RELEASE IN PART B5

Analysis of Violent Extremism in Cameroon

I. Summary

Cameroon experienced a rapid rise in violent extremism and violent extremist attacks within the past three years. Since 2014, there have been over 200 attacks in Cameroon attributed to Boko Haram alone. These have resulted in over 2,600 fatalities, with the Far North impacted the most. Despite this recent rise, the number of adherents in Cameroon to violent extremist ideologies remains limited. Boko Haram recruitment has netted only a small number of individuals through coercion, economic incentives, ethnic ties, and ideology. The severity and frequency of Boko Haram attacks in Cameroon have also recently declined since a wave of deadly attacks in January of this year. Increased regional military cooperation between Nigerian and Cameroonian forces has yielded more effective military operations. Military pressure within Nigeria on Boko strongholds and internal challenges within the organization have also contributed to the reduced number of attacks. Boko Haram also appears to be changing the scale and nature of its attacks. Security forces are now intercepting alleged suicide bombers and are encountering IEDs – a particular threat to civilians.

Despite the gains against Boko Haram, Cameroon still faces challenges and violent extremism risk. These include both country-specific and globally-known risks of violent extremism. A recent study designed to estimate a quantitative change in the number of terrorist attacks over time projects a substantial increase in risk this year.

Environmental factors such as endemic corruption and human rights abuses by security forces could be contributing to increased support for violent extremism, particularly in communities in northern Cameroon. Economic and political disparities demarcate the north from the south in Cameroon. The northern part of the nation is significantly poorer and less represented in the national power structures. There is also a religious division between the more Muslim North and Christian South. Fortunately, the economic disparities are thus far mainly framed along regional rather than religious lines, but this could change. Other risks factors that may be contributing to an increased risk of risk of violent extremism include real and perceived political and economic marginalization for certain ethnic groups, a rise in supremacist Islamic ideology in the South and the targeting of traditional Sufi Islam leaders and locales in the North. There is also a perception of government as primarily predatory rather than supportive of civilian population.

More research is needed to better discern more specific areas within these broad risk indicators to target for intervention. In particular, more research is needed to understand why risk some indicators seem to exist across many environments, but violent extremism itself is not seen emerging in all places these indicators exist.

II. Methodology and Approach

The following desk-based analysis led by the Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations (CSO) combines both qualitative and quantitative methods to identify a set of factors or

dynamics that are relevant to violent extremism in Cameroon and help prioritize programmatic and diplomatic efforts in 2016 and 2017. To the extent feasible given available data and information, the assessment tries to examine different key facets of violent extremism including: i) factors driving the creation or emergence of new violent extremist organizations (VEOs) which can include existing groups that are not considered VEOs but evolve to adopt more extreme tactics or ideology; ii) factors driving the expansion of existing VEOs; iii) escalation of VEO activity; iv) factors that drive individuals and communities to be supportive (for tactical, strategic or ideological reason) of violent extremism (as a concept) or specific VEOs themselves; and v) factors related to the flow of foreign fighters. A number of analytical tools and products were used to assess the environment and generate these findings in support of the FY16 Counterterrorism Partnership Fund (CTPF) process. These include:

Risk Factors – Trends and Projections

- An extensive review of the academic literature on violent extremism and empirical studies conducted by CSO Advanced Analytics to examine factors that consistently appeared as potential drivers of violent extremism;[1]
- A review of existing country-specific reports and assessments conducted by the Department of State and USAID;[2]
- Consultations with State Department and other regional and thematic experts, academics, the National Intelligence Council (NIC), and other interagency stakeholders;
- Survey data on perceptions of violent extremism in a given country, where available.

