DECLARATION OF WILLIAM SWITZER, III

William Switzer, III, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746, declares as follows:

1. I am the Federal Security Director ("FSD") appointed by the Transportation Security Administration ("TSA") to oversee TSA’s operations at Lambert-St. Louis International Airport ("STL"). I have been the FSD at STL since August 2002 and an employee of TSA since July 2002. This Declaration is based on personal knowledge or knowledge gained in my official capacity.

2. Congress has directed that TSA take certain measures intended to preempt threats to air travel, including by searching passengers and their property before boarding. In response, TSA has established checkpoints for each terminal at STL at which passengers and their accessible property are screened so that no individual or item that represents a threat to airline security enters the “sterile area” of the airport where passengers board their flights.

3. In order to ensure that this screening occurs in a uniform, efficient, and courteous manner at each airport under TSA’s authority, TSA has implemented standard operating procedures ("SOP") and directives that are applicable to screening operations. As the FSD,
of my responsibility is to ensure – along with the Assistant FSD for Screening – that the appropriate TSA personnel at STL are aware of and adhere to these SOP, as well as any applicable directives regarding screening.

4. TSA has implemented a set of SOP that set forth the basic principles and processes that TSA personnel must follow when conducting pre-flight screening of passengers and property. Under these SOP, once a passenger has begun the screening process, that passenger cannot withdraw, and that if the screening of a passenger or his or her property cannot be completed, law enforcement must be summoned to resolve the issue.

5. There is also a companion set of SOP for personnel with management responsibility over the screening process, which build on the basic screening SOPs but provide further guidance and instruction. These SOP contemplate that Supervisory Transportation Security Officers ("STSO") and other personnel with management responsibility for the screening process will notify law enforcement at the airport when called for in any applicable TSA SOP, guidance, or directive.

6. TSA has issued Management Directive 100.4 ("MD 100.4") applicable to Transportation Security Searches. Paragraph 6(B)(4) of MD 100.4 directs that when screening personnel are “conducting an administrative or special needs search, the purpose of the search is to detect threat items or to determine compliance with TSA regulations,” and that any evidence of criminal activity that is discovered during such searches “shall be referred to a law enforcement officer for appropriate action.” A true and correct copy of MD 100.4, which went into effect on September 24, 2007, and was in effect at the time of the underlying facts in this case, is appended to this Declaration as Attachment 1.
7. MD 100.4 was revised on September 1, 2009. A true and correct copy of MD 100.4 in its current form is appended to this Declaration as Attachment 2.

8. TSA has also issued Operations Directive 400-54-2 ("OD 400-54-2"), entitled "Discovery of Contraband During Screening." OD 400-54-2 states that when certain types of items are discovered incidental to the screening process, such discoveries should be referred to local law enforcement as appropriate. OD 400-54-2 lists three examples, including large amounts of cash. A true and correct copy of OD 400-54-2, which has been in effect since May 9, 2005, is appended to this Declaration as Attachment 3.

9. By law, TSA is also required to establish an air transportation security agreement ("ASP") with each airport operator. These ASPs address a number of issues related to TSA's presence at the airport, and must include a provision that ensures that there will be a law enforcement presence and capability at each airport that is adequate to ensure the safety of the traveling public.

10. Under the ASP for STL, this law enforcement presence is provided by the St. Louis Airport Police Department. The Airport Police Department is a Missouri law enforcement entity that has no formal affiliation with TSA, and no connection to TSA beyond the ASP. The Airport Police Department is not deputized to perform federal law enforcement functions for TSA.

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Executed on September 4, 2009.
St. Louis, Missouri

[Signature]

William Switzer, III
Attachment 1
To enhance mission performance, TSA is committed to promoting a culture founded on its values of Integrity, Innovation and Team Spirit.

1. PURPOSE: This directive establishes TSA policy and procedures for searches to prevent, prepare for, protect against, or respond to acts of terrorism and to protect persons, facilities, and critical infrastructure in all modes of transportation. The policy and procedures in this directive help to ensure that these searches meet constitutional requirements.

2. SCOPE: This directive applies to TSA components that conduct, direct, or participate in transportation security searches, including administrative and special needs searches, consent searches, and searches by law enforcement officers, as warranted.

3. AUTHORITIES:
   A. 6 U.S.C. § 1112
   B. 49 U.S.C. § 114
   C. 49 U.S.C. § 44901
   D. 49 U.S.C. § 44903
   E. 49 U.S.C. § 44917
   F. 49 CFR Chapter XII

4. DEFINITIONS:
   A. Administrative Search: A search conducted as part of a general regulatory plan in furtherance of a specified government purpose, such as to determine compliance with TSA regulations or to prevent the carrying of weapons or explosives on board an aircraft.

