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NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
CENTRAL SECURITY SERVICE
FORT GEORGE G. MEADE MARYLAND 20755-6000

1 May 2018

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT BOARD

THROUGH: Office of the DoD Senior Intelligence Oversight Official

SUBJECT: (U) Report to the Intelligence Oversight Board on NSA Activities, First Quarter, Calendar Year 2018—INFORMATION MEMORANDUM

(U//~~FOUO~~) Except as previously reported to you or the President or otherwise stated in the enclosure, we have no reason to believe that any activity conducted under DIRNSA authority, direction, or control during the period ending 31 March 2018 was unlawful or contrary to Executive Order or Presidential Directive and, thus, should have been reported pursuant to Section 1.6(c) of Executive Order 12333, as amended. This report summarizes questionable intelligence activities as well as other matters required to be reported to the IOB.

(U//~~FOUO~~) The Inspector General and the General Counsel continue to exercise oversight of Agency activities by inspections, surveys, training, review of directives and guidelines, and advice of counsel.

[Redacted]

ROBERT P. STORCH
Inspector General

[Redacted]

(b) (6)

GLENN S. GERSTELL
General Counsel

(U) I concur with the report of the Inspector General and the General Counsel and hereby make it our combined report.

MICHAEL S. ROGERS
Admiral, U.S. Navy
Director, NSA/Chief, CSS

Encl:
Quarterly Report

(b) (3) - P.L. 86-36

(U) This document may be declassified and marked "UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY" upon removal of enclosure(s)

Approved for Release by NSA on 06-17-2019,
FOIA Case # 105767 (litigation)


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Dated: 20180110
Declassify On: 20430401

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(U) NSA FIRST QUARTER CY2018
INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT REPORT




(b) (3) - P.L. 86-36

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
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
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
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
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
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f. (U) File Number: NSA 2018-007-Q

Non - Responsive

(1) (U) Incident Description: Provider-caused compliance incident regarding call detail



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(b) (1)
(b) (3) - 50 USC 3024 (i)
(b) (3) - P.L. 86-36

Records.

~~(TS//SI//NF)~~ On 16 February 2018, NSA technical analysts examining a provider's targeted production of call detail records (CDRs) pursuant to USA FREEDOM ACT, 50 U.S.C. §1861, observed an anomaly [redacted]

[redacted]

At that time, NSA continued to receive the provider's productions, but ceased making new requests and forwarding CDRs produced by the provider to NSA corporate repositories accessible by intelligence analysts. The provider later confirmed some of the records produced contained inaccurate information. Investigation revealed that NSA relied upon some of the inaccurate information in connection with requests to the FISC to [redacted] the provider stopped the data flow.

- (2) (U//~~FOUO~~) **Timeline:** Date of incident: 16 February 2018
Date incident reported in IRT: 23 February 2018
Date reported to DoD SIOO: 1 May 2018

(3) (U//~~FOUO~~) **Reason for Report:** 50 U.S.C. §1861(b)(2)(C)(ii) limits data that can be sought (and therefore collected) to that pertaining to a "foreign power engaged in international terrorism or activities in preparation therefor, or an agent of a foreign power engaged in international terrorism or activities in preparation therefor." While NSA lawfully sought data pertaining to a foreign power engaged in international terrorism, the provider produced inaccurate data and data beyond that which NSA sought.

(4) ~~(TS//SI//NF)~~ **Cause:** NSA continues to work with the provider to understand the scope of this anomaly and remediate this matter. [redacted] the provider's systems populated fields of certain CDRs with inaccurate data, specifically in circumstances in which [redacted]

[redacted] As a result, when some [redacted] CDRs were produced by the provider to NSA, these fields included certain incorrect values.

(5) (U//~~FOUO~~) **Impact on National Security or International Relations:** None.

(6) (U//~~FOUO~~) **Impact on Civil Liberties or Privacy:** The NSA CLPT Office will assess the scope of the civil liberties and privacy impact of this incident upon completion of the investigation.

(7) (U//~~FOUO~~) **Remedial Action:** On or about [redacted] the provider implemented a solution to prevent its production to NSA of any CDRs generated between approximately [redacted] that contain inaccurate information. NSA has initiated the purge process of all data acquired as a result of targeting these [redacted] selectors pursuant to the Orders issued in [redacted]. There is no estimated date of completion at this time. NSA is investigating how to remove other inaccurate CDRs from its system.

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
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(8) (U/~~FOUO~~) **Additional Information:** The incident was reported to DoJ on 16 February 2018. DoJ reported the incident to the FISC on 5 March 2018. NSA notified the congressional intelligence committees on 10 April 2018.