Quantitative Models

- A global quantitative model developed in collaboration with the CIA's Office of Advanced Analytics specifically for the Counterterrorism Partnership Fund process to assess the political, sociocultural, security, and economic situations in each country of interest using aggregated data concerning terrorism and insurgency linked to extremist groups. The model takes information from thousands of time series datasets and produces an estimate of the year-to-year change in the number of terrorist attacks for each country of interest;[3]
- A statistical model developed by CSO to estimate a country's risk of having an official Da'esh province *(wilayat)* established within its borders in the next 12 months, which takes into account existing Da'esh provinces certain national characteristics.[4]

Foreign Fighter Profiles/Characteristics of Individual Extremists

- A review of an unclassified dataset obtained by the U.S. government through a Da'esh defector that listed several thousand foreign terrorist fighters registered by Da'esh in Syria/Iraq in 2013 and 2014 and included information about age, education, occupation, marital status, and nationality.
- Where there is insufficient data on the flow of foreign fighters, the analysis focuses on examining the characteristics of individuals engaged in violent extremist activities or participation in VEOs.

III. VEO Activity – Trends and Projections

Analysis of conflict and terrorism data from the Armed Conflict Location and Event Dataset (ACLED) Project illustrates how conflict and terrorism have developed in Cameroon from January 1, 2010 – May 1, 2016. Since 2010, ACLED records 3,052 deaths associated with conflict or terrorism in Cameroon, 2,640 attributed to known VEOs.[5] The map and graph below depict fatalities attributed to known VEOs (with Boko Haram the primary perpetrator), shown in orange, and fatalities attributed to other groups and actors, including unaffiliated terrorist actors and unknown actors, shown in blue. Fatalities shown in blue also include fatalities caused during security force operations. Some notable recent events include heavy fighting between Boko Haram militants and Cameroonian and Chadian military forces between December 2014 and February 2015. The fighting left hundreds of Boko Haram militants dead while hundreds were also killed in Boko Haram attacks on unarmed civilians during this period. Boko Haram attacks on civilians in November 2015 left more than 100 dead. Since January of 2016, Boko Haram attacks on civilians in Cameroon – including suicide attacks – have killed scores.

CSO and the CIA's Office of Advanced Analytics (OAA) developed a quantitative model to aggregate available data about the political, sociocultural, military, and economic situations in Cameroon. This model provides an evaluation on the risk of terrorist attack in Cameroon, specifically looking at factors that increase the level of terrorist attacks. Testing thousands of variables, the model did not identify many individual factors as having a significant impact on the level of terrorist attacks. However, with these factors taken together, the model demonstrated a relatively high degree of success in predicting the escalation or de-escalation of terrorist attacks.[6]

Cameroon has a set of factors that, according to the model, make it ripe for a substantial increase (around 35%) in the number of terrorist attacks in 2016. The model indicates that one of Cameroon's more significant risk factors may be its low Polity Score[7], a measurement of the degree of autocracy or democracy in a country, ranging from 10 (consolidated democracy) to -10 (fully consolidated autocracy). Cameroon has a score of -4, the lowest of any of the CTPF countries of interest.[8] Cameroon could, according to the model, significantly reduce its risk for terrorist attacks if it increased its Polity Score to a -3.[9] In other words, Cameroon could substantially reduce its terrorism risk by making a very incremental move toward a greater degree of democracy.

Another significant factor, according to the model, relates to the number of CT operations Cameroon conducted last year. Fewer CT operations[10] in a given year are associated with an increased number of terrorist attacks the following year, according to the model. The fact that Cameroon did not conduct many publicly reported CT operations in 2015 therefore led the model to ascribe a slightly higher risk of terrorism to it than for countries conducting more operations. As we have seen however in other models, the characteristics of the security operations of the state conducts are also important. Heavy-handed, indiscriminate tactics can correlate with increased VE activity. Cameroon's approach appears to continue to be heavily military-focused with its elite, and U.S.-trained, Rapid Intervention Battalion (known by its French acronym, BIR), taking the lead with some gendarmes and police in support. Cameroon would appear to

lack a counterterrorism strategy which extends beyond the use of force, which may well limit its ability to prevent the spread of violent extremism.[11]

