

Investigating Officer's Chronology of Investigation

- 22 February 2010 Received appointment letter from USFOR-A-CDR, dated 22 February 2010, to investigate 21 February 2010 incident near Shahidi Hassas, Afghanistan, that resulted in the death of as many as twenty three civilians. Received initial legal brief from MAJ (b)(3), (b)(6), Legal Advisor, USFOR-A. Arranged preliminary administrative support and travel from Kabul to KAF.
- 22 February 2010 Arrived at KAF and met with investigative team regarding investigative plan and other preliminary issues. Viewed Kiowa recording of the engagement. Arranged for movement to FOB Ripley for initial interview of the Ground Force Commander and JTAC. Reassembled with whole investigation team to prepare avenues of approach and discussed the requirements of the investigation.
- 23 February 2010 Traveled to FOB (b)(1)1.4a and conducted initial interview of the Ground Force Commander, JTAC, and spoke with the Dutch FST in regards to the wounded personnel received in reference to the incident. Interviewed one of the injured civilians. Returned to KAF and met with the investigative team to determine a list of witnesses that needed to be interviewed. Transcribed interview summaries.
- 24 February 2010 Assigned duties/responsibilities and developed investigative work plan. Discussed and prepared interview scripts and Privacy Act statements with legal advisor. Transcribed interview summaries.
- 25 February 2010 Conducted telephonic interviews with members of the three members of the Predator screening crew and their commander. Transcribed interview summaries.
- 26 February 2010 Conducted interviews of the four Kiowa crew members, (b)(1)1.4a five members of ODA(b)(1)1.4a the on-site ANA Commander and three members of AOB. Transcribed interview summaries.
- 27 February 2010 Traveled to FOB (b)(1)1.4a and FB(b)(1)1.4ato interview members of the ANA and the ANP. Returned to KAF and met with investigative party to prioritize the interviews. Continued

interview preparation and notified witnesses of interview schedule and locations. Confirmed travel arrangements to BAF and Kabul. Transcribed interview summaries.

1 March 2010

Hospital visit to interview the wounded civilians. Interviewed the SOTF South LEGAD and the ASG Commander. Transcribed interview summaries.

2 March 2010-
5 March 2010

Interviewed members of the CJSOTF-A, CFSOCC-A, the AC130 Crew, and the Predator Piloting Team. Transcribed interview summaries.

8 March 2010-
12-March 2010

Re-interviewed witnesses to clarify statements. Drafted the timeline visual aid. Transcribed interview summaries.

13 March 2010

Transcribed interview summaries.

14 March 2010-
21 March 2010

Transcribed interview summaries. Prepared interviews for review and corrections. Held meetings with investigative team for recommendations and thoughts for future mitigation of such circumstances. Created reports and visual aids.

22 March 2010-
25 March 2010

Emailed transcripts to witnesses for review. Reviewed all evidence and witness testimony. Drafted findings and recommendations. Submitted report to SJA for Legal Review.



HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES FORCES - AFGHANISTAN
KABUL, AFGHANISTAN
APO AE 09356

13 APR 2010

USFOR-A DCDR-S

MEMORANDUM FOR Commander, United States Forces-Afghanistan/International Security Assistance Force, Afghanistan

SUBJECT: AR 15-6 Investigation, 21 February 2010 CIVCAS incident in Uruzgan Province

1. At your invitation, the United States Air Force and US Army Special Operations Command sent a team to review the investigation's findings and recommendations. I have considered the input of both teams and have adopted most of their recommended changes.
2. I did not incorporate the following recommendations from the Special Operations Command:
 - a. The potential conflict of interest of having a contractor performing the screening function. Although I recognize that a contractor will have a corporate interest, separate and distinct from the military interest, in this instance I found no action or inaction by the Screeners that negatively influenced the engagement. In fact, the Special Operations team suggested that the Screeners might be reluctant to make a definitive call fearing liability or negative contractual action if wrong. In this case, the evidence suggests that there were few, if any, actual weapons and the Screeners' reluctance to make definitive calls was justified.
 - b. The team recommended that the term MAM be maintained and training provided to service-members explaining that MAMs were not inherently hostile. I believe eliminating the term MAM, better serves the Counter-Insurgency Strategy, as the term has come to presume hostility.

TIMOTHY P. MCHALE
Major General, U.S. Army
Deputy Commander, Support
U.S. Forces - Afghanistan