   B. Aviation Direct Access Screening Program (ADASP): TSA screening of persons, their accessible property, and vehicles as they enter or are present within a secured area, sterile area, or Air Operations Area of an airport at a location other than the passenger screening checkpoint.

   C. Behavior Detection Officers (BDOs): TSA personnel who execute TSA’s Screening Passengers by Observation Technique (SPOT) Program, which identifies potentially high-risk individuals based on physical and psychological reactions.

   D. Consent Search: A search of a person, property, location, or vehicle based on permission.

Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (Public Law 110-53, 121 Stat. 266). FAMs are TSA law enforcement officers that detect, deter, and defeat terrorist or other hostile criminal acts targeting the Nation’s transportation systems.

F. **Gate Screening**: The search of passengers and their accessible property at the boarding gate of an aircraft.

G. **Law Enforcement Officer**: A sworn employee of a Federal, state or local government entity with power of arrest, who is trained and commissioned to enforce the criminal laws of the jurisdiction(s) in which he or she is commissioned.

H. **Reverse Screening**: Post-flight search of passengers, accessible property, and luggage conducted after the aircraft has reached its destination and before passengers or baggage are permitted to re-enter the sterile area of an airport.

I. **Random Selection Protocol**: A protocol used during an administrative or special needs search to select which persons, property, or vehicles will be searched.

J. **Regulatory Inspection**: An administrative or special needs search, or other examination to determine compliance with TSA regulations and orders, which may include inspection of records, property, and premises of a regulated party.

K. **Screening**: The search of individuals and property in or around an airport, mass transit location, or other transportation venue for the purpose of detecting threat item(s) and deterring acts of terrorism.

L. **Special Needs Search**: A search conducted without a warrant and in furtherance of a special governmental need, beyond the ordinary needs of law enforcement. In the context of transportation security, special needs searches are designed to mitigate the risk to the public posed by the introduction of threat items into the national transportation system.

M. **Threat Item**: An explosive, incendiary, weapon or other destructive substance that may pose a threat to transportation security. The types of items that are characterized as threat items may vary depending on risk factors such as the mode of transportation, the proximity to the conveyance or transportation facility, or the lethality of the item. Prohibited items and items of interest as identified in TSA aviation screening programs are subsets of threat items.

N. **Transportation Security Inspector (TSI)**: Specially trained TSA employee who conducts security assessments of transportation systems, works with transit officials to enhance the security of their systems, provides technical assistance for security, and conducts inspections to determine compliance with TSA regulations and orders.

O. **Transportation Security Officer (TSO)**: An individual who is trained, certified, and authorized in accordance with applicable TSA standards and directives to inspect individuals, accessible property, and/or checked baggage for the presence of explosives, incendiaries, weapons, or other prohibited items.
P. **Transportation Venue:** A building, structure or location that facilitates the movement of passengers or goods in the transportation sector.

Q. **TSA Law Enforcement Officer:** A law enforcement officer who derives his or her authority from 49 U.S.C. § 114(q), and whose authority includes, but is not limited to: carrying a firearm; making arrests without a warrant for any offense against the United States committed in the officer's presence, or for any felony cognizable under the laws of the United States if there is probable cause to believe that the person to be arrested has committed or is committing the felony; and seeking and executing warrants for arrest or seizure of evidence issued under the authority of the United States upon probable cause that a violation has been committed.

R. **Vehicle Screening:** An administrative or special needs search of vehicles for the purpose of detecting and deterring the introduction of explosives, weapons, or other threat items into a transportation venue.

S. **Visible Intermodal Prevention and Response (VIPR) Program:** TSA’s deployment of specialized teams to augment the security of any mode of transportation.

**NOTE:** VIPR teams may comprise any asset of DHS, including, but not limited to: FAMs, TSIs, canine detection teams, and advanced screening technology.

5. **RESPONSIBILITIES:** All offices and individuals responsible for establishing and implementing programs and procedures involving searches should ensure that searches are conducted in accordance with this directive and other applicable law and policy.

A. Office of Security Operations (OSO) is responsible for:

   (1) General oversight and training of Federal Security Directors (FSDs), BDOs, TSIs and TSOs.

   (2) Drafting procedures for screening operations and policies for regulatory inspections that are consistent with this directive.

   (3) Ensuring that OSO personnel receive appropriate training to carry out this directive.

