishment. Several judges in the Iranian judiciary, including Shahroudi, are Iraqis and are particularly close to Khamenei. And those Iraqi clerics who returned to their homeland after 2003 to take over various mosques and seminaries across southern Iraq have created an important axis of cooperation between Qom and Najaf.

So much, then, for the conventional wisdom prevailing in Washington before the war: that once Iraq was free, Najaf would rival Qom and challenge the Iranian ayatollahs. Since 2003, the two cities have cooperated. There is no visible doctrinal rift between their clerics or any exodus of dissidents from one city to the other. Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani's popular Web site, www.sistani.org, is headquartered in Qom, and most of the religious taxes collected by his representatives are kept in Iran. Despite repeated entreaties from dissident voices in Iran, senior clerics in Najaf have kept scrupulously quiet about Iranian politics, deliberately avoiding upsetting the authorities in Qom and Tehran.

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
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Shiites in Selected Countries

Percentage of population that is Shiite (estimated)



This nexus extends well beyond the elites. The opening of the shrine cities of Iraq has had an emotional impact on regular Iranians, especially on the more religious social classes that support the regime. Since 2003, hundreds of thousands of Iranians have visited the holy cities of Najaf and Karbala every year. This trend has reinforced the growing popularity of devotional piety in Iran. Over the past decade, many Iranian youth have taken to adulating Shiite saints, in particular the Twelfth Imam, the Shiite messiah. Many more Iranians recognize Ayatollah Sistani as their religious leader now than did before 2003, and many more

now turn their religious taxes over to him. Although largely cynical about their own clerical leaders, many Iranians have embraced the revival of Shiite identity and culture in Iraq.

Table 1: Countries with Significant Proportions of Shiite Muslims

% of Population that is Shiite	Country	Total population	Shiite population
90%	Iran	68.7 million	61.8 million
20%	Pakistan	165.8 million	33.2 million
65%	Iraq	26.8 million	17.4 million
1%	India	1,095.4 million	11.0 million
75%	Azerbaijan	8.0 million	6.0 million
19%	Afghanistan	31.1 million	5.9 million
10%	Saudi Arabia	27.0 million	2.7 million
45%	Lebanon	3.9 million	1.7 million
30%	Kuwait	2.4 million	730,000
75%	Bahrain	700,000	520,000
1%	Syria	18.9 million	190,000
6%	UAE	2.6 million	160,000
16%	Qatar	890,000	140,000

Source: Based on data from numerous scholarly references and from governments and NGOs in both the Middle East and the West.

Notes: "Shiites" includes Twelver Shiites and excludes Alawis, Alevis, Ismailis, and Zaydis, among others. Percentages are estimated. Figures under 1 million are rounded to the nearest 10,000; figures over 1 million are rounded to the nearest 100,000.

Business has followed religious fervor. The Iranian pilgrims who flock to the hotels and bazaars of Najaf and Karbala bring with them investments in land, construction, and tourism. Iranian goods are now ubiquitous across southern Iraq. The border town of Mehran, one of the largest points of entry for goods into Iraq, now accounts for upward of \$1 billion in trade between the two countries. Such commercial ties create among Iranians, especially bazaar merchants—a traditional constituency of the conservative leadership in Tehran—a vested interest in the stability of southern Iraq.

Granted, the legacy of the Iran-Iraq War, Iraqi nationalism, and, especially, ethnic differences between Arabs and Persians have historically caused much friction between Iran and Iraq. But these factors should not be overemphasized: ethnic antagonism cannot possibly be all-important when Iraq's supreme religious leader is Iranian and Iran's chief justice is Iraqi. Although ethnicity will continue to matter to Iranian-Iraqi relations, now that Saddam has

fallen and the Shiites of Iraq have risen, it will likely be overshadowed by the complex, layered connections between the two countries' Shiite communities.

These connections, moreover, are likely to be reinforced by the two communities' perception that they face a common threat from Sunnis. Nothing seems to bring Iraqi Shiites closer to Iran than the ferocity and persistence of the Sunni insurgency—especially at a time when their trust in Washington, which has called for disbanding Shiite militias and making greater concessions to the Sunnis, is sagging.

Sunni Scares

Just five years ago, Iran was still surrounded by a wall of hostile Sunni regimes: Iraq and Saudi Arabia to the west, Pakistan and Taliban-ruled Afghanistan to the east. Iranians have welcomed the collapse of the Sunni wall, and they see the rise of Shiites in the region as a safeguard against the return of aggressive Sunni-backed nationalism. They are particularly relieved by Saddam's demise, because Iraq had been a preoccupation of Iranian foreign policy for much of the five decades since the Iraqi monarchy fell to Arab nationalism in 1958. Baathist Iraq worried the shah and threatened the Islamic Republic. The Iran-Iraq War dominated the first decade of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini's revolution, ravaged Iran's economy, and scarred Iranian society.

If there is an Iranian grand strategy in Iraq today, it is to ensure that Iraq does not reemerge as a threat and that the anti-Iranian Arab nationalism championed by Sunnis does not regain primacy. Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and many leaders of the Revolutionary Guards, all veterans of the Iran-Iraq War, see the pacification of Iraq as the fulfillment of a strategic objective they missed during that conflict. Iranians also believe that a Shiite-run Iraq would be a source of security; they take it as an axiom that Shiite countries do not go to war with one another.

All this is small consolation for the Sunnis in the region, who remember the consequences of Iran's ideological aspirations in the 1980s—and now worry about its new regional ambitions. A quarter century ago, Tehran supported Shiite parties, militias, and insurgencies in Bahrain, Iraq, Kuwait, Lebanon, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia. The Iranian Revolution combined Shiite identity with radical anti-Westernism, as reflected in the hostage crisis of 1979, the 1983 bombing of the U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut, and Tehran's continued support for international terrorism. In the end, the Iranian Revolution fell short of its goals, and except for in Lebanon, the Shiite resurgence that it inspired came to naught.

Some say the Islamic Republic is now a tired dictatorship. Others, however, worry about the resurgence of Iran's regional ambitions, fueled this time not by ideology but by nationalism. Tehran sees itself as a regional power and the center of a Persian and Shiite zone of influence stretching from Mesopotamia to Central Asia. Freed from the menace of the Taliban in Afghanistan and of Saddam in Iraq, Iran is riding the crest of the wave of Shiite

revival, aggressively pursuing nuclear power and demanding international recognition of its interests.

Leaders in Tehran who want to create a greater zone of Iranian influence—something akin to Russia's concept of "the near abroad"—view Tehran's activities in southern Iraq as a manifestation of Iran's great-power status. Yet none of them holds on to Khomeini's dream of ruling over Iraq's Shiites. Rather, Tehran's goal in southern Iraq is to exert the type of economic, cultural, and political influence it has wielded in western Afghanistan since the 1990s. Although Tehran clearly expects to play a major role in Iraq, it may not aim—or be able—to turn the country into another Islamic republic.

Predictably, Iran's growing prominence is complicating relations between sectarian groups in the region. Sunni governments have used Tehran's ambitions as an excuse to resist both the demands of their own Shiite populations and Washington's calls for political reform. Since 2003, Sunni leaders in Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia have repeatedly blamed Iran for the chaos in Iraq and warned that Iran would wield considerable influence in the region if Iraqi Shiites came to hold the reins of power in Baghdad. The Egyptian president, Hosni Mubarak, sounded the alarm last April: "Shiites are mostly always loyal to Iran and not the countries where they live." Such partly self-serving rhetoric allows Sunni leaders to divert attention away from their own responsibility for Iraq's troubles: Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia have so far supplied the bulk of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi's army of suicide bombers. It also provides them with a subterfuge to resist U.S. calls for domestic political reform. If bringing democracy to the Middle East means empowering Shiites and strengthening Iran, they argue, Washington would be well advised to stick to Sunni dictatorships.

The Sunnis' public-relations offensive worries the Iranian leadership. Despite its growing clout, Tehran needs its neighbors' support and the goodwill of "the Arab street" to resist international pressure over its nuclear program. So far, Tehran has avoided sectarian posturing and further antagonizing Sunnis; instead, it has tried to generate support in the region by escalating tensions with the United States and Israel. Iranian leaders have routinely blamed sectarian violence in Iraq, including the bombing of the Askariya shrine, in Samarra, in February, on "agents of Zionism" intent on dividing Muslims. Meanwhile, Tehran aggressively pursues nuclear power both to confirm Iran's regional status and to minimize Washington's ability to stand in its way.

A Meeting of Minds

Iran's aspirations leave Washington and Tehran in a complicated, testy face-off. After all, Iran has benefited greatly from U.S.-led regime changes in Kabul and Baghdad. But Washington could hamper the consolidation of Tehran's influence in both Afghanistan and Iraq, and the U.S. military's presence in the region threatens the Islamic Republic. In Iraq especially, the two governments' short-term goals seem to be at odds: whereas Washington wants out of the mess, Tehran is not unhappy to see U.S. forces mired there.

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So far, Tehran has favored a policy of controlled chaos in Iraq, as a way to keep the U.S. government bogged down and so dampen its enthusiasm for seeking regime change in Iran. This strategy makes the current situation in Iraq very different from that in Afghanistan after the fall of the Taliban in late 2001, when Iran worked with the United States to cobble together the government of Hamid Karzai. Tehran cooperated with Washington at the time largely because it needed to: its Persian-speaking and Shiite clients in Afghanistan made up only a minority of the population and were in no position to protect Iran's interests. Tehran's calculus in the aftermath of the Iraq war has been different. Not only do Iran's immediate interests not align with those of the United States, but Tehran's position in Iraq is stronger than it was in Afghanistan thanks to the majority status of Shiites in Iraq. Seeing the Bush doctrine proved wrong in Iraq would be an indirect way for Iran's leaders to discredit Washington's calls for regime change in Tehran. Their recent willingness to escalate tensions with Washington over Iran's nuclear activities suggests that they believe they have largely succeeded in this goal; Iran is now stronger relative to the United States than it was on the eve of the Iraq war.

And yet, in the longer term, U.S. and Iranian interests in Iraq may well converge. Both Washington and Tehran want lasting stability there: Washington, because it wants a reason to bail out; Tehran, because stability in its backyard would secure its position at home and its influence throughout the region. Iran has much to fear from a civil war in Iraq. The fighting could polarize the region and suck in Tehran, as well as spill over into the Arab, Baluchi, and Kurdish regions of Iran, where ethnic tensions have been rising. As former Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Abbas Maleki has put it, chaos in Iraq "does not help Iranian national interest. If your neighbor's house is on fire, it means your home is also in danger." Clearly wary, Tehran has braced itself for greater troubles by appointing a majority of its provincial governors from the ranks of its security officials and Revolutionary Guard commanders.

Two groups within Iran could help convince the Iranian leadership that cooperation with Washington is in its interest. The first are Iraqi refugees, who act as a lobby for Iraqi Shiite interests in Tehran. They have encouraged Iran to pursue talks with the United States over Iraq, partly because they view Washington and Tehran as the twin pillars of their power in Iraq. The escalation of tensions between the two governments would not serve the interests of Iraqi Shiites, and that lobby does not want to see Iraq become hostage to the international standoff over Iran's nuclear program. The second important constituency is made up of the many Iranians who are greatly concerned about the sanctity of Iraq's shrine cities. Every major bombing in Najaf and Karbala so far has claimed Iranian lives. The Iranian public expects Tehran to ensure the security of those cities; its influence has already provided Khamenei with a pretext for publicly endorsing direct talks with Washington over Iraq.

Still, Iran will actively seek stability in Iraq only when it no longer benefits from controlled chaos there, that is, when it no longer feels threatened by the United States' presence. Iran's long-term interests in Iraq are not inherently at odds with those of the United States; it

is current U.S. policy toward Iran that has set the countries' respective Iraq policies on a collision course. Thus a key challenge for Washington in Iraq is to re-calibrate its overall stance toward Iran and engage Tehran in helping to address Iraq's most pressing problems.

Setting the Stage

The most important issue facing Iraq in the coming months will be the constitutional negotiations, particularly regarding the questions of federalism and how oil revenues will be distributed. It was only after the U.S. ambassador to Iraq, Zalmay Khalilzad, persuaded the Shiites and the Kurds to agree to change the constitution that the Sunnis participated in the referendum to ratify it in late 2005. Since then, Washington has hoped for a deal that would bring moderate Sunnis into the political process and thus weaken the Sunni insurgency. But the prospects of such a deal are uncertain. The Shiites, the Sunnis, and the Kurds are unlikely to see the wisdom of compromise without outside pressure, and the U.S. government no longer has the political capital to force concessions or satisfy the demands of one party without risking alienating another. It is the weakening of the United States' position in Iraq that makes it necessary—more so now than in 2003—for Washington to reach out to Iraq's neighbors.

If the constitutional negotiations fail, the Sunnis could abandon the political process. Even if the Sunnis participate, bargaining with the Shiites may become more complicated, especially given signs of increasing turmoil in southern Iraq. Over the past three years, the Shiites have both participated politically and resisted the Sunni insurgency's provocations, largely because they have believed that backing U.S. policy would serve their interests. But if they were to conclude that Washington is now more eager to buy the Sunnis' cooperation than to reward them for their steadfastness, the Shiites might turn their backs on the political process. Such an upset could spark a Shiite uprising. The Shiites would not even need to pick up arms to pressure the United States; by virtue of their numbers alone, they can change the country's political balance. In January 2004, Sistani rallied hundreds of thousands of Shiites for five days of demonstrations against U.S. plans to base the first post-Saddam elections on a caucus system. Earlier this year, he called the crowds to the streets again to protest the Askariya shrine bombing—and to ensure that the U.S. government understood the extent of Shiite power.

Given its clout among the Shiites in southern Iraq, Tehran could help maintain order there while the constitutional negotiations were under way. Iran could ensure that the growing rivalry among Shiite factions such as SCIRI and Sadr's troops did not spin out of control, destabilize southern Iraq, and erode government authority in Baghdad. Keeping the Shiites together and maintaining calm in the south is of singular importance to the United States, and Iranian cooperation is crucial to achieving that goal. Iran's cooperation would help address Iraq's security and reconstruction needs, as well as buttress the central government in Baghdad.



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
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The Major Communities of Iraq and where they are concentrated



But securing such cooperation would require the United States to address broader issues in its relationship with Iran. Tehran will end its military and financial support to Shiite militias and criminal gangs in southern Iraq only if it receives broad security guarantees from Washington. The current situation in Iraq is similar to that in Afghanistan in 2001 in the way it seems to entangle U.S. and Iranian interests—only it is more complicated and the stakes are higher. After the fall of the Taliban in Afghanistan, the United States and Iran worked closely together to bring the Northern Alliance and its Shiite component into the mainstream political process. Washington and Tehran negotiated intensely on the sidelines

of the Bonn conference on the future of Afghanistan, striking deals that helped ensure the early successes of the Karzai regime. The Bonn process promised to open a new chapter in the history of U.S.-Iranian relations. But at the time, Washington had little interest in further engaging a regime it believed it would soon overthrow. It missed an important opportunity then.

Iraq's troubles today offer Washington and Tehran a second great chance not only to normalize their relations, but also to set the stage for managing future tensions between Shiites and Sunnis. The Shiites' rise to power in Iraq sets an example for Shiites elsewhere in the Middle East, and as the model is adopted or tested it is likely to exacerbate Shiite-Sunni tensions. Better for Washington to engage Tehran now, over Iraq, than wait for the problem to have spread through the region. Although Washington and Tehran are unlikely to resolve their major differences, especially their dispute over Iran's nuclear program, anytime soon, they could agree on some critical steps in Iraq: for example, improving security in southern Iraq, disbanding the Shiite militias, and convincing the Shiite parties to compromise.

But if Washington and Tehran are unable to find common ground—and the constitutional negotiations fail—the consequences would be dire. At best, Iraq would go into convulsions; at worst, it would descend into full-fledged civil war. And if Iraq were to collapse, its fate would most likely be decided by a regional war. Iran, Turkey, and Iraq's Arab neighbors would likely enter the fray to protect their interests and scramble for the scraps of Iraq. The major front would be essentially the same as that during the Iran-Iraq War, only two hundred miles further to the west: it would follow the line, running through Baghdad, that separates the predominantly Shiite regions of Iraq from the predominantly Sunni ones. Iran and the countries that supported it in the 1980s would likely back the Shiites; the countries that supported Iraq would likely back the Sunnis.

Iraq is sometimes compared to Vietnam in the early 1970s or Yugoslavia in the late 1980s, but a more relevant—and more sobering—precedent may be British India in 1947. There was no civil war in India, no organized militias, no centrally orchestrated ethnic cleansing, no battle lines, and no conflict over territory. Yet millions of people died or became refugees. British India's professional army was sliced along communal lines as the country was partitioned into Hindu-majority and Muslim-majority regions. Unable to either bridge the widening chasm between both groups or control the violence, the British colonial administrators were forced to beat a hasty retreat. As in Iraq today, the problem in India then lay with a minority that believed in its own manifest destiny to rule and demanded, in exchange for embracing the political process, concessions from an unyielding majority. The pervasive sectarian violence and ethnic cleansing plaguing Iraq today are ominous reminders of what happened in India some 60 years ago. They may also be a worse omen: if the situation in Iraq deteriorates further, the whole Middle East would be at risk of a sectarian conflict between Shiites and Sunnis.

Chapter 7

Arabic Familiarization

HISTORY AND BACKGROUND




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Description

Afro-Asiatic languages took root and flourished in the Mediterranean Basin, especially in the Tigris-Euphrates rivers basin and in the coastal areas of the Levant.

Archaeological findings in the Arabian Peninsula confirm that Arabic—the language of the Arab nomads—goes back more than 4500 years. The first documented example of Arabic is a 4th century C.E. epitaph from a tomb about 100 kilometers southwest of Damascus written in the Nabataean alphabet (a direct ancestor of Arabic script). The vocabulary and syntax in the epitaph are virtually identical with Classical Arabic codified three centuries later in the Qur'an. Today, Semitic languages are spoken by more than 300 million people across much of the Middle East, North Africa, and the Horn of Africa.

Arabic's place in the Afro-Asiatic family tree



Arabic Influences

Outside the Arabian Peninsula, Arabic began as the language of conquerors, as under their control were brought vast and various regions from the Pyrenees mountains, the Atlantic ocean and the Sahara all the way to the Taurus mountain range in Asia Minor, the Caucasus and the Hindus and Oxus valleys. Very quickly the conquered adopted the language of their conquerors. This occurred for several reasons, mainly because Arabic had become the official language of government, the sacred language of the Qur'an, and most importantly, because of the way the Arabs adhered to their language in a commitment that approximated worship. Classical Arabic remains the most powerful symbol of the Muslim umma.

As the language of administration, Arabic pushed aside those languages that were the dominant mode of communication at the time of its ascent. Among them were Syriac-Aramaic and Greek in the Fertile Crescent, Persian in parts of Iraq and western Iran, Coptic and Greek in Egypt and the Sudan; Berber, (Punic, Phoenician) and Latin in northwest Africa, and Latin and Iberian dialects in Spain. Many of these languages ceased to exist or came to have a very limited use as the language of worship (e.g. Coptic and Syriac).

Additionally, the Arabic alphabet has been adopted by non-Semitic languages such as Farsi, Urdu, Malay, and some West African languages such as Hausa. The languages of northern India (Urdu), Turkey, Iran, Portugal, and Spain are full of words of Arabic origin.

Diglossia: The Eloquent vs. the Colloquial

Diglossia is a relatively stable language situation in which, in addition to the primary dialects of the language, there is a very divergent, highly codified (often grammatically more complex) superposed variety, the vehicle of a large and respected body of written literature, either of an earlier period or in another speech community, which is learned largely by formal education and is used for most written and formal spoken purposes but is not used by any sector of the community for informal, ordinary conversation.

Despite the fact that the high variety is learned at school, it is not uncommon for the members of the community to believe that the high variety is the actual mother tongue of all speakers. Some people go as far as to deny the existence of the low variety, and there is a general tendency to regard those forms that belong to the vernacular as nothing more than linguistic errors. This situation holds true in all Arabic speaking societies today.

Classical Arabic (also called Fusha 'eloquent')

Classical Arabic probably emerged as the standard language in the Arabian Peninsula from the Meccan dialect of the Quraysh, the tribe of the Prophet Muhammad. The choice of this dialect was not only based on religious factors but there were also some political, commercial and economic, as well as social, geographical and cultural implications which made

the Qurayshi dialect the standardized form of expression. As such, it existed along-side other pre-Islamic tribal dialects. Thus, when Islam makes its debut on the historical scene, "Classical Arabic" is already in existence, more or less unified, familiar and understood even outside the Arabian Peninsula.

Dialects

Most versions of Arabic used today descended from northern Arabic (from the Northern part of the Arabian Peninsula, called Mudari). Arabic has about 35 official dialects (including such dialects as Tajik, Uzbek, Maltese) and a variety of Judeo-Arabics (e.g. from Yemen, Tunisia, Morocco, Spain, etc.). There are two major groups: eastern and western dialects. The eastern dialects include Peninsular, badawi (nomadic), central Asian, Egyptian, Gulf, Levantine and Iraq. Western dialects include: Algerian, Saharan, Shuwa (Chad), Libyan, Moroccan, Tunisian, Sicilian Arabic (ancestor of Maltese). All of these dialects have different vocabularies and pronunciations, but they all share a basic syntactic structure characterized by an absence of case endings, an SVO sentence structure (Subject-Verb-Object), loss of the dual form of the plural (except in very limited cases) and a reduced number of verbal conjugations.

An Arabic speaker will learn her/his own regional colloquial language (Egyptian, Moroccan, Levantine Arabic) which may have a "prestige" dialect (e.g. Cairene, Casablancon, Beirut Arabic spoken in cultural centers) by which all other dialects of the region are considered "countrified." But our hypothetical Arabic speaker will also, if s/he goes to school and wishes to be considered educated, have to learn literary Arabic or Modern Standard Arabic (MSA), which is, grammatically, virtually identical to the Arabic of the Qur'an and still the only acceptable vehicle of written communication.

However, everyday Arabic is gaining ground as a medium of modern culture, which also means that MSA is getting nearer to everyday Arabic. Thus, to some extent, MSA reflects the dialectical variations both in terms of spoken and written forms.

Cultural Context and Significance of Language

The importance placed on language, fluency and skill in what used to be a mostly nomadic culture goes back centuries prior to the advent of Islam. This was a culture that placed great emphasis on poetry recitation. Each year at the 'Ukkaz market outside of Mecca, poets, representing various tribes, would face off in what probably resembled today's urban rap battles. What was at stake was the honor of the tribe. The significance of linguistic fluency was carried into the Islamic Era and persists to this day.

The role of the language of the Qur'an and Islamic law

After the rise of Islam, the importance of Arabic was and still is probably most palpable in Qur'anic studies and Islamic law. These disciplines developed very early on, as there was a need to explain the language of the Prophet Muhammad's revelations to his contemporaries, and subsequent generations. Moreover, as Islamic law was seen as an expression of Allah's will, it was the responsibility of the experts to interpret the text of the Qur'an (and Hadith, the sayings of the Prophet), and identify Allah's will. This means that, as a society, knowing the language of the sources is of the highest priority, and it gives individuals who are involved in it a great deal of power. Knowledge of Classical Arabic was a *fard kifaya* for scholars (i.e. a sufficient duty imposed on the community as a whole).

Identifying features of Arabic that could explain the present power of Islamic fundamentalism (i.e. adherence to a revealed text)

Uniqueness of Arabic as Speech of God: It was the revelation of the Qur'an in Arabic which itself was considered a miracle. Even today there are Muslim scholars who cling to the view that Islam can only really be expressed in Arabic. The consequences for Arabic have been that it is, by nature, eternally meaningful. Moreover, translation of the Qur'an was and continues to be an issue, since it obscures the inimitability of the Qur'an. This also means, for a non-Arab/non-Muslim, that not understanding the role of Arabic within the Arabo-Islamic system puts one at a great disadvantage.

Logocentricity of Islam: The entire faith is believed to be enshrined in the one linguistic event—the revelation of God's word. The Qur'an is the revealed Word which cannot be made flesh without blasphemy or polytheism; yet when memorized the Word becomes an integral part of the believer. Arabic functions as a linking mechanism between God and the believer (think of the significance of recitation of Qur'anic text as well as the importance of Arabic script as it manifests itself in the art of calligraphy).

The vehicle of imperial administration: As the language of the law of the great Islamic empires, all life was determined by Arabic. Islam developed into a written culture that required the preservation of large quantities of documentation.

Elaborate control systems: Because it became necessary to preserve vast amounts of texts, systems, procedures and institutions were set up to control the transmission and interpretation of the documents: schools (*madrasa*), huge libraries, mosques, endowments (*waqf*), professorships and curricula, scholarships for students. These institutions continue to hold a prominent place throughout the Arab world and larger Islamic community.

These features converge to explain the extraordinary position of Arabic within Islam. The history of Arabic is itself a source of strength and coherence for Islamic fundamentalism. Underestimating this fact has proven thus far to be extremely dangerous. For this reason, the struggle against Islamic "fundamentalist" extremism must be accompanied by

linguistico-theological arguments in order to debunk the foundations on which terrorism is predicated.

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Arabic Familiarization

ARABIC WORD FORMATION AND NAME CONSTRUCTION



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1. ORTHOGRAPHIC CONVENTIONS

The Arabic writing system is based on some 18 distinct shapes that vary according to their connection to preceding or following letters. Using a combination of dots above and below nine of these shapes, the full complement of 28 consonants and the three long vowels can be fully spelled out.

Since letters (consonants) and word order (syntax) are considered minimal for comprehension, any Arabic text will contain only about 75 percent of meaning. The remaining 25 percent is added by the reader. This is the result of the fact that the Arabic script only allows the writer to show the consonants and the long vowels of a word. The short vowels can be indicated by a separate system of straight and curved lines placed above and below the letters, but these are normally included only in texts where it is important to indicate correct pronunciation, like the Qur'an, children's textbooks, and occasionally poetry. This means that the reader must supply the voweling of words from her/his own knowledge of the language structure. Arabic is written from right to left. Thus,

فلنشيده f-l-n-sh-y-d-h
must be read *fa-l-nushayyidhu*
'so let us build it'

A. Sounds and letters

Arabic	Name	Standard translit.	Strict translit.	Notes
ا	Alif	A	'a	With hamza
ب	Ba'	B	b	
ت	Ta'	T	t	
ث	Tha'	Th	□	Levant <i>s</i> , Egypt <i>t</i>
ج	Jim	J	j or *	sometimes <i>zh</i> , in Egyptian <i>g</i>
ح	Ha'	H	h	
خ	Kha'	Kh	ⲕ	
د	Dal	D	d	
ذ	Dhal	Dh	Ⲕ	Levant <i>z</i> , Egypt <i>d</i>
ر	Ra'	R	r	Iraq: French "r"
ز	Zay	Z	z	
س	Sin	S	s	
ش	Shin	Sh	Ⲑ	
ص	Sad	S	š	Emphatic
ض	Dad	D	ḍ	Emphatic
ط	Ta'	T	ṭ	Emphatic
ظ	Za'	Z	ẓ	

Arabic	Name	Standard translit.	Strict translit.	Notes
ع	`Ayn		⦿	Iraq, Kuwait; often devoiced to ʰ in Egyptian
غ	Ghayn	Gh	غ	
ف	Fa'	F	f	
ق	Qa'	Q	q	Bedouin g, Levant, Egypt'
ك	Kaf	K	k	Gulf, Iraq, rural Palestinian <i>ch</i>
ل	Lam	L	l	
م	Mim	M	m	
ن	Nun	N	n	
ه	Ha'	H	h	
و	Waw	W	w	Also long vowel marker
ي	Ya'	Y	y	Also long vowel marker
ء	Hamza	‘	ʔ	glottal stop, often elided
ة	Ta' marbuta	A	a	Usually as <i>a</i> , <i>ah</i> , but sometimes <i>at</i> .

Standard Arabic has only six vowel sounds: a long and short *-a*, a long and short *-i*, and a long and short *-u*

Note: Arabic speakers studying English must learn to pronounce the following consonants: *g*, *p*, *ch* and *v*. They must also struggle with a much wider range of meaningful vowel shadings, and a number of consonants and consonant clusters, like the English 'r'—particularly when pronounced in conjunction with *l*, as in "rural" creating its own special nightmare for non-natives—or the suffix *-ing*. Words containing *p* in English will be pronounced with a *b* instead, as in "blastic" for plastic or "betrol" for petrol.

2. ROOT SYSTEM

In Arabic, words are a product of root and pattern. A root contains a sequence of letters (consonants). Most roots contain three consonants and are called "trilaterals." The abstract roots are used in the derivation of actual words and names by adding vowels and non-root consonants around the root, following specific patterns. This is the key concept in the process of Arabic word formation. All Arabic words can be expressed in these terms. Educated speakers of Arabic are very aware of this "root-and-pattern" system partly because the system itself is so regular.

3. COMMON CHARACTERISTICS OF WORDS THAT AFFECT THE WAY THEY ARE CONSTRUCTED AND PRONOUNCED

A. Definiteness (al-)

Nouns can either be definite or indefinite. The definite article in Arabic *al-* (equivalent to 'the' in English) is prefixed to a noun of any gender or number, *al-rahman* 'the compassionate,' *al-qa'ida* 'the base,' *al-bahrayn* 'the two seas,' *al-qur'an* 'the Qur'an.' The indefinite marker (equivalent to the English 'a/an') is a suffix *-n* sound, called *tanwin* (lit. 'making an n'), as in *'arabiyyun* 'an Arab,' *kafirun* 'an infidel,' *basmatun* 'a fingerprint.'

The *a* in *al-* disappears in medial position, and the article sounds like a mere *-l*; however, the letter *a* is retained in writing; thus, *tanzim al-jihad* 'the jihad organization' in pronunciation sounds like "*tanziml-jihad*," but is written *tanzim al-jihad*.

Also, the *-l* is assimilated to 14 of the 28 letters of the alphabet (called 'sun letters'), so that in these cases, the *al-* in pronunciation is expressed by geminating (i.e. doubling) the first letter of the noun; again, in writing the *al-* is retained, and the doubling can be expressed by putting the orthographical sign *sadda* (ˆ) on the first letter after the *al-*. The consonants causing assimilation are: *t, th, d, dh, r, z, s, sh, ʃ, ʒ, ʒ* (i.e. *emphatic s, d, t and z*), *h* and *n*. For example, the word *الدين* *al-din* sounds like *ad-din* in pronunciation, as in the name *salah al-din*; the word *al-rahman* sounds like *ar-rahman*, as in the name *'abd al-rahman*. Proper transliteration retains the *al-*.

Remember: *ال* (*al-*) is not a permanent component of words, as shown here with *البحرين* 'al-Bahrayn', hence the separating dash in transliteration.

B. Inflection: Case

Arabic uses special endings placed on words, called "cases," to indicate their function in a sentence. In comparison, English uses word order to perform this function. In Arabic, the subject of a sentence would be marked with the vowel *-u* placed at the end of the word, and it would remain the subject regardless of where it was positioned in the sentence. The object would have the vowel *-a* suffixed to it, and the object of any preposition would have the vowel *-i*. So for example, *wasala 'abdu allahi, wa-muhammadun a'ta abda allahi al-kitaba*. "Abdullah arrived and Muhammad gave 'Abdallah the book'. Arabic's three grammatical cases roughly correspond to the Latin terms nominative, accusative and genitive. When speaking or reading aloud in a more informal setting, articulating the case ending is optional or omitted all together.

C. Number

Arabic distinguishes between nouns that are singular, when there is one, dual, when there are two, and plural if there are three or more. Instances of the dual occur more often than you might think: all of the parts of the body that come in pairs (such as eyes, hands, ears, legs) are normally dual. The dual is formed by adding the suffix *-ani* or *-ayni* to the noun, e.g. *البحرين* al-Bahrayn ('the two seas'), *rijlayni* 'two legs,' *al-haramayn* 'the two *harams*,' or the two holy places.

The plurals are formed in two ways. There are "sound plurals" that are formed by the addition of a suffix: masculine sound plurals take the suffix *-una* or *-ina*; e.g. *muslimuna* 'Muslims,' *mujahidina* 'mujahidin.' Feminine sound plurals take *-at*, e.g. *banat* 'girls,' *mujahidas* 'female fighters.' There are "broken plurals" which are formed by altering the vowel structure of the singular noun according to a limited number of established patterns, e.g. *dars* 'lesson' vs. *durus* 'lessons,' *'alim* 'scholar' vs. *'ulama* 'scholars.'

D. Gender

Arabic has two genders, masculine and feminine. The marker for the feminine gender is a *-t* suffix written with a special letter (*ta' marbuta*). The *-t* marker is not usually pronounced in pause: *Madina*, *Fatima*, *mujahida* 'female fighter', *qa'ida* 'base;' but note *salat*, *zakat*. There are nouns without the feminine marker that are nonetheless feminine (e.g. *'umm* 'mother', *'ard* 'earth').

E. Annexation or Genitive construction (*idafa*)

A construction typical for Semitic languages in which one noun is added to and defined more closely by another noun in a compound called *idafa*, literally 'an addition' or 'annexation.' For example: *hizb Allah* 'party [of] God,' *abu mazin* 'the father [of] Mazin,' *ibn taymiyya* 'the son [of] Taymiyya,' '*Abd Allah* 'the servant [of] Allah,' *umm al-hurub* 'mother [of all] wars,' *salat al-jum'a* 'prayer of Friday,' *harakat al-jihad* 'the movement [of] jihad,' i.e. the jihad movement. Moreover, many annexation constructs become idiomatic, especially when reproducing compound nouns from other languages: *rijal a'mal* 'business men' (and should not be translated 'men of deeds'), *mujrim harb* 'war criminal,' '*alim nafs* 'psychologist' (not literally 'scholar of the soul').

F. Nisba

Classical Arabic had a well-developed mechanism for indicating membership of a class, originally a tribe or location, with the suffix *-iyy* (note: the *-un* in the examples is the nominative case suffix), e.g. *qurashiyyun* 'from the Quraysh tribe,' *makkiyyun* 'from Mecca,' *islamiyyun* 'of Islam,' 'Islamic,' *al-suriyyu* 'the Syrian,' *mukhabaratiyyun* 'pertaining to security services.' The *nisba* suffix is inserted before the gender marker. E. g. *lubnān* 'Lebanon,' *lubnāni* 'Lebanese' (sing. masc.), *lubnaniyya* 'Lebanese' (sing. fem.).

Keep in mind: Original Arabic names, like all Arabic words, combine root and pattern, e.g. Ahmad (*af'al* pattern), Muhammad (*mufa'al* pattern), Hafiz (*fa'il* pattern), Fatima (*fa'il* pattern + feminine suffix *a*), Iman (*if'al* pattern), Farid/ Farida (*fa'il+a*)

4. WHAT'S IN A[N ARABIC] NAME?

A. Structure and components of the Arab name

Old Arabic names are based on a sophisticated naming system: most Arabs do not simply have first/middle/last names, but a full chain of names. This system is in use throughout the Arab world. Due to the importance of the Arabic language in Islam, a large majority of the world's Muslims use Arabic first names (*ism*), but it is not common outside the Arab world to employ the full naming conventions described below. Arabic name elements may be divided into five main categories, with the last category having several sub-types.

1) *Ism*

An *ism* is a personal, proper name given shortly after birth, usually on the third day, but sometimes on the seventh day after birth. Most Arabic names are Arabic words (nouns, adjectives) with a meaning, usually signaling the good character of the person. Names are generally identifiable by context, such as: Karim (adj. 'dignified'), Mahmud (adj. 'praiseworthy'), Muhammad (adj./noun 'one who is praised'), Ahmad (adj. 'most praised'), 'Abduh (noun + possessive, 'his servant'). Adults are seldom called by these names. Socially it is considered a slight to address or refer to an elder or parent by their *ism*.

2) *Kunya*

A *kunya* is a patronym, that is comprised of two elements, the first one is *abu* or *umm* (father of-/ mother of- respectively), and the second element can either be a name (*ism*), or a word denoting a [real or fictional] abstract idea or physical object associated with the person. In the latter case the *abu*-phrase is intended as a nickname or a *laqab* (see below). For example, Abu Mazin is "the father of Mazin," Umm Salim "the mother of Salim;" but Abu Burda means "possessor of a cloak," and Abu Lahab means "characterized by a flame." Often, a *kunya* referring to the person's first-born son is used as a substitute for the person's name. It is meant as a prefix of respect. As a general rule, married people (especially women), are simply called by their *kunya*. When using a person's full name, the *kunya* precedes the personal name, thus: *Abu Yusuf Hasan* (the father of Yusuf, Hasan), *Umm Ja'far Amina* (the mother of Ja'far, Amina).

Kunyas are frequently totally made up; most often the name chosen comes from a popular name in Islamic history. A special practice evolved among Palestinian leaders, originally in the Fatah faction, to use real or fictional *kunyas* as pseudonyms in attempts to thwart Israel. For example, Yasir 'Arafat was known by the name Abu 'Ammar (*abū 'ammār* 'the father of 'ammār'), even though he never had a son named 'Ammar; it was based on 'Ammar ibn Yasir ('Ammar the son of Yasir), a companion of the Prophet and a prominent figure in Arab history.

3) *Nasab*

A *nasab* is a pedigree or genealogical chain, as the son or daughter of someone; e.g., *ibn 'Umar* (the son of 'Umar), *bint 'Abbas* (the daughter of 'Abbas). The *nasab* follows the *ism*: *Hasan ibn Faraj* (Hasan the son of Faraj), *Sumayya bint Khubbat* (Sumayya the daughter of Khubbat). Many historical personages are more familiar to us by their *nasab* than by their *ism*: e.g., the historian *ibn Khaldun*, the traveler *ibn Battuta*, and the philosopher *Ibn Sina* (Avicenna).

Nasabs may be extended for several generations, as may be noted in some of the examples below. However, the vast majority of *nasabs* are only one or two generations long. It is uncommon to find a *nasab* which extends three generations back, and there are a very few examples which extend to four generations, such as *Abu Bakr Muhammad ibn Ahmad ibn Muhammad ibn Ja'far ibn al-Haddad*. Tracing a person's ancestry was important in tribal society, both for purposes of identification and for social and political interaction.

Note: When the parent in a *nasab* is referred to by his *kunya*, the word *abu* becomes *abi*, e.g., Muhammad's son-in-law was *'Ali ibn Abi Talib*, 'Ali the son of Abu Talib, or 'Ali, the son of the father of Talib. This happens simply because of change in grammatical case ending.

4) *Laqab*

The *laqab* is intended as a nickname, a description of the person. So, for example, in the name of the famous Abbasid Caliph *Harun al-Rashid* (of A Thousand and One Nights). *Harun* is the Arabic form of Aaron, and *al-rashid* means 'the righteous' or 'the rightly-guided'; *Jamal al-Fadl* (Jamal the Prominent). *Laqabs* usually follow the *ism*: *Harun al-Rashid*, *Muhammad ibn Ya'la al-Dabbi al-Mufaddal*. However, in the full citation of a person's name the honorific *laqab* comes most often right at the beginning, before the *kunya* and *ism*, though occasionally it will be mentioned right at the end, after the *nisba*.

One particular form of *laqab* is formed on the pattern of *'Abd* (servant of) plus one of the 99 names of Allah; e.g., *'Abd Allah* ('*Abdullah* - the servant of God), *'Abd al-Aziz* (servant of the Almighty), *'Abd al-Rahman* (servant of the Merciful). These *laqabs* are used as, and in the place of, a simple *ism*: *'Abd al-Mun'im ibn Idris ibn Sinan*. The feminine form of this type of *laqab* is *Amat al-X*, for example, *Amat Allah* (*Amatullah*), (female) servant of Allah.

The *laqab* has acquired yet another connotation, being now applied to a surname in the European sense.

5) *Nisba*

The *nisba* describes a person's occupation, place of birth, residence, or descent (tribe, family, etc). It will follow a family through several generations, and it is for example common to find people with the name *al-misri* (the Egyptian, or rather "of Egypt") in many places in the Middle East, despite the fact that their families may have resided outside Egypt for several generations. The *nisba* perhaps most closely resembles the Western surname. A *nisba* usually follows the *ism* or, if

the name contains a *nasab*, it will generally follow the *nasab*. As mentioned, there are several types of *nisbas*:

- i. professional, derived from a person's trade or profession; e.g., *Muhammad al-Hallaj* (Muhammad, the dresser of cotton), *al-Fariri* (he in the silk trade).
- ii. tribal or lineal, derived from the name of a person's tribe of birth or family lineage: *Mughirah al-Ju'fi* (Mughirah of the tribe of Ju'fi); *Yusuf al-Ayyubi* (Yusuf the Ayyubid or Yusuf of the family line of Ayyub).
- iii. Geographical, derived from the place of residence or birth: *Ya'qub al-Dimashqi* (Ya'qub of Damascus), *Muhammad ibn Isma'il al-Bukhari*, the author of an early collection of *hadith* (sayings of the Prophet Muhammad) is better known from his place of birth, Bukhara, simply as *al-Bukhari*; on second reference Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi (أبو مصعب الزرقاوي) would be referred to as *al-Zarqawi*, 'the man from al-Zarqā.'

Many individuals use more than one *nisba*, and in this case, as a general rule the geographic *nisba* comes last, preceded by either the occupational *nisba* or the tribal *nisba*. The tribal, professional and even the *madhhab nisbas*—denoting affiliation to religious schools of law (Hanafi, Hanbali, etc.)—have the characteristic of Western family names, as they necessarily continue from father to son through successive generations. This holds true even in the case of the *madhhab* affiliation, since it is not common to adopt a *madhhab* different from one's parents.

Note: as is evident in the *nisba* examples, the definite article *al-* can be attached to certain components within the name. Thus, *masr* (مصر), the Arabic word for Egypt, becomes *masri* 'Egyptian' when the adjectival (*nisba*) suffix *-ī* is added. When *al-* is added, the *nisba* becomes definite: 'the Egyptian.'

B. Name Specimen

How did Arabic naming conventions work in actual practice? Many names still follow the pattern of *kunya* + *ism* + *laqab* (*Abu 'Abd Allah Muhammad al-Mustansir*), or *kunya* + *ism* + *nasab* (*Abu Muhammad Hamid ibn al-'Abbas*).

The following are historical examples of common forms, from simple to the more complex:

Yusuf ibn Ayyub

ism son of *ism* = *ism* + *nasab*

Yazid ibn Abi Hakim

ism son of *kunya* = *ism* + *nasab* (which itself is a *kunya*)

Ahmad ibn Abi Fanan al-Katib

ism son of *kunya* = *ism* + *nasab* (which itself is a *kunya*) + occupational *nisba*

Layla bint Zuhayr ibn Yazid al-Nahdiyya

ism daughter of *ism* + *nasab* + *nisba* = *ism* + double *nasab* + *nisba*

Mariya al-Qibtiyya

ism + religious affiliation *nisba*

Umm Ja'far Zubaydah

kunya + *ism*

Abu al-'Abbas Muhammad ibn Ya'qub ibn Yusuf al-Asamm al-Naysaburi

kunya + *ism* + double *nasab* + *laqab* (the deaf) + geographic *nisba*

Exercise: analyze

Abu Karim Muhammad al-Jamil ibn Nidal ibn Abdulaziz al-Filastini

Or, properly transliterated:

abū karīm muhammadu-l-jamīl ibn nidāl ibn `abdil-`azīzi-l-filastīni

Answer:

"Father-of-Karim, Muhammad, the son of Nidal, son of Abd al-'Aziz, the Palestinian." *Jamil* 'beautiful;' *'abd* 'servant of;' *'aziz* 'Almighty,' and is one of the 99 names of God, hence *'abd al-'aziz* 'servant of God.'

Abu Karim is a *kunya*, Muhammad is the person's *ism*, al-Jamil is a *laqab*, Nidal is his father (first *nasab*), 'Abd al-'Aziz his grandfather (second-generation *nasab*), and "al-Filastini" is his geographical *nisba*.

Manifestly, such a form is far too cumbersome for common use, and the custom arose of making an arbitrarily selected abbreviation of the full form, namely the *'urf* (i.e. the conventional name), by which a man is normally referred to. Normally, this person would simply be referred to as "Muhammad" or "Abu Karim," but to signify respect or to specify which Muhammad we are speaking about (namely, the beautiful one from Palestine), the name could be lengthened as above, to the extent necessary or desired.

More exercises

- 1) Abu Muqatil al-Nadr ibn al-Munqadi al-Daylami
- 2) Abu al-Hasan 'Ali ibn Sahl ibn Rabal al-Tabari
- 3) Abu Ishaq Ibrahim ibn Ishaq ibn Ibrahim ibn Bashir al-Harbi
- 4) 'Ubayd ibn Mu'awiyah ibn Zayd ibn Thabit ibn al-Dahhak
- 5) al-Shabb Fulan ibn Fulana

Answers

- 1) *kunya* + *laqab* *ism* + *nasab* [where name of father is *laqab*] + *nisba*
- 2) *kunya* + *ism* + x2 *nasab* + *nisba*
- 3) *kunya* + *ism* + x3 *nasab* + *nisba*
- 4) *ism* + x4 *nasab*
- 5) title (young sir) + dummy name + *nasab*

5. MODERN AND REGIONAL VARIATIONS

A. Corruption of Arabic names and transliteration problems

As a note of historical interest, Arabic names have often become corrupted when used by Europeans, e.g.: Averroes, from ibn Rushd; Avicenna from ibn Sina; Achmed from Ahmad; Amurath from al-Murad; Saladin from Salah al-Din; Nureddin from Nur al-Din; Almanzor from al-Mansur; Rhases from Razi; and Avenzoar from ibn Zuhr. Regional variation in pronunciation (accents), as well as non-native unfamiliarity with Arabic result in transliteration inconsistencies in English and other Western languages, thus the forms: Muḥammad, Mohammad, Mohamed, Mohamet, and Mehmet; or, Da'ud, Daud, Dawud, Daoud, Dawood, Daood and Da'oud.

In addition, loan words from European languages transcribed in Arabic often show regional variations as well, reflecting the local phonology; this is something that needs to be taken into account when transliterating the loan word back into English, etc., e.g. *جراج* 'garage' in Egyptian but *غرام* 'gram' in other dialects.

B. Westernization of Arab naming practices

It should be noted that many Arabic countries have now adopted a Westernized convention for naming. This is the case for example in Lebanon and Morocco, countries where French conventions are followed, and it is rapidly gaining ground elsewhere.

Also, many Arabs adopt Western conventions for practical purposes when traveling abroad, constructing a first name/surname model out of their full Arab name, to fit Western visa applications or other official forms and documents. The reverse side to this is the surprise of many Westerners when asked to supply their first name, second name, father's name and family name in some Arab visa applications.

Furthermore, while the *ibn/bin* prefix (i.e. *nasab*) is still commonly used in names, its use is declining; in some places, *ibn* is only used in government interactions, and in other places it is dropped altogether.

C. Religious practices: Muslim, Christian and Jewish

A very common form for Muslim Arab names is based on the word *'abd* 'servant' or 'slave.' As God is referred to by a list of precisely 99 names in Islam, the result is names such as *'abd allah* ("Submissive to the God") or *'abd al-rashid* (the servant of the Righteous One"). Contrary to popular belief, "Abdul" is not an Arabic name.

Most Christian Arabs have names that are indistinguishable from those of their Muslim neighbors, but there are also many who retain names of Greek, Armenian, or Syriac origins. Adoption of European names, particularly French ones, has been a centuries-long convention for Arab Christians — especially but not only in the Levant and the Maghrib; thus, George Habash, Charles Helou, Camille Chamoun, etc. In addition, Christian Arabs will very often use names found in the Hebrew bible and the Gospels (and are thus not originally Arabic), while Muslims tend to gravitate to names of biblical figures that have been co-opted into the Islamic tradition:

Hebrew Bible		Gospels	
Ibrahim/ Abraham	Maryam/ Miriam	Yahya/ John	Maryam/ Mary
Musa/ Moses	Sara	'Isa/ Jesus	
Da'ud/ David		Buturs/ Peter	
Yusuf/ Joseph		Bulus/ Paul	
Nuh/ Noah		Girgis/ George	
Ya'qub/ Jacob		Mikha'il/ Michael	
Sulayman/ Solomon			

Many Eastern Jews of Yemeni, Iraqi, Moroccan and other Arabicized Sephardi extraction (Mizrahi) often maintain Arab surnames or adopt Arab names common to Arab Jews (Toledano, Mu'allim, Asulin, Amsalem), even in the West. C.f. Paula Abdul and Loolwa Khazzoom.


D. Non-Arabic forms of Arabic and foreign names:

Maghribi	Farsi Dari/Kurdish/Pashto	Turkish
<p>Berber (Afro-Asiatic) and French influences: transliterated with "ou" for <i>u</i> sound, "c" for <i>s</i> and <i>ch</i> for "sh": 'ouzzat, <i>Couscous</i>, <i>Nouh</i>, <i>Loubna</i>, <i>Houria</i>, <i>Kacem</i>, <i>Aicha</i>, <i>Rachida</i>; tendency to have consonant clusters in the beginning of words and other sounds that are foreign to the eastern dialects: <i>Jmi'aa</i>, <i>Linaati</i>; non-Arab, Berber names like <i>Messina</i>, <i>Jurgutha</i>, <i>Bourgiba</i>.</p>	<p>Indo-European; Distinctive "au" sound, <i>p</i>, <i>v</i>, <i>ch</i>, <i>gh</i> sounds, vowels <i>a, e, o</i>, lacks 'ayn; suffixes "zad", "dokht" (daughter), "jan", "khane", "Az", "ang", "van" for Ar. <i>wan</i> (<i>radwan</i>); <i>Ali</i>, <i>Mohammad</i>, <i>Abaseh</i> (lioness), <i>Ahmadi-nijad</i>, <i>Khatemi</i>, <i>al-Khumayni</i>, <i>Shehrazad</i>, <i>Cyrus</i>, <i>Daryush</i>, <i>Arin</i>, <i>Ghashang</i> قشنگ (pretty)</p>	<p><i>o</i> for "u" sound <i>Mosharref</i>, suffixes "nj", "jan", "zad", diphthongs <i>ow</i> <i>khowst</i>, <i>khout</i>; <i>Aasif</i>, <i>Ahmad-Shah</i>, <i>Assad</i>, <i>Issah</i>, <i>Jamshid</i>, <i>Javid</i>, <i>Farhad</i>, <i>Ghuljaan</i>, <i>Hekmat</i>, <i>Zalash</i>t, <i>Karzai</i>, <i>Khan</i>, <i>Nastarang</i>, <i>Noorzad</i></p> <p>Altic; diphthongs "oy"; "e" for <i>a</i> sound, "s" for <i>th</i>, "v" for <i>w</i>, use of umlaut; <i>Fikret</i>, <i>Emir</i>, <i>Ekber</i>, <i>Ferid</i>, <i>Takkiyuddin</i>, <i>Osman</i>, <i>Ramazan</i>, <i>Tevfik</i>; <i>Meryem</i>, <i>Süheyra</i> Note: Syria retains heavy Turkish influence; Turkish names include: <i>Shishakdi</i>, <i>Zengi</i>, <i>Aqsunqur</i>, <i>Oyuz</i>, <i>Oytun</i>, <i>Toygar</i></p>

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Chapter 8
**Terrorism and Islamist Militancy in
Southeast Asia**



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**INTRODUCTION: THE PEOPLE, THE CULTURE, AND
REGION**

Southeast Asia includes eleven countries: Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia, Philippines, Vietnam, Singapore, Burma, Laos, Cambodia, Brunei and East Timor. They differ vastly in terms of size, governance and wealth. The city state of Singapore is one of the wealthiest countries in the world in terms of per capita income, while the majority of the region's populace survive on under \$2,000 a year.

Southeast Asia is home to a half billion people, nearly half of whom are Muslims. It includes Indonesia, the largest Muslim country in the world with over 80 percent of its 225 million people, and Malaysia whose population is 60 percent Muslim. There are significant Muslim communities in southern Thailand and the southern Philippines that have waged intermittent guerrilla struggles for independent homelands. There are also Muslim populations in Cambodia and predominantly Chinese Singapore.

While most Southeast Asian states are on the Asian mainland, Indonesia and the Philippines are sprawling archipelagos. Indonesia is roughly 3,000 miles from its eastern-most point to its western-most point, and includes some 17,000 islands; though over half of the population lives on the island of Java. The Philippines is comprised of some 7,000 islands. Some of the most vital sea lanes of communication traverse the region. The Strait of Malacca, between the island of Sumatra and peninsular Malaysia is the busiest sea lane in the world, through which all trade between East Asia and Europe, the Middle East and Africa flows, including half the world's oil and much of its liquefied natural gas.

Islam came to Southeast Asia starting in the 15th century by Yemeni traders from the area around Hadramawt. Islam did not come by conquest, and it grafted onto a very rich indigenous religious culture, predominantly Hindu and Buddhist. Thus Islam coexisted very peacefully with other religious groups and was highly syncretic. The vast majority of Muslims in the region are Sunni, and many have strong Sufi traditions. There is a small

Shi'a community in the region, mainly comprised of Persian and Lebanese traders, but it has spread little beyond that and there has not been sectarian violence between Sunni and Shi'a communities. Southeast Asian Islam became synonymous with tolerance, pluralism and secularism. Southeast Asian Muslims tended to eschew the violence and intolerance of their co-religionists in South Asia and the Middle East.

Political Islam and a wave of more orthodox piety began to take hold in the region in the late-1970s. In part it became a means of anti-government protest. A critical mass of students who had been educated in the Middle East returned home and established networks of madrasas that were bolstered by an influx of Saudi and Gulf funding beginning in the late-1980s. Today, there is a distinct hardening of Muslim beliefs in the region, where Salafis and other Islamists comprise about one-fifth of the Muslim population. With their rise, there have been concurrent pushes to incorporate the Shari'a (Islamic law) and greater tensions both within the Muslim community and with non-Muslim communities. Malaysia and Indonesia have Islamist opposition parties committed to implementing Islamic law.

TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS

There are a number of different terrorist and Islamist separatist groups in Southeast Asia, the most significant of which is the al-Qa`ida-linked Jemaah Islamiyah. Other important groups are the Philippine-based Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), which has provided sanctuary and training for JI members and the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), which has killed several American nationals. In addition there are a number of insurgent organizations in Southern Thailand. These organizations are networked to a degree, though the relationship amongst the constituent groups is often informal, based on personal connections, and changes over time in reaction to the changing external security environment.

Jemaah Islamiyah

Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) is a radical Salafi organization centered in Indonesia, but with smaller cells throughout the region. It was responsible for annual terrorist attacks in Indonesia between 2002-2005. While concerted efforts by Indonesian and regional security forces have hurt JI's organization, it remains a moderate threat in the short to medium term. (For an in-depth treatment of JI, see Justin Hasting's chapter on the organization.)

Ideology

JI is a radical Salafi-jihadist organization with some degree of affiliation to al-Qa`ida that was founded in 1992 on the principles of being a clandestine organization (*tanzim sir*) committed to turning Indonesia and the rest of Muslim Southeast Asia into an Islamic state (*Nusantara Raya*).¹

It was founded by two radical clerics, Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, former members of the underground Darul Islam Movement, which was neutralized by Indonesian forces in the late 1960s. Its ideology was focused on the concepts of *al-wala' wal bara'* (love and hate for Allah's sake, i.e. absolute loyalty), in which they pledge *bay'a*, an oath of allegiance to their spiritual leader or *amir*. They engage in *takfir*, i.e. labeling other Muslims as apostates and infidels, and *hijra*, or emigration and a total disassociation from non-Muslims or apostates. It instructs members to live in parallel and exclusive communities governed totally by *Shari'a*. The ideology is formed out of a literal interpretation of the Qur'an and Sunna. They have broadened their definition of a defensive jihad, and believe that the killing of Westerners is justified because Islam as a religion is under attack and Muslim lands are being occupied; Muslims who are killed collaterally become martyrs. Jihad has an explicitly violent connotation, along the lines of Abu al-A'la Mawdudi's "sixth pillar of Islam." JI's ideology encourages and praises *isytiyhad*, or martyrdom, and promises the rewards of *janna* (paradise) for those who die carrying out Allah's deeds, especially through *istimata*, or suicide attacks. It is a vehemently anti-Western organization that justifies its attacks and targeting on the West's aggression towards the Muslim world. Abu Bakar Ba'asyir has made clear that "this fight" against America is compulsory.²

Terrorist Acts

Despite its founding in 1993, JI did not perpetrate its first terrorist act until 2000. In that period it recruited members, dispatched them for training in Mindanao, or when possible to al-Qa'ida camps in Afghanistan, and set up a regional network of front companies, Islamist charities and support cells. In many ways, JI was at al-Qa'ida's disposal, moving money and supporting their operations elsewhere in the world. For example, the money for the 1998 East Africa Embassy bombings came through accounts in Islamic banks in Malaysia. The planning meetings for the USS *Cole* and 9/11 attacks took place in a JI safe house in Kuala Lumpur in 2000, and it was a JI-connected company that procured Zaccarias Mous-sau's visa to the United States. This should not come as a surprise as the JI operations chief, Riduan Isamuddin (aka Hambali) was dispatched by al-Qa'ida from Afghanistan when JI was established, as were other al-Qa'ida operatives over time. With the fall of the Indonesian strongman, Suharto, in May 1998, dozens of JI members, including its two founders who had been living in exile in Malaysia, returned to Indonesia. JI began their campaign to establish an Islamic state in the ashes of a collapsed dictatorship before democracy could take root.

JI's first acts of violence were in response to Christian secessionist groups in the outer islands of Indonesia. Muslim vigilante groups emerged to quell Christian secessionists. JI established the Laskar Mujihidin led by Abdurrahman Iqbal Mohammed (aka Abu Jibril) in the Maluku and the Laskar Jundullah led by Agus Dwikarna in Sulawesi. JI operatives in the southern Philippines were able to procure explosives and automatic weapons. At the same

time, JI brought in a number of al-Qa`ida operatives to lead training and to produce jihadi videos for fundraising and recruitment purposes. The sectarian bloodletting led to the death of between 6,000 and 9,000 people.

JI's first terrorist attack occurred in August 2000, when a bomb was detonated at the Philippine Embassy in Jakarta, as the ambassador Leonides Caday was leaving his vehicle. The bombing was seen as a "thank you note" to the MILF who had provided training and sanctuary for JI and whose ceasefire with the Philippine government had broken down and was on the defensive. The next bombings occurred in December 2000 when JI assisted the MILF to detonate bombs in the light rail transit in metropolitan Manila. In Indonesia, JI planted 30 bombs in churches across the archipelago on Christmas Eve. Only 15 detonated and 18 were killed.

At the time of 9/11, al-Qa`ida had dispatched a young Canadian of Kuwaiti descent to Southeast Asia to liaise with Hambali. The two did reconnaissance on the US and Israeli embassies in Manila but abandoned the operation due to the considerable security at the two targets. They then switched their plan to attack the US embassy in Singapore. In addition, they sought to target office towers in Singapore with US corporate logos.³

Their operation was supported by a JI cell in Singapore, which was also doing reconnaissance on the small US military community in Singapore. There are roughly 120 US port visits annually to Singapore and there is a small permanent US military contingent stationed in Singapore. The JI cell was in the early stages of planning a USS *Cole*-style operation against a US naval vessel. In addition, they had performed reconnaissance of the Yishun MRT station, where US personnel got on shuttle buses to the Sembawang wharf naval facility. This video reconnaissance footage was found in the wreckage of al-Qa`ida's chief of military operations Muhammad `Atif's house in Kabul in October 2001.

In January 2002, Hambali held an emergency meeting of his lieutenants in Bangkok. Hambali was under pressure from Khalid Sheikh Mohammed to perpetrate a major attack that would take some of the pressure off of Al-Qa`ida and the Taliban, which were reeling from the US invasion of Afghanistan. KSM sent roughly \$30,000 to Hambali for a diversionary attack. At the meeting, Hambali shifted JI's focus on hitting hardened US targets and focusing on soft targets in which Westerners would be the primary target. Ten months later JI operatives detonated a large car bomb, with roughly 100kg of ammonium nitrate, parked in front of a nightclub in Bali, Indonesia with a mobile phone. Some 202 people were killed, including six Americans. The overwhelming number of victims, 88, were Australian. The subsequent close cooperation between the Indonesian National Police and the Australian Federal Police led to the first major arrests of JI members. In all 33 people were arrested in conjunction with the Bali attack.

In August 2003, JI perpetrated its next major attack, the bombing of the JW Marriott hotel in Jakarta. Again, a small SUV was packed with a concoction of diesel fuel and ammonium nitrate was detonated. There is still not conclusive evidence as to whether the

bomb was detonated by the drivers or by a cell phone. The incline on the hotel's driveway took most of the blast, and only 15 people were killed, though more than a hundred were wounded. The premature detonation suggests that a cell phone was the detonator.

In October 2004, JI operatives filled a small delivery truck with another chemical fertilizer-based explosive and detonated the bomb at the gate of the Australian Embassy in downtown Jakarta. Unlike the JW Marriott bomb, this bomb included no fuel-based accelerant. This could possibly be because 14 of the 15 victims of the JW Marriott bombing were Indonesian Muslims, which provoked a brief backlash against the group. The object was not to kill as many people as they could, but to hit a hardened and very symbolic target: Australian Federal Police were often seen on Indonesian TV assisting with the investigation into JI, and Australia had become even more closely aligned with the United States with troops both in Afghanistan and Iraq.

In September 2005, JI struck again in Bali, though this time with a different modus operandi. Rather than a large car or truck bomb, three individual suicide bombers simultaneously detonated small bag bombs in three separate crowded cafes. While JI might have switched the method of attacks due to a shortage of resources or as a work around to government counter-measures, the most likely reason is that it wanted to increase the tempo of its attacks. A captured JI member told his captors that JI's master bomb-maker, Dr. Azahari bin Husin, was unhappy with the annual bombing and wanted to increase the rate of attacks. When Azahari was finally killed in a shootout with elite Indonesian counter-terrorism police in November 2005, police recovered 33 bombs, including a motorcycle bomb and Bali II-style bombs, in various states of construction from his safe house.

JI has not recovered from the death of Dr. Azahari, despite the fact that his bomb-making plans were written to be broadly accessible to people with only a limited science background. It is not to say that JI has not tried. A Bali-style bag bomb was recovered in a central Javanese safe house in mid-2006, and a female courier was arrested with some 15kg of plastic explosives. A series of raids and arrests, including JI's military chief Abu Dujana, between March and July 2007, led to an extremely large cache of explosives and small arms. These included, 20 Bali-style bag bombs ready to go, 30 sacks of ammonium nitrate, 50 kg of TNT, 193 detonators, circuitry similar to those used in the three Bali suicide bag bombs in September 2005. There is some evidence that JI was deliberating a shift to a campaign of urban assassination of Westerners and Indonesian political figures. In mid-2007, the Australian head of the Jakarta Center for International Law Enforcement Cooperation, where Detachment-88, the elite counter-terrorism police is headquartered and trains, was nearly assassinated by a drive-by assailant.

There is some evidence that there is a debate within JI between advocates of the Al-Qa`ida line of targeting the far enemy, and those who argue for a more traditional neo-Darul Islam strategy of fomenting sectarian conflict. While the latter group is not theologically opposed to the targeting of Westerners, they point to the increased pressure on the Indonesian government to crackdown on JI members.

One final point that bears special mention is the role that JI could potentially play in any al-Qa`ida-led attack using weapons of mass destruction. On 9/11, Hambali and a US-educated bio-chemist, Yazid Sufaat, were in Kandahar, Afghanistan trying to procure a weapons grade strain of anthrax.⁴ Sufaat owned and operated a laboratory in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia named Green Laboratories Medicine, which was capable of large-scale anthrax production. There is evidence that al-Qa`ida also sought a second anthrax production facility in Bogor, Indonesia.

General Modus Operandi

JI is an elite organization, with no more than a few thousand members, but only several hundred hard core militants. For their survival, such groups have to be highly selective about who they take into their ranks. JI recruitment is based on four primary factors: kinship, mosque, madrasa and friendship; in short, recruitment is based on trust.

JI has carefully bound its members together through kinship, in some cases recruiting whole families. Where familial networks do not exist, JI has promoted marriage among members' families, creating kinship bonds that reduce the likelihood of infiltration.⁵ Malaysian intelligence concluded that more than 100 marriages "involving families of key JI leaders" comprises the core of the organization's membership.⁶ Indonesian investigators think that JI's kinship network is even larger: "[That] figure is just the tip of the iceberg. We believe the number of marriages involved is certainly much higher judging from the information we have continued to gather."⁷

It is important to note that JI has been able to recruit across the socio-economic and educational spectrum, and its ranks are comprised by middle-class, secularly and technically educated individuals, as well as people with nothing more than a Qur'anic education. Many low-ranking JI members come out of the sectarian conflict zones of the outer islands, in particular the Maluku and Central Sulawesi, but there is no single profile of a JI member. There are vast age disparities among JI members, from youth trained in their network of madrasas or who have experienced jihad in the sectarian bloodletting, to middle-aged professionals.

What to Expect from JI in the Coming Years

Despite concerted counter-terrorist operations, and the arrest of much of its founding leadership, JI remains a remarkably resilient organization. Yet, as a short-term terrorist threat, JI has been fairly neutralized. The large caches of explosives seized in central Indonesia in mid-2007 are indicative of the fact that the group is still intent on mass-casualty attacks, but much of their core-leadership still at large, and seems primarily committed to regrouping. JI will remain a serious threat in the medium to long term, and has been able to tap into the growing Islamist presence and political clout.

In the coming years JI will focus on three programs, two of which are overt and legal, and one of which still enjoys fairly broad popular support in Indonesia. In short, JI is building up its core of committed Islamists, while down-playing its militant agenda. JI is taking advantage of the fact that it is not a proscribed organization in Indonesia, and mere membership is not a crime.

First, JI is focusing on recruitment and religious proselytization, or *da'wa*, work. To wit, two of JI's four functional sections are involved in religious training and education.

Second, since late 2004, JI has adopted a Hamas or Hezbollah model of overt social welfare that I refer to as the "inverse triangle." Such a strategy builds up their popular support and forges greater links to Islamist parties and organizations. JI has revitalized a number of charities, in particular KOMPAK and MERC that were used to support militant activities in the sectarian conflict zones from 1998-2001. JI's former militia the Laskar Mujahidin has likewise been reconstituted as a charitable organization providing quick humanitarian responses to natural disasters. JI's overtly civil society arm, headed by JI's founder, Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, has likewise actively entered the realm of social welfare. JI has worked to re-incorporate two banned Saudi charities in Indonesia, al-Haramain and the International Islamic Relief Organization as Indonesian charities.

In short, JI has taken advantage of an opening at the same time that militancy had become counter productive and as political will to take on the terrorist infrastructure waned. JI's emphasis on *da'wa* and charity will make JI more durable over the long term. While the Indonesian government has shown remarkable resolve in going after and putting people on trial for direct participation in terrorist acts, it has not targeted JI's social networks. This unwillingness to take on the terrorist infrastructure is both regrettable and negligent. JI has a very long-term timetable. By pursuing overt strategies JI is able to forge closer ties with Islamists who might otherwise eschew their violence. JI is thus no longer seen as a radical fringe, though their agenda has not changed. There is scant evidence that JI can be weaned off terrorism.

JI's third strategy is to continue to foment sectarian violence in the outer islands, a strategy that has considerable support amongst Indonesian Muslims, and even some members of the political elite. While some contend that there are deep factional rifts within JI between proponents of sectarian bloodletting and those who want to target the West, they are tactical rather than strategic shifts, but strategies that nonetheless are not mutually exclusive. There has been an alarming up-swing in attacks, including bombings, targeted assassinations, and raids on military/police facilities. Since October 2004, there have been at least 28 successful bombings, resulting in 48 deaths. Most were small and a handful of larger bombs killed the majority of the victims. Police found, seized or defused 260 explosive devices. There have been more than 60 bombings since the Malino peace agreement was signed on March 12, 2001. More than 21 people, including five police officers, were gunned down, and most infamously, militants beheaded three schoolgirls. Security forces have been trying

to cope with the problem. On 22 January 2007, government forces responded to a large number of armed militants was amassing near Poso. The raid set off a gun battle that killed 15 suspected fighters and one officer. In all 17 suspected terrorists were killed in January in clashes with the police. Over 10 people were arrested, yet more than 50 suspected militants were able to escape. Attacks, including the beheadings of three schoolgirls, are meant to undermine confidence in the state, and more specifically the Malino Accords.

One final note bears mentioning. In the *Management of Savagery*, one of the most important strategy papers believed to be penned by an al-Qa'ida ideologue, there is an important reference to Southeast Asians. Though condescending and patronizing in tone, the author writes that the pool of technically savvy and well-educated Southeast Asians is an important resource. Though they might "lack Shari'a discipline," the author believed that "they are like a white page, their innate nature and their genuine emotion motivating them to assist the religion."⁸

The Moro Islamic Liberation Front

The Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) is a more traditional rural-based guerilla insurgency located in central Mindanao in the Southern Philippines. The MILF broke away from the secular Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) in 1978, and has continued to fight for an independent Islamic state. The MILF fields up to 12,000 men. While it employs terrorist tactics occasionally, terrorism is not its primary *modus operandi*. The MILF merits attention due to the fact that they have provided training and sanctuary to JI since 1996.

Ideology

Many analysts of the Philippines point to the fact that the MILF has a very simple agenda: the establishment of an independent homeland, and that they eschew the transnational agenda of the global Salafi-jihadi community, such as JI. The MNLF received considerable state sponsorship from the Libyan government of Mu'ammarr al-Qadhafi. When the MILF broke away, they moved their headquarters from Tripoli, where the MNLF was based, to Lahore, Pakistan, where they were housed in the Jamaat-i Islami's compound. The Jamaat, not to be confused with the Indonesian Jemaah Islamiya (both take their name from the Arabic *Jama'a al-Islamiyya*, or Islamic Group), is often described as the Pakistan branch of the Muslim Brotherhood and was very active in the 1980s and 1990s in supporting the jihad in Afghanistan, and afterwards in support of the Taliban. The founder of the MILF, Salamat Hashim, saw the MILF as part of the global struggle of Muslims and was ideologically committed to the establishment of the caliphate. While the MILF remained committed to the establishment of its Islamic state, it received considerable support from jihadist social networks forged in Afghanistan and gained succor from al-Qa'ida and Saudi charities. The first generation of MILF field commanders either fought in Afghanistan or received training in Pakistan.

The brother-in-law and close confidante of Usama bin Ladin, Muhammad Jamal Khalifa, who ran the Muslim World League (MWL) office in Quetta in the mid to late-1980s, first traveled to Mindanao in 1988 and moved there permanently in 1991. He lived in the house of Sheik Omar Pasigan, one of the MILF's founders and leading ideologues. He established branches of both the MWL and the International Islamic Relief Organization and hired members from both the MILF and Abu Sayyaf Group as local office managers, ensuring that the Gulf funding made its way to militant coffers. Khalifa set up several smaller charities, including the International Research and Information Center, which was used to funnel money to Ramzi Yousef and Khalid Sheikh Mohammed's Bojinka plot to down 11 US jetliners. Khalifa worked closely with Wali Khan Amin Shah, an Afghan veteran and close lieutenant of Usama bin Ladin. Khalifa was opening a branch of the Jersey-based charity Muwaffaq, which was one of al-Qa'ida's primary funding mechanisms during the mid-1990s. Khalifa, however never returned to the Philippines after being detained in the US on immigration charges in late-1994.

In September 1996, the secular MNLF signed a peace agreement with the Philippine government, which the MILF leadership rejected outright. The size of the MILF grew with MNLF defectors who also rejected the accord. The MILF, which the government had always considered a small fringe group, was now the largest armed group in Mindanao.

In 1996, JI's spiritual leader Abu Bakar Ba'asyir forged an agreement with Salamaat Hashim to open up MILF camps to JI members. Al-Qa'ida dispatched a number of high-level trainers to Mindanao as part of their attempt to franchise the Afghan training camp model. These trainers at Camp Hudaibiyah included 'Umar al-Faruq, who was al-Qa'ida's senior-most operative in Southeast Asia at the time of his capture in 2003; 'Umar al-Hadrani, and al-Mughira al-Gaza'iri, who was a trainer in al-Qa'ida's Khost camp. Muhammad Nasir bin Abas, who would go on to head JI's Mantiqi III, was in charge of JI training.

After 9/11, the MILF has gone to great lengths to publicly distance itself from both al-Qa'ida and JI and stress the fact that they are simply fighting for a Moro homeland. The MILF's founder and leader Salamat Hashim passed away in mid-2003, and he has been replaced by a more moderate leader, Murad Ebrahim, who rose through the ranks as a military commander, not as a religious leader. Since then the MILF has been involved in a protracted peace negotiation with the Philippine government, and a ceasefire has tenuously been in place since 2003. Although the capture of JI members in Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines have all confirmed that JI training is still taking place in MILF camps, it is at a much lower level than in the late-1990s. In late-2002 or early-2003, two of the Bali bombers, Dulmatin and Umar Patek arrived in MILF camps where they conducted training, until early-2005 when they joined with the Abu Sayyaf Group in Jolo after a Philippine armed forces attack on their safe house. In February 2008, an Indonesian member of JI was captured in an MILF camp in Eastern Mindanao with a cache of small arms and bomb-making materials.

The MILF maintain close ties with the Tablighi Jamaat, which runs most of the ideological and religious indoctrination for the MILF's soldiers.

Structure

The MILF controls vast swaths of territory in central Mindanao and its political and military organization reflect that fact.

The Chairman of the MILF, Ebrahim Murad, sits atop the MILF's central committee, which has some 20 members. The Central Committee includes a secretariat for day-to-day management of MILF affairs, and six functional offices: *da'wa* (proselytization), education, intelligence, finance, information, and foreign affairs. The MILF's peace panel also reports to the Central Committee. The Islamic Supreme Court sits atop of a three-tiered Islamic-style judiciary, which also reports to the Central Committee. Beneath the chairman are three vice chairmen: Political Affairs (Ghadzali Jafaar), Internal Affairs (vacant), and Military Affairs (Aleem Abdulaziz Mimbintas). The Vice Chairman for Internal Affairs oversees the Bangsamoro Internal Security Force, which oversees the implementation of Shari'a law. The Vice Chairman for Political Affairs oversees the front's rural political system and coordinates the United Front of Civil Society Organizations.

The Vice Chairman for Military Affairs oversees the Bangsamoro Islamic Armed Force (BIAF), a twelve-thousand man force that is comprised of full-time soldiers and guerillas. The BIAF was re-organized in 2003-05 in an attempt to neutralize some of the hard line base commanders who were opposed to the peace process and the leadership of Ebrahim Murad. Beneath the Chief of Staff are five Front Commanders. Beneath each front commander are four to five base commanders. The quality, size and equipment of the various base commands differ vastly. They are organized geographically to accommodate the ethno-linguistic differences of the MILF. The MILF have two training camps for their combatants, a 45-day boot camp, and higher-level courses for their officers.

In the villages, the MILF exercises its political control through the mosques. Local imams are often the Front's political leaders and Shari'a Court judges. Thus the Central Committee's Da'wa Committee is really the locus of political power.

Terrorist Attacks

The MILF deny that they ever employ terrorism, yet they routinely do so, in particular following battlefield losses. The establishment of JI training camps and the presence of al-Qa'ida trainers beginning in 1996 led to the establishment of a terrorist arm of the MILF. Founded in 1999, the Special Operations Group was headed by Yukhlis Munos. In a joint operation with JI operative Fathur Rohman al-Ghozi, the MILF detonated a bomb on a crowded commuter train in Manila in December 2000 in retaliation for the government's capture of the Front's main base camp. In 2003, in retaliation for the government's ceasefire violation and capture of another MILF camp, the MILF and JI detonated bombs at the international airport and a crowded ferry terminal in Davao City, killing one American.

Since 2002, there have been over forty bombings in Mindanao. Most are very small bombs that are improvised from mortar or howitzer shells. The MILF strenuously denies its

involvement in such bombings, citing its commitment to the peace process. When MILF members are directly implicated in attacks, the MILF disavows their membership or blames "lost commands." Many of the attacks are all but impossible to disaggregate and often comprise members of JI, the MILF and Abu Sayyaf. Many MILF hardliners participate in terrorist attacks in order to spoil the peace process, which they do not support. In some cases there is evidence that the MILF leadership supports small-scale bombings when the peace process becomes stalemated. In general, the MILF leadership seems uncomfortable with adopting a larger terrorist-style campaign against unarmed citizenry and soft targets.

The peace process has been very complex and slow. The MILF leadership under Ebrahim Murad has foregone independence for now and shown a willingness to accept an agreement of broad autonomy. Yet the details of the agreement remain highly sensitive and the two sides, as of February 2008, have failed to sign a final peace agreement. Until that happens, the MILF do not have any incentive in cutting their ties with JI. It is, simply a rational choice for the group, as well as a source of funding. For example, in 2003, before his arrest in Thailand, Hambali transferred \$27,000 to the MILF to support continued training of JI members. The MILF have legitimate concerns that the government has neither the will nor the capabilities to sign and implement a peace agreement, and thus the MILF enters peace talks with a high degree of trepidation, willing to return to war.

Modus Operandi

The MILF mainly engages in small-scale guerilla tactics. They are much less effective when they operate with larger-scale forces in conventional fighting. The MILF have considerable popular support in central Mindanao amongst the Maranao and Maguindanao, but a much weaker presence in the Sulu archipelago. While the MILF is committed to the establishment of an Islamic state, and use Shari'a as the governing law in territory that they control, the MILF have never engaged in all-out sectarian violence against Christian and indigenous communities.

The Abu Sayyaf Group

The Abu Sayyaf group (ASG) is a small, loosely organized but violent band of militants in the Sulu Archipelago who drift between Islamist terrorism and criminality. They have been directly responsible for the death of at least four American nationals, and the kidnapping of several others.

Ideology

The ASG was founded in 1991 by Abdurrajak Janjalani, a fiery cleric and Afghan veteran who befriended Bin Ladin in Pakistan. Formally known as al-Harakat al-Islamiya, its informal moniker comes from Abdur Rab Rasul Sayyaf, a leading mujahid in Afghanistan and proponent of militant Wahhabism, who ran the training camp in Khost where the Jan-

Janjalani brothers trained. Sayyaf was also the mentor of an Indonesian jihadi, Riduan Isamuddin, better known as Hambali. The group may have received its seed money from Bin Ladin. The group's stated goal was the establishment of an Islamic state in the southern Philippines. Unlike the MILF, the ASG was decidedly sectarian, and between 1991 and 1995, all of its attacks were on churches, priests, nuns, missionaries and other Christian targets. Beginning in 1991, Muhammad Jamal Khalifa began to support the ASG through the establishment of several Saudi charities in Sulu and Basilan. With Khalifa's inability to return to the Philippines after 1995, funding to the ASG began to dry up. In 1996, the ASG entered into the kidnap-for-ransom business. In 1998, Janjalani was killed in a shootout with police, an event that catalyzed the group's degeneration into criminality. By 2002, the group had abandoned its kidnappings, for which it had become notorious and resumed its campaign of urban terrorism. The ASG relied heavily on the Rajah Solaiman Movement, a small group of radicalized Christian converts to Islam, to broaden their reach from the Muslim south to Luzon. Since 2002, the group has professed a more ideological position due to deepened ties with JI as well as stepped-up cooperation with the MILF. Since early 2005, two of the top JI operatives at large have been embedded with the ASG on Jolo.

Structure

The ASG is small, with roughly 200-400 militants at any given time. With the death of Janjalani, the group disintegrated into several kidnap-for-ransom gangs; each gang headed by a leader who served as a patron to his junior members. The ASG was exceptionally loosely organized with very little in the way of a centralized leadership or command and control. With the arrival of US forces in Mindanao in 2002, and a more permanent position after 1994, there has been a greater offensive against the ASG. The neutralization of two of their leading kidnapers, Abu Subaya and Ghalib Andang, allowed the group to be led by Abdurajak Janjalani's younger brother Khadaffy Janjalani. Beginning in 2002, the group began to display slightly more organization and as mentioned above, more ideological commitment. Under the younger Janjalani, the kidnapping ceased and the group began training in MILF camps with JI. There is little in terms of formal organization or training.

Terrorist Attacks

Abu Sayyaf began its terrorist attacks in the Philippines in 1991. Most of their attacks at this time were directed at Christian churches, missionaries and non-Muslim communities.⁹ These attacks include: the 1991 grenade attack in Zamboanga city that killed two American evangelists; the bombing of the Christian missionary ship M/V Doulosin Zamboanga in August 1991; the killing of an Italian priest in Zamboanga on May 20, 1992; the August 10, 1992 bombing of a building in Zamboanga that killed two and wounded 40 staffers of a Christian missionary ship; the kidnapping of two Spanish nuns in Sulu on January 17, 1993; the kidnapping of a Spanish priest on March 18, 1993; the kidnapping of an Ameri-

can missionary on Sulu on November 14, 1993; and the December 26, 1993 bombing of a cathedral in Davao that killed six and wounded 132. On June 10, 1994, a series of bombs in Zamboanga, attributed by Philippine security officials to the ASG, killed over 71 people. In one of the most brutal, grisly, and publicly reviled attacks in modern Philippine terrorism, ASG operatives attacked the western Mindanao town of Ipil on April 4, 1995 killing 53, wounding 48 and then burned and looted 17 commercial buildings. In February 1997 ASG operatives assassinated a Catholic bishop. Between 1991 and 1995, the Abu Sayyaf Group was responsible for 67 terrorist attacks, more than half of which were indiscriminant bombings. All led to the death of some 136 people and hundreds of injuries.¹⁰

In 2000, ASG terrorism took a different turn with a number of spectacular mass-kidnappings. In March 2000, the ASG kidnapped 55 people, mainly school children, teachers and a priest in Basilan. The following month, using high-speed boats, a group of ASG kidnapped 20 foreigners and a Filipino from a dive resort on the Malaysian island of Sipidan. The militants beheaded one American captive. In May 2001, the ASG kidnapped 30 tourists, including two American missionaries, from the Dos Palmas resort on Palawan. In 2000-01 they were responsible for 16 deaths and 140 hostage-takings, but no acts of political-religious terrorism.¹¹ They were a well-armed criminal gang, but not an ideologically motivated political-religious organization. The label "terrorism" was applied to them by both the US and Philippine governments, but that had more to do with their brutality than their political agenda.

