Dear Requester:

Your request for records under the Freedom of Information Act/Privacy Act has been processed. This letter constitutes a third interim reply from the Executive Office for United States Attorneys, the official record-keeper for all records located in this office and the various United States Attorneys' Offices. To provide you the greatest degree of access authorized by the Freedom of Information Act and the Privacy Act, we have considered your request in light of the provisions of both statutes.

The records you seek are located in a Privacy Act system of records that, in accordance with regulations promulgated by the Attorney General, is exempt from the access provisions of the Privacy Act, 28 C.F.R. § 16.81. We have also processed your request under the Freedom of Information Act. This letter constitutes a partial denial. The enclosed material is responsive to category one of your request.

Enclosed please find:

- 63 page(s) are being released in full (RIF);
- 0 page(s) are being released in part (RIP);
- 4 page(s) are withheld in full (WIF). The redacted/withheld documents were reviewed to determine if any information could be segregated for release.

The exemption(s) cited for withholding records or portions of records are marked below. An enclosure to this letter explains the exemptions in more detail. The EOUSA is also asserting Exemptions 5 and 7(C) on behalf of the United States Marshals Service to withhold certain information that originated with that agency.

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Although I am aware that this request is the subject of ongoing litigation and that appeals are not ordinarily acted on in such situations, I am required by statute and regulation to inform you that if you consider my response to be a denial of your request, you have the right to file an administrative appeal by writing within 60 days from the date of this letter to the Office of Information and Privacy, United States Department of Justice, 1425 New York Avenue, Suite 11050, Washington, D.C. 20530-0001. In light of the fact that this is an interim response, I would ask that you wait until the EOUSA has issued its final response in this request before you file an appeal.

Sincerely,

Karen M. Junegar

William G. Stewart II
Assistant Director

Enclosure(s)
Requester: Catherine Crump  
FOIA #: 07-4130

Continuation Sheet:

Please note that your original letter has been split into nineteen separate files ("requests"), for processing purposes, depending on the nature of what you sought. Each file will have a separate Request Number (listed below), for which you will receive a separate response: 07-4120 through 07-4138.

This response is to FOIA No. 07-4130 only and does not include search results associated with the other requests listed above.
EXPLANATION OF EXEMPTIONS

FOIA: TITLE 5, UNITED STATES CODE, SECTION 552

(b)(1) specifically authorized under criteria established by and Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy and (B) are in fact properly classified pursuant to such Executive order;

(b)(2) related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of an agency;

(b)(3) specifically exempted from disclosure by statute (other than section 552b of this title), provided that such statute (A) requires that the matters be withheld from the public in such a manner as to leave no discretion on the issue, or (B) establishes particular criteria for withholding or refers to particular types of matters to be withheld;

(b)(4) trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a person and privileged or confidential;

(b)(5) inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would not be available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency;

(b)(6) personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy;

(b)(7) records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only the extent that the production of such law enforcement records or information (A) could reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings, (B) would deprive a person of a right to a fair trial or an impartial adjudication, (C) could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, (D) could reasonably be expected to disclose the identity of a confidential source, (E) would disclose techniques and procedures for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions, or would disclose guidelines for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions if such disclosure could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the law, or (F) could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or physical safety of any individual.

(b)(8) contained in or related to examination, operating, or condition reports prepared by, on behalf of, or for the use of an agency responsible for the regulation or supervision of financial institutions;

(b)(9) geological and geophysical information and data, including maps, concerning wells.

PRIVACY ACT: TITLE 5, UNITED STATES CODE, SECTION 552a

(d)(5) information compiled in reasonable anticipation of a civil action proceeding;

(j)(2) material reporting investigative efforts pertaining to the enforcement of criminal law including efforts to prevent, control, or reduce crime or apprehend criminals;

(k)(1) information which is currently and properly classified pursuant to Executive Order 12356 in the interest of the national defense or foreign policy, for example, information involving intelligence sources or methods;

(k)(2) investigatory material compiled for law enforcement purposes, other than criminal, which did not result in loss of a right, benefit or privilege under Federal programs, or which would identify a source who furnished information pursuant to a promise that his/her identity would be held in confidence;

(k)(3) material maintained in connection with providing protective services to the President of the United States or any other individual pursuant to the authority of Title 18, United States Code, Section 3056;

(k)(4) required by statute to be maintained and used solely as statistical records;

(k)(5) investigatory material compiled solely for the purpose of determining suitability eligibility, or qualification for Federal civilian employment or for access to classified information, the disclosure of which would reveal the identity of the person who furnished information pursuant to a promise that his identity would be held in confidence;

(k)(6) testing or examination material used to determine individual qualifications for appointment or promotion in Federal Government service the release of which would compromise the testing or examination process;

(k)(7) material used to determine potential for promotion in the armed services, the disclosure of which would reveal the identity of the person who furnished the material pursuant to a promise that his identity would be held in confidence.
REQUESTER: Catherine Crump

FOIA FILE#: 07-4130

DOCUMENTS Released in Full “RIF”

63 pages
By Hand

The Honorable Andrew J. Peck  
Chief United States Magistrate Judge  
Southern District of New York  
United States Courthouse  
500 Pearl Street, Rm. 750  
New York, New York 10007

Re: Applications for Pen Registers and Trap and Trace Devices With Cell-site Location Authority

Dear Chief Magistrate Judge Peck:

The Government respectfully submits this letter in response to the request of the Honorable Gabriel W. Gorenstein, on behalf of Your Honor, for further briefing concerning the Court’s authority to order the prospective disclosure of cell-site information. Specifically, this letter addresses two opinions recently issued by Magistrate Judge Smith in the Southern District of Texas and Magistrate Judge Orenstein in the Eastern District of New York, which called into question the Government’s position concerning this authority. See In re Application for Pen Register and Trap/Trace Device With Cell Site Location Authority, ___ F. Supp.2d ___, 2005 WL 2656621 (S.D. Tx. Oct. 14, 2005) ("Texas Op.") and In re Application of the United States for an Order Authorizing Use of Pen Register and Trap/Trace Device and Authorizing Release of Subscriber Information and/or Cell Site Information, ___ F. Supp.2d ___, 2005 WL 2739208 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 24, 2005) ("New York Op."). This letter also responds to an October 27, 2005 amicus curiae submission from the Federal Defenders of New York, Inc. (the "Federal Defenders”), which largely repeats the reasoning of these opinions and adopts their conclusions (the "Fed. Def. Br.").

In an October 5, 2005 letter to the Court (the "October 5 Letter"), the Government set forth in detail the reasons why the prospective disclosure of cell-site information may be obtained pursuant to the combined authority of Title 18, United States Code, Sections 3121, et seq. (the "Pen/Trap Statute"), and

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Section 2703 of the Stored Communications Act ("SCA"), Title 18, United States Code, Sections 2701, et seq.

The Government’s position may be summarized as follows: The prospective disclosure of cell-site information falls squarely within the Pen/Trap Statute because cell-site information is “dialing, routing, addressing, or signaling information,” and the provisions of that statute mandate a pen/trap order for such disclosure. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3121(a), 3127(3), and 3127(4). The Pen/Trap Statute by itself, however, is insufficient authority for such disclosure, because Congress has forbidden a cellphone company from disclosing cell-site information “solely pursuant” to a pen/trap order. See 47 U.S.C. § 1002(a)(2)(B). The necessary authority for the disclosure of cell-site information called for by the Pen/Trap Statute is provided by Section 2703 of the SCA. In particular, cell-site information falls within the scope of the SCA because it constitutes “record[s] or other information pertaining to a subscriber to or customer of [an electronic communication] service (not including the contents of communications).” See 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)(1). As a result, its disclosure may be obtained pursuant to an “articulable facts” order issued under 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d). Accordingly, the Pen/Trap Statute, together with the SCA, provide authority for the disclosure, on a prospective basis, of cell-site information.

DISCUSSION

The two Magistrate Judges’ opinions, as well as the Federal Defenders’ brief, challenge the Government’s position in three principal ways. First, they dispute the Government’s interpretation of the Pen/Trap Statute and the SCA. Their alternative reading, however, is grounded in a misunderstanding of the relevant statutes and legislative history. Second, they reason that cellphones are “tracking devices” and that the tracking device statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3117, requires the Government to seek a warrant based on probable cause for the disclosure of prospective cell-site information. This argument is incorrect for at least two reasons: cellphones do not fall within the purview of the tracking device statute, but even if they did, there is no statutory requirement that the Government seek a warrant. Third, they assert that there is a reasonable expectation of privacy in cell-site information under the Fourth Amendment, which also triggers the need for a warrant issued upon a showing of probable cause. This argument fails because there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in information conveyed to third parties, and cell-site information is plainly data
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conveyed to third-party cellphone companies. Accordingly, this Court should decline to follow the objections to the Government’s position that prospective cell-site disclosure is authorized pursuant to the Pen/Trap Statute together with the SCA.

A. Legislative History Supports the Disclosure of Cell-Site Data Pursuant to the Combined Authority of the Pen/Trap Statute and the SCA

It is important to address at the outset what the Magistrate Judges’ opinions and the Federal Defenders’ brief view to be a critical weakness in the Government’s position: that there is a lack of legislative history supporting the Government’s argument that prospective cell-site information may be gathered pursuant to Section 2703 of the SCA and the Pen/Trap Statute. See Texas Op. at *15-16; New York Op. at *25; Fed. Def. Br. at 18-19. Magistrate Judge Smith quotes extensively from congressional testimony by then-Federal Bureau of Investigation Director Louis Freeh in connection with proposed legislation that became the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (“CALEA”), P.L. 103-313, 108 Stat. 4279 (1994). Magistrate Smith refers in particular to Director Freeh’s proposal to Congress of the restriction - later embodied in the “solely pursuant” language of 47 U.S.C. § 1002(a)(2)(B) - on the disclosure of cell-site information pursuant to a pen/trap order. See Texas Op. at *14. Based on this testimony, Magistrate Judge Smith concludes that “[w]hile the [solely pursuant] disclaimer did not affirmatively specify what legal authority would govern access to prospective cell site data, Director Freeh’s testimony makes clear that an order under SCA § 2703(d) was not a likely suspect.” Texas Op. at *15.

Magistrate Judge Smith, however, fails to take into account all of Director Freeh’s testimony on this subject. Significantly, Director Freeh discussed the Government’s undisputed ability to obtain “transactional data,” such as cell-site information, before proposing the CALEA restriction on which Magistrate Judge Smith focuses. Director Freeh’s testimony thus makes clear that the SCA provided the necessary authority to secure the disclosure of cell-site data called for by CALEA’s limitation. In particular, Director Freeh testified:

Some cellular carriers do acquire information relating to the general location of a cellular telephone for call distribution analysis purposes. However, this
information is not the specific type of information obtained from “true” tracking devices, which can require a warrant or court order when used to track within a private location not open to public view. See United States v. Karo, 469 U.S. 705, 714 (1984). Even when such generalized location information, or any other type of “transactional” information, is obtained from communications service providers, court orders or subpoenas are required and are obtained.