B. Office of Law Enforcement/Federal Air Marshal Service (OLE/FAMS) is responsible for:

   (1) General oversight and training of FAMs, Bomb Appraisal Officers, Explosive Security Specialists, National Explosive Detection Canine Teams, and Assistant FSDs for Law Enforcement.

   (2) Drafting procedures for OLE/FAMS operations that are consistent with this directive.

   (3) Ensuring that OLE/FAMS personnel receive appropriate training to carry out this directive.

   (4) Planning, coordinating and deploying VIPR assets as designated TSA facilitator of the Joint Coordination Center.
C. FSDs are responsible for:

(1) Ensuring that all searches conducted by OSO personnel under his or her leadership are in accordance with this directive.

(2) Ensuring that all searches conducted by OSO personnel under his or her leadership are in accordance with TSA Standard Operating Procedures and policies for regulatory inspections.

D. OLE/FAMS Special Agents in Charge (SACs) are responsible for ensuring that all searches conducted by FAMs and Assistant FSDs for Law Enforcement under his or her leadership are in accordance with OLE/FAMS authorities, protocols and this directive.

E. Joint Coordination Center (JCC) is responsible for:

(1) General oversight of the VIPR Program.

(2) Coordination and development of guidelines for VIPR operations.

(3) Monitoring active VIPR deployments.

(4) Ensuring that VIPR operations plans are distributed to all appropriate TSA components for review.

F. Office of Intelligence is responsible for:

(1) Providing information and guidance to assist in the identification of current threats and vulnerabilities that may form a predicate for searches.

(2) Providing risk analysis to assist in making search determinations.

G. Office of Chief Counsel (OCC) is responsible for:


(2) Providing legal advice and guidance on issues related to searches.

H. VIPR Team Leaders are responsible for:

(1) On-site supervision of all VIPR operations.

(2) Ensuring that all searches conducted during VIPR operations are in accordance with this Directive and approved operations plans, as applicable.

(3) Ensuring that all VIPR team members understand their responsibility and authority during the VIPR operation, and have appropriate guidance to carry out VIPR operations.
6. **POLICY:** TSA intends that TSA personnel use and implement this directive in carrying out their functions. Nothing in this directive is intended to create any substantive or procedural rights, privileges, or benefits enforceable in any administrative, civil, or criminal matter.

A. General: TSA will conduct searches in all modes of transportation for the purpose of countering threats targeting transportation systems in the United States. Intelligence reports indicate that Al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups continue to develop plans for multiple attacks against transportation systems. Recent successful, coordinated bombing attacks aimed at incurring mass casualties in various transportation systems have occurred in Glasgow, Madrid, London, and Mumbai, and numerous smaller attacks have taken place around the world over the past several years. Terrorist groups continue to pursue a range of targets, tactics, and capabilities to accomplish their objectives.

(1) Searches may vary with the mode of transportation and the security requirements of the conveyance or transportation venue. Risk analysis and operational and strategic intelligence may provide guidance in making search determinations.

(2) Types of searches will include administrative and special needs searches, consent searches, and other searches consistent with the Fourth Amendment. Searches will be conducted to:

(a) enhance the security of persons and critical infrastructure;

(b) prevent, prepare for, protect against, and respond to acts of terrorism;

(c) determine compliance with transportation regulations; or

(d) augment the security of any mode of transportation at any location.

(3) Searches may be conducted by TSA personnel or at the direction of TSA, and may be initiated by TSA Headquarters or local TSA officials. TSA will consult and coordinate with Federal, state, and local law enforcement officials, as well as affected transportation entities, as appropriate, when conducting search operations.

(4) Appropriate TSA managers, in consultation with OCC, shall establish procedures under which searches will be conducted in various transportation venues.

B. Special Needs and Administrative Searches:

(1) The decision to conduct an administrative or special needs search at a specific transportation venue may be based on or pursuant to:

(a) Considerations such as threat level, intelligence, overlapping coverage provided by other layers of security, fluctuations in passenger volume, and available staff.

(b) TSA policies on conducting regulatory inspections.
NOTE: To incorporate unpredictability and enhance deterrence, search locations may be switched or the number, staffing, and scheduling of locations may vary so that deployment patterns are shifting and difficult to predict.

(2) All administrative or special needs searches are to be tailored to the transportation security purpose for which they are conducted. These searches should be designed to be minimally intrusive, in that they should be no more intensive or extensive than reasonably necessary to detect threat items or to determine compliance with TSA regulations.

(3) All administrative or special needs searches should be conducted according to established procedures to ensure that the searches will be confined in good faith to their intended purpose.

(4) When conducting an administrative or special needs search, the purpose of the search is to detect threat items or to determine compliance with TSA regulations. Evidence of crimes shall be referred to a law enforcement officer for appropriate action.

