Introduction

Thank you for the opportunity to provide the board with the ACLU’s views concerning Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (“FISA”). The ACLU’s view is that Section 702 is unconstitutional. The statute violates the Fourth Amendment because it permits the government to conduct large-scale warrantless surveillance of Americans’ international communications—communications in which Americans have a reasonable expectation of privacy.1 The statute would be unconstitutional even if the warrant clause were inapplicable because the surveillance it authorizes is unreasonable.2

The ACLU also believes, based on records released over the past nine months, that the government’s implementation of the Act exceeds statutory authority—i.e., that the government is claiming, and exercising, more authority than the statute actually provides. First, while the statute was intended to augment the government’s authority to collect international communications, the NSA’s targeting and minimization procedures give the government broad authority to collect purely domestic communications as well. Second, while the statute was intended to give the government authority to acquire communications to and from the government’s targets, the NSA’s procedures also permit the government to acquire communications “about” those targets. And, third, while the statute prohibits so-called “reverse targeting,” the NSA’s procedures authorize the government to conduct “backdoor” searches of

---

1 I would like to acknowledge the substantial contributions of Alex Abdo, Brett Max Kaufman, Michelle Richardson, and Patrick Toomey—though any errors herein are solely my own.

2 As discussed below, the statute is also unconstitutional because it imposes a substantial burden on expressive and associational rights but lacks the safeguards that the First Amendment demands.
communications acquired under the FAA using selectors associated with particular, known Americans. Thus, even if the statute itself is lawful, the NSA’s implementation of it is not.³

ANALYSIS

I. Background

A. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978

In 1975, Congress established a committee, chaired by Senator Frank Church, to investigate allegations of “substantial wrongdoing” by the intelligence agencies in their conduct of surveillance.⁴ The committee discovered that, over the course of four decades, the intelligence agencies had “violated specific statutory prohibitions,” “infringed the constitutional rights of American citizens,” and “intentionally disregarded” legal limitations on surveillance in the name of “national security.”⁵ Of particular concern to the committee was that the agencies had “pursued a ‘vacuum cleaner’ approach to intelligence collection,” in some cases intercepting Americans’ communications under the pretext of targeting foreigners.⁶ To better protect Americans’ privacy, the committee recommended that all surveillance of communications “to, from, or about an American without his consent” be subject to a judicial warrant procedure.⁷

In 1978, largely in response to the Church Report, Congress enacted FISA to regulate government surveillance conducted for foreign intelligence purposes. The statute created the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (“FISC”) and empowered it to grant or deny government applications for surveillance orders in certain foreign intelligence investigations.⁸ In its current form, FISA regulates, among other things, “electronic surveillance,” which is defined to include:

the acquisition by an electronic, mechanical, or other surveillance device of the contents of any wire communication to or from a person in the United States, without the consent of any party thereto, if such acquisition occurs in the United States.⁹

³ This submission focuses solely on the requirements of domestic law. The ACLU intends to file a separate submission analyzing Section 702 under principles of international law.


⁵ Church Report at 137.

⁶ Id. at 165.

⁷ Id. at 309.


⁹ Id. § 1801(f)(2).
Before passage of the FAA, FISA generally foreclosed the government from engaging in “electronic surveillance” without first obtaining individualized and particularized orders from the FISC. To obtain an order, the government was required to submit an application that identified or described the target of the surveillance; explained the government’s basis for believing that “the target of the electronic surveillance was a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power”; explained the government’s basis for believing that “each of the facilities or places at which the electronic surveillance was directed being used, or about to be used, by a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power”; described the procedures the government would use to “minimiz[e]” the acquisition, retention, and dissemination of non-publicly available information concerning U.S. persons; described the nature of the foreign intelligence information sought and the type of communications that would be subject to surveillance; and certified that a “significant purpose” of the surveillance was to obtain “foreign intelligence information.”

The FISC could issue a traditional FISA order only if it found that there was “probable cause to believe that the target of the electronic surveillance was a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power,” and that “each of the facilities or places at which the electronic surveillance was directed being used, or about to be used, by a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power.”

B. The Warrantless Wiretapping Program and the 2007 FISA Orders

In late 2001, President Bush secretly authorized the NSA to implement a program of warrantless electronic surveillance. The program, which President Bush publicly acknowledged after The New York Times reported its existence in December 2005, involved, among other things, the interception of certain emails and telephone calls that originated or terminated inside the United States. The interceptions were not predicated on judicial warrants or any other form of judicial authorization; nor were they predicated on any determination of criminal or foreign intelligence probable cause. Instead, NSA “shift supervisors” initiated surveillance when, in their judgment, there was a “reasonable basis to conclude that one party to the communication was a member of al Qaeda, affiliated with al Qaeda, or a member of an organization affiliated with al Qaeda, or working in support of al Qaeda.”

---

10 Id. § 1804(a) (2006).
11 Id. § 1805(a)(2)(A).
12 Id. § 1805(a)(2)(B).
A district court enjoined the warrantless wiretapping program on August 17, 2006, holding that it violated FISA, the First and Fourth Amendments, and the principle of separation of powers. On January 17, 2007, then–Attorney General Alberto Gonzales announced that the government would discontinue the program as it was then constituted. He explained that a judge of the FISC had ratified the program and that, as a result, “any electronic surveillance that had been occurring” as part of the program would thereafter be conducted “subject to the approval of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court.”

In the spring of 2007, the FISC narrowed the orders it had issued in January of that year. After it did so, the administration pressed Congress for amendments that would permit large-scale warrantless surveillance of Americans’ international communications.

C. The FISA Amendments Act of 2008

President Bush signed the FAA into law on July 10, 2008. The statute authorizes the government’s large-scale acquisition of U.S. persons’ international communications from Internet and telecommunications providers inside the United States. It achieves this result by giving the government sweeping authority to monitor the communications of “targets” located outside the United States and to monitor U.S. persons’ communications in the course of that surveillance.

The FAA permits the Attorney General and DNI to “authorize jointly, for a period of up to 1 year . . . the targeting of persons reasonably believed to be located outside the United States to acquire foreign intelligence information.” Before obtaining an order authorizing surveillance under the Act, the Attorney General and DNI must provide to the FISC a written certification attesting that the FISC has approved, or that the government has submitted to the FISC for approval, “targeting procedures” and “minimization procedures.” The targeting procedures must be “reasonably designed” to ensure that the acquisition is “limited to targeting persons reasonably believed to be located outside the United States” and to “prevent the intentional acquisition of any communication as to which the sender and all intended recipients are known at the time of the acquisition to be located in the United States.” The minimization procedures

---


17 Letter from Alberto Gonzales, Attorney General, to Senators Patrick Leahy and Arlen Specter 1 (Jan. 17, 2007), http://nyti.ms/1ixrE0M.


19 See PSP IG Report 30–31; see also Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1144 (2013).


22 50 U.S.C. §1881a(a).

23 Id. § 1881a(d–(g).

24 Id. § 1881a(g)(2)(A)(I).
must meet the requirements of sections 1801(h) and 1821(4), described below. The certification and supporting affidavit must also attest that the Attorney General has adopted “guidelines” to prevent the targeting of known U.S. persons; that the targeting procedures, minimization procedures, and guidelines are consistent with the Fourth Amendment; and that “a significant purpose” of the acquisition is “to obtain foreign intelligence information.” The phrase “foreign intelligence information” is defined broadly to include, among other things, information concerning terrorism, national defense, and foreign affairs.

Surveillance conducted under the FAA differs significantly—indeed, radically—from surveillance conducted under traditional FISA. Unlike surveillance under traditional FISA, surveillance under the FAA is not predicated on probable cause or individualized suspicion. The government’s targets need not be agents of foreign powers, engaged in criminal activity, or connected even remotely with terrorism. Rather, the FAA permits the government to target any foreigner located outside the United States so long as the programmatic purpose of the surveillance is to acquire “foreign intelligence information.”