Moreover, their demands for one million USD in ransom per hostage led many to consider the Abu Sayyaf as nothing more than a criminal menace rather than a secessionist insurgency with legitimate grievances.¹² As the Philippine National Security Advisor Rollo Golez said, "We have no evidence that Abu Sayyaf has gotten financing from [B]in Laden recently. Otherwise they would not have to resort to kidnapping."¹³ One Abu Sayyaf defector said that he quit the movement because "...the group lost its original reason for being. The activities were not for Islam but for personal gratification. We abducted people not any more for the cause of Islam but for money."¹⁴

With the neutralization of two of the leading kidnapers, Abu Subaya and Ghalib Andang, in 2002, Abdurrajak Janjalani's younger brother Khadaffy consolidated power and re-oriented the group back to its traditional ideological struggle. There is also evidence that JI leaders in Indonesia instructed their operatives in Mindanao to forge a relationship with the ASG, which had a much stronger presence in the vital Sulu archipelago than did the MILF. JI operatives would often travel from Nunukan in Kalimantan, Indonesia to Sipidan in Sabah State, Malaysia, and then island-hop Tai Tawi, Sulu, Basilan to Mindanao. There may also have been concern amongst JI members that the MILF was engaged in a peace process with the Philippine Government and might terminate their ties with JI.

In March and April 2003, members of the ASG were implicated along with JI and MILF members in the bombing of the Davao airport and Sasa Wharf, both in Mindanao,

which together killed 48 and wounded 204.¹⁵ On March 4, 2003, two ASG members were arrested in Manila with a large cache of explosives that they hoped to put in backpack bombs to be detonated in malls.¹⁶ In June 2004, six more ASG members were arrested for possessing explosives. In October 2004, three ASG members were arrested for plotting to bomb the US Embassy.¹⁷ In December 2004, they bombed a market in General Santos, killing 14 and wounding 70. December 2004 to January 2005 saw three aborted bombings. Then on February 14, 2005, they executed three near-simultaneous bombings in Manila, Davao and General Santos, killing 11 and wounding roughly 136.¹⁸ Following a prison uprising on March 14, 2005, in which 24 ASG members including three detained leaders were killed, the ASG spokesman vowed to take the war "right to your doorsteps (*sic*)" in Manila.¹⁹ An arrest on March 23, 2005 led to the recovery of 18 improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and 10 sacks of chemical precursors in a safe house in Manila.²⁰ The suspect admitted that the ASG leadership was planning a wave of bombings in Manila during Holy Week.²¹ At the same time, almost all kidnapping incidents by the ASG have ceased. Since October 2004, there were five separate kidnapping incidents by ASG operatives, but all of those ended in executions, not demands for ransom.²² In April 2007, the ASG kidnapped a group of road workers, beheading all six.

Despite the presence of senior JI operatives Dulmatin and Umar Patek, the ASG has been on the defensive and unable to perpetrate many mass-casualty attacks since 2006. In August 2006, the Armed forces of the Philippines began a major offensive against the ASG that led to the neutralization of six top leaders, including Khadaffy Janjalani, Ismin Sahiron, Jundam Jamalul, Borhan Mundus, and Jainal Antel Sali. The group has been in disarray and Philippines Armed Forces overran a large JI-ASG bomb factory in early-2007. The Philippine government asserted that over 140 ASG were killed or captured in 2007. In fighting in early 2008, one of the ASG's top leaders, Wahab Opao, was killed in Tawi Tawi, and Philippine officials exhumed a body believed to be that of JI bomber Dulmatin.

Modus Operandi

Like the MILF, the ASG commonly use IEDs fashioned out of Howitzer or mortar shells. They have experimented with different circuitry and bomb designs, however. Philippine police recovered small bombs, C4 melted down with kerosene and injected into toothpaste and shampoo containers they believed could be used on planes. The ASG have put bombs on ferries, and can be expected to do so again. The ASG will frequently kidnap individuals, and they often execute their captives by beheading.

Southern Thai Insurgents

Since January 2004, Islamic insurgents have waged a secessionist campaign in the three Muslim-majority provinces of Narathiwat, Pattani and Yala in southern Thailand.

Nearly 3,000 people have been killed and over 5,000 wounded, with an estimated 15% of the Buddhist population forced to flee the region.

Ideology

The ideology of the insurgents is both Islamist and ethno-national. The insurgents today are fundamentally different than previous generations. In addition to the broad targeting of women, children, monks and the de facto ethnic cleansing that has transpired, the insurgents have demonstrated exceptionally violent and intimidating practices. Over 55 percent of their victims have been fellow Muslims. They have a liberal definition of collaborator, to include Muslims who reject their values and seek accommodation with the Thai state. They have killed moderate clerics, and threatened others to not perform funerals for the Muslims that they kill as they are not deemed to be real Muslims, the extremist practice of *taqfir*, or ex-communication. They have shuttered businesses on Fridays, killed Islamic teachers who teach at schools that receive government funding and teach mixed curriculums.

Insurgents have set up parallel systems in the villages to force people to opt out of the state political system: private Islamic schools—often the only alternative when their arson attacks and murder of almost 70 teachers force state schools to close. Ad hoc Shari'a courts are now the primary means of dispute adjudication. Insurgents have begun forcing women to not give birth in hospitals, a tragedy for the health of women and infants, but by not registering the births, the children are ineligible to attend government schools or receive healthcare coverage. These policies are meant to impose a rigid set of ideological and religious values, rather than win hearts and minds.

Structure

The violence is being perpetrated by a number of different cell-based organizations who are, for the first time in the history of Malay-Muslim separatism in Thailand, working together. Though the Pattani United Liberation Organization is often cited in the media as being behind the violence, this secular-nationalist organization died out in the mid-1990s, defeated by the Thai state and won over by generous amnesties. Much of its former leadership remains divided in exile. The groups most responsible for the violence are the Barisan Revolusi Nasional-Coordanasi (BRN-C) and the Gerakan Mujahidin Islamiyah Patanni (GMIP). The BRN-C is a madrasa-based movement that is more active in the cities, while the GMIP, which was primarily a criminal enterprise into the 1990s, was taken over by two veterans of the mujahidin in Afghanistan in the 1980s, remains a more rural based movement. Both organizations are highly cellular and horizontal in their organization structure.

Terrorist Attacks

Violence in southern Thailand has steadily escalated since 2004. In 2006, the average rate of killing was 1.6 people per day; in June 2007 it peaked at over seven people per day.

There have been more than 850 bombings, and many more failed or aborted bombings. There have been more than 600 arson attacks, targeting well over 250 schools. Militants have carried out nearly 1,400 assassinations. Thai insurgents have beheaded more than 35 people, and there have been almost twice the number of attempted or botched decapitations. In 2007 there were 3,000 terrorist incidents in the three provinces. On average there are some 40 incidents of violence a week according to police data. 55 percent of the victims of the insurgents have been their co-religionists. While insurgents have stepped up their attacks on police and soldiers, civilians, monks, women (including pregnant women), and children have been killed frequently.

While most people are killed by gunshot, usually pillion motorcycles, the death toll from explosions is climbing markedly. When the insurgency began, in 2004, most bombs were small black-powder pipe bombs, usually under 2 kilograms. By 2006, the average was a 4-5 kilogram ammonium nitrate bomb. In 2006 the average size of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) increased further and by 2007, 15-20 kg bombs were used regularly. Soldiers, frequently wounded by road-side IEDs, are dying in higher numbers. On occasion, insurgents get hold of high-explosives, usually mining-grade plastic. Detonators continue to include remote command detonation, cell phones, but are increasingly relying on digital watches and other timing devices. There has been some experimentation with infrared detonators. IED technology has proliferated.

While few Westerners have been killed by the militants—only a Canadian and an American—it bears noting that the southern three provinces have almost no Western tourists or residents. Insurgents have not attacked soft targets out of area. Teams were caught in Bangkok in November 2005 and in Phuket in September 2006.

The insurgents have a degree of sanctuary in Malaysia, where the Islamist opposition party PAS is in control of the bordering state of Kelantan. Large numbers of southern Thai militants were educated in Indonesia, and there is concern that much of the radicalization and recruitment for the movement occurs there. GMIP leader Doromae Kuteh, arrested by Malaysia in 2004, now lives in exile in Indonesia.

The insurgency, like that in the Philippines, has been hampered by the poor counter-insurgent (COIN) operations of security forces, competition amongst agencies over budgets, unclear chains of command, and a breakdown in law enforcement. Despite the arrest of several thousand insurgent suspects in the past three years, over 90 percent have been released after the 28-day detention period as the police have been unable to garner sufficient evidence to press charges.

THREATS TO THE UNITED STATES

Diaspora Communities

While there are sizeable Southeast Asian diaspora communities in the United States, the number of Indonesians and Malaysians is quite small, as is the number of Muslim Filipinos. For the most part they do not have a history of radicalization. It would be naïve to think that these communities do not engage in some form of fundraising for these groups, but there has been little public evidence of this to date.

A Malaysian national residing in California, Rahmat Abdhir, was arrested in mid-2007 for providing material support to his brother, Zulkifli bin Hir, a senior JI operative who is fighting besides and training members of the MILF. At the time of writing he remained arrested and preparations for his federal trial were underway.

In another case, two African-American converts to Islam were arrested for fundraising for the Abu Sayyaf. In general, the greater threat comes from Southeast Asian students who receive their education in American universities and who are recruited into terrorist networks upon their return.

THREATS TO US PERSONS, PROPERTY, INTERESTS AND ALLIES ABROAD

Citizens

As long as JI and the Abu Sayyaf continue to attack soft targets, US nationals will be likely victims. Both have openly spoken of the need to attack Americans, and America is explicitly identified as an enemy of Islam in which they are locked in a defensive jihad. Seven American nationals were killed in the 2002 Bali bombing. While the MILF has never directly targeted Americans, one was killed in an MILF bombing of the Davao Airport in 2003. The Abu Sayyaf have killed roughly a half dozen American citizens, whom they had kidnapped. Australian and other westerners will be targets for JI and the ASG as well.

Embassies

Between 2000-2003, JI, working with al-Qa`ida, attempted to target the US Embassies in Jakarta, Manila, Singapore and Phnom Penh. Less reported, the perpetrators of the 2002 bombing in Bali also set off a bomb in front of the US Consulate in Denpasar, Bali. In 2003, JI succeeded in attacking the Australian Embassy in Jakarta. JI has also conducted reconnaissance on the Israeli Embassy in Manila, as well as other Israeli targets, such as the El Al counter in Thailand's Don Muang airport. JI has a limited capacity to successfully attack such hard targets as embassies.

Maritime Terrorism

Jl, again working with al-Qa`ida, had plans to conduct USS *Cole*-style attacks against US naval vessels making port calls in Singapore. There is also some evidence that `Umar al-Faruq dispatched a Somali al-Qa`ida operative, Ghalib, to the Indonesian port of Surabaya to recruit locals to assist him in a suicide attack on US naval vessels in Surabaya in May 2002. Moreover, there is ample evidence that al-Qa`ida has identified the Strait of Malacca as a high-value target. The al-Qa`ida chief of naval operations, who planned the Attacks on the USS *Sullivans* and the USS *Cole*, `Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri, was detained in Yemen in November 2002 while en route to Southeast Asia. The architect of the attacks on the USS *Cole* and the French oil tanker, the *Limburg*, had already dispatched maritime suicide terror squads to Morocco to target US naval vessels passing through the Straits of Gibraltar.

There is also the issue of container and port security. Some 230 million containers move through the world's ports each year, and some 90 percent of world's general cargo is in containers. At any given time there are 800 ships and some 150,000 containers in Singapore alone. Though screening of containers at foreign ports has increased especially as efficient and trade dependent hubs such as Singapore, competition between ports is fierce and the pressure to lower costs is intense. Singapore is one of 20 foreign ports that is now part of the US-initiated Container Security Initiative (CSI), that will use intelligence and databases to identify potentially dangerous or suspicious cargo, use increased sensors on containers, and to develop secure containers. Importantly, the screening will be done overseas before the cargo reaches US ports. Singapore is banking on the fact that the US will eventually require all imported cargo to be screened overseas, thereby giving Singapore a competitive advantage over Malaysia, which has resisted the CSI.

Intelligence community has identified some 15 cargo ships around the world that they believe are owned or controlled by al-Qa`ida. Yet these vessels are owned by a myriad of shell companies that are constantly renamed and re-registered. If not for terrorist acts themselves, these vessels are used to support terrorism, through the movement of men and materiel, as well as generating revenue, through legitimate cargo forwarding and illegitimate practices, especially drug, human and gun smuggling. Cambodia has emerged as a flag of convenience registry of choice, and several cargo vessels believed to have belonged to al-Qa`ida in the past were registered in Cambodia, as was the *So San*, which was trying to covertly deliver North Korean missiles to Yemen in 2002 when it was intercepted by Spanish forces. The Cambodian Registrar, which was run under license by a shadowy private company in Singapore since 1995, was under intense scrutiny following a series of scandals regarding several of its 1,600 ships. Under US, European and South Korean pressure, the Cambodian government was forced to withdraw the license in August 2002. It has since given control to another foreign contractor.

US Military Personnel

As mentioned above, in 2000-01, JI and al-Qa'ida monitored US military personnel in Singapore. While neither have such capabilities to launch an attack against US interests in Singapore, the growing presence of US troops in the region will likely make them a more attractive target for militants. The temporary deployment of US military personnel to Aceh, Indonesia following the December 2004 tsunami put US forces side by side Islamist militants engaged in relief work. While no conflicts emerged, US military personnel with which this author has spoken mentioned that it was tense. The Islamist groups, by their own accord, stated that one of their goals was to confront US forces and contain their efforts.

The US has roughly 500 military and law enforcement personnel deployed in the southern Philippines as part of the Joint Task Force-Philippines. ASG and JI militants have actively targeted these troops. In March 2007, a camp where a unit of special forces was based came under mortar attack by a group of MNLF members sympathetic to the ASG. While the MILF has not actively targeted US forces, as US military personnel are deployed in more provocative positions in central Mindanao, often in territory claimed by the MILF, the potential for a conflict is there. For example, the 2002 Balikitan military exercises between the United States and Filipino armed forces are located in the provinces of Lanao del Norte and Lanao del Sur, Mindanao, territory claimed by the MILF, and the home to two of their largest base commands. The MILF have vigorously protested the Balikitan exercises and organized mass public demonstrations, as well as attacked American advance teams with non-lethal force.

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Endnotes

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- 3 Ministry of Home Affairs, Republic of Singapore, "White Paper - The Jemaah Islamiyah Arrests and The Threat of Terrorism," January 2003 at http://www.mha.gov.sg/publication_details.aspx?pageid=35&cid=354
- 4 Lawrence Suskind of *The Wall Street Journal* asserts that they did have a weapons-grade strain. See *The One Percent Doctrine*.
- 5 The analysis of the International Crisis Group has concluded that these kinship ties including marital ties, are the single most important determinant of JI membership. [International Crisis Group, *Jemaah Islamiyah in Southeast Asia: Damaged But Still Dangerous*, 26 August 2003; ICG, *Indonesia Background: Jihad in Central Sulawesi*, 3 February 3, 2004]
- 6 Wong Chun Wai and Lourdes Charles, "More than 100 marriages involve key JI members," *The Star*, 7 September 2004.
- 7 Wong Chun Wai and Lourdes Charles, "More than 100 marriages involve key JI members," *The Star*, 7 September 2004.
- 8 "Truly, every day we see helpers for the jihad coming forth from countries in Asia, like Malaysia and Indonesia, and from the countries of the former Soviet Union... They do not know the class of the great *ulama* or those mores, which cause the deviation of the committed

youth in some of the countries of the Arab world. *They are like a white page, their innate nature and their genuine emotion motivating them to assist the religion.* Naturally, there might be a negative effect, such as the lack of sharia discipline. However, it is our role to fill in this gap. Thus, these youth will not abandon jihad, by the grace of God. Innate human nature is found in them and they will respond to direction from any model or living exemplar of jihad."

- 9 National Intelligence Coordinating Agency (NICA), "Briefing on Al Harakat al Islamiya (AHAI)," No date given, 3.
- 10 Philippine National Intelligence Coordinating Agency (NICA), "Briefing on Al Harakat al Islamiya (AHAI)," No date given, 3.
- 11 See US Pacific Command (USPACOM) Fact Sheet, "Abu Sayyaf History," 5 March 2002, at <http://www.pacom.mil/piupdates/abusayyafhist.shtml>.
- 12 For more on the Libyan payment of ransoms, see, Seth Maydans, "Libyan Aid helps to Free Hostages Held in the Philippines," *The New York Times*, 21 October 2001 and Deidre Sheehan, "Buying Trouble," *Far Eastern Economic Review (FEER)*, 7 September 2000.
- 13 Carlos Conde, "Muslim Cleric Confirms bin Laden Visit to Mindanao," *PDI*.
- 14 Cited in Jose Torres Jr., *Into the Mountain: Hostaged by the Abu Sayyaf* (Quezon City: Claretian Publications, 2001), 41.
- 15 The special panel created by the government, the Maniwang Commission, cleared senior MILF leaders of the bombings at the Davao International Airport and Sasa Wharf. The Maniwang Commission issued its findings on 25 March 2004. Government officials have linked several JI members who were trainers at MILF camps and now held in custody in Malaysia to the bombings. "Prosecutor to MILF on Davao Bombings: Face Trial," *MindaNews*, 1 June 2004.
- 16 Four other cell members were arrested that month. The four-man cell claimed it was responsible for the February SuperFerry bombing. They were captured with 36kg of explosives. One of the four was identified as al-Hamsed Manatad Limbong aka Kosovo, a second cousin of Khadaffi Janajalani, who was implicated in the 2002 Zamboanga bombing that killed a US servicemen and the beheading of an American tourist Guillermo Sobero in 2001. The other three suspects were Redendo Cain Delosa, Abdusaid Lim aka Abu Khalifa, and Radsamar Sangkula. Juliet Labog-Javellana, et. al, "Metro Bomb Plot Foiled; 4 Abu Men Nabbed," *PDI*, 30 March 2004.
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- 18 In a radio statement claiming responsibility, Abu Solaiman, the group's spokesman, said, "Our latest operation in GenSan, Davao and Manila, planned and executed with precision by the gallant warriors of Islam is our continuing response to the government's atrocities committed against Muslims everywhere (sic)." Joel Francis Guinto, "Bomb Blasts Rock Davao, General Santos, Makati," *Philippine Daily Inquirer (PDI)*, 14 February 2005.
- 19 The three leaders were Nadzmie Sadual (aka Commander Global), Alhamser Manatad Limbong (aka Commander Kosovo) and Ghalib Andang (aka Commander Robot). The standoff took place at Camp Bagong Diwa Prison after the ASG members had weapons

- smuggled in. Three guards were killed. "Abu Sayyaf, Very Much Alive, Threaten Retaliation for Bloody Prison Assault," Associated Press (AP), 15 March 2005.
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Chapter 9

**Islamist Terrorism in South Asia: An
Overview**

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South Asia – which for the purposes of this chapter will mean Afghanistan and Pakistan – has been the nerve center of global jihadi terrorism since the 1980s.¹ Al-Qa'ida was born in this region and it was from its South Asian refuge that it planned the attacks on the American homeland on 9/11. The area remains the headquarters of al-Qa'ida's operations and currently shelters its senior leadership. In addition, nearly every major Sunni jihadi group operating today, from West Africa to Western Europe, Southeast Russia to Southeast Asia, has had critical links to the region; many such groups were formed by people whose first jihadi activism and training occurred in South Asia. The most sophisticated jihadi training infrastructure in the world exists in South Asia, and it is to access these training resources that untold numbers of would-be terrorists travel to Pakistan and Afghanistan every year. The purpose of this chapter is to contribute to an understanding of the unique place in the history of jihad held by the region and to introduce the most important issues and groups dominating the landscape of South Asian terrorism today.

¹ The regional term "South Asia" is often used to mean the Indian Subcontinent and several island nations in the Indian Ocean, and thus generally includes India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal, Bhutan, Sri Lanka and the Maldives. While some Islamist terrorist groups do include this larger region in their theater of operations, there is no question that Pakistan and Afghanistan are the center of gravity for these organizations. On terrorism in greater South Asia, see *Responding to Terrorism in South Asia*, ed. S. D. Muni (Colombo: Manohar, 2006).

Geography



Perhaps more than any other part of the world, South Asia's geography has largely determined its history. Since ancient times the trade routes that linked the Mediterranean world with the rest of Asia ran through what is today Pakistan and Afghanistan, and the successive empires of Greece, Rome, China, various Muslim powers, India, Russia, Britain and, more recently, the two Cold War superpowers of the United States and the Soviet Union have all struggled in their turn to control this vital geopolitical center. From the silks and spices of antiquity to the oil and gas of modernity, economic resources that have been essential to

the broader region have all had to pass over this contested terrain. In the nineteenth century the rival empires of Russia and Britain vied for dominance in Central Asia by attempting to control Afghanistan, in a regional conflict that came to be known as the "Great Game." In the first decade of the twenty-first century, in the face of ongoing instability in Afghanistan, a new Great Game has emerged in the region, as the neighboring states (Iran, Russia, China, India and the former Soviet Central Asian republics) and more distant players such as the United States and Saudi Arabia all seek to exert their influence.²

For such a critically important intersection of powers, the Pak-Afghan region boasts some of the most forbidding terrain in the world. The Hindu Kush Mountains, which bisect Afghanistan and run through northern Pakistan, are the western extension of Earth's highest mountain range, making for an extremely rugged environment throughout Afghanistan and northwestern Pakistan. Much of the region is simply impassable in winter, and only about ten percent of the land is cultivable. These features of the landscape have always placed serious limitations on the attempts of central authorities to establish regional or national control, and the large degree of autonomy exercised by tribal groups that live far from the capitals of Kabul and Islamabad has proven to be a valuable asset to jihadi terrorist groups.³

Another geographical factor that makes South Asia a favorable environment for terrorist organizations is the arbitrary nature of national borders, which do not reflect the distribution of tribal and ethnic groups and which thus further limit the reach of central governments. The Pashtuns, for instance, who make up the largest ethnicity in Afghanistan and account for roughly a sixth of Pakistan's population, are concentrated in south and eastern Afghanistan and the western provinces of Pakistan. In other words, a national boundary runs right through the middle of a population that has much stronger tribal ties than it does to either of the respective countries, and the counter-terrorism commitments made by these countries' leaders mean little if Pashtun tribes decide – as they have done in recent years – to provide refuge to jihadi terrorists. Similar problems plague Afghanistan's northern border, which cuts through the Turkmen, Uzbek and Tajik populations there, dividing these groups' loyalties between their ethno-linguistic kin groups, the multi-ethnic state of Afghanistan, and the respective Central Asian republics named for these peoples (Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan). Furthermore, a long-standing irredentist movement advocating the creation of an independent Pashtunistan is seen by Pakistan as a threat to its national integrity and is one reason that Pakistan has so consistently supported Pashtun contenders for power

2 For accounts of these two iterations of the "Game," see Peter Hopkirk, *The Great Game: The Struggle for Empire in Central Asia* (New York: Kodansha International, 1992), and Lutz Kleveman, *The New Great Game: Blood and Oil in Central Asia* (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 2003).

3 Concise accounts of geography and demography can be found in the *CIA World Fact Book*, available online. For Afghanistan, see <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/af.html>; for Pakistan, see <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/pk.html>.

in modern Afghanistan, a fact which has had serious repercussions for the history of jihadi groups in the area (see below).

Even more consequential for Islamist terrorism has been Pakistan's dispute with India – and, to a lesser extent, China – over the Kashmir region, which since its creation in 1947 Pakistan has claimed should rightfully be a part of its sovereign territory. In that year, when greater India was partitioned into the Hindu state of India and the Muslim state of Pakistan (the eastern section of which became independent Bangladesh in 1971), the leader of the princely state of Kashmir opted to accede his territory to India, despite the fact that the majority of the Kashmiri population was Muslim. The United Nations intervened and, in 1948, it was resolved that a plebiscite should be taken of the Kashmiri population to determine its wishes with regard to national affiliation; the plebiscite has never been taken. Instead, the territory remains disputed, and three unequal parts of it are respectively administered by Pakistan, India and China. Pakistan and India have fought two wars over Kashmir since then – in 1965 and 1999 – though some level of violent conflict between the two powers there has been almost a constant. On Pakistan's side, this "low-intensity conflict" has been largely waged by groups who fight over Kashmir in the name of Islam and whose sole available military tactic is often terrorism. In recent years, the relationship between the Pakistani government and these Kashmiri jihadi groups has ranged from open state sponsorship to unspoken tolerance, a fact which has considerably complicated the Pak-American alliance in the war on terrorism.

Jihad in South Asia: The 19th and Early 20th Centuries

In addition to the geographical factors highlighted above, the recent regional history of South Asia has also contributed in important ways to the development of jihadi activism there. In this section, four milestones in that development will be identified and briefly described: the anti-colonial jihad waged by Sayyid Ahmad Shahid; the rise of the Deobandi *madrāsas*; the creation and spread of the Tablighi Jama'at; and the foundation and ideology of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan.

The Wahhabi-inspired, anti-Western terrorist ideology espoused today by the likes of al-Qa'ida is not new to South Asia, but actually had its beginnings in the first third of the nineteenth century. In the early 1820s, Sayyid Ahmad, from the town of Bareilly in northern India, made the pilgrimage to Mecca and was introduced there to the thought of Muhammad ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab, the founder of the Wahhabi movement that had taken control of the Arabian Peninsula by force.⁴ Inspired by the Wahhabi opposition to Western influence in Muslim lands, Sayyid Ahmad traveled in Afghanistan upon his return from Mecca to gather support for a war against the British and their Sikh partners in present day Pakistan

⁴ For an historical account of the rise of the Wahhabi movement in Arabia, see Natana DeLong-Bas, *Wahhabi Islam: From Revival and Reform to Global Jihad* (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2004).

and eastern Afghanistan, a war which Ahmad termed a *jihad*. He also called for a "return" to a very narrowly-defined ideal of Islamic purity, sounding a note of militant revivalism that would reverberate through the region to this day. Uniting several Pashtun tribes under his jihadi banner, by 1830 he had captured Peshawar, a city which would continue thereafter to figure prominently in the history of South Asian jihadi activism. His victory was short-lived, however, and after his death in battle in 1831 he became known as Sayyid Ahmad "Shahid," or "the martyr," and it was as a martyr to the cause of Islam that his example would go on to inspire violent Islamist activists in South Asia into the 21st century. Indeed, according to one writer, Sayyid Ahmad's "revival of the ideology of jihad became the prototype for subsequent Islamic militant movements in South and Central Asia."⁵

The viability of militancy as a form of resistance to British imperialism was brought into serious question in the years following Ahmad Shahid's jihad, however, and in 1857 Britain crushed the widespread rebellion known as the Indian Mutiny, instituting in the following year the direct colonial administration of the Subcontinent that would last until 1947. Muslim rule of northern India, which had been the *status quo* for centuries, thus abruptly came to an end, and lacking a military option Islamic resistance to British encroachments took other forms, most notably in a network of schools (*madrasas*) centered in the northern Indian town of Deoband that inculcated a strict Islamic identity and rejection of all Western social and cultural influences. This Deobandi movement, as it came to be known, pioneered a form of Islamic resistance to the West in the region that could best be described as Islamicization. The decline of Muslim rule, taught the Deobandis in their far-flung madrasas, was due to Muslims' deviations from the pure teachings of primitive Islam, and the only way to regain God's blessing and recover their losses to the colonial powers was through a revival of the peoples' commitment to "correct" Islamic belief and practice. Though initially non-violent, the ideology of the Deobandi madrasas would evolve in the subsequent decades in a distinctly jihadi direction and today forms the core of the Taliban's ideology.⁶ From a handful of madrasas in the 1870s, the network of Deobandi schools in South Asia would grow to 9,000 by 1967, to which many thousand more were added during the years of the anti-Soviet jihad in Afghanistan, when such madrasas would begin to do double-duty as both seminaries and guerrilla warfare training centers.⁷

5 Husain Haqqani, "The Ideologies of South Asian Jihadi Groups," *Current Trends in Islamist Ideology* 1 (2005), pp. 12-26, at p. 13. As Haqqani further notes, "The influence of Sayyid Ahmed's ideas and practices on South Asian Islamists is visible in recent jihad literature in Pakistan, which invariably draws parallels between British colonial rule in the nineteenth century and U.S. domination since the end of the twentieth."

6 See Haqqani, "The Ideologies of South Asian Jihadi Groups," pp. 20-23; but see also Ahmed Rashid, *Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia* (New Haven and London: Yale Nota Bene, 2001), p. 88, who argues that "the Taliban were to take [the Deobandis'] beliefs to an extreme which the original Deobandis would never have recognized."

7 The early history of the Deobandi movement is chronicled in Barabara Metcalf, *Islamic*

A related form of South Asian Islamist resistance emerged in the early twentieth century in the Tablighi Jama'at, which literally means "missionary organization." As its name implies, the Tablighi Jama'at does outreach to Muslim communities and seeks to "convert" people to a strict form of Islamic practice, emphasizing distinctive outward manifestations of religious piety such as one's manner of dress, comportment, preparation of food and so forth. Founded in 1920 by a graduate of Dar al-Ulum Deoband, the preeminent Deobandi center of learning, the Tablighi Jama'at's initial purpose was to counteract the Hindu conversion campaigns being carried out in northern India in the early twentieth century by the Arya Samaj, a group which sought by such campaigns to increase the political clout of Hindus in these areas and to inspire a religiously-based Hindu nationalism. As such, Tablighi Jama'at began as a movement that politicized religious identity and sought to increase the influence of Islam in social and political life through large-scale Islamization campaigns aimed at the masses. After achieving success in this regard in northern India, Tablighi Jama'at spread throughout South Asia and eventually throughout the Muslim world, and Tablighi Jama'at itinerant preachers today perform outreach to Muslims wherever they reside. It is currently one of the largest Muslim organizations in existence, and its annual gathering near Dhaka, Bangladesh, is the second largest gathering of Muslims in the world, after the annual pilgrimage to Mecca.⁸

Today Tablighi Jama'at is officially non-violent and apolitical, though a number of high-profile terrorism cases have implicated the organization in facilitating access for some individuals to South Asian terrorist groups. John Walker Lindh, Richard Reid, the Lackawanna Six and many others had been involved or associated with Tablighi Jama'at at some point in their journey toward radicalization and, ultimately, jihadi militancy. However, this information needs to be weighed carefully, as there is no evidence that Tablighi Jama'at encouraged these people to commit acts of violence, only that it played a role in their conversion experiences or led them to South Asia, where they eventually made contact with militant groups. As it encourages rejection of certain aspects of modernity and a radical commitment to the daily and scrupulous observance of the minutiae of traditional Islamic law, and given the size and global reach of the organization, it is not surprising that Tablighi Jama'at has figured in the radicalization of some jihadis. However, there is no question that Tablighi Jama'at's links to terrorism have been sensationalized by the press, especially in Europe, and any direct and overt role of the group in Islamist violence is consistently discounted by scholars of the movement.⁹

Revival in British India: Deoband, 1860-1900 (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2004).

8 For a concise account of Tablighi Jama'at's history, see Yoginder Sikand, *The Origins and Development of the Tablighi Jama'at (1920-2000)* (New Delhi: Orient Longman, 2002).

9 For a discussion of the controversy over Tablighi Jama'at's relationship to jihad, see Nicholas Howenstien, "Islamist Networks: The Case of Tablighi Jamaat," *United States Institute of Peace Briefing*, October 2006, online at http://www.usip.org/pubs/usipeace_briefings/2006/1011_

A final milestone in the regional history of jihad to be considered is the creation of Pakistan as an *Islamic* state. As already mentioned, when India was partitioned in 1947 the two states that emerged – India and Pakistan – were created on an explicitly religious (as opposed to an ethnic or linguistic) basis; that is, India was to be a Hindu and Pakistan a Muslim state. The massive migration that resulted from the partition was the largest population transfer in history, with more than fourteen million Muslims and Hindus migrating across the new borders. It was also spectacularly violent, and more than half a million people perished in the sectarian rioting that accompanied the trauma of dislocation. This bloodshed, as well as the ongoing conflict over Kashmir, deeply marked Pakistan's national consciousness and resulted in a bitter enmity for India as well as a sense of Muslim embattlement that would go on to color Pakistan's political identity. Pakistan has portrayed itself as both a fundamentally Islamic state – its Constituent Assembly declared in 1949 that the country had been established by South Asia's Muslims for the principal objective of "ordering their lives in accordance with the teachings and requirements of Islam" – and as a vanguard in the (Sunni) Islamic world that would use its military might to defend Muslim interests anywhere they were threatened.¹⁰ In practice this has sometimes translated into an alignment between Pakistan's understanding of its own national interest and the goals and pursuits of jihadi terrorist groups. When it has been involved in regional conflicts, Pakistan's policies have tended to promote the Islamicization of those conflicts, which in turn has bolstered the jihadi and marginalized the non-jihadi actors involved. This process was to have enormous consequences during the anti-Soviet jihad in Afghanistan, as will be discussed in greater detail below. It has also been a determining factor in the character of the Kashmir conflict, where because of the logic of Islamicization Pakistan has supported jihadi groups that seek to "liberate" Kashmir from the control of Hindu India and "return" the province to its rightful place as part of Pakistan, sidelining Kashmiri rebel groups that had fought for an independent *and sovereign* Kashmir.

By the middle of the twentieth century, then, many of the basic elements that make South Asia a singularly favorable region for jihadi groups were already in place. By virtue of its geography and the nature of its borders, the region has large areas that lie outside of the control of the central governments and which are ruled locally by tribes. These tribes, and the Pashtuns in particular, have a history of anti-Western jihad that goes back more than a century and a half. The deeply conservative Islamic ideology that nurtured the jihad of Sayyid Ahmad Shahid was firmly established and maintained through the rise and spread of the Deobandi madrasa system and the Tablighi Jama'at missionaries. In the creation of the state of Pakistan Islamism found full-blown political expression and regional jihadi militants gained state patronage and access to the resources of a modern military and security service.

islamist_networks.html.

10 Husain Haqqani, *Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military* (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005), p. 17.

Through the middle of the twentieth century, these assembled factors would have few repercussions beyond South Asia itself. In the 1970s and '80s, however, South Asian jihad became internationalized, a process that culminated in the emergence of the global jihadi movement and its standard-bearer, al-Qa'ida.

The Beginnings of Global Jihad: The Mujahidin, al-Qa'ida, and the Taliban

Afghanistan gained formal independence from Britain in 1919 and established a constitution. During the next several decades internal tribal and sectarian tensions raged on. In 1973, the last Durrani king was deposed and a Republic was established by leftist officers. In 1975, the new ruling party successfully crushed a rising Islamic fundamentalist movement in Afghanistan and the leaders of this movement fled to Peshawar, Pakistan, where they were given refuge by Pakistan's Prime Minister, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. He supported them in their efforts against the new Republic and its president Muhammad Daoud. The leading members of this opposition – including Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, Burhanuddin Rabbani, and Ahmad Shah Massoud – later led the *mujahidin* (which literally means “those who wage jihad”) against the Soviet Union.¹¹

In the intervening years, Daoud had turned to the Soviet Union for aid towards modernization. By the late 1970s, it had become heavily dependent on this nation for its revenues and had been comfortably integrated into its sphere of influence. In 1978, army officers who had been trained in the Soviet Union wrested control from Daoud in a bloody coup. The communist party was itself divided and the coup unleashed a havoc of internal ethnic and sectarian strife. Amidst the chaos, the Soviet Union set up a new Afghani president, backed by a full invasion force that began to enter the country in large numbers at the end of 1979.¹²

This was the beginning of the Soviet-Afghan wars, which began with an initial backlash from the Afghani population against a foreign invader and evolved into a pan-Islamic struggle for the liberation of a Muslim land from atheist invaders. In terms of global politics, the conflict in Afghanistan was nothing short of the culmination of the Cold War fought by the two great powers, the United States and the Soviet Union via the proxy of a middle state. Soon huge amounts of financial and military backing began to pour into Afghanistan from the United States, the Arab states, and China.¹³ The battle against the Soviet Union

11 On the history of the Islamist opposition parties to the Soviet invasion, see Oliver Roy, *Islam and Resistance in Afghanistan*, 2nd ed. (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990).

12 On the political events in Kabul, Moscow and the international community surrounding the invasion and subsequent wars, see William Maley, *The Afghanistan Wars* (Hampshire, UK and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002).

13 The nature and scope of the involvement of foreign governments in the conflicts in

also resonated in the Muslim world; the invasion was seen as an attack upon a sovereign Muslim community by a non-Muslim giant. Thus great numbers of Muslims from all over the globe set out for Afghanistan to wage *jihad* alongside the embattled Afghans. The confluence of foreign jihadis, the huge sums of aid money and the support networks established for the anti-Soviet jihad by Pakistan laid the groundwork for the later prominence played by Afghanistan in the emergence of the global jihadi movement.

The vast bulk of the aid given by the United States, Saudi Arabia and other donors was given first to Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), which distributed the aid to the mujahidin parties that had established offices in Peshawar. At first there were dozens of such organizations, representing diverse ethnic and ideological constituencies within Afghanistan. Leftist and other secularist parties were progressively sidelined, however, as were those representing the smaller ethnic groups. Pakistan favored groups that were Islamist in ideology and largely Pashtun in membership, deeming this selective support to be in its national interest.¹⁴ In early 1981 the Pakistani government announced that it would thenceforth recognize only six (and soon after a seventh) resistance parties, having the effect of totally freezing out minority and non-Islamist parties, which ceased at that time to have any significant representation in the anti-Soviet insurgency.¹⁵ The official parties were all Sunni, and the three of these that were most ideologically committed to radical Islamism also received the most foreign aid and attracted the most foreign volunteers. These were Ittihad-i Islami, led by 'Abdu'l-Rabb Rasul Sayyaf; Hizb-e Islami, led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar; and a break-away faction with the same name – Hizb-e Islami – led by Yunus Khalis. Sayyaf, a fluent speaker of Arabic, had the most extensive links in the Gulf Arab states and was able to raise the most money and volunteers from those countries.¹⁶ Towards the end of the anti-Soviet jihad and into the early 1990s, Hekmatyar's Hizb-e Islami had emerged as ISI's favorite. ISI's channelling of

Afghanistan is treated in detail in William Maley, *The Afghanistan Wars* (Hampshire, UK and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), *passim*; and Barnett Rubin, *The Fragmentation of Afghanistan: State Formation and Collapse in the International System*, 2nd ed. (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2002), Chs. 9 and 10; Rubin notes that "U.S. aid grew from \$30 million in 1980 to more than \$600 million per year by 1986-89. Saudi and other Arab aid matched or slightly exceeded the American share" (p. 196).

14 For details on the geopolitical considerations that shaped foreign assistance to the mujahidin and which led to the vast majority of this aid going to Pashtun (often radical) Islamist groups, see Steve Coll, *Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and bin Ladin, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001* (New York: Penguin, 2004), *passim*.

15 J. Bruce Amstutz, *Afghanistan: The First Five Years of Soviet Occupation* (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University, 1986), pp. 107f. For a recent analysis of the formation of the seven mujahidin parties, see Dorronsoro, *Revolution Unending: Afghanistan, 1979 to the Present* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005), ch. 4.

16 Anthony Hyman, "Arab Involvement in the Afghan War," *The Beirut Review* 7 (1994): 73-89, at p. 79; Coll, *Ghost Wars*, pp. 82f.

most of the incoming aid money to the ideologically hard-line Islamists among the resistance parties significantly "Islamicized" the Afghan conflict and fostered the environment that gave birth to al-Qa'ida.

While there is a consensus among historians that they were not a decisive factor in the eventual military defeat of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, the many thousands of foreign fighters who poured into the country via Pakistan, especially in the late 1980s, did help to facilitate a growing awareness of the Afghan struggle in Muslim communities around the world, and certainly helped generate funds and other forms of aid for the mujahidin. The international networks established for the support of the jihad in Afghanistan in the 1980s would evolve in subsequent decades into the global network of jihadi activists. In the Peshawar offices of the mujahidin resistance parties, Islamists from different parts of the world were able to make lasting connections with one another, develop shared ideological and strategic perspectives, get hands-on experience organizing violent action against a perceived enemy of Islam, all the while developing and strengthening financial and personal support networks spanning dozens of countries. When the communist superpower was defeated and withdrew its armies in 1989, many of these foreign volunteers – who came to be known as "Afghan Arabs" – felt that their struggle was just beginning and that the resources and experiences developed during the anti-Soviet jihadi should be utilized now for new purposes: taking the jihad global.

The man who emerged as the most important leader of this new trend was Usama bin Ladin, a wealthy and extremely religious Saudi whose father's construction company had amassed for the Bin Ladin family a huge fortune in lucrative building contracts in the Saudi Kingdom, including the renovation of the Grand Mosque of Mecca.¹⁷ Usama bin Ladin had joined the anti-Soviet effort early on and had moved to Peshawar, Pakistan, in the mid-1980s, where he worked with 'Abdullah 'Azzam in the latter's Maktab al-Khidamat (MAK), or "Office of Services."¹⁸ 'Azzam, a Palestinian-born graduate of the prestigious al-Azhar University in Cairo, was a very important figure in the Afghan jihad, as his status as a senior Islamic scholar gave a stamp of religious legitimacy to the international network of fundraising and recruitment for the war effort that he led until his assassination in 1989. The nerve center of that international network was the MAK, and Bin Ladin transformed this organization after 'Azzam's death into al-Qa'ida, which would use the MAK's global connections to sources of money and recruits, its established presence in western Pakistan, and its cadre of battle-hardened "Afghan Arabs" to wage a wider, post-Soviet jihad.

17 On Bin Ladin's biography, see Peter L. Bergen, *Holy War, Inc.: Inside the Secret World of Osama bin Laden* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2002); and Lawrence Wright, *The Looming Tower: Al-Qaeda and the Road to 9/11* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2006).

18 Bin Ladin would later state that his first trip to South Asia in support of the anti-Soviet jihad was in 1979; according to Jamal Khalifa, however Bin Ladin didn't come to Pakistan until 1984 (Wright, *Looming Tower*, p. 94). The MAK or "Office of Services" is also sometimes referred to as the Afghan Services Bureau.

But who and what should be the immediate target of this new jihad? There was no easy consensus on this question among the leading Afghan Arabs, and for several years al-Qa'ida had no clear strategic direction.¹⁹ Before his death 'Abdullah 'Azzam had advocated turning to Palestine as the next battlefield of the mujahidin movement; Zawahiri, who merged his Egyptian Islamic Jihad organization with Bin Ladin's al-Qa'ida, felt that the Egyptian government should be the next target; Bin Ladin himself thought that the jihadis should go to Yemen and support the Islamist faction in the ongoing conflicts there. Some leaders argued, ultimately unsuccessfully, that al-Qa'ida should stay in South Asia and capitalize on the gain made during the anti-Soviet jihad and work toward the creation of an Islamic emirate in Afghanistan, as the creation of such emirates was the stated goal of al-Qa'ida in its founding charter and was put forth as the first step toward the eventual resurrection of the caliphate. By 1992, however, Bin Ladin had decided to relocate the headquarters of his organization to Khartoum, Sudan, where al-Qa'ida would languish for the next four years.²⁰ The training camps that al-Qa'ida had established in Afghanistan remained in operation, however, and began in the early 1990s to provide training to jihadi groups from the former Soviet Central Asian republics, including the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and Tajikistan's al-Nahda movement.

When Bin Ladin and his followers were eventually kicked out of Sudan in 1996, al-Qa'ida's only refuge in the world was Afghanistan, though by that time it had new masters: the Taliban. After the withdrawal of the Soviet Union, Afghanistan had descended into a chaotic period of inter-mujahidin civil wars, with none of the resistance parties able to win decisive control of the country. The Soviet-backed regime of Najibullah lost successively larger portions of territory to various warlords and finally collapsed in 1992, but neither Ahmad Shah Massoud, leader of an alliance of mujahidin groups based in the north of Afghanistan and made up mostly of non-Pashtuns (i.e., Tajiks and Uzbeks), nor Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, leader of the Pakistan-backed Hizb-e Islami, were able to capture Kabul, and these two factions fought one another for control of the capital from 1993 until 1996. Hekmatyar's inability to defeat Massoud's forces was a source of immense frustration to Pakistan, which had hoped that his hardline, largely Pashtun Hizb-e Islami would eventually govern Afghanistan and become Pakistan's obedient "ally" to the west, an ally that would not press for an independent Pashtunistan nor the annexation of Pakistan's Pashtun provinces in the

19 For details of the disagreements and strategic disunity among al-Qa'ida's early leadership see Vahid Brown, *Cracks in the Foundation: Leadership Schisms in al-Qa'ida from 1989-2006* (West Point, NY: Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, 2007), *passim*, available online at <http://ctc.usma.edu/aq/aq3.asp>.

20 On al-Qa'ida's years in Sudan, see Wright, *Looming Tower*, Chapter 8. On al-Qa'ida in Africa more broadly, see the Combating Terrorism Center's Harmony report, *Al-Qa'ida's (Mis) Adventures in the Horn of Africa* (West Point, NY: Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, 2007).

new Afghanistan.²¹ Pakistan decided it needed an alternative, and in the summer of 1994 the ISI began to provide massive military support and direction to militias of young Pashtun men mobilized out of the thousands of madrasas on the Pak-Afghan border and sent in to take control of Afghanistan. These *taliban*, or madrasa students, led by an obscure Afghani Pashtun prayer-leader named Mullah Muhammad 'Umar, proved to be much more popular among the war-weary populations of southern and eastern Afghanistan than any of the warring mujahidin factions there, and these regions quickly fell to the Taliban Movement (*Tehrik-e Taliban Afghanistan*), as it came to be called.²² In 1996 the Taliban captured Kabul and were soon thereafter recognized by Pakistan as the legitimate government of Afghanistan – followed in 1997 by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.

The Taliban never controlled the whole of Afghanistan, proving as unable as Hekmatyar's Hizb-e Islami or the Soviets before them to dislodge Ahmad Shah Massoud's forces from their stronghold in the northeast of the country. They did control most of Afghanistan's major cities and the majority of its territory, however, and established a state enforcing a strict, Wahhabi-inspired interpretation of *Sharia* law. As already mentioned, the Taliban's religio-political ideology was a product of the Deobandi madrasas of the Pak-Afghan border region, a network of religious schools that had been greatly expanded with Saudi and ISI money during the 1980s, a period which also saw their transformation from Qur'an schools to rudimentary guerrilla training camps. The products of these camps proved ill-equipped to govern Afghanistan after their rapid military conquests, and the excesses and human rights abuses of the new regime drew international reprobation. The Taliban's antagonism of aid agencies from non-Muslim countries and NGOs, including attacks on aid workers and UN staff, led to the massive withdrawal of most such groups operating in the country by 1998.²³ Taliban law was particularly hard on Afghani women, who were banned from attending

21 On the Pashtunistan issue as a factor in Pakistan's relations with Afghanistan's successive governments and during the civil wars of the twentieth century, see Rizwan Hussain, *Pakistan and the Emergence of Islamic Militancy in Afghanistan* (Aldershot, Hampshire [UK]: Ashgate Publishing, 2005), index s.v. 'Pashtunistan.'

22 The most comprehensive overview of the Taliban Movement and its history is Ahmed Rashid's *Taliban*, but Rashid largely repeats the myth of the Taliban's origins put forth by Taliban spokespeople in the later '90s (i.e., that the Taliban was a spontaneous uprising against the excesses of the mujahidin warlords and emerged independent of Pakistani involvement); more critical accounts of the Taliban's beginnings which lay much more stress on Pakistan's role can be found in Hussain, *Pakistan and the Emergence of Islamic Militancy in Afghanistan*, pp. 181ff., and Coll, *Ghost Wars*, Chapter 16.

23 The Taliban placed increasingly onerous restrictions on non-Muslim NGOs and UN agencies operating in Afghanistan, including ordering all women aid workers coming into the country to be accompanied by a male relative, an obviously impossible injunction. When, in 1998, the Taliban closed down the offices of all NGOs working in Kabul and ordered them to relocate to the destroyed buildings of the Polytechnic College, 22 out of the 30 NGOs involved voted to pull their operations out of the country (Rashid, *Taliban*, pp. 71f.).

school, working outside the home, or appearing in public unveiled or without the escort of a male relative.²⁴ Afghanistan's medical and education sectors, which before had been largely staffed by women, all but collapsed, and the thousands of Afghanistan's war widows, who were in many cases the sole breadwinners of their families, were forced into total (and often lethal) destitution.

The Taliban's most controversial policy, however, and the one which in the end proved to be their undoing, was the support and refuge that the regime provided to international terrorist groups, including al-Qa'ida. In Taliban-controlled Afghanistan al-Qa'ida had an ideal environment to re-establish and extend the network of training camps it had operated during the anti-Soviet jihad, and groups from the former Soviet Central Asian republics, as well as Pakistani terror groups involved in the ongoing conflict with India in Jammu and Kashmir, came to train in these new and often very sophisticated camps. After al-Qa'ida's bombings of the U.S. Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998, the United States carried out cruise missile attacks on four camp complexes in eastern Afghanistan; the camps were run by both al-Qa'ida and Harkat ul-Ansar, a Pakistan-backed jihadi group operating primarily in Kashmir at the time.²⁵ After the attacks on New York and Washington on September 11, 2001, the United States issued an ultimatum to the Taliban regime that, in its emphasis on terrorist training camps, underscored the importance of these camps for the war that al-Qa'ida was waging against the West.²⁶ In the ensuing invasion of Afghanistan, al-Qa'ida's training infrastructure there was totally destroyed, but unfortunately the leadership was able to escape to Pakistan, where it began to reconstitute its facilities for training a new wave of international jihadis on Pakistani soil.

Pakistan and Post-9/11 Islamist Terrorism

In the wake of 9/11 and the U.S.-declared "Global War on Terror," Pakistan's President Pervez Musharraf announced that his country would fully cooperate with the American-led efforts to combat al-Qa'ida and other Islamist terror groups in South Asia. Since 9/11, a

24 See Rashid, *Taliban*, Chapter 8.

25 See Coll, *Ghost Wars*, pp. 409ff.; Rashid, *Taliban*, pp. 134f.

26 The five-point ultimatum, delivered in a speech to a joint session of Congress by President Bush on September 20, 2001, demanded that the Taliban, "[1] Deliver to United States authorities all of the leaders of Al Qaeda who hide in your land. [2] Release all foreign nationals, including American citizens you have unjustly imprisoned. [3] Protect foreign journalists, diplomats and aid workers in your country. [4] Close immediately and permanently every terrorist training camp in Afghanistan. And hand over every terrorist and every person and their support structure to appropriate authorities. [5] Give the United States full access to terrorist training camps, so we can make sure they are no longer operating." ("Transcript of President Bush's address," *CNN*, September 21, 2001, available online at <http://archives.cnn.com/2001/US/09/20/gen.bush.transcript>.)

number of significant joint operations in Pakistan, some of which have netted senior leaders of al-Qa'ida like Khaled Shaikh Mohammed, have proven the fundamental importance of this cooperation for the international counter-terrorism campaign. However, there are factors in Pakistani politics that have complicated this situation and created an environment where al-Qa'ida and other groups continue to find a base for operations, including the running of training facilities. The two most important factors for understanding the persistence of these groups in Pakistan are the inability of the central government to effectively control the Pashtun tribal areas that border Afghanistan and its unwillingness to relinquish its claims on Indian-controlled Kashmir, claims which Pakistan has chosen to pursue through the activities of jihadi proxies.²⁷

When the invasion of Afghanistan destroyed their refuge there, the senior leadership of al-Qa'ida that managed to escape death or capture either fled south to Iran or east to Pakistan's unruly tribal areas. The former were captured by Iranian authorities and remain under house arrest there; the latter have largely evaded American and Pakistani authorities and, according to the National Intelligence Estimate released in July 2007, al-Qa'ida has "regenerated key elements of its Homeland attack capability, including: a safehaven in the Pakistan Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), operational lieutenants, and its top leadership."²⁸

The reason for this resurgence lies in the unique "wild west" nature of Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP). These areas, whose populations are made up of inter-related Pashtun tribes, have never been directly governed by Pakistan's central government, nor were they directly controlled by the British during the long years of British colonial rule of South Asia. In the latter period, the British devised a "tribal agency" system whereby these areas would be locally ruled by traditional tribal leadership, with a British Political Agent (PA) assigned to an agency for each tribe who would liaise between the tribesmen and the colonial offices of the Viceroy.²⁹ Local customary law – *Pashtunwali* – remained in force, supplemented by a Frontier Crimes Regulations (FCR). This system remains in place today; the FCR is largely unchanged and, in the place of a British PA each agency is assigned a representative from Islamabad.

Fearing calls for a free Pashtunistan or for the annexation of these areas to Afghanistan, Pakistan's government has had to walk a fine line with the tribal areas, combining loose administration with extensive economic support and seeking partners – such as the Taliban in the 1990s – over whom it could exert some control. Though it has engaged its army in irre-

27 Both of these complex but immensely important issues are given an excellent treatment in Mariam Abou Zahab and Olivier Roy, *Islamist Networks: The Afghan-Pakistan Connection*, trans. John King (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004).

28 National Intelligence Council, "The Terrorist Threat to the US Homeland," released July, 2007, available online at http://www.dni.gov/press_releases/20070717_release.pdf.

29. For details see Hussain, *Pakistan and the Emergence of Islamic Militancy in Afghanistan*, pp. 36f.

dentist or ethnic uprisings in other parts of the country numerous times, Pakistan had *never* sent regular Pakistani Army troops in FATA during the 20th century. Only under intense pressure from the United States and with great reluctance did Pervez Musharraf commit troops to the FATA areas. In 2002, some troops were sent into the Khyber Agency, and military incursions were expanded to surrounding agencies after two assassination attempts on Musharraf in 2003 were traced to militants hiding in Waziristan. The army suffered heavy casualties at the hands of the Pashtun tribal militias in 2004 and 2005 and the government decided to negotiate with the tribes and to begin withdrawing its troops, though this drew intense criticism from the United States.³⁰ Without troops on the ground to coordinate with, American and NATO military forces in neighboring Afghanistan have found it difficult to impossible to directly engage al-Qa'ida and associated groups in FATA with ground forces and has instead had to selectively target high-value individuals with precision airstrikes.³¹ Al-Qa'ida's senior leaders – possibly including Usama bin Ladin and Ayman al-Zawahiri – as well as jihadi groups from the former Soviet Central Asian republics continue to operate with impunity in this lawless zone, and Pakistan's policy of accommodation and negotiation has not thus far proven to be a successful tactic in uprooting these groups from the region.

Whereas the Pakistani government has found itself unable to fully curtail the freedom of movement enjoyed by Islamist terrorists in Pakistan's "wild west," the same government has been simply unwilling to shut down the other major zone of terrorist training and activity in the country: the Kashmir region. Pakistan's conflict with India over the Muslim-majority states of Jammu and Kashmir has been a defining element of its national identity since the founding of the state in 1947, and Pakistan and India have fought three wars over this territorial dispute, one of them nearly escalating to a nuclear conflict. Partly because of the constant tension with India, the Pakistani military establishment has become the most powerful player in national politics and military dictators have ruled the country for most of its existence. These leaders have proven to be fiercely committed to the Kashmiri issue and any perceived "softness" on this point is perceived as being politically very dangerous. In light of India's vastly superior military capabilities, Pakistan has contested India's control of the southwestern half of the region through jihadi proxy groups, terrorist organizations that could pursue Pakistan's goal of "liberating" all of Kashmir while receiving covert support from the ISI.

Throughout the 1980s and early '90s, many of the Kashmiri jihadi groups were viewed by the United States and the international community at large as "freedom fighters," or local

30 David Rohde, "Al Qaeda Finds its Center of Gravity," *The New York Times*, September 10, 2006, available online at <http://www.nytimes.com/2006/09/10/weekinreview/10rohde.html>.

31 For example, in January, 2008, a Hellfire missile fired from an unmanned Predator drone into North Waziristan killed senior al-Qa'ida commander Abu Layth al-Libi, who had "played a pivotal role in recruiting and training operatives in the mountainous tribal areas of western Pakistan" (Eric Schmitt, "Senior Qaeda Commander is Killed by U.S. Missile Strike in Pakistan Tribal Areas," *The New York Times*, February 1, 2008).

insurgent movements seeking to oust an unwanted occupier (i.e., India). But beginning in the late 1980s the ISI chose to pursue a policy with regard to these groups that bound their fate to that of al-Qa'ida. As already mentioned, the ISI was tasked with distributing billions of dollars in cash and weapons to mujahidin parties waging the anti-Soviet jihad in Afghanistan. While it distributed most of these resources to such parties, some was diverted to Kashmiri jihadi groups, and Pashtun trainees in FATA madrasas-cum-guerrilla camps began to appear as combatants in Indian-controlled Kashmir. This created links between Afghan Arab groups in Afghanistan like al-Qa'ida and similar groups in Kashmir; indeed, at the time, both sorts of groups were openly supported by the Pakistani government. Following the attacks of 9/11, al-Qa'ida thus found willing partners in Pakistan's Kashmiri jihadi groups, some of which continued to receive government support. Al-Qa'ida also introduced its own expertise and terrorist tactics to the Kashmiri groups. As noted by Abou Zahab and Roy regarding the recent activities of Pakistani jihadi groups, "The level of coordination and of organization of the attacks launched in Pakistan from the spring of 2002 and the new methods including suicide bombing clearly point to Al Qaida being implicated. Groups which were active in Kashmir (like Jaish-e Muhammad) or whose sole aim was to kill Shiites (like the Lashkar-e Jhangvi) have merged operationally and started participating in anti-Western operations."³² Such operational mergers brought the Kashmiri groups under international scrutiny and they began to appear on lists of banned terrorist groups.³³

This has created new and unique challenges for the jihadi groups operating in Kashmir, which have seen their former patron – the Pakistani government – now partners with the United States in the War on Terror and thus constrained to ban groups that have been listed as Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs) by the U.S. State Department. One tactic has emerged among these groups that has proven to be extremely effective in keeping them in business, and boils down to a "shell game" of name and leadership changes so as to keep most of the human and material resources at any given time under the control of an entity not (yet) on any of the various lists of proscribed international terrorists.³⁴ In other words, once an organization is listed by the State Department – and subsequently banned by Musharraf's government – the leaders of the group open offices under one or more splinter groups with new names, new bank accounts, and so forth, but carry on as before in pursuit of the same objectives and in many cases out of the very same offices in Muzaffarabad. Thus, Sipah-i-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP), an anti-Shi'a group that began in the early 2000s to engage in anti-Western and anti-government terrorism, was banned by President Musharraf

32 Abou Zahab and Roy, *Islamist Networks*, p. 65.

33 For further details see the Appendix, below.

34 Such lists can vary quite widely at any given time in who they include and exclude; see, for instance, P.V. Ramana, "Data Paper on Terrorism in South Asia," in *Responding to Terrorism in South Asia*, ed. S.D. Muni (Colombo: Manohar, 2006), which includes lists of proscribed South Asian terrorist groups established by the U.S., the UK, Canada, Australia, the EU, as well as the countries of South Asia themselves.

in January 2002. It almost immediately changed its name to Millat-i-Islami Pakistan and operated as such until the organization was banned under that name as well in November of 2003.³⁵ A similar process of superficial transformation occurred with Harkat al-Ansar, whose camps in Afghanistan, as already mentioned, were targeted by U.S. cruise missile strikes in 1998. This group changed its name to Harakat ul-Mujahidin (HUM), was banned under that name, and changed its name again to Jamiat ul-Ansar, which in turn was also banned in November of 2003.³⁶

Because of the ungoverned zones to the west and the ongoing territorial conflict in Kashmir to the northeast, Pakistan has emerged in the post-9/11 period as the most favored refuge of international jihadi organizations, including the flagship group of that movement, al-Qa'ida. While these groups have maintained a high level of terrorist activity within Pakistan and the surrounding countries, the most threatening element of this situation for the United States has been the freedom accorded to al-Qa'ida and associated groups to establish and operate training facilities in the region, facilities that offer skills that are extremely difficult to acquire elsewhere in the world and nearly impossible to learn without assistance. South Asia, in other words, has become the world university of jihad, and would-be Islamist terrorists all over the world know that Pakistan hosts unique resources for acquiring the know-how that can translate a radical commitment to Islamist violence into a lethal attack on large numbers of civilians. Consider the case of the London bombings in 2005. On July 7 of that year, four jihadis carried out near-simultaneous suicide bombings on three underground trains and a city bus, killing 53 people and injuring 700. The two leaders of the cell had trained for the attack at al-Qa'ida camps in Pakistan.³⁷ Two weeks later another group of jihadis attempted to replicate the 7/7 attack, but their bombs failed to explode properly and only one person received minor injuries. None of the conspirators of that attempted attack had received training in explosives or in coordinating a simultaneous operation; none had travelled to South Asia. Travel or attempts to travel to the region are thus an important law enforcement indicator that, while by itself not a crime, should raise red flags if seen in conjunction with other threatening indications in a given case.

Pakistan and Afghanistan thus continue to lie at the heart of global Islamist terrorism, and so long as they are able to find secure refuge there from which to offer guidance and support for acts of terror, al-Qa'ida and other jihadi organizations will likely continue to rely on the region as the headquarters of their war on the West.

35 U.S. Department of State, *Country Reports on Terrorism 2006*, Groups of Concern, available online at <http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2006/82738.htm>.

36 Ibid. See also Haqqani, "Ideologies of South Asian Jihadi Groups," pp. 21-24, for discussion of these and a number of further examples.

37 This was admitted by Ayman al-Zawahiri himself in commentary to a video made by one of the London bombers prior to the attacks and aired on al-Jazeera on July 6, 2006.

APPENDIX:

South Asian Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs) and Groups of Concern, as designated by the U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Terrorism 2006 (released in April, 2007)³⁸

Harakat ul-Mujahedin (HUM)

a.k.a. Al-Faran; Al-Hadid; Al-Hadith; Harakat ul-Ansar; Harakat ul-Mujahideen; HUA; Jamiat ul-Ansar (JUA)

Description

HUM, an Islamic militant group based in Pakistan, is politically aligned with the radical political party Jamiat Ulama-i-Islam's Fazlur Rehman faction (JUI-F), and operates primarily in Kashmir. Reportedly under pressure from the Government of Pakistan, HUM's long time leader Fazlur Rehman Khalil stepped down and, in January 2005, was replaced by Dr. Badr Munir as the head of HUM. Khalil has been linked to Usama bin Ladin, and his signature was found on Bin Ladin's fatwa in February 1998 calling for attacks on U.S. and Western interests. HUM operated terrorist training camps in eastern Afghanistan until Coalition air strikes destroyed them in autumn 2001. Khalil was detained by Pakistani authorities in mid-2004 and subsequently released in late December. In 2003, HUM began using the name Jamiat ul-Ansar (JUA). Pakistan banned JUA in November 2003.

Activities

HUM has conducted a number of operations against Indian troops and civilian targets in Kashmir. It is linked to the Kashmiri militant group al-Faran that kidnapped five Western tourists in Kashmir in July 1995; one was killed in August, and the other four reportedly were killed in December of the same year. HUM was responsible for the hijacking of an Indian airliner in December 1999 that resulted in the release of Masood Azhar, an important leader in the former Harakat ul-Ansar who was imprisoned by India in 1994 and founded Jaish-e-Mohammed (JEM) after his release. Ahmed Omar Sheik also was released in 1999, and was later convicted of the abduction and murder in 2002 of U.S. journalist Daniel Pearl.

Strength

HUM has several hundred armed supporters located in Azad Kashmir, Pakistan, and India's southern Kashmir and Doda regions and in the Kashmir valley. Supporters are mostly

³⁸ Available online at <http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2006/82738.htm>

Pakistanis and Kashmiris, but also include Afghans and Arab veterans of the Afghan war. HUM uses light and heavy machine guns, assault rifles, mortars, explosives, and rockets. In 2000, HUM lost a significant share of its membership in defections to the JEM.

Location/Area of Operation

Based in Muzaffarabad, Rawalpindi, and several other towns in Pakistan, HUM conducts insurgent and terrorist operations primarily in Kashmir, but members have also been found operating in Afghanistan. HUM trains its militants in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

External Aid

Collects donations from wealthy and grassroots donors in Pakistan, Kashmir, Saudi Arabia, and other Gulf and Islamic states. HUM's financial collection methods also include soliciting donations in magazine ads and pamphlets. The sources and amount of HUM's military funding are unknown. Its overt fundraising in Pakistan has been constrained since the government clampdown there on extremist groups and the freezing of terrorist assets.

Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU)

Description

The IMU is a group of Islamic militants from Uzbekistan and other Central Asian states. The IMU's goal is to overthrow Uzbekistani President Islam Karimov and establishing an Islamic state in Uzbekistan. The IMU is affiliated with al-Qaida and, under the leadership of Tohir Yoldashev, has embraced Usama bin Ladin's ideology.

Activities

Since Operation Enduring Freedom, the IMU has been predominantly occupied with attacks on U.S. and Coalition soldiers in Afghanistan. Although it is difficult to differentiate between IMU and Islamic Jihad Union members, Pakistani security forces continue to arrest probable IMU operatives in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). The IMU was active in terrorist operations in Central Asia. Tajikistan arrested several IMU members in 2005. In November 2004, the IMU was blamed for an explosion in the southern Kyrgyz city of Osh that killed one police officer and one terrorist. In May 2003, Kyrgyz security forces disrupted an IMU cell that was seeking to bomb the U.S. Embassy and a nearby hotel in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan. The IMU was also responsible for explosions in Bishkek in December 2002 and Osh in May 2003 that killed eight people. The IMU primarily targeted Uzbekistani interests before October 2001, and is believed to have been responsible for several explosions in Tashkent in February 1999. IMU militants took foreigners hostage in Kyrgyzstan for two consecutive years: in August 1999, IMU militants

took four Japanese geologists and eight Kyrgyz soldiers hostage, and in August 2000, they took four U.S. mountain climbers hostage.

Strength

Approximately 500 members.

Location/Area of Operation

IMU militants are scattered throughout South Asia, Central Asia, and Iran. Their area of operation includes Afghanistan, Iran, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan.

External Aid

The IMU receives support from a large Uzbek diaspora, Islamic extremist groups and patrons in the Middle East, Central Asia, and South Asia.

Jaish-e-Mohammed (JEM)

a.k.a. Army of Mohammed; Jaish-i-Mohammed; Khudamul Islam; Khuddam-ul-Islam; Kuddam e Islami; Mohammed's Army; Tehrik ul-Furqaan

Description

Jaish-e-Mohammed is an Islamic extremist group based in Pakistan founded by Masood Azhar, a former senior leader of Harakat ul-Ansar, upon his release from prison in India in early 2000. The group's aim is to unite Kashmir with Pakistan, and it has openly declared war against the United States. It is politically aligned with the radical political party Jamaat Ulema-i-Islam's Fazlur Rehman faction (JUI-F). Pakistan outlawed JEM in 2002. By 2003, JEM had splintered into Khuddam ul-Islam (KUI), headed by Azhar, and Jamaat ul-Furqan (JUF), led by Abdul Jabbar, who was released from Pakistani custody in August 2004 after being detained for suspected involvement in the December 2003 assassination attempts against President Pervez Musharraf. Pakistan banned KUI and JUF in November 2003.

Activities

Jaish-e-Mohammed continues to operate openly in parts of Pakistan despite President Musharraf's 2002 ban on its activities. The group is well-funded, and is said to have tens of thousands of followers who support attacks against Indian targets, the Pakistani government, and sectarian minorities. Since Masood Azhar's 2000 release from Indian custody in exchange for 155 hijacked Indian Airlines hostages, JEM has conducted many fatal

terrorist attacks in the area. JEM continues to claim responsibility for several suicide car bombings in Kashmir, including a suicide attack on the Jammu and Kashmir legislative assembly building in Srinagar in October 2001 that killed more than 30. The Indian government has publicly implicated the JEM, along with Lashkar e-Tayyiba, for the December 2001 attack on the Indian Parliament that killed nine and injured 18. Pakistani authorities suspect that JEM members may have been involved in the 2002 anti-Christian attacks in Islamabad, Murree, and Taxila that killed two Americans. In December 2003, Pakistan implicated elements of JEM in the two assassination attempts against President Musharraf. In July 2004, Pakistani authorities arrested a JEM member wanted in connection with the 2002 abduction and murder of U.S. journalist Daniel Pearl. In 2006, JEM claimed responsibility for a number of attacks, including the killing of several Indian police officials in the Indian-administered Kashmir capital of Srinagar.

Strength

JEM has at least several hundred armed supporters, including a large cadre of former HUM members, located in Pakistan, in India's southern Kashmir and Doda regions, and in the Kashmir Valley. Supporters are mostly Pakistanis and Kashmiris, but also include Afghans and Arab veterans of the Afghan war. The group uses light and heavy machine guns, assault rifles, mortars, improvised explosive devices, and rocket-propelled grenades.

Location/Area of Operation

Pakistan and Kashmir. Until autumn 2001, JEM maintained training camps in Afghanistan.

External Aid

Most of JEM's cadre and material resources have been drawn from the Pakistani militant groups Harakat ul-Jihad-i-Islami (HUJI) and the Harakat ul-Mujahedin (HUM). In anticipation of asset seizures by the Pakistani government, JEM withdrew funds from bank accounts and invested in legal businesses, such as commodity trading, real estate, and production of consumer goods. In addition, JEM collects funds through donation requests in magazines and pamphlets, and al-Qaida is suspected of providing funding.

Lashkar e-Tayyiba (LT)

a.k.a. Al Mansoorien; Al Mansoorian; Army of the Pure; Army of the Pure and Righteous; Army of the Righteous; Jamaat ud-Dawa and Al Monsooreen; Lashkar e-Toiba; Lashkar-i-Taiba; Paasban-e-Ahle-Hadis; Paasban-e-Kashmir; Paasban-i-Ahle-Hadith; Pasban-e-Ahle-Hadith; Pasban-e-Kashmir

Description

LT began as the militant wing of the Islamic extremist organization Markaz Dawa ul-Irshad (MDI), which was formed in the mid-1980s. MDI changed its name to Jamaat ul-Dawa (JUD) in 2001, probably in an effort to avoid Pakistan government restrictions. LT, which is not connected to any political party, is led by Hafiz Muhammad Saeed and is one of the three largest and best-trained groups fighting in Kashmir against India. The Pakistani government banned the group and froze its assets in January 2002. Elements of LT and Jaish-e-Muhammad combined with other groups to mount attacks as "The Save Kashmir Movement."

Activities

LT has conducted a number of operations against Indian troops and civilian targets in Jammu and Kashmir since 1993. LT claimed responsibility for numerous attacks in 2001, including an attack in January on Srinagar airport that killed five Indians; an attack on a police station in Srinagar that killed at least eight officers and wounded several others; and an attack in April against Indian border security forces that left at least four dead. The Indian government publicly implicated LT, along with JEM, for the December 2001 attack on the Indian Parliament building, although concrete evidence is lacking. LT is also suspected of involvement in May 2002 attack on an Indian Army base in Kaluchak that left 36 dead. India blamed LT for an October 2005 attack in New Delhi and a December 2005 Bangalore attack. Senior al-Qaida lieutenant Abu Zubaydah was captured at an LT safe house in Faisalabad in March 2002, which suggested that some members were facilitating the movement of al-Qaida members in Pakistan. Government of India officials hold LT responsible for the July 11, 2006 train attack in Mumbai.

Strength

LT has several thousand members in Azad Kashmir, Pakistan, in the southern Jammu and Kashmir and Doda regions, and in the Kashmir Valley. Almost all LT members are Pakistanis from madrassas across Pakistan or Afghan veterans of the Afghan wars. The group uses assault rifles, light and heavy machine guns, mortars, explosives, and rocket-propelled grenades.

Location/Area of Operation

Based in Muridke (near Lahore) and Muzaffarabad.

External Aid

Collects donations from the Pakistani expatriate communities in the Middle East and United Kingdom, Islamic NGOs, and Pakistani and other Kashmiri business people. LT

also maintains a website under the name Jamaat ud-Daawa through which it solicits funds and provides information on the group's activities. The precise amount of LT funding is unknown.

Lashkar i Jhangvi (LJ)

a.k.a. Lashkar e Jhangvi; Lashkari-i-Jhangvi

Description

Lashkar i Jhangvi (LJ) is the militant offshoot of the Sunni Deobandi sectarian group Sipah-i-Sahaba Pakistan. LJ focuses primarily on anti-Shia attacks and was banned by Pakistani President Musharraf in August 2001 as part of an effort to rein in sectarian violence. Many of its members then sought refuge in Afghanistan with the Taliban, with whom they had existing ties. After the collapse of the Taliban, LJ members became active in aiding other terrorists with safe houses, false identities, and protection in Pakistani cities, including Karachi, Peshawar, and Rawalpindi. In January 2003, the United States added LJ to the list of designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations.

Activities

LJ specializes in armed attacks and bombings and has admitted responsibility for numerous killings of Shia religious and community leaders in Pakistan. In January 1999, the group attempted to assassinate former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and his brother Shabaz Sharif, Chief Minister of Punjab Province. Pakistani authorities have publicly linked LJ members to the 2002 abduction and murder of U.S. journalist Daniel Pearl. Media reports linked LJ to attacks on Christian targets in Pakistan, including a March 2002 grenade assault on the Protestant International Church in Islamabad that killed two U.S. citizens, but no formal charges were filed against the group. Pakistani authorities believe LJ was responsible for the July 2003 bombing of a Shiite mosque in Quetta, Pakistan. Authorities also implicated LJ in several sectarian incidents in 2004, including the May and June bombings of two Shiite mosques in Karachi that killed more than 40 people. In May 2006, Pakistani police arrested two LJ militants suspected of involvement in the April bombing outside the U.S. Consulate in Karachi that killed one U.S. official; investigations are ongoing. In late 2006, Pakistani security agencies arrested eight suspects allegedly involved in the October blast at the Ayub Park in Rawalpindi and in planting anti-tank rockets at several locations in Islamabad. The Pakistani Interior Minister claimed these suspects have links to LJ and al-Qaida.

Strength

Probably fewer than 100.

Location/Area of Operation

LJ is active primarily in Punjab and Karachi. Some members travel between Pakistan and Afghanistan.

External Aid

Unknown.

Al-Qaida

a.k.a. International Front for Fighting Jews and Crusaders; Islamic Army; Islamic Army for the Liberation of Holy Sites; Islamic Salvation Foundation; The Base; The Group for the Preservation of the Holy Sites; The Islamic Army for the Liberation of the Holy Places; The World Islamic Front for Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders; Usama bin Ladin Network; Usama bin Ladin Organization; Qaidat al-Jihad

Description

Al-Qaida was established by Usama bin Ladin in 1988 with Arabs who fought in Afghanistan against the Soviet Union. The group helped finance, recruit, transport, and train Sunni Islamic extremists for the Afghan resistance. Al-Qaida's goal is uniting Muslims to fight the United States and its allies, overthrowing regimes it deems "non-Islamic," and expelling Westerners and non-Muslims from Muslim countries. Its ultimate goal is the establishment of a pan-Islamic caliphate throughout the world. Al-Qaida leaders issued a statement in February 1998 under the banner of "The World Islamic Front for Jihad Against the Jews and Crusaders" saying it was the duty of all Muslims to kill U.S. citizens, civilian and military, and their allies everywhere. Al-Qaida merged with al-Jihad (Egyptian Islamic Jihad) in June 2001, renaming itself "Qaidat al-Jihad."

Activities

Even as al-Qaida's top leaders continue to plot and direct terror attacks worldwide, terrorists affiliated with al-Qaida but not necessarily controlled by bin Ladin have increasingly carried out high-profile attacks. Over the past four years, al-Qaida, its affiliates, and those inspired by the group were also involved in anti-U.S. and anti-Coalition attacks in Africa, Europe, the Middle East, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq, including suicide bombings and vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices.

In 2006, al-Qaida and affiliated organizations continued major efforts to attack the West and its interests. For example, in mid-August, U.K. and U.S. authorities foiled a plot to blow up as many as ten aircraft. Al-Qaida may have been complicit in the plot but the group has made no public statement claiming its involvement. Additionally, al-Qaida in

the Arabian Peninsula claimed responsibility for the February 24, 2006, attack on the Abqaiq petroleum processing facility, the largest such facility in the world, in Saudi Arabia. The Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) officially merged with al-Qaida in September 2006, subsequently changed its name to al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), and attacked a U.S. contractor bus in December 2006 in greater Algiers, marking its first attack against a U.S. entity.

Bin Ladin's deputy Ayman al-Zawahiri claimed responsibility on behalf of al-Qaida for multiple attacks in 2005 against the London public transportation system. The extent of senior leadership involvement in planning the July 2005 attacks is unclear, however, some suspects in the attacks included homegrown United Kingdom-based extremists who were inspired by al-Qaida.

In 2003 and 2004, Saudi-based al-Qaida operatives and associated extremists launched more than a dozen attacks, killing at least 90 people, including 14 Americans in Saudi Arabia. Al-Qaida may have been connected to the suicide bombers and planners of the November 2003 attacks in Istanbul that targeted two synagogues, the British Consulate, and the HSBC Bank, and resulted in the deaths of more than 60 people. Pakistani President Musharraf blames al-Qaida for two attempts on his life in December 2003.

In October 2002, al-Qaida directed a suicide attack on the French tanker MV Limburg off the coast of Yemen that killed one and injured four. The group also carried out the November 2002 suicide bombing of a hotel in Mombasa, Kenya, which killed 15. Al-Qaida probably provided financing for the October 2002 Bali bombings by Jemaah Islamiya that killed more than 200.

On September 11, 2001, 19 al-Qaida members hijacked and crashed four U.S. commercial jets – two into the World Trade Center in New York City, one into the Pentagon near Washington, DC, and a fourth into a field in Shanksville, Pennsylvania – leaving nearly 3,000 individuals dead or missing. In October 2000, al-Qaida conducted a suicide attack on the USS Cole in the port of Aden, Yemen, with an explosive-laden boat, killing 17 U.S. Navy sailors and injuring 39. Al-Qaida also carried out the August 1998 bombings of the U.S. Embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam killing at least 301 individuals and injuring more than 5,000 others. Al-Qaida and its supporters claim to have shot down U.S. helicopters and killed U.S. servicemen in Somalia in 1993, and to have conducted three bombings that targeted U.S. troops in Aden in December 1992.

Strength

Al-Qaida's organizational strength is difficult to determine in the aftermath of extensive counterterrorist efforts since 9/11. The arrests and deaths of mid-level and senior al-Qaida operatives have disrupted some communication, financial, and facilitation nodes and disrupted some terrorist plots. Additionally, supporters and associates worldwide who are inspired by the group's ideology may be operating without direction from al-Qaida's central

leadership; it is impossible to estimate their numbers. Al-Qaida also serves as a focal point of inspiration for a worldwide network that is comprised of many Sunni Islamic extremist groups, including some members of the Gama'at al-Islamiyya, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, the Islamic Jihad Group, Lashkar i Jhangvi, Harakat ul-Mujahedin, Ansar al-Sunnah, the Taliban, Jemaah Islamiya, and the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group.

Location/Area of Operation

Al-Qaida's worldwide networks are augmented by ties to local Sunni extremists. The group was based in Afghanistan until Coalition Forces removed the Taliban from power in late 2001. While the largest concentration of senior al-Qaida members now reside in Pakistan, the network incorporates members of al-Qaida in Iraq and other associates throughout the Middle East, Southeast Asia, Africa, Europe, and Central Asia who continue working to carry out future attacks against U.S. and Western interests.

External Aid

Al-Qaida primarily depends on donations from like-minded supporters and individuals who believe that their money is supporting a humanitarian or other cause. Some funds are diverted from Islamic charitable organizations. Additionally, parts of the organization raise funds through criminal activities; for example, al-Qaida in Iraq raises funds through hostage-taking for ransom, and members in Europe have engaged in credit card fraud. U.S. and international efforts to block al-Qaida funding have hampered the group's ability to raise money.

SOUTH ASIAN "GROUPS OF CONCERN."³⁹

Al-Badhr Mujahedin (al-Badr)

Description

The al-Badhr Mujahedin split from Hizbul-Mujahedin (HM) in 1998. It traces its origins to 1971, when a group named al-Badr attacked Bengalis in East Pakistan. The group later operated as part of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's Hizb-I Islami (HIG) in Afghanistan and, from 1990, as a unit of HM in Kashmir. The group was relatively inactive until 2000. Since then, it has increasingly claimed responsibility for attacks against Indian military targets.

³⁹ According to the U.S. State Department's *Country Reports on Terrorism 2006*, "groups of concern have not been designated as Foreign Terrorist Organizations under 8 USC Section 1189, although many have been designated under other U.S. Government counterterrorism authorities."