The importance of Director Freeh’s testimony cannot be overstated. Director Freeh confirmed the prevailing view of the day, namely, that cell-site information was “transactional information,” which could be obtained pursuant to “court orders or subpoenas,” not warrants. Indeed, at the time of his testimony, subpoenas could be used to compel disclosure of any non-content records or information under Section 2703(c) of the SCA, although CALEA soon modified this practice. Moreover, “court orders” referred to orders issued pursuant to Section 2703(d), which were used, then as now, to compel disclosure of “a record or other information pertaining to a customer or subscriber.” At the time of Director Freeh’s testimony, however, such orders were issued upon a showing of relevance to a legitimate law enforcement inquiry, rather than based on the heightened “articulable facts” standard, discussed below. See Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 § 201, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (1986) (providing for compelled disclosure of such records when the Government uses a subpoena or “obtains a court order for such disclosure under [18 U.S.C. § 2703(d)])”. See also October 5 Letter at 5. Director Freeh’s testimony also made clear that the disclosure of cell-site information did not require a warrant.
Accordingly, at the moment Director Freeh proposed the limitation on the disclosure of cell-site information pursuant to a pen/trap order, he also made plain to Congress that disclosure of such information was permissible under Section 2703. It is clear from the legislative history, then, that neither Director Freeh nor Congress intended to require warrants for the disclosure of cell-site information. Instead, they intended for the disclosure of such information to be governed by the rules for transactional, non-content information in Section 2703 of the SCA.

It is also important to note, as Magistrate Smith does, that one ofCALEA's goals at the time it was enacted was to preserve the same surveillance capabilities that law enforcement agencies had prior to the advent of cellphones. See Texas Op. at *13-*14. The prospective disclosure of cell-site information under the combined authority of CALEA and the SCA is in keeping with this legislative intent. Under the "old" system of hard-wired telephones, a pen/trap order allowed law enforcement to pinpoint the physical location of a telephone user each time he or she placed a call because landlines, be they payphones or residential telephones, are fixed to a particular address. See United States Telecom Ass'n v. FCC, 227 F.3d 450, 455 (D.C. Cir. 2000).

Moreover, law enforcement could obtain this location information on a prospective basis using the information derived pursuant to the Pen/Trap Statute. In contrast, cellphones do not require their users to be in a particular place to send and receive calls. As a result, it is impossible to determine the physical location of a cellphone user without reference to cell-site data. 1 Accordingly, Section 2703(d), together with the Pen/Trap

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1 In accordance with CALEA, the telecommunications industry, working with the FBI, adopted a set of technical standards, known as the "J-Standard," to allow law enforcement to maintain the surveillance capability it had before telecommunications technology changed. One of the J-Standard's specifications is that cellphone companies must have the capability to disclose the physical location of the nearest cell-site tower at the beginning and end of each call. See United States Telecom Ass'n v. FCC, 227 F.3d at 455. The J-Standard for cell-site information, at best, discloses the neighborhood a cellphone user is in at the time a call starts and at the time it terminates. This does not provide continuous tracking and is far less geographically precise than the "virtual map of [a cellphone user's] movements" posited by the Federal Defenders. See
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Statute, simply allows law enforcement to maintain a capability it has always had – the ability to locate a telephone user at the time a call is made or received on a prospective basis – in the face of changing technology. What is more, Section 2703(d) requires the Government to satisfy an “articulable facts” standard, an even higher burden than that required for a pen/trap order and which is in keeping with CALEA’s increased privacy protections, discussed in Section B.3 below.

Finally, it is significant that Congress, in enacting CALEA following Director Freeh’s testimony, did not ban the use of pen/trap orders to allow the disclosure of cell-site information from cellphone companies. Instead, it specified that such disclosure should not be made “solely pursuant” to a pen/trap order. 47 U.S.C. § 1002(a)(2)(B). The term “solely” is not wholly prohibitive. Rather, it is partially restrictive. This phrasing therefore implies that Congress in 1994 understood cell-site information to be covered by the Pen/Trap Statute. Indeed, if cell-site information could not be collected at that time pursuant to a pen/trap order, there would have been no need for Congress to limit such collection.

Challenging the Government’s position on the combined authority of the SCA and the Pen/Trap Statute, the Magistrate Judges’ opinions, as well as the Federal Defenders’ brief, also raise questions about this combined authority’s date of origin. See Texas Op. at *15; New York Op. at *25; Fed. Def. Br. at 19-20. This matter is not as mysterious as they suggest and, in any event, it has no bearing on the propriety of the Government’s argument. As discussed above, the best answer is 1994: Director Freeh’s testimony demonstrates that when Congress enacted CALEA in 1994 (with its “solely pursuant” language), it intended for cell-site information to be obtained pursuant to process under the SCA. In addition, as discussed above, CALEA’s “solely pursuant” language suggests that Congress intended cell-site information to be covered by the Pen/Trap Statute.

Nevertheless, after CALEA was passed in 1994, some uncertainty remained over which categories of non-content information the Pen/Trap Statute covered. See Fighting Cyber Crime: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Crime of the Committee

Fed. Def. Br. at 4. Indeed, it reveals considerably less information about a caller’s location than the physical addresses associated with landlines under the “old” hardline system.
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on the Judiciary, 107th Cong., 1st Sess. 47-48 (2001) (statement of Michael Chertoff, Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, U.S. Dep’t of Justice) (available at judiciary.house.gov/legacy/chertoff_061201.htm). Any ambiguity was eliminated by the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 § 216, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001) (the “Patriot Act”). As discussed in the Government’s October 5 Letter at 7-8, disclosure of cell-site information now plainly falls within the definitions of “pen register” and “trap and trace device,” and the Government is now clearly required to obtain such information using the Pen/Trap Statute and the SCA. This result is consistent with the result envisioned in 1994 by Congress and FBI Director Freeh: cell-site information is not available “solely pursuant” to a pen/trap order, but it is available when a Section 2703(d) order is used as well.

B. Prospective Disclosure of Cell-Site Data Is Authorized Pursuant to the Pen/Trap Statute and Section 2703(d) of the SCA

In its October 5 Letter, the Government explained that the combined authority of the Pen/Trap Statute and the SCA authorize courts to order the prospective disclosure of cell-site information. See October 5 Letter at 5-10. Magistrate Judges Smith and Orenstein, as well as the Federal Defenders, disagree. See Texas Op. at *13; New York Op. at *23; Fed. Def. Br. at 15-16. As explained below, however, their objections are without merit.

1. Cell-site Information Falls Within the Scope of the Pen/Trap Statute

As explained in the Government’s October 5 Letter, pen registers and trap and trace devices, by definition, involve the disclosure of “dialing, routing, addressing, or signaling information” for outgoing and incoming telephone calls, respectively. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3127(3) and (4); October 5 Letter at 7-8. Cell-site information tells a cellphone company with which cell tower a cellphone is in contact, thus allowing the cellphone company to provide service to the cellphone. Accordingly, cell-site information is used as signaling information to route cellphone calls, and the disclosure of this data falls squarely within the scope of the definitions for pen registers and trap and trace devices.
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There are several reasons why the Magistrate Judges’ contrary conclusion is incorrect. First, when Congress, via the Patriot Act in 2001, expanded the definition of pen registers and trap and trace devices to include “dialing, routing, addressing, or signaling information,” it was not writing on a blank slate. In 2000, the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit had already held that cell-site information was “signaling information” for purposes of CALEA. In United States Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, 227 F.3d 450 (D.C. Cir. 2000), the D.C. Circuit addressed whether cell-site information was “call-identifying information,” which is defined by CALEA to mean “dialing or signaling information that identifies the origin, direction, destination, or termination of each communication generated or received by a subscriber by means of any equipment, facility, or service of a telecommunications carrier.” United States Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, 227 F.3d at 457 (citing 47 U.S.C. § 1001(2)). The court held that it was, explaining that: “a mobile phone sends signals to the nearest cell site at the start and end of a call. These signals, which are necessary to achieve communications between the caller and the party he or she is calling, clearly are ‘signaling information.’” Id. at 463 (internal quotations omitted). While noting that CALEA could have been clearer on its face, the D.C. Circuit observed that because cell-site information is signaling information, it fell within the type of information covered by the Pen/Trap Statute. Id. at 458, 463-64.

Moreover, once the Patriot Act expanded the statutory definition of pen register and trap and trace device to cover “signaling information,” the Pen/Trap Statute’s inclusion of cell-site location information became explicit. Indeed, this Court must presume that Congress was aware that cell-site information was signaling information when it enacted the Patriot Act. See Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 580-81 (1978) (“Congress is presumed to be aware of an administrative or judicial interpretation of a statute and to adopt that interpretation when it re-enacts a statute without change. . . . So too, where, as here, Congress adopts a law incorporating sections of a prior law, Congress normally can be presumed to have had knowledge of the interpretation given to the incorporated law, at least insofar as it affects the new statute.”).

Second, Magistrate Judge Smith, whose arguments Magistrate Judge Orenstein and the Federal Defenders in large part repeat, erroneously constrains the Patriot Act’s expansion of the pen/trap definitions to reach only the Internet. See Texas Op.
at *13; New York Op. at *23; Fed. Def. Br. at 13-16. In support, Magistrate Judge Smith points to two statements in the Congressional Record noting that the expanded definition of pen register and trap and trace device will apply to the Internet. See Texas Op. at *13. Yet contrary to Magistrate Judge Smith’s conclusion, nothing in these two statements indicates that the expanded definitions are restricted only to the Internet. Moreover, not only is Magistrate Judge Smith’s inference foreclosed by the D.C. Circuit’s holding in United States Ass’n v. FCC that cell-site information is “signaling information” (and thus falls within the scope of the expanded definitions of pen registers and trap and trace devices), but it is also inconsistent with the Patriot Act’s statutory language and legislative history. Nothing in the definition of pen register and trap and trace device limits those terms to a particular method of communications, be it the Internet, cellphones, or hardline telecommunications. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3127(3) and (4). In fact, none of the electronic surveillance statutes – 18 U.S.C. § 2510, et seq. (the “Wiretap Act”), the SCA, and the Pen/Trap Statute – apply only to particular communications technologies. They are written in technology-neutral terms, and thus apply equally to all network and communications technologies. As the House Report on the Patriot Act explained: “This concept, that the information properly obtained by using a pen register or trap and trace device is non-content information, applies across the board to all communications media.” H.R. Rep. No. 236(I), 107th Cong., 1st Sess. at 53 (2001) (emphasis added).