To assess the risk of VEO emergence in Cameroon, including the development of new VEOs and the evolution of existing groups into VEOs, CSO developed a statistical model that estimates a country's risk of having an official Da'esh province (*wilayat*) established within its borders in the next 12 months.[12] This model measures the risk of the emergence of a Da'esh affiliate at a significant threshold of influence, and therefore captures both the risk of emergence as well as the risk of an existing VEO achieving a higher level of influence/recognition. The model predicts a low probability (about 1%) that a Da'esh province would be established in Cameroon given that no groups have pledged allegiance to the Da'esh leader (al-Baghdadi), and political terror (as measured by the Political Terror Scale) is moderate (2.3 on a scale from 1 to 5). If multiple groups pledge allegiance to Da'esh, however, the probability could climb higher. A smaller terrorism attack risk factor for Cameroon is the presence of state-sponsored violence and abuse, as measured by the Political Terror Scale.[13]

A broader assessment was conducted by CSO to assess the risk of the emergence of major VEOs (not constrained to Da'esh affiliates) – major VEOs were defined as VEOs which went on to kill 100 or more individuals following their emergence. This measurement captures both the emergence, as well as the significant escalation of activity by an existing VEO. This measure also captures the new emergence of a VEO in a country of interest that may be affiliated with another VEO in a different country. Significant risk factors included the level of state sponsored violence an abuse, the magnitude of internal violence, external conflict/interventions, and significant Sunni Muslim populations.[14] Based on these indicators, Cameroon's current risk of the emergence of a major VEO is low, in the 2-10% range. However, a significant increase in the level of internal conflict in Cameroon or a significant increase in the level of state sponsored violence and abuse would significantly increase the risk.

Fatalities from Conflict and Terrorism in Cameroon, January 2010 – April 2016

Data Source: Armed Conflict and Event Location Dataset (ACLED)



IV. Underlying Structural Factors Contributing to VE

Empirical testing by CSO identified a number of structural, or "push" factors that correlate with increased support for violent extremism, the adoption of increasingly extreme tactics or ideology by groups, and the emergence of new violent extremist organizations. Building on this research, this analysis also reviewed academic literature and prior assessments of the violent extremism problem set in Cameroon, including group interviews of former Boko Haram fighters. Based on this research, the following factors were cited as helping to drive the emergence and spread of violent extremism and/or violent extremist organizations in Cameroon: religious and ethnic divisions, poverty, perceived (or actual) marginalization, poor governance, and underdevelopment.

Cameroon is roughly 40% Christian and 20% Muslim (with the remaining 40% holding indigenous beliefs, often intermingled Christianity or Islam).[15] A number of recent reports have pointed to the risk of ***growing radicalization*** among Cameroon's Muslims as increasingly fundamentalist Wahhabi-inspired ideologies influence and overturn previously traditional Sufi values in some Islamic communities. A range of sources indicate that Wahhabist ideology is mainly growing in the south of Cameroon; it does not yet appear to have made significant inroads in the North.[16] [17] There have been reports of violence between Wahhabi-inspired groups and Sufis in some communities.[18] A string of suicide bombings in Cameroon since January of 2016, probably carried out by Boko Haram, have targeted Tijaniyya (Sufi) mosques. This tactic of targeting competitors to Wahhabi-inspired theology is consistent with religiously supremacist ideologies, including those of the Da'esh.[19] Unlike Boko Haram's original emergence in Nigeria, Boko Haram has not established bona fide religious credentials or leaders through existing mosques and relationships with established Imams. Rather, Boko Haram appears intent on coercing the population to adopt a new, more correct interpretation of Islam. Multiple empirical studies exist linking supremacist ideologies to support for violent extremism in Africa, such as those often promulgated through Wahhabi-inspired theology.[20] Curiously, in Cameroon, the majority of Cameroonians who have joined terrorist groups or committed terrorist acts come from the North, where traditional Sufi Islam remains dominant among Islamic traditions.[21] More research should be done to understand how and why this is true in order to better inform policy makers on what can be done to prevent the rise or spread of violent extremism both in Cameroon and elsewhere.