Since the late 1990s, al-Badhr leader Bakht Zamin repeatedly has expressed his support for Usama bin Ladin and the Taliban, and in 2002 declared jihad against U.S. forces in Afghanistan.

Activities

The organization has conducted a number of operations against Indian military targets in Jammu and Kashmir. Since late 2001, al-Badhr members have reportedly targeted Coalition Forces in Afghanistan.

Strength

Perhaps several hundred.

Location/Area of Operation

Jammu and Kashmir, Pakistan, and Afghanistan.

External Aid

Unknown.

East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM)

Description

The East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM) is a small Islamic extremist group linked to al-Qaida and the international jihadist movement. It is the most militant of the ethnic Uighur separatist groups pursuing an independent "Eastern Turkistan," an area that would include Turkey, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Western China's Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region. On September 12, 2002, the group was designated under E.O. 13224 for its terrorist activity. ETIM is also listed by the UN 1267 al-Qaida/Taliban/Usama bin Laden Sanctions Committee for its associations with al-Qaida.

Activities

ETIM militants fought alongside al-Qaida and Taliban forces in Afghanistan during Operation Enduring Freedom. In October 2003, Pakistani soldiers killed ETIM leader Hassan Makhsum during raids on al-Qaida-associated compounds in western Pakistan. U.S. and Chinese government information suggests that ETIM is responsible for various terrorist acts inside and outside China. In May 2002, two ETIM members were deported to China from Kyrgyzstan for plotting to attack the U.S. Embassy in Kyrgyzstan as well as other U.S. interests abroad.

Strength

Unknown. Only a small minority of ethnic Uighurs supports the Xinjiang independence movement or the formation of an independent Eastern Turkistan.

Location/Area of Operation

Afghanistan, China, Kyrgyzstan, and Pakistan.

External Aid

ETIM has received training and financial assistance from al-Qaida.

Harakat ul-Jihad-I-Islami (HUJI)

a.k.a Movement of Islamic Holy War

Description

HUJI, a Sunni extremist group that follows the Deobandi tradition of Islam, was founded in 1980 in Afghanistan to fight in the jihad against the Soviets. It also is affiliated with the Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam's Fazlur Rehman faction (JUI-F) of the extremist religious party Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam (JUI). The group, led by Qari Saifullah Akhtar and chief commander Amin Rabbani, is made up primarily of Pakistanis and foreign Islamists who are fighting for the liberation of Jammu and Kashmir and its accession to Pakistan.

Activities

The group has conducted a number of operations against Indian military targets in Jammu and Kashmir. It is linked to the Kashmiri militant group al-Faran that kidnapped five Western tourists in Jammu and Kashmir in July 1995; one was killed in August 1995, and the other four reportedly were killed in December of the same year.

Strength

Exact numbers are unknown, but there may be several hundred members in Kashmir.

Location/Area of Operation

Pakistan and Kashmir. Trained members in Afghanistan until fall of 2001.

External Aid

Specific sources of external aid are unknown.

Hizb-I Islami Gulbuddin (HIG)

Description

Gulbuddin Hikmatyar founded Hizb-I Islami Gulbuddin (HIG) as a faction of the Hizb-I Islami party in 1977, and it was one of the major mujahedin groups in the jihad against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. Hikmatyar has long-established links with Usama bin Ladin. In the early 1990s, Hikmatyar ran several terrorist training camps in Afghanistan and was a pioneer in sending mercenary fighters to other Islamic conflicts. Hikmatyar offered to shelter bin Ladin after the latter fled Sudan in 1996 and has consistently offered public support for him since the 9/11 attacks. Hikmatyar has issued regular statements on the need for Afghans to reject the international community's presence in their country. In 2005, he responded to protests against Danish cartoons of the prophet Mohammad with a new call for the expulsion of international troops from Afghanistan.

Activities

HIG has staged small attacks in its attempt to force the international community to withdraw from Afghanistan, overthrow the Afghan government, and establish an Islamic state. U.S. troops have encountered regular violence in Konar, the area of Afghanistan in which HIG is most active, which has occasionally led to U.S. casualties, and it is likely that HIG is responsible for at least some of this violence.

Strength

Unknown, but possibly could have hundreds of veteran fighters on which to call.

Location/ Area of Operation

Eastern Afghanistan, particularly Konar and Nurestan Provinces, and adjacent areas of Pakistan's tribal areas.

External Aid

Unknown.

Hizbul-Mujahedin (HM)

Description

Hizbul-Mujahedin (HM) is the largest Kashmiri militant group, and was founded in 1989. It officially supports the liberation of Jammu and Kashmir and its accession to Pakistan, although some members favor independence. The group is the militant wing of Pakistan's largest Islamic political party, the Jamaat-i-Islami, and targets Indian security forces and politicians in Jammu and Kashmir. It reportedly operated in Afghanistan in the

mid-1990s and trained with the Afghan Hizb-I Islami Gulbuddin (HIG) in Afghanistan until the Taliban takeover. The group, led by Syed Salahuddin, is composed primarily of ethnic Kashmiris.

Activities

HM has conducted a number of operations against Indian military targets in Jammu and Kashmir. The group also occasionally strikes at civilian targets, but has not engaged in terrorist acts outside India. HM claimed responsibility for numerous attacks within Kashmir in 2006.

Strength

Exact numbers are unknown, but estimates range from several hundred to possibly as many as 1,000 members.

Location/Area of Operation

Jammu, Kashmir, and Pakistan.

External Aid

Specific sources of external aid are unknown.

Jamiat ul-Mujahedin (JUM)

Description

The JUM is a small pro-Pakistan militant group formed in Jammu and Kashmir in 1990 that seeks to unite Jammu and Kashmir with Pakistan. Followers are mostly Kashmiris, but the group includes some Pakistanis.

Activities

Has conducted a number of operations against Indian military and political targets in Jammu and Kashmir, including two grenade attacks in 2004.

Strength

Unknown.

Location/Area of Operation

Jammu, Kashmir, and Pakistan.

External Aid

Unknown.

Sipah-I-Sahaba/Pakistan (SSP)
a.k.a. Millat-I-Islami Pakistan

Description

The Sipah-I-Sahaba/Pakistan (SSP) is a Sunni sectarian group that follows the Deobandi school. Violently anti-Shia, the SSP emerged in central Punjab in the mid-1980s as a response to the Iranian revolution. Pakistani President Musharraf banned the SSP in January 2002. In August 2002, the SSP renamed itself Millat-i-Islami Pakistan, and Musharraf re-banned the group in November 2003. The SSP also has operated as a political party, winning seats in Pakistan's National Assembly.

Activities

The group's activities range from organizing political rallies calling for Shia to be declared non-Muslims to assassinating prominent Shia leaders. The group was responsible for attacks on Shia worshippers in May 2004, when at least 50 people were killed.

Strength

The SSP may have approximately 3,000 to 6,000 trained activists who carry out various kinds of sectarian activities.

Location/Area of Operation

The SSP has influence in all four provinces of Pakistan. It is considered to be one of the most powerful sectarian groups in the country.

External Aid

The SSP reportedly receives significant funding from Saudi Arabia and wealthy private donors in Pakistan. Funds also are acquired from other sources, including other Sunni extremist groups, madrassas, and contributions by political groups.

Tehrik Nefaz-I-Shariat Muhammad (TNSM)

Description

Maulawi Sufi Muhammed (now imprisoned) established TNSM in May 1989 in the former Malakand District of the Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP) of Pakistan with the goal of instituting strict Islamic law in the region because they believe the government

failed to institute Sharia law in the NWFP. The group held massive rallies in 1994 and effectively shut down the Malakand District. The uprising ended after the Pakistani government agreed to implement Sharia law in the Malakand District. Islamabad banned the group in 2002 in response to TNSM's deployment of fighters to Afghanistan to fight with the Taliban. Since Sufi Muhammad's arrest in early 2002, the leadership of the group has been in flux. Both Maulawi Faqir Muhammad and Maulawi Fazlullah-Sufi Muhammad's son-in-law have been mentioned as possible leaders of the group. Faqir Muhammad in November 2006 publicly pledged to continue the jihad in Afghanistan under Taliban leader Mullah Omar.

Activities

TNSM is a party to 2006 peace negotiations with Pakistan. Prior to the peace negotiations, the Pakistani government released nine prisoners associated with TNSM, to include Faqir Muhammad's brother and two senior clerics. On October 28, 2006, TNSM staged an anti-U.S. rally and vowed to continue to support the Taliban but agreed not to shelter foreigners. On October 30, 2006, a madrassa suspected of hosting a terrorist training camp was destroyed in a counterterrorism operation and Pakistani forces killed Maulana Liaqat, the madrassa's director and deputy for the group. At a protest rally following the operation, Faqir Muhammad declared he would continue to wage jihad, but he renewed his pledge to abide by the peace accords and not attack the Pakistani government. Faqir also denied reports that al-Qaida deputy leader Ayman al-Zawahiri was present at the madrassa. Press reports alleged TNSM was responsible for a suicide bombing on November 8 that killed 35 soldiers in Dargai, Pakistan, although the group did not claim responsibility. Pakistan security agencies have reopened investigations on members following this attack. Newspaper announcements requested certain members to appear in court and face charges filed against them under anti-terrorism laws.

Strength

Exact numbers are unknown; however, TNSM has recruited very high numbers of fighters in the past (in the thousands) and has also held demonstrations attended by several thousand people.

Location/Area of Operation

Eastern Afghanistan, Northern Pakistan - particularly Bajaur Agency and Malakand District.

External Aid

TNSM was founded to pursue the implementation of Sharia in the NWFP and strongly supports the Taliban. The group has also been linked to al-Qaida, especially through Faqir

Muhammad who has stated that he would welcome Ayman al-Zawahiri and Usama Bin Ladin if they were to come to his area.

Chapter 10

Understanding Saudi Arabia



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For more than a decade, Saudi Arabia has occupied a central place on the stage of global terrorism. The Saudi kingdom has served both as an engine and as a target for the global jihad. Saudi citizens have participated in some of the most spectacular acts of terrorism in the 21st century, including 15 of the 19 hijackers who carried out the September 11 attacks in 2001. In addition to those who have traveled to Iraq, Lebanon, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Chechnya, the Balkans and various African locales to wage jihad, Saudi militants have carried out suicide bombings and other bold assaults on targets inside the kingdom itself. Between 2003 and 2005, when al-Qa`ida in the Arabian Peninsula successfully undertook a series of bloody attacks on targets across the country, the streets of Riyadh, Yanbu, Mecca, Medina and Jedda were veritable battlegrounds where Saudi police and terrorists engaged regularly in running gun battles.

Saudi Arabia's streets have calmed in recent years, partly as a result of more serious security efforts on the part of central Saudi authorities, but the specter of terrorism remains. Young Saudis continue to slip into Iraq, where they make up the bulk of the foreign fighters.¹ In the summer of 2007, Saudi militants were killed by the Lebanese military in the Nahr al-Bared Palestinian refugee camp.² In the kingdom itself, the absence of violence reflects improved security rather than the drying up of the terrorist reservoir, as several major strikes against oil and other facilities have been foiled in the planning stages.³ There are still an unknown number of Saudis and foreigners in Saudi Arabia who remain committed to the principles of jihad and who seek to harm Saudi and American interests in the country and region. Militancy in Saudi Arabia does not represent an existential threat to Saudi Arabia, its neighbors, or its Western allies. Nevertheless, radicalism emanating from the kingdom will continue to constitute a significant security threat both there and abroad for years to come.

While the vast majority of Saudi citizens abhor al-Qa`ida and the violence it inspires, there remains some residual support for terrorism in the kingdom.⁴ It is likely that there will

- 1 Joseph Felter and Brian Fishman, *Al-Qa`ida's Foreign Fighters in Iraq: A First Look at the Sinjar Records* (West Point, NY: Combating Terrorism Center, 2007).
- 2 Nir Rosen, "Al-Qaeda in Lebanon," *Boston Review*, January/February 2008.
- 3 "Attack on Abqaiq Oil Facility Foiled," *Arab News*, February 25, 2006.
- 4 Saudi views of al-Qa`ida have changed substantially in recent years. In polling conducted in

continue to remain some backing for both the message and the tactics of radical extremists for some time to come. This has partly to do with frustration with Saudi authoritarianism and the inability of Saudi citizens to participate in the political system, the Saudi relationship with the United States, the unresolved Israel-Palestine conflict and U.S. policy in the region, particularly the U.S.-led Iraq war, as well as the politicization and radicalization of Islam by those opposed to the political status quo.⁵ Each generates considerable outrage and fulmination.

Residual support for terrorism is also the result of a decades-long strategy on the part of the state to attempt to harness the forces of militarized Islam in order to support the anti-Soviet jihad in Afghanistan and confront the threat of revolutionary Shi'ism from Iran in the 1980s. State and central authorities ignored, attempted to co-opt, or even assisted the forces fomenting radicalism to gain support throughout the 1980s and 1990s. The state oversaw and financed the building of educational and other institutions that indoctrinated an entire generation of Saudi youth into the ways of jihad.⁶ Social and material factors have also helped create conditions that encourage terrorism. Although the kingdom has enjoyed massive revenues from the rising price of oil since the start of the Iraq war, the country continues to endure high unemployment rates (between 15-30%) and disaffection among a restless youth with little else to do.⁷ Unemployment does not automatically dispose youth toward terrorism, but when taken into consideration alongside political and ideological factors, social and material factors should be kept in mind as important components of what motivates extreme political tendencies.

Roots of Terror and the Islamic Turn

Saudi Arabia first confronted the threat of Islamic radicalism in November 1979 when several hundred Sunni rebels laid siege to and occupied the Grand Mosque in Mecca. Led by Juhayman al-'Utaybi, the grandson of a former religious warrior who had helped the kingdom's founding monarch, 'Abd al-'Aziz Ibn Saud, consolidate Saudi hegemony over the Arabian Peninsula in the first two decades of the 20th century, the heavily armed rebels

2003, more than half of 15,000 Saudis polled expressed support for the organization and its leader, Usama bin Ladin. See "Poll of Saudis Shows Wide Support for Bin Laden's Views," CNN, June 4, 2004. In a 2007 poll of 1,000 Saudi citizens, 85% of respondents expressed unfavorable views of Bin Ladin and 90% expressed unfavorable views of al-Qa'ida. See Alan Fram, "Poll: Saudis Oppose Qaida, Split on US," Associated Press, December 17, 2007.

5 International Crisis Group, "Can Saudi Arabia Reform Itself?" July 14, 2004.

6 Gwenn Okruhlik, "Understanding Political Dissent in Saudi Arabia," *Middle East Report Online*, October 24, 2001.

7 Daryl Champion, *The Paradoxical Kingdom: Saudi Arabia and the Momentum of Reform* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003), p. 193.

held the mosque for two weeks before Saudi and foreign security forces rooted them out.⁸ In the lead-up to the siege, al-'Utaybi rallied support and established a following by challenging the religious credibility of the ruling family and by pointing out the shortcomings and contradictions of rapid modernization.⁹ The rebel leader claimed that one of the members of the group, Muhammad bin 'Abdullah al-Qahtani, was the *mahdi*, an apocalyptic figure who Muslims believe will redeem humanity before the arrival of judgment day. In retaking the mosque, hundreds of rebels, pilgrims and military personnel were killed. The rebels had hunkered down deep in the labyrinth of tunnels and corridors underneath the mosque. Security forces resorted to gas and explosives to flush the rebels from their subterranean redoubt. The authorities publicly beheaded al-'Utaybi and 67 of his followers in the weeks after their capture.

The kingdom confronted a second threat in November 1979 in the oil-rich Eastern Province. The same month that al-'Utaybi seized the Grand Mosque in Mecca, frustrated Shi'a in the east took to the streets in violent protest of their treatment as second class citizens.¹⁰ Since the early 20th century, Saudi Arabia's minority Shi'a community (constituting between 10-15% of the total population¹¹) has faced constant discrimination and persecution. In the late 1970s, energized by the radical message of revolutionary Shi'ism emanating from Iran and Iraq and spurred to action by deplorable social and environmental conditions, thousands of Saudi Shi'a challenged the state by staging multiple street demonstrations and destroying government property during a week-long period in late November 1979.¹² The central government believed that the uprising marked the outbreak of an irredentist revolt on the part of the Shi'a, who the state believed constituted a fifth column for Iran.¹³ The 20,000 Saudi security forces and National Guardsmen dispatched to the region to quell the rioting killed several dozen protestors and arrested hundreds of others. The violence would continue into the 1980s as many Shi'a grew increasingly radicalized.

8 Yaroslav Trofimov, *The Siege of Mecca: The Forgotten Uprising in Islam's Holiest Shrine and the Birth of al-Qaeda* (New York: Doubleday, 2007).

9 Stephane Lacroix and Thomas Heghammer, "Rejectionist Islam in Saudi Arabia: The Story of Juhayman al-'Utaybi Revisited," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 39:1 (2007): pp 103-122.

10 Toby Craig Jones, "Rebellion on the Saudi Periphery: Modernity, Marginalization, and the Shi'a Uprising of 1979," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 38:2 (2006): pp 213-233.

11 Today they number between 1.5 and 2 million.

12 The uprising in the Eastern Province was timed to coincide with the celebration of the commemoration of the martyrdom of Imam Hussein, the grandson of the Prophet Muhammad, on 'Ashura, the 10th of Muharram, the day in which Hussein was murdered in Karbala for refusing to recognize the al-Umayyad caliph Yazid.

13 Iran is overwhelmingly Shi'a. The coming to power of Ayatollah Khomeini in 1979 transformed Iranian-Saudi relations. Khomeini loathed the al-Sa'ud and called for their overthrow and made exporting the Islamic Revolution a central pillar of Iranian policy.

Shaken by the simultaneous outbreak of two massive threats to its authority and stability, Saudi Arabia's leaders ushered in a new political era, one in which Islam and Islamists would play a more central role. To counter threats from both Sunni and Shi'a radicals, Riyadh expanded the power of the clergy and used Islam as a weapon to beat back potential rivals and to restore some of their tarnished legitimacy. Although the al-Sa'ud had come to power in the early 20th century by conceding authority to religious scholars over spiritual, social and cultural matters, the Saudi *ulama* (religious scholars) had been marginalized and bureaucratized during the course of the century.¹⁴ Their power diminished correspondingly over this period. The massive influx of oil wealth exacerbated their marginalization, as the country's leaders encouraged Western-style consumption and modernization rather than piety or religious observance.¹⁵ The events of 1979 thrust the religious establishment back into relevance. In exchange for legitimizing the military assault on the Grand Mosque in November, the clergy demanded the restoration of what they believed to be their rightful authority and control over the public sphere. The kingdom's leaders conceded, not only by restoring the privileges of the clergy, but by expanding the role that religion would play in regulating the lives of Saudis.

The turn to Islam as a political instrument produced a number of effects. During the 1980s, the kingdom directed millions of dollars toward the building of religious institutions, including schools, universities, as well as various other endowments dedicated to local, regional and global objectives. As Gwenn Okruhlik noted, "during the 1980s, an Islamic education system fostered a new generation of sheikhs, professors, and students. The state provided generous funding for the expansion of Islamic universities even during the downturn in oil revenues in the mid-1980s. The regime sought to legitimate itself during hard times by binding religion and state institutionally."¹⁶ Major Islamic universities in Riyadh (Imam Muhammad bin Saud University), Medina (the Islamic University) and Mecca (Umm al-Qura University) expanded considerably in the 1980s. By the mid-1980s around 16,000 of Saudi Arabia's 100,000 university students had devoted themselves to Islamic studies. By the early 1990s, the number had increased to around one-quarter of the student population. Okruhlik makes clear the outcome: "this generation of students serves as bureaucrats, police officers, *mutawwa* [religious police], *Sharia* (Islamic law) judges, or preachers in some of the

14 Joshua Tietelbaum, *Holier than Thou: Saudi Arabia's Islamic Opposition* (Washington, D.C.: Washington Institute for Near Eastern Policy, November 1, 2000).

15 The state did not encourage either the abandonment or the subordination of Islam to material concerns. In the 1960s and 1970s, King Faisal promoted the notion of a pan-Islamic identity with Saudi Arabia positioned as the leader of Muslims globally. Islam also remained vitally important to Saudis across the kingdom. Yet Islam was not used to achieve wide-ranging political objectives, as would be the case in the 1980s.

16 Gwenn Okruhlik, "Networks of Dissent: Islamism and Reform in Saudi Arabia," *Current History*, January 22, 2002.

20,000 mosques in the country.”¹⁷

The proliferation of Islamic institutions and the education of a generation of Saudi youth in Islamic studies did not make the emergence of terrorism in Saudi Arabia or the participation of Saudi citizens in the global jihad inevitable. In the context of the geopolitics of the 1980s and the Cold War, however, Islam was not only put to work in helping the Saudi state better manage and discipline its own subjects, but it was also wielded as a political instrument in addressing Saudi interests abroad. Throughout the 1980s, the rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran worsened. Ayatollah Khomeini persisted in his calls for revolution in Saudi Arabia and the overthrow of the al-Sa`ud. For their part, the Saudis countered by funding and supporting an ideological campaign impugning Shi'ism, fomenting sectarianism and attempting to undermine Khomeini's calls for a global Islamic revolution.¹⁸ Religion and religious difference became central battlegrounds in the pursuit of regional primacy. The Saudis took additional concrete steps to check Iranian regional ambitions, most notably by funding Iraq in its bloody war against Iran from 1980-1988.

No less important to the radicalization of religion in Saudi Arabia than its efforts to check the rising power of Iran was the kingdom's role in supporting the anti-Soviet jihad in Afghanistan. During the 1980s, Saudi Arabia played a direct role in providing financial and human resources to the war in Central Asia. An unknown number of Saudi mujahidin traveled to Pakistan and Afghanistan to take part in the fight against the Soviet Union.¹⁹ Future terrorist figures such as Usama bin Ladin made the journey from Saudi Arabia to Pakistan and Afghanistan where they were radicalized alongside thousands of fellow countrymen as well as others from around the Middle East.²⁰ Afghanistan was the crucible in which thousands of future militants were trained in the tactics of terrorism and were socialized in the ways of the jihad, the brunt of which would be directed against the United States as well as those governments considered to be apostate regimes in the 1990s. The ranks of the global al-Qa`ida franchise were filled with veterans of the Afghan war, including dozens of Saudis who would participate in attacks on American targets in the United States as well as inside Saudi Arabia.

Shortly after the Afghan war and the return of thousands of mujahidin from the front, Saudi Islamists would become increasingly politicized, frustrated and bold in their criticisms of the royal family and its domestic and foreign policies. In part, this had to do with the ascendancy of a politically engaged and assertive community of religious scholars in the 1980s; the Islamic Awakening (*Sahwa al-Islamiyya*) was a community that expanded considerably as

17 Ibid.

18 Toby Jones, "The Iraq Effect in Saudi Arabia," *Middle East Report* 237 (Winter 2005);

International Crisis Group, "The Shiite Question in Saudi Arabia," September 19, 2005.

19 Okruhlik suggests that around 12,000 Saudis traveled to the region, with as many as 5,000 receiving military training and seeing actual combat. See Okruhlik, op cit.

20 See Steve Coll, *Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001* (New York: Penguin, 2004).

a result of the state largesse being poured into Islamic universities and institutions. Where the traditional Wahhabi *ulama* remained quiescent in matters of state and politics, the leading figures of the *sabwa*—such as Safar al-Hawali and Salman al-'Awda—were fundamentally concerned with the political issues of the day.²¹ More importantly, al-Hawali and al-'Awda were increasingly discomfited by what they perceived as contradictions of Saudi Arabian secular political authority and the doctrinal demands of Islam. Even though the state had undertaken significant steps in the 1980s to Islamize the kingdom, the figureheads of the *sabwa* believed that political authority should ultimately reside with the clergy.²²

Saudi leaders overlooked the *sabwa's* doctrinal criticisms during the 1980s as the network gained in popularity and strength. Tensions between the state and the *sabwa* reached a tipping point in the early 1990s. Saudi Arabia's decision to host 500,000 U.S. military forces during the 1991 Gulf War outraged al-Hawali and al-'Awda who considered the presence of U.S. military personnel un-Islamic and a form of occupation, a criticism that would become a centerpiece of al-Qa'ida's rationale for waging jihad against the United States. As a result of the U.S. presence, al-Hawali and al-'Awda began to directly criticize the Saudi regime, circulating sermons on cassette tapes inciting dissent against the state. In addition to offering public criticism of government excess and decision making, al-Hawali and al-'Awda were also central to spreading information about the activities of U.S. military personnel and the confrontation with Iraq, information that the state had attempted to block from the public.

The *sabwa* garnered widespread support in Saudi society and helped further foster the emergence of radicalism, although the movement's leaders did not directly call for the fall of the Saudi regime.²³ Their efforts lent credibility to political activism and especially public

21 For a lengthy discussion of al-Hawali and al-'Awda, see Mamoun Fandy, *Saudi Arabia and the Politics of Dissent* (New York: Palgrave, 2001).

22 Gilles Kepel, *The War for Muslim Minds: Islam and the West* (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 2004).

23 The *sabwa* were not the only group putting pressure on the al-Sa'ud. In 1990 and 1991 several secular and Islamist groups advocated for political change, submitting petitions (including the Letter of Demands in 1991 and the Memorandum of Advice in 1992) to the government demanding a wide range of reforms including the creation of a legislative assembly, the freedom of speech and organization, an end to corruption, the codification of law and the further empowerment of the religious establishment. The state responded by creating an appointed advisory council (*Majlis al-Shura*) and issuing the Basic Law in 1992. These were palliative measures that were more cosmetic than substantive. They did little to ameliorate frustration with the authoritarian nature of the regime. Several of the key figures of the petition drives, Saad al-Faqih and Muhammad al-Massari who had jointly formed the Committee for the Defense of Legitimate Rights, came under significant pressure in the kingdom and fled into exile in the mid-1990s. Al-Faqih split from al-Massari in 1996 and founded the Movement for Islamic Reform in Arabia, which both Saudi Arabia and the U.S. government allege has maintained close ties with al-Qa'ida and other terrorist networks.

dissent. Rankled by the burgeoning following commanded by the two *sabwa* leaders, and by a potential replay of an Islamist revolt like that in 1979, Saudi authorities jailed al-Hawali and al-'Awda in 1994 and kept them imprisoned until 1999. Their arrests prompted a wave of outrage and even public demonstrations, a rare occurrence in the kingdom.

Militants Strike

While Saudi leaders struggled to outmaneuver the rising popularity of the clerics of the Islamic Awakening in the mid-1990s, a more deadly menace made its violent debut in 1995. On November 13, 1995, terrorists detonated a truck bomb outside a training center for the Saudi Arabian National Guard operated by the United States in Riyadh. The blast killed five American and two Indian citizens and injured 60 others, including 37 Americans.²⁴ Responsibility for the attacks remains uncertain. Usama bin Ladin, who had been stripped of his Saudi citizenship in 1994 for his own radical turn, praised the attacks but denied any role. Saudi authorities arrested four men for the assaults, Abd al-Aziz al-Marhem, Khalid Al-Sa'id, Riyadh al-Hajiri and Muslih al-Shamrani. The four confessed on Saudi television and were beheaded in May 1996. At least three of those executed had combat experience in Afghanistan or Bosnia, while the fourth had been a member of an Islamic study group that denounced the absence of a sufficiently rigorous role for Islam in the Saudi polity. Although three organizations (The Tigers of the Gulf, the Islamic Movement for Change²⁵ and Combat Partisans for God) claimed responsibility for the attack and while all four of those arrested for the bombing singled out Bin Ladin and Saad al-Faqih as having had an influence on them, none claimed membership in any organization.²⁶ The perpetrators' affiliation is less important than their ideological leanings, which clearly embraced a radical worldview that blended a political critique of the West with Islam. Al-Qa'ida and other sympathetic terror organizations point to the 1995 attack as a seminal moment in the history and power of the global jihad, a movement that would only become more dangerous during the next decade.

On June 25, 1996, just one month after the execution of those accused of carrying out the Riyadh bombings, militants struck again, this time attacking a U.S. military barracks in al-Khobar, a coastal town in the kingdom's Eastern Province. The massive truck bomb, with estimates of its size ranging from 3,000 to 20,000 pounds, killed 19 Americans and

24 Anthony Cordesman, "Islamic Extremism in Saudi Arabia and the Attack on al-Khobar," Center for Strategic and International Studies, June 2001, p. 19.

25 The Islamic Movement for Change had faxed threatening letters to the U.S. Embassy in Riyadh in April and June 2005, demanding the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Saudi Arabia. See Cordesman, "Islamic Extremism in Saudi Arabia and the Attack on al-Khobar," p. 20.

26 International Crisis Group, "Saudi Arabia Backgrounder: Who are the Islamists?" September 21, 2004, p. 6. Stephane Lacroix and Thomas Hegghammer authored this ICG report. See also Thomas Hegghammer, "Deconstructing the Myth about al-Qa'ida Khobar" 1:3 (2008): p. 21.

wounded around several hundred others.²⁷ The attack forced the United States to move its personnel from al-Khobar to the airbase at al-Kharj, a remote and more secure outpost 60 miles southeast of Riyadh. Saudi authorities claimed to have arrested and sentenced those responsible, although the government refused to cooperate or share intelligence with American investigators from the FBI.

In June 2001, a Virginia federal grand jury issued 13 indictments against Saudi militants that the U.S. government claimed were members of Saudi Hizb Allah, a Shi'a organization founded in the 1980s with close ties to Iran and Lebanon.²⁸ In spite of the indictments, the identities of the attackers remain a mystery and the culpability of Saudi Hizb Allah an uncertainty. *The 9/11 Commission Report* apportioned blame to Saudi Shi'a, Iran and even Usama bin Ladin, suggesting that "there are also signs that al-Qaida played some role, as yet unknown."²⁹ The belief that Saudi Hizb Allah and al-Qa'ida collaborated in the attack even enjoys some support among Saudi Shi'a living in the kingdom.³⁰ Thomas Hegghammer has provided a compelling deconstruction of claims that al-Qa'ida had a hand in the al-Khobar bombings, but the issue remains unresolved.³¹

Whether Saudi Hizb Allah acted alone or in conjunction with Iran, Lebanon or al-Qa'ida, the organization did represent a radical and militant wing within the Saudi Shi'a community. After the 1979 Shi'a uprising in the Eastern Province, the most active and outspoken community leaders, who had formed the Organization for the Islamic Revolution in the Arabian Peninsula (OIR) in 1979, fled to Iran, England, the United States and Syria, creating an international diaspora that continued to call for revolution and public dissent, but that remained organizationally weak.³² The emergence of Saudi Hizb Allah in the late 1980s represented the rise of an indigenous leadership in Saudi Arabia that was disappointed in the lack of progress made by the Organization for Islamic Revolution. Where the leaders of OIR followed the line of Imam Shirazi based in Kuwait and London, the founders of Saudi Hizb Allah oriented themselves toward Iran.³³ While there were important doctrinal differences between the Shirazi and Iranian trends, the most important distinctions were political. The Shirazi networks softened their hard line stance in the late 1980s as they came to believe

27 International Crisis Group, op cit., p. 6; Cordesman, op cit. p. 22. See also *The Khobar Towers Bombing Incident* (Washington, D.C.: House National Security Committee, August 14, 1996); *Report to the President and Congress on the Protection of U.S. Forces Deployed Abroad* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, September 15, 1996); and *Independent Review of the Khobar Towers Bombing* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Air Force, October 31, 1996).

28 Cordesman, "Islamic Extremism in Saudi Arabia and the Attack on al-Khobar," pp. 22-33.

29 *The 9/11 Commission Report* (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 2004), p. 60.

30 Personal interviews, Saudi Arabia, 2003-2005.

31 Hegghammer, op cit.

32 The OIR published a monthly Arabic-language newsletter called *al-Thawra al-Islamiyya* (The Islamic Revolution) in London until the late 1980s.

33 For more details, see International Crisis Group, "The Shiite Question in Saudi Arabia."

that the best path to political change, and most importantly the improvement of the living conditions for Shi'a in Saudi Arabia, was no longer through revolution, but through reform. OIR's shift to a more moderate political position yielded almost immediate political results. In 1993, the Saudi government reached out to leaders in London and Washington, leading to a rapprochement. The 1993 accord allowed exiled Shi'a to return to the kingdom and lead normal lives.³⁴ Yet the arrangement outraged members of Hizb Allah, which probably had 250 hardcore members in the mid-1990s, and may have played a role in further radicalizing the organization, culminating in the 1996 al-Khobar bombing.

Al-Qa`ida and Saudi Arabia

The ex-Saudi citizen Usama bin Ladin declared war on the United States in August 1996, citing a litany of grievances against U.S. policy, including the continued presence of American military personnel in the kingdom. Al-Qa`ida carried out a series of terrorist operations against U.S. targets starting in the late 1990s, including bombings of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998 as well as the strike against the USS *Cole* in Yemen in 2000. Al-Qa`ida's deadliest attacks to date were the coordinated 9/11 attacks.

Al-Qa`ida's global jihad turned its crosshairs on Saudi Arabia in mid-2003. On May 12, 2003, 12 suicide bombers carried out simultaneous bombings against Western residential compounds in the capital Riyadh. The attacks killed 34 people and wounded 200 others. It marked the beginning of what would turn out to be a sustained terror campaign by al-Qa`ida in the Arabian Peninsula (QAP) on Western and regime targets in Saudi Arabia. On November 8, 2003, two suicide bombers disguised as Saudi police officers killed 17 people and wounded more than 100 others in a car bombing against the al-Muhaya residential compound in Riyadh. Unlike in the May bombings, most of the victims in the November attacks were Arab and Muslim. In December 2003, an al-Qa`ida faction called the al-Haramain Brigades launched the first of a series of attacks against regime targets, including shooting a police officer in Riyadh, attacking the Ministry of Interior building and attempting to assassinate Prince Muhammed bin Nayef, the son of the minister of the interior. On April 21, 2004, the al-Haramain Brigades detonated a car bomb outside the headquarters of the traffic police in Riyadh, killing six people.

Al-Qa`ida's reign of terror lasted well into 2004. On May 1, al-Qa`ida gunmen stormed a Swiss company compound in the Red Sea city of Yanbu, killing five. On May 29, the network murdered 22 people at the Oasis residential compound in al-Khobar. The terrorists moved methodically through the complex, taking 50 hostages and killing the non-Muslims. Remarkably, after 24 hours all four of the militants were able to slip through the Saudi security cordon to safety, prompting speculation that Saudi police were complicit in their escape.

³⁴ See Jones, "The Iraq Effect in Saudi Arabia," *Middle East Report* 237 (Winter 2005).

Even before the first attacks in May 2003, Saudi authorities demonstrated concern that it faced a serious terrorist threat, although it bungled an attempt to arrest suspected militants in March.³⁵ After the May 12 bombings, state security intensified its operations against QAP. Within months, security forces had wiped out a considerable part of al-Qa`ida's network and infrastructure, including the killing of the group's leader, Yusuf al-'Uyayri, on May 31.³⁶ Through June 2004, gunfights and clashes between terrorists and security forces occurred daily and were widely reported in the Saudi press. On June 19, one day after al-Qa`ida beheaded Paul Johnson, an American citizen who worked in Riyadh, Saudi police killed 'Abd al-'Aziz al-Muqrin, the group's leader at the time. From mid-2004, state authorities have consistently headed off major attacks in the planning stages, although two would-be bombers did breach the security perimeter around the Abqaiq refinery in the Eastern Province, only to detonate their payloads prematurely. Clashes between militants and police forces continued from 2004 through 2006. In that period, the Saudi government significantly undermined al-Qa`ida's ability to operate in the kingdom by killing or arresting hundreds of suspected militants.

Given the secretive nature of terrorism networks, the scale of al-Qa`ida membership in Saudi Arabia remains unclear. Saudi authorities published two lists of the country's most wanted terrorists in 2003 containing 40 names, one in May with 19 names and another list of 26 in December. The government released another list in 2005 with 36 names, including 21 who were suspected of being outside the kingdom. Most of those named on the various lists have either been killed or captured, including several killed in Iraq.³⁷ In 2003, the *New York Times* reported that an American counter-terrorism official put the number of QAP operatives at around 200, a number that now appears to have been a significant underestimate.³⁸ Since mid-2003, hundreds of suspected militants have been detained or killed. While al-Qa`ida has come under considerable state pressure and its activities have diminished as a result, the organization still commands some support. In late December 2007, Saudi authorities announced that they had arrested 27 militants planning to carry out attacks against pilgrims during the hajj. More than 200 others were arrested earlier in 2007, reportedly for

35 Roel Meijer, "The 'Cycle of Contention' and the Limits of Terrorism in Saudi Arabia," in Paul Aarts and Gerd Nonneman eds., *Saudi Arabia in the Balance* (New York: New York University Press, 2005), p. 279.

36 International Crisis Group, "Who are the Islamists?" p. 13. ICG reported that "large-scale clashes between police and militants occurred throughout the country. While the number of killed and arrested militants remains unclear, a review of police activity suggests that ten or more cells—mostly five to twenty militants each, in safe houses in Mecca and Medina (west), Riyadh and the Qasim region (center) and Jizan (south)—were likely dismantled in the Riyadh area."

37 "List of 36 Most-Wanted Terrorist Suspects," Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia, Washington, D.C., June 28, 2005.

38 *New York Times*, May 20, 2003.

planning to strike oil facilities and carry out assassinations.³⁹

According to several analysts, the first wave of QAP militants (2003-2004) consisted of a select group of operatives who had participated in the Afghan anti-Soviet jihad in the 1980s, had trained with al-Qa`ida in Afghanistan in the late 1990s, or had received training inside Saudi Arabia under the instruction of Afghan veterans who returned home after the fall of the Taliban. As Thomas Hegghammer wrote for the International Crisis Group in 2004, "for core members, the most important common denominator and a key to understanding QAP, is the shared Afghan experience either as mujahidin or in training camps. This experience left them with a common ideological orientation, military culture and technical expertise."⁴⁰ Organizationally, QAP operated in small independent cells, with as many as 10 being active in 2003. The government swept up almost all of those by mid-2004. While little is known about the operatives detained in 2007, they most likely constitute a new generation of radicals either trained at home or in Iraq.

The original core of QAP was also remarkably diverse in make-up, including members from cities and regions from across the kingdom. The ages of those who appeared on Saudi Arabia's most wanted lists averaged in the mid-to-late 20s. The oldest members of the network at the height of its powers were the leaders. Yusuf al-`Uyayri, Khalid Hajj and `Abd al-`Aziz al-Muqrin were all 30 at the time of their deaths. Salah al-Awfi, who was killed in 2005, was 38-years-old.⁴¹ The core QAP members did not possess high levels of education, unlike other terrorists elsewhere.⁴² Only one member of the original Saudi list of 19 most wanted militants had pursued any kind of technical training (Turki al-Dandani in medicine), which he abandoned so he could travel to Afghanistan.⁴³ Among those with any advanced schooling, nine of the individuals who appeared on the December 2003 most wanted list specialized in religious studies at the Imam Muhammad bin Sa`ud University in Riyadh, one of the universities that benefited from the kingdom's Islamic turn in the 1980s.⁴⁴

With the exception of several attacks against Saudi regime targets in 2004 by the al-Haramain Brigades, QAP's strategic focus has been on Western targets (the far enemy) inside the kingdom. The preference of non-regime targets most likely reflects pragmatism on the part of al-Qa`ida rather than any ideological proclivities inhibiting them from attacking symbols of Saudi power (the near enemy). The network suffered a public backlash in 2003 when it killed mostly Arabs and Muslims at the al-Muhaya compound. In spite of the blow-

39 "Saudi Authorities Arrest 28 Suspected Al-Qaeda Militants," Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia, Washington, D.C., December 23, 2007.

40 International Crisis Group, "Who are the Islamists?" p. 17. See also Meijer, "The Limits of Terrorism in Saudi Arabia," pp. 271-300; and, Madawi al-Rasheed, *Contesting the Saudi State: Islamic Voices from a New Generation* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).

41 Meijer, "The Limits of Terrorism in Saudi Arabia," p. 291.

42 International Crisis Group, "Who are the Islamists?" p. 17.

43 Meijer, "The Limits of Terrorism in Saudi Arabia," p. 292.

44 Ibid.

back for killing Muslims, it is important to keep in mind that QAP, much like bin Ladin's al-Qa`ida, ultimately aspired to overthrow the al-Sa`ud.

From 2003 to 2004, QAP did mount an ambitious ideological campaign to muster support for the jihad. The network published two monthly online magazines—*Sawt al-Jihad* and *Mu`askar al-Battar*—that enjoyed a large readership. The two publications emphasized al-Qa`ida's religious credentials, using sympathetic religious scholars to bolster support. The group maintained a Shari`a committee composed of religious theoreticians who used the pages of *Sawt al-Jihad* to press the case for jihad.⁴⁵ Early on, Nasir al-Fahd, one of Saudi Arabia's *tafiri* shaykhs—someone who declares rivals non-Muslims in order to rob them of legitimacy—exerted ideological influence on QAP. Along with `Ali al-Khudayr and Ahmad al-Khalidi, al-Fahd was arrested in 2003 and forced to recant his radical views on Saudi television.⁴⁶ With al-Fahd out of the picture, QAP turned to marginal and young religious figures such as `Abdullah Rushud (killed in April 2004) and Faris Zahrani (arrested in August 2004).

It is unclear what connection QAP had to Usama bin Ladin and the al-Qa`ida leadership that survived the U.S. defeat of the Taliban in 2001. Contributors to *Sawt al-Jihad* continued to honor bin Ladin as the principal political inspiration for QAP and its activities. Given the considerable pressure that bin Ladin faced after 2001 and the difficulties of maintaining “battlefield” communications with operatives in Saudi Arabia, it is unlikely that he directed day-to-day operations from 2003 onward. Although it is impossible to prove, it is more plausible that the al-Qa`ida “braintrust” encouraged national franchises to carry out the jihad whenever and wherever possible and that it specifically charged members of QAP who left Afghanistan in 2001 to do so on the Arabian Peninsula.

The Iraqi Jihad

While Saudi counter-terrorism efforts turned the tide against al-Qa`ida in the Arabian Peninsula by mid-2004, the kingdom has had less success preventing Saudi citizens from infiltrating Iraq, where from 2003 on they have formed not only the bulk of the foreign fighters, but also the bulk of suicide bombers.⁴⁷ Based on records acquired by the U.S. Department of Defense and released in late 2007—providing details for more than 700 militants who had entered Iraq between August 2006 and August 2007—the Combating Terrorism Center at the U.S. Military Academy reported that most foreign militants in Iraq continue to come from Saudi Arabia. The CTC noted that of the 595 profiles identifying the nationalities of foreign fighters in Iraq, 244 (41%) were Saudi.⁴⁸ It remains unclear how many Saudis have

45 Ibid.

46 Jones, “The Clerics, the Sahwa, and the Saudi State,” *Strategic Insights* 4:3 (2005): p. 4.

47 It is important to note that the vast majority of those who violently oppose the U.S. presence in Iraq are Iraqis and not foreign fighters.

48 Felter and Fishman, *Al-Qa`ida's Foreign Fighters in Iraq*, p. 7.

ventured to Iraq in support of the anti-American and sectarian war there since the start of the conflict. Various sources suggest that between 2003 and 2005, when the number of Saudis infiltrating Iraq probably peaked, the total number of Saudi jihadists who had seen combat or died in Iraq ranged between 1,500 and 5,000 people.⁴⁹ The number was probably higher in the early stages of the war when access was easier, with most crossing over the Syrian-Iraqi border. The rate of infiltration has decreased since 2004, although as the records released by DoD indicate, there is still a large reservoir of those willing to fight and die in Iraq.

As a result of the imprecise nature of Saudi participation in the Iraqi jihad, it is also difficult to accurately assess their backgrounds. In an analysis of 205 Saudis who died in Iraq between 2003 and 2005, Thomas Hegghammer determined that the group was younger than those who fought for QAP in the same period, averaging around 23-years-old. The vast majority did not have prior combat experience in Afghanistan and Bosnia, suggesting that they constituted an entirely new generation of mujahidin. The group was also more socially complex, with diverse socio-economic, tribal and educational backgrounds. Of the 16 profiles containing educational details, 14 indicate individuals with higher education, including one with a doctorate. Students were overwhelmingly represented, but so too were members of the business community, medicine, the military and police.⁵⁰

Although Saudis in Iraq came from across the kingdom, citizens from Riyadh, Qasim and the northern provinces, which are situated close or adjacent to Iraq, form the vast majority of those killed in the first two years of the war. The Sinjar Records released by DoD indicate that 161 of the 204 Saudis for whom there was hometown information were from Riyadh, Mecca, Medina, Jedda, al-Jawf, al-Ta'if and Burayda—central and northern Saudi Arabia.⁵¹ Hegghammer offers a number of analytical interpretations for the northern concentration. He explained, "northerners may have been more capable of crossing the Saudi-Iraqi border. They may also have been more sensitive to the U.S. military presence which was more visible in the north in early 2003. Tribal loyalties may have also played a role, as a large number of tribes are present on both sides of the border. So-called 'shared tribes' like the Shammar are prominently represented in [the] sample."⁵²

The principal ideological motivation for Saudis going to Iraq is outrage at the U.S. invasion and occupation of a Muslim country. Dating from the early 1990s, when the *Sabwa*

49 Personal interviews, Saudi Arabia, 2003-2005; Thomas Hegghammer, "Saudi Militants in Iraq: Backgrounds and Recruitment Patterns," Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (FFI), February 5, 2007, p. 11.

50 Hegghammer, "Saudi Militants in Iraq," p. 12.

51 Felter and Fishman, *Al-Qa'ida's Foreign Fighters in Iraq*, p 11.

52 Hegghammer, "Saudi Militants in Iraq," p. 12. Hegghammer continues to make an important qualification regarding the "tribal factor": "It is worth mentioning that the tribal distribution in our sample is very broad and covers most major tribes. With the possible exception of shared tribes in the north, it is thus difficult to speak of a tribal factor in the recruitment of Saudis to Iraq."

al-Islamiyya launched the first wave of dissent against the presence of U.S. soldiers in the region, American foreign policy has consistently stirred up frustration and helped mobilize several generations of militants. Many Saudis viewed the war in Iraq not as an exceptional act on the part of the United States, but rather as an intensification of a standing policy of targeting Muslims, supporting Israel and attempting to exploit the region's resources.

Even though the al-Sa`ud have long looked to the United States to guarantee the kingdom's security, it has also tolerated domestic criticism of U.S. foreign policy, including incitements and support for the anti-American jihad. In the early years of the Iraq conflict, religious scholars directed a great deal of fulmination toward the United States and even encouraged violent resistance to the occupation of Iraq. In November 2004, prominent members of the *sahwa*, including Salman al-`Awda and Safar al-Hawali, signed an "open letter" in support of the Iraqi jihad, calling for all Muslims to lend support to the "resistance." Although the letter did not openly exhort Saudis to travel to Iraq to fight in the jihad, it was widely interpreted as encouraging them to do so.⁵³ The Saudi government worked to quell criticism of the United States or support for jihad in mosques and the press. Many of the signatories of the 2004 open letter subsequently renounced their positions, but there remains considerable ideological support for opposition to the United States in Iraq.

One of the most worrisome trends to emerge in Saudi Arabia since the start of the Iraq war, and what motivates a large number of Saudis to travel to Iraq, is the intensification of sectarianism and sectarian violence. Since the 1980s, Sunnis in Saudi Arabia have been educated in a system that teaches absolute intolerance for Shi'ism and the Shi'a, and it advocates killing them. The rise of Iraqi Shi'a, who are a clear majority of Iraq's population, to political power has sparked considerable enmity in Saudi Arabia and elsewhere in the Middle East. Violence against Iraq's Sunni minority works to reinforce Saudi concerns of a Shi'a crescent, the potential alignment of Shi'a in Iran, Iraq, Lebanon and the Persian Gulf.⁵⁴ Young Saudis who harbor deep hatred for Shi'a have trekked to Iraq to fight not only the United States, but also a sectarian war.

As it has with regard to funding for al-Qa`ida more generally, the state has also taken significant measures to choke off financial and other material support flowing from inside the kingdom to militants in Iraq. It is difficult to evaluate with confidence the extent to which these efforts have been successful, but the government has pursued concrete measures such as monitoring the flow of money through various financial channels, restricting fundraising in Islamic charities, and regulating their spending since 2004.⁵⁵

53 Jones, "The Clerics, the *Sahwa*, and the Saudi State."

54 See Jones, "The Iraq Effect in Saudi Arabia"; International Crisis Group, "The Shiite Question in Saudi Arabia"; and Vali Nasr, *The Shia Revival: How Conflicts Within Islam Will Shape the Future* (New York: W.W. Norton, 2006).

55 See testimony of Juan C. Zarate, Deputy Assistant Secretary Executive Office for Terrorist Financing & Financial Crimes, U.S. Department of the Treasury Before the House International Relations Subcommittee on the Middle East and Central Asia, May 24, 2004,

Conclusion

The threat of terrorism will be a serious security concern in Saudi Arabia for years to come. More than 200 militants were arrested in 2007 alone in the planning stages of various attacks inside the kingdom. Hundreds of Saudi jihadists also made the journey to Iraq in 2007. While most of them die on the Iraqi battlefield, others will survive. One of the most important challenges facing the kingdom in the future is the potential return of battle-hardened veterans from Iraq. The challenge is, in part, about numbers. The Iraq war and support for al-Qa`ida and its criticisms of the United States will continue to radicalize a small number of Saudi youth, ensuring that there will be at least a small contingent of enthusiastic radicals for the foreseeable future. Even though Islamic radicals are a fringe political group in Saudi Arabia, they possess the capacity to inflict considerable harm and to generate widespread fear, not only through spectacular acts of terrorism but also through the public perception that they possess the capability to execute such acts.

Furthermore, while Saudi Arabia has become much more effective in combating terrorists militarily, it has yet to demonstrate that it possesses the will or the capacity to address the various factors that have given rise to them in the first place: ideology and the politicization of Islam, authoritarianism and unemployment. Given these factors, it is likely that Saudi Arabia will not only continue to produce radicals who will travel abroad in the name of jihad, but that others will focus their energies at home. After all, in spite of Saudi Arabia's improved security capabilities, the kingdom offers a range of alluring and vulnerable targets: the sprawling oil infrastructure, Western residents and residential compounds, and a large Shi'a community. As it has for more than a decade, Saudi Arabia will continue to occupy a central place on the stage of global terrorism.

available at <http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/js1257.htm>.

Chapter 11

Understanding North Africa



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I. INTRODUCTION

It is indisputable that terrorism has been and continues to be a security risk and potential threat to the stability of governments in North Africa. What is more open to question is the degree to which North African terrorist groups constitute individually coherent groups. In addition, the North African groups' strictly North African identity is difficult to discern.

This chapter examines the historical, cultural and geographic elements in three North African countries where terrorism has been most prevalent—Algeria, Morocco and Libya. In each of these countries, historical experiences influenced the ways in which terrorism has manifested itself. In addition, cultural distinctions among the three countries have determined the nature and ideology of terrorist groups. Lastly, all three countries fall short of exerting complete control over their territories, both in rural and urban areas. This lack of control provides space for terrorist groups to operate.

In addition to this broad overview of conditions in each North African country, the chapter seeks to examine the constitution of each group, specific acts of terrorism that it has carried out or to which it has been linked, and its *modus operandi*, or how and why it acts the way it does.

During the course of this closer examination of specific Moroccan, Algerian and Libyan groups, varying degrees of national commitment become clear. Some groups are entirely composed of nationals from the countries in which they are active. Other groups only have a minority of members from the country that they represent. Still other groups do not actually operate in the country that they ostensibly represent. The examination of the groups' actions and operations also exposes the degrees to which the different groups collaborate or act independently.

It bears mentioning that the groups examined in this chapter are all Islamically oriented and to greater or lesser extents espouse elements of global Salafi-jihadi ideology. This does not mean, however, that all future terrorist groups in North Africa will be Islamist. It is quite possible that Western Saharan independence groups will adopt terrorist tactics in order to realize their goal of establishing an independent state in the Western Sahara. Likewise, it is

possible (but less likely) that Kabyle groups in Algeria could adopt terrorists tactics to carve out an autonomous region for themselves.

II. HISTORY, CULTURE & GEOGRAPHY

Algeria

Historical Context

Perhaps more so than any other Middle Eastern or North African country, Algeria's colonial past impacts its contemporary political situation, which suffers from an enduring terrorism risk. For 132 years, from 1830 to 1962, Algeria was ruled by France. Traces of French rule in contemporary Algeria are very tangible and they constitute a double component of the Islamist terrorist struggle in the country. On the one hand, the French actively eroded whatever cultural identity Algerians had constructed for themselves. On the other hand, while the terrorist struggle of the 1990s was against the secular state that had annulled elections Islamists were likely to have won, contemporary terrorist activity is part of the Salafi-jihadi movement and targets the "unbeliever" presence in the country and the government's ties to it.¹ While Algeria has a number of foreign allies, its ties to France predominate and it is largely against France that the Islamists direct their ire.

It is important to recognize that while France ruled the country for more than a century, prior to the French conquest Algeria was ruled by representatives of the Ottoman Empire. The links between the Dey of Algiers and the Ottoman capital in Istanbul that reached back to the 1500s were weak but functional.² Only scattered traces of the Ottoman presence in Algiers remain, but Algerians recognize that if they were to want to return to an authentically Algerian political system, unadulterated by foreign influence, they would have to reach back almost 500 years.

The implications are that whereas other post-colonial states used a pre-colonial form of government to guide them—whether to return to or to distance themselves from—Algeria has very little from which to draw, to which to go back to, or from which to flee.

When Algeria won independence in 1962 after eight years of a bloody war that claimed more than one million lives, it embarked on forming a socialist republic that drew from a grab bag of Arabist, Islamist and Third World ideologies. Algeria eventually became autocratic, dominated by one political party (the National Liberation Front or FLN) con-

1 Hugh Roberts, *The Battlefield, Algeria 1988-2002: Studies in a Broken Polity* (London: Verso, 2003).

2 Benjamin Stora, *Histoire de l'Algérie depuis l'indépendance* (Paris: La Découverte, 1994).

trolled by one politician. From 1965 to 1978 Algeria had one leader—Houari Boumedi-
enne. From 1979 to 1992 it had another, Chadli Bendjedid. While the initial years of the
socialist republic and its statist industrial projects were successful, the country had begun to
economically stagnate by the late 1970. The low oil prices of the 1980s brought the country's
economic growth to a halt. Frustration with French influence and secular socialism gave rise
to the emergence of popular Islamist political points of view. In 1988, President Chadli Ben
Djedid opened the political spectrum and for the first time allowed for multiple political
parties to contest the FLN's dominance. The Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) quickly became a
vehicle for Islamists' frustration with the secular government.³

When the FIS was poised to win the first multi-party elections in Algerian history
in 1991, the military aborted the election process and made being an FIS member ille-
gal, thereby creating hundreds of thousands of outlaws almost overnight. From 1992 until
roughly 2002, Islamists and offshoots of the original FIS fought against the government to
restore their stolen election victory. Although current Islamist terrorism in Algeria has lost
this orientation, it nonetheless has its roots in the overturned elections.

Cultural Influences

One outcome of Algeria's crippling colonial experience is that when it achieved inde-
pendence, the goal was not so much to restore a pre-colonial form of government, but rather
to implement French rule without the French. If the French notion of the "republic" meant
equality, fraternity and liberty, then Algeria's post-colonial objective was to demonstrate that
Algeria could be more equal, more brotherly and more free than it had been under the
French. It meant demonstrating that it was capable of doing what the French had done in
terms of political organization, governmental administration and economic planning. At the
same time, the founders of the independent Algerian state in the 1960s recognized that in order
to have a sense of popular legitimacy, the state's rhetoric had to incorporate local themes
and draw upon local identities. This meant that Algeria's equality, fraternity and liberty were
couched in Islamic and Arab terms.

Yet because the independence movement made heavy use of Islamic and Arab
rhetoric in order to gain popular support prior to independence, the founders of the new
state were obliged to retain Islamic and Arab reference points after the state was formed. To
this end, Arabic became the official language of the state and the state was responsible for
the training and employment of Muslim functionaries—the imams, judges and clerics who
worked in the state's mosques. At the same time, most of the leaders who took control of
Algeria after the war of independence were themselves trained in France. This was especially
true of the military leadership that exerted such disproportionate control over the political
arena, as well as of the intellectual class that comments on political life.⁴

³ Roberts, op. cit.

⁴ John Ruedy, *Modern Algeria: The Origins and Development of a Nation* (Bloomington,

One of the consequences of this mix of “more French than the French” and an Arab and Islamic component is that the state vacillated between two views and never fully embraced either. The secularist approach of the French republic existed in tension with the Islamist overtones. Rather than successfully finding a compromise, the state negotiated between the two. In a conscientious attempt to avoid divisive images drawn from either the rhetoric of the republic or Islam, the state’s symbols are a mixture of industrialization, agricultural achievements and nature scenes. For example, Algerian money largely steers clear of images of political leaders, historic references, or contemporary Islamic messages. Instead, it includes images such as oil derricks, sheaves of wheat, and lions and elephants. This semiotic paralysis extends overseas as well. In 2008, the Algerian government criticized the French for issuing a stamp bearing the likeness of the 19th century Algerian rebel leader Abdel Kader.

The approach has provided an opening for Islamists to criticize the government for failing to represent the Algerians’ true identity (leaving aside whether or not Islam is in fact the population’s primary political touch point). Those who have been economically or politically marginalized whether directly or indirectly by the state’s dominant secular socialism look to Islam as an alternative and as a yet not fully tested political identity. This was one of the reasons for the FIS’s success in the 1991 elections.

The state has subsequently allowed room for legal Islamist political parties, but these do not have widespread support because they are widely believed to have either been created as tools of the secular parties or to have been co-opted by them. Other Islamist groups feel that the state’s manipulation of Islamist political parties defiles them and is ultimate proof of the state’s un-Islamicness.

Geography

To a certain extent, Algeria’s geography has facilitated terrorism, or at least is conducive to it. Because the state does not—or cannot—exert total control over the territory encompassed by its borders, there are areas where non-state actors can organize, train and plan unmolested by the state. In particular, there are three main areas where terrorist groups have historically been active in the country.

To the east of the capital Algiers are the Boumerdes and Tizi Ouzou regions. With the exception of some medium size market towns, the area is sparsely populated. Yet more importantly, the terrain is densely forested and extremely mountainous. During the colonial period, independence fighters took refuge in the area and staged raids on Algiers and other cities in the region. Likewise, today Islamist terrorist have established hideouts and weapons caches in the mountains. The military has tried to rout them out, but has had difficulty making inroads in the area. Since 2007, the military has deployed helicopter gunships to pursue terrorists in the mountains, but even though the helicopters can penetrate deep into the mountains, the thick forest provides terrorists with ample cover.

IN: Indiana University Press, 2005).

In addition to the rural mountains of Boumerdes and Tizi Ouzou, some Islamists have been active in Algiers proper. While the city center has been secured effectively in recent years, surrounding suburbs have been more difficult to police. Working class and lower class neighborhoods—where population density is higher and people change addresses more frequently—have harbored Islamist terrorists in the past. In particular, neighborhoods like Bab el-Oued, Belcourt and Kouba have been supportive of terrorist activity.

Algeria's deep south is also problematic in relation to terrorism. The state has historically had a difficult time fully policing the vast stretches of the Sahara in the south of the country. As a result, the area has been home to a full range of non-state actors, including drug smugglers, weapons runners, human traffickers and terrorists. These groups often establish opportunistic alliances or at least business partnerships with one another and take advantage of historic north-south caravan routes across the Sahara to move within Algeria and also between states in the Sahara or Sahel region.

Morocco

Historical Issues

Morocco's colonial history was different from neighboring Algeria and, as a consequence, its experience with terrorism has been different as well. Although the Treaty of Fez was officially signed in 1912 establishing French rule over the country, the French military faced resistance to colonization throughout the 1930s, especially in the mountainous south of the country. In addition, unlike Algeria, Morocco was never conquered by the Ottoman Empire. In fact, by the time the French arrived, the ruling family had controlled the country for more than 300 years. Partially because of this established form of government and partially because methods of colonization had evolved since France's conquest of Algeria, the French administration in Morocco opted to leave Morocco's institutions intact and rule through them, rather than obliterate them and rule directly.⁵

One of the consequences of this approach was that when Morocco achieved independence from the French in 1956 it reverted to a modified form of the monarchy that the French had encountered when they conquered the country. Unlike Algeria, where ideas for how the state should be construed competed against one another and continue to do so, Morocco reclaimed its historic form of government.

Evidence of Morocco's colonial experience under the French lingers, but it is not nearly as disruptive as it is in Algeria. Unlike Algeria, which embarked upon a secular socialist state, the Moroccan monarch always maintained his title of "Commander of the Faithful," which made him the state's official representative (and protector of) Islam in Morocco. Mohamed V (r. 1927-1961), his son Hassan II (r. 1962-1999) and his grandson Mohamed VI (r. 1999-)

⁵ John Waterbury, *The Commander of the Faithful; The Moroccan Political Elite—A Study in Segmented Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1970).

all claim this title. To be sure, there are Moroccan Muslims who challenge the legitimacy of the kings' claims to this title, but at a minimum the title demonstrates that the monarchy is committed to Islam and provides it with a defense against some forms of criticism among politicized Muslims.⁶

During the 1970s and 1980s, however, Hassan II contended with increasingly Islamist politics. Hassan II deployed a two-fold approach to maintain his position and defend himself from Islamist criticism. On the one hand, he repressed Islamist opponents of the monarchy, and on the other hand he undermined his Islamist critics by co-opting their message. Mohamed VI, who inherited the throne upon his father's death in 1999, has adopted a slightly different approach. Although he still relies on repression of his opponents as well as trying to co-opt the Islamists' message, he also actively promotes a Sufi version of Islam that is supportive of the monarchy. This post-colonial political history may explain why terrorism has not been as prevalent in Morocco as it is in Algeria.

Cultural Issues

Just as Morocco's colonial experience was different from that of Algeria, so too is its popular political outlook. Of paramount importance is the presence of the aristocracy and courtly life engendered by the monarchy. Not only does the monarchy set a social standard—a lifestyle and comportment to which to aspire—but the subservience associated with the court, the understanding that an inherent and not entirely unjust social hierarchy still exists in Morocco. A popular expression reflecting acceptance of existing class divisions asks, "If I am a prince and you are a prince, who will drive the donkey?" This is in comparison with a popular observation in Algeria which points out that while there are shoeshine boys on every corner of every Moroccan city, there are none throughout all of Algeria. While Moroccans may accept their social status and prostrate themselves before someone else's feet, Algerians—the more free, the more equal and more brotherly—would never do such a thing.

Although acceptance of class difference and social status is not universal in Morocco, and there are many Moroccans who struggle to improve their lots in life, the presence of the aristocratically driven social hierarchy mitigates to a certain extent against the Islamist violence that has emanated from Algeria's socially and economically marginalized.

In addition, Morocco has a strong Sufi component which has consistently undermined attempts by jihadists to make inroads in the country. The monarchy has recognized the important role Sufi orders have played in keeping Salafists and their more aggressive interpretations of Islam at bay and to this end has actively promoted Sufi life throughout the kingdom. This is particularly true of the Boutchichiya order, which exerts significant influence in the royal court.⁷

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Mouaad Rhandi, Younès Alami and Zizi Yassine, "Le duel de messies," *Le Journal Hebdo* #195, February 2005.

Geography

Morocco has not experienced as much terrorist activity as Algeria, but there are still some geographical nodes that can be associated with terrorism. Like Algeria, Morocco has struggled to exert full state authority in the mountainous north of the country. Morocco's Rif Mountains are strikingly similar geographically to Algeria's Tizi Ouzou and Boumerdes regions. Furthermore, like Algeria's Boumerdes, the Rif were home to historic rebellions. In fact, during the reign of Hassan II, the region largely existed free of state oversight. While terrorism was not a problem, drug production was and the area was divided into drug lord fiefdoms. Mohamed VI has done a better job than his father exerting state control over the region, but has not entirely succeeded and Islamists have exploited the gaps in security to organize and plan. This is allegedly the case in and around the northern city of Tetouan from where most of the bombers involved in the Madrid 2004 bombings hailed.

Also like Algeria, shantytowns on the outskirts of the capital city Casablanca have been associated with terrorist activity. Contrary to popular perception that shantytowns are associated with terrorism because their populations are poor and economically disenfranchised, Morocco's shantytowns (both in Casablanca and on the outskirts of other Moroccan cities) harbor terrorists because the state's presence tends to be minimal. In fact, the state's presence in the shantytowns is so weak that they are tantamount to stateless areas within states. Just as terrorists gravitated toward Afghanistan or Sudan because state presence was weak, terrorists find similar refuge in shantytowns.

Lastly, although primarily contraband goods cross the poorly controlled border between Algeria and Morocco around the eastern Moroccan city of Oujda, it is also possible (although as of yet unconfirmed) that Algerian Salafi-jihadis will ultimately make their way into Morocco or Moroccan jihadis will make their way to Algeria to train with more experienced groups there.

Libya

Historical Context

Of the three North African countries under consideration, Libya's colonial experience was at once exceptionally brutal but also very brief. Libya was firmly part of the Ottoman Empire during the 19th century. In 1911-1912 Libya was colonized by Italy. Resistance to Italian rule escalated in the 1920s and the colonial administration constructed concentration camps to break the population's opposition to the Italian presence. With the end of World War II and the defeat of the Axis powers, the fate of Italy's colonial possession was put before the United Nations. In 1949, the UN voted to create Libya as an independent state. UN members determined that the country's historic royal family, the Sanussis, were the most appropriate rulers for the newly independent country, and Idriss Sanussi became king. Sanussi's

rule was uneven and unpopular, in large part because he did not represent the different groups that were lumped together with the formation of the modern state. In 1969, a young soldier in the Libyan Army staged a coup, overthrowing the monarchy and heralding a new era in Libya's history.

Libya's post-colonial experience has also not been replicated elsewhere in North Africa and the Middle East. Staging his revolution at 27-years-old, Col. Muammar Qadhafi has remained in power since 1969, making him the longest ruling leader in the world. In part, Qadhafi has managed to remain in power through conventional dictatorial means. Yet, part of Qadhafi's longevity is due to his tendency to unpredictably change the functioning and importance of the state's institutions. In the process, he upends the foundations of the revolution and undermines his competitors' sources of power.⁸

To the extent that terrorism exists in Libya, it is a condition of the severe restrictions Qadhafi's dictatorial government places on legal forms of political opposition to the government. With no reliable judiciary, no free press, no civil society, no political parties, and no right of association, the non-state violence—or terrorism—is viewed as the last remaining means to challenge the state and to attempt to bring about change in Libya.

Cultural Component

Like Morocco, Libyan Islam also has a strong Sufi element that mitigates against popular support for the Salafi-jihadi movement and Islamist-inspired terrorism. Although the current state does not overtly support Sufi interpretations of Islam, the pre-revolutionary Libyan monarchy's ties to Sufism were strong enough to allow them to persist until today. Sufi brotherhoods themselves are not permitted by revolutionary law, but the general orientation toward mysticism and away from Islamism prevails.

Sufism's role mitigating against Islamism emerging in Libya is compounded in part by Qadhafi's own efforts to dictate how Libyans should practice Islam. In fact, Qadhafi's determination to meddle with Islamic texts and to contravene what is generally perceived to be Islamic orthodoxy (and orthopraxy) means that even those Libyans who embrace what would elsewhere be considered mainstream Islam are considered by the Libyan state to be radicals. For instance, Qadhafi has introduced his own Islamic dating system, which he claims is more appropriate than the one generally accepted by Sunnis and Shi'a. As a result, following the conventional Islamic dating system (rather than Qadhafi's system) is seen by the state as heterodox.⁹

8 Dirk Vandewalle, *A History of Modern Libya* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006).

9 Lisa Anderson, *The State and Social Transformation in Tunisia and Libya* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986).

Geography

Although Libya itself does not have a significant terrorism problem despite recent reports that suggest that one may be emerging, the country shares Morocco's and Algeria's border control problems. In fact, Libya has recently become a transit country for sub-Saharan African immigrants aiming to get into the European Union. In the south, the state is unable to effectively police its long border with Algeria and Chad, meaning that human traffickers are able to make use of historic caravan routes to move people (and goods) from sub-Saharan Africa north to the Libyan coast.

Once in the north of the country, illegal immigrants gather around the capital city Tripoli and arrange clandestine voyages to the Italian island of Lampedusa, less than 100 kilometers off the Tunisian coast. While there is not yet evidence that terrorists or other violent non-state actors are intermingled with the illegal immigrants transiting Libya, it is possible that terrorists seeking to enter Europe illegally would make use of these human trafficking networks.

In addition to not exerting to the full authority of the state in the south (where Qadhafi has largely relegated the state's duties to loyal tribes), Libyan authorities have less control over activities in Cyrenaica and the Jabal al-Akhdar region in the east of the country. This less palpable state presence is due to historic animosity between modern Libya's capital Tripoli and Cyrenaica's primary city Benghazi. Benghazi, and Cyrenaica in general, have been less accepting of Qadhafi's revolution than the West of the country. In fact, all past incidents of terrorism in Libya have taken place or originated in Cyrenaica.

III. TERRORIST GROUPS

ALGERIA: Al-Qa`ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)

Ideology

Al-Qa`ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) evolved out of a split within the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) in 2006. The GSPC was historically an Algerian group, and while it wanted to retain the Algerian nature of its struggle and continue fighting against the Algerian state in order to restore the Islamists to power after the state annulled the 1991 elections that the Islamists had won, AQIM has joined common cause with al-Qa`ida's broader Salafi-jihadi ideology. Although AQIM continues to target representatives of the state—i.e. government buildings and public officials—AQIM leadership has emphasized the need to rid North Africa of non-Muslim Europeans and has argued that targeting civilians alongside official representatives of the state is legitimate and the proper course of action.

This is a significant departure for an Algerian Islamist group, but beyond its jihadist orientation AQIM has no clear plan other than the utopian goal of reestablishing the caliphate throughout the Muslim world. AQIM's predecessors, the GSPC and the Armed Islamic Group (GIA), had clear ideas of when their struggle would end and what would ensue when victory was achieved. AQIM, however, espouses a pan-Islamic jihad that only ends when all Muslims are living under the authority of the caliph.

Composition and Affiliations

AQIM arose out of the GSPC, which itself had arisen out of the GIA, the armed wing of the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS). While the GIA largely recruited from the civilian ranks of the FIS and from among Algerian veterans of the mujahidin's fight against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, the GSPC was largely formed by members of the military who sympathized with the FIS's and GIA's mission, but were frustrated by the GIA's unprofessionalism and indiscriminate use of violence. The GSPC's numbers, however, were significantly diminished by the state's ongoing campaign to eradicate terrorist groups in conjunction with a general amnesty for members of terrorist groups who were not involved in murders, rapes or public explosions. By 2005, the Algerian state asserted that the GSPC had as few as 500 members (although it is impossible to independently verify this figure). A further general amnesty in 2005 reduced the GSPC's numbers yet again.

As a consequence, the AQIM that continues to fight against the state is largely composed of some diehard fighters and a handful of new recruits. For example, AQIM leader Abdelmalik Droudkel is a veteran GSPC member. (Unlike most of his GSPC counterparts, however, Droudkel has a civilian background.) Other known AQIM members are more recent recruits. A 15-year-old boy was recruited to drive a truck bomb into a coast guard barracks in September 2007, whereas a 63-year-old man who drifted in and out of terrorist organizations during the last several years was implicated in the December 2007 bombing of the UN's headquarters in Algiers. Another planner of the attack (and a previous one in December 2006) was a computer technician employed by an Algerian-U.S. joint venture, Brown and Root-Condor.

AQIM announced its official allegiance with al-Qa`ida in 2006 while it was still known as the GSPC, but it did not formally change its name to al-Qa`ida in the Islamic Maghreb until January 2007. This connection to al-Qa`ida, however, is thought to be largely aspirational. It is only actual to the extent that AQIM is able to tap into al-Qa`ida networks in Algeria, benefit from online technology transfers, and possibly benefit from contact with al-Qa`ida operatives in Iraq. Beyond these ties, AQIM acts alone.

Specific Incidents of Terrorism

Since announcing its creation in January 2007, AQIM has been responsible for several devastating terrorist attacks in Algeria. On April 11, a suicide bomber exploded his car in

front of the Palais du Gouvernement; on July 11, attackers killed several soldiers at a military barracks in an historic Islamist stronghold; on September 6, a bomber blew himself up in a crowd waiting to see President Bouteflika at Batna; on September 8, a bomber blew up his truck at a Coast Guard station in Dellys; and on December 11, two bombers blew up their cars simultaneously in front of the Algiers headquarters of the UN and the Constitutional Court.

The April 11 attack heralded in a new era of terrorism in Algeria and revealed that unlike its predecessor AQIM would use suicide bombers to carry out attacks. In addition, it demonstrated that AQIM was determined to strike at the very core of the Algerian state. The Palais du Gouvernement housed the prime minister's office, as well as offices of other members of parliament.

The July 11 attacks were also in the vein of attacking government institutions—this time a military base. The September 6 attack in Batna, where a bomber blew himself up in a crowd awaiting the arrival of President Bouteflika, has since been analyzed as an attempt to assassinate the president. The September 8 attack on the Coast Guard base in Dellys, though, returned to AQIM's conventional list of targets. The December 11 attacks revealed AQIM's determination to make good on threats to attack foreigners and foreign institutions in Algeria and North Africa. One truck bomb exploded in front of the UN headquarters, while the other targeted the Constitutional Court, the seat of the country's judicial system.

Generalized Modus Operandi

During an August 2007 news conference organized by Algerian authorities for a select group of Algerian reporters, Benmessaoud Abdelkader, a former GSPC regional commander, confirmed that there was deep disagreement within the former GSPC over national commander Abdelmalik Droudkel's decisions first to merge with al-Qa'ida in 2006 and then later to rename the group.

The current split is due to disagreements about whether the group should join common cause with the broader Salafi-jihadi movement or should remain Algerian in focus, and whether it is legitimate to attack civilians.

The evolution confirmed by Benmessaoud has significant ramifications for Droudkel and AQIM's continued viability. Benmessaoud was the commander of the GSPC/AQIM's Zone IX, a long corridor down the middle of the country stretching from the high plateaus in the north to a large swath of Sahara Desert along Algeria's borders with Mali and Niger. Benmessaoud took over the position after its previous incumbent, Mokhtar Belmokhtar, entered into negotiations with the Algerian government to surrender. Zone IX has historically been critical for the viability of GSPC/AQIM activities in the north of the country. With Belmokhtar's resignation and Benmessaoud's surrender, Droudkel is deprived of this key source of money and arms.

The loss of Zone IX, in conjunction with a tremendously intensified military campaign, has left Droudkel restricted to Zone II, his personal fiefdom in Boumerdes. Deprived of southern smuggling revenue, Droudkel and his supporters have come to depend more heavily on kidnap and ransom operations to generate money.

The effort to spread Algeria's Islamist violence into neighboring countries—which is part of Droudkel's new ideological orientation—has met with mixed success. In September 2006 and again in January 2007, AQIM leader Abdelmalik Droudkel encouraged his followers to expand their activities into Morocco and Mauritania to the west and Tunisia and Libya to the east. Although there was an initial uptick of Islamist violence in Tunisia and Morocco, it appears that Mohamed VI and Tunisian President Zine el Abidine Ben Ali's governments have made significant progress curtailing Islamist activity. As a consequence, it appears that AQIM has changed its strategy and may be targeting the "weak links" in North Africa's security network. In particular, the group may be targeting Mauritania. In December 2007, AQIM members allegedly killed several vacationing French citizens in southern Mauritania. Fears of further AQIM activity in Mauritania prompted the cancellation of the Paris-Dakar rally in 2008, but it is not entirely clear what the group's capabilities in the region are or whether the murders of the French citizens were an isolated—and opportunistic—event.

MOROCCO: The Moroccan Islamic Combatants Group (GICM)

Ideology

Unlike al-Qa'ida in the Islamic Maghreb, which is entirely committed to the jihadist goal of reestablishing the caliphate, the Moroccan Islamic Combatants Group (GICM) espouses a jihadist orientation at the same time as its grievances are almost strictly Moroccan. With the exception of the large scale attack on the Madrid commuter rail network on March 11, 2004, the group's goals have been to establish an Islamist state in Morocco. In part, the group's *casus belli* is the Moroccan king's claims to be "the commander of the faithful." As commander of the faithful, the king claims to represent all of Morocco's Muslims, as well as commits himself to the creation of an environment in Morocco in which Islam can flourish. In line with broader Salafi-jihadi doctrine, members of the GICM argue that not only is Morocco's current king Mohamed VI uniquely unsuited to be commander of the faithful, but that the whole concept is bankrupt. Although the GICM has never specifically articulated its ideology, it presumably wants to replace the Moroccan monarchy and royal court with an Islamic state in which religious scholars fully versed in the application of Islamic law rule the country.

Composition and Affiliations

While it is not entirely clear when the GICM emerged, its origins may go back to the 1990s. The predominant theory is that it was founded by returning mujahidin from Af-

ghanistan, but there is no concrete evidence of this and the theory is largely based on trends elsewhere in the Middle East and North Africa where veterans of the Afghanistan campaign returned to their home countries and established violent Salafi-jihadi groups. Although there was a pre-existing Islamist group in Morocco, the Shabiba Islamiya that was founded in 1969, it had more political aspirations.¹⁰ The hypothesis around the emergence of the GICM is that returning veterans from Afghanistan were frustrated with the Shabiba's strictly political orientation and formed the more violent GICM. There is, however, scant evidence to corroborate this view and it is largely circumstantial.

Beyond the early ties to Afghan veterans, it appears the GICM tries to recruit from among the young urban poor. It goes without saying that like other terrorist groups, the GICM draws mostly from among young, unemployed men. Recruiting tends to be distributed throughout Morocco's cities. Evidence shows that members of the GICM have come from areas on the outskirts of the northern city of Tetouan, Fez in the center of the country, and Casablanca on the coast. In addition, individuals that the monarchy suspects of having ties with the GICM have been arrested in Sale, adjacent to the capital city of Rabat and in the former imperial city of Meknes.

Some theories of terrorism propose that members of terrorist groups are frustrated by economic marginalization that comes from not being able to compete in an increasingly information driven world. Despite the GICM members' lower class urban origins, however, they have been able to avail themselves of the limited education that the Moroccan state offers. There may not be job opportunities for them in Morocco, but they are generally not illiterate nor uninformed about global affairs.

The GICM is allegedly affiliated with AQIM and al-Qa`ida more generally, but actual functional connections between the GICM and other groups are unlikely. Although the size of its membership was never clear, it appears that many of its members have either been killed or arrested in recent years. In February 2008, a group was arrested in Morocco, which Moroccan authorities claimed had links to Hizb Allah as well. This latest clash seems farfetched given animosity between Hizb Allah and al-Qa`ida. In fact, only 12 months prior during the summer of 2007, Hizb Allah actively condemned the activities of al-Qa`ida operatives in the Nahr al-Bared Palestinian refugee camp in northern Lebanon.

Specific Incidents of Terrorism

On May 16, 2003, 14 bombers, all young men between 20-24 years-old, targeted a range of public places associated either with Judaism or foreigners in Casablanca. A bomber at a Spanish restaurant killed 20 people and brought international attention to the GICM. A further two people were killed by a suicide bomber at the Hotel Farah. Three more were killed when a bomber detonated his explosives on his way to a Jewish cemetery. Two bombers

¹⁰ Mohammed Tozy, *Monarchie et islam politique au Maroc* (Paris: Presses de Science Po, 1999).

killed themselves when they exploded their bombs at an empty Jewish cultural center. Two more bombers targeted the Belgian consulate in Casablanca and a Jewish-owned restaurant. The remaining two bombers were arrested before they could execute their plans. Following the attacks, Moroccan authorities allegedly arrested more than 2,000 people suspected of having ties to the GICM.

The Madrid attacks in 2004 are linked to the GICM, but the group that carried out the attack was only partially Moroccan. In fact, it was founded by a Syrian who lived in Spain and included Moroccans, Tunisians and Algerians. In addition, it is not clear to what extent it was a GICM operation even though GICM may have been involved. Rather than being categorized as an attack carried out by a Moroccan organization, it may fit more accurately under the general rubric of the al-Qa`ida Salafi-jihadi movement. During the early stages of the group's existence between 2001 and 2003, it maintained a cell in both Larache and Kenitra, two coastal Moroccan cities north of the capital, Rabat. The main cell, however, remained in Madrid where the group was initially founded. The group's Moroccan cells were disrupted by Moroccan state security services after the 2003 attacks in Casablanca and it reverted to its Spanish origins, recruiting members from throughout North Africa and the Levant.

The Madrid attacks involved the placement of 10 backpacks on a morning commuter train to Madrid, which then exploded simultaneously, killing almost 200 people and wounding another 1,800. Seven of the group's members committed suicide rather than be captured by Spanish authorities. Another five members of the group escaped. Allegedly, one of these five later killed himself in a suicide operation in Iraq. The other four, in addition to five others who left unidentified DNA traces at one of the group's apartments, are still at large.

Between 2004 and 2007, there were intermittent rumors of terrorist plots that Moroccan state security services disrupted, but the plots were never independently confirmed. In 2007, however, after AQIM announced its plans to unite North African Islamist groups in a regional jihad, GICM activity seemed to increase. On March 11, 2007, one alleged member of the group blew himself up in a Casablanca internet café when the café owner became suspicious of the bomber's behavior. Likewise, two more alleged members of the group separately blew themselves up in Casablanca a month later on April 11 as a police sweep closed in on them. Three days later, on April 14, two more bombers blew themselves up near the U.S. consulate in that city, but killed only themselves.