Third, Magistrate Judge Smith and the Federal Defenders argue that the Pen/Trap Statute does not cover cell-site information because such information is not “generated by, and incidental to, the transmission of ‘a wire or electronic communication.’” Texas Op. at 13 & n.19. See also Fed. Def. Br. at 16. Their argument, however, relies in part on their insistence that cell-site information constitutes tracking information insufficiently tied to the telephone calls themselves. See Section C below. By definition, however, a pen register records information “transmitted by an instrument or facility from which a wire or electronic communication is transmitted.” 18 U.S.C. § 3127(3). Because cellphone voice communications are wire communications, see 18 U.S.C. § 2510(1), there can be no dispute that a cellular telephone network is a facility from which a wire communication is transmitted. Similarly, a trap and trace device collects “dialing, routing, addressing and signaling information reasonably likely to identify the source of a wire or electronic communication,” 18
U.S.C. § 3127(4), and cell-site information is used to identify the source of a wire communication (a cellphone call). In other words, the pen registers and trap and trace devices are defined by the “instrument,” “facility” or “source” from which they collect information, not whether the information itself must be tied to an electronic or wire communication. Magistrate Judge Orenstein declined to rely on Magistrate Judge Smith on this point, commenting that “as I read the amended definition [of pen registers and trap and trace devices], it merely ties the concept of ‘wire or electronic communication’ to the ‘instrument or facility’ to which the pen register relates.” See New York Op. at *23. Accordingly, cell-site information plainly falls within the definitions of pen registers and trap and trace devices and is subject to the Pen/Trap Statute.

Finally, to exclude cell-site information from the Pen/Trap Statute, Magistrate Judge Smith relies in part on the fact that separate frequencies may be used to transmit voice information and information relating to cell-site location. See Texas Op. at *2-*3. This distinction, however, is irrelevant under the language of the Pen/Trap Statute and the SCA. Cell-site information, no matter by which channel it travels, remains signaling information transmitted by a facility from which a wire communication is transmitted, and it is still a record pertaining to a customer of an electronic communication service.

For its part, the Federal Defenders’ brief argues that cell-site information falls outside of the scope of pen registers and trap and trace devices because they only address “basic” information, while the Government seeks “detailed” cell-site data. See Fed. Def. Br. at 15. Indeed, the Federal Defenders’ brief attempts to make much of the fact that certain technologies may allow for greater precision in the tracking of cellular telephones, declaring that it would create a “virtual map of [a cellphone user’s] movements”. Id. at 2-4. This is not, however, the type of information that the United States Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York has for several years successfully sought in its standard applications for cell-site orders (a sample of which was attached to its October 5 Letter). Here, this Office seeks data which comports with the so-called “J-Standard,” that is, cell-site information concerning the physical location of the antenna towers associated with the beginning and termination of calls to and from a particular cellphone. See United States Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, 227 F.3d at 455. Notably, this is a much smaller set of information than the Government sought in the case before Magistrate Judge Orenstein.
(where the Government also sought cell-site information during the progress of the call), see New York Op. at 1, and the case before Magistrate Judge Smith (where the Government also sought "information regarding the strength, angle, and timing of the caller’s signal measured at two or more cell sites."). see Texas Op. at 1. As explained in the Government’s October 5 Letter, the cell-site information sought by this Office, at best, shows the cell quadrant a cellphone was in. See October 5 Letter at 1. It is not the “host” of information that Federal Defenders alleges would fall into an “altogether different category” than other information collected by pen registers and trap and trace devices. In any event, there is nothing in the Pen/Trap statute that requires the information collected to be “basic” versus “complex.” Rather, the distinction to be drawn is “content” as opposed to “non-content” and whether the information is “dialing, routing, addressing, and signaling information.” As discussed above, cell-site information is at least signaling information. Finally, as discussed in Section A above, the prospective disclosure of J-Standard cell-site information merely maintains the same surveillance capability that existed before the introduction of cellphones as mandated by CALEA.

2. Cell-Site Information Falls Within the Scope of the SCA

Section 2703(c)(1) of the SCA requires “a provider of electronic communication service . . . to disclose a record or other information pertaining to a subscriber to or customer of such service” pursuant to a 2703(d) order. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)(1). See also October 5 Letter at 5-6. A cellphone company is a provider of electronic communication service because it provides its users with the ability to send or receive wire or electronic communications. See 18 U.S.C. § 2510(15). Moreover, as the Government explained in its October 5 Letter, cell-site information is "a record or other information pertaining to a subscriber or customer of such service." October 5 Letter at 5.

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2 While the Government believes the larger set of information does not make a cellphone a tracking device, that issue is not presented here.

3 In fact, the Federal Defenders concedes that “society may be willing to accept the idea of collecting information associated with the origination and termination of calls.” See Fed. Def. Br. at 24 (internal quotes and citation omitted).
Accordingly, disclosure of cell-site information may be obtained pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 2703(c)(1) and (d). Id. at 5-6.

Magistrate Judge Smith, however, concludes that cell-site data does not fall within the scope of the SCA based his categorization of cellphones as "tracking devices" - the same reason he relied on to support his conclusion that the Pen/Trap Statute did not apply to cell site data. Specifically, Magistrate Judge Smith first asserts that the issue under Section 2703(c)(1) is whether prospective cell-site data "may constitute a record pertaining to 'wire or electronic communications,'" and then claims that cell-site information is not a wire or electronic communication because its disclosure would render cellphones as "tracking devices." Texas Op. at *10-*11.

Magistrate Judge Orenstein and the Federal Defenders follow Magistrate Judge Smith's reasoning to reach the same conclusion. See New York Op. at *12-*14; Fed. Def. Br. at 6-8. This is error. As discussed in Section C below, disclosure of cell-site data does not implicate the tracking device statute. Moreover, Magistrate Judge Smith's initial premise is grounded in a misreading of the statute. Section 2703(c)(1) governs records pertaining to a subscriber or customer of an "electronic communication service," such as a cellphone company, not - as Magistrate Judge Smith would have it - records specifically pertaining to wire or electronic communications. For example, a cellphone company's customers' names, addresses, and detailed billing information are records pertaining to customers of an electronic communication service, but they are not records pertaining to wire or electronic communications. See Jessup-Morgan v. America Online, Inc., 20 F. Supp.2d 1105, 1108 (E.D. Mich. 1998) (holding that a customer's identification information is a "record or other information pertaining to a subscriber"). To the same extent, cell-site information is a record pertaining to a subscriber or customer of an electronic communication service. See October 5 Letter at 5. In other words, the question is whether that information concerns a subscriber or customer of an electronic communications service; it makes no difference whether these data ultimately pertain to a wire or electronic communication.

The weakness of Magistrate Judge Smith's argument that cell-site information does not fall within the scope of Section 2703(c)(1) is further illustrated by his admission that Section 2703(c)(1) includes historical cell-site data. See Texas Op. at *11 n.16. See also New York Op. at *31; Fed. Def. Br. at 12. Based on the language of Section 2703(c)(1), however, there is no
reason to distinguish historical from prospective cell-site data when determining whether such information is “a record or other information pertaining to a subscriber or customer.” A court may not pick and choose when cell-site information will constitute “a record or other information pertaining to a subscriber or customer” of an electronic communication service. For this reason, too, Magistrate Judge Smith’s claim that cell-site information does not fall within the scope of the SCA must fail.  

3. The Privacy Provisions of CALEA Substantively Changed Electronic Surveillance Law

The Magistrate Judges’ opinions also reject the Government’s argument that the combined authority of the Pen/Trap Statute and the SCA allows for the prospective disclosure of cell-site information, reasoning that CALEA did not amend existing surveillance law when it forbade the disclosure of location information “solely pursuant” to a pen/trap order. See Texas Op. at *13; New York Op. at *24. In effect, they argue that since CALEA did not change the substantive law of electronic surveillance, its “solely pursuant” limitation has no real significance.

CALEA’s statutory language and legislative history demonstrate otherwise. While one purpose of CALEA “was to allow law enforcement to retain existing surveillance capabilities in the face of technological change,” Texas Op. at 25, there were other aims as well.  

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Magistrate Judge Orenstein raises one additional issue regarding the Government’s authority under the SCA. He states, correctly, that an order under Section 2703 can only compel disclosure by a provider. See New York Op. at *18. That is precisely what the Government seeks through the combined authority of the Pen/Trap Statute and the SCA - cell-site location information from the cellphone company.

CALEA ensured that law enforcement’s existing surveillance capabilities would be preserved by requiring telecommunications companies to maintain certain technical capabilities, such as the ability to “isolate expeditiously the content of targeted communications.” See H.R. Rep. No. 103-827, at 9-10 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3489. The “J-Standard,” discussed above at 5 n.1, “outline[d] the technical features, specifications, and protocols for carriers to make
Notably, CALEA substantively changed the electronic surveillance statutes to enhance privacy, and did so in two principal ways. First, it created the 2703(d) "articulable facts" order for transactional information associated with electronic communications. Up to that time, such records had been available merely pursuant to a subpoena. See CALEA § 207, P.L. 103-313, 108 Stat. 4279, 4292 (1994). Second, it forbade disclosure of cell-site information by a provider "solely pursuant" to a pen/trap order. See CALEA § 207, P.L. 103-313, 108 Stat. 4279, 4280-81 (1994). CALEA’s legislative history even explicitly states that the latter restriction on pen/trap orders was a substantive change in the law intended to enhance privacy. In a section entitled "The Legislation Addresses Privacy Concerns," the House Report on CALEA states:

[T]he bill . . . [e]xpressly provides that the authority for pen registers and trap and trace devices cannot be used to obtain tracking or location information, other than that which can be determined from the phone number. Currently, in some cellular systems, transactional data that could be obtained by a pen register may include location information.

See H.R. Rep. No. 103-827, at 17 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3497 (emphasis added). Significantly, this portion of the House Report demonstrates both that Congress intended CALEA to amend the substantive rules of surveillance law and that Congress understood that prior to CALEA, cell-site information had been available pursuant to a pen/trap order. See also United States Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, 227 F.3d at 463-64.

Against this statutory background, the Magistrate Judges’ opinions claim that CALEA’s "disclaimer of pen/trap authority was intended to assure that the existing legal framework would continue to apply in spite of anticipated legal advances" is erroneous. See Texas Op. at *15 (emphasis in original); New York Op. at *24. The Magistrate Judges’ opinions fail to distinguish between the technological mandates of CALEA, which did not modify the statutory framework for electronic surveillance, with the privacy-enhancing features of CALEA, which did change that subscriber communications and call-identifying information available to law enforcement agencies having appropriate legal authorization.” United States Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, 227 F.3d at 455.
framework. For example, when the opinions cite FBI Director Freeh’s statement that CALEA “relates solely to advanced technology, not legal authority or privacy,” Texas Op. at *14; New York Op. at *24, they fail to realize that Director Freeh was testifying early in the legislative process, prior to the addition of CALEA’s privacy-enhancing features. Section 2703(d) “articulable facts” orders are not mentioned in Director Freeh’s testimony because they were not yet part of the bill. See also supra at 4. Indeed, as noted above, it was Director Freeh himself who first proposed the restriction on disclosure of cell-site information solely pursuant to a pen/trap order. See supra at 3-4.