Some analysts also point to an ethnic dimension among populations associated with the rise of violent extremism in Cameroon. Boko Haram's founder and many of its supporters are drawn from Kanuri communities in northeast Nigeria, which extend into Chad, Niger, and Cameroon. While the Kanuri are relatively numerous across the Lake Chad Basin, they live in only a part of northern Cameroon. Given their position as a small minority group within Cameroon, the prevalence of Kanuri in Boko Haram suggests an ethnic dimension to the group – Boko Haram may have recruited as many as 3,000 combatants in Cameroon, mainly from Kanuri communities.[22] Presumably in response to this ethnic association with Boko Haram, government security forces have stepped up their targeting of Kanuri communities, including allegedly arresting Kanuri youth with little or no evidence tying them to Boko Haram. While anti-terrorism legislation passed in December of 2014 does not specifically mention Kanuri communities, it gives security forces wide latitude to suppress dissent and commit abuses. [23]

Given the association of Kanuri with Boko Haram, it has allowed for security force targeting of Kanuri communities, which has taken the form of arbitrary detentions of imams, journalists, and others.[24] Inter-governmental, U.S. government, and academic research indicate that frustration related to ***underemployment, poor governance, and underdevelopment can facilitate extremism***. A recent UNDP report highlights the role that underdevelopment and poverty can play in increasing support for violent extremism, especially where poor governance and inadequate service delivery are part of the equation, both of which are structural factors evident in northern Cameroon. The report highlights Cameroon, among other sub-Saharan locations as places where the "Nexus between literacy, numeracy, and the growth of radicalization has been observed" and where "The situation is aggravated by high-levels of underemployment, leaving many youth frustrated, lacking inviable prospects for the future and available for relatively easy recruitment into extremist groups, especially since most groups offer financial incentives and provide a sense of purpose."[25] A recent State Department assessment also highlights the potentially important role of underdevelopment and poor governance in facilitating violent extremist recruitment in Cameroon.[26] Specifically, this report highlights the potentially problematic effects of widespread dissatisfaction with the rate of economic growth and the slow nature of democratic reforms. A 2011 Oxford University study of subnational poverty in Cameroon showed that 67.6%, 66%, and 49.1% of population in the northern North, Far North, and Adamaoua regions were considered in "severe poverty" with the next highest poverty rate at 32.8% in the East region.[27] The North and Far North regions are also the regions where violent extremism appears to have had its greatest success in gaining support, illustrating local realities may mirror these associations.

These factors alone may not increase support for violent extremism, however, a combination of these factors with opportunities for ideological radicalization could create an environment conducive to generating support and sympathy for violent extremism. Further research should be done to better understand these relationships; in particularly how and why violent extremism emerges in some areas with these negative socioeconomic/governance indicators and not in others. Furthermore, more research could be done to identify if specific factors within each of these broad categories can be identified as particularly exacerbating the spread of violent extremism.

V. Support and Sympathy for VE

Analysis of a U.S. government survey commissioned in northern Cameroon in 2013 found that respondents most likely to support religiously motivated violence were Muslims who were less religiously devout but had a strong sense of religious intolerance. This is consistent with numerous studies on support for violent extremism in Africa which have identified higher levels of religious intolerance as being positively associated with support for violent extremism and higher levels of religious devotion/commitment as being negatively associated with support for violent extremism.[28] The key distinction between religious intolerance and religious devotion/commitment is that the former involves a strong belief in the need to coerce others to conform, while the latter measures the importance of religion in the life of the individual. [2930]

Another U.S. government commissioned survey conducted in 2015 found that while less than 3% of respondents viewed Boko Haram as having a positive influence on Cameroon, 83% of respondents reported that Boko Haram's influence in Cameroon had increased over the past six

months.[31] In the same survey, 11% of respondents reported that violence in the name of religion is sometimes or always justified, perhaps an indication that a small, but not trivial, population in Cameroon might be disposed to supporting violent extremism – it is worth noting that further understanding of what such dispositions indicate deserves further research.