In addition, the FISC’s role in reviewing the government’s surveillance activities under the FAA is “narrowly circumscribed.” The FISC does not review or approve the government’s targeting decisions. Nor does it review or approve the list of “facilities” the government proposes to monitor—to the contrary, the FAA expressly provides that the government need not inform the FISC of the “facilities, places, premises, or property” at which its surveillance will be directed. The FISC reviews only the general procedures that the government proposes to use in carrying out its surveillance. The role that the FISC plays under the FAA bears no resemblance to the role that it has traditionally played under FISA.

Importantly, while the FAA addresses the circumstances in which the government may “target” individuals outside the United States, its effect is to give the government broad authority to monitor Americans’ international communications. This is by design. In advocating changes to

25 Id. § 1881a(g)(2)(A)(ii).
26 Id. § 1881a(g)(2)(A)(iii)–(vii).
27 Id. § 1801(e).
28 See David S. Kris & J. Douglas Wilson, 1 National Security Investigations and Prosecutions § 17.3, 602 (2d ed. 2012) (“For non–U.S. person targets, there is no probable cause requirement; the only thing that matters is [the government’s reasonable belief about] the target’s location.”).
30 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(g)(4).
31 See id. § 1881a.
FISA, intelligence officials made clear that their principal aim was to enable broader surveillance of communications between individuals inside the United States and non-Americans abroad.\textsuperscript{33}

To the extent the FAA protects Americans’ privacy rights, it does so through the requirement that the government adopt “minimization procedures”—procedures that must be “reasonably designed . . . to minimize the acquisition and retention, and prohibit the dissemination, of nonpublicly available information concerning unconsenting United States persons.”\textsuperscript{34} However, the statute does not prescribe specific minimization procedures and it does not give the FISC the authority to monitor compliance with minimization procedures. Moreover, it includes an exception that expressly allows the government to retain and disseminate communications—including those of U.S. persons—if the government concludes that the communications contain “foreign intelligence information.” Again, that term is defined very broadly. The effect of the statute is to allow the government to conduct large-scale monitoring of Americans’ international communications for “foreign intelligence information.”

\section{The FAA violates the Fourth Amendment.}

The FAA authorizes warrantless surveillance of Americans’ international communications, communications in which Americans have a reasonable expectation of privacy. This warrantless surveillance is not excused by any recognized exception to the warrant requirement. While some courts have recognized an exception to the warrant requirement in the foreign intelligence context, most of these courts did so before Congress enacted FISA in 1978, and the nation’s experience with FISA since 1978 has undermined these courts’ reasoning. In any event, no court has recognized a foreign intelligence exception broad enough to justify the dragnet surveillance at issue here.

The fact that the Constitution forecloses the government from conducting warrantless surveillance of U.S. persons’ international communications does not mean that the Constitution invariably requires the government to obtain probable-cause warrants before conducting surveillance of a legitimate foreign intelligence targets outside the United States. The Fourth Amendment does not require the government to obtain prior judicial authorization for surveillance of foreign targets merely because those foreign targets might at some point communicate with U.S. persons. But compliance with the warrant clause requires, at the very least, that the government avoid warrantless acquisition of Americans’ international communications where it is reasonably possible to do so. It must make reasonable efforts not to intercept those communications in the first place—for example, it must minimize “acquisition” of those communications. If it nonetheless acquires U.S. persons’ communications through warrantless surveillance, it should generally not retain them. If it retains them, it should not access them—“collect” them, in the NSA’s terminology—without first seeking a warrant based on probable cause.\textsuperscript{35} The mere fact that the government’s “targets” are foreigners outside the

\textsuperscript{33} See infra Section II.C.

\textsuperscript{34} 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801(h)(1), 1821(4)(A).

\textsuperscript{35} A bill co-sponsored by then-Senator Obama corresponded to these principles. The bill would have prohibited the government from acquiring a communication without a warrant if it knew “before or at the time of acquisition that the communication [was] to or from a person reasonably believed to be located in
United States cannot render constitutional a program that is designed to allow the government to mine millions of Americans’ international communications for foreign intelligence information.

It is important to note that the FAA would be unconstitutional even if the warrant clause did not apply. As discussed in Section II.D, infra, the FAA lacks any of the traditional indicia of reasonableness. Indeed, it authorizes the kind of surveillance that led to the adoption of the Fourth Amendment in the first place—generalized surveillance based on general warrants. While the government plainly has a legitimate interest in collecting information about threats to the national security, the Fourth Amendment requires that the government pursue this interest with narrower means.

A. The FAA violates the Fourth Amendment because it permits the government to monitor Americans’ communications in violation of the warrant clause.

Americans have a constitutionally protected privacy interest in the content of their telephone calls and emails. This expectation of privacy extends not just to domestic communications but to international communications as well. Because Americans have a constitutionally protected privacy interest in the content of their international communications, the government generally cannot monitor these communications without first obtaining a warrant.


37 See, e.g., United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 616–20 (1977) (holding that Fourth Amendment was implicated by statute that authorized customs officers to open envelopes and packages sent from outside the United States); Birnbaum v. United States, 588 F.2d 319, 325 (2d Cir. 1979); United States v. Doe, 472 F.2d 982, 984 (2d Cir. 1973); United States v. Bin Laden, 126 F. Supp. 2d 264, 281 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); see also United States v. Maturo, 982 F.2d 57, 61 (2d Cir. 1992) (holding that Fourth Amendment is engaged even by foreign governments’ surveillance of Americans abroad if the U.S. government is sufficiently involved in the surveillance); United States v. Peterson, 812 F.2d 486 (9th Cir. 1987) (same); Berlin Democratic Club v. Rumsfeld, 410 F. Supp. 144 (D.D.C. 1976) (same).
based on probable cause. Warrantless searches are “per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment—subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.”

The Supreme Court has interpreted the warrant clause to require three things: first, that any warrant be issued by a neutral, disinterested magistrate; second, that those seeking the warrant demonstrate to the magistrate “probable cause”; and third, that any warrant particularly describe the things to be seized as well as the place to be searched. The requirement of a “neutral, disinterested magistrate” is a requirement that that “the deliberate, impartial judgment of a judicial officer ... be interposed between the citizen and the police.” The requirement of probable cause is meant to ensure that “baseless searches shall not proceed.” The requirement of particularity, finally, is meant to “limit[] the authorization to search to the specific areas and things for which there is probable cause to search” in order to “ensure[] that the search will be carefully tailored.”

The importance of the particularity requirement “is especially great in the case of eavesdropping,” because eavesdropping inevitably leads to the interception of intimate

38 See Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. 238, 256 n.18 (1979) (“electronic surveillance undeniably is a Fourth Amendment intrusion requiring a warrant”); Keith, 407 U.S. at 313 (“the broad and unsuspected governmental incursions into conversational privacy which electronic surveillance entails necessitates the application of Fourth Amendment safeguards”); Katz, 389 U.S. at 356; United States v. Figueroa, 757 F.2d 466, 471 (2d Cir. 1985) (“even narrowly circumscribed electronic surveillance must have prior judicial sanction”); United States v. Tortorello, 480 F.2d 764, 773 (1973).


40 Dalia, 441 U.S. at 255.

41 Katz, 389 U.S. at 357; see also Shadwick v. City of Tampa, 407 U.S. 345, 350 (1972) (stating that a “neutral, disinterested magistrate” must be someone other than an executive officer “engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime”); Keith, 407 U.S. at 316–17 (“The Fourth Amendment contemplates a prior judicial judgment, not the risk that executive discretion may be reasonably exercised.”); McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 455–56 (1948) (“The right of privacy was deemed too precious to entrust to the discretion of those whose job is the detection of crime and the arrest of criminals.”).