Finally, Magistrate Judges Smith’s and Orenstein’s argument that CALEA’s changes were non-substantive violates the fundamental canon of statutory construction that a court should give effect to each statutory provision. See Washington Market Co. v. Hoffman, 101 U.S. (1 Otto) 112, 115-16 (1879). If CALEA’s language limiting disclosure of cell-site information “solely pursuant” to a pen/trap order did not change electronic surveillance law, what, then, did it do? The Magistrate Judges’ opinions hold that CALEA “relates solely to advanced technology, not legal authority or privacy.” Texas Op. at *13; New York Op. at *24. While that may have been true with respect to the draft of CALEA initially introduced, it was not the case with respect to CALEA as it was ultimately enacted. As noted above, Director Freeh’s testimony played a significant role in spurring additions to CALEA. The pen/trap “solely pursuant” restriction changed the substantive law of pen/trap orders to enhance privacy, by requiring the Government to seek prospective cell-site information pursuant to the dual authority of the Pen/Trap Statute and the SCA with its articulable facts requirement. Significantly, neither the Magistrate Judges’ opinions nor the Federal Defenders brief explain what effect the “solely pursuant” language could have other than the one set forth by the Government.

4. Prospective Disclosure of Cell-Site Information Is Authorized By the SCA

Prospective disclosure of cell-site information falls within the scope of the SCA. As discussed previously, cell-site data are “record[s] or other information pertaining to a subscriber or customer” under Section 2703(c) of the SCA. The SCA does not impose any temporal restriction in either its description of “records or other information” or its procedures for disclosing
that information. Thus, nothing within the SCA prevents disclosure of cell-site information on a prospective basis. Historical and prospective data are not treated differently, and courts should not engraft such a limitation onto the SCA where Congress has not done so.

Nonetheless, the Magistrate Judges' opinions insist on bifurcating "records and other information" into past and future time zones. See supra at 12-13. Lacking any support in the SCA itself for this split, the Magistrate Judges' reasoning instead depends, once again, on the categorization of cellphones as "tracking devices." As discussed in Section C below, this is an erroneous designation. Curiously, Magistrate Judge Smith also places historical cell-site data in the category of "transactional records" covered by the SCA, but takes prospective cell-site data out of that category altogether. See Texas Op. at *11 n.16. This is a wholly artificial construct.

Lacking any textual support in the SCA for their historical/prospective bifurcation, the Magistrate Judges' opinions instead seize upon the lack of procedural features in the SCA as evidence that is was not meant to apply prospectively. See Texas Op. at *11-*12; New York Op. at *13. See also Fed. Def. Br. at 12-13. For example, the SCA includes no duration requirement and no sealing requirement. Contrary to the assertions of Magistrate Judges Smith and Orenstein, however, there is simply no reason for the SCA to contain such procedural elements. Prospective disclosure of cell-site information is governed by both the SCA and the Pen/Trap Statute. Thus, when the SCA is used prospectively to gather cell-site information, the collection is also governed by the Pen/Trap Statute, and all the procedural features of that law apply to the government's subsequent collection of cell-site data. In practice, prospective applications and orders for cell-site information should satisfy the requirements of both the pen/trap statute and the SCA. As discussed in Section A above, this is the result Congress intended when it enacted the pen/trap restriction of CALEA, because it understood that the disclosure of cell-site information would continue only pursuant to the heightened "articulable facts" standard of Section 2703(d) orders. This dual-authority requirement thus creates a regime in which pen/trap orders for cell-site information may be issued, but only when the Government also satisfies an "articulable facts" evidentiary showing.
In his analysis, Magistrate Judge Orenstein further suggests that prospective use of the SCA would enable the Government to bypass the restrictions of the Wiretap Act. See New York Op. at *18. That is untrue. Prospective use of the SCA to allow for the disclosure of content would violate the Wiretap Acts’s prohibition on interception of wire or electronic communications. See 18 U.S.C. § 2511. Both the Wiretap Act and the Pen/Trap Statute include strict mandates on prospective disclosure of content and non-content information, respectively. The Government cannot intercept communications without complying with the Wiretap Act, and it cannot acquire pen/trap data, like cell-site information, without complying with the Pen/Trap Statute. The congressional requirement that the Government cannot seek the disclosure of cell-site information “solely pursuant” to a pen/trap order requires the Government to also rely on the SCA for such disclosure, but it does not allow an end-run around either the Pen/Trap Statute or the Wiretap Act.

C. The Tracking Device Statute Is Not Relevant to Orders for the Prospective Disclosure of Cell-Site Data

In its October 5 Letter, the Government explained in detail why a cellphone is not a “tracking device.” See October 5 Letter at 12-13. Rather than repeat in full that explanation here, the Government instead will focus on responding to the points set forth in the Magistrate Judges’ opinions and the Federal Defenders’ brief.7

Indeed, Director Freeh distinguishes cell-site orders, which provide “generalized location information” from tracking devices, which provide more specific location data, in his testimony before Congress in connection with CALEA. See Freeh Testimony, 1994 WL 223962 at *27-28. Furthermore, as discussed above, the United States Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York in this case seeks a smaller set of cell-site information than the applications in the cases before Magistrate Judges Smith and Orenstein. Thus, it is even more difficult in this case than in those cases to claim that the disclosure of cell-site information amounts to a “tracking device” within the meaning of Section 3117(b).

Some of these points have already been addressed above. In Section B.1, the Government explained why cell-site information is subject to the Pen/Trap statute regardless of whether a cellphone is tracking device. Similarly, in Section
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Section 3117, as Magistrate Judge Smith notes, is a short statute with a limited purpose. See Texas Op. at *3. It specifies only that “[i]f a court is empowered to issue a warrant or other order for the installation of a mobile tracking device, such order may authorize the use of that device within the jurisdiction of the court, and outside that jurisdiction if the device is installed in that jurisdiction.” 18 U.S.C. § 3117(a). By its terms, then, the statute has a very restricted purpose: to provide a court authority in certain circumstances to authorize use of a tracking device which may be used outside of the court’s jurisdiction. This narrow purpose is the only one discussed in the legislative history of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (“ECPA”), § 108, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1840 (1986), the act which enabled the tracking device statute. See S. Rep. No. 99-541 at 33-34 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3587-88. In addition, in order to make clear that use of a tracking device does not require a wiretap order, the definition of “electronic communication” excepts “any communication from a tracking device.” 18 U.S.C. § 2510(12)(B).

From this limited procedural statute, the Magistrate Judges’ opinions develop a separate tier of electronic surveillance law. They place the tracking device statute on a par with the Wiretap Act, the SCA, and the Pen/Trap Statute, which Magistrate Judge Smith characterizes as the “four broad categories” of electronic surveillance law. See Texas Op. at *4-*5. But the tracking device statute will not bear the weight they seek to place on it. Their categorization rests on the premise that tracking devices require a warrant based on probable cause. See id. at *3-*5; New York Op. at *26-*27. This premise, however, is incorrect. The tracking device statute does not require the Government to seek a warrant based on probable cause when using a tracking device; indeed, the statute does not even prohibit the use of a tracking device in the absence of conformity with Section 3117. See United States v. Gbemisola, 225 F.3d 753, 758 (D.C. Cir. 2000). Even when the Government invokes the limited authority provided

B.2, the Government explained why cell-site information falls within the scope of Section 2703(c)(1) regardless of whether a cellphone is a tracking device.

Indeed, all of the arguments in the Magistrate Judges’ opinions and the Federal Defenders’ brief essentially rely on the argument that the prospective disclosure of cell-site information converts cellphones into “tracking devices.”
by the tracking device statute, it does not require a search warrant. Rather, it requires only that the court be empowered to issue “a warrant or other order” for the tracking device. 18 U.S.C. 3117(a). Finally, the tracking device statute applies only where the court has ordered “installation” of a tracking device. Id. When seeking disclosure of cell-site information from a cellphone company, the Government is not seeking to install anything. Accordingly, nothing in the tracking device statute limits the Government’s ability to obtain cell-site information pursuant to the Pen/Trap Statute and the SCA.

In addition, ECPA’s drafters understood that there was no constitutional warrant requirement for tracking devices that do not violate a reasonable expectation of privacy. For example, the House Report on ECPA discusses United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 285 (1983) (upholding warrantless use of beeper to track vehicle on public roads) and United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 713–18 (1984) (holding that warrantless use of beeper inside a house violated the Fourth Amendment), and it notes that Section 3117 “does not affect the legal standard for the issuance of orders authorizing the installation of each device.” H.R. Rep. No. 647, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., at 60 (1986). See also Texas Op. at *3. (“The ECPA was not intended to affect the legal standard for the issuance of orders authorizing [tracking devices].”) Therefore, Congress was quite clear that it was not imposing a statutory warrant requirement on the use of statutorily defined tracking devices, and the courts should not impose such a requirement where Congress has not done so. 9

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9 Magistrate Judge Smith also contends that even the mere possibility that a tracking device could disclose information relating to a private space is sufficient to require the Government to seek a warrant based on probable cause. See Texas Op. at *9. Magistrate Judge Orenstein and the Federal Defenders adopt this reasoning. New York Op. at *28; Fed. Def. Br. at 22–23. This view is error in light of KARO, where the Supreme Court specifically reserved this question. In KARO, the Supreme Court stated: “The United States insists that if beeper monitoring is deemed a search, a showing of reasonable suspicion rather than probable cause should suffice for its execution. That issue, however, is not before us. The initial warrant was not invalidated for want of probable cause, which plainly existed, but for misleading statements in the affidavit. . . . It will be time enough to resolve the probable cause–reasonable suspicion issue in a case that requires it.” United States v. KARO, 468
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Further, by its own terms, the definition of “tracking device” given in Section 3117 is limited to devices installed pursuant to a court order. See 18 U.S.C. § 3117(b). This is significant because it plainly excludes any device that an individual voluntarily carries and uses, such as Blackberries, text-based beepers, and cellphones.

Finally, a consequence of Magistrate Judge Smith’s analysis would be to eviscerate privacy protection for millions of users of Blackberries or text-based pagers which rely on cellphone networks. If a Blackberry or a pager were a tracking device for purposes of Section 3117 – and it would be under Magistrate Judge Smith’s statutory interpretation – it could not be used to send an electronic communication, because the definition of “electronic communication” excludes “any communication from a tracking device.” 18 U.S.C. § 2510(12)(B). Consequently, there would be nothing to prevent private individuals from intercepting communications from such devices without violating the Wiretap Act.¹⁰ Magistrate Judge Smith attempts to avoid this necessary consequence of his argument by suggesting that cellphones are sometimes tracking devices and sometimes not, depending on the type of cellphone communication being monitored. See Texas Op. at *2-*3, *7. However, the language of the tracking device statute does not support such parsing. The tracking device statute depends on installation pursuant to a court order. Thus, any user-owned and carried device cannot fall within the ambit of the tracking device statute.

Magistrate Judge Smith further suggests that the Government “threatens to undermine the federal statutory scheme for electronic surveillance” by surreptitiously installing cellphones instead of traditional beeper devices. See Texas Op. at *8. This assertion is meritless. As an initial matter, the law

U.S. at 718 n.5. However, because there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in cell-site information, as discussed below, this case does not require resolution of this issue. Moreover, the generalized, “J-Standard” cell-site data sought by the Government – not the “virtual map of a [cellphone user’s] movements” as claimed by the Federal Defenders – would not provide sufficiently localized information such that private spaces would be invaded.