It is important to note that *support* for violent extremism may be generated by different mechanisms, and may manifest itself in different ways, than *participation* in violent extremism. Future surveys should look specifically at support for violent extremism among Muslims in the Northern regions of Cameroon. Separately, more research should be focused on the rise of Wahhabi-inspired ideologies in southern Cameroon and how it may influence the emergence or spread of violent extremism. In turn, this understanding will assist U.S. government actors and other partners to design policy and programming that can be more targeted to at-risk populations.

VI. Individual Characteristics of Violent Extremists

At this time, there is little known about individuals arrested for terrorist activity and their incentives or involvement with violent extremist organizations in Cameroon. Further research could be considered to explore the lives of select individuals who have actively supported or joined violent extremist groups in Cameroon. This body of research may help further illustrate the dynamics that enable terrorist activity at the local level and enhance policy makers' ability to create effective, targeted interventions. The following examples illustrate the data weakness:

Abdoulaye Farikou, a senior police official in the Far Northern city of Balaza, was arrested by the Cameroonian military on suspicion of using his position as head of the local Identification Unit to issue Cameroonian ID cards for Boko Haram militants entering the country from Nigeria.[32] Were Farikou motivated to do this for financial reasons, it could illustrate how non-ideological factors may be influencing support for the group in Cameroon's impoverished Far North region. No information on Farikou's religious beliefs was publicly available, nor is it clear what his incentives for working with violent extremists – it is not even clear if he was aware of the identities of those to whom he was providing IDs.

The case of Yazan Imra, an 18 year old woman from the Cameroonian border town of Gambarou, illustrates how weak state institutions negatively impacts individuals who could be susceptible to violent extremism. Imra was abducted and held by Boko Haram militants for two years, during which she was used as a cook and sex slave.[33] Without effective local security forces to guard against Boko Haram kidnappings, the ranks of Cameroonians forcibly coerced into joining Boko Haram are likely to grow, enhancing the group's lethality. In both Nigeria and Cameroon, women are increasingly being used by Boko Haram as suicide bombers due to their relatively lower scrutiny by security forces.[34] While individuals may be drawn into violent extremism in a variety of ways, coercion remains a common tool in the case of violent extremism in Cameroon, making the need for a more effective state security presence important.

VII. Synthesis

Empirical modeling suggests that the risk of terrorist attacks in Cameroon will substantially increase through 2016. In order to address the ongoing and potentially increasing risk, this analysis suggests a number of factors and a few discrete trends for consideration. These

considerations should be understood as perhaps overlapping in their data but not exactly the same as the areas proposed for further investigation in the following section.

First, while Boko Haram, a group indigenous to Nigeria, has only a tentative foothold on the fringes of northern Cameroon, ***there appears to be potential for an indigenous violent extremist group*** which could include the establishment of a Boko Haram stronghold or an official affiliate within Cameroon. Some segments of the population, such as the Kanuri in northern Cameroon, are potentially disposed to support violent extremist ideas because of ethnic grievances against the state while other segments of the population could be disposed due to holding extremist and supremacist religious views. Similarly, empirical modeling suggests that the risk of Da'esh establishing a province in Cameroon is low, but would increase dramatically with the presence of indigenous Sunni Jihadist groups pledging allegiance to Da'esh.

Second, the ***Cameroonian government's lacks a comprehensive counterterrorism approach and the continued lack of democratic reforms aggravates the risk for terrorism.*** Empirical modeling for Cameroon suggests that even slight movements toward more democratic forms of governance would have a substantial impact on the level of risk for terrorism in Cameroon. Similarly, this analysis – and similar analyses on other VE environments – indicates that abuse of force by state actors, a lack of targeted, sustained CT operations, and the failure to meet basic security requirements for local communities can exacerbate risks of violent extremism.

In the short and medium term, **the most important indicators to track in Cameroon include:** 1) support for or sympathy with Boko Haram or violent extremist ideas; 2) trends in Cameroonians carrying out attacks or being detained for alleged affiliation with violent extremists; 3) trends in state-sponsored violence and abuse.