42 Keith, 407 U.S. at 316. Probable cause “is the standard by which a particular decision to search is tested against the constitutional mandate of reasonableness.” Camara v. Mun. Court of S.F., 387 U.S. 523, 534 (1967).

43 Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 84 (1987); see also United States v. Silberman, 732 F. Supp. 1057, 1061–62 (1990) (“[T]he particularity clause requires that a statute authorizing a search or seizure must provide some means of limiting the place to be searched in a manner sufficient to protect a person’s legitimate right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures.”); see also United States v. Bianco, 998 F.2d 1112, 1115 (2d Cir. 1993) (stating that the particularity requirement “prevents a general, exploratory rummaging in a person’s belongings” (internal quotation marks omitted)). The particularity requirement is designed to leave nothing “to the discretion of the officer executing the warrant.” Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 480 (1976).
conversations that are unrelated to the investigation.\footnote{Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 65 (1967) (Douglas, J., concurring) ("The traditional wiretap or electronic eavesdropping device constitutes a dragnet, sweeping in all conversations within its scope—without regard to the participants or the nature of the conversations. It intrudes upon the privacy of those not even suspected of crime and intercepts the most intimate of conversations."); see also Tortorello, 480 F.2d at 779.} In the context of electronic surveillance, the requirement of particularity generally demands that the government identify or describe the person to be surveilled, the facilities to be monitored, and the particular communications to be seized.\footnote{See United States v. Donovan, 429 U.S. 413, 427 n.15, 428 (1977).}

The FAA authorizes the executive branch to conduct electronic surveillance without compliance with the warrant clause.

First, the Act fails to interpose “the deliberate, impartial judgment of a judicial officer . . . between the citizen and the police.”\footnote{Katz, 389 U.S. at 357.} While the government may not initiate an acquisition under section the FAA without first applying for an order from the FISC (or, in an emergency, obtaining such an order within seven days of initiating the acquisition), the FISC’s role in this context is limited to reviewing general procedures relating to targeting and minimization. Nothing in the Act requires the government even to inform the court who its surveillance targets are (beyond to say that the targets are outside the United States), what the purpose of its surveillance is (beyond to say that a “significant purpose” of the surveillance is foreign intelligence), or which Americans’ privacy is likely to be implicated by the acquisition.\footnote{Cf. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(b) (requiring government’s application for Title III warrant to include, inter alia, details as to the particular offense that has been committed, a description of the nature and location of facilities to be monitored, a description of the type of communications to be intercepted, and the identity of the individual to be monitored); 50 U.S.C. § 1804(a) (setting out similar requirements for FISA warrants).}

Second, the Act fails to condition government surveillance on the existence of probable cause. The Act permits the government to conduct acquisitions under section 702(a) without proving to a court that its surveillance targets are foreign agents, engaged in criminal activity, or connected even remotely with terrorism.\footnote{Cf. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3) (permitting government to conduct surveillance under Title III only after court makes probable cause determination); 50 U.S.C. § 1805(a)(2) (corresponding provision for FISA).} Indeed, the FAA permits the government to conduct acquisitions without even making an \textit{administrative} determination that its targets fall into any of these categories. Accordingly, the government’s surveillance targets may be political activists, victims of human rights abuses, journalists, or researchers. The government’s targets may even be entire populations or geographic regions.\footnote{See Letter from Att’y Gen. Michael B. Mukasey and DNI McConnell to Hon. Harry Reid (Feb. 5, 2008), http://1.usa.gov/1kVLzJJu (arguing that the intelligence community should not be prevented “from targeting a particular group of buildings or a geographic area abroad”).}
Again, it is important to recognize that the absence of an individualized suspicion requirement has ramifications for Americans even though the government’s ostensible targets are foreign citizens outside the United States. The absence of an individualized suspicion requirement means that the government can conduct large-scale warrantless surveillance of Americans’ international communications.

Third, the FAA fails to impose any meaningful limit on the scope of surveillance conducted under the Act. Unlike FISA, it does not require the government to identify the individuals to be monitored.\(^{50}\) It does not require the government to identify the facilities, telephone lines, email addresses, places, premises, or property at which its surveillance will be directed.\(^{51}\) It does not limit the kinds of communications the government can acquire, beyond requiring that a programmatic purpose of the government’s surveillance be to gather foreign intelligence.\(^{52}\) Nor does it require the government to identify “the particular conversations to be seized.”\(^{53}\) Nor, finally, does it place any reasonable limit on the duration of surveillance orders.\(^{54}\)

B. That surveillance under the FAA is conducted for “foreign intelligence” purposes does not make the warrant clause inapplicable.

The warrant requirement applies not only to surveillance conducted for law enforcement purposes but to surveillance conducted for intelligence purposes as well. In Keith, the government argued that the President, acting through the Attorney General, could constitutionally “authorize electronic surveillance in internal security matters without prior judicial approval.”\(^{55}\) In support of its position, the government argued that surveillance conducted for intelligence purposes “should not be subject to traditional warrant requirements which were established to govern investigation of criminal activity”; that courts “have neither the knowledge nor the techniques necessary to determine whether there was probable cause to believe that surveillance was necessary to protect national security”; and that judicial oversight of intelligence surveillance “would create serious potential dangers to the national security and to the lives of informants and agents.”\(^{56}\)

\(^{50}\) Cf. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(b)(iv) (requiring Title III application to include “the identity of the person, if known, committing the offense and whose communications are to be intercepted”); 50 U.S.C. §1804(a)(2) (requiring FISA application to describe “the identity, if known, or a description of the target of the electronic surveillance”).


\(^{52}\) Cf. 50 U.S.C. § 1804(a)(6) (allowing issuance of FISA order only upon certification that a significant purpose of the specific intercept is to obtain foreign intelligence information).


\(^{54}\) Compare FAA § 702(a) (allowing surveillance programs to continue for up to 1 year), with 50 U.S.C. § 1805(d)(1) (providing that surveillance orders issued under FISA are generally limited to 90 or 120 days); 18 U.S.C. § 2518(5) (providing that surveillance orders issued under Title III are limited to 30 days).

\(^{55}\) 407 U.S. at 299.

\(^{56}\) Id. at 319.
The Court emphatically rejected these arguments. To the government’s effort to distinguish intelligence surveillance from law enforcement surveillance, the court wrote that “[o]fficial surveillance, whether its purpose be criminal investigation or ongoing intelligence gathering, risks infringement of constitutionally protected privacy of speech.”57 To the government’s claim that security matters would be “too subtle and complex for judicial evaluation,” the Court responded that the judiciary “regularly deal[s] with the most difficult issues of our society” and that there was “no reason to believe that federal judges will be insensitive to or uncomprehending of the issues involved in domestic security cases.”58 Finally, to the government’s contention that the warrant requirement would “fracture the secrecy essential to official intelligence gathering,” the Court responded that the judiciary had experience dealing with sensitive and confidential matters and that in any event warrant application proceedings were ordinarily ex parte.59

Keith involved surveillance conducted for domestic intelligence purposes, but all of the Keith Court’s reasons for refusing to exempt domestic intelligence surveillance from the warrant requirement apply with equal force to foreign intelligence surveillance as well. First, intelligence surveillance conducted inside the United States presents the same risks to “constitutionally protected privacy of speech” whether the asserted threats are foreign or domestic in origin; both forms of surveillance can be used to “oversee political dissent,” and both forms of surveillance could as easily lead to the “indiscriminate wiretapping and bugging of law-abiding citizens” that the Keith Court feared.60 The risks are even greater if, as under the FAA, there is no requirement that the government’s surveillance activities be directed at specific foreign agents.61

Second, the courts are just as capable of overseeing intelligence surveillance relating to foreign threats as they are of overseeing intelligence surveillance relating to domestic threats. Indeed, for the past 30 years, the courts have been overseeing intelligence surveillance relating to agents of foreign powers because, since its enactment in 1978, FISA has required the government to obtain individualized judicial authorization—based on probable cause that the target is an agent of a foreign power—before conducting foreign intelligence surveillance inside the nation’s borders. There is nothing unworkable about FISA’s core requirement of judicial authorization. Since 1978, the FISC has granted more than 33,000 surveillance applications...