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(9) (U) **Status:** Open.



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
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
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
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
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
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NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
CENTRAL SECURITY SERVICE
FORT GEORGE G. MEADE MARYLAND 20755-6000

29 July 2015

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT BOARD

THROUGH: Office of the DoD Senior Intelligence Oversight Official

SUBJECT: (U) Report to the Intelligence Oversight Board on NSA Activities—
INFORMATION MEMORANDUM

(U//~~FOUO~~) Except as previously reported to you or the President or otherwise stated in the enclosure, we have no reason to believe that intelligence activities of the National Security Agency during the quarter ending 30 June 2015 were unlawful or contrary to Executive Order or Presidential Directive and, thus, should have been reported pursuant to Section 1.6(c) of Executive Order 12333, as amended.

(U//~~FOUO~~) The Inspector General and the General Counsel continue to exercise oversight of Agency activities by inspections, surveys, training, review of directives and guidelines, and advice of counsel.

DR. GEORGE ELLARD
Inspector General

(b) (6)

PAUL F. MORRIS
Acting General Counsel

(U) I concur with the report of the Inspector General and the General Counsel and hereby make it our combined report.

MICHAEL S. ROGERS
Admiral, U.S. Navy
Director, NSA/Chief, CSS

Encl:
Quarterly Report

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Approved for Release by NSA on 06-17-2019, FOIA Case # 105767 (litigation)

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
**(U) REPORT TO THE INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT BOARD ON NSA ACTIVITIES
SECOND QUARTER CY2015**

(U) Pursuant to Executive Order 12333 (E.O. 12333), as amended, National Security Directive 42, and other legal and policy directives, the National Security Agency (NSA) conducts signals intelligence (SIGINT) and information assurance (IA) activities on behalf of the U.S. government. These activities might result in the acquisition of non-public information of or concerning U.S. persons (USPs). NSA personnel are required to follow procedures designed to protect USP privacy, consistent with the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and other laws. NSA personnel must also comply with requirements of Presidential Policy Directive 28 (PPD-28) concerning protection of personal information of all individuals, regardless of nationality.

(U) NSA has established controls to provide reasonable assurance that its personnel comply with procedures for handling USP information, such as minimization procedures adopted by the Attorney General (AG) and approved by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) to govern USP information acquired during SIGINT activities conducted pursuant to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) of 1978, as amended.

(U) This report summarizes incidents of non-compliance with AG-approved procedures, as well as other matters required to be reported to the Intelligence Oversight Board, identified during the second quarter of calendar year (CY) 2015.

(U) The matters reported herein are based on the information available at the time of this report and are not believed to be cases of willful misuse.



(b) (3) - P.L. 86-36


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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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


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Non - Responsive





Non - Responsive

VI. (U) Other Matters

- (U//~~FOUO~~) On three occasions, NSA notified congressional intelligence committees of the discontinuation of bulk telephone metadata collection pursuant to the business records provision of FISA, commonly referred to as “§215,” and the implementation of the USA Freedom Act (USAFA). On 29 May 2015, NSA reported the timeline of steps to discontinue collection of bulk telephony metadata under title V of FISA, as amended by §215 of the USA Patriot Act. NSA shut down the bulk telephony metadata program on 31 May 2015 in connection with the sunset of §215 of the USA Patriot Act. On 2 June 2015, immediately after the USAFA, which reauthorized a modified version of §215, was enacted into law, the government filed an application to re-initiate the acquisition of the telephone metadata consistent with the USAFA’s 180-day transition provision. On 4 June 2015, NSA reported that it had begun to implement the recently enacted USAFA. The FISC approved the application on 29 June 2015. [redacted] NSA reported that it had re-initiated the collection of bulk telephone metadata.

(b) (3) - P.L. 86-36

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**NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
CENTRAL SECURITY SERVICE**
FORT GEORGE G. MEADE, MARYLAND 20755-6000

8 February 2019

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT BOARD

THROUGH: Office of the DoD Senior Intelligence Oversight Official

SUBJECT: (U) Report to the Intelligence Oversight Board (IOB) on NSA Activities, Fourth Quarter, Calendar Year 2018 – INFORMATION MEMORANDUM

(U//~~FOUO~~) Except as previously reported to you or the President or otherwise stated in the enclosure, we have no reason to believe that any activity conducted under DIRNSA authority, direction, or control during the period ending 31 December 2018 was unlawful or contrary to Executive Order or Presidential Directive and, thus, should have been reported pursuant to Section 1.6 (c) of Executive Order 12333, as amended. This report summarizes questionable intelligence activities as well as other matters required to be reported to the IOB.