(5) During screening operations where some, but not all, persons or vehicles will be searched, a random selection protocol should be used to ensure that selection authority is not arbitrarily exercised. The random selection protocol should be determined in advance and recorded, but may be designed to change at unpublished predetermined intervals to incorporate unpredictability.

(6) To the extent that it is reasonable, notice should be provided to persons who will be subject to search.

(a) For screening operations, the notice should be provided in such a manner as to allow persons the opportunity to avoid the search by choosing not to enter the location.

(b) If practicable, TSA should seek the cooperation of airport, aircraft, mass transit, and other transportation operators to place notice on websites in addition to notice provided prior to the physical location of the search.

(7) Persons wishing to board a conveyance or enter a transportation venue may be subject to an administrative or special needs search.

(a) Once the search has begun, persons may not withdraw from the search and may be detained for a reasonable amount of time for the purpose of completing the search.

(b) Persons who refuse to submit to search may be denied boarding or entry into the transportation venue. Denial of boarding may require the cooperation of the transportation operator.

(8) Examples of administrative or special needs searches include:

(a) ADASP;
(b) gate screening;
(c) regulatory inspections;
(d) reverse screening; and
(e) vehicle screening.

(9) With appropriate training, any TSA personnel, including TSOs and TSIs, may conduct an administrative or special needs search.

C. Consent Searches: Unlike an administrative or special needs search, the scope of a consent search will depend on the scope of the permission given by the individual, and a person may not be denied access or boarding to the transportation venue based solely on a refusal or withdrawal of consent to a search.

(1) A search of a person, property, vehicle, or location based on consent may be conducted in any transportation venue.

(2) Persons may decline to be searched or withdraw consent at any time.

(3) With appropriate training, any TSA personnel, including TSOs and TSIs, may conduct a consent search.

D. Law Enforcement Searches:

(1) TSA law enforcement officers may engage in law enforcement activities consistent with established authorities and protocols. This directive does not and is not intended to limit the authority of TSA law enforcement officers.

(2) Law enforcement activities may include investigations, detentions, and searches, as appropriate, and are not limited to administrative or special needs searches. This directive does not and is not intended to explain or define the variety of law enforcement searches that may be conducted.

(3) The only TSA personnel who should engage in law enforcement activities are TSA law enforcement officers.

7. PROCEDURES:

A. All searches should be conducted in accordance with Federal law and this directive.

B. Before conducting an administrative or special needs search, guidelines for the search should be established.

C. All procedures and guidelines should be reviewed by OCC prior to implementation of the procedures or guidelines.
D. When designing or conducting an administrative or special needs search, the following points should be addressed, if applicable:

(1) How the search is intended to enhance the security of persons and critical infrastructure, to augment the security of any mode of transportation, or to ensure compliance with TSA regulations.

(2) The threat item(s) that are the target of the search.

(3) How persons are given notice of the search.

(4) The procedures used to detect or deter the introduction of the designated threat item(s).

(5) How the search procedures are tailored to protect personal privacy.

(6) The applicable random selection protocol, unless all persons and/or vehicles that pass through the location will be searched.

8. EFFECTIVE DATE AND IMPLEMENTATION: This policy is effective immediately upon signature.

APPROVAL

Kip Hawley
Assistant Secretary

Filing Instructions: File 200.1.1
Effective Date: Date of Signature
Review Date: Two years from Effective Date
Distribution: Offices of Chief Counsel, Inspection, Intelligence, Law Enforcement/Federal Air Marshal Service, Security Operations and all Federal Security Directors and Special Agents in Charge

Point-of-Contact: Office of Chief Counsel, (571) 227-2681/2702
To enhance mission performance, TSA is committed to promoting a culture founded on its values of Integrity, Innovation and Team Spirit.

REVISION: This revised directive supersedes TSA MD 100.4, Transportation Security Searches, dated September 24, 2007.

SUMMARY OF CHANGES: Section 4, Definitions, clarifies and adds terms; and Section 5, Policy, addresses discovery of currency and illegal items, explains authority to verify identity, and discusses layered security.

1. PURPOSE: This directive establishes certain TSA policies to prevent, protect against, or respond to acts of terrorism and to protect persons, facilities, and critical infrastructure as part of a layered security system in all modes of transportation. Among other situations, it applies to checkpoint screening to find explosives, incendiaries, weapons or other items and to screening to ensure that an individual’s identity is appropriately verified and checked against government watch lists.