---

57 Id. at 320.

58 Id.; see also id. (“If a threat is too subtle or complex for our senior law enforcement officers to convey its significance to a court, one may question whether there is probable cause for surveillance.”).

59 Id. at 320–21.

60 See Keith, 407 U.S. at 321; see also S. Rep. No. 95-701, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3984 (stating Senate Select Committee on Intelligence’s judgment that the arguments in favor of prior judicial review “apply with even greater force to foreign counterintelligence surveillance”).

61 Notably, in Keith the government argued that it would be difficult if not impossible to distinguish domestic threats from foreign ones. See Zweibon v. Mitchell, 516 F.2d 594, 652 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (en banc) (plurality opinion) (discussing the Solicitor General’s brief in Keith); United States v. Hoffman, 334 F. Supp. 504, 506 (D.D.C. 1971) (“The government contends that foreign and domestic affairs are inextricably intertwined and that any attempt to legally distinguish the impact of foreign affairs from the matters of internal subversive activities is an exercise in futility.”).
submitted by the executive branch, and the government has brought dozens of prosecutions based on evidence obtained through FISA.62

Finally, the country’s experience with FISA also shows that judicial oversight can operate without compromising the secrecy that is necessary in the intelligence context. The FISC meets in secret, rarely publishes its opinions, and generally allows only the government to appear before it.63 The entire system is organized around the need to preserve the confidentiality of sources and methods. To my knowledge, the executive branch has never suggested that the oversight of the FISC presents a danger to national security. Indeed, in recent months the President and senior intelligence officials have acknowledged that the FISA system is too secretive.64

In the wake of Keith, the D.C. Circuit suggested that a warrant should be required even for foreign intelligence surveillance directed at suspected foreign powers and agents.65 While other circuit courts recognized a foreign intelligence exception,66 all of these cases involved surveillance conducted before the enactment of FISA, and FISA seriously undermines their rationale.67 Equally important, these cases limited the foreign intelligence exception to contexts in which (i) the government’s surveillance was directed at a specific foreign agent or foreign power; (ii) the government’s primary purpose was to gather foreign intelligence information; and

---


63 See In re Motion for Release of Court Records, 526 F. Supp. 2d. 484, 488 (FISC 2007) (“Other courts operate primarily in public, with secrecy the exception; the FISC operates primarily in secret, with public access the exception.”).


65 Zweibon, 516 F.2d at 614 (stating in dicta that “we believe that an analysis of the policies implicated by foreign security surveillance indicates that, absent exigent circumstances, all warrantless electronic surveillance is unreasonable and therefore unconstitutional”); Berlin Democratic Club, 410 F. Supp. at 159.

66 See., e.g., United States v. Truong Dinh Hung, 629 F.2d 908, 912–15 (4th Cir. 1980); United States v. Buck, 548 F.2d 871, 875 (9th Cir. 1977); United States v. Butenko, 494 F.2d 593, 604–05 (3d Cir. 1974); United States v. Brown, 484 F.2d 418, 426 (5th Cir. 1973). In In re Sealed Case, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review noted that pre-FISA cases had recognized a foreign intelligence exception, but the court did not reach the issue itself. 310 F.3d 717, 742 (FISC Rev. 2002).

67 See Bin Laden, 126 F. Supp. 2d at 272 n.8.
(iii) either the President or Attorney General personally approved the surveillance.68 The FAA contains none of these limitations.

C. That U.S. persons’ communications are collected “incidentally” does not render the warrant clause inapplicable.

The government has argued that the warrant clause is inapplicable because surveillance of Americans’ communications under the FAA is “incidental” to surveillance of foreign targets who lack Fourth Amendment rights. This is incorrect. The so-called “incidental overhear” cases hold that where the government has a judicially authorized warrant based on probable cause to monitor specific individuals and facilities, its surveillance is not unlawful merely because it sweeps up the communications of third parties in communication with the target. These cases do not have any application here.

First, the surveillance of Americans’ communications under the Act is not “incidental” in any ordinary sense of that word. Intelligence officials who advocated for passage of the FAA (and the Protect America Act before it) indicated that their principal aim was to allow the government broader authority to monitor Americans’ international communications.69 Indeed, when legislators proposed language that would have required the government to obtain probable-cause warrants before accessing Americans’ international communications, the White House issued a veto threat.70 One cannot reasonably say that the surveillance of Americans’ communications under the FAA is “incidental” when permitting such surveillance was the very purpose of the Act.

Nor can one reasonably say that the surveillance of Americans’ international communications is “incidental” when the Act is designed to allow the government to conduct large-scale warrantless surveillance of those communications. While the statute prohibits “reverse targeting,” the prohibition is narrow—it applies only if the purpose of the government’s surveillance is to target a “particular, known person reasonably believed to be in the United States.”71 Outside that narrow prohibition, the statute allows the government to conduct

---

68 See Truong, 629 F.2d at 912; United States v. Ehrlichman, 546 F.2d 910, 925 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Bin Laden, 126 F. Supp. 2d at 277.

69 See, e.g., FISA for the 21st Century: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. at 9 (2006), http://1.usa.gov/1kbghm3 (statement of NSA Director Michael Hayden) (stating that communications originating or terminating in the United States were those of most importance to the government); see also Privacy & Civil Liberties Oversight Board, Workshop Regarding Surveillance Programs Operated Pursuant to Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act and Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act at 109:9–17 (July 9, 2013) (statement of Steven G. Bradbury, Former Principal Deputy Ass’t Att’y Gen., DOJ Office of Legal Counsel) (stating that the FAA is “particularly focused on communications in and out of the United States because . . . those are the most important communications”).

70 See Letter from Att’y Gen. Michael Mukasey & DNI John M. McConnell to Sen. Harry Reid, at 3–4 (Feb. 5, 2008), http://1.usa.gov/1ihhf9A (asserting that proposed amendment would make it “more difficult to collect intelligence when a foreign terrorist overseas is calling into the United States—which is precisely the communication we generally care about”).

71 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(b)(2) (emphasis added).
surveillance in order to collect Americans’ international communications. It can target Al Jazeera or the Guardian in order to monitor their communications with sources in the United States. It can target business executives in order to monitor their communications with American financial institutions. Consistent with the intent of its proponents, the FAA authorizes the government to conduct surveillance of foreign targets—again, targets who need not be suspected foreign agents but who may be attorneys, human rights researchers, or journalists—with the specific purpose of learning the substance of those targets’ communications with Americans.

Second, the “incidental overhear” cases involve contexts in which the government’s surveillance is predicated on a warrant—that is, where a court has found probable cause with respect to the target and has limited with particularity the facilities and communications to be monitored. The rule is invoked, in other words, where a court has narrowly limited the scope of the government’s intrusion into the privacy of third parties. In that context, the courts have held that the judicially approved warrant satisfied the government’s constitutional obligation to those third parties.