VIII. Areas for Further Investigation

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1 These factors include: state-sponsored violence and abuse; existing intra-state conflict; inter-state conflict; internal conflict in bordering states; perception of foreign interference; religious intolerance/supremacy, which relates to the idea that others must be violently coerced to conform to one's worldview (as separate and distinct from religious devotion); the personal experience of corruption (having to pay bribes for basic services); the personal experience of physical violence (from state actors and otherwise); the systematic marginalization of ethnic/religious groups;

influence of gulf Arab media; technology access and usage (for organizing and recruitment purposes); perception of foreign interference/actual foreign interference (or inter-state conflict); underemployment (tested through the interaction of higher levels of education and poverty or income); designation of Sunni Islam as the official religion of the state, and the presence of significant Sunni populations.

2 Reports and assessments collected within the Department of State and USAID identified these additional factors: general income inequality; rural vs. urban income inequality; resistance to Western cultural influence; border insecurity; government restrictions/regulation on religious space; youth unemployment; security force corruption; growing influence of Wahhabism; inadequate provision of basic services; and lack of trust in the government.

3 We have moderate confidence in the quality of the model's forecasts. The model has a pseudo-R^2 value of 0.46, suggesting that it can explain approximately half of the variation in the year-to-year changes in numbers of attacks in a particular country. Despite this relatively high score for this type of model, the root mean squared error of the model's forecasts on out-of-sample data (data not used to train the model) was a relatively high 0.42, reducing our confidence in its ability to predict well.

4 This includes pledges of allegiance (bay'at) by Sunni militant groups to the Da'esh leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi; the portion of each country's population that practices Sunni Islam; the presence of anocratic governance processes as indicated by values between -5 and +5 on the polity scale (this could also be interpreted as a weak or ineffective government); and state-sponsored violence expressed on a scale of 1 (no state-sponsored violence/abuse) to 5 (widespread state-sponsored violence/abuse). This model is used herein to assess the effect of changing conditions in the countries of interest on the probability that an official province will be established.

5 Imperfect coding of perpetrators in the ACLED dataset leads to totals for named groups which are low. This estimate is probably conservative.

6 We have moderate confidence in the quality of the model's forecasts. The model has a pseudo-R^2 value of 0.46, suggesting that it can explain approximately half of the variation in the year-to-year changes in numbers of attacks in a particular country. Despite this relatively high score for this type of model, the root mean squared error of the model's forecasts on out-of-sample data (data not used to train the model) was a relatively high 0.42, reducing our confidence in its ability to predict well.

7Center for Systematic Peace. http://www.systemicpeace.org/polityproject.html

8 CTPF countries of interest include Cameroon, Mali, Nigeria, Kenya, Somalia, Tunisia, Lebanon, Jordan, India, Bangladesh, and Indonesia.

9 The model does not show further evidence of reductions in terrorism risk for improving Polity scores beyond -3.

10 Joint Chief of Staff's 2014 Joint Publication 3-26 defines CT activities and operations as "actions and activities to neutralize terrorists, their organizations, and networks; removes countering root causes and desired regional end states from the definition" (p.vii) http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_26.pdf

11 In addition, Cameroon experienced a 10% uptick in its rate of GNP growth from 2013 to 2014; the model indicates that such upticks in GNP growth rates have historically been associated with a slightly elevated terrorism risk. We do not know why this has historically been the case. Cameroon, like all the other African countries of interest except Tunisia, experienced a reduction in imports from Sub-Saharan African countries in 2015. These changes have historically been associated with an increase in terrorism risk. This assessment does not offer a clear explanation for this risk, but this association warrants further study.