Generalized Modus Operandi

Just as there is little known about the constitution of the group itself and its ideology, there is not a large enough data set to establish a clear operating style. From the few instances with which the group has been associated, however, it appears that it is determined to use bombs in public places, primarily targeting foreign institutions. Nevertheless, it is extremely mindful of not targeting Moroccan Muslims. For example, bombers who killed themselves in

Casablanca in April 2007 near the American consulate could have targeted nearby markets, a café, or even a movie theater. This precaution is likely driven by a desire to rally popular support and not alienate the local population, a strategy which is indicative of an insurgent group in its early stages. (This is in contrast to AQIM, which is at the end of its lifespan and is indiscriminate in who it kills.) Overseas, however, where the group does not need to court the local population's support, it is more willing to kill civilians.

LIBYA: The Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG)

Ideology

The Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) began as a conventional violent Islamist organization that sought to overthrow what it viewed as a despotic regime in Libya and replace it with an Islamist government. In this vein, the LIFG was similar to any number of opposition groups throughout the Middle East that advocated the use of violence to topple dictatorships. The group's ideology, however, has evolved in step with changes in its operating environment and capabilities. No longer able to operate in Libya, the group has drifted closer to al-Qa`ida and its global Salafi-jihadi ideology.

Composition and Affiliations

Although the LIFG's origins may go back to the 1980s, it is not entirely clear whether it formed a coherent group until the 1990s when Libyan fighters returning from Afghanistan (via Sudan) adopted the goal of bringing down the Qadhafi regime to establish an Islamic state in Libya. It was only in 1995 that the group issued a communiqué announcing its existence. At its peak, the LIFG may have counted as few as 2,500 fighters. When the U.S. Treasury Department took action to freeze assets of the group's members in 2006, it only identified five individuals. In the late 1990s, its ranks were severely depleted during a police crackdown, and by 1998 it had abandoned activities in Libya. The fact that it is not known to have carried out activities in Libya since the late 1990s calls into question the extent to which the group can still be considered a Libyan group.

Based on the backgrounds of the few members of the LIFG who have been captured or surrendered, it seems to draw from a diverse range of people within Libya. Several members of the group have university educations and at least one is a trained engineer, a trait which is not uncommon among members of Islamist organizations.

While historic information about the group is readily available through some of its members who have surrendered to U.S. authorities—such as Noman Benotman—contemporary information about it is hard to come by. This is in part due to the group's nebulous nature, but also due to Libya's repressive information environment and the difficulty foreign researchers have collecting information in-country.

Specific Incidents of Terrorism

In 1996, the LIFG twice tried to assassinate Qadhafi, but failed. LIFG members tried again to kill Qadhafi in 1997 and 1998. In the ensuing crackdown, hundreds of LIFG members were arrested and others fled to Europe and other Middle Eastern countries.

In 1998, Col. Qadhafi was the first international leader to issue an Interpol arrest warrant for al-Qa`ida leader Usama bin Ladin. Qadhafi, however, was still an international pariah at the time due to his own country's support for terrorism and his warrant was largely dismissed.

Libyans who may or may not be members of the LIFG have been caught in both Iraq and Afghanistan where they have fought alongside al-Qa`ida members, but their actions should be seen in the context of resisting U.S. forces in those countries rather than as specific goals of the LIFG. In 2003, the LIFG claimed to have provided technical and logistical support for the GICM's attacks in Casablanca, but this claim has not been confirmed by the GICM itself. It is, in fact, no longer clear whether the LIFG is still functional in Libya or whether it has been replaced by an even looser connection of individuals who resist Qadhafi's government and embrace some aspects of jihadism.

Generalized Modus Operandi

In light of the fact that the LIFG has not been conclusively linked to any terrorist events in recent years, it is difficult to determine its *modus operandi*. In fact, it appears that the LIFG's main strategy for the moment seems to be to link itself to the successful activities of other Islamist terrorist groups in order to inflate perceptions of its strength without actually being required to deploy resources. Beyond that, individual Libyans who may or may not be associated with the group have gone to Iraq and Afghanistan to fight against U.S. forces in those countries, but it is not discernable whether they are operating under the auspices of the LIFG or are tapping into a broader global jihadist network.

IV. POTENTIAL IMPACTS ON U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS (DOMESTIC AND ABROAD)

Diaspora Communities

While Middle Eastern and South Asian communities have large diasporas in the United States, North African diasporas are primarily in Europe. This concentration of North Africans in Europe is a consequence of the region's geographic proximity to Europe, but also of colonial ties between the two regions.

In some ways, North Africa's relationship to Europe is similar to Central America's relationship to the United States. Both communities predominantly fill the lower rungs of

the economic ladder in their host country (although there are some notable exceptions); they maintain strong ties with the home communities (in terms of travel and the sending of remittances); and they feel socially marginalized from the bulk of their host community's population at the same time that some members of the host community feel threatened by the diaspora community's presence.

Yet North African Muslims in Europe have recourse to a radical ideology with which to express their frustrations which is not available to the U.S. Hispanic population. With the rare exception of Jose Padilla, the U.S. Hispanic population avails itself of leftist labor ideology or expresses its frustrations through membership in strictly criminal organizations that lack political objectives.

Another source of contrast is that the U.S. does not share the same colonial history in Central America that Europe does in North Africa. France, Spain and Italy all occupied significant parts of North Africa from the latter part of the 19th century through the middle of the 20th century. This colonial history has been both a driver of the growth of diasporic communities in Europe (North Africans go to Europe because their colonial past has resulted in a shared language), but has also been an irritant and a source of frustration among immigrants from Europe's former colonies (North Africans in Europe believe that the host population harbors an historic animosity toward them).

The U.S. North African community is very small compared to the European North African diaspora. The vast geographic distance between North Africa and the United States means that illegal immigration is not as feasible as it is between North Africa and Europe. Many North Africans in Europe have clandestinely crossed the Mediterranean Sea in small boats, stowing away on ferries, or hiding in trucks and buses that make use of ferry services to Algeciras, Marseilles, Sete and Palermo.

In addition, historical differences between the U.S. and North Africa have reduced the tendency of North Africans to immigrate to the United States. The historical U.S. presence in North Africa has been minimal in comparison to Europe. One result of the long European presence in North Africa is that many North Africans learn Spanish and French in secondary school, but only get access to English language instruction if they attend university. Consequently, many would-be immigrants tend to go to countries where they already speak the language, rather than to the United States where the difficulties ensuing from their illegal status would be compounded by a language barrier. Another more abstract consequence of North Africa's shared historical experience with Europe is that many North African legal and bureaucratic systems are similar to those in Europe (if only because Europe helped to structure them after independence). As a result, North Africans are more at ease navigating Europe's regulatory framework than they are in the United States.

The North African presence in the U.S. is also markedly smaller than that in Europe because visa requirements became more stringent after September 11, 2001. Most illegal immigrants in the United States from North Africa entered the country legally and overstayed

their tourism or student visas. With the tightening visa requirements, it has become more difficult for North Africans to legally enter the United States, whether for work, tourism, or study.

There have been a handful of instances where North Africans in Canada tried to illegally enter the United States. In fact, North African communities in Canada have become a potential source of illegal immigration to the United States. In the face of slowing population growth, Canada implemented policies that encourage immigration from other Francophone countries, including North Africa. As a consequence, there are large Algerian and Moroccan communities in Canada and particularly in Quebec that move back and forth between their host and home communities. Nevertheless, while risk exists, the threat is overblown.¹¹

Likely Targets

Given the groups' limited capabilities and limited access to materiel, it is unlikely that they would try to target U.S. embassies and other military base installations despite the obvious desire to do so. Instead, they are more likely to focus on their own governments and other international organizations, which present less hardened targets. The underlying rationale is that North African groups are unlikely to expend limited resources on secure targets where chances of success are limited. Given the local government's inability to effectively secure all possible targets—local police stations, local political party headquarters, municipal court buildings, among other targets—it is more likely that groups will focus their energies on institutions representing regional governments. Another possibility, given the generally weaker security protocols in place, is institutions representing the international community, similar to the December 11, 2007 attack on the UN headquarters in Algiers.

In addition, it appears that with restricted funding, groups may focus on attacks that will allow them to both hit ideological targets but also raise funds for future attacks. Tourist kidnapping may fit this requirement. The February 2008 kidnapping of two Austrian tourists along the border between Tunisia and Algeria may have been carried out in this vein, as did the earlier attack on five French tourists in Mauritania in December 2007.

¹¹ Olivier Guitta, "The Canadian Peril: Why They're Checking Passports at the Border Now," *National Interest* 13:21 (2008).

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Chapter 12
The Horn of Africa



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I. INTRODUCTION

The Horn of Africa (HOA) is the most active region of terrorist activity in sub-Saharan Africa. It has been the site of several of the largest al-Qa`ida attacks on American targets outside the US, and it continues to serve as an operational base for a number of groups—both Islamist and non-Islamist—engaging in terrorist tactics. Local conditions of political marginalization and deep economic impoverishment constitute a dangerous cocktail that threatens to radicalize the region's Muslim population, especially in Somalia and coastal Kenya. Over the past two decades, the region's multiple wars and humanitarian crises have produced massive refugee flows, contributing to large diaspora communities in Europe, North America, and the Gulf states. Increasingly, political and ideological trends in the Horn are closely linked to the region's powerful and active diasporas.

This chapter on terrorist threats and the Horn of Africa advances several theses. First, most of the Islamist terrorism associated with the HOA has involved the East African al-Qa`ida cell, a small group including individuals from states outside the Horn as well as citizens of the region. Second, Muslim residents of the Horn have been less actively involved in Islamic terrorism than one would expect given the profile of the region. Likewise, the large diaspora from the Horn has to date played a surprisingly minimal role in al-Qa`ida terrorism and activity in Europe, the Middle East, and North America. Third, growing evidence suggests that Muslim populations both in the HOA and the diaspora are increasingly sympathetic to Islamic radicalism and express anger with the policies of their home governments and the United States, a trend that could render them more susceptible to terrorist rhetoric and recruitment than in the past. Fourth, Ethiopia's US-backed military occupation of southern Somalia since late 2006 is presently the single greatest source of radical Islamic mobilization in the region. Periodic US military operations, especially aerial bombardments, inside Somalia aimed at al-Qa`ida suspects also have the side effect of stoking public anger and anti-Americanism in the Muslim community. Fifth, al-Qa`ida's success in exploiting the Horn of Africa—and Kenya in particular—as an operational base for business, as a safe haven, and as a site for terrorist attacks has been due mainly to the region's weak governments. Finally, most indigenous forms of terrorism in the Horn, both Islamist and non-Islamist,

are fueled mainly by local grievances against the state and as such only indirectly impact the US.

Background: Geography, Religion, Culture, and History

The Horn of Africa—comprising Sudan, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Djibouti, Somalia, Kenya, and Uganda—is an extraordinarily diverse region geographically, culturally, and politically. Topographically, the region is broadly divided into highland and lowland areas, which have historically corresponded to patterns in climate, livelihoods, social organization, religion, and political culture. In the lowlands of the eastern Horn and northern Sudan, desert and semi-arid conditions prevail and, except for a few major urban centers (such as Khartoum, Mogadishu, and Djibouti), population density is low. Most inhabitants of the Horn's lowlands engage in pastoralism or agro-pastoralism, requiring seasonal movements with herds over long distances. Unregulated cross-border commerce—smuggling—is an important activity in the lowlands as well. Pastoralism as a subsistence activity is under growing stress in the region; environmental degradation, growing herd pressure on rangelands, and recurring, severe droughts have rendered pastoralists the most impoverished group in the Horn.

Pastoral communities in the Horn have historically been resistant to control by states or other political systems, and instead have organized around lineages or clans. Traditional authorities, elders and religious leaders, remain the primary source of authority in rural pastoral zones. They negotiate and implement customary law, manage disputes, and represent the clan in dealings with the government and other groups. Most systems of informal governance in the pastoral lowlands of the HOA rely on compensatory justice and collective rather than individual responsibility for crimes committed. In practice, this typically means that a guilty individual's blood payment group (*diya* in Arabic) must pay a fixed amount in livestock to the *diya* groups of the victim. This system of governance operates beyond the reach of formal state structures in the region, which generally have a minimal administrative presence in most of the lowland pastoral zones of the region. Indeed, the state is very often viewed as a predator by peripheral (usually lowland) communities in the Horn, especially in Ethiopia, Kenya, and Sudan. Most of the region's vast, isolated border areas are unpoliced by government security forces and customs authorities.

About one half of the total population of the Horn of Africa practices Islam, and Islam is the predominant religion in lowland areas.¹ Sunni Islam arrived in the Horn in the eighth and ninth centuries and gradually spread in the lowlands and portions of the highlands mainly through commercial networks, missionary work, and settlement of coastal traders from the Arabian Peninsula. Today Islam is the main religion among the northern Sudanese, coastal Eritreans, Somalis, and Swahili populations on the East African coast; in the highlands, about half of the large Oromo ethnic group of Ethiopia is Muslim. Historically, Sufi Islam—a more tolerant, mystical form of Sunni Islam, in which saint veneration and other rituals decried by Salafi Muslims as heretical—has been the dominant practice of

Islam in the Horn. Sufi religious orders, or *turuuq*; sing. *tariqat*, are an important form of social organization within Islamic communities in the region and can at times, especially in Sudan, take on political roles. Some level of Arabization has occurred among populations in the Horn which have adopted Islam, though this varies significantly in degree. Arab identity is not an "either-or" ethnic category in the Horn.

Importantly, Sufi Islam is viewed as impure by the strict "fundamentalist" form of Salafist Islam practiced in the Gulf states and parts of South Asia. Salafist missionaries from the Gulf states, Pakistan, and Egypt have aggressively targeted the Sufi Muslim population in the Horn with new mosques, schools, charities, and scholarships as part of an effort to "purify" their practice of Islam. For Salafi movements from the Gulf states, the Sufi population of the Horn is the principal target of their missionary work, not populations subscribing to indigenous religions or Christianity. Many HOA residents who migrate to the Gulf in search of work return home committed to Salafi Islam as well. The vast majority of the Salafi mosques, schools, and charities established by outside Islamist groups not do espouse violent jihad or terrorism, but the Salafi interpretation is more prone to lead to anti-Western and sometimes politically radical positions. Predictably, relations between traditional Sufi clerics and Salafists are strained. The Salafists have gained many adherents in urban centers via "performance legitimacy"—providing basic social services where the state has failed.

Despite a few common features linked to pastoral livelihoods and the importance of Islam in most of the lowlands, populations in the lowlands of the Horn are extraordinarily diverse in culture. The eastern lowlands are mainly populated by the Somali and Oromo peoples, and are intensely rural. The lowlands of Sudan include largely Arab or Arabized populations in the north, including both very poor rural Arab Sudanese and a cosmopolitan urban elite in Khartoum that enjoys high levels of education and wealth. In southern Sudan and parts of southern Ethiopia, non-Arab, non-Muslim African pastoralists live in some of the most isolated and impoverished conditions in the world.

The highlands of East Africa, stretching across Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda, are temperate, fertile, and receive heavier seasonal rainfall than the lowlands. Most of the highlands populations engage in subsistence agriculture; population density is high and pressure on the land is acute. Severe poverty is high among subsistence farmers, but the highlands are also the site of some of the greatest wealth in the region, and the capital areas of Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya, and Uganda have enjoyed a disproportionate level of development activities. In Ethiopia and Eritrea, Orthodox Christianity is predominant in the highlands, along with some Protestant, Catholic, and Muslim faith groups. The Orthodox Church of Ethiopia is one of the oldest Christian communities in the world; the Protestant and Roman Catholic faith groups are the product of more recent European missionary activity. Highland populations in Kenya and Uganda are mainly Protestant or Roman Catholic.

The highland area of what is today Ethiopia and Eritrea was for nearly two millennia the site of a series of large, powerful, and long-running political empires. The highland politi-

cal culture is distinct from that of the lowlands, with a much deeper tradition of hierarchy, bureaucracy, and strong states. Highland ethnic groups which have been able to capture control of the state have benefited, often at the expense of peripheral groups. This has been a source of grievance and armed insurgency across the region, and can factor into terrorist activities.

The contemporary history of the Horn of Africa has been extremely turbulent, featuring numerous and protracted civil wars, inter-state wars, violent revolutions, state collapse, Cold War superpower competition, massive famines and refugee crises, major humanitarian relief operations, and some of the largest peacekeeping operations in the world. Sudan's decades long civil war in the south, which claimed the lives of two million people, ended in 2005, but was succeeded by the crisis in Darfur that erupted in 2003 and continues to this day. Somalia, the longest-running case of complete state collapse in the world, has not had a functioning government since 1990 and has been plagued by years of civil war and warlordism, and more recently has been home to an Islamist movement that includes jihadi elements with links to al-Qa`ida. Ethiopia has been beset for decades by multiple armed insurgencies, fought a bloody border war with neighboring Eritrea in 1998-2000, and since 2007 has been engaged in two major counter-insurgency operations, one in eastern Ethiopia and the other in southern Somalia, which it militarily occupied following an offensive against Somali Islamists in December 2006. Uganda's two decades-long insurgency in the north of the country by the Lord's Resistance Army is close to a negotiated settlement in 2008, but has caused the displacement of 1.7 million people. Kenya has avoided outright civil war but like the rest of the region is bedeviled by chronic, bloody, often politically instigated communal clashes over scarce resources, especially land. Post-electoral violence in Kenya in early 2008, which claimed over a thousand lives and displaced a half million people, was a reminder of the vulnerability of even the most stable country in the Horn.

Implications for Terrorist Threat Assessments

Understanding of the geographical, cultural, and historical context of the Horn of Africa is critical for accurate threat assessment and interpretation of behavior by individuals from the region. Some key implications include:

- Because ethnic identity is under present conditions a primary source of personal security in the Horn, Muslim communities from the HOA lowlands are generally clannish or tribal. Ideological movements in the region, including those espousing terrorism, have great difficulty transcending clan, tribe, and nation. Most HOA residents, including those in the diaspora, are beholden to clan or ethnic group interests and are reluctant to take actions which harm the clan;
- Because of the principal of collective responsibility in customary law, HOA lowland populations have difficulty accepting legal action against individuals in their group, viewing

a police search for or arrest of a clan member as an attack on the clan as a whole. Because customary law is negotiated, not imposed, many lowland communities approach legal issues with the state as a matter of bargaining and negotiation. This makes community cooperation with law enforcement more difficult;

- Distrust of the state and state agents among lowland populations of the HOA is, for reasons explored above, very high, contributing still further to difficulties in forging working relations between law enforcement agencies and diaspora members. It can also lead to false accusations between rival clans seeking to use law enforcement against one another;
- The widespread and protracted nature of war and criminal violence in the HOA has led to a proliferation of small arms and a flourishing trade in a wide range of weapons and explosives, a boon for terrorist operations;
- Very weak government control over isolated border areas in the HOA facilitate the routine smuggling of people, money, and materiel, and can be easily exploited by terrorist cells;
- The lowland region's harsh environment and deep levels of impoverishment tend to foster a strong level of pragmatism in the local political culture, in which negotiation and alliances of expedience are prized as a matter of group survival. This reduces political space for sustained ideological commitment, weakening movements like al-Qa'ida. Foreign ideologies and agendas, including both jihadist Islam and Western counter-terrorism, are often viewed locally as opportunities to exploit for material gain;
- Salafist Islam is on the ascent across most of the region (with the exception of Sudan) and in the diaspora, but faces numerous constraints. Critically, most Salafist movements and programs in the Horn are *not* supportive of jihadist agendas and should not be conflated with terrorist activity.

II. TERRORIST GROUPS AND GROUPS ACCUSED OF TERRORIST LINKS

Political violence is ubiquitous in the Horn of Africa, and is employed as much by governments as by armed opposition. Distinguishing between the formal state security sector, paramilitaries, private security forces controlled by political figures, private sector security forces, armed insurgency groups, rogue elements of insurgencies and government security forces, and armed criminal gangs is not always easy in a region where governments often "outsource" violent tactics to non-state actors, where the police can be a major source of organized crime, and where members of parliament often maintain their own private security units. The fissurable, loose nature of movement affiliation, poor levels of command and control in armed insurgencies, and the proclivity for poorly paid soldiers and gunmen to engage in unauthorized looting and atrocities also make it very difficult to attribute responsibility for terrorist acts to movement leadership. This complicates efforts to clearly define certain acts of violence as terrorism and label certain groups as terrorist. The inventory that follows includes

both groups that clearly meet the definition of terrorist organizations as well as armed groups whose designation as terrorists by regional governments is open to debate.

A. Islamist Groups Accused of Terrorism or Terrorist Links

East African Al-Qa`ida Cell The East African al-Qa`ida (EAAQ) cell is a small but very dangerous organization of jihadi operatives and their network of supporters in East Africa. Al-Qa`ida has been active in the Horn since 1991, when the radical Islamist government of Sudan hosted Osama bin Laden and other terrorist groups during a six year period when Sudan served as a "Holiday Inn" for Islamic terrorism.² Al-Qa`ida immediately established a cell in Kenya from which it sought to penetrate Somalia and Somali-inhabited eastern Ethiopia, with limited results. Somalia's state of civil war, state collapse, and clannish politics proved to be a frustrating, non-permissive environment for al-Qa`ida operatives—in contrast to the widely held view that zones of state collapse provide an attractive safe haven for terrorists.³ But the al-Qa`ida cell in Kenya flourished, even after the al Bashir government expelled al-Qa`ida from Sudan in 1996. Kenya's weak and corrupt security sector, sprawling multi-ethnic cities, politically marginalized and aggrieved coastal Muslim populations, abundance of soft Western targets, and heavy volume of international visitors, businesspeople, and charity organizations made for an ideal setting from which the cell planned and executed several major terrorist attacks, including the bombings of the US Embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam in August 1998 and the bombing of an Israeli hotel in Mombasa in 2002. They have reportedly planned but failed to execute several additional terrorist attacks in Kenya since 2002.

A portion of the EAAQ's cell's membership was arrested, tried, and convicted following the embassy bombings, but the top leadership remained at large and featured among the FBI's Most Wanted Terrorists. They included Comorian national Fazul Abdullah Mohammed, who served as commander of the Nairobi cell; coastal Kenyan Shaykh Ahmed Salim Swedan; coastal Kenyan Fahid Mohammed Ali Msalam; coastal Kenyan Saleh Ali Saleh Nabhan; and Sudanese national Tariq Abdullah al-Sudani.⁴ These individuals and others in the cells were able to regroup after the 1998 embassy attacks, relying on supporters among Somali hardline Islamists in Mogadishu, Somalia, as well as sympathizers in the coastal Kenyan community. They have proven capable of moving undetected throughout East Africa and the Middle East. Several were believed to be in Mogadishu enjoying safe haven with hard-line elements of the Council of Islamic Courts (CIC) in 2006 and were forced out of the country by the Ethiopian offensive which routed the CIC in December of that year. The number of active members of the EAAQ cell is believed to be low, and their operational capacities have been diminished thanks to more robust Kenyan security crackdowns and the ouster of the CIC from Somalia, but it is still considered the most dangerous terrorist organization in east Africa and the Horn. Recently, it was suspected of involvement in a failed terrorist plot in Tanzania to have taken place during the visit of President George W. Bush

to that country in February 2008; nine suspects, including five Tanzanians, three Arabs, and one Asian, were detained by Tanzanian authorities.⁵ A March 2008 US aerial bombardment of a home in the Somali town of Doblely on the Kenyan border was intended to target one of the EAAQ suspects, Saleh Nabhan.

*Council of Islamic Courts (CIC).*⁶ The Somali CIC has technically been defunct as an organization since late December 2006, when it dissolved itself and fled the capital Mogadishu after its forces were routed by an Ethiopian military offensive in southern Somalia. Since that time, its leaders in exile have been referred to as the ex-CIC. Prior to the December 2006 defeat, the CIC had won a four month battle with a US-backed coalition of militias known as the Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counter-Terrorism (ARPCT), gaining complete control over the capital Mogadishu in June 2006. Over the last six months of 2006, the CIC extended its control over most of south-central Somalia and provided some of the most effective administration and public order the country has seen in 16 years.

The CIC operated as a broad umbrella group comprising non-Islamist nationalists, moderate Islamists, and hard-line Islamists. A moderate Sufi leader, Shaykh Sharif Shaykh Ahmad, was selected Chair of the CIC Executive Committee, while hardliner Hassan Dahir Aweys, whose links to al-Qa`ida earned him designation as a terror suspect in the US, served as head of the consultative council, or *shura*. The CIC militia included numerous clan-based units associated serving as Shari`a militia in Mogadishu's two dozen clan-based Shari`a courts, as well as a force of about 400 well-trained and committed fighters known as the *shabab*, or "youth" in Arabic (treated below). Unlike the *shabab*, few of the Shari`a court militiamen would be considered jihadists; most simply sought paid employment in the Shari`a court system.

The CIC enjoyed considerable popularity with a broad cross-section of Somalis, including many who did not embrace Islamism, for its ability to bring order to Mogadishu and defeat the "warlords" associated with the ARPCT. The CIC tapped into deep sentiments of nationalism on the part of many Somalis, especially in the diaspora, conflating their Islamist agenda with nationalist renewal. Many Somalis from the diaspora returned to Mogadishu to assist the CIC administration, believing it represented an end to the long nightmare of state collapse and warlordism in Somalia.

Over the course of late 2006, however, hardliners effectively marginalized the moderate wing of the CIC and pushed the CIC into increasingly radical social policies and confrontational, jihadist rhetoric aimed at neighboring Ethiopia. The *shabab* and some of the hardline leaders of the CIC, including Aweys, were also accused by the US of harboring a number of East Africa al-Qa`ida cell members in Mogadishu, a charge they denied. When Ethiopia launched its military offensive in late December, CIC forces were surprisingly ill-prepared and quickly defeated. The *shabab* forces regrouped in the remote border areas near Kenya and returned to Mogadishu as an insurgency group, while ex-CIC leaders—both moderates and hardliners—were either apprehended or fled into exile in Eritrea.

The ex-CIC leadership has since folded itself in a broader opposition-in-exile movement, the Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia (ARS), comprising non-Islamists as well as Islamists (discussed below). Yet what is now referred to as the "ex-CIC" continues to exist as a distinct, if very loose, entity, in many ways more functional than the ARS. In the first half of 2007, the ex-CIC leaders claimed to control the Mogadishu-based insurgency, but that claim was disputed by shabab media statements which asserted that the shabab is leading the insurgency and did not accept the leadership of the ARS. The split with the shabab became public after the formation of the ARS. Even without the shabab, the ex-CIC still claims to have at least some men under arms in southern Somalia, overseen by CIC Minister of Defense Sheikh Yusuf "Inda'adde." In the Kenyan border areas, hardliner Hassan Abdullah "Turki" commands an Islamist militia which he argues answers to the ex-CIC leadership, not the shabab. In effect, this means that the ex-CIC group is currently split into three factions—the moderate wing, with whom the US government engages in quiet diplomacy; the hardliners, of whom only two, Hassan Dahir Aweys and Hassan Abdullah "Turki," are designated as terrorist suspects by the US; and the shabab, which, as discussed below, is now a political and military actor in its own right, and which since late 2007 openly rejects the leadership of the ex-CIC (see ARS, below). Following the March 2008 US aerial attacks on a site in Doblely where an EAAQ suspect was believed to be located, Hassan Turki visited a local mosque there and issued a death threat against all Americans and Westerners working in southern Somalia, as well as all Somalis working with Americans, leading to an evacuation of several aid agency personnel in the region.⁷

Because of the wide range of public backing the CIC enjoyed in 2006, it is critical that an individual's track record of support to the CIC—ranging from expressions of solidarity to financial contributions to actual participation in the CIC administration—not to be conflated with terrorist activity. Only a small subset of the CIC umbrella movement falls under suspicion of aiding and abetting terrorism.

Al-Shabab. The shabab is a cross-clan, Somali mujahidin outfit based in Mogadishu, formed around 1999 by Hassan Dahir Aweys in an attempt to create a committed militia which answered to Islamist, not clan-based leadership. Though multi-clan in composition, it draws heavily on a few Hawiye sub-clans. By 2004, the shabab was arguably the most powerful armed group in the capital. It engaged in a "dirty war" of political assassinations against Somalis suspected of collaborating with the US or Ethiopia in counter-terrorism surveillance, and was sufficiently intimidating that most Somali residents feared publicly criticizing it, even when the shabab engaged in actions that appalled most Somalis—including the desecration of an Italian colonial cemetery.⁸ By 2006 the shabab was believed to number about 400 well-trained fighters, and possessed superior command and control, weaponry, external funding, and dedication to their cause than any other armed group in Somalia. This was made clear with the resounding victory by shabab-led Islamist forces over the ARPCT in the first half of 2006.⁹ The shabab suffered considerable losses in the brief war with Ethio-

pian National Defense Forces in December 2006, and some of its members left the group disillusioned with what they saw as reckless policies by the leadership.¹⁰ Still, the shabab was able to regroup and has subsequently played an important role in the "complex insurgency"¹¹ against occupying Ethiopian forces and the Transitional Federal Government (TFG), which the insurgency views as an illegitimate puppet of Ethiopia.

As of early 2008, observers with close knowledge of the insurgency believe that the shabab numbers only about 200-250 armed men, broken down into one to two dozen small cells.¹² This is only a rough estimate, however; the actual number of active shabab militia, and the scope of their local and external supporters, is unknown. The leadership structure of the shabab is also unknown, though it is surmised that command and control over the cells is intentionally decentralized. Two figures—Aden Hashi 'Ayro and Shaykh Mukhtar Robow "Abu Mansur"—play a prominent role.¹³ Though the shabab were joined by some foreign mujahidin in 2006, the current group is believed to be entirely Somali, composed of a combination of young recruits from Somalia and some diaspora members who returned to Somalia and received training with the shabab. A small percentage of the shabab are veterans of the war in Afghanistan. Many Mogadishu-based Somalis insist that some of the shabab fighters are not in fact committed jihadists but merely young gunmen who identify with the movement's resistance to Ethiopian occupation and who have only a limited understanding of the Islamist ideology of the movement.

The shabab mainly employ tactics which have proven effective in Somali insurgencies over the past two decades—hit and run mortar, rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) and grenade attacks, urban ambushes using light weapons, landmines, political assassination, and intimidation. They are, however, much more willing to engage in high-risk stand-off attacks than clan-based militias, and as a result can inflict higher casualties on their enemies.¹⁴ In addition, the shabab have adopted several new insurgency technologies previously unknown in Somalia, including extensive use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs; especially remote detonated roadside bombs), and occasionally suicide bombing. The number of attacks attributed to the shabab in Mogadishu since January 2007 has varied over time, but typically has numbered one to two dozen per week.

The main targets of shabab attacks have been Ethiopian occupying forces; TFG security forces; civilians working in or with the TFG, including top officials (the former TFG Prime Minister survived at least three assassination attempts); journalists and civil society figures who have criticized the shabab or worked closely with Westerners; and, in a few earlier instances from 2000 to 2004, international aid workers.¹⁵ In 2007 the shabab publicly stated it will not target humanitarian aid workers. And, despite its fierce anti-Western rhetoric, it has also refrained from attacking Western targets in neighboring Kenya or Ethiopia. Whether this reflects a conscious tactical decision or is a function of lack of opportunity is unknown.

Though most Somalis have a strong distaste for the level of violence and extremism the shabab represents, the shabab has, at least in the short run, come to enjoy broad public

support as the main source of armed resistance to the Ethiopian occupation. Local communities may not actively support the insurgency, but they do not inform on the activities and movements of the shabab to TFG authorities. Harsh Ethiopian counter-insurgency tactics against civilian populations, which have led to the displacement of a third to one half of the 1.3 million residents of Mogadishu since early 2007, have served to drive many non-militant Somalis to passively support the shabab.

Small numbers of Somali jihadist fighters, whose affiliation with the shabab is unclear (they are often referred to as fighters of the CIC, and their leaders, including terror suspect Hassan Turki, answer to the ex-CIC leadership in Asmara), are also present in Mogadishu and other parts of the country, especially in the remote lower and middle Juba regions near the Kenyan border. Recent tensions—and efforts to reconcile—between members of Turki's "CIC forces" and shabab militia operating near the Kenyan border suggest a deterioration in relations between Islamist militias. In Mogadishu, several small Islamist splinter groups with small militia capacity have been formed independent of the shabab (see *al-Itisam*, below).

On March 18, 2008, the US Department of State designated al-Shabab as a terrorist group, noting its ties to al-Qa`ida, its support for the East African al-Qa`ida cell, its attack on TFG and Ethiopian force, and its public praise of Usama bin Ladin as justification for the designation.¹⁶

The shabab openly espouse terrorist tactics against Ethiopian forces, TFG officials, and Somalis collaborating with the TFG or Ethiopia, but justify this use of violence as a legitimate form of self-defense in the face of external occupation—or, in their terminology, "defensive jihad." The shabab leadership has been active in eastern Ethiopia, but it is not clear they are responsible for any acts of terrorism inside Ethiopia (see ONLF, below). The shabab issue vitriolic statements condemning the West and the United States in particular. It uses a number of Somali media outlets, but has preferred two sites: *Qaadisiya* (<http://www.qaadisiya.com/>), and *Almujahiid* (www.kataaib.net), the latter serving as the movement's unofficial website.

Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia (ARS). The ARS was formed in September 2007 in Asmara, and was intended to unite Islamist and non-Islamist groups opposed to the TFG. The ARS includes the mainly Islamist "opposition in exile" based in Asmara, Eritrea, but also represents a heavy involvement of the Somali diaspora, most of whom were leery of too close an affiliation with hardline Islamists in the opposition. The ARS selected former "moderate" CIC leader Shaykh Sharif Shaykh Ahmed, as head of the new alliance. A ninety person central committee was formed as well, only 40 percent of whom were Islamists. The fact that the majority of central committee members were non-Islamists (mainly ex-MPs of the TFG and diaspora members), and that the shabab was marginalized in the power structure of the ARS, led the shabab to publicly reject the authority of the ARS in October 2007. This was the moment that long-running tensions between the political Islamist leadership and the shabab came to a head; since October 2007, the split between the two has been

open. It is unclear if this split has harmed the shabab's relations with ex-CIC hardliners like Hassan Dahir Aweys.

The ARS has since September 2007 remained an umbrella opposition movement in exile, with only a marginal ability to project power on the ground in Somalia. The ARS has proven useful to both the Islamists and non-Islamists in the alliance, however. The ARS has allowed the ex-CIC leadership to recast themselves to the international community as part of a much broader-based and legitimate nationalist opposition to Ethiopian occupation, not as an ousted radical Islamist front. For the non-Islamists involved in the ARS, who include the former speaker of the TFG parliament Sharif Hassan, as well as some respected Somali academics and civic leaders with citizenship and employment in the US,¹⁷ the ARS has given them a platform to voice united opposition to the TFG's policies and the continued Ethiopian occupation.

Membership in or active support of the ARS is not, therefore, necessarily a marker of Islamic radicalism or terrorism, despite efforts by some interests to conflate the ARS with jihadi violence. Indeed, while the ARS includes radicals in its umbrella movement, the Alliance's policy of building a broad-based coalition with non-Islamists has fueled condemnations of the ARS by the shabab, which accuses it of consorting with secular Somalis and of capitulating to Western pressure. In early 2008, TFG willingness to reach out to the ARS for political dialogue, and quiet US and Ethiopian contact with the group, were additional indicators that the ARS is viewed as a legitimate, if controversial, political player on the Somali scene.

Al-Ittihad al-Islamiyya (AIAI). Al-Ittihad al-Islamiyya is the oldest Salafist movement in Somalia, formed in 1991 after the fall of the Barre regime. It was never able to defeat or outmaneuver clan-based factions in the early to mid-1990s, and was soundly defeated in battles for control over key port towns of Kismayo and Bosaso in 1991. But AIAI did manage to hold and govern the town and district of Luuq in southwestern Somalia from 1991-96, until it was driven out by an Ethiopian military offensive. In the early 1990s, AIAI was informally organized along regional (clan-based) lines, and was the target of the East African al-Qa'ida cell's efforts to forge a partnership.¹⁸ AIAI leadership inside Somalia, led by Hassan Dahir Aweys, argued against jihadi violence at that time, but the AIAI wing in eastern Ethiopia opted in 1994-95 to launch a series of assassination attempts and bombings targeting the Zenawi government of Ethiopia.¹⁹ That earned AIAI a reputation as a terrorist organization in Ethiopia, and eventually (in late 2001) the US designated AIAI a terrorist organization as well. By the late 1990s, however, AIAI had essentially ceased to operate as a discrete organization in Somalia; it dissolved into a loose network of "alumni," most of whom were fully absorbed into their communities as teachers, merchants, and shaykhs. In eastern Ethiopia, there is some evidence to suggest that AIAI continued to exist after 1996, but its level of activity appears to be very low.

Some ex-AIAI members in Somalia subsequently came to play a role in the ascendant Islamist movement in Mogadishu which eventually became the CIC, the most famous of whom is hardliner Hassan Aweys. But other ex-AIAI members were viewed as more moderate elements who sought to assist in dialogue between the CIC and the TFG in 2006 and steer the CIC away from reckless policies.

Because AIAI in the 1990s was split into different regional cells that embraced conflicting views on matters such as the use of jihadi violence, it cannot be assumed that an individual who is proven to be an AIAI member in the 1990s is or was an advocate of terrorism. The US government did not consider AIAI a terrorist organization until 2001, by which time the group's active existence was questionable.

Al-Itisam. Al-Itisam is a small, recently formed successor movement to the AIAI, which has a military wing operating in Mogadishu known as the Islamic Front for Somalia.²⁰ Al-Itisam is believed to operate independently of the more powerful shabab militia. Al-Itisam's links to the ex-CIC opposition are unclear. Al-Itisam is also active in Puntland (northeast Somalia); in March 2008, leaflets threatening Puntland intelligence officers were allegedly distributed and signed by al-Itisam.

Al-Islah. Al-Islah is a progressive Islamist movement in Somalia comprised mainly of businesspeople, leading educators, and civil society leaders. The movement initially helped to form the University of Mogadishu and has been active in fundraising for schools and charities. Al-Islah members have actively sought to reach out to Western and American diplomats and aid agencies. It is sometimes attacked by critics for being elitist and lacking a grass-roots base. Some strident anti-terrorist sources have accused al-Islah of serving as a front for radicals and jihadists, but this accusation is unfounded. Links to Al-Islah should not be interpreted to imply support to either radical Islam or terrorism.

United Western Somali Liberation Front (United-WSLF). A recent movement in Somali-inhabited eastern Ethiopia, the United-WSLF has adapted the name of a long-defunct secular insurgency (the Western Somali Liberation Front). The United-WSLF became known when it kidnapped two staff members of the International Committee of the Red Cross in eastern Ethiopia in 2006.²¹ Little is known about the United-WSLF, except that it operates mainly in the southern half of the Ogaden region of Ethiopia and has an ill-defined Islamist agenda. It has periodically burned vehicles and threatened international aid agency staff.

Eritrean Islamic Jihad (EIJ). The EIJ is a small and generally inactive movement of radical Muslim Eritreans which has launched several minor attacks against Eritrea. Originally based in eastern Sudan, the EIJ was used by the government of Sudan as a proxy against Eritrea. More recently, Eritrea has accused the government of Ethiopia of sponsoring the group.

B. Non-Islamist Groups Accused of Terrorism or Terrorism Links

The Horn of Africa is beset with multiple armed insurgencies, some used by rival governments in proxy wars. Almost all are based on ethnic or tribal identity. Several of these insurgencies have been characterized as terrorist by the governments they are fighting; not surprisingly, the groups reject this allegation and claim to be legitimate liberation movements. The US government has not formally designated any of these groups as terrorist at this time, although the leaders of several groups have been indicted by the International Criminal Court (ICC). The most important of these groups are briefly described below.

Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF). The ONLF was formed in 1984 as an armed resistance movement against the Ethiopian government. It is based in Somali-inhabited eastern Ethiopia and draws primarily on a large Somali lineage, the Ogaden clan, for most of its support and recruitment. It briefly operated as a legal political party from 1991-94 before returning to armed resistance. The ONLF is a secular, ethnic/nationalist movement which taps into a widespread sense of resentment by Somali Sunni Muslims against the politically dominant Ethiopian highland Christians. Its objectives are unclear—at times it espouses secessionism, at other times it calls for full political rights for all Somali Ethiopians. The ONLF has been accused of collaboration with the radical AIAI and, more recently, the shabab, but this claim is inflated. Inasmuch as the ONLF colludes with Somali Islamist groups, it is an alliance of convenience based on a common enemy, the government of Ethiopia, not a reflection of an ONLF Islamist platform. The ONLF leadership bases itself in London and Asmara, Eritrea and receives support from Eritrea.

The ONLF's armed activities have been limited to eastern Ethiopia. Until recently, the ONLF constituted only a nuisance to the Ethiopian state. It engaged in periodic ambushes on military Ethiopian patrols, and grenade attacks on government compounds and occasionally civilian targets. It also roamed and indirectly controlled large sections of remote rural areas in Ogaden-inhabited areas of eastern Ethiopia. In May 2007 the ONLF launched a major attack on an oil exploration site at Degahbur zone in Somali Regional State, in which 65 Ethiopians (mainly security forces) and nine Chinese workers were killed. That was followed by a grenade attack by the ONLF on a political rally in May 2007 which injured the Somali Region President. Thereafter, Ethiopian National Defense Forces (ENDF) launched a major counter-insurgency campaign against the ONLF, an operation that had a devastating humanitarian impact across large sections of Somali Regional State. Ethiopia has considered the ONLF a terrorist organization and has pressed the US government to designate the ONLF a terrorist group. To date, the US has not done so, though it has explored the option. US military forces based in the Horn of Africa have at times worked informally with the ONLF to monitor al-Qa`ida activity in the eastern Horn. ONLF leaders travel freely in the US, giving talks and fund-raising. Somalis in the US who have a record of direct support to or membership in the ONLF cannot therefore be labeled terrorists or supporters of terrorism.

Oromo Liberation Front (OLF). The Oromo Liberation Front is an armed group formed in 1973. It claims to represent Ethiopia's largest ethnic group, the Oromo, which is marginalized politically in Ethiopia. The Oromo people are divided into Christian, Muslim, and animist faiths, and the OLF as a result adopts a strictly secular ethnic agenda. The OLF has been a weak insurgency and for years never posed a serious threat to the Ethiopian government. It has been consistently beset by internal divisions over leadership, tactics, and objectives. In the late 1990s it began exploiting Oromo-inhabited areas of northern Kenya to conduct increasingly serious raids into Ethiopia, resulting in Ethiopian raids into Kenya which produced heavy OLF losses. Ethiopia considers the OLF a terrorist group and accuses its regional rival Eritrea of sponsoring the OLF. The US has not designated it as a terrorist group. The OLF leadership frequently travels to the US and engages in fund-raising and lobbying; some members of the OLF leadership are based in the US. Many US-based Oromo Ethiopians provide moral and financial support to the movement.

Lord's Resistance Army (LRA). The LRA is a small but very destructive armed insurgency based in northern Uganda but at times operating in border areas of south Sudan and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. It claims to represent the Acholi people and their grievances against the government of Uganda. Yet the LRA's main victims have been the Acholi people themselves. Acholi villages have been attacked and young boys abducted and forced to join the LRA; hundreds of thousands of Acholi have been displaced; and horrific atrocities, including mutilation, have been inflicted on local people. The government of Uganda has considered the LRA a terrorist organization and has waged an ineffective counter-insurgency against it in northern Uganda, displacing still more Acholi. In recent years the government has been in peace talks with the LRA and the Acholi, sponsored by the Government of South Sudan in the town of Juba. Many Acholi diaspora members have traveled to Juba to participate in the talks and to serve as an intermediary for top LRA leaders. Top LRA leaders, including the group's erratic and reclusive leader Joseph Kony, have been indicted by the International Criminal Court. Acholi Ugandans in the diaspora are split over the LRA; though they despise the LRA's tactics and the costs imposed on the Acholi people, most are reluctant to openly condemn the only movement articulating the grievances of the Acholi people against the Ugandan government. The LRA does not rely on contributions from the diaspora and does little campaigning abroad. The US has not designated the LRA a terrorist organization.

Janjaweed. The janjaweed is the name given to the local Arab, pastoral paramilitaries in Darfur which have launched a campaign of ethnic cleansing and possibly genocide against the mainly sedentary ethnic groups of Darfur associated with the armed insurgency groups of the Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM). The janjaweed operate with direct support and instructions from the government of Sudan. Their tactics are terrorist in nature, including massacres, rape, and burning of villages. An

estimated 200,000 people have died and two million displaced by the janjaweed since 2002. The janjaweed are loosely informed by an ideology of ethnic superiority over "black" Darfurians, but are mainly motivated by land hunger. Religion plays no role in the crisis—both the janjaweed and their victims are Muslim. The International Criminal Court has issued a warrant against the top militia leader of the janjaweed, Ali Muhammad Ali `Abd al-Rahman (also known as Ali Kushayb), he and his associates continue to enjoy protection of the government of Sudan. Because the janjaweed is a state-sponsored paramilitary, not a full-fledged movement, it has no support from a diaspora. It has not been formally designated a terrorist group by the US government.

Ethiopian People's Patriotic Front (EPPF). The EPPF is an umbrella movement formed in 2000 which unites several ethnic armed movements fighting against the Ethiopian government. In 2002, it successfully launched several ambushes against Ethiopian troops in the northwest area of Ethiopia, near the Sudanese border. It receives support from Eritrea and is based in the Eritrean capital Asmara. Since 2002 the group has been largely inactive.

C. States Accused of Sponsoring Terrorism

Most of the states in the HOA have at times used armed groups as proxies against regional rivals, prompting accusations from those governments of sponsorship of terrorism. Two states in particular have come under special criticism.

Eritrea. Ethiopia and Eritrea fought a bloody and inconclusive border war in 1998-2000 which cost 70,000 lives; the UN monitored cease-fire never produced a final peace accord, and the two neighbors remain in a state of high tension. Both accuse the other of waging proxy wars by sponsoring armed groups. Eritrea has been much more active on this score, providing direct support—training, military, supplies, and an operational base—to the OLF, ONLF, and the ARS. Because the latter group includes two Somali Islamists on the US list of designated terror suspects, and because the ARS has claimed to have control over the shabab jihadi group in southern Somalia, the US government has threatened to place Eritrea on its list of state sponsors of terrorism. This action has not been taken as of early 2008.

Sudan. From 1991 to 1996, Sudan's government was dominated by hard-line Islamists of the National Islamic Front, or NIF. Sudan became a major state sponsor of terrorist groups, allowing several movements—including al-Qa`ida and its leader Usama bin Ladin—to base themselves in Khartoum. The political costs of serving as the "Holiday Inn of terrorism" grew high, however, and in 1996 al-Qa`ida and other terrorist movements were requested to leave Sudan. Sudan's leadership gradually marginalized the NIF and has since 2001 cooperated with the US in counter-terrorism initiatives despite tensions between the two governments over the crisis in Darfur. Critics of the government of Sudan accuse

it of engaging in state terrorism against the Darfur population. In 2007 the International Criminal Court (ICC) issued warrants against two Sudanese, including Ahmad Muhammad Harun, a former interior minister and at the time Minister for Humanitarian Affairs, for war crimes against humanity.²²

III. DIASPORA COMMUNITIES

The HOA has produced a very large diaspora concentrated in North America, Europe, the Gulf states, and other regions of Africa. An estimated 1 million of the 10 million Somali population live abroad, including about 150,000 in the US.²³ About one million of a total population of 4.4 million Eritreans live outside the country.²⁴ The US hosts 74,000 Ethiopians born in Ethiopia, and another 460,000 first or second generation Ethiopian-Americans.²⁵ The number of Sudanese living outside the country has fluctuated dramatically due to waves of refugee crises caused by wars. In 2004, 700,000 Sudanese lived outside the country.²⁶ Over 20,000 southern Sudanese have been resettled in the US since the mid-1990s.

Two factors have driven this extraordinary level of migration. One is political turmoil—multiple protracted wars, state collapse, and repression—which produced millions of refugees in the HOA since the 1970s. Most have remained in large refugee camps in the region or have assimilated into neighboring countries, but many were awarded political asylum in Europe and North America, mainly in the 1980s (when Ethiopians and Eritreans arrived in large numbers), the 1990s (when a wave of Somalis arrived), and since 2000 (mainly southern Sudanese refugees).

A second driver has been the profound levels of poverty and underdevelopment of the HOA, which has led millions of residents to seek employment abroad. In the 1970s, most of the region's economic migrants sought work in the booming economies of the Gulf states. The flow of migrant laborers from the Horn to the Gulf states remains strong up to today. In Dubai (UAE), tens of thousands of HOA businesspeople have settled and turned the city into the de facto financial and commercial capital of the Horn of Africa. Economic migrants from the Horn also sought to relocate to Europe and North America as well, a trend which has accelerated since the 1980s.

Whether immigrants from the Horn arrive as political refugees or economic migrants, their principal role is to secure employment and/or welfare benefits and send remittances back to their extended family in the HOA. It is difficult to overstate the importance of this role, or the pressure that diaspora members are under to send remittances. Remittances today play a major role in the poor economies of the HOA, in some cases dwarfing all other sources of hard currency. Somalia, for instance, is thought to receive between \$500 million to \$1 billion annually in remittances. By contrast, its top export, livestock, earns about \$100 million each year, while foreign aid to the country typically fluctuates between one and two hundred million dollars annually.²⁷ Eritrea is even more dependent on remittances from its

diaspora; it is not an exaggeration to claim that that weak economy is floated by the money sent back from abroad. Africa as a whole receives an estimated \$14 billion annually in remittances from its diaspora.²⁸

The amount of money sent back to relatives in the home country varies according to income earned, but the typical diaspora member sends about \$200 per month to relatives. They are also expected to send larger amounts in time of extra need, including during economic crises, holidays, and school fees. Studies of diaspora groups in the US indicate that the diaspora members are under constant pressure to send more money. The rise of inexpensive global telecommunications networks and e-mail access throughout most of the HOA has reduced transaction costs of sending remittances but has also meant that the diaspora is under a constant flow of requests and demands from kinsmen back home.²⁹ Resentments on both sides of the relationship can and do occur—diaspora members working two jobs and sharing a crowded apartment to save money feel overburdened by family members back home, while the home family operates on the false assumption that their relatives abroad are living in luxury.

Unlike the short journey to the Gulf, relocating from the Horn of Africa to North America is very costly. As a result, in general HOA diaspora members in Canada and the US tend to be somewhat wealthier, better connected, and better educated than their countrymen. Alternatively, in some instances poorer extended families or even whole villages will pool money to “place” a selected young person abroad. The “investment” in that individual is expected to yield not only remittances but assistance in bringing over additional community members. Not surprisingly, households in the HOA which possess a family member in the diaspora are, by dint of the remittances they receive, a distinct economic class in their communities, considered well-off and able to pay for school fees, health costs, and a housekeeper.

New tele-communications technologies have helped to drive the proliferation and importance of remittance, or *hawala*, companies in the Horn, especially in Somalia, Sudan, Djibouti, and Kenya. In Ethiopia and Eritrea, tighter government regulations on financial flows tends to privilege established money-wiring companies like Western Union or national banks. The *hawala* companies are poorly regulated, and some have come under suspicion of linkages to terrorist groups, specifically al-Qa`ida. The specific types of linkages run across a broad spectrum, ranging from serving as a front and a money making operation for al-Qa`ida to active complicity in laundering money to unwittingly being used by al-Qa`ida to move funds undetected. One major Somali-owned *hawala* company, al-Barakat, was identified in late 2001 by the US government as an al-Qa`ida affiliated business and had its assets frozen. Others have been compelled to adopt more stringent reporting and monitoring procedures. Disruption of remittances risks considerable hardship in the home country; not surprisingly, American efforts to restrict *hawala* activities have been deeply unpopular among HOA communities.

The diaspora can also come under pressure to contribute to armed groups, including some considered terrorist by the US or regional states. The ONLF and OLF are very effective in fund-raising abroad, earning much of their operating revenue in this manner. While the CIC was in power in Mogadishu in 2006 it was also very effective raising funds from the Somali diaspora. Sometimes these contributions are voluntary; sometimes they are given under pressure. No HOA insurgency, however, has the kind of extensive and coercive capacity to extort funds from its diaspora as do the Tamil Tigers, and anecdotal evidence suggest that most HOA diaspora groups are increasingly resistant to funding war chests. One regional government, Eritrea, imposes an income tax on its diaspora and denies diaspora members the right to enter the country if those taxes go unpaid.

The HOA diaspora is now playing an increasingly central role in both the politics and development of their home countries. As members of the early wave of refugees from the HOA have become more established in the US and elsewhere and in some cases have succeeded in business, they are now a major source of indigenous investment capital into the region. Major real estate booms in parts of the Horn, especially Somali urban centers and in the Ethiopian capital Addis Ababa, have been fueled by diaspora investments, and expansion of both small and medium size businesses in the region is largely due to diaspora investments.

At the same time, the diaspora is playing an increasingly central role in the political life of the region. This trend varies significantly by country. Ethiopia's large diaspora is overwhelmingly associated with opposition groups (generally along ethnic lines) and is often more strident than the opposition leadership in country. Eritrea's diaspora is more quiescent, deeply disappointed with the current regime but reluctant to oppose it openly for fear of mistreatment of relatives back in Eritrea. The Somali diaspora is so deeply involved in the politics of the country that it is increasingly problematic to differentiate between the Somali political class and the diaspora. Across the political spectrum, including the hardline Islamists, most Somali political elites have secured some form of citizenship, residence rights, or travel documents from a second country, and have "parked" their families in safer countries while they periodically pursue their political ambitions in Somalia. Many of the top Islamists in the CIC are diaspora members from Europe and Canada, and were easily able to attract thousands of young diaspora professional to return to Somalia in 2006 to help set up their short-lived administration. Likewise, the newly formed cabinet of the Somali Transitional Federal Government is composed almost entirely of diaspora members. And the TFG parliament has so many diaspora MPs that it has trouble convening a quorum because so many MOs have returned "home." In general, the Somali diaspora in the West was fiercely supportive of the CIC, seeing in it a rallying point for a conflation of nationalist and Islamist ambitions to revive the collapsed state in Somalia.

Despite the high and often intense level of diaspora engagement in the politics of the HOA, including active support to a number of the region's armed insurgencies, the Horn's

diaspora has had a surprisingly low level of involvement in al-Qa`ida or in acts of terrorism. The region's large Muslim diaspora has to date produced few terrorist recruits, neither as leaders nor foot-soldiers. HOA diaspora involvement in al-Qa`ida is nowhere near the level generated by the diaspora originating from North Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia. The one major exception to this rule—the botched London subway bombing plot on July 21, 2005, implicating several young men of Eritrean, Ethiopian, and Somali origin—is generally thought to be an aberration, not the first sign of a new wave of Horn of Africa terrorism (see discussion below).³⁰

The Horn of Africa's "exceptionalism" is especially intriguing in light of the fact that the region's Muslim diaspora in the West suffers from the same conditions of social exclusion, alienation, and frustration which are conventionally cited to explain the rise of radicalism and terrorist activities among other Muslim diasporas in the West. Why this explanation seems so plausible and self-evident in explaining the rise of terrorist cells among the North African, Middle Eastern, and South Asian diaspora in Europe, and yet is so inadequate with regard to the HOA Muslim diaspora, is a puzzle.

One potential explanation for this reticence to engage in radical politics or al-Qa`ida-related terrorist activity is the fact that the diaspora from the Horn are an economic lifeline for their communities back home. They shoulder enormous responsibilities as the primary source of income for their extended families, and as a result cannot afford to engage in risky activities which lead to their deportation or imprisonment or jeopardize the status of the broader diaspora community in the US. This could explain why so many Somali diaspora members are so privately passionate in support of the Islamist opposition in Somalia and yet so careful not to be viewed as publicly supporting the hardline elements of the group. When in October 2007 a new Somali opposition umbrella movement was formed—the Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia (ARS)—diaspora members formed a majority of the group's central committee, but were adamant that the hard-line Islamists, especially Hassan Dahir Aweys, could not be included in the council, out of fear of association with a man designated a terrorist by the US government.

The recent US designation of the shabab as a terrorist group could complicate efforts to identify Somali diaspora members who actively aid and abet terrorist groups. To date, most Somalis who oppose the Ethiopian occupation of Somalia view the shabab more as liberation fighters than terrorists, even if they disagree with their radical Islamist views and find some of their tactics distasteful. Because so many Somalis have provided various levels of support to the "complex insurgency" in Mogadishu, the designation of shabab as a terrorist group risks inadvertently criminalizing a large section of the Somali diaspora.

IV. POTENTIAL IMPACT ON US SECURITY INTERESTS

A. Overseas

The principal threats posed by terrorist groups operating in the Horn of Africa remain the same since the late 1990s. Specifically, some states in the HOA, especially Kenya, are replete with "soft" Western targets and are likely to remain the main base of operations for al-Qa`ida in the region. Kenya is a major hub for tourism, business, diplomacy, and missionary work; it is multi-ethnic and an easy location for terrorists to blend into the local community; it has a relatively weak and corrupt security sector; it possesses a strong infrastructure for communications and transportation; and its coastal Muslim population feels marginalized and is more prone to support radical Islamist views. Not surprisingly, al-Qa`ida has used Kenya since the early 1990s as a base of operations and has launched some of its most damaging terrorist attacks from there. Though Kenya's security sector has improved considerably in its counterterrorism capacities, thanks in part to American support, the country remains a relatively easy mark for terrorist activity, and must be considered the top target of a future al-Qa`ida attack in the region.

Somalia's ongoing crises—the US-backed Ethiopian occupation, the insurgency, the prolonged humanitarian crisis, and periodic US airstrikes against suspected al-Qa`ida safe houses—continue to inflame and radicalize portions of the Somali population and are generating worrisome levels of anti-Americanism. Yet, to date, insurgency activities have targeted Ethiopian forces and the TFG, not Western targets outside Somalia. Shabab operatives have assassinated several foreign aid workers inside Somalia since 2000, and have also targeted dozens of Somalis who worked closely with the US government, but have thus far kept those attacks within Somali borders. An ongoing concern is the possibility that the shabab could opt to expand its attacks on US targets into Kenya or Ethiopia.

All other armed movements in the Horn of Africa have generally sought to avoid targeting of Americans or foreigners, focusing their attacks on domestic targets. The ONLF's April 2007 attack at Dagahbur, eastern Ethiopia, which resulted in the deaths of nine Chinese oil workers, was highly unusual in this regard.

B. Domestic

Despite a profile that should render Muslim HOA diaspora members especially susceptible to recruitment into al-Qa`ida, very few Horn residents have posed a terrorist threat in the US, Canada, or Europe. The one exception was the botched London terrorist plot of July 2005. In that incident, a group of six young Muslim HOA immigrants in the UK made what was first believed to be an amateurish attempt to copy the July 7 London underground terrorist bombings. Subsequent evidence revealed that the group had begun planning the bombing plot months before the 7 July attacks, throwing into question the claim that they

were little more than copycats. The group of six included a few who were apparent social misfits; at least one with a background in chemistry and a capacity to assemble home-made bombs; and one who allegedly received terrorist training in Sudan and Pakistan in 2003 and 2004.³¹ Several attended sermons by the convicted radical preacher Abu Hamza al-Masri.³² In a public statement after his arrest, one of the suspects insisted the plot was merely a hoax to frighten people, and was motivated by their anger over British involvement in the Iraq intervention. "We made some false, fake explosives to frighten people, to stop them, because of the [Iraq] war, basically," claimed Hussein Osman, an Eritrean diaspora member.³³ The home made bombs, made of hydrogen peroxide, flour, other chemicals, and nails, failed to explode though the detonators went off; the failure was apparently due to improper construction of the bombs.³⁴

Publicly available evidence in this case has revealed no link between this July 21 cell and the July 7 terrorist attack, which was carried out by the "Luton cell" comprised mainly of South Asians. Unlike the Luton cell, which appears to have close and direct ties to al-Qa`ida, the link between the July 21 plotters and a broader terror network is thin. While the July 21 plot serves as a sobering reminder that terror attacks can emanate unpredictably from small circles of angry, disaffected youth, it does not provide much evidence to suggest a growing role of the Horn of African Muslim diaspora in organized, al-Qa`ida affiliated terror networks.

Even so, there remains a concern about the dispensation of some of the Somali diaspora members who returned to Somalia to support the CIC in 2006. Most took on purely administrative tasks, but dozens of diaspora members opted to join the shabab, where they underwent training in a variety of insurgency and terrorist tactics. When the CIC was defeated by Ethiopian forces in December 2006, these diaspora members sought to return home. Those with new knowledge of improvised explosive devices and other terrorist technologies could conceivably put those skills to use back in the US, Canada, or Europe. No such incidents occurred in 2007, however, suggesting that the threat posed by returnee diaspora members from Somalia is low.

V. INSIGHTS AND REFERENCES FOR INVESTIGATORS

- These populations are primarily preoccupied with earning money to send back to their extended families in the Horn, and are under significant pressure to remit funds back home. The vast majority of them will have little time or energy to devote to politics in their home countries, or to radical causes.
- The diaspora have no control over how their remittances are spent back in country.
- Most of the HOA diaspora has deeply negative experiences with the state and state police and security forces, and as a result will often be evasive or fearful about contact with US law enforcement.

- A culture of collective responsibility, clannism and tribalism can work against efforts to convince community members to report on violations of the law by one of their own.
- Rhetorical and financial support that the diaspora provides to armed movements back in their home country is routine, and viewed as part of a legitimate liberation movement, not as support to terrorist groups.
- Fierce rhetoric supporting the Islamist resistance in Mogadishu, condemning Ethiopian occupation of Somalia, and criticizing American policy in Somalia is widespread among the Somali diaspora today, but must not be conflated with sympathy towards al-Qa`ida or terrorism.
- A widespread sense of victimization exists among the HOA's Muslim population, especially the Somalis; they feel unfairly singled out in counterterrorism monitoring and are inclined to dismiss out of hand the existence of any terrorist threat from their community.
- Salafist interpretations of Islam are growing both in the region and among the diaspora, but that must also not necessarily be connected to jihadism or terrorism, as some groups are indeed non-violent.
- Somali diaspora who joined the CIC in 2006 and then returned to the US are probably not a security threat but constitute a special category of concern and require more careful monitoring.

VI. FURTHER READING

Research on political Islam, radical Islam, Islamic terrorism, and non-Islamic terrorism in the Horn of Africa has increased considerably since the 2001 9/11 attacks. The quality of this expanding literature is variable; some studies promote political agendas seeking to advance or rebut a claim that a particular group is terrorist in nature; others are essentially desk studies that at times accept at face value questionable evidence. Several impressive and in-depth studies have been produced by analysts on contract to the US government; those reports are not in the public domain at this time. A periodic newsletter out of the South African Institute for Security Studies tracking news on terrorism in Africa, *African Terrorism Bulletin*, is useful. Electronic subscriptions can be requested at: <http://www.iss.co.za/Pubs/Newsletters/newsletterindex.html>.

Some of the most meticulously researched and original studies of both political Islam and terrorism in the HOA have been produced by International Crisis Group.³⁵ This series includes a general overview, "Somalia: Countering Terrorism in a Failed State (May 2002), followed by two very detailed studies, "Counter-Terrorism in Somalia: Losing Hearts and Minds?" (July 2005), and "Somalia's Islamists" (December 2005). These studies form part of an excellent ICG series on Islamism, Violence, and Reform, which includes the seminal piece "Understanding Islamism" (March 2005).³⁶

Another study which draws on original data, in this case recently declassified al-Qa`ida documents, to provide a close portrait of the East Africa al-Qa`ida cell's frustrations in the Horn of Africa is the Harmony Project, *Al-Qaida's (Mis)Adventures in the Horn of Africa* (West Point, NY: Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, 2007). A summary of those findings is available in Ken Menkhaus, "Constraints and Opportunities in Ungoverned Spaces: The Horn of Africa," in *Denial of Sanctuary: Understanding Terrorist Safe Havens*, ed. Michael Innes, pp. 67-82 (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2007).

Several recent publications provide useful regional overviews of terrorism and radicalism in the Horn of Africa. One, Robert Rotberg, ed., *Battling Terrorism in the Horn of Africa* (Washington DC: Brookings Institution, 2005), features chapters on each state in the Horn of Africa, including Kenya and Yemen. Another, David Shinn's "Al-Qa`ida in East Africa and the Horn" in *Journal of Conflict Studies* is a very well-informed synthesis of existing reports and studies on al-Qa`ida in the region, also organized by individual countries. A third, Alex de Waal, ed., *Islamism and its Enemies in the Horn of Africa* (2004), focuses especially on Sudan and argues that the Islamist threat peaked in the HOA in the late 1990s. It includes a strong historical chapter on the evolution of Islamist movements in Somalia by Roland Marchal, "Islamic Political Dynamics in the Somali Civil War."

Because the major threat of terrorism, and the most active Islamist movements, have been in Somalia, most research on al-Qa`ida and radical Islam in the region has focused on that country. The ICG reports noted above are essential reading on Somalia. Another very important work is Andre Le Sage, "Somalia and the War on Terrorism: Political Islamic Movements and US Counter-Terrorism Efforts," (Cambridge University: Ph.D. diss., 2004). This study draws on extensive fieldwork conducted by the author in Mogadishu, and includes in depth accounts of the wide range of Islamic charities and educational institutions in Mogadishu. The study will soon be published as a book. A number of publications and unpublished reports by Matt Bryden constitute some of the best-informed work on Somalia, Islamism, and terrorism. See for example Bryden, "No Quick Fixes: Coming to Terms with Terrorism, Islam, and Statelessness in Somalia," *Journal of Conflict Studies* (2003). See also Ken Menkhaus, *Somalia: State Collapse and the Threat of Terrorism* (Adelphi Paper 364. Oxford: Oxford

University Press 2004), and Dirk Spilker, "Mad Mullahs? Islamic Fundamentalism in Somalia: Past Trends and Future Prospects" (unpublished paper, 2007). A somewhat more alarmist interpretation of Islamism, Terrorism and Somalia can be found in Medane Tedasse, *Al-Itihad: Political Islam and Black Economy in Somalia* (Addis Ababa 2002).

The literature on the large and increasingly important diaspora of the HOA is modest but has seen a significant increase recently. Most of the new studies focus on issues such as adaptation and adjustment problems for the diaspora, the diaspora's critical role in sending remittances to the HOA, and the diaspora's growing role in development and politics in their country or origin. See for instance *Engaging the African Diaspora to Finance Africa's De-*

velopment, ed. Raj Bardouille (London: Oxford Scholars Publications, forthcoming 2008); Ashok Swain, ed., *Diasporas, Armed Conflicts, and peacebuilding in their Homelands* (Uppsala: Department of Peace and Conflict Research Report no 79, 2007). Specific studies of diasporas from the region include A. Osman Farah, Mammo Muchie, and Joakim Gundel, eds., *Somalia: Diaspora and State Reconstitution in the Horn of Africa* (London: Adonis and Abby, 2007), and Terrence Lyons, "Conflict Generated Diasporas and Transitional Politics in Ethiopia," *Conflict, Security, and Development* vol. 7, no. 4 (December 2007), pp. 529-49. Much less has been written on the HOA diaspora as a source of support or recruitment for terrorist groups. For a general overview, see Ken Menkhaus, "African Diasporas, Diasporas in Africa, and the Terrorist Threat," in *Diasporas and Terrorism*, edited by Bill Rosenau and Doron Zimmerman (RAND, forthcoming 2008).

Endnotes

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Chapter 13

Europe's Angry Muslims

Robert S. Leiken

An American Concern

Fox News and CNN's Lou Dobbs worry about terrorists stealing across the United States' border with Mexico concealed among illegal immigrants. The Pentagon wages war in the Middle East to stop terrorist attacks on the United States. But the growing nightmare of officials at the Department of Homeland Security is passport-carrying, visa-exempt mujahideen coming from the United States' western European allies.

Jihadist networks span Europe from Poland to Portugal, thanks to the spread of radical Islam among the descendants of guest workers once recruited to shore up Europe's postwar economic miracle. In smoky coffeehouses in Rotterdam and Copenhagen, makeshift prayer halls in Hamburg and Brussels, Islamic bookstalls in Birmingham and "Londonistan," and the prisons of Madrid, Milan, and Marseilles, immigrants or their descendants are volunteering for jihad against the West. It was a Dutch Muslim of Moroccan descent, born and socialized in Europe, who murdered the filmmaker Theo van Gogh in Amsterdam last November. A Nixon Center study of 373 mujahideen in western Europe and North America between 1993 and 2004 found more than twice as many Frenchmen as Saudis and more Britons than Sudanese, Yemenites, Emiratis, Lebanese, or Libyans. Fully a quarter of the jihadists it listed were western European nationals—eligible to travel visa-free to the United States.

The emergence of homegrown mujahideen in Europe threatens the United States as well as Europe. Yet it was the dog that never barked at last winter's Euro-American rapprochement meeting. Neither President George W. Bush nor Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice drew attention to this mutual peril, even though it should focus minds and could buttress solidarity in the West.

Our Land is My Land

The mass immigration of Muslims to Europe was an unintended consequence of post-World War II guest-worker programs. Backed by friendly politicians and sympathetic judges, guest workers, who were supposed to stay temporarily, benefited from family reunification

programs and became permanent. Successive waves of immigrants formed a sea of descendants. Today, Muslims constitute the majority of immigrants in most western European countries, including Belgium, France, Germany, and the Netherlands, and the largest single component of the immigrant population in the United Kingdom. Exact numbers are hard to come by because Western censuses rarely ask respondents about their faith. But it is estimated that between 15 and 20 million Muslims now call Europe home and make up four to five percent of its total population. (Muslims in the United States probably do not exceed 3 million, accounting for less than two percent of the total population.) France has the largest proportion of Muslims (seven to ten percent of its total population), followed by the Netherlands, Germany, Denmark, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and Italy. Given continued immigration and high Muslim fertility rates, the National Intelligence Council projects that Europe's Muslim population will double by 2025.

Unlike their U.S. counterparts, who entered a gigantic country built on immigration, most Muslim newcomers to western Europe started arriving only after World War II, crowding into small, culturally homogenous nations. Their influx was a new phenomenon for many host states and often unwelcome. Meanwhile, North African immigrants retained powerful attachments to their native cultures. So unlike American Muslims, who are geographically diffuse, ethnically fragmented, and generally well off, Europe's Muslims gather in bleak enclaves with their compatriots: Algerians in France, Moroccans in Spain, Turks in Germany, and Pakistanis in the United Kingdom.

The footprint of Muslim immigrants in Europe is already more visible than that of the Hispanic population in the United States. Unlike the jumble of nationalities that make up the American Latino community, the Muslims of western Europe are likely to be distinct, cohesive, and bitter. In Europe, host countries that never learned to integrate newcomers collide with immigrants exceptionally retentive of their ways, producing a variant of what the French scholar Olivier Roy calls "globalized Islam": militant Islamic resentment at Western dominance, anti-imperialism exalted by revivalism.

As the French academic Gilles Kepel acknowledges, "neither the blood spilled by Muslims from North Africa fighting in French uniforms during both world wars nor the sweat of migrant laborers, living under deplorable living conditions, who rebuilt France (and Europe) for a pittance after 1945, has made their children ... full fellow citizens." Small wonder, then, that a radical leader of the Union of Islamic Organizations of France, a group associated with the Muslim Brotherhood, curses his new homeland: "Oh sweet France! Are you astonished that so many of your children commune in a stinging *naal bou la France* [fuck France], and damn your Fathers?"

As a consequence of demography, history, ideology, and policy, western Europe now plays host to often disconsolate Muslim offspring, who are its citizens in name but not culturally or socially. In a fit of absentmindedness, during which its academics discoursed on the obsolescence of the nation-state, western Europe acquired not a colonial empire but

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something of an internal colony, whose numbers are roughly equivalent to the population of Syria. Many of its members are willing to integrate and try to climb Europe's steep social ladder. But many younger Muslims reject the minority status to which their parents acquiesced. A volatile mix of European nativism and immigrant dissidence challenges what the Danish sociologist Ole Waever calls "societal security," or national cohesion. To make matters worse, the very isolation of these diaspora communities obscures their inner workings, allowing mujahideen to fundraise, prepare, and recruit for jihad with a freedom available in few Muslim countries.

As these conditions developed in the late 1990s, even liberal segments of the European public began to have second thoughts about immigration. Many were galled by their governments' failure to reduce or even identify the sources of *insécurité* (a French code word for the combination of vandalism, delinquency, and hate crimes stemming from Muslim immigrant enclaves). The state appeared unable to regulate the entry of immigrants, and society seemed unwilling to integrate them. In some cases, the backlash was xenophobic and racist; in others, it was a reaction against policymakers captivated by a multiculturalist dream of diverse communities living in harmony, offering oppressed nationalities marked compassion and remedial benefits. By 2002, electoral rebellion over the issue of immigration was threatening the party systems of Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, and the Netherlands. The Dutch were so incensed by the 2002 assassination of Pim Fortuyn, a gay anti-immigration politician, that mainstream parties adopted much of the victim's program. In the United Kingdom this spring, the Tories not only joined the ruling Labour Party in embracing sweeping immigration restrictions, such as tightened procedures for asylum and family reunification (both regularly abused throughout Europe) and a computerized exit-entry system like the new U.S. Visitor and Immigration Status Indicator Technology program; they also campaigned for numerical caps on immigrants. With the Muslim headscarf controversy raging in France, talk about the connection between asylum abuse and terrorism rising in the United Kingdom, an immigration dispute threatening to tear Belgium apart, and the Dutch outrage over the van Gogh killing, western Europe may now be reaching a tipping point.

Going Dutch

The uncomfortable truth is that disenfranchisement and radicalization are happening even in countries, such as the Netherlands, that have done much to accommodate Muslim immigrants. Proud of a legendary tolerance of minorities, the Netherlands welcomed tens of thousands of Muslim asylum seekers allegedly escaping persecution. Immigrants availed themselves of generous welfare and housing benefits, an affirmative-action hiring policy, and free language courses. Dutch taxpayers funded Muslim religious schools and mosques, and public television broadcast programs in Moroccan Arabic. Mohammed Bouyeri was collecting unemployment benefits when he murdered van Gogh.

The van Gogh slaying rocked the Netherlands and neighboring countries not only because the victim, a provocative filmmaker, was a descendant of the painter Vincent, the Dutch's most cherished icon, but also because Bouyeri was "an average second-generation immigrant," according to Stef Blok, the chairman of the parliamentary commission reviewing Bouyeri's immigration record. European counterterrorism authorities saw the killing as a new phase in the terrorist threat. It raised the specter of Middle East-style political assassinations as part of the European jihadist arsenal and it disclosed a new source of danger: unknown individuals among Europe's own Muslims. The cell in Hamburg that was connected to the attacks of September 11, 2001, was composed of student visitors, and the Madrid train bombings of March 2004 were committed by Moroccan immigrants. But van Gogh's killer and his associates were born and raised in Europe.

Bouyeri was the child of Moroccan immigrant workers. He grew up in a proletarian area of Amsterdam sometimes known as Satellite City because of the many reception dishes that sit on its balconies, tuned to al Jazeera and Moroccan television. Bouyeri's parents arrived in a wave of immigration in the 1970s and never learned Dutch. But Bouyeri graduated from the area's best high school. His transformation from promising student to jihadist follows a pattern in which groups of thriving, young European Muslims enlist in jihad to slaughter Westerners.

After graduating from a local college and then taking advanced courses in accounting and information technology, Bouyeri, who had an unruly temper, was jailed for seven months on a violence-related crime. He emerged from jail an Islamist, angry over Palestine and sympathetic to Hamas. He studied social work and became a community organizer. He wrote in a community newsletter that "the Netherlands is now our enemy because they participate in the occupation of Iraq." After he failed to get funding for a youth center in Satellite City and was unable to ban the sale of beer or the presence of women at the events he organized, he moved to downtown Amsterdam. There, he was recruited into the Hofstad Group, a cell of second-generation Islamic militants.

The cell started meeting every two weeks in Bouyeri's apartment to hear the sermons of a Syrian preacher known as Abu Khatib. Hofstad was connected to networks in Spain, Morocco, Italy, and Belgium, and it was planning a string of assassinations of Dutch politicians, an attack on the Netherlands' sole nuclear reactor, and other actions around Europe. European intelligence services have linked the cell to the Moroccan Islamic Combat Group, which is associated with the Madrid bombings and a series of attacks in Casablanca in 2003. Its Syrian imam was involved with mujahideen in Iraq and with an operational chief of al Qaeda. "Judging by Bouyeri's and the Hofstad network's international contacts," an analyst for the Norwegian government says, "it seems safe to conclude that they were part of the numerous terrorist plots that have been unraveled over the past years in western Europe."

The Hofstad Group should not be compared with marginal European terrorist groups of the past, such as the Baader-Meinhof Gang in Germany, Action Directe in France, or the

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Red Brigades in Italy. Like other jihadist groups today, it enjoys what Marxist terrorists long sought but always lacked: a social base. And its base is growing rapidly, thanks in part to the war in Iraq.

The Dutch General Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD) says that radical Islam in the Netherlands encompasses "a multitude of movements, organizations and groups." Some are nonviolent and share only religious dogma and a loathing for the West. But AIVD stresses that others, including al Qaeda, are also "stealthily taking root in Dutch society" by recruiting estranged Dutch-born Muslim youths. An AIVD report portrays such recruits watching jihadist videos, discussing martyrdom in Internet chat rooms, and attending Islamist readings, congresses, and summer camps. Radical Islam has become "an autonomous phenomenon," the AIVD affirms, so that even without direct influence from abroad, Dutch youth are now embracing the fundamentalist line. Much the same can be said about angry young Muslims in Brussels, London, Paris, Madrid, and Milan.

The Rank and File

Broadly speaking, there are two types of jihadists in western Europe: call them "outsiders" and "insiders." The outsiders are aliens, typically asylum seekers or students, who gained refuge in liberal Europe from crackdowns against Islamists in the Middle East. Among them are radical imams, often on stipends from Saudi Arabia, who open their mosques to terrorist recruiters and serve as messengers for or spiritual fathers to jihadist networks. Once these aliens secure entry into one EU country, they have the run of them all. They may be assisted by legal or illegal residents, such as the storekeepers, merchants, and petty criminals who carried out the Madrid bombings.

Many of these first-generation outsiders have migrated to Europe expressly to carry out jihad. In Islamist mythology, migration is archetypically linked to conquest. Facing persecution in idolatrous Mecca, in AD 622 the Prophet Muhammad pronounced an anathema on the city's leaders and took his followers to Medina. From there, he built an army that conquered Mecca in AD 630, establishing Muslim rule. Today, in the minds of mujahideen in Europe, it is the Middle East at large that figures as an idolatrous Mecca because several governments in the region suppressed Islamist takeovers in the 1990s. Europe could even be viewed as a kind of Medina, where troops are recruited for the re-conquest of the holy land, starting with Iraq.

The insiders, on the other hand, are a group of alienated citizens, second- or third-generation children of immigrants, like Bouyeri, who were born and bred under European liberalism. Some are unemployed youth from hardscrabble suburbs of Marseilles, Lyon, and Paris or former mill towns such as Bradford and Leicester. They are the latest, most dangerous incarnation of that staple of immigration literature, the revolt of the second generation. They are also dramatic instances of what could be called adversarial assimilation—integration into the host country's adversarial culture. But this sort of anti-West westernization is

illustrated more typically by another paradigmatic second-generation recruit: the upwardly mobile young adult, such as the university-educated Zacarias Moussaoui, the so-called 20th hijacker, or Omar Khyam, the computer student and soccer captain from Sussex, England, who dreamed of playing for his country but was detained in April 2004 for holding, with eight accomplices, half a ton of explosives aimed at London.

These downwardly mobile slum dwellers and upwardly mobile achievers replicate in western Europe the two social types that formed the base of Islamist movements in developing countries such as Algeria, Egypt, and Malaysia: the residents of shanty-towns and the devout bourgeois. As in the September 11 attacks, the educated tend to form the leadership cadre, with the plebeians providing the muscle. No Chinese wall separates first-generation outsiders from second-generation insiders; indeed, the former typically find their recruits among the latter. Hofstad's Syrian imam mentored Bouyeri; the notorious one-eyed imam Abu Hamza al-Masri coached Moussaoui in London. A decade ago in France, the Algerian Armed Islamic Group proselytized beurs (the French-born children of North African immigrants) and turned them into the jihadists who terrorized train passengers during the 1990s. But post-September 11 recruitment appears more systematic and strategic. Al Qaeda's drives focus on the second generation. And if jihad recruiters sometimes find sympathetic ears underground, among gangs or in jails, today they are more likely to score at university campuses, prep schools, and even junior high schools.

The Iraq Effect

According to senior counterintelligence officials, classified intelligence briefings, and wiretaps, jihadists extended their European operations after the roundups that followed September 11 and then again, with fresh energy, after the invasion of Iraq. Osama bin Laden now provides encouragement and strategic orientation to scores of relatively autonomous European jihadist networks that assemble for specific missions, draw operatives from a pool of professionals and apprentices, strike, and then dissolve, only to re-group later.