Neither the FAA nor the FISC, however, imposes analogous limitations on surveillance conducted under the FAA, and neither, therefore, accounts for the Fourth Amendment rights of Americans whose communications are swept up in the course of that warrantless surveillance. Quite the opposite: as discussed above, the FAA does not require the government to establish probable cause or individualized suspicion of any kind with respect to its targets; it does not require the government to identify to any court the facilities it intends to monitor; and it does not require the government to limit the communications it acquires—so long as the programmatic purpose of its surveillance is to obtain foreign intelligence information. Surveillance under the statute is not particularized in any way. The rule of the “incidental overhear” cases cannot be extended to this context.

Third, and relatedly, the volume of communications intercepted “incidentally” in the course of surveillance under the FAA differs dramatically from the volume of communications intercepted incidentally in the course of surveillance conducted under FISA or Title III. Unlike FISA and Title III, the FAA allows the government to conduct dragnet surveillance—surveillance that targets entire populations or geographic areas or, if the government’s interpretation of the statute is correct, surveillance that scans millions of people’s communications for information “about” the government’s targets. The use of the term “incidental” suggests that the collection of Americans’ communications under the FAA is a *de minimis* byproduct common to all forms of surveillance. But whereas surveillance under Title III or traditional FISA might lead to the incidental collection of a handful of people’s communications, surveillance under the FAA can result in the collection of communications from millions of Americans.

---


73 See Donovan, 429 U.S. at 436 n.15 (holding that while a warrant is not made unconstitutional by “failure to identify every individual who could be expected to be overheard,” the “complete absence of prior judicial authorization would make an intercept unlawful”); United States v. Yannotti, 399 F. Supp. 2d 268, 274 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (finding lawful an incidental intercept because the government had obtained a judicial warrant that “did not give the monitoring agents unfettered discretion to intercept any conversations whatsoever occurring over the target cell phone”).
communications over a relatively short period of time, surveillance under the FAA is likely to invade the privacy of thousands or even millions of people.\textsuperscript{74}

D. The FAA violates the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness requirement.

The FAA would be unconstitutional even if the warrant clause were inapplicable, because the surveillance it authorizes is unreasonable.

“The ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness,”\textsuperscript{75} and the reasonableness requirement applies even where the warrant requirement does not.\textsuperscript{76} Reasonableness is determined by examining the “totality of circumstances” to “assess[]”, on the one hand, the degree to which [government conduct] intrudes upon an individual’s privacy and, on the other, the degree to which it is needed for the promotion of legitimate governmental interests.\textsuperscript{77} In the context of electronic surveillance, reasonableness demands that government eavesdropping be “precise and discriminate” and “carefully circumscribed so as to prevent unauthorized invasions of privacy.”\textsuperscript{78} Courts that have assessed the lawfulness of electronic surveillance have often looked to Title III as one measure of reasonableness.\textsuperscript{79} While constitutional limitations on foreign intelligence surveillance may differ in some respects from those applicable to law enforcement surveillance,\textsuperscript{80} “the closer [the challenged] procedures are to Title III procedures, the lesser are [the] constitutional concerns.”\textsuperscript{81}

\textsuperscript{74} See [Redacted], 2011 WL 10945618, at *27 (FISC Oct. 3, 2011) (observing that “the quantity of incidentally-acquired, non-target, protected communications being acquired by NSA through its upstream collection is, in absolute terms, very large, and the resulting intrusion is, in each instance, likewise very substantial”); id. at *26 (“[T]he Court must also take into account the absolute number of non-target, protected communications that are acquired. In absolute terms, tens of thousands of non-target, protected communications annually is a very large number.”); see also id. at *27 (noting that the government collects more than 250 million communications each year under the FAA).

\textsuperscript{75} See Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006) (quotation marks omitted).

\textsuperscript{76} United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 539 (1985); see In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 737 (assessing reasonableness of FISA); Figueroa, 757 F.2d at 471–73 (Title III); United States v. Duggan, 743 F.2d 59, 73–74 (2d Cir. 1984) (assessing reasonableness of FISA); United States v. Tortorello, 480 F.2d 764, 772–73 (2d Cir. 1973) (Title III).


\textsuperscript{78} Berger, 388 U.S. at 58 (quotation marks omitted); see United States v. Bobo, 477 F.2d 974, 980 (4th Cir. 1973) (“[W]e must look . . . to the totality of the circumstances and the overall impact of the statute to see if it authorizes indiscriminate and irresponsible use of electronic surveillance or if it authorizes a reasonable search under the Fourth Amendment.”).

\textsuperscript{79} See, e.g., United States v. Mesa-Rincon, 911 F.2d 1433, 1438 (10th Cir. 1990) (evaluating reasonableness of video surveillance); United States v. Biasucci, 786 F.2d 504, 510 (2d Cir. 1986) (same); United States v. Torres, 751 F.2d 875, 884 (7th Cir. 1984) (same).

\textsuperscript{80} See Keith, 407 U.S. at 323–24.

\textsuperscript{81} In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 737
The FAA lacks any of the indicia of reasonableness the courts have cited in upholding Title III. Indeed, in its failure to cabin executive discretion, the FAA differs dramatically from Title III—and, for that matter, from traditional FISA. Whereas both FISA and Title III require the government to identify to a court its targets and the facilities it intends to monitor, the FAA does not. Whereas both FISA and Title III require the government to demonstrate individualized suspicion to a court, the FAA does not. (Indeed, the FAA does not require even an administrative finding of individualized suspicion.) And, whereas both FISA and Title III impose strict limitations on the nature of the communications that the government may monitor and the duration of its surveillance, the FAA does not. By permitting the government such broad authority to acquire the communications of foreigners abroad, the Act guarantees that Americans’ privacy will be invaded on a truly unprecedented scale.

For Americans whose international communications are swept up by FAA surveillance, the sole protection is the requirement that the government “minimize the acquisition and retention, and prohibit the dissemination, of nonpublicly available information concerning unconsenting United States persons.” The protection provided by the minimization requirement, however, is largely illusory. First, the minimization requirement does not extend to “foreign intelligence information,” a phrase that is defined very broadly to encompass not just information relating to terrorism but information relating to “the conduct of the foreign affairs of the United States.”

Second, unlike Title III and FISA, the FAA does not require that minimization be particularized with respect to individual targets, and it does not subject the government’s implementation of minimization requirements to judicial oversight. Title III requires the government to conduct surveillance “in such a way as to minimize the interception of” innocent and irrelevant conversations. It strictly limits the use and dissemination of material obtained under the statute. It also authorizes courts to oversee the government’s compliance with minimization requirements. FISA similarly requires that each order authorizing surveillance of a particular target contain specific minimization procedures governing that particular

---

82 See, e.g., Duggan, 743 F.2d at 73 (FISA); United States v. Pelton, 835 F.2d 1067, 1075 (4th Cir. 1987) (FISA); United States v. Cavanagh, 807 F.2d 787, 790 (9th Cir. 1987) (FISA); In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 739–40 (FISA); In re Kevork, 634 F. Supp. 1002, 1013 (C.D. Cal. 1987) (FISA), aff’d, 788 F.2d 566 (9th Cir. 1986); United States v. Falvey, 540 F. Supp. 1306, 1313 (E.D.N.Y. 1982) (FISA); Tortorello, 480 F.2d at 773–74 (Title III); Bobo, 477 F.2d at 982 (Title III); United States v. Cafero, 473 F.2d 489, 498 (3d Cir. 1973) (Title III).

83 50 U.S.C. § 1801(h)(1); see id. § 1881a(e).

84 Id.

85 See id. § 1881(a); id. § 1801(e).

86 Id. § 2518(5); see id. (stating that “every order and extension thereof shall contain a provision” regarding the general minimization requirement).

87 Id. § 2517.

88 Id. § 2518(6).
surveillance. It also provides the FISC with authority to oversee the government’s minimization on an individualized basis during the course of the surveillance.