¹⁰ Cellphone communications containing the human voice will remain protected as wire communications.
governing the use of beepers is based on the Fourth Amendment, not a "federal statutory scheme." Indeed, as the D.C. Circuit noted in Gbemisola, the tracking device statute does not prohibit the use of a tracking device in the absence of conformity with Section 3117. See United States v. Gbemisola, 225 F.3d at 758 ("But by contrast to statutes governing other kinds of electronic surveillance devices, section 3117 does not prohibit the use of a tracking device in the absence of conformity with the section.") (emphasis in original).
Furthermore, if the Government were installing the cellphone, the dictates of the tracking device might very well apply. More significantly, there is no dispute that if the Government surreptitiously installs a cellphone in an item given to a target, the Government’s monitoring of the cellphone would be judged under the constitutional framework set forth by the Supreme Court in United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 285 (1983), and United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 713-18 (1984).
Here, however, the Government merely seeks disclosure of information conveyed by a voluntarily possessed and used cellphone to a third-party cellphone company. As discussed below in Section D, there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in such information and, accordingly, no Fourth Amendment privacy concerns are implicated.

D. There Is No Reasonable Expectation of Privacy in Cell-Site Information

In order to receive service from a cellphone company, the owner of a cellphone must transmit a signal to a nearby cell tower to register his or her presence within the network. Cellphone companies keep track of such information in a database, something they must do to complete calls to and from the cellphone. Under the established principles of Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979), there can be no reasonable expectation of privacy in such information. See October 5 Letter at 11-12. Magistrate Judge Smith, followed by Magistrate Judge Orenstein and the Federal Defenders, dispute this conclusion. See Texas Op. at *3; New York Op. at *27-*28; Fed. Def. Br. at 23-24. Their position, however, is erroneous.

The Smith case is controlling here. The Smith Court held both that telephone users had no subjective expectation of privacy in dialed telephone numbers and also that any such expectation is not one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. See Smith, 442 U.S. at 742-44. The Court’s reasoning also applies to cell-site information. First, the
Court stated: “we doubt that people in general entertain any actual expectation of privacy in the numbers they dial. All telephone users realize that they must ‘convey’ phone numbers to the telephone company, since it is through telephone company switching equipment that their calls are completed.” Smith, 442 U.S. at 742. This logic also holds for cellphones: cellphone users understand that they are broadcasting a signal to the cellphone company so that the cellphone company can locate them to complete their calls.

Moreover, under the reasoning of Smith, any subjective expectation of privacy in cell-site information is unreasonable. In Smith, the Court explicitly held that “even if petitioner did harbor some subjective expectation that the phone numbers he dialed would remain private, this expectation is not one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.” Smith, 442 U.S. at 743 (internal quotation marks omitted). It noted that “[t]his Court consistently has held that a person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily turns over to third parties.” Smith, 442 U.S. at 743-44. In Smith, the user “voluntarily conveyed numerical information to the telephone company” and thereby “assumed the risk that the company would reveal to the police the numbers he dialed.” Smith, 442 U.S. at 744. This reasoning is dispositive here. A cellphone user must transmit a signal to the cellphone company and thereby assumes the risk that the cellphone provider will reveal the cell-site information to law enforcement. In other words, it makes no difference if some users have never thought about how their cellphones work or if they believe that the cellphone company locates them through magic. A cellphone user can have no expectation of privacy in cell-site information.

Magistrate Judge Smith is simply mistaken when he asserts that cell-site date is not voluntarily conveyed by the user, or that it is transmitted “independent of the user’s input, control or knowledge.” Texas Op. at *8. The process of turning on a cellphone is a voluntary act, as is the process of sending or receiving a cell call. It is true that if someone wants to use a cellphone, he or she must turn it on and send a signal to the cellphone company. But such an action is no more involuntary than dialing a number to make a telephone call. If someone wants to make a phone call, he or she must reveal the phone number to the telephone company. To the same extent, if someone wants to use a cellphone, he or she must send a signal to the cellphone company, and the company will receive the signal at a particular cell tower. See United States Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, 227 F.3d at
459 (stating that "Smith’s reason for finding no legitimate expectation of privacy in dialed telephone numbers - that callers voluntarily convey this information to the phone company in order to complete calls - applies as well to much of the information provided by the challenged capabilities," which included the ability to disclose cell-site information).

Indeed, when purchasing a cellphone or subscribing to cellphone service, most cellphone users are well aware that they will be signaling their location to the cellphone company when they are using their cellphone. The type and cost of service is typically tied to the location of the user. In fact, cellphone customers are usually given maps outlining their calling plan’s geographical boundaries, and ubiquitous "roaming fees" are charged if calls are made from outside these areas.

The Supreme Court decisions in Knotts and Karo are plainly inapplicable to the disclosure of cell-site information. Smith is controlling in this case for a simple and fundamental reason: Knotts and Karo involved surreptitious installation by the Government of a transponder, whereas Smith and this case involve the disclosure of information in the possession of a third party. Further, even under the standard of Knotts and Karo, there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in cell-site information. In Knotts, the Supreme Court held that law enforcement monitoring of a beeper along public highways did not violate the Fourth Amendment. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 282 (1983). In Karo, the Court held that police monitoring of a beeper which disclosed information about the interior of a house, not open to visual surveillance, does implicate Fourth Amendment privacy interests. United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 713 (1984). "J-standard" cell-site information, however, is not sufficiently particularized to pinpoint the location of a cellphone in a private space, and the Fourth Amendment protects only such specific location information. In Karo, when law enforcement used a beeper to locate a container of ether in a warehouse, it did not use the beeper to identify the specific locker containing the targeted ether - that was done by smell from a public part of the warehouse. United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. at 720-21. The Supreme Court found no constitutional violation, explaining that "[h]ad the monitoring disclosed the presence of the container within a particular locker the result would be otherwise, for surely [the defendants] had a reasonable expectation of privacy in their own storage locker." Id. at 720 n.6. Thus, law enforcement does not violate the Fourth Amendment when it uses a beeper to determine the general location of an object, even if there is a reasonable expectation of privacy in the object’s
specific location. Under this reasoning, the generalized location information available from cell-site data does not implicate Fourth Amendment privacy concerns.

Moreover, as previously noted by the Government, see October 5 Letter at 12, the privacy interest of a target in cell-site information is even less than the privacy interest in dialed telephone numbers. Cell-site information is generated internally by the service provider—a customer will not even know where the cell towers are. It would be entirely unprecedented in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence to find that a defendant has a reasonable expectation of privacy in information he or she does not know about and has not ever possessed. It is true, as Magistrate Judge Smith notes, that United States v. Forest, 355 F.3d 942, 951-52 (6th Cir. 2004), rejects the application of Smith to cell-site information, holding that it is not voluntarily conveyed by cellphone users because it is transmitted automatically or may be triggered by law enforcement dialing the cellphone. Texas Op. at *8. However, Forest's discussion of this issue is dicta because the court in Forest held that the defendants had no reasonable expectation of privacy under the principles of Knotts and Karo. In any case, Forest's dicta is incorrect for the reasons explained above; that is, the court failed to understand that cellphone users have no legitimate expectation of privacy in the cell-site location information conveyed to their cellphone company.

Finally, Magistrate Judge Smith's reliance on the Wireless Communication and Public Safety Act of 1999 (the "WCPSA") is similarly misplaced. Judge Smith asserts that the WCPSA demonstrates that "location information is a special class of customer information, which can only be used or disclosed by a carrier in an emergency situation, absent express prior consent by the customer." Texas Op. at *9. This assertion is incorrect. In fact, the WCPSA states that "[e]xcept as required by law or with the approval of the customer, a telecommunications carrier that receives or obtains customer proprietary network information by virtue of its provision of a telecommunications service shall only use, disclose or permit access to individually identifiable customer proprietary network information" in certain specified situations. 47 U.S.C. 222(c)(1) (emphasis added). The phrase "except as required by law" encompasses appropriate criminal legal process. See Farastino v. Conestoga Tel. & Tel. Co., No. Civ. A 99-697, 1999 WL 636664, at *1-*2 (E.D. Pa., Aug. 18, 1999) (holding that a valid subpoena falls within the "except as required by law" exception of § 222(c)(1)). Such criminal process includes process under the SCA. Judge Smith quotes
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Section 222(f) of the WCPSA, see Texas Op. at *8-*9, but this provision does not limit the "as required by law" exception. Instead, Section 222(f) sets rules for determining whether a customer has consented to voluntary disclosure of his cell-site information. Thus, the WCPSA does not in any way limit the disclosure of cell-site information pursuant to the SCA. Furthermore, the fact that Congress has provided additional statutory protections of cell-site information does not create a constitutional reasonable expectation of privacy in that information. For example, the pen/trap statute and the SCA create statutory privacy rights in dialed phone numbers, but dialed phone numbers remain constitutionally unprotected under Smith v. Maryland.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the Government respectfully submits that the Court has authority, pursuant to the Pen/Trap Statute and the SCA, to order the prospective disclosure of cell-site information.

Respectfully submitted,

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cc: Yuanchung Lee, Esq.  
Federal Defenders of New York, Inc.  
(By Hand)
October 5, 2005

By Hand

The Honorable Andrew J. Peck
United States Magistrate Judge
Southern District of New York
United States Courthouse
500 Pearl Street, Rm. 750
New York, New York 10007

Re: Application for Pen Register and Trap and Trace Device With Cell-site Location Authority

Dear Magistrate Judge Peck:

The Government respectfully submits this letter in response to Your Honor’s request for briefing before deciding whether to approve further Government applications for orders to disclose cell-site information. For the reasons set forth below, the Court should grant such applications pursuant to the combined authority of Title 18, United States Code, Sections 3121, et seq. (the pen register and trap and trace statute, or “Pen/Trap Statute”), and Title 18, United States Code, Sections 2701, et seq. (the Stored Communications Act, or “SCA”).

BACKGROUND

A. Cellular Telephone Networks

Cellular telephone networks function by dividing a geographic area into many coverage areas, or “cells,” each containing a tower through which an individual portable cell phone transmits and receives calls. As the cell phone and its user move from place to place, the cell phone automatically switches to the cell tower that provides the best reception. For this process to function correctly, the cell phone must transmit a signal to a nearby cell tower to register its presence within the cell network. Cellular telephone companies typically keep track of this information, which can include the identity of the cell tower currently serving the cell phone and the portion of the tower facing it, in order to provide service to the cell
phone. Cellular telephone companies also have the technical means to collect and store this information.

B. Orders to Compel Disclosure of Cell-site Data

The United States Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York - like other U.S. Attorney’s offices around the country - has routinely applied for and obtained court orders for pen registers and trap and trace devices with cell-site disclosure authority (“cell-site orders”). These orders compel cellular telephone companies to report dialed and received numbers, as well as cell-site data, for a particular cell phone on a prospective basis. The cell-site information is used by government agents to, among other things, help locate kidnapping victims and fugitives or other targets of criminal investigations.