2. SCOPE: This directive applies to TSA operational components.

3. AUTHORITIES:
   A. 6 U.S.C. § 1112
   B. 49 U.S.C. § 114
   C. 49 U.S.C. § 44901
   D. 49 U.S.C. § 44903
   E. 49 U.S.C. § 44917
   F. 49 CFR Chapter XII, Parts 1500-1699
   G. Prohibited Items Interpretive Rule, 70 FR 72930 (Dec. 8, 2005)

4. DEFINITIONS: For purposes of this directive, the following definitions apply:
   A. Additional Screening: Secondary screening conducted to detect potential threats or risks or any particular substance, attribute, person, or undesirable material.
   B. Administrative Search: A search conducted as part of a regulatory plan in furtherance of a specified non-law enforcement government purpose, such as to determine compliance with TSA regulations or to prevent the carriage of threat items or entry of an unauthorized person into the sterile area or on board an aircraft.
   C. Accessible Property: Property that is intended to be accessible to the individual in the secured area, sterile area, or Air Operations Area of an airport or in the cabin of an aircraft.
D. **Aviation Direct Access Screening Program (ADASP) Playbook Screening:** TSA screening of persons, their accessible property, and vehicles as they enter or are present within a secured area, sterile area, or Air Operations Area of an airport.

E. **Behavior Detection Officers (BDOs):** Specially-trained TSA personnel who execute TSA’s Screening of Passengers by Observation Technique (SPOT) Program.

F. **Checkpoint Screening:** A screening of individuals and property for threats at the screening checkpoint.

G. **Consent Search:** A search of a person, property, location, or vehicle based on permission.

H. **Detection Technology:** Electronic and/or mechanical means used to assist in the discovery and identification of property or persons that may pose a threat.


J. **Gate Screening:** The screening of passengers and their accessible property at the boarding gate of an aircraft.

K. **Identification Media:** Documents that establish identity for the purposes of accessing the screening checkpoint. Identification media includes, but is not limited to, Government-issued photo identification such as passports and driver’s licenses as listed at [www.tsa.gov](http://www.tsa.gov). In accordance with TSA standard operating procedures, other documents, such as a school identification or library card may serve as identification media where the individual presents two such documents, which both bear the individual’s name, and one of which also includes the individual’s photo, address, phone number, date of birth or gender.

L. **Law Enforcement Officer:** A sworn employee of a Federal, state, tribal, territorial or local government entity with power of arrest, who is trained and commissioned to enforce the criminal laws of the jurisdiction(s) in which he or she is commissioned.


N. **Prohibited items:** Items that are not permitted to be carried by passengers and non-traveling individuals through the screening checkpoint, in the sterile area, in the cabin of an aircraft, or in checked baggage, as described in the prohibited items interpretive rule (70 FR 72930 (Dec. 8, 2005)) or other TSA regulations, orders, and policies.

O. **Random Selection Protocol:** A protocol that uses a random number generator or other neutral system to select which persons, property, or vehicles will be screened during an administrative or special needs search. Use of a random selection protocol helps to ensure that selection authority is not arbitrarily exercised.
P. **Regulatory Inspection:** Inspection or test to determine compliance with TSA regulations, security programs, orders, policies, and applicable laws.

Q. **Reverse Screening:** Post-flight screening of passengers, accessible property, and luggage conducted after the aircraft has reached its destination and before passengers or baggage are permitted to re-enter the sterile area of an airport.

R. **Searches:** Examinations consistent with the Fourth Amendment that include administrative and special needs searches, consent searches, and law enforcement searches.

S. **Screening:** A physical or visible inspection or appraisal of a person, place, document or thing, with or without assisting technologies, to determine compliance with TSA standards, regulations and applicable laws and to detect a threat.

T. **Screening Checkpoint:** A screening location at the entry to a sterile area or other transportation area defined by TSA regulations, polices and procedures.

U. **Screening of Passengers by Observation Technique (SPOT):** A program that identifies potentially high-risk individuals based on behavioral cues.

V. **Special Needs Search:** A search conducted without a warrant and in furtherance of a special governmental need, beyond the ordinary needs of law enforcement. In the context of transportation security, special needs searches are designed to mitigate the risk to the public posed by the introduction of threat items or entrance of an unauthorized person into the transportation system.

W. **Threat:** A natural or man-made situation, individual, entity, or action that has or indicates the potential to harm life, information, operations, the environment and/or property.

X. **Threat Items:** Includes, but are not limited to, prohibited items such as explosives, incendiaries and weapons. Threat items may include items that are themselves benign, but that can be rapidly transformed into a security risk, such as parts of weapons or explosives, and certain liquids and gels. Threat items may also be benign items that cannot be effectively and rapidly distinguished from dangerous items (e.g., water from certain liquid explosive; or an ordinary laptop from an electronic triggering device) or items that on their face appear to be threat items, such as imitation firearms or grenades. In addition, threat items may also include items that can be used or altered to conceal other threats or prohibited items, such as thermos bottles and certain electronics.