Under the FAA, minimization is not individualized but programmatic: the minimization requirement applies not to surveillance of specific targets but rather to entire surveillance programs, the specific targets of which may be known only to the executive branch. Moreover, the FISC is granted no authority to supervise the government’s compliance with the minimization requirements during the course of an acquisition—there is no requirement that the government seek judicial approval before it analyzes, retains, or disseminates U.S. communications. This defect is particularly significant because the FAA does not provide for individualized judicial review at the acquisition stage. Under FISA and Title III, minimization operates as a second-level protection against the acquisition, retention, and dissemination of information relating to U.S. persons. The first level of protection comes from the requirement of individualized judicial authorization for each specific surveillance target. Under the FAA, by contrast, there is no first-level protection, because the statute does not call for individualized judicial authorization of specific surveillance targets (or, for that matter, of specific facilities to be monitored or specific communications to be acquired).

Thus, the FAA’s minimization requirement does not prevent intrusion into the privacy of innocent U.S. persons. Certainly, the requirement does not prohibit the government from acquiring Americans’ communications en masse and mining them for foreign intelligence information. To the contrary, the minimization requirement is formulated to permit precisely this.

III. The FISA Amendments Act violates the First Amendment.

The Supreme Court has recognized that government surveillance can have a profound chilling effect on First Amendment rights. In Keith, the Court addressed this point at length, writing:

---

89 See 50 U.S.C. § 1804(a)(4); id. § 1805(a)(3); id. § 1805(c)(2)(A).

90 See id. § 1805(d)(3).

91 Cf. id. § 1805(d)(3); id. § 1801(h)(4) (requiring court order in order to “disclose[], disseminate[], use[] . . . or retain[] for longer than 72 hours” U.S. communications obtained in the course of warrantless surveillance of facilities used exclusively by foreign powers).

92 Cf. Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 130–31 (1978) (“The scheme of the Fourth Amendment becomes meaningful only when it is assured that at some point the conduct of those charged with enforcing the laws can be subjected to the more detached, neutral scrutiny of a judge who must evaluate the reasonableness of a particular search or seizure in light of the particular circumstances.” (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968))); United States v. James, 494 F.2d 1007, 1021 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (“The most striking feature of Title III is its reliance upon a judicial officer to supervise wiretap operations. Close scrutiny by a federal or state judge during all phases of the intercept, from the authorization through reporting and inventory, enhances the protection of individual rights.” (quotation marks omitted)); Cavanagh, 807 F.2d at 790.
National security cases . . . often reflect a convergence of First and Fourth Amendment values not present in cases of ‘ordinary’ crime. Though the investigative duty of the executive may be stronger in such cases, so also is there greater jeopardy to constitutionally protected speech. ‘Historically the struggle for freedom of speech and press in England was bound up with the issue of the scope of the search and seizure power,’ . . . history abundantly documents the tendency of Government—however benevolent and benign its motives—to view with suspicion those who most fervently dispute its policies. Fourth Amendment protections become the more necessary when the targets of official surveillance may be those suspected of unorthodoxy in their political beliefs. The danger to political dissent is acute where the Government attempts to act under so vague a concept as the power to protect ‘domestic security.’ Given the difficulty of defining the domestic security interest, the danger of abuse in acting to protect that interest becomes apparent . . . .

The price of lawful public dissent must not be a dread of subjection to an unchecked surveillance power. Nor must the fear of unauthorized official eavesdropping deter vigorous citizen dissent and discussion of Government action in private conversation. For private dissent, no less than open public discourse, is essential to our free society.93

As discussed above, Keith involved the question of whether the government could constitutionally conduct warrantless surveillance to protect against domestic security threats, but in many other contexts the Supreme Court has recognized that the government’s surveillance and investigatory activities can infringe on rights protected by the First Amendment. Thus in NAACP v. Alabama,94 a case in which the Supreme Court invalidated an Alabama order that would have required the NAACP to disclose its membership lists, the Supreme Court wrote:

It is hardly a novel perception that compelled disclosure of affiliation with groups engaged in advocacy may constitute as effective a restraint on freedom of association as the forms of governmental action in the cases above were thought likely to produce upon the particular constitutional rights there involved. This Court has recognized the vital relationship between freedom to associate and privacy in one’s associations . . . . Inviolability of privacy in group association may in many circumstances be indispensable to preservation of freedom of association, particularly where a group espouses dissident beliefs . . . .95

---

93 Keith, 407 U.S. at 313–14 (citations omitted).


95 Id. at 462; accord Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 197 (1957) (noting, in invalidating conviction for refusal to divulge sensitive associational information, that “forced revelations [that] concern matters that are unorthodox, unpopular, or even hateful to the general public, the reaction in the life of the witness may be disastrous”); see also McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334 (1995) (stating that the First Amendment protects speaker against compelled disclosure of identity); Tally v. California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960) (same).
Because government surveillance and investigative activities can have such an invidious effect on rights protected by the First Amendment, the Supreme Court has said that Fourth Amendment safeguards must be strictly enforced where the information sought to be collected implicates the First Amendment. The Court has made clear, however, that the First Amendment also supplies its own protection against laws that burden speech. Thus, in *McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission*, a case that involved a statute requiring disclosure of the identity of persons distributing election literature, the Supreme Court wrote: “When a law burdens core political speech, we apply exacting scrutiny and we uphold the restriction only if it is narrowly tailored to serve an overriding interest.” Indeed, the Supreme Court has said that even where a challenged statute burdens speech only incidentally, the statute can withstand scrutiny under the First Amendment only “if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.”

The FAA imposes a substantial burden on rights protected by the First Amendment. The statute compromises the ability of advocacy organizations, journalists and media organizations, lawyers, and others to gather information, engage in advocacy, and communicate with colleagues, clients, journalistic sources, witnesses, experts, foreign government officials, and victims of human rights abuses located outside the United States. In the debate that preceded the enactment of the FAA, some members of Congress anticipated the implications this kind of surveillance would have for expressive and associational rights. For example, Senator Cardin of Maryland stated:

> Also formidable, although incalculable, is the chilling effect which warrantless electronic surveillance may have on the constitutional rights of those who were not targets of surveillance, but who perceived themselves, whether reasonably or unreasonably, as potential targets. Our Bill of Rights is concerned not only with direct infringements on constitutional rights, but also with government activities which effectively inhibit exercise of these rights. The exercise of political freedom depends in large measure on citizens’ understanding that they will be able to be publicly active and dissent from official policy within lawful limits, without having to sacrifice the expectation of privacy they rightfully hold. Warrantless electronic surveillance can violate that understanding and impair the public confidence so necessary to an uninhibited political life.

---

96 See, e.g., *Zurcher v. Stanford Daily*, 436 U.S. 547, 564 (1978) (holding that mandates of the Fourth Amendment must be applied with “scrupulous exactitude” in this context); *id.* (“Where presumptively protected materials are sought to be seized, the warrant requirement should be administered to leave as little as possible to the discretion or whim of the officer in the field.”).

97 514 U.S. at 347 (quotation marks and citation omitted); see also *In Re Primus*, 436 U.S. 412, 432 (1978) (stating that government-imposed burdens upon constitutionally protected communications must withstand “exact ing scrutiny” and can be sustained, consistent with the First Amendment, only if the burdens are “closely drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgement of associational freedoms”).


Because the FAA imposes a substantial burden on First Amendment rights and lacks the particularity that the Fourth Amendment requires, it necessarily sweeps within its ambit constitutionally protected speech that the government has no legitimate interest in acquiring. As discussed above, the FAA permits the government to conduct intrusive surveillance of people who are neither foreign agents nor criminals and to collect vast databases of information that has nothing to do with foreign intelligence or terrorism. Indeed, the statute sweeps so broadly that no international communication is beyond its reach.