In its applications, the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York relies on a combination of two statutes to authorize the disclosure of cell-site information: Title 18, United States Code, Sections 3121, et seq., (the Pen/Trap Statute) and Title 18, United States Code, Sections 2701, et seq., (the SCA), in particular Section 2703(d). As discussed more fully below, a pen register/trap and trace device may be issued upon a Government attorney’s affirmation “that the information likely to be obtained is relevant to an ongoing criminal investigation.” 18 U.S.C. § 3122. Cell-site disclosure requires a further demonstration by the Government attorney of “specific and articulable facts showing that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the contents of a wire or electronic communication, or the records or other information sought are relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investigation.” 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d). It is this Office’s practice to comply with these requirements when submitting an application for cell-site orders.

1 It is this Office’s understanding that the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Eastern District of New York likewise relied on the same combination of statutes in its application for a cell-site order which was rejected by Magistrate Judge Orenstein, as discussed below.
C. The Government’s Recent Applications for Cell-site Orders

On September 21, 2005, the Government submitted two sealed applications for cell-site orders. (A copy of a similar model application is attached hereto as Exhibit A.) On September 22, 2005, Your Honor’s chambers informed the Government that Your Honor had declined to grant the Government’s applications without further briefing from the Government concerning the propriety of issuing these orders. In doing so, Your Honor’s chambers cited a recent opinion by Magistrate Judge Orenstein in the Eastern District of New York, In re Authorizing the Use of a Pen Register, 2005 WL 2043543 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 25, 2005).

D. Magistrate Judge Orenstein’s Opinion

In his decision, Magistrate Judge Orenstein rejected a Government application for a cell-site order, finding that neither Section 2703(d) nor the Pen/Trap Statute standing alone provided sufficient authority for the disclosure of cell-site data, and that a search warrant issued on a showing of probable cause would be required for this information. Notably, Judge Orenstein did not consider whether the statutes together provided the necessary authority.

Referring to the language in Section 2703(d), Judge Orenstein stated that “the only one” of Section 2703’s provisions that “appears arguably to permit the disclosure of cell-site location information is the language permitting the disclosure of ‘the contents of a wire or electronic communication.’” In re Pen Register, 2005 WL 2043543 at *1-2 (emphasis added”). Judge Orenstein concluded that this language was insufficient, however, finding that cell-site information constitutes a “communication from a tracking device,” as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 3117, which is specifically exempted from the class of “electronic communications” discoverable under Section 2703. Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510(12)(C)). The Court ended its analysis by contending that use of a tracking device normally requires a showing of probable cause.

Turning to the Pen/Trap Statute, Judge Orenstein recognized that pen registers and trap and trace devices provide cell-site information as a matter of course. Id. at *2. The Court found, however, that the Pen/Trap Statute was limited by Section 103(a)(2) of the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (“CALEA”), P.L. 103-313, 108 Sta. 4279 (1994), codified at 47
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U.S.C. § 1002(a)(2)(B), which provides that “with regard to information acquired solely pursuant to the authority for pen registers and trap and trace devices . . . such call-identifying information shall not include any information that may disclose the physical location of the subscriber.” 47 U.S.C. § 1002(a)(2)(B) (emphasis added). On this basis, Judge Orenstein determined that the Pen/Trap Statute did not provide authority for the disclosure of cell-site information, which would disclose the physical location of a cell phone user, and again suggested that probable cause is required to obtain this information.

The United States Attorney’s Office for the Eastern District of New York has moved Magistrate Judge Orenstein to reconsider his opinion, and the matter is presently sub judice.

**DISCUSSION**

This Court should decline to follow Judge Orenstein’s reasoning because it is based upon a flawed understanding of the relevant statutes. As a threshold matter, cell-site information is properly classified as “information pertaining to a subscriber” pursuant to Section 2703(c), not the “contents of an electronic communication” under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2703(a) or (b), as Judge Orenstein has concluded. Further, cell-site information is not the product of a “tracking device” or communications from it. Instead, as discussed below, Section 2703(d) by itself, upon a showing of specific and articulable facts demonstrating reasonable grounds to believe the information sought is relevant and material to an ongoing investigation, authorizes the disclosure of existing cell-site records. Moreover, Section 2703(d), together with the Pen/Trap Statute and upon a showing of the necessary specific and articulable facts, authorizes the disclosure of prospective cell-site information, as the Government has sought in its recent applications to this Court.

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2 On September 19, 2005, Judge Orenstein issued an order allowing additional briefing, in which he admitted that his conclusion that cell-site data constitutes the “contents of a communication” is “clearly erroneous.” A discussion of the reasons why his conclusion is error is included in this letter brief for Your Honor’s reference.
A. Cell-Site Data Are "Records or Other Information" Disclosable Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2703

In rejecting Section 2703(d) as a basis for disclosing cell-site information, Judge Orenstein first posited that only the portion of that statute relating to the "contents of a wire or electronic communication" could arguably provide that authority. This assumption, upon which the rest of Judge Orenstein’s conclusion is based, is error. As explained below, it both misconstrues the nature of cell-site data and ignores 18 U.S.C. 2703(c)(1)(B), a statute which, in conjunction with Section 2703(d), authorizes the disclosure of cell-site records.

As an initial matter, cell-site information is not "the contents of a communication" within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2703(a) and (b). In general, such "contents" include only the "substance, purport or meaning of a communication." 18 U.S.C. § 2510(8), incorporated by reference in the SCA at 18 U.S.C. § 2711(1). Cell-site information, by contrast, conveys data concerning the particular location a cell phone and its user are in, rather than the contents of any conversations the user has over the cell phone. Thus, cell-site information constitutes "information pertaining to a subscriber," rather than the "contents of a communication." Accordingly, it is governed by Section 2703(c) of the SCA.

The structure of SCA, as it was first enacted and as it was later amended by CALEA, demonstrates that Congress intended to authorize courts to order the disclosure of a broad array of non-content information, such as cell-site information, pursuant to Section 2703(c). When the SCA was enacted in 1986, it permitted the disclosure pursuant to court order or subpoena of a catch-all category of "record[s] or other information pertaining to a subscriber or customer of such service (not including the contents of communications)." See P.L. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848, 1862 (1986), now codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)(1). The accompanying 1986 Senate report emphasized the breadth of the "record or other information" language: "[t]he information involved is information about the customer’s use of the service not the content of the customers communications." S. Rep. No. 541, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. at 38 (1986).

When Congress enacted CALEA in 1994, it amended the SCA to increase privacy protections with respect to detailed, non-content telephone transactional records. At the same time, however, Congress preserved the Government’s right to access such
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data. In particular, CALEA created a distinction between basic subscriber records (e.g., a subscriber’s name and address and duration of calls) and more detailed transactional logs. Basic subscriber information could be obtained by subpoena. See 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)(2). Disclosure of “record[s] or other transactional information pertaining to a subscriber to or customer of such service (not including the contents of communications)” other than basic subscriber information, however, required an order pursuant to Section 2703(d). See 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)(1)(B). To obtain a Section 2703(d) order, the government must offer “specific and articulable facts showing that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the . . . records or other information sought are relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investigation.” 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d).

The legislative record reveals that Congress intended this new “intermediate standard,” which is midway between the standards required for the issuance of a subpoena and the issuance of a search warrant, see H.R. Rep. No. 827(I), 103rd Cong., 2d Sess., at 31 (1994) (the “House CALEA Report”), to apply to detailed transactional data, such as cell-site information. In discussing the changes to Section 2703(c), the House CALEA Report addressed, in particular, “transactional records from on-line communication services” and acknowledged that they would “reveal more than telephone records or mail records.” House CALEA Report at 31. Accordingly, under the revised 2703(c), the Government would now be permitted to obtain the addresses used in e-mail messages, as long as it satisfied the “reasonable grounds” requirement of Section 2703(d). House CALEA Report at 31.

If anything, an individual’s privacy interest in the addresses of her e-mail correspondents exceeds her privacy interest in the neighborhood in which she uses a cell phone. Given that Congress explicitly stated that the SCA, as amended by CALEA, was intended to authorize the disclosure of e-mail addresses pursuant to Section 2703(d), it likewise intended that statute to govern less intrusive categories of detailed, non-content telephone transactional records, such as cell-site information.
B. Prospective Disclosure of Cell-Site Data Is Authorized Pursuant to the Pen/Trap Statute and Section 2703(d)

Judge Orenstein also denied the Government's application for a cell-site orders on the theory that CALEA prohibits use of the Pen/Trap Statute to acquire prospective cell-site information. In re Pen Application at *3-4. This, too, is error because it fails to consider the Pen/Trap Statute together with Section 2703(d), a combination which provides authority for the prospective disclosure of cell-site data.

When the Pen/Trap Statute was first enacted in 1986, pen registers and trap and trace devices were given narrow definitions which were limited to the capture of telephone numbers. For example, "pen register" was defined in part to mean "a device which records or decodes electronic or other impulses which identify the numbers dialed or otherwise transmitted on the telephone line to which such device is attached . . . ." Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, § 301, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (1986). As communications networks developed, however, federal law enforcement began to use pen/trap orders to collect additional categories of non-content information. For example, a pen/trap order was used on an e-mail account to locate a murder suspect who had evaded capture for three years. See Fighting Cyber Crime: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Crime of the Committee on the Judiciary, 107th Cong., 1st Sess. 47-48 (2001) (statement of Michael Chertoff, Asst. Atty General, Crim. Div., U.S. Dept. of Justice) (available at judiciary.house.gov/legacy/chertoff_061201.htm).

Any ambiguity over whether pen registers and trap and trace devices were narrowly limited to telephone numbers was eliminated by the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 § 216, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001) ("Patriot Act"). The Patriot Act amended the definitions of "pen register" and "trap and trace device" to make clear that the Pen/Trap Statute applies to a broad variety of communications technologies and allows the collection of a broad range of non-content information. "Pen register" is now defined to mean

- a device or process which records or decodes dialing, routing, addressing, or signaling information transmitted by an instrument or facility from which a wire or electronic communication is transmitted, provided, however, that such information shall not include the contents of any communication . . . .
18 U.S.C. 3127(3). Similarly, "trap and trace device" is now defined to mean

a device or process which captures the incoming electronic or other impulses which identify the originating number or other dialing, routing, addressing, and signaling information reasonably likely to identify the source of a wire or electronic communication, provided, however, that such information shall not include the contents of any communication.