Typically these groups target European countries allied with the United States in Iraq, as was proved by the Madrid bombings, the November 2003 attacks on British targets in Istanbul, as well as the lion's share of some 30 spectacular terrorist plots that have failed since September 11. In March 2004, within days of the London police chief's pronouncement that a local terrorist attack was "inevitable," his officers uncovered a plot involving nine British nationals of Pakistani origin and seized the largest cache of potential bomb-making material since the heyday of the Irish Republican Army. A few months later, Scotland Yard charged eight second-generation South Asian immigrants, reportedly trained in al Qaeda camps, with assembling a dirty bomb. Three of them had reconnaissance plans showing the layout of financial institutions in three U.S. cities.

Several hundred European militants—including dozens of second-generation Dutch immigrants "wrestling with their identity," according to the Dutch intelligence service—have

also struck out for Iraq's Sunni Triangle. In turn, western Europe serves as a way station for mujahideen wounded in Iraq. The Iraq network belongs to an extensive structure developed by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, now formally bin Laden's sworn ally and the "emir" of al Qaeda in Iraq. Recently unsealed Spanish court documents suggest that at a meeting in Istanbul in February 2002, Zarqawi, anticipating a protracted war in Iraq, began to lay plans for a two-way underground railway to send European recruits to Iraq and Middle Eastern recruiters, as well as illegal aliens, to Europe. Zarqawi also activated sleeper cells established in European cities during the Bosnian conflict.

A chief terrorism investigator in Milan, Armando Spataro, says that "almost all European countries have been touched by [Iraq] recruiting," including, improbably, Norway, Switzerland, Poland, Bulgaria, and the Czech Republic. The recruitment methods of the Iraq network, which procures weapons in Germany from Balkan gangs, parallels those for the conflicts in Chechnya and Kashmir. Thanks to its state-of-the-art document-forging industry, Italy has become a base for dispatching volunteers. And Spain forms a trunk line with North Africa as well as a staging area for attacks in "al Andalus," the erstwhile Muslim Spanish caliphate.

Lax Populi

Although for some Europeans the Madrid bombings were a watershed event comparable to the September 11 attacks in the United States, these Europeans form a minority, especially among politicians. Yet what Americans perceive as European complacency is easy to fathom. The September 11 attacks did not happen in Europe, and for a long time the continent's experience with terrorism mainly took the form of car bombs and booby-trapped trash cans. Terrorism is still seen as a crime problem, not an occasion for war. Moreover, some European officials believe that acquiescent policies toward the Middle East can offer protection. In fact, while bin Laden has selectively attacked the United States' allies in the Iraq war, he has offered a truce to those European states that have stayed out of the conflict.

With a few exceptions, European authorities shrink from the relatively stout legislative and security measures adopted in the United States. They prefer criminal surveillance and traditional prosecutions to launching a U.S.-style "war on terrorism" and mobilizing the military, establishing detention centers, enhancing border security, requiring machine-readable passports, expelling hate preachers, and lengthening notoriously light sentences for convicted terrorists. Germany's failure to convict conspirators in the September 11 attacks suggests that the European public, outside of France and now perhaps the Netherlands, is not ready for a war on terrorism.

Contrary to what many Americans concluded during Washington's dispute with Paris in the lead-up to the invasion of Iraq, France is the exception to general European complacency. Well before September 11, France had deployed the most robust counter-terrorism regime of any Western country. Irish terrorism may have diverted British attention from

jihad, as has Basque terrorism in Spain, but Algerian terrorism worked the opposite effect in France.

To prevent proselytizing among its mostly North African Muslim community, during the 1990s the energetic French state denied asylum to radical Islamists even while they were being welcomed by its neighbors. Fearing, as Kepel puts it, that contagion would turn "the social malaise felt by Muslims in the suburbs of major cities" into extremism and terrorism, the French government cracked down on jihadists, detaining suspects for as long as four days without charging them or allowing them access to a lawyer. Today no place of worship is off limits to the police in secular France. Hate speech is rewarded with a visit from the police, blacklisting, and the prospect of deportation. These practices are consistent with the strict Gallic assimilationist model that bars religion from the public sphere (hence the headscarf dispute).

Contrast the French approach to the United Kingdom's separatist form of multiculturalism, which offered radical Arab Islamists refuge and the opportunity to preach openly, while stepping up surveillance of them. French youth could still tune into jihadist messages on satellite television and the Internet, but in the United Kingdom open radical preaching spawned terrorist cells. Most of the rest of Europe adopted the relaxed British approach, but with less surveillance.

Now, the Madrid bombings and the van Gogh killing have strengthened the hand of engaged politicians, such as Germany's Social Democratic interior minister, Otto Schily, and the former French interior minister, Nicolas Sarkozy, who leads the governing Union for a Popular Movement. They have also prompted Brussels, London, Madrid, Paris, and The Hague to increase resources and personnel devoted to terrorism.

In general, European politicians with security responsibilities, not to mention intelligence and security officials who get daily intelligence reports, take the harder U.S. line. Schily has called for Europe-wide "computer-aided profiling" to identify mujahideen. The emergence of holy warriors in Europe and the meiosis of radical groups once connected to al Qaeda have prompted several European capitals to increase cooperation on counterterrorism as well as their counterterrorism resources and personnel.

Yet a jihadist can cross Europe with little scrutiny. Even if noticed, he can change his name or glide across a border, relying on long-standing bureaucratic and legal stovepipes. After the Madrid bombings, a midlevel European official was appointed to coordinate European counterterrorist statutes and harmonize EU security arrangements. But he often serves simply as a broker amid the gallimaufry of the 25 member states' legal codes.

Since the Madrid bombings, the Spanish Interior Ministry has tripled to 450 the number of full-time antiterrorism operatives, and the Spanish national police are assigning a similar number of additional agents to mujahideen intelligence. Spanish law enforcement established a task force combining police and intelligence specialists to keep tabs on Muslim neighborhoods and prison mosques. Similarly, special police cells are being organized in each

of France's 22 regions, stepping up the surveillance of mosques, Islamic bookshops, long-distance phone facilities, and halal butchers and restaurants.

The 25 EU members have also put into effect a European arrest warrant allowing police to avoid lengthy extradition procedures. Despite widespread concerns about possible privacy abuses, several EU countries have lowered barriers between intelligence and police agencies since the van Gogh murder. Germany aims to place its 16 police forces under one umbrella. In France, Germany, Spain, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom, intelligence and police officers meet with officials in state-of-the-art communications centers, or "war rooms," to share information about interrogations, informant reports, live wiretaps, and video or satellite pictures.

Still, counterterrorism agencies remain reluctant to share sensitive information or cooperate on prosecutions. Measures proposed in the wake of the Madrid attacks, such as a Europe-wide fingerprint and DNA database and biometric passports, remain only that—proposals. Fragmentation and rivalry among Europe's security systems and other institutions continue to hamper counterterrorism efforts. For nearly a decade, France has sought the extradition of the organizer of several bombings in the Paris metro in the 1990s, but his case languishes in the British courts to the anguish of the Home Office as well as Paris.

The new mujahideen are not only testing traditional counterterrorist practices; their emergence is also challenging the mentality prevailing in western Europe since the end of World War II. Revulsion against Nazism and colonialism translated into compassion toward religious minorities, of whatever stripe. At first, Muslim guest workers were welcomed in Europe by a liberal orthodoxy that generally regarded them as victims lacking rights. In some countries, such as the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, that perspective spawned a comprehensive form of multiculturalism. London's version verged on separatism. While stepping up surveillance, the British authorities allowed Islamists refuge and an opportunity to preach openly and disseminate rabid propaganda. Multiculturalism had a dual appeal: it allowed these states to seem tolerant by showering minorities with rights while segregating them from, rather than absorbing them into, the rest of society. Multiculturalism dovetailed with a diminished Western ethos that suited libertarians as well as liberals.

But now many Europeans have come to see that permissiveness as excessive, even dangerous. A version of religious tolerance allowed the Hamburg cell to flourish and rendered German universities hospitable to radical Islam. Now Europeans are asking Muslims to practice religious tolerance themselves and adjust to the values of their host countries. Tony Blair's government requires that would-be citizens master "Britishness." Likewise, "Dutch values" are central to The Hague's new approach, and similar proposals are being put forward in Berlin, Brussels, and Copenhagen. Patrick Weil, the immigration guru of the French Socialist Party, sees a continental trend in which immigrant "responsibilities" balance immigrant "rights."

The Dutch reaction to van Gogh's assassination, the British reaction to jihadist abuse of political asylum, and the French reaction to the wearing of the headscarf suggest that Eu-

Europe's multiculturalism has begun to collide with its liberalism, privacy rights with national security. Multiculturalism was once a hallmark of Europe's cultural liberalism, which the British columnist John O'Sullivan defined as "free[dom] from irksome traditional moral customs and cultural restraints." But when multiculturalism is perceived to coddle terrorism, liberalism parts company. The gap between the two is opening in France, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and to some extent even in Germany, where liberalism stretched a form of religious tolerance so much so that it allowed the Hamburg cell to turn prayer rooms into war rooms with cocky immunity from the German police.

Yet it is far from clear whether top-down policies will work without bottom-up adjustments in social attitudes. Can Muslims become Europeans without Europe opening its social and political circles to them? So far, it appears that absolute assimilationism has failed in France, but so has segregation in Germany and multiculturalism in the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. Could there be another way? The French ban the headscarf in public schools; the Germans ban it among public employees. The British celebrate it. The Americans tolerate it. Given the United States' comparatively happier record of integrating immigrants, one may wonder whether the mixed U.S. approach—separating religion from politics without placing a wall between them, helping immigrants slowly adapt but allowing them relative cultural autonomy—could inspire Europeans to chart a new course between an increasingly hazardous multiculturalism and a naked secularism that estranges Muslims and other believers. One thing is certain: if only for the sake of counterterrorism, Europe needs to develop an integration policy that works. But that will not happen overnight.

Indeed, the fissure between liberalism and multiculturalism is opening just as the continent undergoes its most momentous population shift since Asian tribes pushed westward in the first Christian millennium. Immigration obviously hits a national security nerve, but it also raises economic and demographic questions: how to cope with a demonstrably aging population; how to maintain social cohesion as Christianity declines and both secularism and Islam climb; whether the EU should exercise sovereignty over borders and citizenship; and what the accession of Turkey, with its 70 million Muslims, would mean for the EU. Moreover, European mujahideen do not threaten only the Old World; they also pose an immediate danger to the United States.

A Finer Sieve

The United States' relative success in assimilating its own Muslim immigrants means that its border security must be more vigilant. To strike at the United States, al Qaeda counts less on domestic sleeper cells than on foreign infiltration. As a 9/11 Commission staff report put it, al Qaeda faces "a travel problem": How can it move its mujahideen from hatchery to target? Europe's mujahideen may represent a solution.

The *New York Times* has reported that bin Laden has outsourced planning for the next spectacular attack on the United States to an "external planning node." Chances are it

is based in Europe and will deploy European citizens. European countries generally accord citizenship to immigrants born on their soil, and so potential European jihadists are entitled to European passports, allowing them visa-free travel to the United States and entry without an interview. The members of the Hamburg cell that captained the September 11 attacks came by air from Europe and were treated by the State Department as travelers on the Visa Waiver Program (VWP), just like Moussaoui and Richard Reid, the shoe bomber.

Does that mean the VWP should be scrapped altogether, as some members of Congress are asking? By no means. The State Department is already straining to enforce stricter post-September 11 visa-screening measures, which involve longer interviews, more staff, and more delays. Terminating the VWP would exact steep bureaucratic and diplomatic costs, and rile the United States' remaining European friends. Instead, the United States should update the criteria used in the periodic reviews of VWP countries, taking into account terrorist recruiting and evaluating passport procedures. These reviews could utilize task forces set up in collaboration with the Europeans. Together, U.S. and European authorities should insist that the airlines require U.S.-bound transatlantic travelers to submit passport information when purchasing tickets. Such a measure would give the new U.S. National Targeting Center time to check potential entrants without delaying flight departures. And officers should be stationed at check-in counters to weed out suspects.

Europe's emerging mujahideen endanger the entire Western world. Collaboration in taming Muslim rancor or at least in keeping European jihadists off U.S.-bound airplanes could help reconcile estranged allies. A shared threat and a mutual interest should engage media, policymakers, and the public on both sides of the Atlantic. To concentrate their minds on common dangers and solutions might come as a bittersweet relief to Europeans and Americans after their recent disagreements.

Chapter 14

**Jihadism in the US:
Creating an Ideological Profile**

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The taxonomy of Sunni activism defines Islamists as those who endeavor to implement Islamic law, viewing the *Shari'a* as the primary source of law for their society. Among them are Salafis, who pursue a specific program of social, political and religious reform. Within the circle of Salafis are jihadi activists, who consider militant struggle to be the best means of establishing an Islamic state and improving the status of Muslims worldwide.

The ability to identify an individual or group's driving ideology is a highly challenging but invaluable tool in detecting and combating terrorist activity in the United States. Gauging one's proclivity toward violence does not rest solely on establishing one's alliance with a jihadi organization. Instead, there are a set of issues that define the ideology of one who is willing to use violence to further an Islamist agenda.

Yet, the number of dedicated adherents to the global jihadi movement accounts for only a minute portion of overall Muslims. Investigative and law enforcement agencies may find themselves in unfamiliar territory when attempting to identify those groups or individuals that pose the risk of carrying out terrorist attacks, or radicalizing others toward that end. Understanding where one fits into the ideological spectrum of contemporary Islamism can allow for some accurate prediction of motivation and intent. That, along with organizational affiliations, educational and outreach networks (and the outlook that accompanies them), can provide a broad ideological profile useful—although by no means definitive—in gauging the risk of violent activity.

Terrorism Arrests since 9/11

Since the attacks of September 11, there have been roughly 375 terrorism-related arrests in the U.S.¹ The table in Appendix A shows a sample of these arrests, representative of the diverse backgrounds of those involved in terrorism cases. One observes that, based on the

¹ U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, "The Department of Justice's Internal Controls Over Terrorism Reporting," accessed at: <http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/reports/plus/a0720/final.pdf>, on December 2, 2007.

arrests, participants or sympathizers of jihad are both converts and Muslims born into the faith. Some were born in the U.S., some were naturalized citizens or became legal residents, while a handful were illegal immigrants. The list of arrests includes those of Arab, South Asian, Caribbean, African-American and European descent.

The partial list of arrests and indictments since 9/11 purposefully omits those implicated in funding terrorist activities. These cases include the Elashi brothers' alleged efforts to aid Hamas, the inquiry into the Safa Group/SAAR Foundation in northern Virginia and its subsidiaries, and other fraudulent charities like KindHearts International, as well as cigarette smuggling for Hezbollah. Terrorism financing is, without doubt, an essential aspect of counter terrorism activities in the U.S. However, such cases have a different set of variables that motivate the individuals to act, sometimes in concert with nationalist concerns such as the conflicts in Palestine, Lebanon, Kashmir, etc.

The table also includes a terrorist cell in Toronto, Canada that was disrupted in 2006. Although not based in the U.S., the individuals shared the ideology of American groups and individuals intent upon jihad, and further illustrate the ethnic diversity among its members. The Toronto group was comprised of Muslims from Somali, Pakistani, Caribbean, and Arab origin, bound by their common belief in the need to confront the Canadian government for their "oppression" of Muslims overseas.²

What the arrests and indictments demonstrate, above all, is that there is no singular ethnic or racial profile that can be derived from the pattern of terrorist activity in the U.S. since September 11. Those involved in violent jihad in the U.S. and Canada are of numerous ethnic backgrounds—including those of South Asian, Arab, and African descent, as well as converts of Asian, European and African heritage. Because of the diversity of participants in the jihad identified by the arrests, it proves difficult and inefficient to create a profile for violent Islamist activism based on race or ethnicity.

With the exception of October Lewis, the wife of one of the Portland Seven, all of the 90 individuals included in the table of arrests are male. While jihadi ideologues have encouraged women to support the jihad, female combatants are a rare occurrence.³ In terms of age, the results of the compiled arrests in Appendix A are mixed. The individuals do not fall into any one age bracket. The recorded age at the time of arrest ranged from 19 to 63, with more than half in their twenties. For obvious reasons, younger males are more desirable contributors to militant action than are older males. There were notable exceptions: Abdul Qayyum Jamal, 43, arrested in the Toronto plot; Christopher Paul, 43, arrested in the Columbus, OH mall plot; and Russell DeFreitas, 63, arrested in the JFK bomb plot. Others over the

2 CBC News, In-depth: Toronto Bomb Plot, <http://www.cbc.ca/news/background/toronto-bomb-plot/index.html>, accessed on December 4, 2007.

3 'Abdullah 'Azzam encourages women to support the jihad through financial means, and directly participate only in "exceptional" cases. *Militant Ideology Atlas*, Combating Terrorism Center, p. 44. Accessed at <http://ctc.usma.edu>.

age of 40, however, were charged with providing support to the jihad or attempting to aid al-Qa`ida or the Taliban overseas. The range in ages from those arrested does challenge the conception that the domain of jihad is exclusive to young males.

A number of the informal groups involved in terrorist activities coalesced because of an ideological affinity of the group members above any other factor. These informal networks all subscribed to a form of Islam that fits into the rubric of Salafism, in their views on society and the need for bringing about change. Organized groups predominately made up of men under age 30 include the Virginia Jihad Group, the Lackawanna Six, the Portland Seven and the Ft. Dix Group. All believed in the need to prepare for jihad as an obligation of that faith, and in order to serve the global Muslim community. Those four groups (though not every individual in the group) did engage in some form of paramilitary training for participating in jihad, either within the U.S. or overseas.

With the exception of the seven men charged in the Miami-based plot to bomb the Sears Tower in Chicago, all individuals in Appendix A were tied to Salafi-oriented activism. The Miami group, known as the Liberty City Seven, for the Miami neighborhood where they organized, subscribed to teachings that blended Christianity and Islam. The Seas of David, the obscure organized group of which the seven were members, developed teachings partially derived from those of the Moorish Science Temple of America, according to Narseal Batiste, the group's alleged leader.⁴ It becomes clear after reviewing this sample of arrests in Appendix A that a shared ideology that allows for mutual interests with foreign jihadi groups like al-Qa`ida is the only common denominator present.

Underlying Beliefs

It is important to establish from the outset that an individual's likelihood of participating in Islamist violence is not a function of piety, how closely one adheres to Islamic teachings, but rather the acceptance of a set of radical doctrines that grew out of the Salafi movement. The Salafi movement itself has been evolving over the last two centuries, but the current strand of Salafism that espouses jihad as one of its primary tenets can be traced back to ideologues that rose to prominence in the last three decades. Salafi-jihadism is a movement dedicated to political and social change through violent means, which has attempted to gain legitimacy by justifying its actions in the Qur'an and *Sunna* (the teachings of the Prophet). Identifying the key characteristics of this movement can allow one to outline an ideological profile of its supporters.

Among those calling for a return to the "pure" Islam of the *salaf* (the pious predecessors, or the first three generations succeeding the Prophet) were a range of organized movements and charismatic individuals, some seeking violent change in order to implement their

⁴ CNN, "Indictment: Suspects wanted to 'kill all the devils we can'," June 24, 2006.

agenda. Such groups came to the fore in the 1970s, responding to conflicts with secular authority (e.g. the struggle with the Egyptian government; the anti-Soviet jihad). One result of the growth of organized jihad movements was an increasingly self-contained ideology resistant to external criticism. This ideology has since fueled the global jihadi movement, including al-Qa`ida, and attempts to forge Muslims into a unified body that will eventually usher in an Islamic state built broadly on the Salafi model.

“Salafi” has been used by a variety of parties to describe an agenda of strict orthodox reformation, popularized during the last two centuries, but with a range of societal and political implications. In many regards, these Salafi movements have been the instigators of the greatest social change, resistance and turmoil in the Islamic world. In the Arabian Peninsula, this call for a return to early Islamic ideals translated into a rigid orthodoxy imposed primarily in religious terms on its population, while the Salafi elite strongly discouraged social mobilization or political opposition of any kind. In other countries, most notably Egypt, Salafism meant organized social and political reform in order to implement the ideal vision of society.

The core theological concern of Salafi reformers and activists is upholding the oneness of God (*tawhid*). They frequently level other Muslims with the serious allegation of *shirk*, or polytheism—associating others with God—for excessive praise of the Prophet and other practices. Such a sin carries the weight of *kufir*, or disbelief. Furthermore, Salafis reject the doctrine of the Shi`a and other Muslims sects outright, especially Sufis; arguing that there is only one true way, that of the *Ahl al-Sunna wal-Jama`a*, (or the people of the sunna and the majority group). They are known in the Muslim world for their vehement opposition to what they brand “innovations” (*bid`a*) in popular religious practice, including the invocation of prophets or saints in prayer, visiting the graves of prophets or saints, praying or holding vigils at them, celebrating the *Mawlid* (the birthday of Prophet Muhammad); as well as the use of signing, instruments, photographs, and other popular rites accepted into Islamic practice over the centuries.

The mantra of the Salafis has been the call for exclusive use of the Qur`an and *hadith* (sayings of the Prophet), as well as the consensus of the salaf, as the only legitimate sources for understanding and formulating Islamic doctrine.⁵ This methodology has led to the view that Salafis possess the only correct understanding of the religion and must bring the Muslim community to their path as it has lost its way through decay, corruption and innovation. They find proof of this in the concept of the saved sect (*al-firqa al-najiyya*). This concept is rooted in a saying of the Prophet Muhammad that the Muslim nation will split into 73 sects and only one will be saved, those who follow the path of the Prophet and his companions.⁶

5 See Hamid Algar, *Wahhabism: a critical essay*, 2001; and the classical refutation *al-Fajr as-Sadiq* by Iraqi scholar Jamil Effendi al-Zahawi al-Hanbali al-Makki; the full title is: *al-Fajr as-Sadiq fi-r-Radd `ala Munkiri-t-Tawassul wa-l-Khawariq* (“The True Dawn: A Refutation of Those Who Deny The Validity of Using Means to Allah and the Miracles of Saints”).

6 Sunan Abu Dawud, *Book 40, Number 4579*, accessed at USC-MSA Compendium of

The concept of the saved sect is closely related to that of the *ghurabaa'* (strangers); this concept is used by Salafis to further demonstrate their unique place in guiding the Muslim community to salvation. *Ghurabaa'* refers to the strangeness of true believers in times of corruption. It is also rooted in a saying of the Prophet (*hadith*), "Islam began as something strange, and it would revert to its (old position) of being strange. So good tidings for the stranger."⁷ The Prophet clarifies that the strangers are those who forbid evil when mankind becomes corrupted. As such, Salafi groups and Salafi mosques often use this term in their names, mission statements, etc., and project an image of themselves as preservers of the true faith while others have abandoned the correct practices and worship of Islam.

An example of this concept in practice is found on the alghurabaa.co.uk website, which states: "We adopt the Aqeedah of Ahl ul-Sunnah wal Jama'ah referring to the Quran and the sunnah of the Messenger Muhammad (saw) in accordance with the understanding of the sahabah and the salaf of this ummah [the Muslim community] only, whilst rejecting all other false and erroneous sources which many have adopted [*sic*]." Some Salafis describe the "Strangers" in modern-day society as those who "...hate all of that which they used to do and any jaahiliyyah [ignorance] they come across, hence you never see them voting for man-made law, calling for Freedom, Secularism, Democracy, swearing allegiance to the president and its nation or committing any form of kufr or shirk. [*sic*]."⁸ This mindset is prototypical of Salafis; and such rigidity necessitates a unity of doctrine among their ranks.

Above all, the Salafi movement is distinguished by its drive to unify Islamic doctrine under its literalist and exclusionary interpretation of Islam, all the while presenting itself as the one true sect unadulterated by foreign influence and corrupting innovation. This core tendency has defined the activities of Salafis in their relations with other Muslims, including the need for violent resistance. In regards to their view of the West and non-Muslims, the Salafi movement has been divided on matters of appropriate methods and tactics of achieving change.

Divisions in Methodology

The most important categorization made in establishing an ideological profile involves activism. Muslim activism covers a range of goals and methodology, from educational and cultural missions, to deconstructing the state in order to create an Islamic state in its stead. The majority of contemporary movements find the existing political and social status of Muslims to be unacceptable; they differ over the means to rectify this situation and the specific type of action required.

Muslim Texts, <http://www.usc.edu/dept/MSA/>, on December 11, 2007.

7 Sahih Muslim, *Book 1, Number 0270*, accessed at USC-MSA Compendium of Muslim Texts, <http://www.usc.edu/dept/MSA/>, on December 11, 2007.

8 Islamic Thinkers Society, <http://www.islamicthinkers.com/>, accessed on December 10, 2007.

Organized Islamic movements hold differing views on a number of key issues pertaining to role of Muslims in society. They include the legitimate sources of Islamic law, Muslims' relationship to authority and the nature of democracy, the correct means of political involvement and organization, the future direction of the umma, and of course the use of violent tactics in bringing about change in the status of Muslims.

In essence, Salafi activism today can be divided into three main categories: reform-*da'wa* (literally invitation; proselytizing), political and jihadi. Each reflects the preferred method employed to achieve their aims, but all agree on the broad need for improving the status of Muslims vis-à-vis the West and non-Muslim societies.

Reform-*Da'wa* Activism

This category of Salafi activism is the broadest, encompassing educational, reform and missionary efforts. *Da'wa* is an important aspect of all Muslims' faith. For Salafis, however, the purpose of *da'wa* is less about conversion and instead aims to bring other Muslims' understanding of Islamic belief and practice in line with their own. While such efforts have been ongoing since the inception of Salafi reformation in 18th-century Arabia, today's efforts stem from organizational undertakings by Saudi Salafis beginning in the 1960s.

The main proponents of this type of activism are typically adherents or supporters of the Salafi establishment of Saudi Arabia. Under the aegis of the late 'Abd al-'Aziz bin Baz (d. 1999), Nasr al-Din al-Albani (d. 1999) and other leading shaykhs of the Salafi establishment, this movement has promoted *islah* (reform) and *tajdid* (renewal) and has generally forbade the use of violent tactics.⁹ These groups reject *ijtihad* (individual interpretation) as a source of law, and decry other Muslims—and other Salafis—who organize for political participation or social activism as partisans undermining Islam.¹⁰

One of the primary aims of these reform-*da'wa* movements is to "purify" Islam, a process known as *tasfiya*. These movements revolve around scholars who devote their efforts to refuting what they perceive to be erroneous Muslim beliefs and practices that lead the *umma* (global Muslim community) astray. Such groups and individuals most often dedicate their time to educational or informational endeavors, seeking to bring about gradual change through the individual and ultimately the broader society.

Political Activism

The primary organization for political Muslim activism is the *Ikhwan al-Muslimin*, or Muslim Brotherhood, originally founded in the 1920s in Egypt. The Muslim Brotherhood

9 Quintan Wiktorowicz. 2001. *The Management of Islamic Activism: Salafis, the Muslim Brotherhood, and State Power in Jordan*. Albany: State University of New York

10 See Salafipublications.com for examples of (Saudi) Salafi views of "parties and sects."

has operated in the United States since the early 1960s, then primarily through student and youth activist organizations. The first chapter of the brotherhood was formed in the U.S. in the early 1960s in the Midwest, and incorporated as a "cultural society".¹¹ Today, ties are weak between the *Ikhwan* in Egypt and Muslim organizations founded or rooted in the U.S. in the sixties, but the Islamic reform principles carried out through the mobilization of Muslims continues.

Islamist activism in the United States began in earnest with the formation of the Muslim Students Association (MSA) in Illinois in 1963. Three of the MSA's founders were members of the Muslim Brotherhood, Dr. Ahmad Sakr, Dr. Ahmad Totonji, and Jamal Barzinji, who helped bring the teachings of the Brotherhood (those of Hasan al-Banna and Sayyid Qutb) to Muslim students.¹² Out of this original group of activists sprung the most influential Muslim organizations: the Islamic Society of North America, the Islamic Circle of North America, and others. These organizations, established by immigrants, were among the first to provide English-language materials on Islam to Muslims and non-Muslims alike, and gained an early footing among the Muslim community in America.

The Muslim American Society (MAS) is perhaps the foremost Islamist organization attempting to fulfill the objectives of the Muslim Brotherhood in the U.S.¹³ A top MAS leader, Shaker Elsayed, acknowledged that his organization was founded by the Muslim Brotherhood, "*Ikhwan* [Brotherhood] members founded MAS, but MAS went way beyond that point of conception."¹⁴ The MAS now operates an activist wing, an Islamic university, a council of Islamic schools in the U.S., a magazine, youth mission, and offers *fatwas* from Muhammad al-Hanooti, an imam who is accused of raising more than \$6 million for Hamas and was an unindicted co-conspirator in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing.¹⁵

The lines among the various types of Salafi activism can overlap. Yusuf Qaradawi represents one of the most active *da'wa*-based reformers, and is also a member of the Muslim Brotherhood. Qaradawi is one of the best-known clerics in the Muslim world, with a program on al-Jazira satellite network entitled *al-Shari'a wal-Hayat* (Islamic Law and Life). He also co-founded the popular Islamic website IslamOnline.net.¹⁶ He has focused his energies on *da'wa* activities, stating in an Ohio speech in 1995 that "conquest through *dawah*, that

11 Noreen Ahmed-Ullah, Sam Roe and Laurie Cohen. A rare look at secretive Brotherhood in America. *Chicago Tribune*, September 19, 2004.

12 Larry Poston. *Islamic Da'wah in the West: Muslim Missionary Activity and the Dynamics of Conversion to Islam*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992, p. 79.

13 See Ikhwanweb.info, "American Muslims' Campaign Against Egypt's HR Abuses Heats Up", and masnet.org.

14 Ahmed-Ullah, Noreen S., Roe, Sam and Cohen, Laurie. A rare look at secretive Brotherhood in America. *Chicago Tribune*, September 19, 2004.

15 Lyons, Brendan. Religious leader tied to terror. *Times Union*, June 30, 2002.

16 *Militant Ideology Atlas*, <http://ctc.usma.edu/atlas/Atlas-ResearchCompendium.pdf>, accessed on December 7, 2007.

is what we hope for... We will conquer Europe, we will conquer America, not through the sword but through *dawah*.”¹⁷

Unlike the reform-*da'wa* movements, political activism does call for organized resistance, but is willing to work under a democratic framework to achieve its ends. One tactic common to reformers and political activists is outreach activities under the umbrella of *da'wa*. Both types of activists employ non-violent tactics to rally Muslims to a given cause, raise awareness among non-Muslims, or promote an Islamist agenda.

Militant Activism

A set of clerics who reach their audience primarily online are highly influential among militant Salafis, and their credentials help provide legitimacy to jihadi activities. Among them are Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, Abu Basir al-Tartusi, and Abu Qatada al-Filistini—contemporary Salafi clerics who frequently provide *fatwas*, or religious rulings, legitimizing violent acts against unbelievers.¹⁸ Their literature debates the proper meaning and best approach to implementing the *Shari'a* in the current political climate, rejecting the idea that Muslims can permissibly live under man-made laws. To do so, and willfully participate in a democracy, is depicted as inherently contradictory with the Qur'anic injunctions revealed to humanity, which in their view provide the legal basis for Islamic society.

The aim of these scholars and the movement they back is rarely jihad itself. Such Salafi-jihadi scholars seek to persuade Muslims of the need to resist as part of a larger effort to adhere to the practices of the *salaf* toward returning to a pure Islamic society, much as reformist and political Salafis do. This movement, however, calls on the individual Muslim to fulfill his or her obligation to Islam through supporting jihad against the “tyrannical” or “oppressive” forces confronting Muslims.

The beliefs of jihadi activists and sympathizers follow the teachings of militant Salafi ideologues. Those leaders put forth an ideology that prioritizes violent resistance in order to defend the community of believers from outside oppression. These views were successfully imbued into those involved in the terrorism cases listed in Appendix A, where the individuals either planned attacks or sought overseas training toward furthering the jihad.

Profile of a Homegrown Terrorist Plot

The six young men arrested in the plot to attack Ft. Dix army post in New Jersey shared an ideology akin to the Lackawanna Six, the Portland Seven, and other jihadi activists. The group crafted a plan that aimed to kill around 100 soldiers on the post as their contribu-

17 John Mintz and Douglas Farah, “In Search Of Friends Among The Foes,” *Washington Post*, September 11, 2004.

18 The writings of these clerics, and analysis of their writing, can be found in the Militant Ideology Atlas, available at <http://cc.usma.edu/atlas>.

tion to the jihad, in homage to the 9/11 hijackers and in the hopes of, demonstrating that an attack against US military personnel, on American soil, could be executed.

The Ft. Dix group formed independently while worshipping at two Philadelphia-area mosques. Others at the mosque recalled how they openly promoted their desire for *Shari'a* law in the United States.¹⁹ The defendants in the case did not have an extensive knowledge of Salafi literature or doctrine, although they clearly did consider themselves a part of that movement.

Mohamed Shnewer, the only one of the six who spoke and read Arabic, downloaded numerous videos by al-Sahab²⁰ Productions, one of the media outfits that produces al-Qa`ida's audio and video releases. Shnewer was also a vigorous proponent of these jihadi videos, distributing them to members of the group and others with whom they met. In this sense, the group was obsessed with the culture of jihad as much as the theology of radical Islam, which can prove inaccessible to some (none had more than a high school education).

While the group's journey into militant ideology was years in the making, according to statements of friends and family, it is not known exactly when the group came together.

The three Duka brothers, Eljvir, Dritan and Shain, appear to have already gravitated to radical Islam before meeting Shnewer, Serdar Tatar or Agron Abdullahu. Given the information currently available in the case, the young men coalesced into a group through common world views, embracing Salafi ideology and, in particular, the jihadi tendency within the Salafi movement. Over a two to three year period, the group was fully dedicated to the Salafi agenda and its mindset, and increasingly disassociated themselves from America and American society. Ultimately, they arrived at a point where they considered militant action—against American soldiers either abroad or at home—a necessary part of their commitment to the global Muslim community.

During the Duka brothers' transformation into radical Islamists, their cousin Ramiz Duka noted pronounced changes in their behavior and appearance. The brothers became increasingly critical of Ramiz and other practicing Muslims, engaging in frequent disagreements over religious matters. The three grew beards, banned the playing of music (including traditional Albanian music), and began to criticize others for errors in their dress, behavior, and manner of prayer.²¹ The three Duka brothers went from being almost completely Americanized while in New York and in high school, to chastising other Muslims for incorrectly practicing the faith. A sudden obsession with upholding the *Shari'a*, in particular its outward components, is a common characteristic of recent Salafi converts.

19 George Anastasia, A Radical Shift in Reputation for 6 Men. *The Philadelphia Inquirer*, May 13, 2007.

20 Often transliterated as 'as-Sahab.'

21 Wilensky-Lanford, Ethan and Rohde, David. Relatives Noticed Changes in Accused Plotters. *The New York Times*, May 11, 2007.

During the course of the investigation, Eljvir Duka stated, "...at the end, when it comes to defending your religion, when someone is trying attacks your religion, your way of life, then you go jihad [*sic*]." ²² While simplistic, this view does indeed support the ideological portrait of jihadi activists and sympathizers; perceiving themselves and their community as being under siege. The group was moved by the message of the Salafi-jihadi movement, providing them with a means of responding to this external challenge to their faith and community.

Ali al-Timimi: Ideological Backing for Jihadi Activism

Islamic scholar and activist Ali al-Timimi embodies the ideology of Salafi Islam that can be transformed into militant activism among its adherents. Timimi was born in the U.S. in 1963 to parents who immigrated to Washington, D.C. from Baghdad.²³ He attended American schools, including the Georgetown Day school in Washington, until his parents moved to Saudi Arabia in 1978. At age 15, Timimi began Arabic language training at Manaret High School in Riyadh, where he quickly progressed in spoken and written Arabic. He also received instruction on Islamic worship and practices as interpreted by the austere traditions of Salafism in Saudi Arabia. He would continue his studies there, and undertook his earliest ideological training in his second year with one of today's best known English-speaking Salafi Imams, Bilal Phillips.²⁴

Canadian-born Bilal Phillips was a graduate of the Islamic University of Medina, one of the most influential institutions for Salafi learning, established in 1961. Timimi was influenced by his teacher, who emphasized the importance of strict adherence to the Qur'an and *sunna* (teachings of the Prophet), as he had learned in his own university instruction.²⁵ Ali returned to Washington in 1981 to begin college, with a newfound devotion and commitment to the Islam he had experienced in Riyadh.

Attending George Washington University, Timimi found that awareness and perceptions of Islam among Americans had changed greatly since 1978, when he left the U.S. The Iranian revolution and Juhayman al-'Utaybi's takeover of the Great Mosque in Mecca in 1979 had brought Islam into the political discussions of Americans to a much greater extent than in previous years. His interest in, and his devotion to, Islam continued throughout his college years, and he opted to return to Saudi Arabia in 1987 to attend Phillips' alma mater, the Islamic University of Medina.

22 Criminal complaint, U.S. v. Shain Duka et al. United States District Court, District of New Jersey, filed May 7, 2007.

23 Milton Viorst, "The Education of Ali al-Timimi," *The Atlantic Monthly*, June 2006.

24 Islamic Awakening, <http://www.islamicawakening.com/viewnews.php?newsID=4139>, accessed on December 4, 2007

25 Islamic Awakening, <http://www.islamicawakening.com/viewnews.php?newsID=4139>, accessed on December 4, 2007.

Timimi returned to the Washington area a year later to pursue a career in the U.S., at his family's urging. He had, nonetheless, formed ties to the Saudi clerical establishment which provides instruction at the university, including the grand mufti of the kingdom, 'Abd al-'Aziz bin Baz. Despite his early attachment to Saudi clerics, he was open to rational methods (bin Baz famously insisted the world was flat in a 1976 *fatwa*) and continued his pursuit of science, eventually defending his PhD dissertation at George Mason University in Virginia in computational biology.²⁶

Throughout the 1990s, Timimi delivered lectures at Islamic conferences and grew a small following, though most topics covered were doctrinal and apolitical. Mentored by Jafar Idris, a Sudanese shaykh who had settled in the northern Virginia area, Ali gave talks on Salafi doctrine and practices to followers in the area. Eventually, he founded a mosque and educational center, *Dar al-Arqam*, at a nondescript office park in Falls Church, VA. It was a group of his followers from this center that organized themselves into a paintball group; 11 men later indicted as the "Virginia Jihad Network," who had sought more formal jihad training overseas.

Timimi was sentenced to life in prison for inciting jihad among those followers. At a dinner hosted at the home of Yong Kwon, one of the frequent attendees at *Dar al-Arqam*, five days after September 11, 2001, Timimi told the young men that American troops would be legitimate military targets if they arrived in Afghanistan to topple the Taliban, and encouraged the young men to receive military training for violent jihad from the Pakistani militant group Lashkar-e-Taiba. He further counseled the young men that they were obligated to support the Taliban, Mullah Omar, and "the Arabs with them" by "body, wealth and word even if some find that distasteful."²⁷

In Timimi's case, his initial place in *da'wa*-centered Salafi activism turned to a call for militancy to his followers. Here, fellow Muslims involved in overseas conflicts—and the need to come to their aid—led the cleric to instruct his followers to prepare and engage in violent jihad as a necessary part of their faith.

Conclusion

The contemporary spectrum of Islamic doctrine and belief is widely varied. It ranges from liberal movements seeking greater cooperation and reconciliation with the West and non-Muslims to those violently opposed to it. There is no singular ideological profile for identifying a potential terrorist. Clearly, militant Salafis, or jihadi activists, pose a direct risk for terrorism against the U.S. But others, including political and *da'wa*-centered Salafi activists, can bolster ideological arguments for resistance, and usher individuals into an orbit of militancy.

26 Milton Viorst, "The Education of Ali al-Timimi," *The Atlantic Monthly*, June 2006.

27 Indictment in United States District Court, Eastern District of Virginia, United States of America v Ali al-Timimi.

APPENDIX A

Sample of indicted and convicted terrorists in the US and Canada since 9/11

Name	Age at arrest	Sex	Citizenship	Ethnic/national background	Conversion to Islam	Plot/group
Shain Duka	26	Male	US resident	Albanian		Ft. Dix group
Eljvir Duka	23	Male	US resident	Albanian		Ft. Dix group
Dritan Duka	28	Male	US resident	Albanian		Ft. Dix group
Mohamad Ibrahim Shnewer	22	Male	US	Palestinian		Ft. Dix group
Agron Abdullahu	24	Male	US resident	Albanian		Ft. Dix group
Serdar Tatar	23	Male	Turkish	Turkish		Ft. Dix group
Habis al-Saoub	38	Male	Jordanian	Palestinian		Portland Seven
Ahmed Bilal	25	Male	US	African-American	Yes	Portland Seven
Muhammad Bilal	22	Male	US	African-American	Yes	Portland Seven
Maher Hawash	39	Male	US	Palestinian		Portland Seven
Patrice Lumumba Ford	33	Male	US	African-American	Yes	Portland Seven
Jeffrey Bartle	32	Male	US	African-American		Portland Seven
October Lewis	25	Female	US	African-American		Portland Seven
Yasein Taher	24	Male	US	Yemeni		Lackawanna Six
Mukhtar al-Bakri	22	Male	US	Yemeni		Lackawanna Six
Shafel Mosed	24	Male	US	Yemeni		Lackawanna Six
Faysal Galab	26	Male	US	Yemeni		Lackawanna Six
Sahim Alwan	29	Male	US	Yemeni		Lackawanna Six
Yahya Goba	25	Male	US	Yemeni		Lackawanna Six
Masoud Ahmad Khan	31	Male	US	Pakistani		Virginia Jihad Group
Randall Todd Royer	30	Male	US	Caucasian	Yes	Virginia Jihad Group
Ibrahim Ahmed al-Hamdi	26	Male	Yemeni	Yemeni		Virginia Jihad Group
Yong Ki Kwon	27	Male	US	Korean	Yes	Virginia Jihad Group

Name	Age at arrest	Sex	Citizenship	Ethnic/national background	Conversion to Islam	Plot/group
Muhammed Aatique	30	Male	Pakistani	Pakistani		Virginia Jihad Group
Seifullah Chapman	30	Male	US	Caucasian	Yes	Virginia Jihad Group
Hammad Abdur-Raheem	35	Male	US	African-American	Yes	Virginia Jihad Group
Donald Surratt	30	Male	US	African-American	Yes	Virginia Jihad Group
Caliph Basha Ibn Abdur-Raheem	29	Male	US	N/A		Virginia Jihad Group
Khwaja Mahmood Hasan	27	Male	US	Pakistani		Virginia Jihad Group
Sabri Benkhala	28	Male	US	(Arab Origin)		Virginia Jihad Group
Ali Asad Chandia	26	Male	Pakistani	Pakistani		Virginia Jihad Group
Ehsanul Islam Sadequee	19	Male	US	Bangladeshi		Atlanta - casing buildings
Syed Haris Ahmed	21	Male	US	Pakistani		Atlanta - casing buildings
Richard C. Reid	28	Male	British	N/A		"Shoe-bomber"
Jose Padilla	31	Male	US	Latino		"Dirty Bomb" plot
Kifah Wael Jayyousi	43	Male	US	Jordanian		"Dirty Bomb" plot
Hamid Hayat	22	Male	US	Pakistani		Lodi, CA
Umer Hayat	47	Male	US	Pakistani		Lodi, CA
Russell Defreitas	63	Male	US	Guyanese		JFK Bomb Plot
Daniel Maldonado	28	Male	US	Puerto Rican	Yes	Support for al-Qa'ida
John Walker Lindh	20	Male	US	Caucasian	Yes	Support for al-Qa'ida
Adam Gadahn	28	Male	US	Caucasian	Yes	Support for al-Qa'ida
Tarik Shah	43	Male	US	African-American		Support for al-Qa'ida
Rafiq Abdus Sabir	52	Male	US	African-American		Support for al-Qa'ida
Abdulrahman Farhane	52	Male	US	Moroccan		Support for al-Qa'ida
Mahmud Faruq Brent	32	Male	US	N/A		Support for al-Qa'ida

Name	Age at arrest	Sex	Citizenship	Ethnic/national background	Conversion to Islam	Plot/group
Mujahid Abdulqaadir Menepta	51	Male	US	African-American	Yes	Support for al-Qa'ida
Ali al-Tamimi (b. 1963)	40	Male	US	Iraqi		NoVa Paintball
Kifah Wael Jayyousi	43	Male	US	Jordanian		Support for al-Qa'ida
Earnest James Ujaama (b. 1966)	36	Male	US	African-American	Yes	Bly, OR - support for al-Qa'ida
Syed Mustajab Shah	54	Male	Pakistani	Pakistani		Drugs for Missiles
Muhammed Abid Afridi	29	Male	Pakistani	Pakistani		Drugs for Missiles
Ilyas Ali	55	Male	US	Indian		Drugs for Missiles
Derrick Shareef	22	Male	US	African-American	Yes	Plot to attack IL Mall
Mohammad Ali Hasan Al-Moayad	55	Male	Yemeni	Yemeni		Cleric supporting al-Qa'ida
Mohammed Mohsen Yahya Zayed	29	Male	Yemeni	Yemeni		Asst to al-Moayad
Iyman Faris	33	Male	US	Pakistani		Brooklyn Bridge plot
Nuradin M. Abdi	32	Male	Somali	Somali		Columbus, OH mall plot
Christopher Paul	43	Male	US	African-American	Yes	Columbus, OH mall plot
Haroon Rashid Aswat	26	Male	British	Indian		Bly, OR - support for al-Qa'ida
James Elshafay	19	Male	US	Arab-American		New York subway plot
Shahawar Matin Siraj	23	Male	Pakistani	Pakistani		New York subway plot
Hammad Riaz Samana	21	Male	Pakistani	Pakistani		Los Angeles plots
Kevin James	29	Male	US	African-American	Yes	Los Angeles plots
Levar Washington	25	Male	US	African-American	Yes	Los Angeles plots

Name	Age at arrest	Sex	Citizenship	Ethnic/national background	Conversion to Islam	Plot/group
Gregory Patterson	21	Male	US	African-American	Yes	Los Angeles plots
Stanley Grant Phanor	31	Male	US	Haitian-American	Yes	Miami group-sears tower plot
Patrick Abraham	27	Male	Haitian	Haitian	Yes	Miami group-sears tower plot
Narseal Batiste	32	Male	US	Haitian-American	Yes	Miami group-sears tower plot
Lyglenson Lemorin	31	Male	US	Haitian	Yes	Miami group-sears tower plot
Naudimar Herrera	22	Male	US	Latino	Yes	Miami group-sears tower plot
Burson Augustin	21	Male	US	Haitian-American	Yes	Miami group-sears tower plot
Rotschild Augustine	22	Male	US	Haitian-American	Yes	Miami group-sears tower plot
Abdul Qayyum Jamal	43	Male	(Canadian)	Pakistani		Toronto cell
Muhammad Shareef Abdelhaleem	30	Male	(Canadian)	Egyptian		Toronto cell
Steven Vikash Chand	25	Male	(Canadian)	Sri Lankan	Yes	Toronto cell
Yasim Abdi Mohamed	25	Male	(Canadian)	Somali		Toronto cell
Jahmaal James	23	Male	(Canadian)	N/A		Toronto cell
Mohammed Ali Dirie	22	Male	(Canadian)	Somali		Toronto cell
Ibrahim Alkhalel Mohammed Aboud	19	Male	(Canadian)	N/A		Toronto cell
Fahim Ahmad	21	Male	(Canadian)	N/A		Toronto cell
Zakaria Amara	20	Male	(Canadian)	N/A		Toronto cell
Asad Ansari	21	Male	(Canadian)	N/A		Toronto cell
Ahmad Mustafa Ghany	21	Male	(Canadian)	Trinidadian (father)		Toronto cell
Amin Mohamed Durrani	19	Male	(Canadian)	N/A		Toronto cell
Saad Khalid	19	Male	(Canadian)	Pakistani		Toronto cell

Source: US Department of Justice releases; "Terrorist Trial Report Card: US Edition," Center on Law and Security, NYU School of Law; Newswire reports.

Chapter 15

Eight Phases to Restoring the Caliphate: Al-Qa`ida's Long-Term Strategy Against the West

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The ultimate goal of al-Qa`ida and its supporters is to re-establish the historic Caliphate and dominate the international order. To achieve this goal, the Salafi-Jihadi network continues to carry out a long-term jihad against the West and its allies in the Muslim world. Just as the transnational jihadi ideology of al-Qa`ida should not be viewed as an unsystematic amalgamation of fanatical beliefs, nor should its choice of targets or methods of attack be seen as random. Indeed, given the large body of al-Qa`ida's literature that speaks to this point, ignoring this fact would amount to a dangerous underestimation of a very deadly foe. The long-term strategy for undermining the West and re-establishing the Caliphate articulated by al-Qa`ida's leaders, ideologues, and supporters reflects a significant level of rationality.

Al-Qa`ida leaders, through their public communiqués, have described eight stages of the jihad. These are: 1) "awakening the masses"; 2) a long-term "war of attrition"; 3) severing Western-Muslim alliances; 4) "settling scores"; 5) the "management of savagery"; 6) establishing *Shari'a* law; 7) the removal of all Western influences from the region; and 8) re-establishment of the Caliphate. This chapter will discuss the successive stages of al-Qa`ida's long-term strategy to restoring the Caliphate. Note, however, that while the overall trajectory of their strategy proceeds successively from one stage to the next, the strategic imperatives of multiple phases can (and have been) pursued simultaneously. Indeed, many of the dynamics outlined in the following phases are understood by al-Qa`ida to be mutually reinforcing.

Awakening the Masses

In this initial stage al-Qa`ida primarily seeks to influence perceptions in the Muslim world. It opts to "expose" an alleged intrinsic US and Western hostility to Islam and Muslims, thereby raising the consciousness of the global Muslim community (*umma*). A central aim here is to increase popular support for, and recruitment into, al-Qa`ida while creating social opposition to Western influences in the Muslim world. Furthermore, al-Qa`ida strives

to reveal the alleged collaborative nature of "apostate" Muslim governments who support their Western "masters." To awaken the masses, al-Qa`ida utilizes a three-pronged strategy: a comprehensive public relations campaign on the internet; continuous demonization of the West; and attacks against Westerners and Western interests, intended to instigate a conflict between the West and Muslim masses and force the latter to pick sides in an epic battle.

Over the past seven years, al-Qa`ida and its supporters have launched a massive public relations campaign on the internet utilizing thousands of websites and web forums to spread their brand of militant Islamism. Through this effort al-Qa`ida and its supporters opt to "awaken the masses" by providing them with an easily accessible, and often highly sophisticated, alternative to mainstream media reporting. Since September 11, 2001, a range of jihadi websites have emerged. Although it is difficult to specify exact numbers, experts estimate that over the past few years, the number of jihadi websites dramatically increased from roughly dozens of websites in 2001 to more than 4,000 websites by 2005-2006.¹ In addition, sites maintained by members of al-Qa`ida and their supporters link to a plethora of al-Qa`ida-related media products, including statements of leaders, books written by members, texts outlining historical or doctrinal matters, numerous official magazines and most alarmingly, scores of operational manuals.

The second part of al-Qa`ida's plan to "awaken the masses" is to repeatedly claim a long-term and inherent Western conspiracy to subjugate and humiliate Muslims, and to steal Muslim treasure and resources. As stated in the following message issued by Usama bin Ladin in 2005:

One of the foremost motivations of our enemies is the desire to subjugate our lands and to steal our oil, for that, you should spare no effort is stopping the greatest theft in history from current and future generations through the work of collaborators. They take it for cheap knowing that the price of every other commodity has multiplied many times except for oil, which is the base of industry... Be vigilant to put a distance between them and oil, and concentrate your operations on it especially in Iraq and the gulf. This would be their end.²

Such statements are meant to generate sympathy and support for al-Qa`ida's actions among Muslims and to cast al-Qa`ida's activities in a "defensive" light. This strategy is further enforced by al-Qa`ida's attacks on Westerners.

A fundamental pillar of al-Qa`ida's objective of "awakening the masses" is its attacks on Western targets. The rationale for such attacks is neither erratic nor impulsive, but is aimed at creating a societal cleft between Muslims who share al-Qa`ida's worldview and those who do not. By doing so, al-Qa`ida hopes to create a polarized political climate where Muslim leaders are forced to explicitly align themselves with the West or with militant jihadi Islamism. Moreover, the intention to "draw the line and divide the people into two camps"³ has been stated explicitly by al-Qa`ida members. Al-Qa`ida wishes to discredit more mod-

erate trends in the Muslim world which renounce attacks on the West and the killing of Western civilians. Undeniably, al-Qa`ida and its supporters routinely accuse their critics in the Muslim world of waffling and blatant sedition against the Muslim cause and of adhering to "a curriculum of humiliation."⁴ Furthermore, attacking Westerners in the Muslim world also draws attention to moderate Muslim regimes' willingness to defend Western instillations and persons in their countries, while sacrificing their security forces who routinely die in clashes with jihadis or in the attacks carried out by them. By carrying out these attacks, Al-Qa`ida argues that it is exposing the true nature of "apostate" regimes who it portrays as puppets and servants of Western powers, regimes that are committed to protecting their "masters" even to the point of sacrificing their own men.⁵

***Harb Istinzaf*— A Long-Term "War of Attrition"**

Al-Qa`ida presently conceives of its jihad as spanning three phases: "awakening the masses;" a war of attrition; and the severing of Western-Muslim alliances. Principal emphasis, however, is placed on its prosecution of *harb istinzaf* (war of attrition)—also referred to as the stage of "vexation and exhaustion"—with the US and its allies. Al-Qa`ida's foremost strategic objective presently is to "bleed" and overextend the financial and military resources of the US by forcing it to spend enormous amounts of money to guard its domestic and international interests from terrorist attacks, and dragging it into prolonged military deployments overseas. The hypothesized US withdrawal from the Muslim World will be the result of *financial* considerations, first and foremost. Thus, al-Qa`ida sees its present struggle as one of economic warfare. In an audio recording released on December 26, 2001, Usama bin Ladin remarked that "America has been set back...and the economic bleeding still goes on today. Yet we still need more strikes."⁶ More recently, Abu Mus`ab al-Najdi, a Saudi member/supporter of the network, stated in October of 2005 that "this period is based on economic war due to the peculiar nature of the adversary...Usually wars are based on military strength...But our war with America is fundamentally different, for the first priority is defeating it economically."⁷ Another al-Qa`ida member has remarked that targeting the economies of the West is "the most dangerous and effective arena of Jihad, because we live in a materialistic world."⁸

The economic effects of targeting US and Western political, military, and commercial facilities and personnel domestically and abroad are, in al-Qa`ida's strategy of *harb istinzaf*, three-fold. First, these terrorist attacks directly result in the disruption or destruction of economic activity. Al-Qa`ida's leader, Usama bin Ladin, has explicitly stated, "The youth should strive to find weak points of the American economy and strike the enemy there."⁹ Al-Qa`ida's strategy of *harb istinzaf* is also intended to have a second, indirect effect on the economies of the US and the West. In order to prevent future terrorist attacks on potential targets domestically and abroad, both Western governments and private companies have been forced to exponentially increase their financial outlays on everything from facility secu-

rity to personnel training. Jihadis believe, whether correctly or incorrectly, that these increasing expenses will overextend state budgets and cause the profits of corporations to evaporate. The following excerpts from *Sawt al-jihad* (Voice of Jihad), al-Qa`ida's (now defunct) flagship periodical, describe these expectations:

Since September 11th America has been spending billions of dollars to protect its infrastructure and interests around the world...Striking the American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania means protecting every American embassy in the world. Striking the [USS] *Cole* at sea means protecting all American assets in the seas. Diversifying targets means protecting all American things in every land that may have terrorists!!!... The enemy was used to protecting a thousand interests outside his country, now he has to protect a million interests inside his country that need continuing protection!!...This is how America was transformed after one strike, protecting all that can be struck, and they guard all that can be used to strike with!¹⁰

Likewise, in the prolific treatise *Idarat al-Tawahhush* (the Management of Savagery) Abu Bakr Naji advises jihadi cells to not underestimate the value of "small" attacks against Western targets in favor of the more grandiose, "qualitative, medium" operations like the bombings in Bali and Iraq. The smaller-scale attacks, according to Naji, play the important role of exhausting and overextending the enemies' financial and military resources. He also encourages cells to both diversify their targets and to conduct multiple operations against similar targets in order to maximize the enemies' perception of vulnerability, and thus, their security expenditures.¹¹ Abu Bakr Naji also claims that *harb istinzaf* is the process by which al-Qa`ida intends to "bleed" the United States, forcing it to withdraw from its military, political, and economic involvement in the Muslim World. The three primary goals of this stage, according to Abu Bakr Naji, are: 1) dragging the US into a full-scale war with the Muslim masses, thus tarnishing the US image and rallying support for al-Qa`ida; 2) increasing recruitment into the network through "propaganda of the deed", e.g. "qualitative" attacks like the prominent bombings in Iraq; and 3) exacerbating the US military and economic overextension.¹²

The jihadis' "War of Attrition" intends, moreover, to undercut Western economies by creating an overall environment that discourages investment both into and from these economies. As stated in *Sawt al-jihad*,

If the enemy built his economy on the basis of open markets and free trade by getting the monies of investors, then we have to prove to these investors that the enemy's land is not safe for them, that his economy is not capable of guarding their monies, so they would abandon him to suffer alone the fall of his economy.¹³

Al-Qa`ida's stated objectives also include thwarting Western investment and business activity in the Muslim world. One of the network's operational manuals identifies the ob-

jectives of attacking Western economic targets in the Middle East (Iraq in particular) as “breaching the security and climate of stability that is necessary for economic growth, such as the bombing of oil pipelines in Iraq, which has made it less appealing for foreign corporations,” along with the “removal of foreign capitalists from domestic [Islamic] markets.” The author proceeds to describe attacks on “Jewish Crusader investments in Muslim lands,” “international corporations,” and “international economists and business experts” as ideal operations. Moreover, while US military targets and personnel are relegated to a position of secondary importance, primary emphasis is placed on targeting businessmen, “for business has global importance in this age.”¹⁴ The strategic imperative of targeting Western financial interests and hindering the alleged “theft of Muslim resources” has been repeatedly expressed by al-Qa`ida’s leaders and ideologues.¹⁵ The petroleum industry, in particular, has been singled out as an area of key value to jihadis.¹⁶

Severing Western-Muslim Alliances

The ultimate aim of al-Qa`ida’s “War of Attrition” is to prompt the US and its Western allies to abandon their military, economic, and political support for allied Muslim regimes. Thus, according to the network’s long-term strategy, the stage of *harb istinzaf* will be followed by the severing of Western-Muslim alliances. Al-Qa`ida intends to provoke the withdrawal of US and Western military forces from the region, to terminate all flows of direct economic and military assistance from the West to Muslim states. Jihadis are presently attempting to bring about the severing of Western-Muslim alliances through the economic warfare of *harb istinzaf*, inflicting damaging losses on US and Coalition forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, and a media strategy aimed at building popular support for jihadism among the Muslim masses and, interestingly, convincing the American and European publics that continuing involvement in the Muslim world is no longer in their interest.

Usama bin Ladin has long asserted that forcefully ending Western involvement in the Muslim world was a necessary precondition to the establishment of an Islamic state and eventual resurrection of the Caliphate. Explaining al-Qa`ida’s 1996 declaration of war against the US, bin Ladin remarked to CNN’s Peter Arnett that “our main problem is the US government, while the Saudi regime is but a branch or an agent of the US.”¹⁷ He therefore advocated that al-Qa`ida strike the “head of the snake”¹⁸ (the US) and refrain from targeting local regimes directly. Instructing his followers, bin Ladin said, “Leave them alone and do not preoccupy yourselves with them. They are scum... When they witness the defeat of the United States, they will be in their worst situation.”¹⁹ This perception placed bin Ladin squarely in the minority of jihadis throughout the early to mid 1990s. It was not until the latter part of the decade that he was joined by al-Qa`ida’s central ideologue, Ayman al-Zawahiri, in believing that the severing of Western-Muslim alliances must precede the toppling of “apostate” regimes.

The development of al-Qa`ida's ideology of transnational jihad against the "Zionist-Crusader" alliance can be seen as a reaction to militant Islamists' failure to overthrow secular regimes in the Muslim world and establish Islamic states from the 1960s until the late 1990s. Ayman al-Zawahiri, as head of the Egyptian terrorist organization al-Jihad al-Islami, remained focused on waging armed struggle against the "near enemy" (the "apostate" regime of Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak) and cautioned against transferring the jihad to the "far enemy" (the US and the West) throughout the 1980s and most of the 1990s. As late as 1996 he maintained that it was wrong to cease operations in Egypt to focus on the "Far Enemy."²⁰ While Usama bin Ladin has arguably seen the US as the "main *kufar* (heretics)" and has viewed the secular regimes of the Muslim world as "mere agents of the American-Israeli alliance"²¹ for the majority of his involvement in militant Islamism, Zawahiri's decision to unify al-Jihad with al-Qa`ida in 1998 marked a dramatic ideological break with his jihadi background. Part of his reasoning for this move is revealed in his 2001 memoirs, *Knights Under the Prophet's Banner*. Zawahiri ascribes the Egyptian government's ability to withstand the terrorist campaign waged against it throughout the 1980s and 90s to the alleged military and economic support provided by the US government.²² According to al-Qa`ida's leaders, the ruling regimes of the Muslim world are no more than "the hired policemen"²³ of the West, and therefore the task of overthrowing their rule requires first that the mujahidin strike the "head of the snake,"²⁴ the United States. Ayman al-Zawahiri further elaborates that the rationale behind attacking the West is to sever its alliances with regional actors. As he states:

The masters in Washington and Tel Aviv are using the [Muslim] regimes to protect their interest and to fight the battle against the Muslims on their behalf. If the shrapnel from the battle reaches their homes and their bodies, they will trade accusations with their agents about who is responsible for this. In that case, they will face one of two bitter choices: Either personally wage the battle against the Muslims, which means the battle will turn into clear-cut jihad against the infidels, or they reconsider their plans after acknowledging the failure of the brute and violent confrontation against Muslims. Therefore, we must move the battle to the enemy's grounds to burn the hands of those who ignite fire in our countries.²⁵

Additionally, Zawahiri stated that transnational jihad against the "Far Enemy" would be more successful in eliciting popular support for al-Qa`ida in the Muslim world. Reflecting on his experience confronting the Egyptian government as head of al-Jihad al-Islami, Zawahiri concludes that effective popular mobilization is the key to victory.²⁶ Usama bin Ladin and Ayman al-Zawahiri have both addressed the American and European public directly on multiple occasions in an apparent attempt to provoke internal dissent to their governments' involvement in the Muslim world. In 2005 Zawahiri instructed the British to cease their support for their Muslim allies and promptly withdraw from the Middle East.²⁷ The following year, in a direct statement to the American people, he urged them to "depart from our lands

and stop supporting corrupt rulers, and don't prevent the Muslim Umma from establishing its legitimate Shura [Shari'a] state accountable to it." 28

According to al-Qa'ida's strategic outlook, successful prosecution of *Harb Istinzaf* will prompt the severing of alliances between the US and the so-called "apostate" regimes of the Muslim World (Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Jordan, Morocco; etc). Deprived of Western economic and military assistance, these states will be greatly weakened in their resistance to al-Qa'ida and global jihadis as a whole. Eventually, their ability to project power in the peripheries of their territories will crumble, opening the way for *Tasfiyat Hisabat* "settling scores."

Tasfiyat Hisabat – "Settling Scores"

In addition to its desire to establish Shari'a law in Muslim lands, another significant motivator of al-Qa'ida attacks on secular and moderate Muslim regimes is to exact revenge for their historic persecution of Islamist operatives and ideologues. Al-Qa'ida is an amalgamation of numerous Islamist groups and actors many of which were imprisoned and tortured by secular Arab governments, including the second-in-command Ayman al-Zawahiri who spent numerous years in Egyptian prisons for his association with the killers of President Anwar Sadat. In addition, al-Qa'ida literature routinely invokes the memory of past "martyrs" such as Marwan Hadid and Sayyid Qutb who were imprisoned and killed by secular Arab governments in the 20th century. These men laid the ground work for Jihadi activity and ideology in the Arab world and are greatly admired by al-Qa'ida and its supporters. Sayyid Qutb was a prominent spokesman for the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood in the 1960's. A towering ideologue and a prolific writer, Qutb dramatically radicalized the movement during his tenure. He was hanged on August 29, 1966 for being implicated in an assassination attempt on Egyptian President Gamal 'Abd al-Nasir. The life journey, writings and execution of Sayyid Qutb greatly influenced Zawahiri and Bin Ladin. Marwan Hadid was a prominent operative of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood and played a key role in the movement's struggle against the Syrian government in 1964-65. After leading a minor revolt in Hama in 1965, Hadid was imprisoned, tortured and killed by Syrian security forces. He is often glorified as an important martyr in Jihadi literature.

As a whole the al-Qa'ida network wishes to exact revenge for these historical "injustices" committed against its members and mentors. It is important to keep in mind that Islamist forces have engaged in asymmetric warfare against secular governments in the Middle East for numerous decades. From the assassination of Egyptian Prime Minister Mahmud Fahmi Nuqrashi in 1948 to the 1982 Hama revolt in Syria and beyond, thousands of Islamist operatives, activists and ideologues have been imprisoned, tortured and killed by the security forces of secular Arab governments. As a result, a collective sense of revenge has swelled among the Islamist ranks. Simply stated, the al-Qa'ida network intends to avenge the historical persecution of Islamists by overthrowing secular and moderate Muslim govern-

ments. Once "apostate" Muslim regimes are weakened, al-Qa`ida will overthrow them and "settle scores" for past injustices by eradicating the leaders of these regimes and the members of their security forces. In fact, as described in the previous section, in addition to its desire to exhaust the United States, al-Qa`ida also attacks the United States to sever its alliances with its Muslim allies to weaken these regional actors and bring about their demise. As candidly stated in an al-Qa`ida communiqué issued in July 2004, "following these steps comes the awaited strike that will break the will of America, which will abandon its collaborators and agents so we can settle our scores with them. Then we launch the caravan to Jerusalem with God's permission."²⁹

Idarat al-Tawabbush – "The Management of Savagery"

One of the most thorough, first-hand descriptions to date of al-Qa`ida's long-term strategy for toppling apostate Arab regimes and creating a new, Islamic order can be found in "The Management of Savagery: The Most Critical Stage Through Which the Umma Will Pass," a compilation of articles authored under the penname Abu Bakr Naji.³⁰ While Naji's primary focus is, as the title implies, on the stage of "The Management of Savagery," the articles also provide a window to al-Qa`ida's imperatives and concerns regarding the "War of Attrition" (*harb istinzaf*). The most striking aspect of Naji's analysis, however, is how it combines the typical utopianism and inflation of capabilities that is prevalent throughout jihadi literature with a hyper-rational explication of Western history and political theory. Naji writes, "Each stage of this solution gives way to others in accordance with similar historical, and even modern, situations. This is not an elementary deduction."³¹ Indeed, it is Naji's apparent rationality that demands a closer look at the critical elements of al-Qa`ida's strategy during the "War of Attrition" and "The Management of Savagery."

The present US-led global order, according to Naji, is one whose dynamics adhere to a realist conception of international relations theory. Echoing the famous words of 19th century British statesman Henry John Temple, Naji states that "there is no eternal enmity in politics and no eternal friendships; rather, there are eternal interests."³² States are primarily motivated by material aim and attempt to maximize their power relative to other actors. The US maintains its dominance by propagating an "illusion of power" predicated on seemingly "overwhelming military strength," a "deceptive media halo," and the collusion of local proxies (*al-wukala*).³³ Naji, however, believes that the "human structure" of the US is weak in comparison to the Soviets in Afghanistan, and that the US attempts to compensate for this shortcoming through reliance on its technological and media superiority.³⁴ The "War of Attrition" phase of jihad, therefore, is primarily aimed at undermining confidence in the US—outside of, as well as within, the country—and exhausting its material capacity to exert dominance over the Muslim world.³⁵

As described previously, Naji outlines the three goals of *harb istinzaf* as tarnishing the US image and rallying support for jihadism in the Muslim world by forcing the US to at-

tack the Muslim world directly, increasing recruitment into al-Qa`ida through "propaganda of the deed" and rising anger towards the US, and exposing the US' overextension.³⁶ Jihadi cells—referred to by Naji as "vexation groups"—should engage in two types of armed operations during the phase of *harb istinzaf*: "small" attacks aimed at exhausting and overextending the enemies' resources, and "qualitative, medium operations like the operation in Bali... and the large operations in Iraq" that are primarily aimed at increasing recruitment.³⁷ Both types, moreover, should be carried out by "small, separate groups" spanning the globe, and should involve multiple attacks against the same type of target.³⁸ Jihadi cells who aspire to carry out "qualitative, medium" operations are urged to first prepare themselves by successfully executing attacks of the "small" variety.³⁹ Naji also warns that operations on the scale of the September 11th attacks should not be pursued without the involvement of the "High Command" (presumably al-Qa`ida's Majlis al-Shura).⁴⁰ Jihadis are also instructed to increase their level of coordination, and to aggressively infiltrate security and police forces, political offices, media and economic sectors. Finally, Naji recommends that jihadis consult the *al-Battar* magazine, the encyclopedias of the Afghan jihad, and the writings of Abu `Ubayd al-Qurashi in the *al-Ansar* journal in order to augment their operational capabilities.⁴¹

While the ongoing War of Attrition currently occupies the efforts of al-Qa`ida, it is the period which follows that Naji identifies as "the most crucial stage through which the umma will pass."⁴² The Management of Savagery serves as the vital link between the network's present struggle and its future goal of establishing Islamic states and, ultimately, the Caliphate. It is important to note, however, that al-Qa`ida foresees this stage as one that only a small group of states and regions in the Muslim world will undergo. This "priority group" was initially designated by "the leadership" three years prior to 9/11, was added to in the years following the attacks, and now includes Jordan, the Maghreb states, Pakistan, Yemen, Nigeria, and the Haramayn ("Land of the Two Holy Places," meaning Saudi Arabia).⁴³ Naji explains that this group has been identified according to geographical considerations, "the weakness of the ruling regime and the weakness of the centralization of its power in the peripheries of its state and sometimes in internal regions, particularly those that are overcrowded," the influence of jihadi groups in the given areas, the "nature" of the population, and the prevalence of weapons among the population.⁴⁴ The War of Attrition is to continue until "chaos and savagery breaks out in several" of these regions, after which al-Qa`ida's strategy becomes two-fold: Management of Savagery in the priority areas, and the continuation of War of Attrition in the remaining lands.⁴⁵ Naji writes:

"...When the large states or empires fell...and a state did not come into being which was equal in power or comparable to the previous state in its ability to control the lands and regions of the state which collapsed, the regions and sectors of this state became, according to human nature, subservient to what is called "administrations of savagery."⁴⁶

It is important to note here that, in Naji's view, a "region of savagery" usually denotes "a city, or a village, or two cities, or a district, or a part of a large city." Chaos and lawlessness is not expected to immediately cover the entire state or area, but rather, will spread slowly. Moreover, Naji is compelled to explain that al-Qa`ida's identification of Yemen as a "priority region" refers to the historic area of Yemen, not the modern state.⁴⁷

Naji conceives of the Management of Savagery as a form of "diminished government"⁴⁸ with a number of historic and modern precedents. The period in Medina directly following the Prophet Muhammad's arrival to the city in 622 AD (the *hijra*) is referred to as the "ideal order for the administration of savagery." More recently, the state of affairs in Afghanistan prior to the Taliban's rise to power is highlighted as an accurate representation of this concept.⁴⁹ Following the implosion of state control over large areas of the "priority group" states, "groups of vexation" (e.g. jihadi cells) will settle in the chaotic regions. Armed operations against the state's security forces will then trigger further state withdrawal, thus expanding the region of savagery.⁵⁰ The initial aims of the jihadi "management groups" in the regions of savagery will be the provision of basic human needs and security, defending the regions from outside attacks, and erecting "defensive fortifications." Successful administration of savagery, however, will also eventually include "establishing Shari`a justice," "raising the level of belief and combat efficiency during the training of the youth of the Regions of Savagery and establishing a fighting society at all levels," spreading theological and scientific knowledge, establishing an internal security/intelligence apparatus, "uniting the hearts of the world's people by means of money and uniting the world through shari`a governance," suppressing internal dissent, "progressing until it is possible to expand and attack enemies in order to repel them, plunder their money, and place them in a constant state of apprehension and (make them) desire reconciliation," "establishing coalitions with those with whom coalitions are permitted," and forming "managerial groups" to pursue the establishment of an Islamic state.⁵¹

In order to carry out these tasks, Naji explains that the administration will establish multiple specialized committees characterized by an efficient division of labor. Direction of these committees and authority over the region of savagery will be exercised by "managers" and "leaders." The latter will be extensively screened for their "reliability," and will "issue fundamental and secondary administrative decisions, while other[s] [will] issue decisions that include Shari`a dimensions." Managers, on the other hand, will deal with a "financial or nutritional sector" and will have only compartmentalized access to information.⁵² Al-Qa`ida's central problem at this stage, according to Naji, will be a deficit of knowledgeable administrators from within its own ranks. He therefore proposes the possible solution of giving many of the "manager" positions to natives of the regions of savagery.⁵³ Above the level of the "managers" and even the "leaders," however, is position of ultimate authority held (predictably) by the "High Command" of al-Qa`ida.⁵⁴

Naji recognizes that the nascent regions of savagery administered by jihadis will be quite vulnerable to Western military intervention. Aerial attacks, in particular, are identified as an area of major concern. He therefore recommends that jihadis adopt the strategy of "paying the price"—wielding the threat of future violence—due to its supposed capacity to deter intervention. Brutal, indiscriminate attacks on the enemy should be carried out in locations distant from the region of savagery, preferably by newly-formed jihadi cells that are seemingly disconnected from those administering the region. Naji predicts that this will prompt a desire for reconciliation on the part of the enemy, whereupon the region of savagery will seize the opportunity for a "temporary stop to fighting," but without any treaties or concessions.⁵⁵

Al-Qa`ida also believes that it will have to contend with potential rivals in the regions of savagery, competing with "other gangs and other parties." Whether these competing groups are quelled or their allegiance to the jihadi regions successfully elicited, Naji explains that al-Qa`ida will eventually achieve a position of dominance because "we will be the greatest organized force."⁵⁶ Jihadis will seek to expand the regions of savagery, increase popular support for its cause, and demoralize the enemies' forces through an aggressive media campaign.⁵⁷ Al-Qa`ida's central goal at the level of society, however, is polarization, a clear division between the righteous Umma and competing forces. Naji predicts that this will largely be achieved spontaneously within the regions of savagery, whereby society is divided between those who seek the protection of the Management of Savagery and those who seek the protection of the apostate regime.⁵⁸ However, it is through extreme bloodshed and violence that complete polarization is achieved. "We must drag everyone into the battle in order to give life to those who deserve to live and destroy those who deserve to be destroyed. We must drag all of the movements, the masses, and the parties to the battle and turn the table over the heads of everyone."

That the correct execution of the Management of Savagery will intrinsically entail the wholesale killing of thousands of individuals is not, evidently, reason for pause. For (quoting Shaykh Sulayman ibn Sihman), "If you fight the desert and the city until no one in them remains, this is better than a Taghut [tyrant] being appointed who rules contrary to the shari`a of Islam."⁵⁹

The Management of Savagery will culminate in the unification of contiguous regions of savagery and the establishment of Islamic states in the designated group of "priority states."⁶⁰ A pattern will then be set in motion whereby continuing jihadi operations within the remaining "apostate" states of the Muslim world will open the way for the Islamic states to directly impose Shari`a rule through military campaigns, harkening back to the 7th and 8th century expansion of Islam. The conquest will thus spread outwards, from state to state, until finally the entire Muslim world is united under the centralized rule of a caliph. With the establishment of the Caliphate, Muslim dominance of the global system will once more come to pass.

Establishing Shari`a Law

At the heart of the militant Islamist ideology of al-Qa`ida, its jihadi affiliates, and indeed all prior Islamist groups, is the belief in the absolute necessity for rule by Islamic law, the Shari`a. As stated by Ayman al-Zawahiri, "The first principle is the rule of Shari`a because Shari`a, was given by God... The Islamic nation will not accept any other law, after it has suffered from the anti-Islamic trends forcefully imposed on it."⁶¹ Al-Qa`ida's leaders hold the conviction that theirs is a cosmic struggle along with a Manichean conception of the world as starkly divided between the forces of good (the righteous mujahidin vanguard of the Umma) and the forces of evil (the present world order as lead by the "Zionist-Crusader" alliance). Usama bin Ladin, Ayman al-Zawahiri and others see their bloody acts of terrorism as necessary components of a divinely ordained jihad, one that is waged in defense of Islam. In their eyes, moreover, participation in this jihad – whose definitive aim is to usher in the rule of God over earth (*hakimiyyat Allah*) in the form of Shari`a law – is obligatory for every able-bodied Muslim. Echoing countless prior statements to the same effect, Zawahiri recently stated that "the elevation of Allah's Word on His earth means the elevation of His Law (Shari`a), and that the Muslim cannot possibly be a believer without litigating to Divine Law alone to the exclusion of all other laws."⁶²

Al-Qa`ida's insistence on the dominion of Shari`a and its ideology as a whole draw upon the 13th century teachings of Taqi al-Din Ahmad ibn Taymiyya, an arch fundamentalist Hanbali jurist, for inspiration and legitimacy. Born six years after the Mongol invasion of present-day Iraq and the toppling of the Abbasid Empire in 1258, Ibn Taymiyya sought reasons for the demise of medieval Islamic power. Like his present-day jihadi progeny who hold the prevalence of Western ideas and secular rulers responsible for the Muslim world's relative economic, military, and cultural backwardness, Ibn Taymiyya believed that restoring Muslims' military might could only be achieved through purifying Islam of all foreign influences and innovations (*bid`a*). It was his *fatwa* (legal ruling) against the Mongol rulers of Iraq, however, that has provided the foundation for modern jihadi ideologies. The *fatwa* declared that the Mongol rulers were *kufar* (apostates), despite the fact that they had nominally converted to Islam, citing their failure to fully implement Shari`a as justification. Ruling instead by man-made laws (*ahkam al-kufar*), these "infidel" rulers were deemed the rightful targets of violent jihad, that was an individual duty (*fard `ayn*) incumbent on every healthy adult Muslim male.⁶³ When al-Zawahiri exhorts his followers to "make the purified Shari`a the highest authority which is unrivaled by any other authority, and to take away legitimacy from the corrupt and corruptive rulers and end recognition of them, their constitutions and their laws,"⁶⁴ these could easily be the words of Ibn Taymiyya. Indeed, the 13th century jurist's injunctions have been frequently cited in the writing of al-Qa`ida's leaders.⁶⁵

Bin Ladin and al-Zawahiri have also been profoundly influenced by the militant Islamist ideology of Sayyid Qutb.⁶⁶ Qutb breathed new life into the extremist theology of Ibn Taymiyya, clearing the conceptual path for al-Qa`ida and the modern-day jihadist move-

ment as a whole. It is his ideas that mark the revolutionary break with the incrementalist approach to establishing the Islamic state (a state whose legal system and form of government are composed entirely of the Shari`a) through non-violent political participation and proselytization (*da'wa*). The world order, according to Qutb, is defined as a system of ignorance and barbarity, referred to as *jahiliyya* (state of ignorance prior to the revelation of Islam). Moreover, because the majority of the Muslim world is ruled by non-Islamic governments, it too is jahili. The waging of violent jihad to bring about *hakimiyyat Allah* (God's rule on earth) is in his view "an imperative that all Muslims must strive to implement or impose immediately."⁶⁷ Qutb also maintained that, because the states of the Muslim world are governed according to secular laws (*ahkam al-kufar*), they are a de facto part of the *Dar al-Harb* (House of War). Jihad against the apostate rulers of these states is therefore defensive rather than offensive, and can thus be waged without the historical requirement of authorization from a rightfully appointed caliph (successor to the Prophet). Furthermore, like all defensive jihads, participation in the divine struggle to implement the Shari`a is an individual (as opposed to communal) obligation. Those who refuse to contribute are therefore deemed apostates themselves and are subject to *takfir* (excommunication).⁶⁸ The advocacy of armed struggle in the name of Shari`a rule is by no means novel to al-Qa`ida.

Unlike other militant Islamist groups who have viewed the enforcement of Shari`a over the geographical areas which they control as occurring towards the outset or initial stages of their jihad, al-Qa`ida frames this as a medium-range goal. Al-Qa`ida's literature makes it clear that enforcement of the Shari`a will only be possible after successful confrontation with the "Crusader-Zionist" alliance through *harb istinzaf* (War of Attrition) and the outbreak of regions of savagery. One area of ambiguity, however, is the precise sequence of events that are to precede the implementation of the Shari`a. Abu Bakr Naji's strategic framework envisions "establishing Shari`a justice" as one of the primary duties of the "Administrations of Savagery." According to Naji, this stage precedes the founding of an Islamic state by multiple, united administrations.⁶⁹ Perhaps reflecting a slight alteration to al-Qa`ida's long-term planning or a minor conceptual disagreement between the network's ideologues, al-Zawahiri has recently put forward a divergent chain of events. In a May 2007 videotaped interview, he remarked,

The Jihad in Iraq today, by the Grace of Allah, is moving from the stage of defeat of the Crusader invaders and their traitorous underlings to the stage of consolidating a Mujahid Islamic Emirate [state] which will liberate the homelands of Islam, protect the sacred things of the Muslims, implement the rules of the Shari`a, give the weak and oppressed their rights back, and raise the banner of Jihad as it makes its way through a rugged path of sacrifice and giving towards the environs of Jerusalem, with Allah's permission.⁷⁰

Regardless of the whether Shari`a rule is the responsibility of the "Administrations of Savagery" or the Islamic state, however, the centrality of this goal to al-Qa`ida's ideology is

apparent. Not only do they believe that "the infallible methodology is the methodology of Allah,"⁷¹ but that adherence to the Shari`a will restore the Muslim nation to its former glory and grant the Caliphate hegemony over the globe.