More precision is required when First Amendment rights are at stake. Notably, the phrase “scrupulous exactitude,” as used in Zurcher, was drawn from an earlier Supreme Court decision, Stanford v. Texas, a decision that particularly criticized the use of “general warrants” directed at expressive activity. As discussed above, the orders issued by the FISC under the FAA are, in essence, exactly that—general warrants.

IV. The NSA’s targeting and minimization procedures do not mitigate the statute’s constitutional defects.

In June 2013, The Guardian published targeting and minimization procedures approved by the FISC in 2009. More recently, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence released minimization procedures approved by the FISC in 2011. The procedures give the government broad authority to acquire Americans’ international communications with the government’s targets overseas. This is unsurprising, because supplying the government with this authority was the statute’s purpose. The procedures also indicate, however, that the government is exceeding its statutory authority in at least three respects.

---

100 See Promotions Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 561 (1975); Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 66 (1963) (“the freedoms of expression must be ringed about with adequate bulwarks”); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 520–21 (1958) (“the more important the rights at stake the more important must be the procedural safeguards surrounding those rights”); see also Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y of N.Y., Inc. v. Vill. of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150, 168 (2002) (striking down local ordinance that burdened First Amendment activity through requirement of a permit for door-to-door canvassing on the grounds that the ordinance “[was] not tailored to the Village’s stated interests”); McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 351–53 (striking down compelled disclosure statute on grounds that statute reached speech that was beyond state’s legitimate interests); NAACP, 357 U.S. at 463–66 (striking down order to disclose membership lists on grounds that order was not supported by state’s purported justification).


A. The procedures give the government broad authority to collect purely domestic communications.

As discussed above, the FAA gives the government sweeping authority to monitor the communications of foreigners abroad. The targeting and minimization procedures indicate, however, that the government has implemented this authority in a manner that guarantees that the NSA will acquire and retain many purely domestic communications as well. First, the procedures permit the NSA to presume that prospective surveillance targets are foreigners outside the United States absent specific information to the contrary. Second, rather than require the government to destroy purely domestic communications that are obtained inadvertently, the procedures allow the government to retain those communications if they contain foreign intelligence information, evidence of a crime, or encrypted information. This is to say that the government is using a statute that was intended to permit broad access to Americans’ international communications as a tool to engage in broad surveillance of Americans’ purely domestic communications.

B. The procedures allow the government to acquire huge volumes of communications that are neither to nor from, but merely “about,” its targets.

Section 702 authorizes the government to acquire the communications of foreign targets overseas. The NSA’s targeting and minimization procedures, however, contemplate that the agency will acquire not only communications to and from its targets but also communications that are merely “about” its targets. This form of surveillance involves the interception and search of virtually every text-based communication entering or leaving the country.\(^{104}\) An August 2013 report from The New York Times states that the NSA is “searching the contents of vast amounts of Americans’ e-mail and text communications into and out of the country, hunting for people who mention information about foreigners under surveillance, according to intelligence officials.”\(^{105}\) To conduct these searches, the NSA makes a copy of “nearly all cross-border text-based data,” scans the content of each message using its chosen keywords or “selectors,” and saves for further analysis any communication that contains a match.\(^{106}\)

This surveillance—“about” surveillance—is unlawful even if the FAA is constitutional. Nothing in the FAA’s legislative history suggests that Congress understood itself to be authorizing the very thing FISA originally set out to prohibit—the indiscriminate searching of Americans’ communications for foreign intelligence information. And concluding that the FAA permits “about” surveillance requires distorting the meaning of some of FISA’s key terms.


\(^{105}\) Savage, supra note 104.

\(^{106}\) Id.
Although the words “target” and “targeting” are not defined in FISA or the FAA, these terms have always been understood to refer to the act of intentionally subjecting a person’s communications or activities to monitoring—not to the act of searching third parties’ communications for information about that person.

Thus, in defining “electronic surveillance,” FISA and the FAA limit “targeting” to the interception of communications to or from a target:

Electronic surveillance means:

(1) [T]he acquisition ... of the contents of any wire or radio communication sent by or intended to be received by a particular, known United States person who is in the United States, if the contents are acquired by intentionally targeting that United States person . . . .

The provision that enumerates the findings the FISC must make before approving a traditional FISA application similarly contemplates surveillance of communications to and from the target, rather than merely about the target: it requires the FISC to find that the government has demonstrated probable cause to believe that the facilities it intends to monitor are “being used, or [are] about to be used, by a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power”—that is, by its targets. The provision that addresses circumstances in which the government cannot specify in advance the facilities or places it intends to monitor reflects the same premise: it requires that the government attest to the FISC that “each new facility or place at which the electronic surveillance is directed is or was being used, or is about to be used, by the target of the surveillance.” These provisions assume that the target (or the target’s agents) will be communicating using the facility that the government intends to monitor.

FISA’s definition of “aggrieved person” reflects the same premise. FISA defines an “aggrieved person” to be “a person who is the target of an electronic surveillance or any other person whose communications or activities were subject to electronic surveillance.”

Congress’s use of the word “other” in this context would be superfluous unless it understood the

---

107 50 U.S.C. § 1801(f)(1) (emphasis added); see also id. § 1881(a) (incorporating FISA’s definitions).
108 See id. § 1805(a)(2)(B).
109 Id. § 1805(c)(3)(B).
110 That the FAA does not require the government to identify the “facilities” it intends to monitor, id. § 1881a(g)(4), does not mean that the government may monitor any facility at all in order to obtain information about its targets. The term “target” limits the facilities the government may permissibly monitor. Cf. Strengthening FISA: Does the Protect America Act Protect Americans’ Civil Liberties and Enhance Security?, Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. (Sept. 25, 2007), http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2007_hr/strengthen.pdf (“September 2007 SJC Hearing”) (statements of Sen. Feingold, DNI Michael J. McConnell, and James A. Baker) (criticizing the PAA’s authorization of surveillance “concerning” non-U.S. persons, and suggesting that “targeting” would be narrower and more precise).
“target” herself to be a person whose communications or activities were subject to electronic surveillance.

Reading the statute to permit “about” surveillance also leads to perverse results. For example, it renders some individuals “aggrieved persons” even though their communications have not been acquired. This is because FISA defines “aggrieved person” to encompass any “target.” If the government targets one person by conducting “about” surveillance on others, its target is an aggrieved person under the statute even though her communications have not been acquired. This is nonsensical, and it is also inconsistent with legislative intent. The legislative history makes clear that Congress intended its definition of the term “aggrieved person” to be “coextensive [with], but no broader than, those persons who have standing to raise claims under the Fourth Amendment with respect to electronic surveillance.” Thus, it intended to exclude from the definition of “aggrieved person” those “persons, not parties to a communication, who may be mentioned or talked about by others.” As Congress observed, individuals “have no fourth amendment privacy right in communications about them which the Government may intercept.” A person targeted solely through “about” surveillance would not normally have Fourth Amendment standing. Yet, if “about” surveillance were permitted by statute, “about” targets would have standing to bring challenges under FISA. Congress’s definition of “aggrieved person” is tenable only if a “target” is a person whose communications have actually been intercepted.