Prospective cell-site collection falls within the scope of these definitions of "pen register" and "trap and trace device" because cell-site information constitutes "dialing, routing, addressing, and signaling information." In particular, cell-site information is used by cell phone companies to route calls to and from their proper destination. The House Report on the bill that became the Patriot Act emphasized the inclusion of cell-site data within the scope of the Pen/Trap Statute when it noted that "orders for the installation of pen register and trap and trace devices may obtain any non-content information - 'dialing, routing, addressing, and signaling information' - utilized in the processing or transmitting of wire and electronic communications." H.R. Rep. No. 236(I), 107th Cong. 1st Sess. at 53 (2001). The Report further explained the broad scope of information that may be obtained by pen registers/ trap and trace devices: "This concept, that the information properly obtained by using a pen register or trap and trace device is non-content information, applies across the board to all communications media." Id. Accordingly, the Government must seek a pen/trap order to collect cell-site data. See 18 U.S.C. 3121(a) ("no person may install or use a pen register or a trap and trace device without first obtaining a court order under section 3123 of this title . . . .")

The Government, however, cannot rely upon the Pen/Trap Statute alone because CALEA restricts the use of pen/ trap orders to obtain cell-site information. It is critical to note, however, the mechanism through which Congress accomplished this restriction. Congress did not - as Judge Orenstein presumes - simply forbid the use of pen/ trap orders to obtain such information. Instead, it prohibited the disclosure of cell-site information "solely pursuant" to a pen/ trap order:
(a) ... a telecommunications carrier shall ensure that its equipment, facilities, or services that provide a customer or subscriber with the ability to originate, terminate, or direct communications are capable of -

(2) expeditiously isolating and enabling the government, pursuant to a court order or other lawful authorization, to access call-identifying information that is reasonably available to the carrier-

except that, with regard to information acquired solely pursuant to the authority for pen registers and trap and trace devices (as defined in section 3127 of title 18, United States Code), such call-identifying information shall not include any information that may disclose the physical location of the subscriber (except to the extent that the location may be determined from the telephone number).

CALEA § 103(a), codified at 47 U.S.C. § 1002.

There is no dispute that “[i]nformation that may disclose the physical location of the subscriber” includes cell-site information of the kind in issue here. Congress’ use of the “solely pursuant” language to restrict the use of pen/trap orders to obtain cell-site information, however, demonstrates that the Pen/Trap Statute applies to the collection of cell-site information, as discussed above, but that additional authority beyond the Pen/Trap Statute should be sought for such collection. In fact, as discussed at pages 5-6 above, CALEA created just such authority when it amended the SCA to authorize the disclosure of cell-site information pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 2703(c)(1)(B) and 2703(d), provided the Government articulates facts demonstrating “reasonable grounds to believe” that the information sought is “relevant and material” to a criminal investigation. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d). Thus, by amending the SCA, CALEA created authority distinct from the Pen/Trap Statute — i.e., not “solely pursuant” to that statute — that authorizes the release to the Government of “information that may disclose the physical location of” a cell phone subscriber.

Indeed, the only conceivable purpose for the “solely pursuant” language is to make clear that cell phone service
providers must disclose cell-site data when authority in addition to the Pen/Trap Statute is relied upon by the Government. Section 2703(d) provides that authority, as is clear from the nature of cell-site information, the structure and legislative history of the SCA, and by the timing of Section 2703(d)’s introduction at the same time CALEA’s restrictive language was enacted. Any argument that the Pen/Trap Statute and Section 2703(d) cannot be combined would render the “solely pursuant” language surplusage, a result which Congress could not have intended. It also suggests the absurd result that the Government, once it had obtained a pen/trap order, would be barred from obtaining cell-site data, no matter what additional authority it cited, including a search warrant.

Here, the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York has not sought to acquire cell-site information “solely pursuant” to the Pen/Trap Statute, but under the more demanding requirements of Section 2703(d) as well, consistent with CALEA. (See Exhibit A at 2-3). Under the Pen/Trap Statute, a court is empowered to authorize the installation of a pen register or trap and trace device upon the finding that a law enforcement officer “has certified . . . that the information sought is likely to be obtained . . . is relevant to an ongoing investigation.” 18 U.S.C. § 3123(b). Recognizing the complementary role played by the SCA, and to comply with CALEA, the Government also seeks cell-site authority based on an additional showing, pursuant to Section 2703(d), that the information is “relevant and material to” that investigation. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d). Accordingly, the Government submits that the Court has authority to issue cell-site orders pursuant to the combined authority of the Pen/Trap Statute and Section 2703(d) of the SCA.

C. Disclosure of Cell-Site Information Does Not Convert a Cell Phone Into a “Tracking Device” Requiring a Warrant

Judge Orenstein also concluded, in the course of rejecting the Government’s application for a cell-site order, that disclosure of cell-site information pursuant to Section 2703(d) “would effectively allow the installation of a tracking device without the showing of probable cause normally required for a warrant.” In re Pen Application at *2. Judge Orenstein amplified his point by asserting that cell-site information is the equivalent of “physical surveillance of the telephone user” because “it reveals [the user’s] location at a given time.” Id. This reasoning is incorrect.
First, a warrant is generally not required for the installation of a tracking device. See United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983) (holding that law enforcement need not obtain a warrant to install a proximity beeper that discloses the location of a car traveling on public roads). In fact, there is no warrant requirement under the tracking device statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3117. See United States v. Gbemisola, 225 F.3d 753, 758 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (“But by contrast to statutes governing other kinds of electronic surveillance devices, section 3117 does not prohibit the use of a tracking device in the absence of conformity with the section.”) (emphasis in original).

Second, a warrant is required for a mobile tracking device only when the Government invades a reasonable expectation of privacy. Compare United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. at 285 with United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 713-18 (1984) (holding that warrantless use of a beeper inside a house violated Fourth Amendment). However, there is no such reasonable expectation of privacy in the case of cell-site information under the rule articulated in Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979). In Smith, the Supreme Court applied a two-prong test to determine whether a defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in dialed telephone numbers. Under the first prong, the Court determines whether a defendant exhibits an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy. Under the second prong, the Court then determines whether such a subjective expectation of privacy is one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. See Smith, 442 U.S. at 742-44. A reasonable expectation of privacy exists only if both of these criteria are met.

In Smith, the Supreme Court held both that telephone users had no subjective expectations of privacy in dialed telephone numbers and that any such expectation is not one that society was prepared to recognize as reasonable. The Court stated: “First, we doubt that people in general entertain any actual expectation in the numbers they dial. All telephone users realize that they must 'convey' phone numbers to the telephone company, since it is through telephone company switching equipment that their calls are completed.” Smith, 442 U.S. at 742. Notably, the Supreme Court based this statement about subjective expectations of privacy not on any public survey or polling data, but from the way telephones function. The Court went on to state that "even if [a defendant] did harbor some subjective expectation that the phone numbers he dialed would remain private, this expectation is not one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable."
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Smith, 442 U.S. at 743 (internal quotes omitted). It noted that "[t]his Court consistently has held that a person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily turns over to third parties." Smith 442 U.S. at 743-44. In Smith, the user "voluntarily conveyed numerical information to the telephone company" and thereby "assumed the risk that the company would reveal to the police the numbers he dialed." Smith 442 U.S. at 744.

This reasoning is equally applicable to cell phone usage. Cell phone users understand that they are broadcasting a signal to the cell phone company so that the cell phone company can locate them to complete their calls. Users cannot have a subjective expectation that the location of the cell tower through which the signal is passed will be secret from the cell phone company. Moreover, even if users did have such an expectation, it would make no difference under the second prong of Smith’s analysis. A cell phone user voluntarily transmits a signal to the cell phone company, and thereby “assumes the risk” that the cell phone provider will reveal to law enforcement the cell-site information. This is not a privacy expectation that society is prepared to view as reasonable. Indeed, the cell-site information here is even less worthy of protection than the dialed telephone numbers in Smith. There, the defendant was claiming a privacy interest in numbers he personally had dialed. In cell-site cases, a defendant must attempt to claim a privacy interest in information generated by the cell phone provider and which he never possessed – the location of the cell towers that received a signal the user voluntarily broadcast.

Third, a cell phone disclosing cell-site data does not fit the definition of a “tracking device.” A tracking device is “an electronic or mechanical device which permits the tracking of movement of a person or object.” 18 U.S.C. § 3117(b). In other words, it is a homing device which allows law enforcement to closely monitor its physical location and the location of the person or thing to which it is attached. Cell-site data, while it provides information about the location of the cell phone and its user, does not permit detailed, continuous tracking of the cell phone user’s movement. At best, it can provide a cell phone and its user’s general location within a broad area surrounding a particular cell-site tower, or show when a cell phone moves to an adjoining cell. Indeed, as long as the cell phone user stays within reception of a particular cell tower, it is impossible to determine the user’s precise location, or even whether the user is stationary or moving. Thus, cell-site data does not actually
“permit the tracking of the movement of a person or object,” and certainly does not replace “physical surveillance” which would disclose a person’s location at a particular moment, as Judge Orenstein presumes it would. In re Pen Application at *2.

Moreover, the legislative history of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (“ECPA”), see § 108, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (1986), which enacted the tracking device statute codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3117, demonstrates that Congress understood “tracking devices” to be homing devices which are separate and apart from cell phones. For example, the Senate Report on ECPA includes a glossary of technological terms. The glossary— which defines “electronic tracking devices” separately from cell phones and pagers— defines electronic tracking devices as

one-way radio communication devices that emit a signal on a specific radio frequency. This signal can be received by special tracking equipment, and allows the user to trace the geographical location of the transponder. Such “homing” devices are used by law enforcement personnel to keep track of the physical whereabouts of the sending unit, which might be placed in an automobile, on a person, or in some other item.


There is no reason to supply a broader definition of “tracking device” than Congress intended. If “tracking device” were given the broad interpretation suggested by Judge Orenstein, nearly all communications devices would be tracking devices. Certainly any device relying on a cellular communication system, including many pagers, text messaging devices such as Blackberries, and cellular Internet systems would, like cell phones, be a tracking device. Moreover, it is generally possible to determine the physical location of users connected to the Internet, making all computers which communicate over the Internet tracking devices, according to Judge Orenstein’s definition. Similarly, land-line telephones would also constitute tracking devices, because it is possible to determine an individual’s location from his use of a land-line telephone.
CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court has authority to authorize the disclosure of cell-site information upon the showings required by the Pen/Trap Statute and Section 2703(d) of the SCA. Accordingly, the Government respectfully requests that the Court grant is applications for cell-site orders.

Respectfully submitted,

MICHAEL J. GARCIA
United States Attorney

By:

Thomas G. A. Brown
Assistant United States Attorney
(212) 637-2194
Chief Magistrate Judge Kenneth P. Neiman
United States District Court
1550 Main Street, Suite 508
Springfield, MA 01103

Dear Chief Magistrate Judge Neiman:

The American Civil Liberties Union has submitted a request to the Department of Justice under the Freedom of Information Act for information pertaining to the policies, practices and procedures followed by U.S. Attorneys Offices to obtain mobile phone location information. The Department has determined that a document drafted by our office at the request of the Court falls within the terms of the request.

In the latter half of 2005, districts around the country were focusing on when, and under what circumstances, the government would be permitted to learn through what cell tower a cell phone call was being routed at the same time the government learned the originating and terminating numbers of that call. At the request of one of the members of the Court, this office submitted a letter describing for all of the Magistrate Judges simultaneously the position we would be taking on this issue and the legal basis for that position. This enabled the Magistrate Court as a body to review the law, discuss it at their monthly meeting, and apply a consistent standard for considering government applications. After consideration, the Magistrate Court adopted a more rigorous standard than the position of this office.