(U) The NSA Intelligence Oversight Officer and the General Counsel continue to exercise oversight of Agency activities focused on achieving compliance with the laws and regulations for protecting privacy during the conduct of Agency operations.

[Redacted]

PATRICK J. REYNOLDS
Director of Compliance
Intelligence Oversight Officer

(b) (6)

[Redacted]

GLENN S. GERSTELL
General Counsel

(U) I concur with the report of the NSA Intelligence Oversight Officer and the General Counsel and hereby make it our combined report.

PAUL M. NAKASONE
General, U.S. Army
Director, NSA/Chief, CSS

Encl:
Quarterly Report

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Approved for Release by NSA on 06-17-2019, FOIA Case # 105767 (litigation)

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
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(U) NSA FOURTH QUARTER CY2018

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INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT REPORT




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
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
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129 **b. File Number: NSA 2018-024-Q**

130 (1) ~~(S//NF)~~ **Incident Description:** Provider misprovision of call detail records (CDRs)
131 produced pursuant to Title V of FISA, as amended by the USA FREEDOM Act (UFA).

132 ~~(TS//SI//NF)~~ Pursuant to UFA, the FISC has authorized the targeted production to NSA
133 of CDRs pertaining to certain specific selection terms, and issued Secondary Orders to certain
134 providers to compel the production of those CDRs. On or about October 12, 2018, NSA

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(b) (1)
(b) (3) -50 USC 3024 (i)
(b) (3) -P.L. 86-36

135 technical analysts examining the targeted production of CDRs observed an anomaly.
 136 Specifically, these analysts identified a larger than expected number of [redacted]
 137 [redacted]
 138 [redacted] Further investigation determined
 139 that these records were produced by [redacted] On October 12, 2018, NSA requested the
 140 provider investigate the anomaly. The provider later confirmed that [redacted]
 141 [redacted] had resulted in the creation of CDRs [redacted]
 142 [redacted]
 143 [redacted] According to the provider, it produced CDRs affected by the error
 144 starting on or about October 3, 2018.

145 (2) (U) **Timeline:** Date(s) of incident: October 3-12, 2018
 146 Date of incident reported in IRT: October 12, 2018
 147 Date reported to DoD SIOO: February 1, 2019

148 (3) ~~(S//NF)~~ **Reason for Report:** Production by the provider of erroneous CDRs that
 149 were not authorized by the FISC's orders.

150 (4) ~~(S//NF)~~ **Cause:** [redacted]
 151 [redacted]

152 (5) (U) **Impact on National Security or International Relations:** None.

153 (6) (U) **Impact on Civil Liberties or Privacy:** CLPT will reassess the scope of the
 154 civil liberties and privacy impact of this incident upon completion of the investigation. CLPT's
 155 initial assessment is that the impact was limited given the quick identification, purge processes,
 156 and lack of reporting.

157 (7) ~~(TS//SI//NF)~~ **Remedial Action:** On [redacted] NSA suspended the data
 158 flow from the provider until it could validate that the issue had been resolved. The provider
 159 informed NSA on [redacted] that it implemented a solution that corrects the error, and
 160 NSA worked with the provider to verify the solution. On [redacted] NSA reinitiated the
 161 data flow from the provider. NSA is continuing to review the production of CDRs.

162 (8) (U) **Additional Information:** None.

(b) (3) -P.L. 86-36


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163 (9) (U) **Status:** Open.

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
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
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
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
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
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NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
CENTRAL SECURITY SERVICE
FORT GEORGE G. MEADE, MARYLAND 20755-6000

7 August 2018

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT BOARD

THROUGH: Office of the DoD Senior Intelligence Oversight Official

SUBJECT: (U) Report to the Intelligence Oversight Board (IOB) on NSA Activities, Second Quarter, Calendar Year 2018 – INFORMATION MEMORANDUM

(U//~~FOUO~~) Except as previously reported to you or the President or otherwise stated in the enclosure, we have no reason to believe that any activity conducted under DIRNSA authority, direction, or control during the period ending 30 June 2018 was unlawful or contrary to Executive Order or Presidential Directive and, thus, should have been reported pursuant to Section 1.6 (c) of Executive Order 12333, as amended. This report summarizes questionable intelligence activities as well as other matters required to be reported to the IOB.

(U//~~FOUO~~) The NSA Intelligence Oversight Officer and the General Counsel continue to exercise oversight of Agency activities focused on achieving compliance with the laws and regulations for protecting privacy during the conduct of Agency operations.