Removal of All Western Influences from the Region

Al-Qa`ida's opposition to the West is not only military, it is also ideological and cultural. Salafi-Jihadis reject Western cultural and political values and resent such influences in the region. While supporters of the network justify their terrorism by pointing to historical Western injustices against Muslims such as the support of oppressive regimes in the Middle East or the occupation of Muslim lands, Salafi-Jihadi opposition to the West is far from reactionary. Salafi-Jihadis oppose Western culture and values as strongly as they oppose Western policies in the Muslim world. At the heart of their resentment of Western systems are their secular nature and their adherence to man-made laws and political paradigms that are seen as illegitimate by Salafi-Jihadis. Al-Qa`ida not only wishes to eject American military, political and economic influence from the Muslim world but also to repel all Western cultural influences as well and to reclaim all previously controlled Muslim lands.

If it is successful in overthrowing current Muslim governments and replacing them with Shari`a rule, in the seventh stage, the Salafi-Jihadi network opts to remove all Western influences from the Muslim world as a whole. Al-Qa`ida opts to simply eject or destroy all Western, secular and non-Muslim influences and entities in the region as proclaimed in an al-Qa`ida communiqué issued in July 2004. It states that the goal of the network is "purifying all Muslim lands from the filth of Jews, Americans and Hindus including Jerusalem and Kashmir."⁷² This stage involves reclaiming all previously-held Muslim lands including historical Palestine, Kashmir, *al-Andalus* (Andalusia, Spain), and parts of the Balkans. This entails a combined Islamist assault on Indian positions in Kashmir, to force India to withdraw all of its forces from the area and restore Muslim domination to Kashmir. Simultaneously, al-Qa`ida and its supporters intend "to launch the caravan to Jerusalem," in essence a combined assault in the Levant aimed at destroying Israel, ending Jewish presence in the Holy Land and reclaiming Jerusalem and the rest of historic Palestine. The "purification" of Muslim lands from foreign influences will entail the return of the historic Muslim Caliphate.

When analyzing the stages of al-Qa`ida's long-term strategy, it is difficult not to observe the irony of contemporary modern Middle Eastern dynamics. In its own words, al-Qa`ida first wishes to overthrow current Arab regimes and replace them with Shari`a-ruled governments. Second, the network opts to "launch the caravan to Jerusalem" and destroy the state of Israel. If it is able to overthrow Israel's neighbors it will use their territories as a launching pad to spear-head a colossal Islamist wave against Israel. By default, this makes the secular Arab governments of Egypt, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon, Israel's last line of defense against a combined Islamist blitz from all directions, which will surely come about if in the distant future the Salafi-Jihadis succeed in overthrowing these secular governments. This is

truly ironic considering the numerous wars Israel have fought with its secular Arab neighbors since its inception in 1948. Through Salafi-Jihadi lenses, despite its long-standing ominous relationship with Israel, the secular Allawi Ba`athist government of Syria, for example, is actually a barrier to their proclaimed desires to overrun it.

Restoring the Caliphate

The final phase will ensue once Shari`a rule has been established in all individual Arab and Muslim states, and following the full liberation and retrieval of all historic Muslim lands. At this juncture the global Jihadi network and its sympathizers intend to reestablish the historic Caliphate which ruled the Muslim community as a single entity for many centuries. The Caliphate is viewed by many Islamists as the golden age of Islamic power. During an interview with al-Jazeera on October 21, 2001 Usama bin Ladin stated:

Our concern is that our umma unites either under the Words of the Book of God or His Prophet, and that this nation should establish the righteous Caliphate of our umma, which has been prophesized by our Prophet in his authentic hadith: that the righteous caliph will return with the permission of God.⁷³

The restoration of the Caliphate, the form of Islamic government led by a caliph that legitimized the rule of successive dynasties from the time of the Prophet Muhammad until the Abbasid Caliphate's demise in 1258, remains the ultimate goal of al-Qa`ida and the global jihadi movement as a whole. The Caliphate once stretched from Spain in the west to India in the east, and outpaced Europe in scientific and cultural sophistication throughout the Middle Ages.⁷⁴ The idea of the Caliphate thus symbolizes collective yearnings for the apex of Islamic power and dreams of resurrecting Muslims' military, political, and economic might.⁷⁵ Regaining the "lost glory"⁷⁶ of the Umma is viewed by al-Qa`ida's leaders as constituting the final stage of the jihad that will follow the establishment of Islamic states in the Muslim world.

In a 2005 letter to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, former head of al-Qa`ida in Iraq, Ayman al-Zawahiri explained that, after the successful expulsion of "the Americans from Iraq," al-Qa`ida should "establish an Islamic authority or emirate, then develop and support it until it achieves the level of a Caliphate—over as much territory as you can to spread its power in Iraq..."⁷⁷ In May 2007, al-Zawahiri included Afghanistan as a potential point of departure for the future Caliphate, stating, "The defeat of the Crusaders [in Iraq and Afghanistan]... will lead to the setting up of two Mujahid Emirates which will be launch pads for the liberation of the Islamic lands and the establishment of the Caliphate."⁷⁸ While it is unclear what factors, exactly, will indicate that the Islamic state(s) has "achieved the level of a Caliphate," the network's leaders leave no doubt as to what will subsequently ensue. The mujahidin forces of the Caliphate will wage war on all remaining states of the Muslim world, toppling

"apostate" governments and expanding the dominion of *hakimiyyat Allah*. This expansion will continue until, finally, the jihad extends into regions of the Muslim periphery that were at one time ruled by the Caliphate. Moreover, al-Zawahiri stated that "the recovery of every land which was once a land of Islam is the personal duty of every Muslim."⁷⁹ The expansion of the Caliphate will coincide with the demise of the US-dominated international system, and a new world order of Islamist hegemony will arise. Ultimately, all of mankind will be submitted to the rule of Shari'a, until the entire world is dominated by the centralized authority of the caliph.

Conclusion

Al-Qa`ida attacks are not the acts of maniacs or irrational religious zealots. To the contrary, their attacks on Americans in the West and in the Middle East are part of a much larger and more sinister long-term strategy that aims to bring about the demise of the American-led international order, an overthrow of governments in the Muslim world, and ultimately the restoration of the historic Caliphate. To achieve these goals, the al-Qa`ida network has in its literature, messages and manuals articulated or implied eight successive phases in its long-term war against the West and its allies in the Muslim world. Currently we are still in the first three phases of this war, and it is likely that this period will last decades into the future.

The relevance of any long-term strategy articulated primarily by al-Qa`ida's central leadership to the behavior of its various cells and affiliates, however, must be discussed. While the behavior of al-Qa`ida's leadership body (*Majlis al-Shura*) and a number of the al-Qa`ida network's connected operatives and affiliated terrorist organizations are motivated in part by the aforementioned strategic objectives, the motivational dynamic behind the actions of autonomous jihadis and jihadi cells that are merely inspired by al-Qa`ida's ideology is likely to tell a different story. At this level of the al-Qa`ida network, actions are more likely to be the product of individual considerations. The trend, post-9/11, that has characterized the evolution of the al-Qa`ida network is the increasing dispersion of authority horizontally, along with a growing disconnect between al-Qa`ida's *Majlis al-Shura* and the network's operatives, affiliated groups, and autonomous followers. Yet, recent reports indicate that al-Qa`ida is reconstituting its operational capabilities and leadership apparatus in the tribal areas of Pakistan, as stated in a National Intelligence Estimate published in July 2007, "We assess the group has protected or regenerated key elements of its Homeland attack capability, including: a safehaven in the Pakistan Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), operational lieutenants, and its top leadership."⁸⁰

The degree to which the long-term strategy outlined above influences, and will continue to influence, the target selection, tactics, and the timing of terrorist operations undertaken by members of the al-Qa`ida network is, arguably, tied to the level of association individual cells have with the parent organization. Al-Qa`ida cells trained in Waziristan and dispatched with the direction of the high command will adhere to its central authority, while autono-

mous "inspired cells" who have no concrete links to the central leadership or organization carry out attacks on a more ad-hoc basis. As it relates to al-Qa`ida affiliated groups the level of authority that al-Qa`ida's leaders are capable of exercising over them is important. The case of al-Zarqawi's leadership of al-Qa`ida in Iraq demonstrates how an ostensible 'affiliate' of the al-Qa`ida network can actually serve to directly undermine the strategic objectives of al-Qa`ida's leaders.⁸¹

Nevertheless, understanding the long-term strategy of al-Qa`ida's leaders, however, is instrumental for grasping the nature of its conflict with the West, its overall target selection, tactics, and also for shaping appropriate and effective policies to hinder its activities and viability. It is imperative on the United States and its allies in the Muslim world to decisively win the initial three phases of this long-term war to hinder this budding Salafi-Jihadi juggernaut at its infancy. To do so, the United States and its allies in the Muslim world need to pursue aggressive military and law enforcement measures against al-Qa`ida coupled with well thought through and favorable policies toward Muslim populations to reduce the appeal of Salafi-Jihadis and win over the support of the greater Muslim community. This is likely to be an arduous and lengthy campaign.

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
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- 30 The true identity of Abu Bakr Naji is presently unknown, as is his exact relationship to al-Qa`ida's central leadership. Abu Bakr Naji, moreover, may also be a penname used by a group of individuals.
- 31 Bakr Naji, 74. Naji also implores jihadi cells, referred to here as "vexation groups", to target the US' economic interests in the Middle East, primarily petroleum. See 40-41.
- 32 Naji, 38.
- 33 Naji, 7.
- 34 Naji, 9; 41.
- 35 Naji, 7-8.
- 36 Naji, 9-10.
- 37 Naji, 17.
- 38 Naji, 19.
- 39 Naji, 17.
- 40 Naji, 16-17.
- 41 Naji, 23, 52, 30. All of these materials have been proliferated online on various Jihadi websites.
- 42 See Title.

- 43 15. Note the exclusion of Egypt from the list. Naji states, however, that "this selection is preliminary, of course," and is subject to changing dynamics. 16.
- 44 Naji, 16.
- 45 Naji, 52, 16.
- 46 Naji, 11.
- 47 Naji, 16.
- 48 Naji, 23.
- 49 Naji, 12-13.
- 50 Naji, 20-21.
- 51 Naji, 11-12, 18.
- 52 Naji, 25.
- 53 Naji, 63.
- 54 Naji makes explicit the injunction that, in order to avoid past mistakes, decisions regarding whether or not to target certain classes of individuals with armed operations should be "left to the High Command." 25.
- 55 Naji, 32-33.
- 56 Naji, 44, 65, 68.
- 57 Naji, 21.
- 58 Naji, 47.
- 59 Naji, 76.
- 60 Naji, 50.
- 61 Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri, "True Reform is Only Through Jihad," video released on *al-Jazeera* (June 18, 2005), translated by Laura Mansfield, in Mansfield, *His Own Words: A Translation of the Writings of Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri*, 247.
- 62 Ayman al-Zawahiri, "Realities of Conflict: Between Islam and Unbelief," al-Sahab Media (December 2006), translated by Laura Mansfield, available from http://www.lauramansfield.com/zawahiri_122006.asp, accessed on 09/20/07.
- 63 John L. Esposito, *Unholy War: Terror in the Name of Islam* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 45-46.
- 64 "Interview with Sheikh Ayman al-Zawahiri," al-Sahab Media (May 2007), translated by Laura Mansfield, available from http://www.lauramansfield.com/zawahiri_052007.wmv, accessed on 09/20/07.
- 65 See, for example, Usama bin Ladin's August 1996, "Declaration of Jihad," and the February 1998 declaration of the International Islamic Front (authored by Zawahiri), in Lawrence, 26, 61.
- 66 Zawahiri established an underground Islamist cell, while still in high school, shortly after Qutb's hanging. Gerges, 91. Usama bin Ladin was absorbed in Qutb's books while in university, and he attended the lectures of Sayyid Qutb's younger brother, Mohammad. Lawrence Wright, *The Looming Tower: Al-Qaeda and the Road to 9/11* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2006), 79.
- 67 Esposito, 60.

- 68 See Nemat Guenena, *The Jihad: An Islamic Alternative in Egypt*. Cairo Papers in Social Science, American University in Cairo 9, 2 (Summer 1986), chp. 4; Mustapha Kamel Al-Sayyid, "The Other Face of the Islamist Movement," *Working Papers*, no. 33, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace – Democracy and Rule of Law Project (January 2003); Esposito, 50-60.
- 69 Naji, 11-12, 18.
- 70 "Interview with Sheikh Ayman al-Zawahiri."
- 71 Usama bin Ladin, "The Solution," al-Sahab Media (September 2007), translated by the SITE Intelligence Group.
- 72 Abu Hafiz al-Masri Brigades – al-Qa'ida in Europe, "A Communiqué." July 1, 2004.
- 73 Lawrence, 121.
- 74 Following the demise of the Abbasids, other Muslim states and empires opted to portray themselves as the Caliphate. The most notable of which is the Ottoman Empire that ruled the Middle East for many centuries up until its demise Post WWI. In the 1920's various notable Islamist thinkers including Rashid Rida the leader of the Salafi movement and Hassan al-Banna the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood were traumatized by the fall of the Ottoman "Caliphate" and the division of Muslim lands by European colonial powers.
- 75 Marc Sageman, *Understanding Terror Networks* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004), 21.
- 76 Al-Zawahiri, *Knights Under the Prophet's Banner*, in Mansfield, *His Own Words*, 215.
- 77 Mansfield, *His Own Words*, 255-256.
- 78 "Interview with Sheikh Ayman al-Zawahiri."
- 79 Al-Zawahiri, "Realities of Conflict: Between Islam and Unbelief."
- 80 "National Intelligence Estimate: The Terrorist Threat to the US Homeland," *National Intelligence Council*, July 2007, available from http://www.dni.gov/press_releases/20070717_release.pdf, accessed on February 16, 2008.
- 81 This tension between al-Zarqawi and al-Qa'ida's central leaders is discussed extensively in Harmony Project, *Cracks in the Foundation: Leadership Schisms in al-Qa'ida From 1989-2006* (West Point: Combating Terrorism Center, 2007), 10-19, 68-69; and Mansfield, *His Own Words*, 70-71.

Chapter 16

Unraveling Al-Qaida's Target Selection Calculus



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The topic of al-Qaida's choice of targets has been the subject of much conjecture and speculation in open source literature. Some analysts state that al-Qaida's modus operandi is similar to traditional terrorism in that it is a form of "political theater" meant to bring attention to the group and its objectives by attacking targets of high importance. Others have diverged from this view, arguing that unlike traditional terror organizations, the al-Qaida network is more interested in the mass killing of Western civilians as revenge for perceived historical injustices against Muslims. In some cases, the debate concerning al-Qaida's target selection is based on the assumption that al-Qaida will target symbolic facilities within the United States to demonstrate its military prowess and long-reach capability. Others argue that al-Qaida attacks soft targets due to the difficulty of attacking military and security facilities in the West.

Yet an examination of primary al-Qaida operational manuals and open source published literature reveals a much different set of considerations in the group's target selection. Such analyses of what al-Qaida tells the world—and, most importantly, what it instructs its recruits and would-be cell members—indicates that al-Qaida's target selection calculus is motivated by a far more ambitious, sophisticated and sinister motive: to destroy the economy of the United States and other Western powers by striking economic targets in the West and in the Muslim world. This ambition includes the final objective of severing American and Muslim alliances and bringing about the removal of all Western influence from the Middle East, as well as the overthrow of current Muslim regimes.

To best understand al-Qaida's target selection calculus, it is important to keep in mind al-Qaida's foremost strategic objective, which is to "bleed" [exhaust] the United States economically and militarily by forcing the U.S. to spend exuberant amounts of money on protecting its numerous sectors and facilities. Al-Qaida's primary literature and manuals affirm that the United States draws its formidable military power and political influence from its superior economy. Therefore, if the American economy is derailed, then the United States will crumble and will not be able to sustain its military hegemony and presence overseas. One al-Qaida member stated that hindering Western economies is "the most dangerous and

effective arena of Jihad, because we live in a materialistic world.”¹ Accordingly, al-Qaida cells are encouraged to attack targets that have a high economic value and will cause the United States severe economic losses.

The calculus of primarily attacking western targets of significant economic value is bluntly discussed in al-Qaida’s political publications which aim to “educate” the Muslim world about al-Qaida’s objectives and methods. These publications elaborate in sinister detail the network’s intention to empower individual cell members with the training and skills required to sustain al-Qaida’s global Jihad. The following excerpts from *Sawt al-Jihad* (Voice of Jihad), the official publication of al-Qaida in Saudi Arabia, illustrate the rationale behind al-Qaida’s target selection:

What Else is there to Say about September 11?

Since September 11th America has been spending billions of dollars to protect its infrastructure and interests around the world... The attacker determines the timing of the strike. He will carry a concentrated strike one time at a weak point and then sit in ambush again. So the enemy will look for a gap and close it, this is not necessarily where he was hit but all other similar targets. So striking the American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania means protecting every American embassy in the world. Striking the [U.S.S.] Cole at sea means protecting all American assets in the seas. Diversifying targets means protecting all American things in every land that may have terrorists!!

If the enemy used his economy to rule the world and hire collaborators, then we need to strike this economy with harsh attacks to bring it down on the heads of its owners. If the enemy has built his economy on the basis of open markets and free trade by getting the monies of investors, then we have to prove to these investors that the enemy’s land is not safe for them, that his economy is not capable of guarding their monies, so they would abandon him to suffer alone the fall of his economy.

This is about Jihad against the crusader enemy, so what about the September 11th operation? Hijacking planes is a well known tactic, which was used by various fighters and freedom fighters, so what’s new about this operation? People used to hijack planes and consider them a target, but those who are willing to put in the extra effort turned these planes into a method only, a projectile shot in the heart of the enemy ... The enemy used to protect his external interests and spend exuberant sums for this protection, so he was surprised when he was struck inside his borders. The enemy used to protect a thousand interests outside his county, now he has to protect a million interests inside his country that need continuing protection!! The attack on the Trade Center forced America since that day to spend billions to protect the huge economic infrastructure that runs the

American economy. Using planes in this attack has forced America to spend billions to protect the planes and airports in all possible ways. This protection is not limited to the hundreds of American airports but also to every airport in the world. Anyone related to the aviation field is spending excessive amounts to guard air travel; the matter has reached protecting the skies... This is how America was transformed after one strike, protecting all that can be struck, and they guard all that can be used to strike with!²

Another al-Qaida text authored in late 2005 clearly articulates the network's emphasis on attacking economic targets. In October 2005, Abu Mus'ab al-Najadi, a Saudi supporter/member of al-Qaida, authored a prolific seven page document titled "Al-Qaida's Battle is Economic not Military." In late 2005, this document was circulated on numerous Jihadi websites, elaborating on the logic for attacking soft targets of high economic value. As stated by al-Najadi:

The Islamic nation has entered through al-Qaida's war with America a new period that is different from all the other periods experienced by Muslims against their enemies. This period is based on the economic war due to the peculiar nature of the adversary in this ferocious battle. Usually, wars are based on military strength and victory belongs to those who are military superior on the battle field... But our war with America is fundamentally different for the first priority is defeating her economically. For that, anything that negatively affects their economy is considered for us a step in the right direction in the path to victory. Military defeats do not greatly effect how we measure total victory, but these defeats indirectly affect the economy which can be demonstrated with breaching the confidence of capitalists and investors in this nation's ability to safeguard their various trade and dealings.

In light of this matter, the difficulty and ease of the task becomes apparent. In addition, it becomes apparent why additional al-Qaida strikes inside the United States have been delayed. When thinking about military strikes, it is not difficult to carry out an attack that would kill a good number of American civilians, but in my opinion this is a waste of resources without much benefit. However when directing these resources against economic targets, it is more effective and can get us many steps closer toward victory. An attack that kills a large number of Americans can not achieve a tenth of this effectiveness. This reveals the importance of the blessed September 11th attacks, which is not that it killed large number of infidels, but what is more important, is the economic effect that this strike achieved... I will not be exaggerating if I said that striking the Pentagon was purely symbolic and had no noticeable effect on the course of the battle. It is symbolic for it shows the Americans that their foremost military facility can be destroyed by handful of individuals, which is a blow to their morale and a point of pride for the Islamic peoples who have been drowning in defeat for many years.

Any operation targeting a field of infrastructure in a new country that does not have a history of countering these operations is considered as bleeding (exhausting) to the greater enemy America and the targeted nation itself. It is so because these nations will be required to protect all similar potential targets which results in economic exhaustion (bleeding)... For example, if a hotel that caters to western tourists in Indonesia is targeted, the enemy will be required to protect all hotels that cater to western tourists in all countries which may become a target of similar attacks. You can say the same thing about living residences, economic establishments, embassies and other.³

Based on al-Qaida's own described calculus and explanation of its targeting rationale, as it relates to the U.S. mainland one can safely assume that this network is most likely to target facilities and establishments of high economic value which can be found anywhere throughout the country. Such facilities include but are not limited to airports, bus stations, train stations, subways, ports, financial districts, financial buildings, malls, markets, resorts, planes, ships, oil installations, hotels, sports arenas, theaters, embassies and so forth. As illustrated previously, al-Qaida's stated objective is to cause the highest scale of economic damage as well as force the United States to spend excessive resources on guarding and protecting facilities all over the United States in order to ultimately bring down the U.S. economy, the source of American military power and hegemony.

In addition to these statements in al-Qaida's publications that articulate the networks' strategy, the calculus of attacking western targets of high economic value is also elaborated in al-Qaida's operational manuals that teach individuals cell members how to attack and exact severe losses on the West. For example, a detailed online manual titled *Al-Mubtakkar al-Farid: Li Irsaal al-Safah al-Ashiri Ila al-Kafir al-'Anid* [The Unique Invention: To Deliver the Gaseous Killer to the Stubborn Infidel], teaches the reader how to manufacture a hydrogen cyanide dispersal device. The manual provides would-be terrorists with step by step instructions, in explicit detail, on utilizing various precursors and procuring readily available components to assemble the dispersal device. The *al-Mubtakkar* manual guides al-Qaida members in the use of this crude hydrogen cyanide dispersal device to attack mostly civilian targets of high economic value that are abundantly available in Western societies. It specifically highlights the following targets:⁴

- Brothels
- Theaters
- Markets and Shopping Malls
- Synagogues
- Dancing Halls
- Trains
- Schools
- Hospitals
- Bars and Restaurants
- Banks and Loan Facilities
- Cinemas
- Gyms
- Casinos
- Churches on Muslim Lands
- Government Offices (especially security and intelligence related)

Another short document dealing with radiological terrorism posted on a prominent Jihadi operational website also emphasized the network's desire to exact severe economic losses on the United States and its allies. The short posting entitled "Instances of Radiation Pollution from 1945-1987" specifically encouraged the Jihadi community to attack western cities with Radiological Dispersal Devices (RDD or dirty bombs) in order to cause acute economic losses. It explicitly states the following economic benefits to such attacks:

The important thing is to disperse radioactive material in a large commercial area so the government is forced to shut down this area which will cause this country massive economic disruption due to the following reasons:

- 1. The high costs of decontamination of radioactive areas.*
- 2. The high economic losses in this large commercial area due to closure.*
- 3. Subsequent unemployment and loss of jobs.*
- 4. Stoppage of general life in that area.*
- 5. Large compounded problems are to follow due to these losses.*

Suggested cities: Las Vegas (the city of fornication and gambling that does not sleep) - New York - London - Sydney - Tokyo - Moscow - Other large tourist cities - and commercial capitals of all infidel nations.⁵

In addition to attacking economic targets in the United States and other western nations, another stated objective of the network is to hinder Westerners from conducting commerce and business in the Arab and Muslim world. According to al-Qaida's world view, Western commerce in Muslim and Arab countries has resulted in Western military support for corrupt and apostate regimes in the region (specifically Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, and Morocco). It has also contributed to the corruption of Muslim societies with imported Western values and the "theft" of Muslim natural resources including oil. As we have seen in the last few years, the al-Qaida network has repeatedly attacked Western interests, facilities and citizens in numerous Muslim and Arab countries including Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Egypt, Morocco, and Malaysia.

Attacking American interests in these countries further serves to bleed the United States economically and deny Westerners commercial opportunities in the Arab and Muslim world. Also, of equal importance, it serves to hinder an alliance between the United States and its regional allies. The terrorist tactics aim to isolate these regional governments that al-Qaida considers 'apostates' and ultimately wishes to overthrow along its path toward the re-establishment of the global caliphate. As a matter of operational expediency the al-Qaida network intends to continuously carry out attacks against American interests in the Muslim and Arab worlds. This is stated clearly in a widely circulated al-Qaida operational manual that trains prospective Jihadis on urban operations in the Arab and Muslim world. The Jihadi training manual "Military Sciences - Targets Inside the Cities," unequivocally identifies these targets:

Economic targets:

The objective of attacking these targets: breaching the security and climate of stability that is necessary for economic growth, such as the bombing of oil pipelines in Iraq, which has made it less appealing for foreign corporations.

Additional objectives include:

Removal of foreign capitalists from domestic [Islamic] markets; also [to exact] negative economic consequences on their native lands as occurred very quickly following the blessed strikes in Madrid, which affected the entire European economy. Among these are double strikes that affect the economy of the Crusader or Jewish or apostates regimes.

Among the Examples of such Strikes:

- *Striking Jewish Crusader investments in Muslim lands.*
- *Striking international corporations.*
- *Striking international economists and business experts.*
- *Striking imports from crusader nations through military means (as occurred in the bombing and burning of certain American restaurants), or through political means like boycotts.*
- *Striking raw materials stolen from Muslim lands, such as the strike on the French oil carrier or the strikes on Iraqi oil pipelines. These kinds of economic strikes are determined by the high leadership who wait for the appropriate time and place.*
- *Assassination of Jews who work in business and disciplining those who cooperate with them economically following a proper warning. Only those who are proven to be collaborating apostates should be assassinated.⁶*

In addition to advising the Jihadi community and individual al-Qaida cell members to concentrate their attacks on economic targets inside the Arab and Muslim world and beyond, this manual also breaks down in vivid detail the nationality, religion and occupation of al-Qaida's prime "human targets." In this, the operational instructions to the cell members are consistent with previous political arguments put forth in al-Qaida's open source publications. It tells would-be al-Qaida terrorists to concentrate on Western businessmen as they represent the foremost candidates. It states unambiguously:

Human targets:

... The priority in these operations should be given to Jews and Christians with official connection to Muslim lands. It is advisable to start with targeting unprotected easy targets. Priority is given to the dependants of infidel nations that are directly involved in supporting local apostates. For example, in Saudi Arabia, first target Americans, then the English. In Iraq, the Americans. In Afghanistan, the Americans. In Algeria, the French. In Indonesia, the Australians, etc.

Categorizing Human Targets by Importance:

- *Jews: they are divided into various degrees by importance. First American and Israeli Jews, then British Jews, then French ... etc.*
- *Christians: they are categorized by order of importance as follows:*
 - *Americans*
 - *British*
 - *Spanish*
 - *Australians*
 - *Canadians*
 - *Italians*

These groups are further divided into:

- *Businessmen. For business has global importance in this age.*
- *Diplomats, politicians, intellectuals, analysts, and political emissaries.*
- *Scientists and experts.*
- *Military commanders and soldiers [as noted, military targets are seen as less valuable].*
- *Tourists, visiting entertainers, and all who have received a warning from the Mujahideen to abstain from or to evacuate Muslim lands.*
- *Apostates: They are categorized by order of importance as follows:*
 - *The most important targets are those who are close to Jewish and Christian governments, such as Husni Mubarak and the rulers of the Arabian Peninsula and their advisors.*
 - *Secularists and modernists who criticize believers and ridicule religion.*
 - *Intelligence professionals and spies, they are the armor and protection fence of the Jews and Christians. They are also the striking arms of the apostates.⁷*

These instructions given to prospective Jihadis further demonstrate that the primary targets of the al-Qaida network are American entities of high economic value such as businessmen and corporations. In this it relegates American military targets and soldiers to secondary importance as potential targets. However, the network does not usually specify in print which specific Western companies or sectors are to be targeted. It is probable that the leadership of al-Qaida is being intentionally vague on this matter to make it possible for individual cell leaders to choose appropriate targets on a case-by-case basis, as well as availability of targets in their respective theaters of operations.

Two sectors which are surely to be in the sights of al-Qaida operatives are the oil and tourism industries. In the past year the leaders of al-Qaida, including Usama Bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri, have specifically called on their operatives to target oil installations in the Gulf to hinder what they consider the ongoing "theft of Muslim resources," and have likewise called for attacks on tourist resorts in the Muslim world.⁸ Clearly, the message has been received by al-Qaida's rank and file, as can be seen from the recent bombings in Eryp-

tian tourist resorts and the constant attacks on oil facilities in Iraq (as well as similar attempted attacks in Saudi Arabia). In the future, al-Qaida operations outside the U.S. mainland are likely to concentrate on similar facilities, in addition to financial districts, buildings of high economic value and Western embassies.

Furthermore, it is important to clarify that an additional primary objective of the September 11th attacks was to drag the United States into a wider war in which al-Qaida and its allies wish to scatter, isolate and bleed the United States militarily and economically [this is referred to as Harb Istinzaf—a long term war of attrition, i.e., dragging and bleeding the enemy]. The American invasion of Iraq has provided al-Qaida with a prime opportunity to attack American troops within the Arab world, as was stated explicitly by Usama Bin Laden in his message to his supporters in 2005, "Bleeding the United States, which is currently in Iraq economically, militarily and morally, is a golden opportunity that you should not miss or you will regret it . . . concentrate your operations on it especially in Iraq and the Gulf. This will be their end."⁹

Increased American presence in the Gulf states, coupled with the American occupation of Iraq, is being exploited by al-Qaida to rally its supporters to concentrate their efforts on American and Western targets in the Gulf (Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, UAE, Oman and Yemen) and also in Jordan.

Nevertheless, al-Qaida is still likely to attempt to attack the American homeland. Attacking the American homeland offers al-Qaida many advantages, such as symbolic victory and proof of the network's reach and perseverance. More importantly, as discussed previously, such an attack would also greatly stress the U.S. economically. Equally, continuously attacking the American homeland causes further rifts between the United States and its Arab and Muslim allies, an objective which is among al-Qaida's foremost strategic goals. This point was argued by Ayman al-Zawahiri, the network's second in command in 2001:

The masters in Washington and Tel Aviv are using the [Muslim] regimes to protect their interest and to fight the battle against the Muslims on their behalf. If the shrapnel from the battle reaches their homes and their bodies, they will trade accusations with their agents about who is responsible for this. In that case, they will face one of two bitter choices: Either personally wage the battle against the Muslims, which means the battle will turn into clear-cut jihad against infidels, or they reconsider their plans after acknowledging the failure of the brute and violent confrontation against Muslims. Therefore, we must move the battle to the enemy's grounds to burn the hands of those who ignite fire in our countries.¹⁰

Al-Qaida's leadership argues that only when military and economic alliances between the United States and its Arab and Muslim allies are broken will the network be able to weaken and overthrow these "apostate" regimes and impose an Islamic state, which is the eventual goal of al-Qaida. This is the main reason why al-Zawahiri and bin Laden decided to

embark on an external Jihad against the "Far Enemy," i.e., the United States and the West. They opted to attack the West to sever its military and economic support for Arab and Muslim leaders in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and other states seen to have close ties to the U.S. Al-Qaida's leadership reasoned that the direct attacks on American and European homelands will force Western leaders to doubt their alliances with Muslim and Arab leaders and will eventually force the West to abandon their regional allies. This approach was a clear departure from the traditional Jihadi strategy of the Muslim Brotherhood and its various offshoots in the Middle East, who in previous decades have opted to wage a long term internal Jihad against the "near enemy," Arab and Muslim regimes. Al-Qaida also aims to stretch the United States thin, knowing full well that even superpowers have limited financial and military resources. It is the objective of this network to pull the United States into a third quagmire, in addition to Iraq and Afghanistan, in order to drag, exhaust and further bleed the U.S. as it stated in its communiqué released in July 2004:

Our Goals in the Next Period . . .

1. *Increasing the scope of the conflict by spreading operations all around the world. Dragging America into a third quagmire in addition to Iraq and Afghanistan; let it be Yemen god willing. We have mentioned this in our communiqué on March 11, 2004: "we tell the company of Abu Ali al-Harithi, the leadership has decided that Yemen will be the third quagmire for the hegemony of our era, America. Move so, to discipline the collaborating infidel government that is second only to Musharaf."*
2. *Shaking the confidence of investors in the American economy.*
3. *Exposing the Crusader Jewish project.*
4. *Scattering and bleeding [exhausting] the enemy.*

Following these steps comes the awaited strike that will break the will of America, who in return will abandon its collaborators and agents, so we can settle our scores with them. Then we launch the caravan to Jerusalem with god's permission.¹¹

The Path to the Caliphate – The Various Phases of al-Qaida's Global War

Ongoing analysis and examination of al-Qaida's vast published literature, abundant manuals and endless statements imply the following eight successive phases in the network's intended long-term battle against the United States and its allies in the Middle East and Muslim world:

- a. **Awakening the Masses:** In this phase the network aims to increase the consciousness of the global Muslim community by "exposing" the true nature of alleged inherent American and western hostility to Islamic peoples. The network argues this

will lead to increased hatred of western influences in Muslim lands and to swelling the ranks of al-Qaida and its affiliates with new volunteers and sympathizers. More so, in this phase, "apostate" governments will reveal their true collaborative nature when they are forced to side publicly with their western "masters" in the aftermath of al-Qaida attacks. Furthermore, in this phase other political trends in the Middle East (nationalists, leftists, liberals...etc) will be shown as weak and indecisive, hence, enhancing the image of the Salafis as the only entity in the Arab and Muslim world that is willing and capable to fight on behalf of the Muslim masses and to take the fight to the west and to the corrupt "apostate" regimes.

- b. **"*Harb Istinzaf* – A long term war of attrition"**: In this phase the network aims to 'bleed the enemy' until it crumbles. In short, their goal is to make the United States 'bleed' economically, militarily, and politically until it loses the desire and the means to fight and withdraws militarily, politically and economically from the Middle East and other Muslim lands.
- c. **Severing Western/Muslim alliances**: In this phase, an American withdrawal from the Middle East will lead to the severing of American alliances with secular and moderates regimes (Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, etc). This will entail the end of American military and economic support to Arab and Muslim regimes. Absent American military and economic aid, these regimes will be greatly weakened and will eventually lose their grip on their populations and will lack the ability to resist the global Jihadi movement.
- d. **"*Tasfiyat Hisabat* – Settling Scores"**: Once Arab and Muslim regimes are weakened, al-Qaida and its affiliates aim to overthrow them, and "settle scores" by eliminating the leaders and their security forces.
- e. **"*Idarat al-Tawabush* – Management of Barbarism"**: Prolific al-Qaida thinker Abu Bakr Naji considers this phase the most dangerous. In this phase the network and its sympathizers will aim to administer and manage Arab and Muslim lands in the intermediary period immediately following the collapse of apostate regimes. At this fragile period rampant chaos will ensue in Muslim lands due to lawlessness and lack of authority.¹²
- f. **Establishing Shari`a Law**: In this phase the network aims to establish pious Shari`a governments that will rule individual Arab and Muslim states by Islamic law for a temporary period, while awaiting the return of the Muslim caliphate.
- g. **Removal of All Western Influences from the Region**: This phase entails the full liberation of all Muslim lands including Palestine [i.e. the destruction of Israel] and Kashmir, and the retrieval of lands once ruled by Muslims, including al-Andalus [Andalusia, Spain].
- h. **Reestablishment of the Caliphate**: The final Phase will ensue once Shari`a rule has been established in all individual Arab and Muslim states, and following the full liberation and retrieval of all historic Muslim lands. At this juncture the global Ji-

hadi network and its sympathizers intend to reestablish the historic caliphate which ruled the Muslim community as a single entity for many centuries. The Caliphate is viewed by many Islamists as the golden age of Islamic power.

Currently, we are still in the first three phases of this long and protracted conflict which the al-Qaida network wishes to expand and intensify. In these concurrent initial three phases, the al-Qaida network aims to exhaust the United States while severing its alliances with Muslim and Arab governments, and while simultaneously escalating anti-Western animosity in the region. The al-Qaida network reasons that the best way to achieve the goal of exhausting the United States is through repeated attacks against American and Western targets of high economic value. Some prominent analysts of the global Jihadi movement argue that al-Qaida's quest for the reestablishment of the historic caliphate and the removal of all western influences from the Muslim world is a step toward the networks ultimate goal of establishing "*Hakimiyat Allah* – God's rule over the world" an order of domination of the rest of the world.¹³

In sum, al-Qaida's target selection is neither arbitrary nor impulsive. Continuing examination of al-Qaida's primary literature and operational manuals reveals that their target selection calculus is governed by a basic and genuinely sinister desire to bring down the economy of the United States and other western powers. This targeting strategy is an integral part of the network's overall objective of bleeding and exhausting the United States in order to force it to leave the Middle East and abandon its regional allies. To do so, al-Qaida will primarily attack facilities of high economic value repeatedly. The al-Qaida network is likely to continue to attack particular targets that cause economic disruption within the United States and worldwide. That is in line with al-Qaida's strategy to engage the United States and its allies in a long term war of attrition. As stated by the network, "The enemy may be patient, but it cannot endure. As for us with our doctrine, belief, and our love for meeting God, we can endure until the enemy crumbles. If this takes decades or centuries, we are charged with fighting them come victory or martyrdom."¹⁴

Endnotes

- 1 Nur al-Din al-Kurdi, "The Arenas of Jihad," *Dharwat al-Sunam* (Peak of the Camel's Hump), Volume 3, p. 27-28.
- 2 Akhu Man Ta'a Allah, "What Else is There to Say About September 11," *Sawt al-Jihad* (Voice of Jihad Magazine), Volume 26, p. 35-42.
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Chapter 19
Jemaah Islamiyah¹



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Origins of Jemaah Islamiyah

Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) has its origins in the Darul Islam (DI) movement, which fought the Indonesian government from 1949 to 1962 in an effort to establish an Islamic state in the country. The movement was crushed, but the dream was not. Abu Bakar Ba'asyir and Abdullah Sungkar were among those who yearned for the revival of Darul Islam, and in the 1970s, they became involved in Komando Jihad, a clandestine group dedicated to creating an Islamic state and fighting Communists. The group was either a front for Indonesian intelligence to draw out Islamists, or had been heavily infiltrated by intelligence operatives, and it was rolled up in 1979 by the government, who jailed Ba'asyir and Sungkar.²

The two were released in 1982 on appeal, and returned to Solo in central Java, where earlier they had established an Islamic school (*pesantren*) known colloquially as Pondok Ngruki. Emanating out from this school was a network of cells of young men who met (and often lived) together for the purposes of studying the Qur'an and pursuing an Islamic life. In the two years that Ba'asyir and Sungkar were free on appeal, the cells spread throughout Java and into Jakarta, and formed a considerable support base for DI, and for Sungkar and Ba'asyir in particular.³ In 1985, the Indonesian Supreme Court reinstated Sungkar and Ba'asyir's convictions, and they decided to flee to Malaysia.

Darul Islam was re-activated by descendants of the original leaders and others in the 1980s, with Ba'asyir and Sungkar playing key roles from exile. However, Sungkar had begun to build up a network loyal to himself rather than merely to DI, and ultimately he came into conflict with the group's leadership over this and theological issues. Jemaah Islamiyah "formally" separated from DI in January 1993, and remains a distinct organization.⁴

Sungkar had been sending Indonesians, and later Malaysians and Singaporeans, to Pakistan for training from 1985 until about a year after JI came into existence, in 1994. By 1997, the camps in Pakistan were replaced by a camp in the Philippines that served a similar purpose. Like all Darul Islam members, Sungkar and Ba'asyir were originally focused on establishing an Islamic state in Indonesia, but in exile their views changed as they encountered the pan-Islamic ideology of al-Qa'ida in Pakistan and Afghanistan, expanded their support

base in Malaysia and Singapore, and recruited new non-Indonesian members. These recruits returned to their home countries to staff the JI-affiliated schools, spread JI's philosophy, and recruit new members. In 1998, with the fall of Suharto, Sungkar and Ba'asyir returned to Indonesia, and JI began spreading rapidly into Indonesia. By 2000, it had cells in dozens of cities throughout Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, the Philippines, and Australia, and was ready to begin bombing attacks.

Demographics and Group Characteristics

The membership of Jemaah Islamiyah has varied with its location and the political conditions it has faced over the years. At JI's height, there may have been thousands of members, mostly involved in the group through Quranic study cells. By 2007, given arrests and factionalism, JI may have declined to 900 members, but continued recruitment efforts.⁵

Ji has always been primarily Indonesian—the top leadership, especially the amir, have always been composed mostly of Indonesians, specifically Javanese. Moreover, these Javanese members are often (but not always) from the families of the original DI loyalists, and are often (but not always) linked to each other by marriage. Mukhlas, for example, the former head of the Mantiqi I network and one of the plotters sentenced to death for the 2002 Bali bombing, is married to Paridah Abas, the sister of Nasir Abas, the former head of Mantiqi III.

There is an official membership process where inductees pledge an oath of loyalty to the amir and promise to defend Muslims, and members often remain loyal to their superiors even after years of inactivity.⁶ With that said, many of JI's members joined the organization more out of personal loyalty to Abu Bakar Ba'asyir and/or Abdullah Sungkar than a dedication to such an abstract concept as Jemaah Islamiyah, and membership (or lack thereof) has never seemed to be a deciding factor in whether someone is involved in JI activities, whether it be hiding fugitives, obtaining explosives, or serving as suicide bombers. Although Imam Samudra was involved in the 2002 Bali bombing and the 2000 Christmas Eve bombings, it is unclear to what extent he was a full member of Jemaah Islamiyah, and to what extent he was seconded from the DI affiliate Ring Banten.

Abdullah Sungkar recruited Malaysian members for his network as early as 1987, and Singaporeans seem to have been members as early as 1991.⁷ Thus, Jemaah Islamiyah included Singaporeans, Malaysians, and Indonesians at its official inception in 1993. Some rose to high positions—Noordin Top served as the head of the JI-affiliated pesantren Luqmanul Hakiem in Johor, Malaysia in order to satisfy the legal requirement that it be led by a Malaysian citizen, while the Malaysian Nasir Abas rose to be head of Mantiqi III. He was based in Sandakan, East Malaysia, which positioned him to facilitate illicit movement between Indonesia and the southern Philippines without attracting attention as a foreigner.

Since Jemaah Islamiyah saw itself as a coordinating hub and force multiplier for like-minded regional Islamist groups, it was careful not to recruit Filipinos or Thais as formal

members, so as not to encroach on the territory of the Abu Sayyaf Group, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front, or the Pattani separatist organizations. In Malaysia in 1999 and 2000, JI went so far as to convene the Rabitatul Mujahidin, a meeting of most of the region's jihadist groups, in order to coordinate attacks and approve cooperation. The Rabitatul Mujahidin does not appear to have met after November 2000 (when it approved the Christmas Eve bombings), but it is clear that JI did not see itself as superseding pre-existing organizations so much as complementing them.⁸

Non-Southeast Asians did occasionally assist in JI operations, although they were always used for special purposes or on the periphery. Jack Roche, for instance, was involved in planning an attack on the Israeli embassy in Australia that was cancelled by Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, while 'Umar al-Faruq and others were sent by al-Qa'ida to assist JI in training.⁹ The suicide bombers in the Singapore plots were also to have been Middle Easterners, rather than Southeast Asians.¹⁰

Jemaah Islamiyah as it emerged in 1993 was on paper a hierarchical organization, with a military-like structure (which the leaders had learned about in Afghanistan). At the top sat the amir, the head of the organization, who presided over four councils. The *syura* (advisory) council was primarily advisory, the fatwa council issued religious decisions, and the *hisbah* (party) council policed against corruption within JI. The fourth council, the *markaziyah* (central), was the operational side of JI. Under the markaziyah were both functional and geographical divisions. The functional units were typical of any large organization (there was a head of finance, for example), but also encompassed JI's training and indoctrination efforts, notably its *dakwah* (proselytization) cells, the network of JI-affiliated schools, the military academy in Afghanistan, and the logistical structure to send JI recruits to fight or train, as well as offices to handle communications and political activities. In 1993, JI had only two geographical divisions: Mantiqi I, which covered Malaysia and Singapore; and Mantiqi II, which covered Indonesia, although actual JI assets within Indonesia were limited due to Sungkar and Ba'asyir's exile.¹¹ Sungkar saw the mantiqi as a convenient way to organize JI, rather than as an acceptance of the political boundaries of the region. Below the mantiqi (which were roughly equivalent to military divisions) were, on paper at least, a series of sub-divisions. Only the *wakalah* (approximately equal to a battalion) and the *fiah* (the traditional terrorist cells, consisting of five or six individuals) appear to have been fully realized. Not every *wakalah* or *fiah* was at full strength, and many levels of JI's organization existed only theoretically in certain parts of the country. The *wakalah* in Solo, on Java, appears to have been the only *wakalah* that had enough people to be fully staffed at every level.¹² More importantly, JI from the beginning had aspirations of being a hierarchical, bureaucratic organization capable of changing leadership on a regular basis.

In the mid-1990s, JI went operational. While the majority of the organization remained in *dakwah* mode, Hambali and other top leaders began picking out certain *fiah* members (often without the knowledge of the *fiah* or *wakalah* leaders) to make plans for

staging attacks. In addition to the normal Qur'anic study sessions, these members also began going to operational meetings, casing targets, formulating attack plans, and receiving paramilitary training (assuming they had not gone to Pakistan or the Philippines). In this way, bombing plotters were drawn from the regular JI hierarchy, but the organization of the actual plots were largely ad hoc. As a result, it would be a mistake to say, for instance, that the Christmas Eve 2000 bombings were a Mantiqi II plot since they took place in Indonesia. Three of the five JI members who participated in the Batam part of that plot were actually Singaporeans seconded from the fiah of the Singapore wakalah within Mantiqi I.¹⁵

After the fall of Suharto, as Jemaah Islamiyah was expanding across Southeast Asia, it spun off two more mantiqi: Mantiqi III, which covered eastern Indonesia (especially Sulawesi), East Malaysia, and the Philippines, and Mantiqi IV, covering Australia. Although all mantiqi were supposed to be capable of carrying out attacks, JI leaders viewed Mantiqi I and Mantiqi IV as the financial backbone of the organization, while Mantiqi III oversaw the supply routes to and from the Philippines, and the training facilities in Mindanao, and Mantiqi II was the political center of the organization.¹⁴

From 2001 on, as different countries successively cracked down on JI, the group's organizational structure was forced to adapt. The crackdowns in Australia, Malaysia and Singapore virtually wiped out Mantiqi I and Mantiqi IV within the space of a few weeks at the end of 2001. The survivors, which included many of those who would plan the 2002 Bali bombing, escaped to Thailand and eventually returned to Indonesia, where they were absorbed into Mantiqi II.¹⁵ Mantiqi III was virtually untouched by the Malaysian crackdown, since it was on the other side of the country, and there was virtually no personnel overlap between the two divisions (with the exception, arguably, of Fathur Rahman al-Ghozi, JI's representative in Manila).

In 2002, Abu Bakar Ba'asyir resigned as amir to concentrate on his overt Islamist organization, Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI), a move that did not please many members, since they were convinced that only a truly clandestine organization could properly achieve an Islamic state.¹⁶ The group did not fall apart, however. Notably, JI is an organization capable of sustaining regularized leadership changes at all levels, and the killing or capture of a charismatic leader (as in other groups) will not necessarily destroy it.

After the 2002 Bali bombing, Indonesia cracked down on Mantiqi II and III. Within a year, it appeared that JI was unable to maintain the same structure. Mantiqi III seems to have disappeared as a separate entity by 2005, while Mantiqi II was reorganized along functional lines (probably to make do with fewer people, and to focus on paramilitary training and proselytization), although some wakalah, particularly those that had not been involved in the Bali bombing in any way, were largely untouched. What remain of JI's hierarchical structure are largely elements of Mantiqi II, with the members of other mantiqis under central command. The leader of Mantiqi II is effectively the head of Jemaah Islamiyah, which seems to have been reorganized into three new division-level units: East Indonesia, West In-

onesia, and Poso. Until June 2007, Abu Irsyad AKA Nuaim was the head of Mantiqi I and thus of Jemaah Islamiyah, while Abu Dujana was the military leader under him.¹⁷

In 2003, the main element of JI started a training program in Indonesia that was sporadically successful, and seems to have tried to build a new military wing, while two other factions of JI continued active involvement in bombings—Noordin Top's group in Sumatra, Java, and Bali, and the JI fugitives in the southern Philippines. Noordin Top seems to have split formally with JI by recruiting his own followers, continuing bombings despite the disapproval of his superiors, and liaising with other groups without formal permission, while it is unclear whether the fugitives in the southern Philippines are still an active part of JI Indonesia.¹⁸

Ideology and Strategic Goals

Jemaah Islamiyah's militant Sunni Islamist ideology is quite similar to al-Qa`ida's, inasmuch as it is the "official" Southeast Asian affiliate of al-Qa`ida. The relative absence of Jews and Shiites in Southeast Asia, and the relative preponderance of Christians, Buddhists, and Hindus, means that Jemaah Islamiyah's activities vary somewhat from al-Qa`ida.

The group's strategic goals have changed alongside changes in its fortunes. As a branch of Darul Islam, the goal of what would become Jemaah Islamiyah was to establish an Islamic state in Indonesia. Once Sungkar and Ba'asyir escaped to Malaysia, they began building up a support base in Malaysia and Singapore, initially in order to maintain the financial and logistical means to continue operations in Indonesia, and to send Indonesian recruits to Pakistan for training. Sungkar recruited the original non-Indonesian members of his network on the basis of fighting the Soviets in Afghanistan, and more generally of protecting Muslims under attack.¹⁹ Upon encountering universalistic al-Qa`ida ideology in Afghanistan, Sungkar expanded his horizons, and the justification for non-Indonesians joining his network expanded accordingly, inasmuch as they were generally not enthused about focusing strictly on Indonesia.

From approximately 1987 onward, JI's leaders espoused the view that a global pan-Islamic state should transcend current political borders, and that the group should fight for an Islamic state across Southeast Asia. Indonesia, as the cultural, geographic, and political center of Southeast Asia, would by necessity be the first country to institute an Islamist regime. The peripheral countries, such as Malaysia and Singapore, would fall once the Indonesian Islamic State (NIS) had been established. Thus, by working to create NIS, Singaporeans and Malaysians would indirectly be working to create Islamic states in their home countries.²⁰

In 2001, after the majority of Malaysian and Singaporean members were arrested, JI was reduced again to an almost entirely Indonesian membership; and while a regional Islamic state is a goal for the longer-term future, in the nearer term, the remaining members are focused on Indonesia or adopt the goals of the groups with whom they are allied. Darul Islam members, for example, have collaborated with JI members on attacks, but only within

Indonesia, while JI members have helped Filipino groups with attacks in the Philippines, but it is unlikely that Abu Sayyaf Group would leave the Philippines to help JI stage an attack far afield.

In the shorter-term, JI's goal is to protect Muslims who it perceives as being under attack by non-Muslims. In practice, this means that JI members with combat and explosives training insert themselves into ethno-religious conflicts between Muslims and Christians in Indonesia (notably in Maluku and in central Sulawesi) and between Muslim groups and the (Christian) Philippine government in the southern Philippines. Jemaah Islamiyah as an organization has sometimes been involved directly in the conflicts, but more usually has provided expertise and fighters to local groups to increase their capabilities. Project Uhud did this in central Sulawesi (Poso) in the early 2000s before it was absorbed into Mantiqi III. Furthermore, JI has shown a willingness to attack targets outside of conflict areas.²¹ The churches in the Christmas Eve 2000 bombings, all of which were in western Indonesia, were ostensibly chosen, for example, because they were thought to be providing financial support to the Christian side in the Maluku conflict.²²

Darul Islam preceded al-Qa'ida by decades, and it would be a mistake to think that a downturn in al-Qa'ida's fortunes (or even the destruction of al-Qa'ida) would have a major effect on Jemaah Islamiyah's plans for Southeast Asia. Elements of DI have been established for more than fifty years, and they (and their descendents) are capable of waiting further to see their dreams come to fruition.

Recruitment and Indoctrination

Although there have been isolated cases, Jemaah Islamiyah does not generally recruit from mosques. Recruitment tactics vary according to the political environment, but JI typically recruits new members through religious schools (*pesantren*), through seemingly innocuous Qur'anic study groups (*dakwah* cells), from the families of existing members, or from people who are involved with other Islamist groups.²³ There is a formal membership process, although it would be a mistake to make too much of this, and it is probably even less important now that the group is under pressure. Those who had pledged *bay'a* (oath of allegiance) to Abdullah Sungkar in the 1980s as they went to train in Pakistan were told in 1993 that they were members of Jemaah Islamiyah by default, and allies of JI (such as members of DI, KOMPAK, or any of the jihadist groups in Poso or Ambon) might not feel the need to pledge loyalty to JI at all, even if they cooperate in specific operations.²⁴

There is a network of about twenty *pesantren* loosely affiliated with Pondok Ngruki al-Mukmin, a *pesantren* near Solo in Java, and the intellectual center of Jemaah Islamiyah.²⁵ Any of these schools in theory could be recruiting grounds for the organization, although that is clearly not their stated (nor even necessarily their main) purpose. Luqmanul Hakiem in Johor, Malaysia served a similar purpose until it was closed. Unlike many *madrasas* in Pakistan, Pondok Ngruki provides a fairly rigorous education on subjects outside of Qur'anic in-

terpretation.²⁶ As a result, many families send their children there, even if they are otherwise uninterested in the radical Islamist foundations of the school. Enrollment at a JI-affiliated pesantren provides the basis for induction into JI, but association with Pondok Ngruki and others of its ilk is neither necessary nor sufficient to infer a given person's membership in JI (or even Islamist tendencies).

Many JI members have been teachers at JI-affiliated pesantren, but never reveal their agenda overtly. As described by a graduate of Pondok Ngruki, the teachers will hold a discussion about, for example, the suffering of Muslims in some part of the world. If some of the more intelligent students ask for further information after class, the teacher will then direct them to extracurricular Qur'anic study sessions that eventually lead to an invitation to receive training, or join JI.²⁷ These are the dakwah cells that were the basis for Sungkar's network starting in the 1980s. The advantage of recruiting the top students from the pesantren or from the family of current members is that the new members' dedication is higher than may otherwise be the case. The dakwah cells appear to be the main way that most JI members experience the organization, and are not limited to Indonesia. Many of the Singaporean members of JI were recruited through the dakwah cells.²⁸

In the past, JI has also used training itself, not only in Pakistan and the Philippines, but also in Indonesia, to incur a future obligation from recruits to work for the group, particularly when it has paid their way. The clandestine nature of the group, and its status as the best-trained jihadist organization in Southeast Asia, have also inspired an esprit de corp that is lacking in mass movements or more loosely organized groups, although this could change as the group brings in new recruits. As a result, JI members may help other members even if they do not approve of a specific operation per se. After the 2002 Bali bombing, for example, Nasir Abas, then head of Mantiqi III, continued for a number of months as a leader of JI, and helped hide one of the Bali fugitives even though he disapproved of the bombing.²⁹

When members are involved in operations, indoctrination often comes in the form of propaganda to fire them up, and to reinforce the idea that jihad is right and necessary. In the Christmas Eve 2000 bombings, for example, Hambali traveled around showing the plotters videos of atrocities allegedly committed by Christians against Muslims in Ambon in order to bolster the necessity of their actions.³⁰

Suicide bombers, which have been used by JI and its various factions several times over the years, require somewhat different indoctrination. Prior to the Bali bombing in 2002, JI does not seem to have used suicide bombers—the Singapore bombers were supposed to come from the Middle East.³¹ Even now, while Noordin Top does not seem to have had a problem finding volunteers, the bombers are prepared individually. There does not seem to be a conveyor belt-type martyrdom program, as in the Middle East. Instead, in the months leading up to an attack, the few suicide bombers used by JI and Noordin Top have received intensive religious training, often in isolation, to prepare them for their task.³² Nor is there one characteristic that the bombers have in common (aside from radical Islamist ideology).

The suicide bomber trainers seem to be able to use a range of motivations to prepare the bombers. The suicide bombers themselves generally have not been members of Jemaah Islamiyah. Instead, they have been associated with groups or teachers allied with JI, and have been motivated by a desire to engage in jihad, revenge (against Christians), or Darul Islam ideology.³³

Training

Sungkar and Ba'asyir began preparing to send recruits to Pakistan for military training almost as soon as they arrived in Malaysia in 1985. At first Sungkar would recruit only Indonesians, and then send them through Malaysia to Pakistan, but starting in 1987 he also began sending Malaysians, and later, Singaporeans. They trained at Camp Saddah, a facility run with the encouragement of Afghan mujahid warlord Abu Sayyaf. The camp was divided into three sections, one of which was for Southeast Asians.³⁴ Most of these recruits, but not all, were sent by Darul Islam primarily to train and return to fight for DI back in Indonesia. Although some Southeast Asians did end up fighting the Soviets, especially in the Battle of Jaji in 1987, they were warned that they were to stay alive and wage jihad at home, rather than in Afghanistan.³⁵ In a sign of how bureaucratic JI was to become, the first recruits set up a welcome center near Peshawar through which later Southeast Asian trainees were processed (Zulkarnaen, later to be JI's military leader, was the official liaison between Sungkar's network and the Afghan mujahidin), and the curriculum at the "Afghanistan Mujahidin Military Academy" was formalized relatively quickly: a combination of weapons and explosives training, religious and ideological indoctrination, military strategy, and battle tactics. English and Malay were the languages of instruction. At first, Arab instructors worked with translators, but later the Southeast Asians were able use recruits from earlier classes to train later classes.³⁶ In 1992, with the increase in hostilities among the various Afghan warlords, Camp Saddah was forced to close, but Sungkar was successful in opening Camp Towrkham along the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Camp Towrkham provided essentially the same curriculum as Camp Saddah, although it was only open for three years, until 1995, and also provided short courses on various topics.³⁷

Aside from the training itself, the experience of the DI recruits in Pakistan had several effects. First, the camps were often the first international experience the Southeast Asians had ever had; they had never seen snow before, for instance, and it opened their eyes to being part of a global jihad.³⁸ Jemaah Islamiyah's ideology and later alliance with al-Qa'ida was at least partly defined by what happened in Afghanistan. Second, Jemaah Islamiyah's later military structure was based on what the leaders learned from the Soviets in Afghanistan.³⁹ Third, the recruits found a sense of camaraderie and shared purpose, even though they were from different parts of Indonesia and even from different countries, in the case of the Malaysians and Singaporeans.⁴⁰ Finally, what would become Jemaah Islamiyah made contact with other Southeast Asian Islamist groups, most notably the members of the Moro Islamic Liberation

Front (MILF).⁴¹ In essence, Pakistan was a major contributor to Jemaah Islamiyah's development: a transnational military-style organization with ties to other Islamist groups and sympathy for al-Qa'ida's ideology.

By 1994, it was clear that the political situation in Afghanistan would not allow Jemaah Islamiyah to keep Camp Towrkham open, and Sungkar began scouting for other locations. Hambali and other JI leaders already had taken trips to the southern Philippines to meet with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front in the early 1990s, and Jemaah Islamiyah began to increase its contacts with that organization as Camp Towrkham wound down. In 1994, a number of JI members traveled to Mindanao to train the Moro Islamic Liberation Front fighters. Nasir Abas and Qotadah were left behind to build what would become Camp Hudaibiyah, within the larger Abu Bakar complex (actually a series of villages in the jungles). The camp, which was run on a round-the-clock schedule, was equipped with a library, an electric generator to run a TV and VCR so that trainees could watch training and propaganda videos, obstacle courses, and several buildings that served as dorms and classrooms.⁴² A series of JI teachers ran the camp for the MILF until 1997, when JI went operational, and took over the camp to train its own people. From then until June 2000, when the Philippine military overran much of the Camp Abu Bakar complex, JI trained over one hundred recruits in courses that lasted anywhere from a week to several months, depending on the subject matter, and the time constraints of the recruits (all the Singaporeans had jobs, for instance, and could only take enough vacation to take short courses).⁴³ Jemaah Islamiyah modeled the curriculum and administration of Camp Hudaibiyah directly on the camps in Afghanistan; there were discrete training classes, often organized by mantiqi, and instructors would serve fixed terms before being rotated out.⁴⁴ After Camp Hudaibiyah's continued use became untenable, JI established Camp Jabal Quba, which was operating until at least 2004.⁴⁵ Thereafter, political conditions in the southern Philippines declined precipitously for Jemaah Islamiyah. Increased scrutiny from the Indonesian government of JI members after the October 2002 Bali bombing, and the souring of the MILF's top leadership (if not individual factions) curtailed many of JI's activities. Jemaah Islamiyah continues to send recruits to train in Mindanao, but they apparently operate in smaller groups of five or six in semi-mobile encampments, often protected by the Abu Sayyaf Group, and the number of recruits has decreased drastically.⁴⁶

Since 2003, both the main faction of Jemaah Islamiyah, which has emphasized refraining from major bombing attacks on Western targets (for tactical reasons) and proselytizing, and Noordin Top's faction, which has continued bombing, have engaged in small-scale training. These have mostly taken the form of short courses, no more than a couple of weeks, dealing with physical exercise, battle tactics, and occasionally weapons use, in the mountains of Java, Sumatra or Maluku.⁴⁷ Noordin Top also ran training courses, as well as intensive bomb-making classes (taught by Dr. Azhari Husin when he was alive) in Java, occasionally with the help of allied jihadist groups, especially groups that had been involved in the Ambon and Poso conflicts, such as KOMPAK.⁴⁸

We can draw several lessons from JI's training experiences. First, intensive, first-class paramilitary training is JI's comparative advantage among Southeast Asian Islamist groups. The expertise that results from this training makes individual JI members more formidable terrorists than virtually any other group's members in the region. Jemaah Islamiyah fugitives' willingness to pass on this expertise to other groups such as Abu Sayyaf Group has also encouraged other groups to take on the risk of associating with them. Second, training itself serves as a recruiting and networking tool for JI—the group has something besides Islamist propaganda to offer young men interested in jihad, recruits form connections with other Islamists that remain with them for years, and those who get training incur an obligation to help the group at some point in the future, even if they do not officially join it. Third, since JI has never actually controlled its own territory, it is dependent on Islamist guerrilla groups that do to provide the protection and resources for large-scale training, such as the camps in Afghanistan/Pakistan and the southern Philippines. Absent these advantages, its ability to train new JI members on the same level as the original generation is limited. On the other hand, even the JI members who trained in Afghanistan in the 1980s could be active for decades to come. Nasir Abas, for example, went to Camp Saddah in 1987 at the age of 17.

Preferred Targets

Jemaah Islamiyah's preferred targets fall into three categories; those in conflict with the group's allies and Muslims in general; targets that indirectly help achieve JI's long-term goals; and Western interests. After Jemaah Islamiyah went operational in the mid-1990s, its first target was the Philippine ambassador's residence in Jakarta as a means of aiding the MILF.⁴⁹ In concert with MILF special forces and the Abu Sayyaf Group, it has continued until the present to attack Philippine government assets and civilian targets in Manila and the southern Philippines, particularly shopping areas and public transit. Although JI showed the ability to carry out independent attacks in the Philippines early on (the 2000 Manila Metro attack being an example), since 2002 JI in the Philippines seems to have acted as a force multiplier for ASG and certain MILF factions by injecting technical sophistication into their bomb attacks.

Within Indonesia, JI has also targeted non-state groups that were actively engaged in conflict with Muslims, or that it perceived to be sympathetic to Muslims' enemies. Specifically, JI has inserted itself into the Muslim-Christian ethno-religious conflicts in Maluku and Poso (in central Sulawesi) since 1999. Its activities have included direct paramilitary fighting against Christians in Ambon and Poso, bombings against Christians in Poso in recent years, collaboration with local jihadist groups, and bombings against Christian targets elsewhere in Indonesia. The 2000 Christmas Eve bombings are the most obvious example, when JI selected as targets churches and priests that it perceived to be supporting Christian fighters.⁵⁰ Also in 2000, JI set up Project Uhud, the specific purpose of which was to coordinate its involvement in the fighting in Poso. Project Uhud was absorbed into Mantiqi III in 2002,

but within Indonesia, Poso remains the location where the main branch of JI is most actively involved.⁵¹

Since its long-term goal is to establish an Islamic state throughout Southeast Asia, Malaysian, Singaporean, and Indonesian government assets are all potential targets, although only attacks on Singaporean and Indonesian government property and personnel have reached the detailed planning stage. Since it views the Indonesian government as fundamentally illegitimate, Jemaah Islamiyah has plotted to kill almost every Indonesian president at some point, although it has yet to make any serious attempts.⁵² The group has also caused installations associated with Singapore's Ministry of Defence.⁵³

Jemaah Islamiyah has long had a strong interest in attacking Western interests in Southeast Asia, and has looked into attacking the embassies of the US and its allies, especially the UK, Australia, and Israel in Singapore, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Australia. Noordin Top's faction of JI actually did attack the Australian embassy in Jakarta in 2004, and the first bombs set off in the 2002 Bali bombings were in front of the US Consulate in Denpasar. It has also targeted Western banks, restaurants, hotels, and schools in Southeast Asia, particularly in Singapore and Indonesia.

In many ways, Jemaah Islamiyah's targets are not all that different from those of other al-Qa'ida affiliates, although JI has demonstrated a willingness to attack targets that are more important to its allies (such as Abu Sayyaf or the MILF) than the group itself. Attacks on certain targets are also designed to achieve its long-term goals indirectly, using logic that may not be readily apparent to investigators. At one point, for example, JI considered attacking the water pipeline that connects Malaysia and Singapore in such a way as to foment a crackdown on Malays in Singapore that would spark an ethnic conflict between Malays and Chinese in Malaysia and Singapore.⁵⁴ When the Malaysian and Singaporean crackdowns did not lead to unrest, one JI member admitted to being surprised at the low level of support JI attracted from the Malay community in the two countries.⁵⁵ Jemaah Islamiyah appears to have honestly believed that Malays would rise up given enough provocation. In Indonesia, aside from the obvious—attacking Westerners in a location without any security—the perpetrators of the Bali bombing intended to hit Indonesia's economy by devastating its tourism industry, which would destabilize the government and pave the way for Islamists to take power.⁵⁶

Operational Abilities

Jemaah Islamiyah is arguably the most operationally sophisticated terrorist/insurgent group in Southeast Asia. It has shown the ability to build relatively complicated bombs, smuggle illicit materials across international boundaries, train suicide bombers, and indoctrinate other Islamist groups.

Jemaah Islamiyah's bombs have improved in technical sophistication over time. The Christmas Eve bombings in 2000 had one batch that failed entirely due to faulty ignition

switches, while Abu Jabir, the head of the Bandung plot, was killed when someone called his cell phone, the SIM card for which was still hooked up to the ignition device for the bomb he was carrying.⁵⁷ On the other hand, the Bali bombing in 2002 featured a combination of remotely detonated devices, a suicide truck bomb, and another suicide bomber wearing explosives. Attacks since then have been a combination of suicide bombers and car bombs. Generally, as happened in the 2002 Bali bombing, the 2003 Marriott bombing, and the planned 2001 Singapore bombings, the plotters have used a core of high explosives, usually TNT, to amplify some combination of potassium chlorate, sulfur, ammonium nitrate and/or aluminum powder.⁵⁸ While JI has obtained nearly all of the ingredients for its bombs locally, it has had a somewhat more difficult time obtaining high explosives, and has often found itself buying TNT in the Philippines, and then smuggling it into Indonesia, or using 'leftovers' from previous operations.⁵⁹

Other groups in Indonesia do not approach JI's level of sophistication. One of the police officials in charge of tracking down JI operatives has commented that, even though they were in existence for thirty years, the Free Aceh Movement's bombs never reached the same level of sophistication as those of JI.⁶⁰ Since the death of Dr. Azhari, Noordin Top's chief bomb maker in November 2005, there have been no more JI-related attacks in Java or Bali, so it is difficult to comment on the current technical expertise of JI's bomb makers, but it is still most likely higher than that of the other Islamist groups in Southeast Asia.

Given that Jemaah Islamiyah members have received weapons and tactical training in the camps in Afghanistan and the Philippines—and many have had combat experience in Ambon, Poso, and Mindanao—the paramilitary fighting abilities of JI are relatively high. The group has never attempted to seize and control territory on its own, so it is difficult to say how it would fare as a guerrilla organization, but JI does have the capacity to exacerbate and prolong any conflict into which it injects itself. Individual JI members can also strengthen and solidify the ideology of potentially wayward allied groups, as reportedly happened when JI members began collaborating with Abu Sayyaf Group. Prior to its interaction with JI, ASG was essentially a criminal gang with an Islamist tinge, but upon taking on JI fugitives, it became noticeably more Islamist in its ideology.⁶¹

Jemaah Islamiyah also has operational characteristics that are just as dangerous but less apparent. It is the only organization in Southeast Asia capable of planning and carrying out simultaneous attacks across great distances. The Christmas Eve bombings in 2000, which hit 38 targets in 11 cities in western Indonesia within an hour of each other, are proof of this. Because, until 2002 at least, JI had cells in so many countries in the region, it was able to plan operations regionally through the skillful use of a combination of email, cell phones, and face-to-face meetings. The Singapore plots, for example, involved meetings among the conspirators or cells in Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, and the Philippines.⁶² With the recent degradation in JI's transnational capacity, it is clearly not what it once was, but the fact that it could do this once should be taken as a sign of its abilities given enough political leeway.

In addition, because both its ideology and organizational structure are so transnational, JI has developed cross-border routes and cells useful for smuggling weapons and people around Southeast Asia. Other separatist and Islamist groups have developed some of these same routes—the Free Aceh Movement between west Malaysia and Sumatra, or Darul Islam between the southern Philippines and Indonesia—but no other group has shown itself able to use all of the routes at the same time, as JI has.

Jemaah Islamiyah's primary illicit route between Indonesia and the southern Philippines extended from Manado (or more generally, North Sulawesi and Gorontalo) or Sandakan, Malaysia through the Sangihe-Talaud islands to Mindanao in the Philippines, and was largely run by Mantiqi III. The route is one commonly used by traditional smugglers as well. At one point, JI had its own boat that it would use to bypass customs and immigrations procedures entirely when bringing recruits to the Philippines and pistols, rifles, and explosives to Indonesia.⁶³ The cells that supported the route seem to have broken down as of 2007, but other groups, notably Darul Islam, have their own infrastructure to support movement along the same route, and individual JI members could use their own connections to move around.⁶⁴ In western Indonesia, there are also smuggling routes between Sumatra and the west coast of the Malay peninsula, as well as between the Riau islands in Indonesia and Johor in Malaysia. Jemaah Islamiyah has used both of these illicit routes in the past—the first, when Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Ba'asyir escaped from Indonesia in 1985; the second when Mukhlas traveled from Malaysia to Indonesia following the crackdown in Malaysia in early 2002.⁶⁵

Setting up a cell is difficult, costly and time-intensive, and JI has used the same cells and routes repeatedly—the explosives destined for the Singapore bombings in 2001 were to be smuggled into Indonesia using the same network that had moved the explosives for the Christmas Eve bombings in 2000.⁶⁶ Because of these difficulties, Jemaah Islamiyah has shown a willingness to use legal means to move whenever the political environment has permitted it to do so. Recruits who trained in Pakistan in the 1980s took Aeroflot from Malaysia to Pakistan because it offered the cheapest tickets, for example.⁶⁷ When Abdullah Sungkar sent a contingent of JI members to the southern Philippines in 1994 to train MILF fighters, while the low-ranking members crossed into the Philippines illegally by boat, the higher-ranking members, including Mustapha, later the head of Mantiqi III, took out Philippines visas-on-arrival and flew through Manila to Mindanao to save time.⁶⁸ Thus, in 1994, JI's illegal crossings were mostly to save money rather than any commitment to stealth. In the more hostile current environment, JI members obviously exercise more caution, but for members that are not fugitives (or helping fugitives), there may not be incentives for them to go to great lengths to hide their movements.

Jemaah Islamiyah has used modern telecommunications and the Internet in its operations, although it is not involved in cyber-terrorism, and its use of communications technology is not particularly sophisticated. The plotters of all of JI's major attacks have used email

as well as cell phones, both for voice calls and text messaging, and seem to have switched out SIM cards to avoid being tracked. The plotters in Singapore sent messages to each other by logging into a free email account and leaving emails in the Drafts folder.⁶⁹ In terms of publicity and recruitment, Imam Samudra was planning on using his laptop to set up a website and mailing list to spread his message in the wake of Bali bombings.⁷⁰ Noordin Top has also been involved in the creation of websites to spread jihadist ideology, with messages from Mukhlas (*after* he was sent to prison).⁷¹ Whatever Noordin's publicity efforts, Jemaah Islamiyah has always been an intensely clandestine organization; there is no JI website per se. Jemaah Islamiyah has always preferred face-to-face contact when possible, probably for security reasons and because of JI's emphasis on personal ties.

Recent and/or Prominent Examples of Operations

The exact form of Jemaah Islamiyah's recent operations has depended on the location and political circumstances of the attack, and the faction of Jemaah Islamiyah involved. This section will look at four different types of operations: the 2002 Bali bombing, perpetrated by the "military wing" of Jemaah Islamiyah; the bombings in Java and Bali in 2003, 2004, and 2005, perpetrated by Noordin Top and his followers; Jemaah Islamiyah's continuing involvement in Poso, which seems to be the major operational activity of mainstream JI at the moment; and possibly schismatic JI members' alliance with Abu Sayyaf Group in the southern Philippines.

Bali Bombing (2002)

The October 2002 Bali bombing, JI's most notorious operation, rose from the aftermath of Malaysia and Singapore's crackdown at the end of 2001. Mukhlas, then the head of Mantiqi I, and a number of other JI fugitives fled Malaysia, first going to Thailand, and later returning to Indonesia, where Mukhlas settled in the Javanese village of Tenggulun. At the time, despite the crackdowns elsewhere, the political environment in Indonesia was quite open, and Mukhlas was able to travel to Ambon in July 2002, as well as receive tens of thousands of dollars from JI's financier, Wan Min Wan Mat. In August, Amrozi, Mukhlas' brother, told him that Imam Samudra was planning to conduct a bombing operation in Bali. In August, the main conspirators (including Imam Samudra, Dulmatin, and others) met for a planning meeting at a house in Sukoharjo, where Mukhlas doled out tasks, followed by a motivational meeting in a mosque near Pondok Ngruki, JI's main school in early September. After this meeting, Amrozi, Idris, and Ali Imron (Mukhlas and Amrozi's brother) bought the white Mitsubishi L-300 that would become the car bomb.

Amrozi purchased the chemicals (potassium chlorate, aluminum powder, and sulfur) for the bomb at a chemical store in Surabaya in East Java and had the chemicals shipped as unaccompanied baggage in long-distance busses from Surabaya to Denpasar (the capital

of Bali). The plotters made two trips to Bali themselves. The first time, at the beginning of September, they scouted for targets, safe houses, and other logistical needs. The second time, most of the plotters drove in the Mitsubishi, and other car (a green Suzuki Vitara) to Denpasar on October 5th and 6th, and met up in Denpasar. There they came together with the rest of the team (including Imam Samudra and Dr. Azhari) in a garage and put the car bomb together. Dr. Azhari actually designed the bomb; Dulmatin built the electronics and two others loaded the chemicals into the Mitsubishi. Dulmatin and Abdul Ghoni provided TNT through their contacts in Ambon, although it is possible the explosives originated in the southern Philippines. By October 10th, the bombs were built, and Amrozi, Dulmatin, and Dr. Azhari left. Mukhlas came to Denpasar from October 9 to 11 to oversee preparations, and bless the operation. On October 12, the day of the operation, the only people left in Bali were Imam Samudra, who was the operational commander on the ground, Idris, who set off the two remotely detonated bombs (including at the US consulate) as a diversion, Ali Imron, who drove the Mitsubishi most of the way to the two nightclubs, and the two suicide bombers: Jimmy, who blew himself up in one of the clubs, and Iqbal, who blew himself up in the car bomb immediately afterwards.⁷²

We can glean several lessons from the 2002 Bali bombing. First, the car bomb was the most technically sophisticated bomb that JI had created up to that point (or perhaps even since), certainly more so than the small package bombs from the Christmas Eve 2000 bombings. But the logistics of the operation were not particularly sophisticated. Although the plotters moved around a fair amount, all the planning and logistics, with the exception of the provision of the TNT, took place in Central Java, East Java, and Bali. Because of the crackdowns in Malaysia and Singapore, the plotters were limited to Indonesia; but within Indonesia, they did not act as if they were facing a high degree of police scrutiny. While JI planned the Christmas Eve 2000 bombings across three different countries, Bali was limited to just one.

Second, organizationally the operation was fairly ad hoc. Mukhlas had been head of Mantiqi I, and did not per se have any jurisdiction over the JI members in Central Java and East Java (which were part of Mantiqi II), but put together a team based on the remnants of Mantiqi I who had escaped to Java and local members he was able to pull from the cells in Java through personal ties, without the knowledge or even necessarily the approval of their superiors in Mantiqi II. Nonetheless, when the Bali perpetrators went on the run, and requested the assistance of members within the JI hierarchy, they received it. Nasir Abas, for instances, used his authority as Mantiqi III head to hide Dulmatin for a time, even though he was strongly against the Bali bombing.⁷³ Harboring fugitives is the crime with which most arrested JI members have been charged, even if they have not been involved in any violent attacks.

Third, the bombing used several people who had been involved in previous bombings (Imam Samudra, for example, had been the bomb maker and operational commander for

the Batam portion of the Christmas Eve 2000 bombings). Even within JI, with its hundreds of members, there are specialists who cannot be replaced easily. Dr. Azhari designed the Bali bombs and all of Noordin's bombs until he was killed in November 2005. Dulmatin, who provided the electronics, is in the Philippines, far away from the JI mainstream, if indeed he is alive. While JI is the most technically sophisticated organization in Southeast Asia, even it does not have unlimited depth in expertise.

Noordin Top's Bombings (2003-2005)

All three of the JI-related bombings in Java and Bali since 2002—the August 2003 bombing of the Marriott Hotel in Jakarta, the September 2004 attack on the Australian Embassy in Jakarta, and the October 2005 bombings in Bali—were perpetrated by a break-away group of JI led by the Malaysian Noordin Top. In the aftermath of the Bali bombing, Dr. Azhari moved to Bukittinggi in Sumatra, where he came together with Noordin Top. Top had come into possession of some TNT held by a member of the Medan *wakalah*, and wanted to use it to continue jihad after the Bali bombing. The actual logistics of the Marriott attack were very similar to the previous Bali operation. In February 2003, the plotters sent the non-TNT explosive ingredients as unaccompanied baggage on busses from Dumai to Pekanbaru, and on to Bengkulu, along the spine of Sumatra. Dr. Azhari and Mohammed Rais got the TNT and detonators in Padang, and took them to Bengkulu. From Bengkulu, in June two plotters (including Asmar Latin Sani, the eventual suicide bomber) accompanied all the ingredients (hidden in bulk cigarette boxes) by bus to Lampung, where everything came together. Noordin was the leader, Azhari the field commander, and Asmar Latin Sani and Tohir would be in charge of logistics (vehicles, house rental, and bomb transportation). In July, the plotters went to Jakarta to scout for safe houses and targets—they considered Citibank, the Marriott, the American School, and Jakarta International School. The bomb went off at the Marriott on August 5, 2003.⁷⁴

Abu Dujana, then secretary of JI, and Qotadah, a high-ranking JI leader, knew about the Marriott bombing before it took place, because Noordin told them in Lampung, and Abu Dujanah helped hide Noordin and the other conspirators afterwards. It is unclear how much he or other JI leaders actually approved, although he met with Noordin and Dr. Azhari after the attack in Bandung to evaluate it.⁷⁵

In any case, in the next two bombings, Noordin Top and Dr. Azhari appear to have acted without any authorization from the top JI leadership, although Noordin's strategy of waging continuing jihad against Western targets attracted a portion of the JI rank and file. In one case a JI cell leader in Java brought over his entire cell to Noordin's cause.⁷⁶ Mukhlas also apparently provided ideological support from prison for the post-Bali bombings through smuggled materials.⁷⁷ For the most part, Noordin drew on a number of different, overlapping networks to provide him and his allies with shelter, explosives, suicide bombers, and training. Aside from portions of JI, Noordin also received help from alumni of JI's religious schools, and branches of DI in West Java and Central Java, all of which were interconnected.⁷⁸

For the 2004 Australian Embassy bombing, Noordin asked for help from a member of the East Java wakalah, Abu Fida, who had been a lecturer at a JI-sympathetic school, Universitas an-Nur, in Solo. In turn, Abu Fida sought out Urwah, who had been at Universitas an-Nur at the same time as Abu Fida. Noordin then asked Urwah to sound out the receptivity of a member of DI, Rois, to jihad against Western interests. Rois, who had apparently met Noordin before in either Ambon or Mindanao, was receptive, and set up a training camp in West Java where he selected three potential suicide bombers. The plotters' original plan was to have the bombers given intensive religious indoctrination by teachers in a friendly pesantren, but constant pursuit by the police made this difficult. Three weeks before the bombing, Heri Golun, the eventual bomber, moved in with Noordin and Azhari in the house where they were staying, and they personally prepared him for the bomb that would go off on 9 September 2004. Noordin apparently used the same method for three suicide bombers in the 2005 Bali bombing—weeks of personal intensive indoctrination.⁷⁹ Heri Golun was not a member of Jemaah Islamiyah. In fact, it would be more accurate to say that he was within the orbit of Darul Islam, given that he was found by Rois. Likewise, Iqbal, one of the 2005 Bali bombers, was also a member of DI and explicitly said he became a suicide bomber to inspire others to follow the legacy of its founder, Kartosuwirjo.⁸⁰

Although Noordin Top's group would best be described as a breakaway faction from mainstream Jemaah Islamiyah, the logistics of the Marriott bombing were similar in many ways to that of the 2002 Bali bombing. In addition, because Noordin was able to take a portion of JI in Java and Sumatra with him, he also acquired those members' expertise and own personal networks, often derived from their experiences at JI-related schools or on jihad in Ambon and Mindanao. Just as importantly, the involvement in Darul Islam members in Noordin's activities suggest that there is a pool of Indonesian suicide bombers and trained fighters outside the control of the JI leadership. Many, perhaps even most, DI members have no interest in suicide bombings or attacking Western targets; but clearly some do, and there are enough personal ties between JI members and DI members to continue to recruit them even if JI falls apart. Finally, in the long term, even if Jemaah Islamiyah itself becomes quiescent, the JI members themselves may continue their fight by setting up new organizations with their own networks, drawn from their experiences in Ambon, Mindanao, Poso, and now Java.