12 The model took into account the locations of existing Islamic State (IS) provinces and certain national characteristics, including pledges of allegiance (bay'at) by Sunni militant groups to the Islamic State's leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi; the portion of each country's population that practices Sunni Islam; the presence of anocratic

governance processes as indicated by values between -5 and +5 on the polity scale (this could also be interpreted as a weak or ineffective government);12 and state-sponsored violence expressed on a scale of 1 (no state-sponsored violence/abuse) to 5 (widespread state-sponsored violence/abuse).12 This model is used to assess the effect of changing conditions in the countries of interest on the probability that an official province will be established. To do this, the number of bay'at, an indicator of government weakness, and the degree of state-sponsored violence were varied independently for each country –it was assumed that the religious composition of a country would not change substantially over the short term. In general, pledges of allegiance to the IS leader (al-Baghdadi) by groups within the country had the greatest impact on probability, and both government weakness and political terror had moderate effects.

13 http://www.politicalterrorscale.org/

14 Global Risk of Emerging Violent Extremism, CSO, July 2015. The study examined 159 countries from 1995-2014.

15 CIA World Fact Book: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2122.html

16 http://tonyblairfaithfoundation.org/religion-geopolitics/reports-analysis/report/radicalisation-cameroons-religious-ferment

17 ICG Report (previously cited in this paper)

18 Cameroon: The Threat of Religious Radicalism, International Crisis Group, Africa Report N°229, 3 September 2015; Preventing and Responding to Violent Extremism in Africa: A Development Approach, UNDP, 2015, pg. 3.;and Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership: Baseline Assessment for PKO Operations, Cameroon, November 2015, U.S. Department of State, pg. 7.

19 Muir Analytics: http://muiranalytics.com/?p=265

20 The Nexus between Religion and Violent Extremism in Africa, CSO January 2016

21 http://tonyblairfaithfoundation.org/religion-geopolitics/reports-analysis/report/radicalisation-cameroons-religious-ferment

22 Cameroon: The Threat of Religious Radicalism, International Crisis Group, Africa Report N229, 2015, pg.18. Note: if this number is correct, it would suggest that as many as one quarter of military aged Kanuris in Cameroon have joined Boko Haram (Kanuris make up less then 1% of Cameroon's population).

23 http://www.loc.gov/law/foreign-news/article/cameroon-new-law-on-repression-of-terrorism-passed/

24 Cameroon: The Threat of Religious Radicalism, International Crisis Group, Africa Report N°229, 3 September 2015; Preventing and Responding to Violent Extremism in Africa: A Development Approach, UNDP, 2015, pg. 18.

25 Preventing and Responding to Violent Extremism in Africa: A Development Approach, UNDP, 2015, pg. 20.

26 Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership: Baseline Assessment for PKO Operations, Cameroon, November 2015, U.S. Department of State, pg. 7.

27 Country Briefing: Cameroon (December 2011). Oxford Poverty and Human Development Initiative (OPHI). Oxford Department of International Development. http://www.ophi.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/Cameroon1.pdf

28 The Nexus between Religion and Support for Violent Extremism in Africa, CSO, January 2016.

29 The survey was commissioned by the U.S. government in 2013 and included 1,488 survey respondents aged 16 – 65. There were 677 self-identified Muslims (broadly defined and including Sunni, Shia, and non-denominational) and 811 self-identified non-Muslims (also broadly defined to include any non-Muslim religion including Christian, Hindu, etc.). There were 744 males in the survey and 744 females. The survey itself was not designed to be representative of Cameroon nationally. Rather, it was designed to survey Cameroonian citizens from three regions: North, Far North, and West.

30 Analysis of the same survey also found that across the religious spectrum, the most significant indicator of support for religiously-based violence was media consumption. We do not have reliable data on the primary sources of media being consumed, but this is an area for future study.

31 The nationally representative survey of 1,959 respondents was conducted by AFRICOM and completed in September 2015.

32 http://www.cameroonjournal.com/national-news/cameroon-in-for-long-fight-as-youths-join-boko-haram/

33 http://www.dw.com/en/cameroon-sex-slaves-for-boko-haram/a-19178836

34 http://blogs.cfr.org/campbell/2015/08/11/women-and-the-boko-haram-insurgency/