Y. **Transportation Security Inspector (TSI):** Specially-trained TSA employee who conducts security assessments of transportation systems, works with transit officials to enhance the security of their systems, provides technical assistance for security, and conducts regulatory inspections.

Z. **Transportation Security Officer (TSO):** An individual who is trained, certified, and authorized in accordance with applicable TSA standards and directives to inspect individuals, accessible property, identification documents and/or checked baggage for threats.

AA. **Transportation Venue:** A building, structure, or location that facilitates the movement of passengers or goods in the transportation system.
BB. **Travel Document Checker:** A specially-trained TSA employee who conducts checks of travel documents and verification of identification for individuals desiring access to the screening checkpoint.

CC. **TSA Law Enforcement Officer:** A law enforcement officer who derives his or her authority from 49 U.S.C. § 114(p), and whose authority includes, but is not limited to, carrying a firearm; making arrests without a warrant for any offense against the United States committed in the officer’s presence, or for any felony cognizable under the laws of the United States if there is probable cause to believe that the person to be arrested has committed or is committing the felony; and seeking and executing warrants for arrest or seizure of evidence issued under the authority of the United States upon probable cause that a violation has been committed.

DD. **Visible Intermodal Prevention and Response (VIPR) Program:** TSA’s deployment of specialized teams to augment the security of any mode of transportation. VIPR teams may comprise any asset of DHS, including, FAMs, TSIs, canine detection teams, and detection technology.

5. **RESPONSIBILITIES:** All offices and individuals responsible for establishing and implementing programs and procedures involving searches should ensure that searches are conducted in accordance with this directive and other applicable law and policy.

A. Office of Security Operations (OSO) is responsible for:

1. General oversight and training of Federal Security Directors (FSDs), BDOs, Bomb Appraisal Officers, Explosives Security Specialists, TSIs and TSOs.
2. Drafting procedures for operations that are consistent with this directive.
3. Ensuring that OSO personnel receive appropriate training to carry out this directive.
4. Coordinating with the Joint Coordination Center.

B. Office of Law Enforcement/Federal Air Marshal Service (OLE/FAMS) is responsible for:

1. General oversight and training of FAMs, National Explosives Detection Canine Teams, and Assistant FSDs for Law Enforcement.
2. Drafting procedures for OLE/FAMS operations that are consistent with this directive.
3. Ensuring that OLE/FAMS personnel receive appropriate training to carry out this directive.
4. Planning, coordinating and deploying VIPR assets as designated TSA facilitator of the Joint Coordination Center.

C. FSDs are responsible for:

1. Ensuring that all searches conducted by OSO personnel under his or her leadership are in accordance with this directive.
(2) Ensuring that all searches conducted by OSO personnel under his or her leadership are in accordance with this directive and all other applicable laws and policy including TSA Standard Operating Procedures and policies for regulatory inspections.

D. OLE/FAMS Special Agents in Charge (SACs) are responsible for ensuring that all searches conducted by FAMs and Assistant FSDs for Law Enforcement under his or her leadership are in accordance with OLE/FAMS authorities, protocols and this directive.

E. Joint Coordination Center (JCC) is responsible for:
   (1) General oversight of the VIPR Program.
   (2) Coordination and development of guidelines for VIPR operations with other TSA components.
   (3) Monitoring active VIPR deployments.
   (4) Ensuring that VIPR operations plans are distributed to all appropriate TSA components for review.

F. Office of Intelligence is responsible for:
   (1) Providing information and guidance to assist in the identification of current threats and vulnerabilities that may form a predicate for searches.
   (2) Providing risk analysis to assist in making search determinations.

G. Office of Chief Counsel (OCC) is responsible for:
   (1) Reviewing Operations Plans, Standard Operating Procedures, Security Directives, TSA regulations, and other policies and plans to help ensure compliance with legal requirements.
   (2) Providing legal advice and guidance on issues related to searches.

H. VIPR Team Leaders are responsible for:
   (1) On-site supervision of all VIPR operations.
   (2) Ensuring that all searches conducted during VIPR operations are in accordance with this directive and approved operations plans, as applicable.
   (3) Ensuring that all VIPR team members understand their responsibility and authority during the VIPR operation, and have appropriate guidance to carry out VIPR operations.