Involvement with Abu Sayyaf Group and Rajah Solaiman Movement in the southern Philippines

Jemaah Islamiyah was not the only organization with an illicit route between Indonesia and Mindanao. Darul Islam also had a route that was still operating after the crackdown on Jemaah Islamiyah at the end of 2002, and apparently this is how Dulmatin and Umar Patek escaped to the Philippines in 2003. They contacted Abdullah Sunata, an Ambon veteran, and eventually found Arham, another Ambon veteran, who had the contacts to move

them through Sabah, Malaysia across to Mindanao instead of through the usual JI route through Manado and the Sangihe-Talaud islands.⁸¹

For a while, the fugitives, perhaps eight people including Dulmatin and Umar Patek, were sheltered with elements of the MILF opposed to the peace process with the government, but after a Philippines government attack on a joint MILF-Abu Sayyaf-JI fugitive meeting in November 2004, the MILF leadership reportedly grew tired of the fugitives, and they began moving around with Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG).⁸² Dulmatin and the other fugitives, having come to the Philippines using their own connections, do not seem to have been under the command any longer of the mainstream JI, which was experiencing its own problems as the Indonesian government cracked down.

There was also a JI wakalah in Mindanao, Wakalah Hudaibiyah, until at least 2004. The main task of that wakalah was not to recruit local members but to train JI recruits, first at Camp Hudaibiyah and later at Camp Jabal Quba. Zulkifli, the head of the wakalah (and himself a graduate of Camp Hudaibiyah) until his capture in September 2003, and his subordinates also began making contacts with Abu Sayyaf Group in 2001, as well as elements of the MILF, and helped ASG in a series of bombings starting in March 2002, especially after oversight from Mantiqi III began to break down in 2003. From then on, the role of both Dulmatin and his associates, and the members of Wakalah Hudaibiyah was apparently to train Abu Sayyaf Group members and, later, members of the Islamic convert Rajah Solaiman Movement (RSM). The effect of this training was to enable the Filipino groups to build more effective bombs. The bomber on the February 27, 2004 Superferry attack, for instance, which killed 116 people, was Redondo Cain Dellosa, an Islamic convert who was trained by Jemaah Islamiyah in bomb-making in 2002. Likewise, the February 14, 2005 attacks, a small bomb on a bus in Makati, Manila killed several people, as did two bombs at approximately the same in a mall in General Santos City, in Mindanao. The bombers on the Manila bus, Gappal Asali and Angelo Trinidad, were also RSM converts, and were accompanied by an Abu Sayyaf Group liaison, Gamal Baharan. Rahmat, the Wakalah Hudaibiyah liaison with ASG and RSM called Asali several times to encourage him in the operation. Both Asali and Trinidad had also been trained by JI the previous year.⁸³

Jemaah Islamiyah's recent activity in the Philippines is confusing, but can best be summed up in the following: Dulmatin and his associates are not necessarily linked with or under the command of whatever remains of Wakalah Hudaibiyah (or for that matter Mantiqi III), but they both provide support to ASG, RSM, and hard-line elements of the MILF in terms of paramilitary training, bomb-making, and ideological strengthening. In return, ASG and some parts of the MILF provide shelter to the fugitives within their territory, and allow some training for the small numbers of Indonesian and Malaysian Islamists who can make their way to Mindanao. Given that they are probably cut off from JI headquarters, the demise of JI in Indonesia may have a minimal effect on their activities.

Involvement in Poso

According to the International Crisis Group, mainstream Jemaah Islamiyah's operational activities since 2002 have been confined to Central Sulawesi. While many JI members do not look kindly on attacking Western targets (due to the unfavorable cost-benefit analysis rather than any love of Westerners), they remain committed to waging jihad against Christian targets in ethnic conflict areas of Indonesia, particularly Poso. The violence in Sulawesi was coordinated from Java through the hierarchical structure of JI, consisting of three wakalabs (in Pendolo, Palu, and Poso) in the province, rather than through an ad hoc structure (as the Bali and Christmas Eve bomb attacks had been). Jihad took the form of assassinations and smaller bombings. The Palu wakalah sheltered some of the Bali bombing fugitives and assassinated a leader of the Sulawesi Protestant church in October 2006, while the Poso wakalah was involved in beheading three Christian schoolgirls in October 2005. While some of the members of the Central Sulawesi wakalah were surely local, JI may have supplied weapons and explosives to Poso from a cache in Java, and sent teachers from Java to Poso to recruit new members in local pesantren. While arrests in 2006 and 2007 have weakened JI's structure in the area, much of it remains untouched, and any flare-up in ethnic tensions would bring even greater jihadist involvement.⁸⁴

Implications for US National Security

Jemaah Islamiyah is first and foremost a Southeast Asian organization. Pakistan and Australia are the only countries outside of the region where it has been shown to have any substantial organizational presence. Hambali is reported to have considered an attack somewhere in Los Angeles, but this seems to have been in his role as a high-ranking member of al-Qa'ida.⁸⁵ As long as Jemaah Islamiyah is under such strong pressure in Southeast Asia, it is highly unlikely it would contemplate, much less have the ability to carry out, attacks inside the United States. In theory, it could raise funds in the US, but there is not a large expatriate Indonesian community in the United States, and most of JI's funds have come either from levies on its own members, from front companies in Southeast Asia, or from al-Qa'ida.

US targets in Southeast Asia are a different story. As long as US Special Forces are cooperating with the Philippine military to fight the Abu Sayyaf Group, the Jemaah Islamiyah elements attached to Abu Sayyaf Group will also target US Special Forces. Other US facilities in the Philippines, such as the USVA building, might also be targeted. Jemaah Islamiyah's expertise can also increase the lethality of Abu Sayyaf Group attacks.

In the past, in Singapore JI has cased the Singapore American School, the US military shuttle from Yishun MRT Station to Sembawang Naval Base, and the US embassy, and has also considered targeting the US embassy in Jakarta.⁸⁶ US embassies and consulates in Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, and the Philippines are the most obvious targets, although JI arguably currently has only the operational capacity to stage attacks in Indonesia

and the Philippines. American and international schools are softer targets. Given JI's animosity to Christians, buildings that house American or international churches in Indonesia could also be targeted.

The connection between target selection and current political events should not be overplayed. Given JI's long-term goals, and its willingness to take circuitous paths to achieve those goals, US withdrawal from Singapore or the Philippines would not necessarily remove US targets from JI's purview. Moreover, the selection of specific targets might have nothing to do with the intricacies of US foreign policy. For example, while he claimed that one of his overall goals was to strike out at the US and its allies, Imam Samudra selected the two nightclubs in Bali because he observed that they had a large number of foreigners relative to Indonesians, and attacking them would presumably minimize Muslim casualties.⁶⁷

Indicators for JI Membership

The core of remaining JI members are from certain parts of Java, although there are members scattered throughout Sumatra, Sulawesi, Nusa Tenggara and possibly Kalimantan. Although JI remains capable of extending itself outside of Java, and could in theory reactivate its old transit routes, if it uses Javanese operatives in these activities, it would be easier to dislodge them from Sulawesi or parts of Sumatra where their local roots are not as deep.

There are a number of indicators for affiliation with Jemaah Islamiyah. Aside from an actual pledge of loyalty to a JI superior, none are necessary or sufficient to indicate JI membership. Someone who has multiple, overlapping ties to a known member through marriage, blood, or schools should be considered at high risk. If a person has actually been present in conflict areas in the Philippines, Ambon, or Poso since 1999, this could also indicate at least sympathy with JI's jihadist goals. Simply attending a pesantren is not enough—some pesantren are actively opposed to the agenda of both mainstream JI and Noordin Top's group, as is Muhammadiyah, the mainstream Muslim group in Indonesia. Jemaah Islamiyah has its own pesantren but could also infiltrate others, so attendance at a given pesantren should only be taken as an indicator if there were JI teachers there at the time.

Since the loss of Mantiqi I, JI as a whole has refocused on Indonesia (in no small part because most of the members still free are Indonesians), which has brought it into greater ideological alignment with Darul Islam. Any Islamist group in Indonesia will condemn the US and Israel, but not all support attacking civilians. Supporting such attacks, as well as a preoccupation with Israel, US policies, and particularly perceived Christian persecution of Muslims could indicate sympathy with JI, or at least with Noordin Top's group.

Conclusion

The different factions of Jemaah Islamiyah pose different threats. The JI fugitives attached to Abu Sayyaf Group and Noordin Top's breakaway faction will most likely continue

to attack Western targets and augment other Islamist groups' capabilities until they are killed or captured. Since they do not rely on the support of a significant population, there is little to be done other than capturing their associates and getting current intelligence. Their tactics do not necessarily have the support of the main branch of JI, but other JI members are not against killing Westerners per se, and will shelter them out of loyalty.

The long-term threat posed by the mainstream branch of JI is multilayered. Jemaah Islamiyah is a separate organization from al-Qa'ida; it is not "al-Qa'ida in Southeast Asia." Setbacks for al-Qa'ida in the Middle East may have no effect on Jemaah Islamiyah. Jemaah Islamiyah is interested only in a military path to an Islamic state, not in a political process, and does not appear to have made any attempt to infiltrate the Islamist political parties in Indonesia. Furthermore, JI has reconfigured itself in such a way that it can wait, reconsolidate, train, and involve itself in conflicts that arise. Jemaah Islamiyah's first bombing did not occur until six years after JI was formally established, and the group has been willing to store weapons for years in preparation for the right moment.⁸⁹ This means that even the absence of recent bombing attacks does not mean that JI has gone away, or even been weakened. It signals instead a return to what JI was when it first broke away from DI. In some respects, actual violence is secondary to training and ideological indoctrination, for the time being.

Further Reading

The reports put out on Jemaah Islamiyah, Darul Islam, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front and related groups by the International Crisis Group's Southeast Asia office (based in Jakarta and headed by Sidney Jones) are by far the most detailed information available on the history of JI, operational details of the group, and connections between different individuals in jihadist groups in Southeast Asia. The reports themselves can be downloaded from <http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=2613&l=1> (Accessed 15 January 2008).

International Crisis Group's research relies in large part on Indonesian-language primary documents (mostly court depositions and police interrogation reports) that it has obtained through various means; these documents are available on CD-ROMs from the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies at Nanyang Technological University in Singapore. These are the documents from which I have drawn most of my own Indonesian-language sources for this chapter.

Most sources on Jemaah Islamiyah tend to place the group within the context of Islamic radicalism in general in Southeast Asia, or treat JI as a subset of al-Qa'ida, and can be found below. Some of these books (particularly those by Zachary Abuza) do not appear to use Indonesian- or Tagalog-language sources.

Zachary Abuza, *Militant Islam in Southeast Asia: Crucible of Terror*. (Boulder, Colorado, USA: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003).

Zachary Abuza, *Political Islam and Violence in Indonesia* (London: Routledge, 2007).

Greg Barton, *Jemaah Islamiyah: Radical Islam in Indonesia* (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 2005).

Kenneth Conboy, *The Second Front: Inside Asia's Most Dangerous Terrorist Network* (Jakarta: Equinox Publishing (Asia), 2006).

Maria Ressa, *Seeds of Terror: An Eyewitness Account of Al-Qa'ida's Newest Center of Operations in Southeast Asia* (New York: Free Press, 2003).

John Thayer Sidel, *Riots, Pogroms, Jihad: Religious Violence in Indonesia* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2006).

Endnotes

- 1 'Jemaah Islamiyah' literally means 'Islamic society' in Indonesian, and could technically refer to any such group. Some JI members therefore prefer to call JI *al-Jamaah al-Islamiyah*. While many of the terms used in this chapter are derived from Arabic, they are all Indonesian words, and use Indonesian spelling.
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Chapter 20

Counterterrorism Interview and Interrogation Strategies: Understanding and Responding to the Domestic Threat

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INTRODUCTION

Today, the military is responding to a new, continually evolving threat. Counterinsurgency operations (COIN) are providing the military with a multifaceted challenge, a departure from the historical Cold War method of fighting. Domestically, U.S. law enforcement and the Intelligence Community (USIC) are as well facing a new threat, replete with changing tactics and techniques. Nevertheless, history has shown that timely and accurately trained local officers respond well to evolving threats. For example, in the early- to mid-1990s, law enforcement agencies faced a new challenge with the appearance of violent, ruthless Asian gangs. As part of this effort, the law enforcement community worked together to train officers to deal with informants and suspects successfully. Officers learned that knowledge of certain ethnic and street gang-related customs and cultural differences assisted them in their interactions with members of that population. For example, street gang investigators learned quickly that gang members often use street monikers, rather than their legal names. Once recognizing this, it became easier for investigators to identify members and their activities, as well as to effectively communicate with gang members and those with whom they interacted.

How does this relate to terrorism? The same principle applies in the world of terrorist networks and the populations that sympathize with and support them. From this knowledge, great strides can be made toward communication and information exchanges with community members, building trust with potential sources and the identification of militancy indicators in subjects.

The September 11, 2001 attacks introduced a new and evolving threat to U.S. law enforcement and intelligence agencies. Although not a new phenomenon, Islamic militancy made its dramatic debut on the stage of the average American's consciousness. Drawing from past experiences, such as street gang or other specialized investigative areas, U.S. law enforce-

ment officers have now realized that learning about Islamic individuals (*Muslims*, pronounced "Moos-lims") and their culture, geography, language and customs can help them combat local terrorist cells and enhance community confidence in understanding, trustworthiness and abilities. This enhanced understanding will assist law enforcement in better establishing important relationships with individuals who could potentially help our efforts. Although the U.S. spent \$43.5 billion on intelligence in 2007, mainly on tools such as satellite systems, aircraft, electronic sensors, analysts and computers, some would say that nothing is of more value than human intelligence.¹ Technical collection obviously has its benefits, but given coded communications and obfuscation deep source reporting may prove more valuable to the counterterrorism efforts of U.S. law enforcement personnel. How is this achieved? The Middle Eastern community carries with it an inherently unique culture with which the U.S. authorities are not familiar. Nevertheless, human intelligence can be acquired, but not without some basic understanding of the integrated topics of culture, geography, politics and religion. Provided with an adequate understanding of these issues, various interview and interrogation strategies will serve officers and agents well in their endeavors.

This paper will examine these factors, placing user-friendly operational tools in the hands of domestic law enforcement personnel in order to better facilitate counterterrorism efforts on U.S. soil. As such, unique interviewing techniques and strategies, and a knowledge of potential indicators, can help officers better identify Islamic extremists in their territory. With proper training and knowledge and their application, local officers and federal agents can effectively fight the war on terror in their jurisdictions.²

UNDERSTANDING THE COMMUNITY

Geography

Law enforcement personnel can gain a better understanding of Middle Eastern ethnic populations in their jurisdiction by studying the 22 Arab states. People with ties to this region derive distinct traits from the differences which characterize each country. Like most people, they tend to be proud of their respective heritages. To this end, officers should strive to learn as much as they can about the ethnic groups in their territory.

The Persian Gulf, or *Khaleej*, has its own flavor and history; this area includes Bahrain, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. Iran's and Iraq's extensive histories warrant study of the recognized Shi'a Caliph³ 'Ali ibn Abi Talib, and his sons Hasan and Husayn, to explore the source of some of the deep-rooted animosity between the primary sects of Islam, the Sunni and Shi'a. An ability to demonstrate understanding of this divide has the potential to reap great rewards when interviewing Muslims.

The Fertile Crescent, or the Levant area, consists of Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Egypt and Israel. Historically, it also includes portions of Iraq because it is considered a country

"watered by the Nile, Jordan, Euphrates and Tigris rivers."⁴ Palestine is also located within the Fertile Crescent area.

Although not recognized officially as a country, Palestine often arises as a topic in Arab conversations. Investigators should have a general understanding of the history and current state of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, as well as of the vastly different viewpoints regarding the historical facts maintained by Arabs and Israelis. Officers can use this topic to build rapport by demonstrating an understanding of the situation, and also help determine an individual's tendency toward extremism (e.g., completely loyal to the United States versus puritanically militant in belief). Caution, however, is essential. It is unwise for officers to broach the subject of Palestine before they have developed some general rapport with the interviewee. It is important to note, however, that an interviewee's comfort in talking about this controversial topic serves as an excellent gauge as to whether the investigator has accomplished rapport.

Egypt (*Misr* in Arabic) features a distinct culture and a colorful history. Egyptians are proud of their rich culture and history, and modern Egypt is known for its contributions in education and the arts, including film. Egyptian people are often animated, politically knowledgeable and engaging. They will occasionally mingle with Palestinians and Moroccans in local mosques.

The Maghreb (Arabic for "land where the sun sets" or "West") area consists of Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia, and in wider interpretations includes Libya and Mauritania, which have significant Berber populations. Although considered part of the Arab world, this distinct, quasi-European region also has a culture of its own. Except for sharing a common culinary tradition, the region's countries are each unique. In spite of their differences, these five states have formed the Union of the Arab Maghreb or UAM; this economic union is similar to the European Union, although perhaps not as cohesive.⁵

Culture and Customs

For effective liaison with Middle Eastern ethnic populations, officers should become familiar with some long-standing Arab culture and customs. For instance, they should understand the important concepts of time and destiny, which guide Arabs in their daily lives.

Generally, Arabs do not feel pressured by time constraints the way Westerners do. As such, during an interview, officers should plan to spend more time talking with Arabs than they might do normally. Also, Middle Easterners generally spend considerable time talking about subjects other than the one at hand. For example, an investigator may make an appointment with an Arab shop owner to discuss his knowledge of a case subject, or even to conduct community liaison. Before the individual is ready to discuss the primary purpose of the interview, he may prefer to get to know the interviewer, converse about the weather, the economy, the college his son is thinking of attending and local politics. To the Arab, this does not constitute non-recognition of law enforcement priorities, but a unique way of thinking

and relating to others that is often inherent in their culture. It should be noted that U.S. law enforcement should shift paradigms, realizing that individuals from the Middle East do not necessarily follow a Western way of thinking.

Another important concept which investigators must understand is destiny. Muslims generally live according to their view of Allah's (God's) will, which extends even to their casual activities on any particular day. It is a fatalistic, but not necessarily negative, view of life. *Inshalla* (pronounced in-shal-la; "God willing") is the highest view Muslims can take of their lives. For example, two friends may make plans to attend a soccer game on Tuesday night. When they make this plan on Monday, and part ways, they may say, "I'll see you tomorrow night, *Inshalla*." This is common, and simply means that they will keep their plans for the following evening provided that it is Allah's will. In another example, a detective may make plans to meet with a potential source for coffee the next day. They agree to meet, definitively, at 10:00 a.m. regardless of how concrete those plans are, or how important the detective says that the meeting is, the individual may add "*Inshalla*" at the end of his comments when they depart. The detective should understand that the individual is acknowledging that something could override him actually making that appointment. If he does miss the meeting, it should not be interpreted as a sign of disrespect or intent to stop cooperating. It is simply part of Arab culture. For terrorists, this concept may be the overriding factor in becoming a *Shaheed* (pronounced sha-heed; "martyr"), especially when a militant spiritual leader advises them that Allah wills them to give their life for the cause. Many Muslims, however, believe that the Qur'an does not support the act of suicide.

Naming Convention

Officers and agents should have a basic understanding of the Arab naming convention. This understanding is critical in helping them avoid making basic mistakes in the obtainment of biographical data, while also ensuring that information provided to obfuscate is fleshed out. Consider the following name provided to an agent or officer:

<i>Ali</i>	<i>bin Ahmed</i>	<i>bin Hatim</i>	<i>al Fulani</i>
(Given name)	(Father's name: Ahmed)	(Grandfather's name: Hatim)	(Family name)

In this example, '*Ali*' will generally represent the given name, such as the Western names Michael or Thomas. *Bin Ahmed* ("son of Ahmed") refers to Ali's father's name. *Bin Hatim* ("son of Hatim") represents Ali's grandfather's name. Investigators should note that *bin* is not always used; a name also could be '*Ali Ahmed Hatim al-Fulani*.'⁶ Other words besides *bin* can be used as well. *Abu* means "father of." Al-Fulani simply designates Ali's family name, sometimes derived from where the person was born and raised. This corresponds to a Western last name, such as Smith. A person named *Ahmad al-Ordani*, in another example, often will originally be from Jordan ("Al-Ordin" in Arabic). The now-deceased terrorist *Abu Musab al-Zarqawi* serves as another example. His name is transliterated as "father of Mosab"

and "one from Zarka, Jordan." In reality, this is not his true name but his useable nickname, or what is referred to as a *kunya* (an honorific name or surname).⁷

In attempting to fully identify a person with a standard Arab name, officers should request the person's: given name, father's name, grandfather's name and family name. It is also beneficial to identify a person's *kunya* (there may be more than one) as well. Obviously, beyond this officers should ask to see varying forms of identification to include multiple passports, student identification card, international driver's permit, driver's license and immigration paperwork.

Language

Much of the Islamic world is rooted in the Arabic language. Middle Easterners view it as a special language in which Allah provided revelations through the Angel Gabriel to the Prophet Mohammad. These revelations eventually became the holy book known as the Qur'an. Arabic is written and read from right to left, as contrasted by the Western method of left to right. Arabic is completely phonetic, which means that all words are literally spelled as they sound, which is also not true of Western languages. Finally, Arabic is written mainly in script, akin to cursive writing, rather than separated letters or type.

Muslims believe that, as a special language from Allah, Arabic should not be translated into other languages and, specifically, cannot be correctly transliterated to English. Accordingly, some Muslims believe that the Qur'an should be read only in the original Arabic. Although learning the Arabic language is not feasible for most officers, this exemplifies another good reason to acquire at least some "survival Arabic," which is integrated in part throughout this paper.

IDENTIFYING EXTREMISTS

Liaison

Armed with a basic understanding of the Arab/Muslim community, officers can devise a successful strategy to develop relationships within their territories, build rapport and communication, develop intelligence and identify Islamic militants. Of course, this is not to "target" Muslims or Islam in any way. In fact, this would go against the ideals upon which this nation was founded. What this paper recommends, however, is simply enhanced cultural awareness from a law enforcement needs perspective to establish liaison and ultimately open lines of communication with the community leadership, as well as an increased ability to identify militancy or moderation.

To this end, officers should have a solid understanding of the ethnic makeup of the local Muslim population, just as with any other subgroup within the community which offi-

cers serve. This might include an understanding of which nationalities are represented in the community, whether both Sunni and Shi'a are represented (as these groups have somewhat different cultural viewpoints and backgrounds) and whether there are mosques and Islamic centers with which to liaison.

As part of a solid community-based policing effort, departments should proactively and aggressively establish liaison and two-way communication in the Arab community, with both Muslims and Christians. Generally, spiritual leaders appreciate law enforcement visits to the mosques when those visits are undertaken with an attitude of openness and understanding. A friendly, non-threatening approach is most effective, especially when infused with an understanding and recognition of the nuances of the Islamic culture. When a proper liaison relationship is established, Muslim community leadership will often notify law enforcement when they encounter persons with militant ideology. For example, if an *imam* (pronounced ee-mom) discovers that an individual with extremist beliefs has recently joined his mosque, it is plausible that the mosque's leadership would call an officer or executive with whom he has a good relationship to express concern.

Warning Signs

A variety of factors may be present that can help officers identify militant believers who potentially pose a threat to national security. Independently, these characteristics do not necessarily indicate an interest in terrorist-related activities, but they should be part of the officer's evaluation of ideology and mindset.⁸

Militant individuals will often stand out in the general Muslim community and appear very religious, maybe even rigidly so, sometimes visiting the mosque for *Salat* (pronounced sa-lat; prayer) every day. Militant believers will likely immerse themselves deeply in a program to learn and study the Qur'an and the Arabic language; in fact, they may strive to become a *Hafez* (pronounced hab-fez; to be hafez is a highly respected status where one has memorized the entire Qur'an). A militant may be extremely outspoken about certain topics, such as the Palestinian cause, *tawhid* (pronounced taow-heed; "monotheism"), actions against *kufaar* (pronounced ku-far; "infidels") and providing these nonbelievers the option to convert to Islam. These topics may arise during conversations with officers or detectives and should be regarded as excellent opportunities to build rapport and conduct ideological pinpointing.

There are different schools of thought regarding physical appearance and extremism. Some also would opine that the presence of a beard in Islam potentially indicates puritanical thinking or even fanaticism. Instead, it may actually be a simple indication of religiosity. Individuals from Pakistan or Afghanistan do not necessarily fall under this category in that many individuals from that region wear a beard as part of their culture. Fresh calluses on an individual's forehead (indicative of prayer during which a person's forehead makes contact with the ground) may indicate recent conversion to the religion or, of concern to law

enforcement, acceleration to a new level of ideology, potentially toward extremism. Again, however, these factors alone do not equate the individual to being one that follows extremist beliefs. Many considerations must be taken into account as part of the officer's evaluation.

The above-listed topics comprise a list of behavioral characteristics which can be used as a gauge to assist in determining whether or not further conversation or investigation is warranted. If a number of these factors are present, it could be indicative of extremism and officers should consider delving deeper into the person's beliefs and activities. It should be noted, as well, that the above factors have nothing to do with being Arab, but rather are signs of potential religious extremism. The most attention should be paid to ideological pinpointing regarding the issues described, such as Palestine, infidels and other topics. The operational tools of interviewing and interrogation provide this opportunity.

OPERATIONAL TOOLS: INTERVIEWING AND INTERROGATION

Interviewing

The FBI teaches that interviewing and interrogation are generally separate processes that should be approached differently. An interview is a conversation with a purpose, specifically utilized to obtain information. In counterterrorism investigations, this generally is not conducted with the intent to obtain a confession to a crime. Rather, it is often carried out to determine where an individual stands ideologically. Understanding ideology, linked with an assessment of the individual's propensity to carry out terrorism-related activities, can greatly assist the investigator in discerning the actual threat. The interview, specifically, is often the most reliable tool in determining the ideological factor in the equation. The FBI teaches that a general interview consists of eight steps:⁹

1. **Preparation:** Planning and assessment conducted prior to the interview.
2. **Introduction:** Introducing yourself as an investigator to the interviewee.
3. **Rapport:** Developing rapport with the interviewee with the potential intent of source cultivation.
4. **Questions:** Strategically asking open, closed and indicator type questions as part of attempts to obtain as much relevant information as possible.
5. **Verification:** Summarizing the information with the interviewee to ensure the information is accurate and complete.
6. **Catch-all Question:** Asking the question, "Is there anything I haven't asked you about?" or "If you were the investigator, what other information would you want to know?"
7. **Departure:** Ending the interview on a positive note keeping in mind that all individuals contacted could become potential sources.

8. **Critique:** Critically reviewing (with the interviewing partner) how the interview went in terms of approach, techniques and effectiveness.

RQRD Technique


When conducting interviews, officers are best served in their attempts to identify militants through the employment of basic interviewing techniques. One useful method, the RQRD Technique, focuses on one individual at a time and involves four steps: 1. Rapport; 2. Questions; 3. Responses; and 4. Determination (RQRD).¹⁰ This method may not only assist an officer's efforts during that particular conversation, but the department's information-gathering mission as a whole.

(R) Rapport:

First, officers should try to develop strong rapport with the interviewee. Investigators can use their knowledge of Arab culture or Islam to help ensure success in this effort. Experience shows that displaying respectful knowledge, or at a minimum respectful curiosity, can result in substantial gains in the area of rapport building. During the preparation phase of the interview process, internet searches regarding geopolitical topics as well as regional history may be of benefit with the aim of establishing a commonality of knowledge. Research the country of origin corresponding to the person's ethnicity. These are excellent topics upon which to build rapport. Ideally, the interviewing officer should take plenty of time with this step, especially if talking to an Arab. In Arab culture, a premium is placed upon personal relationships, more so than in Western cultures. The officer should present all appearances of having all day to converse and get to know each other. Hours should be devoted to such endeavors, all the while avoiding the appearance of being disingenuous. Although this might lead to a fear of coming off as less than genuine, this is not the case. It is a cultural difference that the investigator should utilize in order to be successful.

(Q) Questions:

Next, through a series of specialized indicator questions, officers can begin determining an individual's ideological stance. The spectrum can range from a person loyal to the United States who desires to be an honest and reliable informant for law enforcement on the one end, or at the other end of the spectrum one who is militant and preparing to carry out jihad. The following continuum represents the spectrum of an individual's ideology:



By posing a series of ideology-related indicator questions and receiving honest responses from the individual, the officer can then develop a baseline determination of the person's mindset through his or her responses. The questions should be bipolar and controversial in nature in order to elicit a relevant response. One of the most common mistakes made by interviewers is bailing the interviewee out after asking him a question. Once the question is asked, especially in the case of indicator-type questions, the interviewer must ask the question and then allow for an awkward silence to permeate the interview room. The interviewee will often feel compelled to answer. Patiently allowing the interviewee to answer is a perishable skill that must be intentionally practiced by the interviewer. Another common mistake is to react judgmentally to the interviewee's statements during the interview. If the interviewee was apprehended after detonating an Improvised Explosive Device (IED) in Iraq and proudly recounts his actions during the interview, the interviewer must not flinch or react judgmentally. The recommended approach, with the goal of obtaining additional information about those in the interviewee's network, would more appropriately be, "It's been quite a day for you, hasn't it?" Although not agreeing with his actions, the interviewer is encouraging the interviewee's train of thought, building rapport and establishing control over the interview.

Of course, when asking the indicator questions, officers must convey a respectful, engaged and nonjudgmental attitude. If good rapport has been built as described above, officers will find interviewees to be quite receptive. Preambles are a good lead-in to these questions. For example, the interviewer might mention that he or she has been following the Palestinian cause in the news, is concerned for the plight of the people living there and wants to understand the situation more clearly from the interviewee's point of view. Such facilitating commentaries can prove helpful in encouraging free flow conversation. Sometimes simply getting the militant believer to talk about anything is as well beneficial. Experience shows that the most effective questions in determining the individual's true beliefs are those generally considered controversial, enabling a bipolar response. A fictional interview with a person, who turns out to be an extremist, can serve as an example. The following "transcript" represents an abbreviated version of an RQRD technique line of questioning. In a real scenario, this questioning would occur at length:

(R) Responses:

Investigator: What do you think about the situation in Iraq?

Interviewee: I do not support those actions.

Investigator: What do you think about the situation in Palestine?

Interviewee: I support Palestine and staunchly oppose Israel's actions.

Investigator: What do you think about governments, such as Israel and Egypt, that are allies of the United States?

Interviewee: They are infidel governments.

Investigator: What is your belief about what happened on 9/11?

Interviewee: It was a conspiracy orchestrated by the U.S. government.

Investigator: What is the true Islamic definition of *Kufuur*?

Interviewee: All non-Muslims.

Investigator: What would it be like if all countries were Islamic and followed the *Shar'ia* (Islamic law)?

Interviewee: All governments should convert to the *Shari'a* law, leading to a worldwide *khalifate*.

Investigator: What do you believe Muslims should do to be in Allah's favor?

Interviewee: They must return to the austere and pious life that Muhammad led.

Investigator: What resources would you recommend to me that teach the "true" path of Islam?

Interviewee: The reliable resources should include works by Sayyid Qutb, Ibn Taymiyyah and Hasan al-Banna.

(D) Determination:

By asking these questions, officers can gauge, almost quantitatively, where an individual stands. A person answering with a patriotic and pro-Western stance could potentially evolve into a street informant or concerned citizen. However, if an individual responds as in the example above, along with other investigative results, it may indicate that the individual follows militant ideology.

Of course, the approach and policies of the department or Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) should determine the next investigative step. Nevertheless, the investigator has potentially determined where one individual in the community stands on a variety of political and religious issues.

Considering that Islam is a life system wherein law, politics and religion are intermingled, this method gives officers a quick start in their endeavor of identifying Islamic militants. Overall, these inquiries allow for some basic responses, and as the investigator's knowledge grows regarding these topics they can pose many other questions. In the end, it provides a means in which an individual officer or agent can impact the war on terrorism beneficially.

The interview as a whole is focused on determining if the person is involved in terrorism-related activities and is a potential threat to domestic or international security; in other words, is he involved in terrorist-related activity and why. In some cases, the investigator may not feel that he is being provided the full truth or any information at all. In this case, the investigator is encouraged to transition to the interrogation phase.

Interrogation

In comparison to the interview, the goal of interrogation in the counterterrorism realm is to influence the interviewee to provide truthful information that he may not have offered during the interview. The other objective is to obtain more in-depth information as it relates to terrorism-related activity. The interrogation is altogether different by approach in that during the interview the individual being interviewed does most of the talking. During interrogation, the roles are reversed and the interviewer conducts most of the talking. In addition, interviewers may see great benefit in conducting a "transition," which often equates to the interviewing team leaving the room, changing the "scenery" and returning after a brief break. When the interviewers return to the room, the atmosphere must change. The interrogation should begin with the interviewer convincingly accusing the interviewee of being involved in terrorist-related activity or a particular crime. The accusation can take the form of the following:

"The evidence clearly shows you were involved in the crime."

"We know you did it."

"You are the only individual that we couldn't eliminate as a suspect."

The interrogator should allow for a three to five second pause following the accusation in order to evaluate the interviewee's initial reaction. At this point, there is no returning to the interview phase unless an outright confession begins. After the unequivocal accusation takes place by the interrogator, much success can be found in the utilization of what the FBI teaches as Rationalizations, Projections and Minimizations (RPMs).¹¹ The RPMs essentially provide the interviewee with justified reasons to confess or provide further information. It should be noted that often after the accusation takes place the interviewee will deny the allegations. These denials should be refused by the interrogator, often in the form of a hand up to the interviewee followed by statements such as "We're beyond that," "Please give me more respect than that," or "At this point I want to know why." If the denials continue, the interrogator should keep the hand up, keep talking and then turn his head away. With further denials, the interrogator should stand up and turn away. The interrogator cannot return to asking questions or appearing equivocal in his position. This negates the intended purpose of the accusation.

Overall, the FBI teaches the following general elements of interrogation:

1. Convincingly accuse the suspect
2. Cut off denials by the suspect
3. Provide reasons to confess (RPMs)
4. Redirect protests
5. Prevent mental withdrawal
6. Watch for signs of receptivity
7. Present a bad/good option

As part of the interrogation, certain tenets should be followed. The interrogator should have a chair on rolling wheels allowing him to close the distance as necessary. The understanding and use of proxemics during interrogation can prove essential to the interrogator. Closing the distance increases stress upon the interviewee. Generally, personal space is between 18" and 4'. With his personal space invaded, he is looking for an outlet to reduce his stress. Sometimes the good/bad option may prove fruitful. An example could be the following: "You weren't carrying out this fraud to financially support a terrorist network; you were trying to put food on the table for your family." In addition, the unrelenting use of RPMs and good/bad options can often lead to obtaining a confession regarding the interviewee's involvement in nefarious activities.

RPMs are an excellent tool for the interrogator. Overall, with RPMs the interrogator is conveying that he does not judge the interviewee for what has taken place. In essence, what has taken place can be rationalized, projected upon another, or minimized. Of course, interrogators should never do or say anything that would cause an innocent person to confess.

The following are various counterterrorism focused RPMs that may prove helpful:

Rationalizations

"Anyone in your position would have done the same thing."

"You were just trying to bring the truth to those that are ignorant."

"You were just trying to make a point about the materialism and lack of morality in this country."

Projections

"You're not to blame. It's the person that paid you to build the device that should be sitting here"

"_____ put you in this situation."

"Jihadists brought us to this point. It's not your fault."

Minimizations

"It's not like anyone died."

"You only carried out the surveillance of the bridge, you weren't the planner."

From the interviewee's perspective, RPMs can be the key to the development of an honest conversation regarding what took place. If the interviewee feels justified in his actions, he will feel more comfortable telling the interrogator about his activities. Overall, the interviewee may just be waiting for a reason to confess. To do this, the interrogator may draw upon the interviewee's situation, motives, pressures, frustrations or concerns.

Overall, if the interview does not prove fruitful, a transition to interrogation may provide a beneficial avenue for the interrogator. The interrogation must begin with a change in "scenery" and an unequivocal accusation. At this point, the interrogator can draw upon RPMs or good/bad options to elicit further information. Closing the space creates additional stress after which the interviewee will most likely be looking to appease the interrogator with some partial truths, if not a full confession. Working together with the interview, interrogation is another tool that can be drawn upon when a stalemate is reached in the interview.

Conclusion

Overall, law enforcement officers and agents need an understanding of the Arab community and the Islamic community, including knowledge of their culture and customs. This information can help develop trust among Arabs and Muslims in their jurisdictions. The resulting relationships can then assist investigators in obtaining information that may lead to the identification and disruption of domestic or international terrorist activities. With these efforts, along with the use of proactive interview and identification processes, departments and agencies can feel assured that their efforts are impacting the war on terrorism.

Endnotes


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Chapter 21
The Radicalization Process

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Radicalization process



Ideological Underpinnings: Reorienting Islam

Broadly speaking, the foremost priority of the global jihadi movement is to revolutionize Islam. On the model of past Salafi movements, and the teachings of contemporary militant Salafis, jihadis strive to alter Islamic society and its perceptions—to reorient it upon an Islamist agenda as read through the early texts of Islam. The Salafi movement took hold in the United States in the 1960s, and although its practitioners have been largely non-violent to date, their role in radicalizing Muslims, youth in particular, has been largely under-explored.

The term "Salafi" has been used by a variety of parties to describe an agenda of strict orthodox reformation, popularized during the last two centuries, but with a range of societal and political implications. In many regards, these Salafi movements have been the instigators of the greatest social change, resistance and turmoil in the Islamic world. In the Arabian Peninsula, this call for a return to early Islamic ideals translated into a rigid orthodoxy imposed primarily in religious terms on its population, while the Salafi elite strongly discouraged

social mobilization or political opposition of any kind. In other instances, Salafism meant organized social and political reform in order to implement an idealized vision of Islamic society.

The 18th century activist Muhammad ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab attacked the popular forms of Islam of the day, namely Sufism, labeling many Muslims *mushrikin* (polytheists) for having intermediaries to God, believing in saints or holy men, and other practices he considered to be deviant. He drew heavily on the prolific writings of 13th century Syrian scholar Ahmad ibn Taymiyya, using his literature to support arguments for *takfir*—labeling other Muslims disbelievers and making them lawful targets in warfare.¹

The 20th century saw these Salafi ideals transformed into organized political and social movements, notably in Egypt with Hasan al-Banna and Sayyid Qurb (1906-1966), and Abu al-'Ala Mawdudi (1903-1979) in Pakistan, the latter of which helped shape the political landscape following partition with India. These social reformers laid the groundwork for more widespread Islamic revivalist (i.e. Islamist) movements that spread to other parts of the Muslim world. Today's global jihadist movement sprung out of these Salafi reformers and activists, and that ideology remains the basis for the vast majority of contemporary Sunni Islamist militancy.

Recent Historical Underpinnings: From Afghanistan to the Internet

Contemporary militant Islamists in the United States and Europe are the successors to the Afghan campaign of 'Abd Allah 'Azzam and Usama bin Ladin. Adopting many of the principles of earlier Salafi movements, theirs focused on jihad as the forgotten "sixth pillar" of Islam. By renewing their commitment to this neglected obligation, Muslims would be saved and earthly success and power would follow.

As Usama bin Ladin began organizing incoming mujahidin and published the *Jihad* magazine under 'Abd Allah 'Azzam in the early 1980s, a much greater project was in the making, although neither may have known it at the time. These jihadi leaders and others began to look outside Afghanistan after the Soviet withdrawal, determined not to let their efforts end although that battle had been won. They saw the corps of mujahidin as a foundation for global efforts, aiming their sights on Palestine, Uzbekistan, Lebanon, Chad, Eritrea, Somalia, Yemen, Andalucia (southern Spain) and the Philippines as future theatres of war.

Afghan veterans took on the role of emissaries, bringing the message of the mujahidin's victory to their home countries, primarily Arab states. Through Islamic scholars, local mosques and *madrasas*, and various media outlets, they persistently called on Muslims to aid their brethren under oppression in the aforementioned theatres. At the same time, Islamic educational institutions in the Arabian Peninsula and in several other Muslim-majority countries were dominated by Salafi or Salafi-inspired curriculum, largely due to the wealth of its sponsors.

The literature from this movement began arriving on the internet in the mid-1990s. This medium introduced the writings of 'Abd Allah 'Azzam, Sayyid Qutb and other late revolutionary Islamist leaders, as well as contemporary Salafi ideologues like Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi and Abu Basir al-Tartusi, to a new generation of young Muslims. This took place largely through the initial efforts of the Afghan veterans from the 1970s, who continued to globalize the jihadi movement toward an Islamic awakening.

The social, political and legal framework underpinning jihadi radicalization is furthered through a number of avenues, many of them tied to the Salafi movement. As the process of radicalization for jihadi recruits like John Walker Lindh, Adam Gadahn, Daniel Maldonado and others is explored, it is important to note the ideological foundation preceding militancy, which is present in nearly all such cases in the United States to date.

Salafism in the United States

In the United States, a group of Muslim leaders educated in Saudi Arabia—especially those on the influential Fiqh (jurisprudence) Council of North America—holds a great deal of influence over American Muslims. Working through educational, outreach and political organizations, Salafi Islam is behind a great deal of the Islamic activism and charitable work in the United States. Salafi or Salafi-oriented groups (mainly aligned with the Saudi establishment) have found success by providing materials to Muslims in the United States who are often isolated from the global Muslim community and establishing themselves as authorities on Islam in their communities by presenting speakers, providing fatwa services and giving free Arabic instruction.²

As a result, popular Muslim culture in the United States has been swayed by Salafi currents, as the most popular Muslim American clerics were predominantly educated in Mecca or Medina, or have other educational links to the official Saudi Salafi establishment. These currents can, at times, be transformed by political or social tendencies that result in militancy.

The result of foreign Islamist educational and ideological influences is manifest in the agenda of Muslim activism in the United States. These organizations are by-and-large focused on the problems facing the global Muslim community, with an emphasis on Palestine, Iraq and Afghanistan. They persistently raise their concerns above those of Muslims in America, aside from confronting anti-Muslim discrimination. These currents, streaming from the Islamic revivalist movements of the Middle East, continue to shape the debate among Muslims in America.³

Although the vast majority of Islamist organizations in the United States are non-violent, there have been attempts to incite violence. The Islamic Assembly of North America (IANA), based near Ann Arbor, Michigan, was founded in 1993 with a focus on missionary (*da'wa*) activities.⁴ They have held eight annual conventions, "more than 100 educational programs and workshops around U.S. and Canada," and maintained an extensive prison

outreach program that sent out, according to IANA, at least 530 packages containing a copy of the Qur'an, books, lectures and other Islamic materials.

In 2003, however, IANA also began publishing fatwas from Saudi dissidents Safar al-Hawali and Salman Ouda encouraging jihad against Americans.³ According to the FBI, much of their other funding since 1995 has come from foreign sources. IANA receives financial backing from Saudi Minister Saleh Hussayen, whose nephew also has an affiliate relief organization called Help the Needy that was investigated for terrorist funding. In addition, IANA offers a toll free number for fatwa consultations (1-800-95-FATWA).

Minister Hussayen has provided financial backing to various Muslim institutions to promote Salafi teachings. In the 1990s, he was a director of the SAAR foundation, an organization based in northern Virginia at the center of a terrorism financing probe tied to al-Taqwa bank, a shell entity in Switzerland that provided millions of dollars to al-Qa'ida, according to the U.S. Treasury Department. Clearly, this case demonstrates the complexity of the networks involved in Islamist radicalization. Yet, it also demonstrates how educational and missionary organizations can participate in the first stage of the radicalization process; such materials and outreach often constitute the initial step on the path to jihadi radicalism, although there is no violent activity taking place.

Paths to Radicalization

The four stages of radicalization will be discussed in detail below. In the first step, *introduction*, individuals begin down a path to radicalization that ultimately results in one's immersion into jihadi culture and a determination to carry out an act of violence in furtherance of their cause. The inclinations and motivations of those who choose to embark down this path vary among the individuals surveyed. Some were non-Muslims who espoused the beliefs of the Salafi movement at the same time they converted; some were born Muslims who took up the cause of the movement to help their Muslim brothers.

To reiterate, jihad is not the ultimate goal of the militant Salafi movement. Their foremost objective is to bring fellow Muslims to a Salafi reading of Islam and, from that point, to deliver salvation to the global Muslim community by returning it to the "true" Islam. These efforts are manifest through various Salafi literature, videos, speeches and other materials introduced at the mosque, in prison, or online.

Accessing the Message via the Internet

Beginning in the late 1990s, the CIA and other intelligence agencies began to actively monitor the nascent community of jihadi websites and discussion forums.

There appears to be a strong and growing online readership of militant Salafi ideology, and recent cases have demonstrated how homegrown terrorists can be inspired to act through this body of jihadi literature. A May 2006 survey of participant membership on

three popular (often militant) Salafi forums—Muslim.net: 692,925; Sahab.net: 248,714; and Tajdeed.co.uk: 125,461—list more than one million registered users. The Tawhed.ws website contains perhaps the largest collection of militant Salafi and jihadi literature online. Each article receives between 5,000-10,000 reads, with hundreds of articles and books provided on the website.

The primary element of the literature is the explanation and implementation of the Shari'a. The common ground among nearly all Salafi scholars is their rejection of Muslims living under apostate laws and political systems (such as democracy, or any man-made law), transgressing the law that God has decreed. The required response—for all, but to differing degrees and with differing tactics—is resistance.

Scholars such as Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, Abu Qatada al-Filistini and Abu Basir al-Tartusi enjoy tremendous credibility as leading Salafi scholars of resistance (and are among the most widely read).⁶ All have strong Salafi credentials and have been prolific writers and leading voices in the movement; they have also been imprisoned or exiled from their homeland. They are perceived as being true to Islam for placing the interests of Muslims before themselves, making them sincere, legitimate and incorruptible. For the mujahidin, they enjoy the status of scholarly authorities.

In addition to the ideological, political and social tracts on Tawhed.ws and other sites, the internet plays a crucial role in distributing jihadi groups' video and audio statements. This was perhaps most widely exploited by the late Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi, once leader of the semi-independent al-Qa'ida in Iraq. His videos, featuring footage of attacks on Coalition forces and beheadings of his captives, were issued via Islamist discussion forums and distributed globally.

At least four separate media production outfits (al-Sahab, GIMF, al-Fajr and al-Furqan) create recruiting, motivational, instructional and strategic videos for al-Qa'ida and other jihadi groups. Even since 2003, the production quality and distribution capabilities of these videos have increased tremendously. Moreover, they have become increasingly read and discussed and, in some cases, been a primary motivator for homegrown terrorism.

In the Ft. Dix case in May 2006, group members were highly motivated by jihadi videos they found online. Mohamed Shnewer, the only one of the six who spoke and read Arabic, downloaded numerous videos by al-Sahab media productions. Shnewer was a vigorous proponent of these jihadi videos—particularly those featuring attacks against U.S. military personnel—distributing them to members of the group and others with whom they met.⁷ As they determined to plot and carry out an attack, the group had become obsessed with the culture of jihad, evident from FBI surveillance records.

This case, like the foiled plots such as the 2006 UK plan to destroy 10 trans-Atlantic airliners, demonstrates how groups of young men with little or no contact with formal terrorist groups can be inspired by Salafi literature and jihadi videos found online.

The Magazine Craze

During a span of two years, twin publications from Saudi Arabia established a model for providing comprehensive training materials to the mujahidin—both doctrinal and military in nature. *Sawt al-Jihad* (The Voice of Jihad) and *Mu`askar al-Battar* (the al-Battar Training Camp, named for the late Yusuf al-`Uyayri) published 22 issues, beginning in 2002.⁸ Al-`Uyayri, who took the nom de guerre *al-Battar*, or “cutting edge,” was a Saudi-born al-Qai`da strategist and leading mujahid commander killed in 2003 by Saudi security forces. *Al-Battar* featured numerous articles from al-`Uyayri, who joined the jihad against the Soviets at age 18. Later, he served in Somalia under Muhammad `Atif, where he trained Islamist militias to use anti-aircraft weapons in 1992 or 1993, which contributed to the deaths of 18 U.S. military personnel when three helicopters were shot down on October 3-4, 1993.

The *al-Battar* magazine focused on paramilitary training. It featured content on urban warfare techniques, basic weapons training and maintenance, bomb-making and other topics from commanders who had fought in ongoing campaigns in Afghanistan and Saudi Arabia. In lengthy detail, these authors laid out explicit instructions on security measures, operational guidelines, cell organization and communications.

Sawt al-Jihad, meanwhile, featured ideological justifications for jihad, in politically charged, anti-U.S. articles from leading Salafi-jihadi leaders and strategists. It also produced other content for the mujahidin, such as poems, testimonials and stories of martyrs. Together, *Sawt al-Jihad* and *Mu`askar al-Battar* were forerunners of many other online magazines that mimicked their format, layout and content. For example, they spawned *Majjalat al-Fath* (Magazine of the Conquest) and *Dhurwat al-Sanam* (The Pinnacle) in Iraq; *Majallat al-Ansar*, *al-Fursan* and *Tora Bora* are among other numerous examples.

These sister publications from other fronts of jihad were part of a rapid growth in jihadi materials online that occurred in the early 2000s. Ironically, this occurred largely as a result of the worldwide interest in jihad and jihadi materials following 9/11. This was seen in the expanded readership of internet discussion forums on jihad and militant Salafi Islam, greater readership of websites with Salafi and jihadi libraries such as *tawhed.ws*, and a general increase in the quantity and quality of media output from al-Qa`ida and like-minded groups.

Development of an Online Curriculum

Archives of *Sawt al-Jihad*, *Mu`askar al-Battar*, *Majjalat al-Ansar*, *Dhurwat al-Sanam* and other magazines provided a rich body of content. Efforts were made to extract articles from these publications and create collections that could be used as training curriculum for aspiring mujahidin. Not all of these collections came from a single source, however; some encouraged cells to organize and operate independently under their guidelines, while others encouraged recruits to join existing jihadist groups for additional training and guidance in order to avoid attacks that might damage the public image of the movement.

At the same time, encyclopedias on jihad with content from an array of sources—including excerpts from U.S. military and intelligence training manuals—became available online. From at least 2003 onward, the expansive Encyclopedia of Preparation (*Mawsu'at al-'Idad*), the Encyclopedia of Jihad (*Mawsu'at al-Jihad*), prepared by the mujahidin in Afghanistan, and other virtual “encyclopedias,” as they styled themselves, were published and distributed online.⁹

Other encyclopedias have emerged, like the Encyclopedia of Periodicals and Publications on Jihad, which contains dozens of files and links to magazines, mostly published in 2002-03. It describes itself as a presentation and explanation of the mujahidin's communications, made available to all Muslims. Its contents include a video course and seven-part audio course from Abu Mus'ab al-Suri on the call to organized resistance. Additionally, the encyclopedia includes the writings of 'Abd Allah 'Azzam; content from jihadi periodicals and publications such as *Sawt al-Jihad* and *al-Battar*; statements from Usama bin Ladin; courses on security precautions; responses to criticism of the mujahidin and the jihadi movement; poetry in praise of jihad; and war videos.

Such encyclopedias illustrate how the community of mujahidin and their supporters not only develop and distribute curriculum for the aspiring, inexperienced youth who wish to join their ranks, but also consolidate jihadi strategy and serve as a conduit for implementing that strategy at the lowest levels—the Arab and Muslim youth who browse the content and contemplate taking action.

Moreover, according to al-Suri and other jihadi leaders and strategists, the mujahidin should have a thorough understanding of correct Islamic belief and doctrine (in accordance with Salafi Islam) before moving on to any weapons or combat training. Indeed, ideology is more often than not a fundament and prerequisite for joining the mujahidin, and one finds that captured or repentant mujahidin all progressed along a path of ideological radicalization until they eventually sought armed combat in support of the cause.

At the Mosque

Few mosques in the West have openly promoted militancy in recent years. Mosques, however, can provide a meeting place for Muslims who have more radical views than their leaders; these individuals often gravitate toward one another and form groups parallel to the mosque—keeping their own motivations private.

Nevertheless, there have been cases where a terrorist plot originated with a mosque or mosque leader. Two al-Qa'ida members, Juma al-Dosari (a Saudi imam) and Kamal Derwish (a Yemeni born in Lackawanna, raised in Saudi Arabia), began giving informal talks at the Lackawanna mosque, near Buffalo in upstate New York. Although some in the community were concerned about the militant tone the two carried in their sermons, they nonetheless used the mosque as a meeting and recruiting ground until they made private their planning to attend training camps in Afghanistan.¹⁰

The so-called "Virginia Jihad Group" under `Ali al-Timimi provides another example of a group coalescing within a mosque, although not directly commanded to violence by their imam. Al-Timimi opened the mosque Dar al-Arqam in a storefront in Falls Church, Virginia in the late 1990s, also founding a center for Islamic education in the area. He continued to draw more and more people to his sermons, typically on aspects of Salafi belief and practice. Al-Timimi was deeply involved with Salafi Islam, having studied in Saudi Arabian institutions and also serving as an Islamic teacher for the Islamic Assembly of North America (IANA), described above.¹¹

Al-Timimi was also in contact with two radical clerics, Egyptian-born Salafi Abd al-Rahman Abd al-Khalid and Saudi dissident Safar al-Hawali.¹² Both are Salafi clerics who encourage jihad against Americans. Al-Timimi was sentenced to life in prison for soliciting others to levy war against the United States. Eleven people were charged in total in the case.

Through the Prison System

U.S. prisons (New York State in particular) essentially hosted an extensive presence of militant Salafi Muslims during the late 1980s and 1990s, as many officials were unaware of the ideological framework of terrorist groups. These inmates were radicalized—and in some cases recruited by terrorist groups—while serving their terms. According to the testimony of then FBI Assistant Director for Counterterrorism John Pistole, "convicted terrorists from the 1993 World Trade Center bombing were put into their prisons' general population where they radicalized inmates and told them that terrorism was part of Islam."¹³

A larger source of Islamist radicalization in the New York State Department of Corrections, however, was taking place under its own chaplain, Warith Deen Umar. Again, according to Pistole, "Umar denied prisoners access to mainstream imams and materials. He sought to incite prisoners against America, preaching that the 9/11 hijackers should be remembered as martyrs and heroes. Umar has since been banned from ever entering a New York State prison."¹⁴

Additional Causes

Aside from the ideological factors that guide radicalization, nationalism and a desire to help one's brethren in one's home-country have also been strong motivators for pursuing jihad. The Ft. Dix suspects and various London cases of 2005, '06 and '07 demonstrate how an individual's strong emotional ties to their native country can effectively estrange them from American (or European) culture when they perceive the West to be behind their people's suffering. By all indications, the Dukas—three brothers who were a central part of the Ft. Dix plot—transformation began with their emotional response to the atrocities against fellow Albanians in Kosovo in 1999.

Meanwhile, Salafi publicity efforts (along with humanitarian aid and educational and *da'wa* efforts) mapped the jihad in the Balkans onto the defense of Albanian Muslims from tyranny and bloodshed. An individual (whether immigrant or second-generation) moved by events in their home country may view Islamists as having a true and demonstrated dedication to helping their people. They may, therefore, sympathize and then adopt the Salafi precepts, later down the road becoming enmeshed in the rigid ideological framework of the movement.

In all these cases, there is essentially a conversion into Salafi Islam taking place—a commitment to follow the basic reform principles of the movement toward aiding the umma and bringing it back to the correct Islamic practices, which will ultimately, they believe, restore Muslims to success and power. Militant Islamists have found support in the Arab and Muslim world as defenders of the people against Western aggression, being opposed to the widespread corruption, hypocrisy and nepotism prevalent in the region, and for attempting to regain the lost prestige of the Islamic empire. They rarely find support on the basis of their ideology alone; it seems that those moved to support the mujahidin do so out of sympathy for their positions on contemporary problems facing the Muslim world rather than their strict Salafi interpretation of Islam alone.

Four Stages of Radicalization

Among the cases analyzed thus far at the Combating Terrorism Center, jihadist radicalization often occurs over the following four stages:¹⁵

- 1) **Introduction** to the literature;
- 2) **Immersion** in Salafi thinking and mindset;
- 3) Growing dissatisfaction or **frustration** with inaction, or a need to do more to help the cause;
- 4) **Resolve** to receive training; active pursuit of contacting mujahidin; resolved in the principle of preparation for jihad.

These steps trace the distinct changes in attitude and worldview a potential mujahid goes through before arriving at the point where s/he is prepared and intent upon jihad. This model focuses on events and persons that lead to jihadi activism; it leaves off where one resolves to carry out a terrorist act, or join the mujahidin overseas in combat. There does appear to be a “line of militancy” between the third and fourth stages, where one crosses over from non-violent to violent intent. It stands to reason, then, that intervention has the best odds of success in the early stages of radicalization, although such actions have not been tested.

In the first stage of radicalization, a subject comes into contact with the movement through one of the paths to radicalization described in the above sections. The individual may browse through videos or audio lectures and read articles, learning more about Salafi

Islam and, depending on the individual's motivations and inclinations, search out an individual ideologue or jihadi leader who captivates them. This stage is effectively where serious, hard-line Salafists are separated from other Muslims who elect not to traverse down this path of resistance.

In the second stage, the individual or group of individuals immerse themselves in the thinking and mindset, and/or the culture of jihad that surrounds militant Salafism. This stage can last anywhere from a matter of months to several years. During this stage, the individual becomes increasingly consumed in the doctrine of the movement, seeing the world in terms of black and white: *haram* (forbidden) and *halal* (permissible); *kufir* (disbelief or heresy) and *iman* (belief); *shirk* (polytheism) and *tawhid* (monotheism). After sufficient study and mastery of the doctrine, an individual on this path typically looks to spread this message to his fellow Muslims in order to bring the umma back to "true" Islamic practices.

The third stage is marked by a growing dissatisfaction or frustration with inaction, as the individual attempts to persuade others to modify their behavior and worship, as well as bring other Muslims' worldviews in line with their own. While a number of individuals who embrace the Salafi movement never move beyond such non-violent tactics, those who have carried out an attack, joined a training camp or attempted a terrorist plot did, by and large, find the inactive Islam of their fellow Muslims—even fellow Salafis—to be inadequate. Theirs is characterized by a constant search for the "true Islam," persistently seeing others as falling short of the model of the *Salaf* (the pious predecessors, for which the movement is named).

In the fourth and final stage, the individual, frustrated with the lack of results from their *da'wa* work, resolves to join the mujahidin in their battle against oppression. Often, in accordance with their Salafi training, they seek out a trusted brother who can bring them to a training camp or provide the guidance to carry out an attack. (Although there have been homegrown groups that self-select targets, this is the exception. Even the Ft. Dix group sought a *fatwa* before executing their attack.¹⁶)

This resolution to join the jihad is sometimes, though not always, the result of some emotional or traumatic event, which leaves the individual feeling though s/he has nothing left to lose. This was the case for John Walker Lindh and Adam Gadahn, as well as at least one of the Duka brothers.

Case Studies

Three prominent cases of American converts joining the jihad show a steady ladder of increasingly radical Salafi contacts after an initial introduction and interest in the movement. These three, John Walker Lindh, Adam Gadahn and Daniel Maldonado, were all teenage American converts to Islam who identified with the message of resistance they found online and then at the mosque. The young men's reading and postings on discussion forums soon after converting show that they were attracted to the purity of Salafi Islam.

John Walker Lindh

John Walker Lindh inquired about Islam and the requirements of becoming a Muslim on chat rooms and began using the screen name "Brother Mujahid." He developed some rudimentary Salafi beliefs from online contacts, which led him to reject the first mosque he sought to visit as "unorthodox." Lindh sought an almost mythically pure Islam, traveling from California to Yemen, then to Pakistan and ultimately to Afghanistan where he found what he was seeking among the mujahidin fighting Coalition forces.

Lindh's radicalization occurred in California. Subsequent encounters only bolstered his Salafi beliefs, which eventually turned to militancy. A signal of his early Salafi beliefs came when he was first searching for a mosque to pray in—and make his conversion—and he rejected the first mosque he visited as "unorthodox."¹⁷ This obsession with outward compliance with the Shari'a is a hallmark of the Salafi sect.

For Lindh, as well as Gadahn and Maldonado, there was a steady ladder of increasingly radical contacts made as he ventured into Islam. His first contacts online appear to be Salafis, primarily concerned with the implementation of the Shari'a. He then became close to Tablighi Jama'at members (not Salafi itself, but these contacts were ideologically close in nature to Salafi Islam) active in missionary work in the western United States, but he persistently gravitated toward (sometimes militant) Salafis—in the United States, in Yemen and ultimately in northwestern Pakistan and Afghanistan.

After Lindh returned for a summer break from his studies in Yemen, he learned that his parents were divorced and his father declared that he was gay. Lindh did not again speak of this, and he arrived in Pakistan via Sana'a, en route to Afghanistan, a few months later.

Adam Gadahn

At age 17, Adam Yahye Gadahn converted to Islam at the Islamic Society of Orange County, witnessed by the mosque's imam. Soon after, he found a job as a night watchman at that mosque, but was fired for sleeping on the job. Within a few months, in early 1996, he was under the tutelage of two al-Qa'ida recruiters, Khalil al-Deek and Hisham al-Diab. He began wearing traditional Arab dress akin to that of Gulf Salafis. Gadahn was effectively under their control; the two men often referred to him as their "little rabbit."

Like Lindh, he had done much Salafi reading online and was prepared to convert—and also knew the type of Islam he was looking for—as soon as he arrived at the mosque. He spent roughly one year studying Salafi Islam, first at the mosque on his own, and then with al-Diab and al-Deek, before he left for Pakistan on orders from, and at the expense of, the two al-Qa'ida recruiters.

He returned to California a few months later ill and underweight. His grandfather Carl Pearlman helped care for him in their home in California. After his grandfather's death, Gadahn returned to Pakistan permanently, and has since been featured in a number of al-Qa'ida videos and serves as a lieutenant to Ayman al-Zawahiri.

Daniel Maldonado

Born in a suburb outside Boston, Daniel Maldonado dropped out of high school and moved from his native Massachusetts to a Muslim enclave in Houston soon after his conversion, hoping to find sanctuary from his perceived persecution of Muslims in America. At that same time, he became active on a U.S.-based Salafi website. He served as a webmaster for Islamicnetworking.org, delving into increasingly hard-line topics in his postings. He was dissatisfied with the inaction of his brothers, however, and moved to Cairo in search of a place to practice "true" Islam.

After arriving in Egypt, Daniel Maldonado was already a radical Salafi and soon decided to join the mujahidin. His initial radicalization occurred, like Lindh and Gadahn, largely online, which then led to Salafi contacts at local mosques, to scholars overseas and ultimately to the mujahidin. These cases—and many others in Europe, North Africa, Southeast Asia and elsewhere—show a ladder of increasingly radical Salafi contacts leading up to the point of enlisting with the mujahidin. At some point along the path, they broke with the non-violent Salafis that introduced them to the movement, seeing them as insufficiently dedicated.

As with the case of Lindh and Gadahn, Maldonado converted and displayed an immediate interest in Salafism. They were all persistently unsatisfied with the Salafi Islam practiced in the United States. They both sought more "pure" or "correct" Islam, culminating in participation in training and limited armed conflict with mujahidin fighting alongside al-Qa`ida members. Individuals who find the Islam of the Saudi Salafi establishment incorrect or hypocritical often pursue the teachings of more radical Salafis who endorse jihad and the active creation of an Islamic state. That transition marks a point of departure from non-violence; in terms of Islamic doctrine, however, their beliefs are largely the same—it is a difference over the correct response to Western influence and oppression of Muslims.

Conclusion

In the three cases outlined above, all subjects discovered Islam online, read the literature and partook in discussion forums, and all were seeking some form of resistance. Similar to the Ft. Dix group, the three all began a strict adherence with the Shari`a, in particular the outward aspects; they adopted Arab or traditional Muslim dress, grew beards and forbid music, ornamentation or photographs in the mosque. Throughout this immersion stage, they routinely confronted or attempted to correct other Muslims' perceived errors, and often found mosques they attended to be inadequately Islamic.

All of the individuals gravitated toward the black and white rigidity of Salafi Islam, arriving at the mosque with literal and strict interpretations of the Shari`a already in place. From there, they pursued increasingly radical contacts, and further immersed themselves in militant Salafi ideology. Finally, they adopted the doctrine of jihad as an obligation for Muslims and sought training to carry it out.

Through the various paths to radicalization observed above, it is clear that the Salafi doctrine provides the ideological basis for jihadi radicalization. Through a variety of media, this movement strives to bring other Muslims to a Salafi reading of Islam. Not merely the jihadi rhetoric of Usama bin Ladin and other such leaders, but educational, charitable and missionary organizations tied to Salafi Islam play a pivotal role in this process, solidifying the image of Salafi Islam as pure and unadulterated by modernity and innovation.

Endnotes

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- 2 See <http://www.masnet.org/> as an example.
- 3 "Foreign Influences on U.S. Muslims," *Jane's Islamic Affairs Analyst*, August 6, 2007.
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- 11 Milton Vorst, "The Education of Ali al-Timimi," *The Atlantic Monthly*, June 2006.
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- 13 Testimony of John S. Pistole, Assistant Director, Counterterrorism Division, FBI before the Senate Judiciary Committee, Subcommittee on Terrorism, Technology, and Homeland Security, October 14, 2003.
- 14 "A Review of the Bureau of Prisons' Selection of Muslim Religious Services Providers," Office of the Inspector General, U.S. Department of Justice, April 2004.
- 15 This is distinct from the four stage model of radicalization used by the New York Police Department.
- 16 Criminal complaint, U.S. v. Shain Duka et al. United States District Court, District of New Jersey, filed May 7, 2007.
- 17 Timothy Roche, et. al. "The Making Of John Walker Lindh," *Time*, October 7, 2002.

Chapter 22

**Jihadist Use of the Internet
and Implications for
Counter-Terrorism Efforts**

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b7C

INTRODUCTION

It is well recognized that jihadists use the internet extensively.¹ The purpose of this chapter is to examine this use in some detail in order to discern how it may affect our ability to monitor, investigate, exploit or counteract their efforts.

The internet operates on multiple levels. It is a communications channel, facilitates information storage and retrieval, and perhaps most importantly it is a place: cyber-space.² It is a place where people live, work, play and find companionship. Communities form on the internet and loyalties emerge, often created by a common perceived enemy, or through hatred for other communities, societies or cultures. In the case of jihadists, their community has taken on aspects of a nation called the Virtual Umma.³

USES OF THE INTERNET

Jihadist use of the internet includes agitation and propaganda, intelligence collection and dissemination, communications, training, indoctrination, identity shaping, community building and crime.

1 Gabriel Weimann, *Terror on the Internet* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Institute of Peace, 2006).

2 "Cyber-space" is a term first coined by novelist William Gibson. See William Gibson, *Neuromancer* (New York: Ace Books, 1984), p. 69.

3 Umma—the global community of Muslims irrespective of national boundaries. For "Virtual Umma," see Olivier Roy, *Globalised Islam* (London: C. Hurst & Co., 2004).

Agitation and Propaganda

Jihadists are ravenous consumers of video, audio and still images that either claim to document some perceived insult to or attack upon Muslims, or that present the actions of terrorists as heroic and worthy of emulation. The intent of those who produce and distribute jihadist agitprop is frequently expressed through reference to Sura 4:84. At the root of contemporary Salafi-jihadi terrorism is the belief that participation in violent jihad is required of Muslims. To quote 'Abd Allah 'Azzam:

Does one fight alone if the rest stay behind?

Yes he fights alone because Allah the Almighty the Majestic revealed these words to His Prophet (saw): "Then fight (O Mohammed s.a.w.) in the cause of Allah, your [sic] are not tasked (held responsible) except for yourself, and incite the believers (to fight along with you) it may be that Allah restrain the evil might of the disbelievers. And Allah is stronger in might and stronger in punishing."

This verse orders the Messenger (saw) in two obligations:

1. Fight, even if alone.
2. Incite the believers.⁴

Efforts to incite other Muslims to join in violent jihad may thus be considered a religious duty or obligation. An al-Qa`ida commentator known as Abu Mohammed al-Hilali drove home the importance of this activity following several successful terrorist attacks in the Sinai in 2004 and 2005, committed by a branch of Abu Mus`ab al-Zarqawi's Tawhid wal Jihad organization. The perpetrators had failed to produce videos celebrating the attacks—no last wills of the martyrs, no scenes of preparation for the attacks and no coherent claims of responsibility afterwards. From al-Hilali's perspective, this amounted to dereliction of duty.⁵

Intelligence Collection and Dissemination

The internet was created to facilitate the sharing of information,⁶ and jihadists have exploited this open source of intelligence. Al-Qa`ida called for the creation of a "virtual intel-

⁴ See 'Abd Allah 'Azzam's "Defense of the Muslim Lands."

⁵ Reuven Paz, "Al-Qaeda's Search for New Fronts: Instructions for Jihadi Activity in Egypt and Sinai," *PRISM Occasional Papers* 3:7 (2005).

⁶ Steven Segaller, *Nerds 2.0.1*. (New York: TV Books, 1998), p. 33.

ligence network" in early 2004 on the Muntada al-Ansar forum.⁷ The purpose of this intelligence network was to gather information in support of the jihad in Iraq. An early volunteer in this effort was Irhabi007, an al-Qa`ida operative who saw himself as the terrorist James Bond.⁸ Irhabi007 posted the following message on March 21, 2004:

Im looking for soldier footages from within US bases etc...

we all know some yankees recently got back from Iraq and we all know these idiots tend to tape on camera anything so im sure in a couple of weeks we might see personal home pages displaying footages from Iraq giving us a little insight into how things go...

That's the fish i want to catch...

If I get any I'll keep you updated...

During six years of actively monitoring jihadist activity on the internet, the author has seen numerous examples of intelligence collection and dissemination in support of al-Qa`ida operations. Two notable examples are the use of free satellite imagery to identify targets, and the leak to jihadist forums of details of a "secret" visit to Baghdad by the president of the United States a week before the trip took place.

Communications

There is more to jihadist communications on the internet than just e-mail and instant messaging. Central to online jihadist activity are the forums, also called bulletin boards. These websites offer both public and private communications capabilities.

Private messaging on a forum works as follows: membership is required—private messaging is not a service available to non-members of the forum. A member accesses their user control panel and selects the option to send a private message. The message is drafted much like an e-mail, with a recipient (another forum member), a subject line and a message body. When the message is "sent" it does not actually go anywhere. An e-mail is sent to the recipient informing them that they have a message. The recipient then logs into the forum and reads the message.

While the message may appear to be private, in fact it is stored unencrypted in a database on the server hosting the forum. The administrators of the forum have the most ready

⁷ The website is no longer available online.

⁸ Irhabi007 was subsequently arrested and identified as a young Moroccan named Younis Tsouli. Tsouli is currently serving a 16-year sentence at Belmarsh Prison in the United Kingdom. *Irhabi* means "terrorist" in Arabic.

access to the database but others may too, such as the individuals or company hosting the forum and/or the company that operates the data center where the server physically connects to the internet.

On December 12, 2005, an individual associated with the central command of al-Qa`ida known only as `Atiyah wrote a letter to Abu Mus`ab al-Zarqawi.⁹ The letter was part of al-Qa`ida's effort to bring an end to what it viewed as the excessive violence of its Iraqi franchise. The dialogue that started with the letter was supposed to be continued online, and `Atiyah instructed Zarqawi as follows:

We advise you to maintain reliable and quick contact, with all the power you can muster. I am ready to communicate via the internet or any other means, so send me your men to ask for me on the chat forum of Ana al-Muslim,¹⁰ or others. The password between us is that thing that you brought to me a long time ago from Herat. Then, after that, we would agree with them about e-mails, or you should instruct your men who are in the country that I live in to develop communications with us.¹¹

How this correspondence progressed is unknown, but the letter was found in close proximity to Zarqawi upon his demise on June 7, 2006.¹² It is unlikely that `Atiyah was improvising when he suggested this technique for establishing a communications channel with Zarqawi.

Training, Indoctrination, Identity and Community

The use of the internet for training is often cited as a key adaptation by al-Qa`ida in the post-9/11 era. Most of this training involves ideological indoctrination, strategies and tactics, target selection, operational security, planning, intelligence collection and the use or manufacture of weapons and explosives. The manufacture of explosives is the one element of terrorist tradecraft that is difficult to teach online. This is not a result of any limitation inherent to the internet; instead, it is a result of real world factors.

A terrorist who enrolls in a self-training program will require opportunity, self-discipline, intelligence, courage, luck and information. The internet can be a source of good in-

9 A copy of the `Atiyah letter can be found on the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point's website, at www.ctc.usma.edu/harmony/pdf/CTC-AtiyahLetter.pdf.

10 The chat forum he refers to is at www.muslim.net.

11 See the `Atiyah letter at www.ctc.usma.edu/harmony/pdf/CTC-AtiyahLetter.pdf.

12 Ibid.

formation regarding explosives manufacturing. In order to successfully complete the course of study, however, a would-be terrorist would need the opportunity to make and test explosives repeatedly in order to be assured that they will actually function as desired when the time comes. In any area that is densely populated, this activity is liable to draw unwanted attention and bring with it an increased risk of exposure. Conversely, failure to adequately test one's student project prior to an operation can result in spectacular failure.¹³

At any moment the semester may come to a dramatic end in the form of a work accident that results in the death or dismemberment of the student. Even with good information, luck and the opportunity and intelligence to test the work without being noticed, the apprentice bomb-maker may well lack the discipline necessary to complete any course of self-instruction. On the other hand, no amount of opportunity, self-discipline, intelligence, courage and luck will make up for the absence of good information, and in this regard the internet may play a vital role in the successful training of any individual inclined to the most extreme forms of political violence.

The cell that conducted the successful bombing of commuter trains in Madrid, Spain on March 11, 2004 was notable for being largely self-recruited and self-trained. Investigators analyzed computer hard disk drives and flash drives and identified 49 websites visited by the Madrid cell.¹⁴ The list included the prominent al-Qa`ida supporting forums of the period; the major points of distribution for al-Qa`ida propaganda and communiqués; the sites of prominent Salafi-jihadi ideologues; and official sites of a number of Islamic extremist or terrorist organizations including Hamas, al-Muhajiroun, the Taliban and Soldiers of Shari`a.¹⁵

The Madrid indictment identifies and describes at least 185 files found on the various storage media. Table 1 illustrates the findings.

Category	No. of Files	Percentage
Ideological/Theological	140	76
Agitation/Propaganda	28	15
Terrorist Tradecraft	14	8
Miscellaneous	2	1
Pornography	1	1
Totals	185	100

Table 1: Madrid Bombers' Files by Category

13 See, for example, the failure of the attacks in London and Glasgow in the summer of 2007. "Police Avert Car Bomb 'Carnage,'" BBC News, June 29, 2007; "Blazing Car Crashes into Airport," BBC News, June 30, 2007.

14 Administración de Justicia, *Juzgado Central de Instrucción No 6, Audiencia Nacional, Madrid - Sumario No 20/2004* (2006), pp. 403-513.

15 "Favorites of the Madrid Bombers," Society for Internet Research, February 7, 2007.

Many of the ideological or theological documents dealt with issues related to jihad and justifications for the use of violence. Most of the files downloaded by the Madrid bombers were written by just a few contemporary and historical individuals including 'Abd al-Qadir, Abu Qatada al-Filistini, Ibn Taymiyya, 'Abd Allah 'Azzam, Abu Basir al-Tartusi, Abu Muhammed al-Maqdisi and Sayyid Qutb.¹⁶ The terrorist tradecraft files dealt mostly with the preparation and/or use of explosives. Of all the "homegrown" terrorist cells of which we are aware, only the Madrid group may in fact have been self-taught in this regard. It is worth noting that they greatly increased their likelihood of success when they chose to buy commercial explosives and detonators, leaving only the wiring of the explosives to be learned on their own.

Recruitment and indoctrination are part of a larger process of radicalization. At the beginning of the process we see people, mostly young men, who are unhappy about the state of the world and confused about their own identity. They identify with the global jihad on an emotional level and seek to learn more. Once initial information on key concepts and persons has been obtained, the internet can put the seeker in touch with online communities where further guidance, inspiration and indoctrination may occur. At the end of the process they have come to view themselves as mujahidin in their own right. The radicalizing Muslim will find community and will come to define his or her identity very much in terms of the websites they frequent and the people they come to interact with on those sites.

Crime

Terrorists tend to be involved in criminal activity, although the types of crime will change over time and from one kind of terrorist organization to another.¹⁷ We are confronted at present with "do-it-yourself" terrorists and it should come as no surprise that they engage in a form of criminal activity that is suited to small groups of self-organizing extremists: credit card fraud, identity theft and phishing.¹⁸ The poster child for this kind of criminal activity is the aforementioned Younis Tsouli, aka Irhabi007, who together with his two associates raised more than \$3.5 million in under two years. The author has consistently uncovered evidence of similar crimes since beginning to investigate the use of the internet by Islamic extremists in 2002. Other incidents include the discovery that the individuals running the

16 *Administración de Justicia, Juzgado Central de Instrucción No 6, Audiencia Nacional, Madrid – Sumario No 20/2004* (2006), pp. 403-513.

17 For a detailed discussion of terrorist criminology, see "Crimes Committed by Terrorist Groups: Theory, Research, and Prevention" by Mark S. Hamm of Indiana State University.

18 This refers to the practice of using unsolicited e-mail, which appears to be from a legitimate institution or service provider in the hope of getting the recipient/victim to click a link and then enter a username and password at a fake website.

official site of al-Qa`ida's Algerian franchise¹⁹ were also operating a number of sophisticated phishing scams, including one targeting Chase Manhattan Bank. More recently, Hamas set up a site on a server in the United States in support of its candidates then running for office in the Palestinian Territories. The site was linked in turn to Hamas activists in the West Bank and Beirut who were phishing for the usernames and passwords of holders of Yahoo! e-mail accounts. Returning once again to Younis Tsouli: in one of his lesser known exploits, he stole the identity of a U.S. citizen and used that identity to register a domain name for an al-Qa`ida website. The U.S. citizen was deployed to Iraq at the time he was victimized and there is every reason to believe that he was targeted deliberately.

Other illegal activities frequently engaged in by jihadists include attacks against the websites of those who are perceived as "enemies of Islam," including sites associated with other sects of Islam (e.g. Shi'a), and the trading of pirated software (aka "warez"). Both activities have the potential to reveal the location of the perpetrators. It happens occasionally that in the course of investigating a jihadist website one will discover that one or more of the service providers are themselves involved in criminal activity (e.g. phishing or gambling).

Users of the Internet

Much can be learned by reading what jihadists say on their websites. We can learn about their concerns, current interests, conflicts they may be most inclined to join, issues that are of concern to them locally, terrorist leaders they admire most, clerics they cite in their discussions, among other information.²⁰ The one detail we are unlikely to be able to determine by reading what they say online is perhaps the most important: the likelihood of their being involved in real world terrorist activity. What jihadists say online may or may not indicate the degree of threat that the individual represents. We have introduced Younis Tsouli, an "internet jihadist" who was arrested as a result of being connected to multiple real world terrorist plots. He was quite active online and did investigators the kindness of documenting his criminal exploits and his support for violent jihad.²¹ Daniel Maldonado presents us with a different and perhaps more common scenario: while quite active on a radical Islamist forum that had a history of spawning terrorist plots, Maldonado's temperate writings²² gave

19 Then called the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC), and now known as al-Qa`ida in the Islamic Maghreb.

20 The reader is encouraged to review the following works which address this issue in great detail: Reuven Paz, "Reading Their Lips: The Credibility of Jihadi Web Sites in Arabic as a Source of Information," *PRISM Occasional Papers* 5:5 (2007); Reuven Paz, "Reading Their Lips: The Credibility of Jihadi Web Sites as 'Soft Power' in the War of the Minds," *PRISM Occasional Papers* 5:5 (2007); Jarret M. Brachman and William F. McCants, *Stealing al-Qa`ida's Playbook* (West Point, NY: Combating Terrorism Center, 2006).

21 See www.archives.sofir.org/archives/007/index.html for more information.

22 See www.sofir.org/resources/daniel/index.html for more information.

no clear indication that he would turn up in Kenya, fleeing the battle in Somalia where he had received training from al-Qa`ida in bomb-making techniques.

