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
otherwise prohibited by policy. None of these techniques have ever been approved in Afghanistan. Of these, three (marked with X) are alleged to have been employed during interrogations. These techniques - sleep deprivation, the use of scenarios designed to convince the detainee that death or severely painful consequences are imminent for him and/or his family, and beating - are alleged to have been used in the incidents leading to the two deaths at Bagram in December 2002, which are described at greater length later in this report.

(S/NF) The behavior alleged in the December 2002 Bagram death cases was clearly abusive, and clearly not in keeping with any approved interrogation policy or guidance. In both instances, the deaths followed interrogation sessions in which unauthorized techniques were allegedly employed, but in both cases, these sessions were followed by further alleged abusive behavior outside of the interrogation booth. In light of the uncertainty, the cases are considered for purposes of this report to be interrogation related.


**Migration of Interrogation Techniques (U)**

(U) Early Migration

(S)



(S/NF)



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two cases concern the December 2002 detainee deaths at the Bagram Collection Point, the third concerns a detainee death following questioning by OGA contractor David Passaro, and the fourth concerns allegations of detainee abuse at the hands of SOF personnel at Gardez in March 2003 resulting in the death of an Afghan Army recruit. (The last two cases are open, as described below, and the two Bagram death cases were closed on October 8, 2004, after our data analysis had been completed.) Notwithstanding their association with interrogation, however, it will be evident that these cases of abuse do not correlate to any approved interrogation policy.

(U) December 2002 Deaths at the Bagram Collection Point

(U) On December 4, 2002, a PUC died in custody at the BCP. Six days later, on December 10, a second PUC died at the BCP. The patterns of detainee abuse in these two incidents share some similarities. In both cases, for example, the PUCs were handcuffed to fixed objects above their heads in order to keep them awake. Additionally, interrogations in both incidents involved the use of physical violence, including kicking, beating and the use of "compliance blows" which involved striking the PUCs' legs with the MP's knee. In both cases, blunt force trauma to the legs was implicated in the deaths. In one case, a pulmonary embolism developed as a consequence of the blunt force trauma, and in the other case pre-existing

coronary artery disease was complicated by the blunt force trauma.

~~(S//NF)~~ Command and criminal investigations have been conducted to determine whether MI or MP personnel inflicted the trauma that caused the deaths, and whether prohibited interrogation practices described contributed to the deaths. At the command level, on the day after the second death, LTG McNeill ordered a broad AR 15-6 investigation into conditions at the BCP. In February 2003, after reviewing the results of the investigation, LTG McNeill prohibited several interrogation techniques implicated in the detainees' deaths. Specifically, he prohibited the practices of handcuffing the detainee as a means of enforcing sleep deprivation; hooding a detainee during questioning; and any form of physical contact used for the purposes of interrogation. (It should be noted that handcuffing as a means of enforcing sleep deprivation was never approved in any interrogation policy; and in any event, FM 34-52 constituted the only interrogation guidance in Afghanistan at the time.) Although some of these measures were later reversed in the March 2004 interrogation guidance, as described previously, they do indicate that initial action was taken.

(U) Criminal investigation into the BCP deaths was completed in early October 2004. The Army's Criminal Investigative Division (CID) has recommended charges against 28 soldiers in connection with the deaths: 15 in conjunction with

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