6. POLICY: TSA personnel must use this directive in carrying out their functions. Nothing in this directive is intended to create any substantive or procedural rights, privileges, or benefits enforceable in any administrative, civil, or criminal matter.

A. General: Intelligence reports indicate that Al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups continue to develop plans for multiple attacks against transportation systems. Successful, coordinated bombing attacks aimed at incurring mass casualties in various transportation systems have
occurred. Terrorist groups continue to pursue a range of targets, tactics, and capabilities to accomplish their objectives.

(1) Screening and searches may be conducted by TSA personnel or at the direction of TSA, and may be initiated by TSA Headquarters or local TSA officials. TSA will consult and coordinate with Federal, state, and local law enforcement officials, as well as affected transportation entities, as appropriate, when conducting these operations. Risk analysis and operational and strategic intelligence may provide guidance in executing appropriate screening and security measures.

(2) TSA’s layered security strategy includes an overlapping system of screening and searches. No single security measure or method is sufficiently reliable to be depended upon in isolation. For this reason, screening and search techniques are not limited to circumstances where detection technology is unavailable or has indicated a potential threat.

(3) Screening may include examination of individuals and all contents of accessible property, including, but not limited to, containers, compartments, and envelopes. Screening may be conducted for the purpose of finding threat items or identification media, as appropriate.

(4) Screening may not be conducted to detect evidence of crimes unrelated to transportation security. However, if such evidence is discovered, TSA shall refer it to a supervisor or a law enforcement official for appropriate action. This report satisfies a TSA employee’s obligation to report known or suspected violations of federal law. (ref: TSA MD 106.73-5, Employee Responsibilities and Conduct, Section 5A(9)). Although an individual may be requested to wait until law enforcement arrives, he or she is free to leave the checkpoint once applicable screening requirements have been completed successfully. TSA officers should complete an Incident Report whenever law enforcement is notified. Examples of ordinary criminal wrongdoing include possession of illegal drugs and child pornography, and money laundering (i.e., transferring illegally gained money through legitimate channels so that its illegal source is untraceable).

(5) Traveling with large amounts of currency is not illegal. Sometimes currency discovered at the checkpoint will need to be examined to clear it to enter the sterile areas (or other secured areas). As a general matter, there should be no reason to ask questions of the passenger about currency, although there may be times when questions are warranted by security needs. When currency appears to be indicative of criminal activity, TSA may report the matter to the appropriate authorities. For all flights, factors indicating that cash is related to criminal activity include the quantity, packaging, circumstances of discovery, or method by which the cash is carried, including concealment. For international flights, currency that exceeds $10,000 may not be transported into or out of the United States unless it has been reported to Customs and Border Protection (CBP). TSA may notify CBP and/or law enforcement authorities pursuant to its standard operating procedures that the individual possesses a sum of currency. TSA may also note any factors related to criminal activity for purposes of notifying CBP and/or law enforcement, as well as request that the individual remain accessible pursuant to such notification.

(6) Prior to entering the sterile area, individuals seeking access to the screening checkpoint must have their identity verified by the Travel Document Checker. Once screening at the checkpoint has begun, as a policy matter, TSA may screen an individual’s accessible
property for identification media under two circumstances: according to the standard operating procedures for the SPOT program; and when TSA is already screening the accessible property to resolve an alarm or for another appropriate reason (e.g., as a result of a random selection protocol for screening accessible property). The purpose of screening for identification media is to re-verify that the individual's identity has been matched against government watch lists, thus adding an additional layer of security to the initial check performed by the Travel Document Checker. An individual in possession of multiple forms of identifications reflecting different names or dates of birth may have an identity that has not been checked against the watch lists. Whenever such items are discovered, the new identities should be checked against the No Fly and Selectee lists.

B. Special Needs and Administrative Searches:

(1) The decision to conduct an administrative or special needs search at a specific transportation venue may be based on or pursuant to:

(a) Considerations such as threat level, intelligence, overlapping coverage provided by other layers of security, fluctuations in passenger volume, and available staff.

(b) TSA policies on conducting regulatory inspections.

(2) All administrative or special needs searches are to be tailored to the transportation security purpose for which they are conducted. These searches should be designed to be minimally intrusive, in that they should be no more intensive or extensive than reasonably necessary to detect threat items, to prevent persons who may pose a threat to transportation security from entering the transportation system, or to determine compliance with TSA standards, regulations and applicable laws.

(3) Examples of administrative or special needs searches include:

(a) ADASP/Playbook Screening;

(b) Gate screenings;

(c) Checkpoint screening;

(d) Regulatory inspections;

(e) Reverse screening; and

(f) Vehicle screening.