Visiting a jihadist website or downloading a jihadist video may be the only indication available that a person poses a threat. The priority then is to find that person in the real world and determine if he or she is alone and thus less likely to pose a threat, or if the individual has like-minded companions—thus posing a greater threat. Chart 1 provides some idea as to where the hardcore jihadists were in 2006.




Chart 1

Chart 1 illustrates the geographic distribution of Arabic-speaking jihadists who were observed online in 2006.²³ A question that often arises is: what effect does the availability of the internet have on data such as this? In other words, does this data represent the global distribution of jihadists, or does limited internet availability affect the number of jihadists we observe in different countries? Table 2 addresses that issue.²⁴

²³ The chart was based on investigations conducted by the Society for Internet Research. Access to the source reports is restricted and available upon request to the author.

²⁴ This table is also available at www.internet-haganah.com/harchives/005631.html.

Country	% of Users	Penetration
Egypt	13.22	7%
Morocco	9.06	12%
Arab Emirates	5.62	36%
Yemen	5.07	1%
Palestinian Territories	4.89	5%
United States	4.53	69%
Algeria	3.99	3%
Germany	3.8	59%
Spain	3.62	39%
Jordan	3.62	11%
United Kingdom	3.26	63%
France	3.08	43%
Israel	3.08	45%
Syria	2.72	4%
Lebanon	2.54	13%
Qatar	2.54	21%
Canada	2.36	68%
Bahrain	1.99	21%
Netherlands	1.99	66%
Belgium	1.81	49%

Table 2: Comparison of Internet Availability (penetration) to the Presence of Jihadists on a Prominent Forum

Note that the internet is only available to 1% of the population of Yemen, and yet 5% of the readership of the forum is composed of jihadists in Yemen. On the other hand, internet access is available to 36% of the population of the United Arab Emirates, and yet there are about as many jihadists online from the UAE as there are from Yemen. What this tells us is that if internet access is at all available, jihadists will have it (it also tells us that relative to the country's population, there are many more jihadists in the UAE than there are in Yemen, given that the population of the UAE is about 4.4 million and the population of Yemen is about 22 million).

INTERNET INVESTIGATION BASICS

It is beyond the scope of this chapter to provide a detailed description of how the internet works. The purpose of the following section is to introduce a few basic concepts.

The IP Address

The IP (Internet Protocol) address is the basic element of navigation on the internet. Whether one is investigating a person using the internet or the site that person visited, both the accessing computer and the site will have an IP address. The IP address is made up of four sets of three numbers each (from 0 to 254) and will resemble the following example: 213.178.224.167. The IP address is, or at least is supposed to be, the physical address of any device that is connected to a network or the internet.

IP addresses (or IPs—pron. “eye-peas”) are managed globally on a region-by-region basis by organizations including ARIN (North America and most, but not all, academic institutions), RIPE (Europe and the Middle East), AFRINIC (Africa, including North Africa and Egypt), APNIC (Asia-Pacific) and LACNIC (Latin America and the Caribbean). These organizations provide IP addresses in large netblocks to internet service providers, data centers, corporations, universities and similar institutions. Each of these organizations maintain websites from which one may be able look up additional information about an IP address—for example, the name of the company to which an IP is assigned, or the country in which the person or website behind that IP is operating.

The IP Address Whois

The information about what company, organization or individual to which an IP address is assigned is known as a “whois record,” and the process of finding out that information is referred to as a “lookup.” Lookups can be done with the help of any one of a number of websites, as well as from the command line on unix-like systems (e.g. Linux or Sun). The important thing to remember is that ARIN was the original authority over all IP addresses, and as a result many IP whois lookup tools only query ARIN. If ARIN tells the tool to ask a different authority, such as RIPE, these tools may not do so, or may only tell the investigator that RIPE is the authority, leaving the investigator to query RIPE’s database directly.

The whois record for an IP address should, at a minimum, identify the company or organization to which the address is assigned. Keep in mind that with very few exceptions, IP addresses are not assigned to individuals—although an individual may enjoy exclusive use of an IP address for an extended period of time (in which case the IP address is referred to as “static”). Let us look at a single IP address: 80.191.89.6. The first result of a whois lookup returns the following:

```
OrgName: RIPE Network Coordination Centre
OrgID: RIPE
Address: P.O. Box 10096
City: Amsterdam
StateProv:
PostalCode: 1001EB
Country: NL
```

The second lookup, made to the RIPE database, returns:

```
inetnum: 80.191.89.0 - 80.191.89.127
netname: ARYANOVIN
descr: Aryaproje Novin Company
country: IR
admin-c: NN830-RIPE
tech-c: NN830-RIPE
status: ASSIGNED PA
mnt-by: AS12880-MNT
source: RIPE # Filtered

person: Nosrat Nonyadi
address: jahad Street, Qom, Iran
phone: +98 251 771 62 01
nic-hdl: NN830-RIPE
source: RIPE # Filtered

% Information related to '80.191.0.0/16AS12880'

route: 80.191.0.0/16
descr: DCI-Route
origin: AS12880
mnt-by: AS12880-MNT
source: RIPE # Filtered
```

The information reveals the following: the IP address 80.191.89.6 is part of a range of IP addresses from 80.191.89.0 to 80.191.89.127 that was assigned by RIPE to DCI, the Data Communications Company of Iran. DCI then assigned that block of IP addresses to the Aryaproje Novin Company, and the person responsible for this block of IP addresses is Nosrat Nonyadi. There is no reason to think that Nosrat Nonyadi is associated with the online activity that brought this IP address to the author's attention.

The Traceroute

We may want to know the location of the person using this IP address. A Google search for "Aryoproje Novin Company" suggests that the company is located in the town of Novin, in the Kurdish part of Iran. A traceroute may or may not help us to verify that this person is in Novin. The way the Internet works is as follows: while traffic/data is routed from one place to another, it may pass through many routers which try to direct the data to its final destination. A traceroute traces the route that the data takes, with each router along the way known as a "hop." In some countries, the network engineers give their routers names that help us to close in on an individual's location. In other countries they do not, and in the case of this person in Iran we are left not knowing for certain where he/she is:

```
traceroute to 80.191.89.6 (80.191.89.6), 64 hops max, 40 byte packets
 1 192.168.0.1 (192.168.0.1) 0.473 ms 0.329 ms 0.420 ms
 2 loopback0.dsl.core.routers.hcis.net (63.245.245.129) 24.730 ms 27.744
ms 24.781 ms
 3 int9-48.corerouter.core.routers.hcis.net (63.245.225.29) 25.230 ms
29.036 ms 27.281 ms
 4 254-128-149.csiweb.net (66.254.128.149) 33.850 ms 27.795 ms 39.898
ms
 5 12.125.74.89 (12.125.74.89) 43.717 ms 39.755 ms 43.018 ms
 6 tbr2.s19mo.ip.att.net (12.123.24.238) 54.836 ms 50.155 ms 55.889 ms
 7 cr2.s19mo.ip.att.net (12.122.18.101) 53.210 ms 49.249 ms 53.251 ms
 8 cr2.cgcil.ip.att.net (12.122.2.21) 50.089 ms 50.267 ms 48.516 ms
 9 tbr2.cgcil.ip.att.net (12.122.17.198) 59.955 ms 49.395 ms 51.638 ms
10 ggr3.cgcil.ip.att.net (12.123.4.253) 49.460 ms 45.399 ms 45.512 ms
11 br1-a340s2.attga.ip.att.net (192.205.33.194) 45.466 ms 49.396 ms 56.384
ms
12 te4-1.mpd01.ord03.atlas.cogentco.com (154.54.3.242) 45.588 ms 46.155
ms 53.637 ms
13 vl3488.mpd01.ord01.atlas.cogentco.com (154.54.5.25) 159.380 ms 160.691
ms 161.309 ms
14 te7-1.mpd01.bos01.atlas.cogentco.com (154.54.6.153) 160.133 ms 167.394
ms 162.541 ms
15 te7-3.ccr04.jfk02.atlas.cogentco.com (154.54.5.241) 161.132 ms 160.933
ms 162.557 ms
16 te8-1.mpd03.jfk02.atlas.cogentco.com (154.54.24.137) 158.361 ms 159.668
ms 161.306 ms
17 te4-1.mpd02.par01.atlas.cogentco.com (130.117.1.246) 160.884 ms 158.431
ms 158.311 ms
18 te7-4.mpd01.par02.atlas.cogentco.com (130.117.2.109) 182.364 ms 352.514
ms 210.636 ms
19 te3-1.mpd02.fra03.atlas.cogentco.com (130.117.0.101) 155.391 ms 157.546
ms 157.808 ms
20 gi9-0-0.core01.fra03.atlas.cogentco.com (130.117.0.1) 156.513 ms 157.063
ms 156.435 ms
21 turk-telecom.demarc.cogentco.com (149.6.84.182) 215.985 ms 218.882 ms
213.768 ms
22 212.156.119.241 (212.156.119.241) 222.591 ms 245.720 ms 214.505 ms
23 * * *
```

24	195.175.10.106 (195.175.10.106)	263.068 ms	261.961 ms	277.215 ms
25	195.146.63.66 (195.146.63.66)	265.060 ms	261.974 ms	261.849 ms
26	217.218.146.137 (217.218.146.137)	282.422 ms	283.834 ms	282.701 ms
27	* 217.218.127.77 (217.218.127.77)	282.977 ms	283.059 ms	
28	217.218.127.45 (217.218.127.45)	290.160 ms	283.565 ms	283.221 ms
29	195.146.33.34 (195.146.33.34)	288.921 ms	288.810 ms	288.093 ms
30	217.218.208.251 (217.218.208.251)	269.058 ms	271.582 ms	265.858 ms
31	* * *			
32	80.191.89.6 (80.191.89.6)	298.363 ms	290.940 ms	291.088 ms

Our inquiry is not a complete loss, however. Hop number 21 (bolded) indicates that this traffic has been routed through Turkey. This correlates with the author's previous observations that a great deal of internet traffic to and from Iran passes through just a few routers in Turkey (and Turkey is an ally of the United States).

Proxy Servers

A proxy server is a computer that passes traffic from the web browser to the site that someone wants to view, and then relays that site back to the browser. To anyone observing the traffic it will appear as though the request is coming from the proxy server, and not from the location of the person requesting to view the website. Any time one is investigating the IP address of a person of interest, the question has to be asked: are they using a proxy server? In the author's experience, jihadists will use proxy servers perhaps 25% of the time. The impression is that all jihadists may use proxy servers at least some of the time, but few, if any, will make the effort to use proxy servers all of the time. Anyone who *does* use proxy servers all of the time is probably someone worth finding out more about. While there is no foolproof way to say with absolute certainty that a computer is or is not a proxy server, there are a few simple methods for ruling in or ruling out the possibility.

Our initial Google search did not tell us anything about the Aryoproje Novin Company other than where they are located in Iran. The IP whois tells us how large their netblock is: 80.191.89.0 to 80.191.89.127. This means that they have 128 addresses (looking at the last set of numbers, they have 0 - 127). That is big enough for a small provider of internet access, or it could be all for the company's use. Our traceroute went all the way to the very end, to the IP address to which we were tracing a route:

32	80.191.89.6 (80.191.89.6)	298.363 ms	290.940 ms	291.088 ms
----	---------------------------	------------	------------	------------

This is unusual if the IP is assigned to an individual internet user, as the kind of data packets used to do a traceroute are also used in various kinds of cyber-attacks, and so internet service providers will commonly filter them out before they reach a customer's computer. A search online for the IP address plus the word "proxy" returns no results, which means the IP address is not the location of a known open proxy server, i.e. a proxy anyone on the in-

ternet may use. Yet this could be some kind of local proxy server—for instance, the gateway through which all traffic to or from a cyber-cafe passes. In short, our person of interest may well be in Novin, Iran, but from open sources that is hard to say with certainty.

Let us look briefly at another IP address to show results that are much more certain. The IP address of 72.81.193.112 appeared in the access log for internet-haganah.com. A whois lookup of the IP returns the following information:

```
OrgName: Verizon Internet Services Inc.
OrgID: VRIS
Address: 1880 Campus Commons Dr
City: Reston
StateProv: VA
PostalCode: 20191
Country: US

NetRange: 72.64.0.0 - 72.95.255.255
```

This tells us that the IP is that of a Verizon customer, but there is no reason to think that customer is located where Verizon's office is in Reston, Virginia. A lookup to see if there is a domain name associated with the IP address returns:

```
Name: pool-72-81-193-112.blmmd.east.verizon.net
Address: 72.81.193.112
```

From this we can conclude that the user was assigned an IP address from a pool of such addresses in the Baltimore, Maryland area (note the "blmmd" text in the name). This could be a dial-up internet user, or someone with a broadband account that assigns IP addresses to users on an as-needed basis and then reassigns them to someone else at a point in the future. The last few hops in the traceroute confirm the Baltimore location:

```
15 so-7-3-0-0.BB-RTR2.PHIL.verizon-gni.net (130.81.7.185) 74.696 ms 73.491
ms 68.126 ms
16 P14-1.LCR-04.BLTMMMD.verizon-gni.net (130.81.29.131) 68.072 ms 67.744
ms 68.001 ms
17 P14-0.LCR-03.BLTMMMD.verizon-gni.net (130.81.27.142) 65.452 ms 65.617
ms 66.361 ms
18 P14-2.LCR-01.BLTMMMD.verizon-gni.net (130.81.27.144) 69.071 ms 65.279
ms 70.498 ms
19 P8-0.BLTMMMDCH-ERXG02.BLTMMMD.verizon-gni.net (130.81.33.117) 66.075 ms
72.488 ms 66.374 ms
20 * * *
```

Finally, a search on Google provides no indication that this is an open proxy server (although it is possible the computer has been hijacked by hackers who have turned it into a proxy without the owner's knowledge).

The Access Log

It is in the access log file of a website that the information we can acquire about either a site or the people who access it all come together. Returning to the case of the person in Iran, he/she came to the author's attention when they visited his [sofir.org](http://www.sofir.org) website after doing a search on Google for www.noorsoft.org. This is interesting because [noorsoft.org](http://www.noorsoft.org) is directly linked to Ayatollah Khamenei of the Islamic Republic of Iran.²⁵ This is the log entry that was produced when they clicked on the link from google.com:

```
80.191.89.6 - - [27/Dec/2007:04:14:53 -0500] "GET /sarchives/004208.php HTTP/1.1" 200 9973 www.sofir.org "http://www.google.com/search?q=www.noorsoft.org&start=0&ie=utf-8&oe=utf-8&client=firefox&rls=org.mozilla:en-US:unofficial" "Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 5.1; en-US; rv:1.8.1a2) Gecko/20060512 BonEcho/2.0a2" "-"
```

A website's access log contains an entry for every request made to a website, either for a page, or a part of a page (such as an image on the page), or for a file that can be downloaded or a video that can be viewed. While not all log files are formatted exactly the same, the sample before us is typical.²⁶

IP address: 80.191.89.6

The IP address of the client (browser) that requested the item.

Timestamp: [27/Dec/2007:04:14:53 -0500]

The date, time and time zone (GMT -5) according to the server. The server may or may not have its time set accurately.

Request: "GET /sarchives/004208.php HTTP/1.1"

The request received by the server. In this case it is for a page of a SoFIR report regarding [noorsoft.com](http://www.noorsoft.com).

²⁵ "CRCIS - The Ayatollah's 'Computer Research Center of Islamic Sciences,'" Society for Internet Research, June 2, 2005. The full report is available at www.sofir.org/sarchives/004207.php.

²⁶ For more information about possible log file formats, see, among other sources of information, the following: <http://httpd.apache.org/docs/2.2/logs.html#accesslog>.

Status code: 200

The status code tells us the response to the request. In this case "200" indicates a successful request.

Byte size: 9973

The size of the requested item in bytes. In other words, the page requested in this case was about 10 kilobytes in size.

Host: www.sofir.org

A web server can host many sites, and an access log may record requests to more than one site. In this case the same log file notes requests to both sofir.org and to internet-haganah.org.

Referer [sic]: "http://www.google.com/search?q=www.noorsoft.org&start=0&ie=utf-8&oe=utf-8&client=firefox&rls=org.mozilla:en-US:unofficial"

The "referer"²⁷ is the site that referred the visitor to our site. In this case it was google.com.

User agent: "Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 5.1; en-US; rv:1.8.1a2) Gecko/20060512 BonEcho/2.0a2"

The combination of web browser and computer operating system the visitor is using. In this case they are using Windows XP ("Windows NT 5.1"), set up to run American English ("en-US") and they are using a beta version of the Firefox browser ("Gecko/20060512 BonEcho/2.0a2").

Sometimes there is little left to doubt when one investigates an IP address. Take this log entry for example:

```
198.81.129.193 - - [28/Dec/2007:13:07:55 -0500] "GET /
hmedia/20sep05-hgnh-logo.jpg HTTP/1.0" 200 13492 internet-
haganah.com "http://internet-haganah.com/haganah/" "Mozilla/4.0
(compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1; .NET CLR 1.0.3705; .NET
CLR 1.1.4322; InfoPath.1; .NET CLR 2.0.50727)" "-"
```

This is what an intelligence leak looks like. Note who this IP address is assigned to:

```
ANS Communications, Inc BLK198-15-ANS (NET-198-80-0-0-1)
198.80.0.0 - 198.81.255.255
Central Intelligence Agency OIT-BLK1 (NET-198-81-128-0-1)
198.81.128.0 - 198.81.191.255
```

²⁷ It is spelled incorrectly in the documentation and configuration files for web servers.

In this case the harm done by the leak is minimal, but in other cases and with other organizations the damage (or advantage, depending on your point of view) could be considerable. While the author is flattered that the CIA finds information published on his website to be of interest and finds it helpful in terms of what he will publish in the future, he really has no need to know the web browsing habits of CIA employees. Both large and small organizations frequently leak information such as this.

It is not by accident that the author chose an Iranian IP address to examine earlier. In this case, the activity detected may have a perfectly harmless explanation; however, in six years of closely monitoring jihadist activity online, the author has on a number of occasions stumbled upon signs of what was in all likelihood the activity of foreign intelligence services operating in support of elements of the global jihad. The case of a "Lebanese" jihadist forum comes to mind—the site had a disproportionate number of activists who were located in Syria, a country known for keeping a tight lid on its domestic Islamists. This forum provided jihadists in Lebanon with a steady supply of high-quality information about weapons and explosives as well as information about possible U.S. and French intelligence activity in Lebanon.²⁸ In the information age, the concept of "state-sponsorship of terrorism" takes on an entirely new meaning.

Domain Names

A domain name, such as internet-haganah.com, is a kind of label we put onto a website because the name is easier to remember than the string of numbers in an IP address. Domain names are not bought so much as they are leased for a period of time from a domain name registration company, and the record to whom a domain name is assigned is public—although there are those in the internet industry who would like to change that. A domain name whois record can be looked up using any one of a number of programs or websites, and the record will look something like this:

```
Domain ID:D6242459-LROR
Domain Name:NOORSOFT.ORG
Created On:05-May-1999 01:13:45 UTC
Last Updated On:06-Mar-2004 08:16:06 UTC
Expiration Date:05-May-2008 01:13:21 UTC
Sponsoring Registrar:OnlineNIC Inc. (R64-LROR)
Status:OK
Registrant ID:ONLC-477326-4
Registrant Name:Computer Research Center of Islamic Sciences
Registrant Organization:Computer Research Center of Islamic
```

²⁸ The site in question was the al-Nusra forum, which ceased operation after its administrator was allegedly killed in action fighting the Lebanese Armed Forces in Nahr al-Bared, outside of Tripoli, Lebanon.

Sciences
Registrant Street1:Moallem St. Shohada SQ
Registrant Street2:
Registrant Street3:
Registrant City:Qom
Registrant State/Province:Qom
Registrant Postal Code:37185
Registrant Country:IR
Registrant Phone:+9.25177458
Registrant Phone Ext.:1111
Registrant FAX:+9.25177441
Registrant FAX Ext.:
Registrant Email:
Admin ID:ONLC-477326-1
Admin Name:Nosrat Allah Bonyadi
Admin Organization:Computer Research Center of Islamic Sciences
Admin Street1:Moallem St. Shohada SQ
Admin Street2:
Admin Street3:
Admin City:Qom
Admin State/Province:Qom
Admin Postal Code:37185
Admin Country:IR
Admin Phone:+9.25177458
Admin Phone Ext.:1111
Admin FAX:+9.25177441
Admin FAX Ext.:
Admin Email:
Tech ID:ONLC-477326-2
Tech Name:Nosrat Allah Bonyadi
Tech Organization:Computer Research Center of Islamic Sciences
Tech Street1:Moallem St. Shohada SQ
Tech Street2:
Tech Street3:
Tech City:Qom
Tech State/Province:Qom
Tech Postal Code:37185
Tech Country:IR
Tech Phone:+9.25177458
Tech Phone Ext.:1111
Tech FAX:+9.25177441
Tech FAX Ext.:
Tech Email:
Name Server:NS1.HAWZAH.NET
Name Server:NS2.HAWZAH.NET

The "Admin" and "Tech" sections are supposed to indicate who is responsible for the administration of the domain and the site associated with it, but in the author's experience they may actually contain information about the company that first hosted the domain. The "Registrant" is supposed to be the person or organization that registered the domain name, but this information is commonly falsified in domain name whois records. Regardless of how much false information the domain name whois record contains, each domain name will be associated with one or more transactions that may lead to the person or organization that registered the name. In this case the registrant information is accurate and also constitutes evidence of a violation of United States sanctions against the Islamic Republic of Iran because the sponsoring registrar for this domain is OnlineNIC Inc., a company located in the state of California.

In the event that there is some issue with a domain name, the whois record must contain a valid e-mail address so that the holder of the domain name can be contacted to resolve the problem, meaning that the e-mail addresses associated with the domain name are worth a closer look. It also happens that people will register a domain name using real information, and then realize that, for example, not everyone in the world shares their enthusiasm for jihadist terrorism. At some point they change the whois record to either fictitious information or transfer it to a company that holds the name in proxy. At least one site, domaintools.com, maintains an archive of domain name records as they change over time, which is one way to counteract this tactic. In the case of the whois proxy service, this is another instance where there is likely to be a financial transaction that can be investigated.

THE HUMAN ELEMENT

To analyze data gathered from the internet, one must first acquire access to it. Government agencies can utilize various legal means to collect such information, measures which are not available to civilians. They include subpoenas, arrest warrants and other law enforcement measures. Yet, despite being bound by legal constraints on data gathering methods, civilians can employ other means to collect information, and these methods may also be of use in law enforcement. The author's approach has been to employ a "secret weapon" that takes advantage of the human nature of internet users: they are human beings whose vulnerabilities may help in this endeavor of data gathering. These vulnerabilities correspond to the "Seven Deadly Sins."

Rather than describe in detail any particular method that one can use to acquire information about where and who a jihadist is or what they may be up to—methods which will change over time with changes in technology—we will conclude this chapter with a brief review of these timeless if not fatal flaws in character. These flaws will not exist in every jihadist, or in every jihadist equally, but they will manifest themselves with great regularity, so much so that one can plan investigative strategies and select tactics based on them.

THE SEVEN DEADLY SINS OF THE GLOBAL JIHAD ONLINE

- **Lust:** Best summarized by the Islamist expression: "We love death more than you love life." This is related to the concept of *istishhad* or "sacrifice in the cause of Allah," a euphemism for a suicide mission.
- **Gluttony:** Why download just one video of someone being decapitated when you can download dozens of them, and then spend hours organizing and reorganizing your collection before sharing your favorites with your friends online.
- **Greed:** In the view of Islamists, jihad is a license from Allah to steal from the non-believers, including other Muslims thought to be insufficiently righteous. Online this most commonly takes the form of credit card fraud.
- **Sloth:** Laziness, a lack of diligence. It is not that they do not know how to surf the internet safely; it is that doing so all the time takes effort. The result is poor or at least inconsistent operational security.
- **Wrath:** To say jihadists have serious anger management issues would be an understatement. Anger is the fuel they run on—it burns hot and fast, is easy to ignite and causes people to take less-than-intelligent actions.
- **Envy:** Defined by the medieval Italian poet Danté as: "Love of one's own good perverted to a desire to deprive other men of theirs." This enables the jihadist to justify otherwise unacceptable actions on the part of themselves or the terrorist organizations they support.
- **Pride:** Related terms include: vanity, arrogance, narcissism. As it says in the Book of Proverbs 16:18: "Pride goes before destruction, a haughty spirit before a fall."

Chapter 23

The Logic of Suicide Terrorism

Bruce Hoffman

Nearly everywhere in the world, it is taken for granted that one can simply push open the door to a restaurant, café, or bar, sit down, and order a meal or a drink. In Israel, however, the process of entering such a place is more complicated.

One often encounters an armed guard who, in addition to asking prospective patrons whether they themselves are armed, may quickly pat them down, feeling for the telltale bulge of a belt or a vest containing explosives. Establishments that cannot afford a guard or are unwilling to pass on the cost of one to customers simply keep their doors locked, responding to knocks with a quick glance through the glass and an instant judgment as to whether this or that person can be admitted safely. What would have been unimaginable a year ago is now not only routine, but reassuring. It has become the price of a redefined normality.

In the United States, in the months and years since 9/11 we, too, have had to become accustomed to an array of new, often previously inconceivable security measures—in airports and other transportation hubs, hotels, office buildings, sports stadiums, and concert halls. Although some are more noticeable and perhaps more inconvenient than others, the fact remains that they have redefined our own sense of normality. They are accepted because we feel more vulnerable than before. With every new threat to international security, we become more willing to live with stringent precautions and reflexive, almost unconscious wariness. With every new threat, that is, our everyday life becomes more like Israel's.

The situation in Israel, where an intensified suicide-bombing campaign changed the national mood and people's personal politics, is not analogous to that of the United States today. But the organization and the operations of the suicide bombers are neither limited to Israel and its conflict with the Palestinians, nor unique to its geo-strategic position. The fundamental characteristics of suicide bombing, and its strong attraction for the terrorist organizations behind it, are universal: Suicide bombings are inexpensive and effective. They are less complicated and compromising than other kinds of terrorist operations. They guarantee media coverage. The suicide terrorist is the ultimate smart bomb. Perhaps most important, coldly efficient bombings tear at the fabric of trust that holds societies together. All these reasons undoubtedly account for the spread of suicide terrorism from the Middle East to Sri Lanka, and to Turkey, Argentina, Chechnya, Russia, Algeria—and to the United States.

To understand the power that suicide terrorism can have over a populace—and what a populace can do to counter it—one naturally goes to the society that has been most deeply affected. As a researcher who has studied the strategies of terrorism for more than 25 years, I recently visited Israel to review the steps the military, the police, and the intelligence and security services have taken against a threat more pervasive and personal than ever before.

I was looking at x-rays with Dr. Shmuel Shapira in his office at Jerusalem's Hadassah Hospital. "This is not a place to have a wristwatch," he said, as he described the injuries of a young girl who'd been on her way to school one morning last November when a suicide terrorist detonated a bomb on her bus. Eleven of her fellow passengers were killed, and more than 50 others wounded. The blast was so powerful that the hands and case of the bomber's wristwatch had turned into lethal projectiles, lodging in the girl's neck and ripping a major artery. The presence of such foreign objects in the bodies of his patients no longer surprises Shapira. "We have cases with a nail in the neck, or nuts and bolts in the thigh... a ball bearing in the skull," he said.

Such are the weapons of war in Israel today: nuts and bolts, screws and ball bearings, any metal shards or odd bits of broken machinery that can be packed together with homemade explosive and then strapped to the body of a terrorist dispatched to any place where people gather—bus, train, restaurant, café, supermarket, shopping mall, street corner, promenade. These attacks probably cost no more than \$150 to mount, and they need no escape plan—often the most difficult aspect of a terrorist operation. And they are reliably deadly. According to data from the RAND Corporation's chronology of international terrorism incidents, suicide attacks on average kill four times as many people as other terrorist acts.

Perhaps it is not surprising, then, that this means of terror has become increasingly popular. The tactic first emerged in Lebanon, in 1983; a decade later it came to Israel, and it has been a regular security problem ever since. Fully two thirds of all such incidents in Israel have occurred in the past two and a half years—that is, since the start of the second *intifada*, in September of 2000. Indeed, suicide bombers are responsible for almost half of the approximately 750 deaths in terrorist attacks since then.

In December 2002, I walked through Jerusalem with two police officers, one of them a senior operational commander, who were showing me the sites of suicide bombings in recent years. They described the first major suicide-terrorist attack in the city, which occurred in February of 1996, early on a Sunday morning—the beginning of the Israeli work week. The driver of the No. 18 Egged bus was hurrying across a busy intersection at Sarei Yisrael Street as a yellow light turned red. The bus was about halfway through when an explosion transformed it into an inferno of twisted metal, pulverized glass, and burning flesh. A traffic camera designed to catch drivers running stop lights captured the scene on film. Twenty-five people were killed, including two U.S. citizens, and 80 were wounded.

The early years of suicide terrorism were a simpler time, the officers explained. Suicide bombers were—at least in theory—easier to spot then. They tended to carry their bombs in

nylon backpacks or duffel bags rather than in belts or vests concealed beneath their clothing, as they do now. They were also typically male, aged 17 to 23, and unmarried. Armed with these data, the authorities could simply deny work permits to Palestinians most likely to be suicide bombers, thus restricting their ability to cross the Green Line (Israel's pre-1967 border) into Israel proper from the West Bank or the Gaza Strip.

Today, though, suicide bombers are middle-aged or young, married or unmarried, and some of them have children. Some of them, too, are women, and word has it that even children are being trained for martyrdom. "There is no clear profile anymore—not for terrorists and especially not for suicide bombers," an exasperated senior officer in the Israel Defense Forces told me last year.

Sometimes the bombers disguise themselves: male *shahed* (Arabic for "martyrs") have worn green IDF fatigues; have dressed as *haredim* (ultra-Orthodox Jews), complete with yarmulkes and tzitzit, the fringes that devout Jews display as part of their everyday clothing; or have donned long-haired wigs in an effort to look like hip Israelis rather than threatening Arabs. A few women have tried to camouflage bombs by strap-ping them to their stomachs to fake pregnancy. And contrary to popular belief, the bombers are not drawn exclusively from the ranks of the poor, but have included two sons of millionaires. (Most of the September 11 terrorists came from comfortable middle to upper middle class families and were well educated.) The Israeli journalist Ronni Shaked, an expert on the Palestinian terrorist group HAMAS, who writes for *Yedioth Ahronoth*, an Israeli daily, has debunked the myth that it is only people with no means of improving their lot in life who turn to suicide terrorism. "All leaders of HAMAS," he told me, "are university graduates, some with master's degrees. This is a movement not of poor, miserable people, but of highly educated people who are using [the image of] poverty to make the movement more powerful."

Buses remain among the bombers' preferred targets. Winter and summer are the better seasons for bombing buses in Jerusalem, because the closed windows (for heat or air-conditioning) intensify the force of the blast, maximizing the bombs' killing potential. As a hail of shrapnel pierces flesh and breaks bones, the shock wave tears lungs and crushes other internal organs. When the bus's fuel tank explodes, a fireball causes burns, and smoke inhalation causes respiratory damage. All this is a significant return on a relatively modest investment. Two or three kilograms of explosive on a bus can kill as many people as 20 to 30 kilograms left on a street, or in a mall or restaurant. But as security on buses has improved, and passengers have become more alert, the bombers have been forced to seek other targets.

The terrorists are lethally flexible and inventive. A person wearing a bomb is far more dangerous and far more difficult to defend against than a timed device left to explode in a marketplace. This human weapons system can effect last-minute changes based on the ease of approach, the paucity or density of people, and the security measures in evidence. On a Thursday afternoon in March of last year, a reportedly smiling, self-satisfied bomber strolled down King George Street, in the heart of Jerusalem, looking for just the right target.

He found it in a crowd of shoppers gathered in front of the trendy Aroma Café, near the corner of Agrippas Street. In a fusillade of nails and other bits of metal, two victims were killed and 56 wounded. Similarly, in April of last year, a female suicide bomber tried to enter the Mahane Yehuda open-air market—the fourth woman to make such an attempt in four months—but was deterred by a strong police presence. So she simply walked up to a bus stop packed with shoppers hurrying home before the Sabbath and detonated her explosives, killing six and wounding 73.

Suicide bombing initially seemed the desperate act of lone individuals, but it is not undertaken alone. Invariably, a terrorist organization such as HAMAS (the Islamic Resistance Movement), the Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ), or the al Aqsa Martyrs Brigade has recruited the bomber, conducted reconnaissance, prepared the explosive device, and identified a target—explaining that if it turns out to be guarded or protected, any crowded place nearby will do. “We hardly ever find that the suicide bomber came [alone],” a police officer explained to me. “There is always a handler.” In fact, in some cases a handler has used a cell phone or other device to trigger the blast from a distance. A policeman told me, “There was one event where a suicide bomber had been told all he had to do was to carry the bomb and plant explosives in a certain place. But the bomb was remote-control detonated.”

The organizations behind the Palestinians’ suicide terrorism have numerous components. Quartermasters obtain the explosives and the other materials (nuts, bolts, nails, and the like) that are combined to make a bomb. Now that bomb-making methods have been so widely disseminated throughout the West Bank and Gaza, a merely competent technician, rather than the skilled engineer once required, can build a bomb. Explosive material is packed into pockets sewn into a canvas or denim belt or vest and hooked up to a detonator—usually involving a simple hand-operated plunger.

Before the operation is to be launched, “minders” sequester the bomber in a safe house, isolating him or her from family and friends—from all contact with the outside world—during the final preparations for martyrdom. A film crew makes a martyrdom video, as much to help ensure that the bomber can’t back out as for propaganda and recruitment purposes. Reconnaissance teams have already either scouted the target or received detailed information about it, which they pass on to the bomber’s handlers. The job of the handlers, who are highly skilled at avoiding Israeli army checkpoints or police patrols, is to deliver the bomber as close to the target as possible.

I talked to a senior police-operations commander in his office at the Russian Compound, the nerve center of law enforcement for Jerusalem since the time when first the Turks and then the British ruled this part of the world. It was easy to imagine, amid the graceful arches and the traditional Jerusalem stone, an era when Jerusalem’s law enforcement officers wore tarbooshes and pressed blue tunics with Sam Browne belts rather than the bland polyester uniforms and blue baseball-style caps of today. Although policing this multi-faith, historically beleaguered city has undoubtedly always involved difficult challenges, none can

compare with the current situation. "This year there were very many events," my host explained, using the bland generic noun that signifies terrorist attacks or attempted attacks. "In previous years we considered 10 events as normal; now we are already at 43." He sighed. There were still three weeks to go before the end of the year. Nineteen of these events had been suicide bombings. In the calculus of terrorism, it doesn't get much better. "How easy it has become for a person to wake up in the morning and go off and commit suicide," he observed. Once there were only "bags on buses, not vests or belts" to contend with, the policeman said. "Everything is open now. The purpose is to prove that the police can do whatever they want but it won't help."

This, of course, is the age-old strategy of terrorists everywhere—to undermine public confidence in the ability of the authorities to protect and defend citizens, thereby creating a climate of fear and intimidation amenable to terrorist exploitation. In Jerusalem, and in Israel as a whole, this strategy has not succeeded. But it has fundamentally changed daily behavior patterns—the first step toward crushing morale and breaking the will to resist.

The terrorists appear to be deliberately homing in on the few remaining places where Israelis thought they could socialize in peace. An unprecedented string of attacks in the first four months of 2002 illustrated this careful strategy, beginning at bus stops and malls and moving into more private realms, such as corner supermarkets and local coffee bars. In March, for example, no one paid much attention to a young man dressed like an ultra-Orthodox Jew who was standing near some parked cars as guests left a bar mitzvah celebration at a social hall in the ultra-Orthodox Jerusalem neighborhood of Beit Yisrael. Then he blew himself up, killing nine people, eight of them children, and wounding 59. The tight-knit religious community had felt that it was protected by God, pointing to the miraculous lack of injury a year before when a booby-trapped car blew up in front of the same hall. Using a strategy al-Qaida has made familiar, the terrorists revisited the site.

Less than a month after the Beit Yisrael attack, the suicide bombers and their leaders drove home the point that Israelis cannot feel safe anywhere by going to the one large Israeli city that had felt immune from the suspicion and antipathy prevalent elsewhere—Haifa, with its successful mixture of Jews, Christian and Muslim Arabs, and followers of the Bahai faith. The University of Haifa has long had the highest proportion of Arab students of any Israeli university. The nearby Matza restaurant, owned by Jews but run by an Israeli Arab family from Galilee, seemed to embody the unusually cordial relations that exist among the city's diverse communities. Matza was popular with Jews and Arabs alike, and the presence of its Arab staff and patrons provided a feeling of safety from attack. That feeling was shattered at two-thirty on a quiet Sunday afternoon, when a suicide bomber killed 15 people and wounded nearly 50.

As we had tea late one afternoon in the regal, though almost preternaturally quiet, surroundings of Jerusalem's King David Hotel, Benny Morris, a professor of history at Ben Gurion University, explained, "The Palestinians say they have found a strategic weapon, and

suicide bombing is it. This hotel is empty. The streets are empty. They have effectively terrorized Israeli society. My wife won't use a bus anymore, only a taxi." It is undeniable that daily life in Jerusalem, and throughout Israel, has changed as a result of last year's wave of suicide bombings. Even the police have been affected. "I'm worried," one officer told me in an aside—whether in confidence or in embarrassment, I couldn't tell—as we walked past Zion Square, near where some bombs had exploded. "I tell you this as a police officer. I don't come to Jerusalem with my children anymore. I'd give back the settlements. I'd give over my bank account to live in peace."

By any measure, 2002 was an astonishing year for Israel in terms of suicide bombings. An average of five attacks a month were made, nearly double the number during the first 15 months of the second *intifada*—and that number was itself more than 10 times the monthly average since 1993. Indeed, according to a database maintained by the National Security Studies Center, at Haifa University, there were nearly as many suicide attacks in Israel in 2002 (59) as there had been in the previous eight years combined (62). In Jerusalem alone there were nine suicide attacks during the first four months of 2002, killing 33 and injuring 464. "It was horrendous," a young professional woman living in the city told me. "No one went out for coffee. No one went out to restaurants. We went as a group of people to one another's houses only."

Again, terrorism is meant to produce psychological effects that reach far beyond the immediate victims of the attack. "The Scuds of Saddam [in 1991] never caused as much psychological damage as the suicide bombers have," says Ami Pedahzur, a professor of political science at Haifa University and an expert on political extremism and violence who manages the National Security Studies Center's terrorism database. As the French philosopher Gaston Bouthoul argued three decades ago in a theoretical treatise on the subject, the "anonymous, unidentifiable threat creates huge anxiety, and the terrorist tries to spread fear by contagion, to immobilize and subjugate those living under this threat."¹

This is precisely what the Palestinian terrorist groups are trying to achieve. "The Israelis... will fall to their knees," Sheikh Ahmad Yassin, the spiritual leader of HAMAS, said in 2001. "You can sense the fear in Israel already; they are worried about where and when the next attacks will come. Ultimately, HAMAS will win."³

The strategy of suicide terrorists is to make people paranoid and xenophobic, fearful of venturing beyond their homes even to a convenience store. Terrorists hope to compel the enemy society's acquiescence, if not outright surrender, to their demands. This is what al-Qaida hoped to achieve on 9/11 in one stunning blow—and what the Palestinians seek as well, on a more sustained, if piecemeal, basis.

After decades of struggle, the Palestinians are convinced that they have finally discovered Israel's Achilles' heel. Ismail Haniya, another HAMAS leader, was quoted in March of 2002 in *The Washington Post* as saying that Jews "love life more than any other people, and they prefer not to die."⁴ In contrast, suicide terrorists are often said to have gone to their deaths smiling. An Israeli policeman told me, "A suicide bomber goes on a bus and finds

himself face-to-face with victims and he smiles and he activates the bomb—but we learned that only by asking people afterwards who survived.” This is what is known in the Shia Islamic tradition as the *bassamat al-farah*, or “smile of joy”—prompted by one’s impending martyrdom. It is just as prevalent among Sunni terrorists. (Indeed, the last will and testament of Mohammed Atta, the ringleader of the September 11 hijackers, and his “primer” for martyrs, *The Sky Smiles, My Young Son*, clearly evidence a belief in the joy of death.)

This perceived weakness of an ostensibly powerful society has given rise to what is known in the Middle East as the “spider-web theory,” which originated within Hizballah, the Lebanese Shia organization, following a struggle that ultimately compelled the Israel Defense Forces to withdraw from southern Lebanon in May of 2000. The term is said to have been coined by Hizballah’s secretary general, Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah, who described Israel as a still formidable military power whose civil society had become materialistic and lazy, its citizens self-satisfied, comfortable, and pampered to the point where they had gone soft. IDF Chief of Staff Moshe “Boogie” Ya’alon paraphrased Nasrallah for the Israeli public in an interview published in the newspaper *Ha’aretz* last August.

The Israeli army is strong, Israel has technological superiority and is said to have strategic capabilities, but its citizens are unwilling any longer to sacrifice lives in order to defend their national interests and national goals. Therefore, Israel is a spider-web society: it looks strong from the outside, but touch it and it will fall apart.

Al-Qaida, of course, has made a similar assessment of America’s vulnerability.

A society facing such a determined foe can respond. Israel, with its necessarily advanced military and intelligence capacities, was able in the first four months of 2002, to meet the most concerted effort to date by Palestinian terrorists to test the resolve of its government and the mettle of its citizens. Twelve Israelis were killed in terrorist attacks in January, 26 in February, 108 in March, and 41 in April. The population of the United States is roughly 47 times that of Israel, meaning that the American equivalent of the March figure would have exceeded 5,000—another 9/11, but with more than 2,000 additional deaths.

After April of 2002, however, a period of relative quiet settled over Israel. The number of suicide attacks, according to the National Security Studies Center, declined from 16 in March to six in April, six in May, five in June, and six in July, before falling still further to two in August, and similarly small numbers for the remainder of the year. “We wouldn’t want it to be perceived [by the Israeli population] that we have no military answers,” a senior IDF planner told me. The military answer was Operation Defensive Shield, which began in March and involved both the IDF’s huge deployment of personnel to the West Bank and its continuing presence in all the major Palestinian population centers that Israel regards as well-springs of the suicide campaign. This presence has involved aggressive military operations to preempt suicide bombing, along with curfews and other restrictions on the movement of residents.

The success of the IDF's strategy is utterly dependent on regularly acquiring intelligence and rapidly disseminating it to operational units that can take appropriate action. Thus the IDF must continue to occupy the West Bank's major population centers, so that Israeli intelligence agents can stay in close—and relatively safe—proximity to their information sources, and troops can act immediately, either to round up suspects or to rescue the agent should an operation go awry.

"Military pressure facilitates arrests, because you're there," one knowledgeable observer explained to me. "Not only do you know the area, but you have [covert] spotters deployed, and the whole area is under curfew anyway, so it is difficult for terrorists to move about and hide without being noticed, and more difficult for them to get out. The IDF presence facilitates intelligence gathering, and the troops can also conduct massive sweeps, house to house and block to block, pick up people, and interrogate them."

The IDF units in West Bank cities and towns can amass detailed knowledge of a community, identifying terrorists and their sympathizers, tracking their movements and daily routines, and observing the people with whom they associate. Agents from Shabak, Israel's General Security Service (also known as the Shin Bet) work alongside these units, participating in operations and often assigning missions. "The moment someone from Shabak comes with us, everything changes," a young soldier in an elite reconnaissance unit told me over coffee and cake in his mother's apartment. "The Shabak guy talks in Arabic to [the suspect] without an accent, or appears as an Arab guy himself. Shabak already knows everything about them, and that is such a shock to them. So they are afraid, and they will tell Shabak everything." The success of Defensive Shield and the subsequent Operation Determined Way depends on this synchronization of intelligence and operations. A junior officer well acquainted with this environment says, "Whoever has better intelligence is the winner."

The strategy—at least in the short run—is working. The dramatic decline in the number of suicide operations since last spring is proof enough. "Tactically, we are doing everything we can," a senior officer involved in the framing of this policy told me, "and we have managed to prevent 80 percent of all attempts." Another officer said, "We are now bringing the war to them. We do it so that we fight the war in *their* homes rather than in *our* homes. We try to make certain that we fight on their ground, where we can have the maximum advantage." The goal of the IDF, though, is not simply to fight in a manner that plays to its strength; the goal is to actively shrink the time and space in which the suicide bombers and their operational commanders, logisticians, and handlers function—to stop them before they can cross the Green Line, by threatening their personal safety and putting them on the defensive.

Citizens in Israel, as in America, have a fundamental expectation that their government and its military and security forces will protect and defend them. Soldiers are expected to die, if necessary, in order to discharge this responsibility. As one senior IDF commander put it, "It is better for the IDF to bear the brunt of these attacks than Israeli civilians. The IDF

is better prepared, protected, educated." Thus security in Israel means to the IDF an almost indefinite deployment in the West Bank—a state of ongoing low-level war. For Palestinian civilians it means no respite from roadblocks and identity checks, cordon-and-search operations, lightning snatch-and-grabs, bombing raids, helicopter strikes, ground attacks, and other countermeasures that have turned densely populated civilian areas into war zones.

Many Israelis do not relish involvement in this protracted war of attrition, but even more of them accept that there is no alternative. "Israel's ability to stand fast indefinitely is a tremendous advantage," says Dan Schueftan, an Israeli strategist and military thinker who teaches at Haifa University, "since the suicide bombers believe that time is on their side. It imposes a strain on the army, yes, but this is what the army is for."

Indeed, no Israeli with whom I spoke on this visit, doubted that the IDF's continued heavy presence in the West Bank was directly responsible for the drop in the number of suicide bombings. And I encountered very few who favored withdrawing the IDF from the West Bank. This view cut across ideological and demographic lines. As we dined one evening at Matza, which has been rebuilt, a centrist graduate student at Haifa University named Uzi Nisim told me that Palestinian terrorists "will have the power to hit us, to hurt us, once [the IDF] withdraws from Jenin and elsewhere on the West Bank." Ami Pedahzur of Haifa University, who is a leftist, agreed. He said, "There is widespread recognition in Israel that this is the only way to stop terrorism." I later heard the same thing from a South African couple, relatively new immigrants to Israel, who are active in a variety of human-rights endeavors. "Just the other day," the husband told me, "even my wife said, 'Thank God we have Sharon. Otherwise I wouldn't feel safe going out.'"

Nevertheless, few Israelis believe that the current situation will lead to any improvement in Israeli-Palestinian relations over the long run. Dennis Zinn, the defense correspondent for Israel's Channel 1, told me, "Yes, there is a drop-off [in suicide bombings]. When you have bombs coming down on your heads, you can't carry out planning and suicide attacks. But that doesn't take away their motivation. It only increases it."

Suicide Terrorism and Homeland Security in the United States

Given the relative ease and the strategic and tactical attraction of suicide bombing, it is perhaps no wonder that after a five-day visit to Israel last fall, Louis Anemone, the security chief of the New York Metropolitan Transit Authority, concluded that New Yorkers—and, by implication, other Americans—face the same threat. "This stuff is going to be imported over here," he declared—a prediction that Vice President Dick Cheney and FBI Director Robert Mueller had already made.

In March 2004, Secretary of Homeland Security Tom Ridge also referred to the threat, saying in an interview with Fox News that we have to "prepare for the inevitability" of suicide bombings in the United States. Anemone even argued that "today's terrorists appear to be using Israel as a testing ground to prepare for a sustained attack against the U.S."

In fact, Palestinians had tried a suicide attack in New York four years before 9/11; their plans to bomb a Brooklyn subway station were foiled only because an informant told the police. When they were arrested, the terrorists were probably less than a day away from attacking; according to law-enforcement authorities, five bombs had been primed. "I wouldn't call them sophisticated," Howard Safir, the commissioner of police at the time, commented, "but they certainly were very dangerous." That suicide bombers don't need to be sophisticated is precisely what makes them so dangerous. All that's required is a willingness to kill and a willingness to die.

According to the RAND Corporation's chronology of worldwide terrorism, which begins in 1968 (the year acknowledged as marking the advent of modern international terrorism, whereby terrorists attack other countries or foreign targets in their own country), nearly two thirds of the 144 suicide bombings recorded have occurred in the past two years. No society, least of all the United States, can regard itself as immune from this threat. Israeli Foreign Minister Benjamin Netanyahu emphasized this point when he addressed the U.S. Congress nine days after 9/11. So did Dan Schueftan, the Israeli strategist, when I asked him if he thought suicide terrorism would come to America in a form similar to that seen in Israel this past year. He said, "It is an interesting comment that the terrorists make: we will finish defeating the Jews because they love life so much. Their goal is to bring misery and grief to people who have an arrogance of power. Who has this? The United States and Israel. Europe will suffer too. I don't think that it will happen in the U.S. on the magnitude we have seen it here, but I have no doubt that it will occur. We had the same discussion back in 1968, when El Al aircraft were hijacked and people said this is your problem, not ours."

The United States, of course, is not Israel. However much we may want to harden our hearts and our targets, the challenge goes far beyond fortifying a single national airline or corralling the enemy into a territory ringed by walls and barbed-wire fences that can be intensively monitored by our armed forces. But we can take precautions based on Israel's experience, and be confident that we are substantially reducing the threat of suicide terrorism here.

The police, the military, and intelligence agencies can take steps that work from the outside in, beginning far in time and distance from a potential attack, and ending at the moment and the site of an actual attack. Although the importance of these steps is widely recognized, they have been implemented only unevenly across the United States:

- Understand the terrorists' operational environment. Know their *modus operandi* and targeting patterns. Suicide bombers are rarely lone outlaws; they are preceded by long logistical trails. Focus not just on suspected bombers, but on the infrastructure required to launch and sustain suicide-bombing campaigns. This is the essential spadework. It will be for naught, however, if concerted efforts are not made to circulate this information quickly and systematically among federal, state, and local authorities.

- Develop strong, confidence-building ties with the communities from which terrorists are most likely to come, and mount communications campaigns to eradicate support from these communities. The most effective and useful intelligence comes from places where terrorists conceal themselves and seek to establish and hide their infrastructure. Law-enforcement officers should actively encourage and cultivate cooperation in a non-threatening way.
- Encourage businesses from which terrorists can obtain bomb-making components to alert authorities if they notice large purchases of, for example, ammonium nitrate fertilizer; pipes, batteries, and wires; or chemicals commonly used to fabricate explosives. Information about customers who simply inquire about any of these materials can also be extremely useful to the police.
- Force terrorists to pay more attention to their own organizational security than to planning and carrying out attacks. The greatest benefit is in disrupting pre-attack operations. Given the highly fluid, international threat the United States faces, counterterrorism units, dedicated to identifying and targeting the intelligence-gathering and reconnaissance activities of terrorist organizations, should be established here within existing law-enforcement agencies. These units should be especially aware of places where organizations frequently recruit new members and the bombers themselves, such as community centers, social clubs, schools, and religious institutions.
- Make sure ordinary materials don't become shrapnel. Some steps to build up physical defenses were taken after 9/11—reinforcing park benches, erecting Jersey barriers around vulnerable buildings, and the like. More are needed, such as ensuring that windows on buses and subway cars are shatterproof, and that seats and other accoutrements are not easily dislodged or splintered. Israel has had to learn to examine every element of its public infrastructure. Israeli buses and bus shelters are austere for a reason.
- Teach law-enforcement personnel what to do at the moment of an attack or an attempt. Prevention comes first from the cop on the beat, who will be forced to make instant life-and-death decisions affecting those nearby. Rigorous training is needed for identifying a potential suicide bomber, confronting a suspect, and responding and securing the area around the attack site in the event of an explosion. Is the officer authorized to take action upon sighting a suspected bomber, or must a supervisor or special unit be called first? Policies and procedures must be established. In the aftermath of a blast, the police must determine whether emergency medical crews and firefighters may enter the site; concerns about a follow-up attack can dictate that first responders be held back until the area is secured. The ability to make such lightning determinations requires training—and, tragically, experience. We can learn from foreign countries with long experience of suicide bombings, such as Israel and Sri Lanka, and also from our own responses in the past to other types of terrorist attacks.

America's enemies are marshaling their resources to continue the struggle that crystallized on 9/11. Exactly what shape that struggle will take remains to be seen. But a recruitment video reportedly circulated by al-Qaida as recently as spring of 2002 may provide some important clues. The seven-minute tape, seized from an al-Qaida member by U.S. authorities, extols the virtues of martyrdom and solicits recruits to Usama bin Ladin's cause. It depicts scenes of *jihadists* in combat, followed by the successive images of 27 martyrs with their names, where they were from, and where they died. Twelve of the martyrs are featured in a concluding segment with voice-over that says, "They rejoice in the bounty provided by Allah. And with regard to those left behind who have not yet joined them in their bliss, the martyrs glory in the fact that on them is no fear, nor have they cause to grieve." The video closes with a message of greeting from the Black Banner Center for Islamic Information.

The greatest military onslaught in history against a terrorist group crushed the infrastructure of al-Qaida in Afghanistan, depriving it of training camps, operational bases, and command-and-control headquarters; killing and wounding many of its leaders and fighters; and dispersing the survivors. Yet this group still actively seeks to rally its forces and attract recruits: Ayman Zawahiri, bin Ladin's chief lieutenant, laid out a list of terrorist principles in his book, *Knights Under the Prophet's Banner* (2001), prominent among them the need for al-Qaida to "move the battle to the enemy's ground to burn the hands of those who ignite fire in our countries." He also mentioned "the need to concentrate on the method of martyrdom operations as the most successful way of inflicting damage against the opponent and the least costly to the mujahideen in terms of casualties."

That martyrdom highlighted in the recruitment video strongly suggests that suicide attacks will continue to be a primary instrument in al-Qaida's war against—and perhaps in—the United States. Suleiman Abu Gheith, al-Qaida's chief spokesman, has said as much. In rhetoric disturbingly reminiscent of the way that Palestinian terrorists describe their inevitable triumph over Israel, Abu Gheith declared, "Those youths that destroyed Americans with their planes, they did a good deed. There are thousands more young followers who look forward to death like Americans look forward to living."

Endnotes

- 1 Gaston Bouthoul, *Traité de Polémologie: Sociologie des Guerres [The Treaty of Polémologie: The Sociology of Wars]*. Paris: Payot, 1970.
- 2 Burhan Wazir, "Suicide Bombing is Democratic Right, Says the 'Soul' of Hamas." *The Observer* (UK), August 19, 2001
- 3 Lee Hockstader, "Suicide Bomber Kills At Least 19." *The Washington Post*, March 28, 2002.

Chapter 24
Operation Smokescreen



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One of the hardest skills to teach new officers is to trust their instincts. In early 1995, while working in uniform at an off-duty job for JR's Tobacco in Statesville, North Carolina, a detective sergeant with the Iredell County Sheriff's Office saw something that his instincts told him was not right. Several individuals entered the store carrying plastic grocery bags that contained \$20,000 to \$30,000 in cash and placed large structured orders for cigarettes. Having previously worked undercover narcotics, the detective suspected that the men were laundering drug money. When he overheard the men speaking Arabic—unusual in rural North Carolina—the detective suspected something more than the common criminal enterprise. The detective approached his supervisor in the Sheriff's Department and explained his observations and suspicions. His supervisor allowed him to begin surveillance, although he was required to do so on his own time.

During the next few months, the detective observed the individuals purchasing large amounts of cigarettes and transporting them along interstates to Tennessee and Virginia. This occurred daily. As a North Carolina sheriff's deputy, the detective could only follow the vehicles to the Virginia or Tennessee state lines and watch as they drove out of his jurisdiction. He took care to note dates, times, and vehicle and individual descriptions.

After documenting this activity for several months, the detective contacted Special Agent John Loric of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) in Charlotte, North Carolina. Special Agent John Loric advised the detective that what he had stumbled across was most likely a "cigarette diversion ring." In this scheme, traffickers purchase large amounts of cigarettes in states where the taxes are low, such as North Carolina where the tobacco is grown and the cigarettes are manufactured, and transport them north to states such as Maryland, New York, Pennsylvania, Michigan and New Jersey where taxes are much higher. There they sell the cigarettes at a discount without paying any taxes. S/A Loric and the detective conducted additional surveillance during the next several months to test Loric's theory.

In September 1996, the ATF opened an official investigation and the detective was assigned to the ATF on a permanent, full-time basis. Soon after the assignment, the ATF instructed the detective to contact the North Carolina Attorney General's Office to see if they wanted to participate in the investigation. The detective contacted the attorney general,

outlined the investigation and asked if the office wished to participate. The attorney general responded, "Sir, the state of North Carolina is a tobacco friendly state. As far as we are concerned, there are no violations occurring. We do not wish to be a part of this investigation." The detective was then instructed to contact the North Carolina State Bureau of Investigation. Again, the detective was advised, "Sir, the state of North Carolina is a tobacco friendly state. And, as far as we are concerned, there were no violations occurring."

As the ATF investigation began, investigators used mail covers and pen registers to identify the eight core members of the organization. At one point during the investigation, investigators had 22 pen registers and eight mail covers in place. The volume of information collected by these methods was so massive that it required the use of full-time intelligence analysts. The investigators later learned that these eight men had grown up in the same suburb of Beirut, Lebanon, and were either related or close friends.

Three of the men under surveillance, Mohammed Youssef Hammoud, Ali Faye Darwich and Mohammed Atef Darwich, came to the United States together. Shortly after the bombings at the embassy in Beirut, they had traveled to Caracas, Venezuela where they purchased fake visas for \$200 each. Using these visas, they flew to New York City where Hammoud requested political asylum, claiming that he was a political refugee of the war in Beirut. His request was denied. As is usual in such cases, he was released and told to return in 30 days for deportation.

While awaiting deportation, Hammoud found a woman in New York City who married him for a fee. This gave him the legal status necessary to remain in the country indefinitely. Eventually, all eight individuals entered into at least one fraudulent marriage for the sole purpose of gaining legal status in the United States. Several of them were also collecting welfare.

As soon as his status allowed it, Hammoud reunited with his older brother Chawki and both of the Darwichs who had already migrated to the Charlotte area. Chawki had already identified cigarette smuggling as a way to make money quickly and purchased a local convenience store for use as a front in the smuggling operation.

Chawki liked cigarette smuggling for several reasons. The state tax on a carton of cigarettes varied greatly between states. For example, at the time the tax on a carton of cigarettes in North Carolina was \$0.50; however, the tax on a carton of cigarettes in Michigan was \$7.50. This, along with the fact that certain brands of cigarettes sold for more in Michigan than they did in North Carolina, made for a high profit margin. Typically, a carton of cigarettes that sold for \$14 a carton in North Carolina would sell for \$28 in Michigan. Taking these cartons to Michigan by the thousands, they were making an average of \$13,000 profit per van load and could ship as many as three van loads a day.

As the investigation progressed, investigators found that each of the eight individuals had specific jobs or tasks in the organization. One of the cell members, for example, was a banker. A member could go to him, borrow \$10,000 and purchase a van load of cigarettes.

The driver would go to Michigan one day and repay the banker \$11,000 the next, keeping the profit for himself. Another member was responsible for renting the vans. Again, the use of pen registers and mail covers revealed the conspiracy and connected all eight of the main suspects.

Soon after moving to Charlotte, Hammoud divorced his first wife and married a woman from the Charlotte area. Again, this was a fraudulent marriage with the purpose to allow Hammoud to remain in the United States.

While in the process of trying to develop the smuggling business, many of the eight suspects worked part time as deliverymen for a local pizza establishment. It was while working there that Hammoud met his third wife, Angie Tsioumas. He married her in September 1997 while he was still married to his second wife and Angie was still married to her first husband.

In October 1997, a rental truck was loaded with cigarettes and delivered to the residence of a white female. Investigators followed her as she drove the truck from Charlotte into West Virginia. The West Virginia State Police were contacted, given a description of the truck, and asked to stop and inspect it.

The driver of the truck, a white female, and a passenger, the driver's mother, were questioned by the West Virginia trooper. The driver told him that she was moving her mother from Charlotte to Michigan. The driver stated that her mother's belongings were in the back of the truck. The trooper asked for and received consent to search the vehicle. He discovered 4,708 cartons of cigarettes and no furniture, clothing, or reasonable personal belongings.

The driver was arrested and taken to the West Virginia State Patrol barracks where she was offered a chance to cooperate with the authorities. She agreed and made a supervised phone call to Hammoud. After she identified herself to him, Hammoud said, "I don't know who you are or what you're talking about, but call me when you get back to Charlotte."

Once back in Charlotte, the authorities fitted the driver with a recording device and sent her to Hammoud's residence. It was revealed later in the investigation that when she entered the residence, she immediately closed the door, put a finger to her lips and mouthed the words, "I'm wired, don't say anything," while pointing to her chest. Rather than abandoning their operation, the smugglers accepted that they would lose one out of every 10 loads of cigarettes.

One of the biggest mistakes we made during the investigation was our failure to recognize the need for financial auditors. Once they were involved in the operation, they had to spend a considerable amount of time learning about the investigation and advising our team what was needed to assist. During the course of the investigation we issued more than 850 federal grand jury bank subpoenas. The auditors were able to unravel the complex schemes and reveal further correlations between the group's members. They proved that person "A" used a credit card belonging to person "B" to purchase cigarettes, and that person "C" would later pay the credit card bill. The auditors also used credit card purchases of gasoline to prove

that the subjects had traveled from North Carolina to Michigan, which was corroborated by officer testimony from traditional surveillance.

For almost three years, the detective and ATF worked to collect evidence linking each of the eight individuals to the group and its illegal activities. In the summer of 1999, the ATF and Iredell County met with the U.S. Attorneys Office in Charlotte and were given the authority to proceed with the indictments.

The next day, the FBI contacted the ATF and asked to meet in order to discuss the case. At that meeting, the FBI explained that the smugglers had direct ties to Hizb Allah (also known as Hezbollah), a designated terrorist organization. The FBI asked that the ATF and the county postpone their indictments for approximately one year while the FBI agents completed their investigation. At that time, a joint investigation involving all three organizations was opened to facilitate collaboration.

As a result, the investigation suffered from the "Chinese Wall," which is one of the main stumbling blocks encountered in investigations of this type. The "Chinese Wall" is the practice that requires the investigative side to pass any and all information over to the intelligence side, while the intelligence side is not allowed to pass any information back. This slowed down the investigation considerably since the intelligence side was not allowed to tell the investigators what they were looking for or what they needed. Fortunately, since 9/11 this problem has begun to be rectified.

The FBI revealed that one of the members of the group, Said Harb, was actually a procurement officer for Hizb Allah. He had made numerous trips to Canada to meet with Ali Amhaz, providing him with equipment and money.

Hizb Allah was founded in 1981 by Ayatollah Khomeini and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, primarily to oust the Israelis from Beirut. Hizb Allah receives between \$100 million and \$200 million per year in financial support from Iran. It was responsible for the bombing of the U.S. Marine barracks in 1983, which killed 283 Marines; the hijacking of TWA Flight 847 in 1985; and the bombing of the U.S. Embassy in Beirut in 1983, which was the first attack by Muslims that intentionally targeted American civilians. Up until 9/11, Hizb Allah was responsible for the deaths of more Americans than any other terrorist organization in the world.

U.S. federal law prohibits the shipping of equipment or items to a designated terrorist organization, except medical and religious supplies. Therefore, all equipment destined for Hizb Allah would go through Harb to Amhaz, who shipped it to Lebanon.

Said Harb and the other suspects acquired a variety of items for Hizb Allah. Most were used in violent engagements against Israel, while others were used to film attacks on Israelis for propaganda purposes. Included in their shopping lists were:

- Night vision devices, such as goggles, cameras and scopes.
- Surveying equipment.
- Global positioning systems, such as watches and aviation antennas.

- Mine and metal detection equipment.
- Video equipment.
- Advanced aircraft analysis and design software.
- Computer equipment, including laptops, high-speed modems, processors, joysticks, plotters, scanners and printers.
- Stun guns.
- Handheld radios and receivers.
- Cellular telephones.
- Nitrogen cutters.
- Mining, drilling and blasting equipment.
- Military-style lensatic compasses.
- Binoculars.
- Naval equipment.
- Radars.
- Ultrasonic dog repellers.
- Laser range finders.
- Camera equipment, including digital cameras, zoom lenses, tubes and film scanners.

At this point, the FBI was working closely with the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS). On one trip to Canada, CSIS was able to photograph Harb meeting with Amhaz. During that meeting, Harb paid \$5,000 each for five fraudulent credit cards, with a \$20,000 credit limit on each card. Harb was also asked to begin investigating the possibility of securing life insurance policies on some of the "brothers" who might go for a walk one night and never come back; in other words, "suicide bombers."

Despite his support for Hizb Allah, Harb was not very religious. For example, he hired an individual by the name of Mohit Behl to develop and maintain two pornographic websites. Harb double-billed most customers every month.

Each morning, Harb would go to Behl's residence to retrieve a logbook that was kept in a locked safe at that address. The logbook detailed which aliases he had used the day before and what aliases he should use that day. Harb used his cell phone's feature providing different ring tones to help him keep his aliases straight. The different ring tones told him how he should answer the phone. Harb also had at least seven different North Carolina driver's licenses under alias names.

Harb's sister, Fatima Harb, was legally married to an individual by the name of Samir Dpek. Harb persuaded a U.S. citizen in Charlotte, Jeffery Wayne-Swaringer, to accompany him to Beirut to marry his sister for a fee. Due to problems with paperwork in Beirut, the group traveled to Nicosia, Cyprus for the marriage.

After the marriage, Said Harb, Fatima Harb and Jeffery Wayne-Swaringer returned to the United States, leaving Haissam Harb and Samir Dpek in Beirut. Harb also convinced

a lesbian couple in Charlotte to marry his brother and brother-in-law. Haissam Harb and Dpek entered the country illegally and quickly married.

Because the lesbian couple continued to live together, these marriages were discovered and Haissam, Fatima and Dpek were all deported. Harb offered a U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Services agent \$10,000 to facilitate paperwork allowing his brother back into the United States.

It was about this time that Hammoud had become unhappy with the "Westernization" of Harb. In September 1999, Harb traveled back to Beirut to visit family. Before this trip, Hammoud had given Harb a check to be delivered to Hizb Allah leaders. On September 25, 1999, Hammoud placed 36 phone calls to Shaykh Abbas Harake, attempting to ascertain the status of the check. He feared that Harb would not deliver the check and instead keep it.

In July 2000, a contingency of approximately 250 local, state and federal law enforcement agents carried out 18 federal search warrants and federal seizure warrants. They arrested 20 individuals for cigarette smuggling, money laundering and INS violations. Approximately \$600,000 worth of assets, including numerous bank accounts, vehicles and two residences, were seized from the smuggling ring, along with numerous records of their large money laundering operation.

During the course of the investigation, several investigative techniques were employed:

1. Mail covers: eight were used on the main target residences as well as their businesses.
2. Pin registers: at one point there were 22 pin registers up and running.
3. Physical surveillance: at times there were as many as 50 ATF agents assigned to the surveillance of the targets. Targets were followed from North Carolina through Virginia, West Virginia, Maryland, Pennsylvania, Ohio and Michigan. There were some trips that required agents to remain away from home for as much as a week at a time following the suspects.
4. Pole cameras: these were in place in five different locations.
5. Financial analysis: this was done by three separate financial auditors assigned to the case.
6. Ex parte tax returns: they revealed that Mohammed Hammoud and Angie Tsioumas reported joint federal gross income of \$24,000 in order to qualify for an Earned Income Credit. The auditors were able to show that Mohammed used an alias to transfer \$400,000 from a fraudulent bank account in Michigan to his bank account in North Carolina.
7. Federal grand jury subpoenas.
8. Telephone toll records.
9. Bank records: more than 850 bank account subpoenas were served.

10. Witness testimony.

11. Informant testimony.

The use of informants played a key role in helping to identify the suspects.

Some investigative concerns were:

- The possibility of exposing highly sensitive informants as a side effect of criminal prosecutions based on their information.
- The use of information/evidence obtained as a result of intelligence activities to support criminal prosecutions (i.e. FISA vs. TIII).
- The timing of the prosecution's actions relating to intelligence activities.
- Guidance from DOJ to protect sensitive intelligence methods and sources and to protect ongoing federal grand jury investigations.

Based on documents collected during the execution of our search warrants, we began to prepare for superseding indictments and charges ranging from RICO, money laundering, visa fraud, marriage fraud, credit card fraud and bank fraud. Additionally, two individuals in Michigan were to be charged in the money laundering conspiracy. Seizures of bank accounts, cigarettes, real estate and vehicles continued in North Carolina and Michigan.

In July 2000, Hammoud and his codefendants were arrested and booked at the Mecklenburg County Jail in Charlotte. Since Said Harb had adopted a Western lifestyle, we felt he stood to lose the most and would be the one most likely to cooperate and testify against the others in the group. Harb accepted this offer, and a superseding indictment—charging Mohammed Hammoud with “providing material support to a designated terrorist organization”—was issued.

While Hammoud was housed in the Mecklenburg County Jail awaiting trial, authorities intercepted a note he had written. In it, he detailed escape plans involving medical treatment and the murder of any law enforcement officials who attempted to stop the escape. He also wrote about his plans to blow up the federal courthouse in Charlotte in an attempt to destroy the evidence against him and to “put two into the left eye of that arrogant U.S. attorney” who was prosecuting his case.

Eighteen of the 25 defendants entered guilty pleas. Mohammed Hammoud and his brother Chawki Hammoud were both found guilty of all charges. Mohammed Hammoud was the only defendant charged with providing material support to a designated terrorist organization. Hammoud was sentenced to 1,850 months in federal prison, which equates to 155 years, and then he is to be deported. His sentencing is currently under appeal. There are still five fugitives, two in Canada and three in Lebanon.

After Hammoud's arrest and throughout his trial, Hizb Allah denied any association with him. Some believe that Hizb Allah wanted the trial to proceed in order to gather information about the investigative techniques used to build a case against him and his associates.

For the first time in its history, CSIS allowed evidence to be turned over to a foreign government for use in a trial. It was also the first conviction ever for "Providing Material Support to a Designated Terrorist Organization."

This case demonstrates the importance of law enforcement agencies coming together and working as a team. I can say without reservation that everyone involved in the case left their egos at the door. The entire investigation was a joint effort and a perfect example of how one should be conducted.

Robert Fromme is the detective who first noticed the plastic bags of cash and trusted his instincts. He participated in the investigation until its end. Fromme is now retired from law enforcement after 30 years of service. He is currently a "Senior Consultant" with Harbinger Technologies Group in McLean, VA.

Glossary

Basic Facts about Islam:

- The third Abrahamic religion (following Judaism and Christianity).
- Second largest religion in the world after Christianity.
- Currently there are roughly 1.4 billion Muslims in the world.
- Most Muslims are not Arab. Less than 30% of Muslims live in the Middle East.
- Most populous Muslims states include: Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, Iran, Egypt, and Turkey. India also has a considerable and growing population.
- Saudi Arabia is the birthplace of Islam.

Most Prominent Muslim Holy Sites:

Mecca Saudi Arabia: Birth place of the Prophet Muhammad and the location of the Ka'ba shrine. It is where the Prophet was living at the time he received the recitation.

Medina Saudi Arabia: Destination of early Islamic migration and the burial place of the Prophet Muhammad.

al-Quds [Jerusalem] Israel/Palestine: It is where the Prophet Muhammad ascended to heaven on a winged horse during the "Night Journey."

Najaf – Iraq: Burial place of Ali Ibn Abi Talib, the first Imam (leader) of the Shi'a, cousin and son in law of the Prophet Muhammad.

Karbala' – Iraq: Burial place of Husayn Ibn Ali, the third Imam of the Shi'a, and the grandson of the Prophet Muhammad.

The First Four Caliphs (Successors):

Abu Bakr 632-634.

Umar Ibn al-Khatab 634-644.

Uthman Ibn Affan 644-656.

Ali Ibn Abi Talib 656-661. Also the Prophet's first cousin and son-in-law. Founder of the Shi'a sect.

Two sects of Islam:

Sunna Constitutes the majority of Muslims from Morocco to Indonesia.

Shi'a Minority in most Muslim nations (a majority in Iran, Iraq and south Lebanon). Originally, the partisans of Ali and his descendants.

The five pillars of Sunni Islam:

Shahada Proclamation of faith: "I bear witness that there is no God but God and that Muhammad is His prophet."

Salat Prayer: Muslims are required to pray 5 times a day.

Zakat Charity: Muslims are required to donate 2.5 % of their annual wealth to the poor.

Sawm or Siam Fasting: Muslims are required to fast from dawn to dusk during the holy month of Ramadan for the purpose of atonement. Ramadan is the 9th month in the Islamic lunar year; it historically marks the time the Prophet Muhammad received the first divine revelations.

Hajj Pilgrimage: For those who can afford it, Muslims are required to make the pilgrimage to Mecca.

The holy texts of Islam:

The Qur'an The Recitation: What God revealed to the Prophet Muhammad via the archangel Gabriel. Muslims believe that the Qur'an is infallible and is literally the word of the God of Abraham, Moses and Jesus. (*Allah* is the Arabic word for God).

The Hadith The body of recorded deeds and sayings of the prophet Muhammad, who Muslims believe is the best example of human behavior. The foremost sources of hadith are known as "The Six Books," collections made in the 9th cent. AD and known individually by the names of their compilers: al-Bukhari, Muslim, Abu D'a'ud, al-Nasa'i, al-Tirmidhi and Ibn Maja.

The Akhbar The body of recorded deeds and sayings of the Shi'i Imams, which for the Shi'a are an additional source of law and doctrine not recognized by the Sunnis. There are many collections, the most comprehensive of which is the 110-volume, Bihar al-Anwar, compiled in the 17th Cent. AD. Shi'a and scholars (but not Sunni's) also sometimes refer to these as Hadith.

Major schools of law (madhhabs) in Sunni Islam:

Hanafi The oldest and most liberal madhhab, or school of Islamic jurisprudence (it is prevalent in the Levant and Central and South Asia).

Maliki The next oldest school of law (it is mainly prevalent in North and West Africa).

Shafi'i An attempt to combine both the Hanafi and Maliki schools of law (it is mainly prevalent in Egypt, Indonesia, Malaysia, Yemen and East Africa).

Hanbali The most conservative and rigid of all Muslim schools of law, it is the official legal tradition of Saudi Arabia and some of the other Gulf States.

Important Terminology:

“al- Islam huwa al-hal “Islam is the Solution,” the motto and slogan of Islamists everywhere.

al- Haras al- Thawri “Revolutionary Guards,” Arabic term for the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps.

Ansar Allies, originally refers to the allies of the Prophet Muhammad from Medina.

Coptic Christians The Christian population of Egypt, roughly 10% of the population.

Fatwa A legal opinion or judgment issued by a Muslim judge or legal scholar.

Halal Permissible

Haram Forbidden

Hijab Traditional Islamic veil and cover worn by women in some Muslim countries.

Hijra Migration, originally refers to the migration of the Prophet Muhammad and his companions from Mecca to Medina.

Ijtihad Learned thinking and re-interpretation of the Qur'an. Primarily refers to independent reasoning in the determination of Islamic law, a practice which is generally forbidden by the traditional schools of Sunni Islamic jurisprudence and embraced by Salafis and Wahhabis (as well as most Shi'a).

Imam Literally “leader,” has a number of usages. In Shi'i Islam, the Imams were successive descendents of Muhammad that the Shi'a believe were appointed to lead the community

and inspired by God with special religious knowledge and moral perfection. In Sunni usage, it can refer to the founders of the four schools of Islamic law (e.g., Imam al-Shafi'i), to particularly prominent religious scholars, or to the person who stands at the front of a mosque and leads the prayer.

Islamism A modern political ideology that advocates the creation of Islamic theocracies and works toward having Islamic laws (Shari'a) and customs play a primary role in the culture and politics of a society.

Jahiliyya lit. "Ignorance"; refers to Pre-Islamic Arabia and, in modern Islamist usage, to any un-Islamic society. Adjectival form is Jahili.

Jama'a Group

Jihad Struggle, also used to describe "holy war."

Kafir Infidel or nonbeliever; plural is Kuffar or Kafirun.

Levant The Eastern shores of the Mediterranean. The term often refers to Syria, Lebanon, Israel, Palestine and Jordan.

Maghreb Arabic for "the West," used to describe Morocco and parts of North Africa.

Mahdi The "gifted one," the last Shi'i Imam (leader). Also, an expected messianic figure in both Shiite and Sunni Islam.

Mufti A Muslim legal scholar, capable of issuing a Fatwa.

Mujahideen Those who participate in Jihad.

Muttawa Religious police who enforce adherence to Islamic code in some fundamentalist Islamic communities.

Pasdaran Persian for "Guards" (singular is Pasdar). The most common short hand term for the IRGC.

Sepah Persian and Urdu term, literally "Corps." In Persian, generally a short hand for the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps.

Shahada Literally "witnessing," refers both to martyrdom and to bearing witness to one's faith in Islam; in the latter case, one declares themselves Muslim by "saying the shahada," an Arabic phrase that translates as "I bear witness that there is no God but God and that Muhammad is His prophet."

Shahid A martyr or witness; a person who dies in battle for the defense of Islam. Plural is Shuhadaa'.

Shari'a Literally, law or code. The body of Islamic religious law and the associated corpus of legal interpretations.

Shura Consultation, originally a decision making process in Arab tribes and early Muslim history.

Sunna The example of the Prophet Muhammad or the customary practice.

Takfir Declaring someone to be a Kafir; excommunication. Radicals who deem many or most other Muslims to be infidels are sometimes referred to as Takfiris.

Taqlid The opposite of ijihad (independent legal reasoning), in practice it means the unquestioned imitation or following of tradition, past legal or doctrinal precedents, or religious leaders.

Tawhid Absolute monotheism or 'Oneness of God.' In Islamist usage, Tawhid implies God's exclusive prerogative of obedience from humanity, and hence the need for human governments to apply divine law (Shari'a).

Ulama Plural of 'Alim, an educated Muslim scholar. "The 'Ulama" usually refers to the class of religious professionals in Muslim societies, and is thus roughly equivalent to "the clergy."

Umma Muslim nation. Used with reference to the global Muslim community, irrespective of nationality or ethnicity.

Notable Militant Persons:

Ahmed Ibn Taymiyya 13th century Hanbali cleric and ideologue, issued the famous anti-Mongul fatwas. Considered by many as the most prominent militant Islamist thinker, Ibn Taymiyya's writings are borrowed extensively by modern Islamists.

Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahab 18th century Hanbali cleric and founder of the Wahabi ideology and movement.

Hassan al-Banna Founder of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt in 1929.

Taqi al-Din Ibrahim Yusuf al-Nabhan Founder of Hizb al-Tahrir al-Islami

Sayyid Qutb Former leader of the Muslim Brotherhood and arguably the most important Islamist thinker of the 20th century. Author of Ma'alim fi al-Tariq (Milestones), a prominent Jihadi manifesto.

Muhammad Abd al-Salam Faraj Founder of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad and author of Al-Faridah al-Ghaiba (the neglected duty), a prominent Jihadi manifesto.

Khalid al-Islambouli Assassin of Egyptian president Anwar Sadat and member of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad.

Sheikh Omar AbdulRahman Spiritual leader of numerous Egyptian Islamist organizations, currently imprisoned in the U.S. for his role in 1993 WTC bombing.

Karam Zohdi Founder of the Egyptian Jama`a al-Islamiya.

Shukri Mustafa Founder of al-Takfir wal-Hijra.

Usama Bin Laden (aka Abu Abdallah)- Founder and leader of al-Qaeda.

Sheikh Abdullah Azzam Co-founder of al-Qaeda and its predecessor organization, 'the Services Bureau', influential ideologue.

Ayman al-Zawahiri (aka Doctor Nur) – al-Qaeda's number 2; former leader in Egyptian Islamic Jihad.

Abu Ubaydah al-Banshiri (aka Amin Ali al-Rashidi) - Al-Qaeda's first military commander who died in May 1996 in Africa.

Muhammad Atef (aka Abu Hafez al-Masri) – Former head of al-Qaeda's military committee.

Muhammed Ibrahim Makkawi (aka Saif al-Adel) – Bin Laden's former security chief and leading trainer of top operatives including 9/11 hijackers and Africa Embassies bombers. Former deputy of Muhammad Atef; alleged head of al-Qaeda's military committee.

Abdullah Ahmed Abdullah (aka Abu Mohammed al-Masri) – Ran al-Qaeda's training camps in Afghanistan, including al-Faruq training camp near Kandahar.

Ahmed Fadl al-Khalayleh (aka Abu Musab al-Zarqawi) – Founder of al-Tawhid wal-Jihad and former al-Qaeda captain in Iraq.

Abu Hamza al-Muhajir (aka Abu Ayub al-Masri) – Leader of al-Qaeda in Iraq following the death of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi.

Sheikh Ahmed Yasin Founder and spiritual leader of Hamas.

Dr. Abd al-Aziz Rantisi Co-Founder of Hamas and second in command under Sheikh Ahmed Yasin. Leader of Hamas following the assassination of Sheikh Ahmed Yasin.

Khalid Meshaal Head of Hamas Politburo.

Ismail Haniyeh Prominent Hamas member in Gaza and current Palestinian Prime Minister

Mahmoud Zahar Hamas co-founder and current leader of Hamas in Gaza and the Palestinian Foreign Minister

Sheikh Hasan Nasrallah Secretary General of Hezbollah

Sheikh Subhi Tufeili Founder of Hezbollah and its first Secretary General.

Sayed Hussein Fadlallah Currently a Grand Ayatollah and founder and former spiritual leader of Hezbollah.