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DRONES / CENTCOM / 000131

Review Of Investigation	Suggestions of what areas require an additional look/comments	Recommendations of Fixes
<p>Poorly planned and delayed (b)(1)1.4c - QRF + BDA was planned 2 X QRF HAF and GAF (Book 5, I) - Execution of the QRF to assist ODA (b)(1)1.4a was not properly handled - No oversight of what was happening VIC of original TGT or CIVCAS location</p>	<p>JMD support - Experience and Training - - ISR at CJSOTF Navy E-5 SOTF AF E-3</p>	<p>Assist with JMD Manning</p>
<p>ODB C2 Function - Facilitates ODA's with QRF + coordinate with Battle Space Owner - Example of both robust C2 by an ODB and limited C2 in OEF</p>	<p>PED Location - Interaction with ground force and Predator crew - PED that was at CJSOTF went home SEPT 09 - Experience level of ISR TM</p>	<p>Greater Integration of professional developmental opportunities. Highlighting Situations/Actions/Consequence Role of leadership relearned</p>
<p>GFC Mind Set: Vehicles 5-12 KM (GFC knew vehicles can get to his location quickly) - GFC has fought in terrain previously – was threat imminent or immediate</p>	<p>Screeners Conflict of Interest - Wife and service member - Contractor worried about corporate interest will not give a definitive answer</p>	<p>Integration of CFSOC in culmination battle staff exercise</p>
<p>Terminology – need to define clearly – MAM, TIC, PID, Evolved Term “AIRTIC” From lack of air support/air requested' Resource Issue? Confidence by ground forces education of AIR request/capabilities</p>		<p>SF Cultural issue Place of ODA Default to ODA SA to higher HQs</p>
		<p>Synchronize all ISR assets to confirm TGT</p>

<p>(b)(1)1.4c Monitor with direction finding recommendation (PG 34) Note: Wolfhound being deployed with ODAs issue is limited # and capability of the system</p>		
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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
Washington DC

11 Apr 2010

MEMORANDUM FOR

Major General Timothy P. McHale, USA, Deputy Commander Support, U.S. Forces -
Afghanistan

FROM: Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6), USAF

SUBJECT: USAF Recommended Edits of AR 15-6, 21 February 2010, Uruzgan CIVCAS

1. (U) **Question a. Para (2).** The Predator crew passed four key assessments to the JTAC influencing the ODA CDR's decision to destroy the vehicles instead of providing full tactical situational awareness updates that could have prevented the strike. Three of the assessments require a degree of cultural/tactical awareness potentially specific to this AO or the benefit of knowledge on SOF/land maneuver TTP's to be relevant. Though the Predator crews do develop a certain degree of familiarity over time, they do not receive specific training to make assessments with the confidence they suggested. The final assessment on the presence of children/adolescents is an appropriate assessment based on relative size as ascertained from the targeting pod. At that point the Screeners, located in...

Third, the Predator pilot describes a scuffle near one of the vehicles as the "potential use of human shields" with no Screener concurrence and no basis.... (true, the Predator crew should not have made/transmitted the "human shields" assessment; however the Predator crews are not required to vette their assessments/comments through the Screener as the text implies)

2. (U) **Questions b. Para (9).** The SOTF (b)(1)1.4a Operations Center had access to the mIRC chat between the Predator MIC and the Screeners; SATCOM to (b)(1)1.4a and another ODA's JTAC, (b)(1)1.4a

The "SOTF_SOUTH_ISR" (A1C (b)(3), (b)(6)

3. (U) **Question d. Para (1).** Add the following after the last sentence: From request for CCA support to executing CCA, none of the elements mentioned children or adolescents to the OH-58Ds while providing generalities on the target.
4. (U) **Question f. Para (3).** At 0539D, 0540D, and 0547D, the Predator Screener identified a child...

5.

6.

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(3), (b)(6)

7. (U) **Question h. Para (3).** (sentence 4) When the final vehicle entered the convoy, the (b)(1)1.4a Mission Coordinator stated on the crews recorded intercom that vehicle and its occupants were ~~assess their hostility with the statement~~ “guilty by association.” (b)(1)1.4a Log, Book 5, Exhibit X). (recommend striking this whole sentence because “guilty by association” is never passed on the radio or entered in a mIRC window. It is just internal crew communications. If it is left in the report, recommend the rewrite above. Additionally, this is actually in another book TAB C: Entire Compiled Chat Log for (b)(1)1.4a – this is from the internal cockpit communications not the mIRC log)
8. (U) **Question h. Para (3).** ~~When the vehicles were struck~~ The Predator ~~had still never identified~~ never passed suspected/confirmed children/adolescents when describing the occupants of the vehicles to the OH-58 crews. (The Predator pilot did describe the occupants of the vehicles as 30 MAMs but left out the children/adolescents.)
9. (U) **Question p. Para (4).** (I offer the following text to consider in the paragraph (4) recommendation:) Headquarters Air Force (HAF) should appoint Air Combat Command (ACC) as lead MAJCOM to quickly codify command level guidance on DCGS/RPA (Distributed Common Ground System/Remote Piloted Vehicle) tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) and conflict resolution in an Air Force Tactics Techniques and Procedures (AFTTP) manual. It will require coordination across ACC and AFSOC commands and should include joint participation to include the supported customers. The TTPs should then be introduced to the joint community through an Air, Land, and Sea Applications Center

~~SECRET//REL ISAF~~

(ALSA) Tactics Bulletin and eventually codified in a Joint Forces Command Joint Publication.

(b)(3), (b)(6)
Colonel, USAF

~~SECRET//REL ISAF~~