(4) All administrative or special needs searches should be conducted according to established procedures to ensure that the searches will be confined in good faith to their intended purpose. When designing or conducting an administrative or special needs search, the following objectives should be addressed, if applicable:

(a) How the search is intended to enhance the security of persons and critical infrastructure, to augment the security of any mode of transportation, or to ensure compliance with TSA regulations;
(b) The threat item(s) that are the target of the search, or the regulation or order for regulatory inspection in the case of regulatory inspection;

(c) The manner in which persons are given notice of the search;

(d) The procedures used to detect or deter the introduction of the designated threat item(s), to conduct regulatory inspections, or to determine whether an individual is using multiple names or dates of birth which may need to be checked against government watch lists;

(e) How the search procedures are tailored to protect personal privacy; and

(f) The applicable random selection protocol, unless all persons and/or vehicles that pass through the location will be searched.

(5) Before conducting an administrative or special needs search, standard operating procedures and deployment operations plans should be developed in consultation with OCC, if practical.

(6) To incorporate unpredictability and enhance deterrence, search locations may be switched or the number, staffing, and scheduling of locations may vary so that deployment patterns are shifting and difficult to predict.

(7) To the extent that it is possible, notice should be provided to persons who will be subject to search.

(a) The notice should be provided in such a manner as to allow persons the opportunity to avoid the search by choosing not to enter the location.

(b) TSA may seek the cooperation of airport, aircraft, mass transit, or other transportation operators to place notice on websites in addition to notice provided prior to entry into the physical location of the search.

(8) With appropriate training, any TSA personnel, including TSOs and TSIs, may conduct an administrative or special needs search.

(9) An individual submits to screening to verify his or her identity when he or she produces identification media to TSA or an alternative verification process is requested. This normally occurs at the Travel Document Checker podium in front of the checkpoint. Once TSA has verified the individual’s identity and has determined that the identification is not fraudulent, the individual is free to proceed to the checkpoint or to exit the queue. At the checkpoint, an individual submits to screening of his or her person when he or she enters the first walk-through screening technology or requests special screening. An individual submits to screening of his or her accessible property when he or she places it on the conveyor belt leading to the x-ray machine. Individuals who have completed the process of screening of their persons or accessible property are free to leave the checkpoint and the sterile area.
C. Consent Searches: Unlike an administrative or special needs search, the scope of a consent search will depend on the scope of the permission given by the individual, and a person may not be denied access or boarding to the transportation venue based solely on a refusal or withdrawal of consent to a search.

(1) A search of a person, property, vehicle, or location based on consent may be conducted in any transportation venue.

(2) Persons may decline to be searched or withdraw consent at any time.

(3) With appropriate training, any TSA personnel, including TSOs and TSIs, may conduct a consent search.

D. Law Enforcement Searches:

(1) TSA law enforcement officers may engage in law enforcement activities consistent with established authorities and protocols. This directive does not and is not intended to limit the authority of TSA law enforcement officers.

(2) Law enforcement activities may include investigations, detentions, and searches, as appropriate, and are not limited to administrative or special needs searches. This directive does not and is not intended to explain or define the variety of law enforcement searches that may be conducted.

(3) The only TSA personnel who should engage in law enforcement activities are TSA law enforcement officers (e.g., Office of Inspection Criminal Investigator or FAMr conducting investigations pursuant to their authority under 49 U.S.C. § 114(p)).

7. PROCEDURES: All screening, searches and regulatory inspection should be conducted in accordance with this directive and other applicable laws and policy.

8. EFFECTIVE DATE AND IMPLEMENTATION: This policy is effective immediately upon signature.

APPROVAL

[Signature]
Gale Rossides
Acting Assistant Secretary

[Date]


Point-of-Contact: Office of Chief Counsel, (571) 227-2681/2702
Attachment 3
Operations Directive

OD-400-54-2: Discovery of Contraband During the Screening Process

Expiration: Indefinite

Summary

This directive provides guidance to ensure nationwide consistency in the appropriate referral or initiation of civil enforcement actions for incidents involving discovery of contraband during TSA screening procedures.

Procedures

When TSA discovers contraband during the screening process that is not a TSA Prohibited Item, the matter should be referred to the local Law Enforcement Officers as appropriate. An Enforcement Investigative Report should not be initiated.

Examples of such contraband include:

- Illegal drugs
- Drug paraphernalia
- Large amounts of cash ($10,000)

Point of Contact

Kimberley Siro, Office of Compliance, (571) 227-2224 (work), (202) 302-7487 (cell), or email to avopsinsp@dhs.gov.

/s/
Jonathan J. Fleming
Chief Operating Officer