[Redacted Signature]

PATRICK J. REYNOLDS
NSA Intelligence Oversight Officer

[Redacted Signature]

GLENN S. GERSTELL
General Counsel

(b) (6)

(U) I concur with the report of the NSA Intelligence Oversight Officer and the General Counsel and hereby make it our combined report.

Paul M. Nakasone
PAUL M. NAKASONE
General, U.S. Army
Director, NSA/Chief, CSS

Encl:
Quarterly Report


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**(U) NSA SECOND QUARTER CY2018
INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT REPORT**



Non - Responsive


(b) (3) - P.L. 86-36

Classified By: [redacted]
Derived From: NSA/CSSM 1.5
Dated: 20180110
Declassify On: ~~20470201~~

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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
278 d. (U) File Number: NSA 2018-007-Q

(b) (3) - P.L. 86-36

(b) (1)
(b) (3) - P.L. 86-36

279 (I) (U//FOUO) Incident Description: Compliance incident regarding call
280 records.

281 ~~(TS//SI//NF)~~ On or about [redacted] a provider [redacted] of call detail
282 records (CDRs) pursuant to USA FREEDOM ACT, 50 U.S.C. Section 1861 informed NSA that
283 its system had been incorrectly [redacted]



296 ~~(TS//SI//NF)~~ On 16 February 2018, NSA technical analysts examining [redacted]
297 [redacted] targeted production of CDRs observed an anomaly [redacted]
298 [redacted]
299 [redacted] At that time,
300 NSA continued to receive the provider's productions, but ceased making new requests and
301 forwarding CDRs produced by the provider to NSA corporate repositories accessible by
302 intelligence analysts. The provider later confirmed some of the records produced contained
303 inaccurate information. Investigation revealed that NSA relied upon some of the inaccurate
304 information in connection with requests to the FISC to [redacted] On
305 [redacted] the provider stopped the data flow.

(b) (1)
(b) (3) - 50 USC 3024(i)
(b) (3) - P.L. 86-36

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(b) (1)
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[Redacted]

(2) (U//~~FOUO~~) **Timeline:** Date(s) of incident: [Redacted]

Date(s) of incident reported in IRT: November 2017 and 23 February 2018

[Redacted] (b) (3) -P.L. 86-36

Date reported to DoD SIOO: 1 May 2018

(b) (1)
(b) (3) -P.L. 86-36

(3) (U//~~FOUO~~) **Reason for Report:** 50 U.S.C. Section 1861(b)(2)(C)(ii) limits data that can be sought (and therefore collected) to that pertaining to a "foreign power engaged in international terrorism or activities in preparation therefor, or an agent of a foreign power engaged in international terrorism or activities in preparation therefor." While NSA lawfully sought data pertaining to a foreign power engaged in international terrorism, [Redacted] produced inaccurate data and data beyond that which NSA sought.

(4) (U//~~FOUO~~) **Cause:** This incident occurred as a result of technical errors [Redacted]. There was nothing in the substance of the CDRs that would have alerted NSA targeting analysts to this problem as the information was being collected. Rather, it was NSA technical analysts' observations of anomalies in certain CDRs that led them to investigate further [Redacted].

(5) (U//~~FOUO~~) **Impact on National Security or International Relations:** None.

(6) (U//~~FOUO~~) **Impact on Civil Liberties or Privacy:** The CLPT assesses that the incident had a significant impact on civil liberties and privacy. A determination was made to delete all the CDRs and any associated reporting. NSA began deleting all CDRs acquired [Redacted] under Title V of the FISA.

(7) ~~(TS//SI//NF)~~ **Remedial Action:** On 23 May 2018, NSA began deleting all call detail records (CDRs) acquired [Redacted] under Title V of the FISA. Because [Redacted] have informed NSA that the issue has been remediated, NSA believes that CDRs delivered after 23 May 2018 will not contain these errors. NSA has reviewed all intelligence reports based on USA FREEDOM Act CDR data and has recalled and reissued one report to correct erroneous

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
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(b) (3) -50 USC 3024 (i)
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347 information. In addition, NSA relied on the inaccurate information in targeting requests for
348 approved by the FISC, and notified the court of such.

349 (8) (U) **Additional Information:** NSA notified the congressional intelligence
350 committees of this incident on 10 April 2018. DoJ notified the FISC about the details of this
351 matter as they became available on 22 November 2017, 5 March 2018, 11 April 2018, and
352 4 June 2018. This matter has also been reported to the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight
353 Board (PCLOB). NSA also reported this matter publicly.

354 (9) (U) **Status:** Closed/substantiated.


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
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