The legislative history of the FAA confirms that a “target” is an individual whose communications or activities the government intends to monitor. I am aware of no evidence that Congress considered “about” surveillance when it enacted the FAA, or that Congress considered the implications of allowing the government to scan and search the contents of every communication entering or leaving the United States. To the contrary, executive branch

---

112 Id.
113 Id.
114 FISA House Report at 66.
115 Id. (emphasis added) (citing Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 316 (1968)).
116 See 50 U.S.C. § 1881e(a) (information acquired under Title VII is deemed to be information acquired from an electronic surveillance under Title I for certain purposes); id. § 1806 (defining notice, disclosure, and suppression rights of “aggrieved person[s]”).
117 See, e.g., September 2007 SJC Hearing (statement of DNI Michael J. McConnell) (addressing the fact that the PAA granted authority to acquire information “concerning” persons outside the United States and stating: “[Q]uite frankly, we were not sure why the word ‘concerning’ was used. Different language—at one point it was ‘directed at,’ at another it was ‘concerning.’”); id. (statement of James A. Baker) (suggesting that “targeting” was a more narrow, clear, and precise term than “concerning”); see also, e.g., FISA Amendments: How to Protect Americans’ Security and Privacy and Preserve the Rule of Law and Government Accountability, Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. (Oct. 31, 2007), https://fas.org/irp/congress/2007_hr/fisa-amend.html (“October 2007 SJC Hearing”); Warrantless Surveillance and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act: The Role of Checks and Balances in Protecting Americans’ Privacy Rights, Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. (Sept. 18, 2007), http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2007_hr/warrantless2.pdf; FISA, Hearing Before the H. Permanent Select Comm. on Intelligence, 110th Cong. (Sept. 20, 2007), 23
officials repeatedly indicated that FAA surveillance would be directed at the communications of foreign targets. According to those officials, the FAA was designed to fill a foreign intelligence gap previously addressed by the warrantless wiretapping program—a program that was focused on the communications of “foreign powers or their agents.” In defending the FAA before the Supreme Court, the Justice Department, too, emphasized that the statute was focused on communications to and from the government’s foreign intelligence targets. It argued that plaintiffs lacked standing to sue because they could not demonstrate that their foreign contacts would be “target[ed].”

The practice of “about” surveillance is consistent neither with the statute’s language nor with its legislative history.


118 See, e.g., October 2007 SJC Hearing (statement of Kenneth Wainstein) (“When we talk about the program, the interception of signals or communications intelligence is absolutely critical, and that is how we learn what our adversaries are planning to do. We capture their communications. We capture their conversations.”).

119 See Department of Justice, Legal Authorities Supporting the Activities of the National Security Agency Described by the President 9 n.2 (Jan. 19, 2006), http://www.fas.org/irp/nsa/doj011906.pdf; id. at 13 n.4 (“The NSA activities are proportional because they are minimally invasive and narrow in scope, targeting only the international communications of persons reasonably believed to be linked to al Qaeda . . . .”); id. at 41 (“The NSA activities are targeted to intercept international communications of persons reasonably believed to be members or agents of al Qaeda or an affiliated terrorist organization, a limitation which further strongly supports the reasonableness of the searches.”).

120 Br. of Petitioners at 19, Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138 (2013) (No. 11-1025) (“But it is wholly speculative, for instance, whether the government will imminently target respondents’ (largely unidentified) foreign contacts abroad for foreign-intelligence information . . . .”); id. at 21–22 (“Respondents’ self-inflicted harms flow from their and their foreign contacts’ fears that the government will monitor their contacts’ communications, but respondents do not seek to enjoin all possible government surveillance of their contacts.”); id. at 30 (“Respondents, for instance, rely on conjecture that the government will choose to expend its limited resources to target respondents’ own (largely unidentified) foreign contacts.”); Tr. of Oral Argument at 11:21–12:1, Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138 (2013) (No. 11-1025) (statement of the Solicitor General) (“But, in addition to the speculation I just described, once you get through all that, you still have to speculate about whether the communication that—whether the persons with whom the Respondents are communicating are going to be targeted . . . .” (emphasis added)).

121 Even if it is unclear whether the statute allows “about” surveillance, the doctrine of constitutional avoidance weighs heavily against reading the statute as the government reads it. See, e.g., Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 381 (2005); Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Const. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988). Permitting the government to mine Americans’ international communications for foreign intelligence information would raise grave constitutional concerns. The FAA should not be read to permit such surveillance absent clear evidence that Congress intended to permit it.

24
C. The procedures allow the government to circumvent the prohibition against reverse targeting.

As discussed above, the FAA prohibits the government from “reverse targeting”—it prohibits the government from “intentionally target[ing] a person reasonably believed to be located outside the United States if the purpose of such acquisition is to target a particular, known person reasonably believed to be in the United States.” The prohibition against reverse targeting was meant to limit the government’s ability to use the surveillance of foreign targets as a pretext for the monitoring of Americans.

It appears that since at least 2011, however, the NSA’s minimization procedures have allowed the agency to circumvent the prohibition against reverse targeting by searching communications already-acquired under the FAA for information about “particular, known” Americans. The agency’s 2009 minimization procedures barred such searches, stating that “[c]omputer selection terms used for scanning, such as telephone numbers, key words or phrases, or other discriminators, will not include United States person names or identifiers.” The agency’s 2011 minimization procedures, however, omit that proscription and indicate instead that “use of United States person identifiers as terms to identify and select communications” will be permitted if “first approved in accordance with NSA procedures.”

If, as they seem to do, the NSA’s 2011 minimization procedures permit so-called “backdoor” searches of communications acquired under the FAA, they render the prohibition against reverse targeting all but meaningless, because they allow the government to use the surveillance of communications to, from, or “about” foreign targets as a means of facilitating the surveillance of particular, known Americans. The problem is magnified because of the sheer volume of communications that the NSA acquires under the statute. Given the absence of any

---

122 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(b)(2) (emphasis added); see supra § II.C.

123 See James Ball & Spencer Ackerman, NSA Loophole Allows Warrantless Search for US Citizens’ Emails and Phone Calls, Guardian, Aug. 9, 2013, http://gu.com/p/3tva4 (“Senator Ron Wyden told the Guardian that the law provides the NSA with a loophole potentially allowing ‘warrantless searches for the phone calls or emails of law-abiding Americans’”).

124 Minimization Procedures Used by the National Security Agency in Connection with Acquisitions of Foreign Intelligence Information Pursuant to Section 702, As Amended § 3(b)(5) (July 29, 2009), https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/716634/exhibit-b.pdf.

125 Minimization Procedures Used by National Security Agency in Connection with Acquisitions of Foreign Intelligence Information Pursuant to Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as Amended § 3(b)(6) (Oct. 31, 2011), http://1.usa.gov/1e2JsAv (“2011 Minimization Procedures”) (omitting same restriction and stating that “use of United States person identifiers as terms to identify and select communications must first be approved in accordance with NSA procedures”).

126 154 Cong. Rec. S753, S776 (Feb. 7, 2008) (statement of Sen. Feingold) (“The bill pretends to ban reverse targeting, but this ban is so weak as to be meaningless.”).

127 Marty Lederman, Key Questions About the New FISA Bill, Balkinization (June 22, 2008, 8:27 PM EST), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2008/06/key-questions-about-new-fisa-bill.html (explaining that the potential consequences of “incidentally” collected communications are far more severe under the FAA
meaningful limitation on the NSA’s authority to acquire international communications under the statute, it is likely that the NSA’s databases already include the communications of millions of Americans. The 2011 minimization procedures allow the NSA to search through these communications and to conduct the kind of targeted investigations that in other contexts would be permitted only after a judicial finding of probable cause. Such searches would amount to an end run around both the ban on reverse targeting and the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement.  

than under FISA because the FAA gives the government a “vastly expanded reservoir of foreign-to-domestic communications from which it can cull information about nontargeted U.S. persons”).  

128 Notably, the President’s Review Group recommended that the government be prohibited from “search[ing] the contents of communications acquired under section 702 . . . in an effort to identify communications of particular United States persons,” except (a) when the information is necessary to prevent a threat of death or serious bodily harm,” or (b) when the government obtains a warrant based on probable cause to believe that the United States person is planning or is engaged in acts of international terrorism.” PRG Report 146.