For your convenience, a copy of the January 13, 2006 letter to then Chief Magistrate Judge Swartwood is attached.

Very truly yours,

MICHAEL J. SULLIVAN
United States Attorney

By: Stephen P. Heymann
STEPHEN P. HEYMANN
Assistant U.S. Attorney
Jones, Patricia (USALAM)

From: Dugas, David R. (USALAM)
Sent: Thursday, February 16, 2006 2:04 PM
To: Thornton, Lyman (USALAM)
Cc: Lemelle, Stan (USALAM); Jones, Patricia (USALAM); Kleinpeter, Jennifer (USALAM)
Subject: Fw: Cell Site Location Letter
Attachments: Cell-Site Letter.pdf; Sample Cell- Site Data.pdf; Southern District Opinion.pdf; Eastern District Opinion.pdf; Texas Opinion.pdf; Maryland Opinion.pdf; District of Columbia I.pdf; District of Columbia II.pdf; Cell-Site Letter Copy.txt; WDPA MJ Decision 1-26-06.wpd; Wisconsin Decision.doc; Decision_and_Order_WDNY_2-10-06.pdf

FYI.

------------------------------------
David R. Dugas
Sent from my BlackBerry Wireless Handheld

-----Original Message-----
From: Heymann, Stephen (USAMA) <SHeymann@usa.doj.gov>
To: Acosta, Alex (USAFIS) <AACosta@usa.doj.gov>; Connolly, Colm (USADE)
   <CConnolly1@usa.doj.gov>; Cummins, Bud (USAARE) <BCummins@usa.doj.gov>; Dugas, David R.
   (USALAM) <DDugas@usa.doj.gov>; Graves, Todd (USAMOV) <TGraves@usa.doj.gov>; Hahn, Paul
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   Miller, Gregory (USAFLN) <GMiller1@usa.doj.gov>; Roper, Richard (USATXN)
   <RRoper@usa.doj.gov>; Sinnott, Steve (USANW) <SSinnott@usa.doj.gov>; Sullivan, Michael
   (USAMA) <MSullivan2@usa.doj.gov>; Vines, Jim (USATNM) <JVines@usa.doj.gov>; Wood, Lisa
   (USAGAS) <LWood@usa.doj.gov>
CC: Sullivan, Michael (USAMA) <MSullivan2@usa.doj.gov>
Sent: Thu Feb 16 14:00:57 2006
Subject: Cell Site Location Letter

Mike Sullivan has asked me to forward the attached to his fellow
members on the AGAC Intellectual Property/Cybercrimes Subcommittee on his behalf. Below is
the letter which we submitted to our Magistrate Judges concerning the use of combined pen
register/2703 applications to obtain cell site location information, along with three
subsequently decided cases.

Your Honor,

The attached letter submitted to the Magistrate Judges in this District addresses issues
concerning the collection of cell-site data pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 2703 at the same
time a pen register or trap and trace order is being executed on a cell phone. The .pdf file
entitled "Cell-Site Letter" contains the letter to the Court; the file entitled "Sample Cell-
Site Data" contains the attachment referenced in the letter.

There have been six decisions nationally by Magistrate Judges on this issue over the past several months. The remaining
.pdf files contain copies of those opinions for the Court's convenience.

Respectfully submitted, Steve Heymann
Since our submission, three other cases have surfaced, one for us from the Western District of Louisiana, the other two against us from Wisconsin. Those three cases are attached below in WP/Word formats, as is a copy of our letter to the Court in WP format, for anyone who may want to draw from it.

<<Cell-Site Letter Copy.frm>>  <<WDLA MJ Decision 1-26-06.wpd>>  <<Wisconsin Decision.doc>>
<<Decision_and_Order_MDNY_2-10-06.pdf>>
Re: Applications for Cell-Site Information

Dear Judge Swartwood:

Over the past several months, Courts in several districts have focused on when, and under what circumstances, the government may learn through what cell tower a cell phone call is being routed at the same time the government learns the numbers being dialed to originate that call. At the suggestion of Magistrate Judge Collings, we are submitting this letter memorandum to brief the Court on this issue before the Court’s monthly meeting.

It is important at the outset to separate the technology from the activity which the government seeks to monitor. Cellular telephones are now capable of a broad range of functions, each of which raise different search and seizure issues. Some cell phones, for example, have sophisticated calendaring abilities; others are capable of sending email and web browsing; others, still, incorporate precise GPS location systems; while yet others combine these and still other functionalities. Each of these functions may implicate different Fourth Amendment and/or statutory rights. Over time, each of these, and others to come, will require critical analysis by the Court.

At this juncture, however, we address with the Court only the most basic of cellular phone activities — making a telephone call. At the risk of stating the obvious, since a cell
phone is not connected by household wiring to the telephone network, to place a call a cell phone must send a radio signal to an antenna tower which, in turn, is connected to the network. Depending on whether one is in a densely populated urban area or in a less populated suburban or rural one, towers may be located anywhere between hundreds of yards and several miles apart. To maintain their networks and properly bill customers, cellular telephone companies record the site of the antenna tower ("cell-site") to which a cell phone sends its signal when a call is first placed, the telephone number dialed, the duration of the call, and the cell-site through which the call is being routed when the call ends. \(^1\)

Because a cell-site identifies the origin of a phone call as somewhere between a several square block area and a several square mile area, this information standing alone is inadequate to pinpoint the location of a caller. Nonetheless, the U.S. Marshals find the information extremely valuable in locating fugitives when combined with information developed from other sources, including informants, witnesses, and surveillance. Similarly, agencies such as the Drug Enforcement Administration find the cell-site information helpful in determining the general geographic location of individuals involved in drug distribution and other conspiracies. Unlike a fixed line telephone where the area code and exchange of a telephone number recorded by a pen register or trap and trace device tells where the phone is located, the area code and exchange assigned to a cell phone has no necessary linkage to its location.

Before turning to the legal analysis, we think it is extremely important to make clear what we are not seeking, since what we are not seeking forms the background of many of the reported cases. We are not routinely seeking, or addressing

\(^1\) Cell-sites are often divided into thirds—120 degree sectors. Cell phone companies typically capture and record the sector in which an antenna tower receives a signal from a cell phone at the beginning and the end of a call as well as the tower itself. For clarity, the combined tower and sector information will be referred to throughout this letter as simply cell-site or tower information.

\(^2\) Similar information is recorded when a call is received, but again for clarity we will only refer to outgoing calls in our descriptions.
here, the ability to remotely activate a cellular telephone's GPS functionality, as may be possible in some instances. Nor are we seeking permission to get information from multiple cellular antenna towers simultaneously in order to triangulate precisely on the location of a cell phone. Nor are we seeking permission to repeatedly place calls to a particular cellular telephone, or otherwise track on a continuous basis the location of a cell phone. As indicated earlier, we are seeking here only the legal authority to obtain the most basic of data, the antenna towers through which a cell phone company routes a customer's call when the customer originates and terminates the call, both records regularly kept in the course of cellular telephone companies' business.

The legal analysis which follows takes four steps. First, the Fourth Amendment does not apply to cell-site information because there is neither an objectively nor subjectively reasonable expectation of privacy when a user makes a telephone call by intentionally sending a radio signal to an antenna tower. Second, with the Fourth Amendment inapplicable, whatever protection is accorded cell-site information at the time a call is placed must be purely statutory. Here, the pen register/trap and trace ("pen/trap") statute, 18 U.S.C. §§3121 et seq., both constrains when the government can obtain this information contemporaneous with the cell phone's usage and defines the legal mechanism which the government must use to obtain the information. Third, in 47 U.S.C. §1002 (a)(2), Congress increased the burden for obtaining disclosure of cell-site information from cell phone companies above the "relevancy" standard contained in the pen/trap statute, specifying that disclosure of cell-site information should not be made "solely pursuant" to a pen/trap order. The appropriate additional burden to meet is that contained in 18 U.S.C. §2703(c), which specifically addresses local and long distance telephone connection records. Finally, this letter addresses two central concerns of the handful of opinions over the past few months concerning cell-site information applications—whether §2703 can be applied prospectively and whether contemporaneous collection of cell-site information converts a cell phone into a de facto tracking device which can only be tracked on a finding of probable cause.
There Is No Reasonable Expectation of Privacy in Cell-Site Information

In order to make a telephone call, the owner of a cell phone must connect to the telephone network by transmitting a signal to a nearby antenna tower. Cell phone companies keep track of cell tower information in a database, just as they do the numbers dialed. Under the established principles of Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979), there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in such information, and, accordingly, no Fourth Amendment-protected privacy interest.

The Smith Court held both that telephone users had no subjective expectation of privacy in dialed telephone numbers and also that any such expectation is not one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. See Smith, 442 U.S. at 742-44. The Court's reasoning applies equally to cell-site information. First, the Court stated: "we doubt that people in general entertain any actual expectation of privacy in the numbers they dial. All telephone users realize that they must 'convey' phone numbers to the telephone company, since it is through telephone company switching equipment that their calls are completed." Id. at 742. Similarly, cell phone users understand that they must send a radio signal which can be heard by a cell phone company's antenna if the company is going to route their call to its intended recipient.

Second, under the reasoning of Smith, any subjective expectation of privacy in cell-site information is unreasonable. In Smith, the Court explicitly held that "even if petitioner did harbor some subjective expectation that the phone numbers he dialed would remain private, this expectation is not one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable." Id. at 743 (internal quotation omitted). It noted that "[t]his Court consistently has held that a person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily turns over to third parties." Id. at 743-44. In Smith, the user "voluntarily conveyed numerical information to the telephone company" and thereby "assumed the risk that the company would reveal to the police the numbers he dialed." Id. at 744. Here, a cell phone user transmits a signal to a cell tower for his call to be connected and thereby assumes the risk that the cell phone provider will reveal the cell-site information to law enforcement. In other words, it makes no difference if some users have never thought about how their cell phones work or if they believe that the cell phone company locates them through
magic. A cell phone user can have no expectation of privacy in cell-site information.

A variant of this Fourth Amendment analysis leads to the same result. The cell-site data which the government is seeking is not in the hands of the cell phone user at all, but rather is in the business records of a third party - the cell phone company. The Supreme Court has held that a customer has no privacy interest in business records of this kind. Addressing a Fourth Amendment challenge to a third party subpoena for bank records, the Court in United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976), found that the banks' records "are not respondent's 'private papers'" but are "the business records of the banks" in which a customer "can assert neither ownership nor possession." Id. at 440; see also SEC v. Jerry T. O'Brien, Inc., 467 U.S. 735, 743 (1984) (under Miller, "when a person communicates information to a third party .... he cannot object if the third party conveys that information or records thereof to law enforcement authorities"); United States v. Daccarett, 6 F.3d 37, 50 (2nd Cir. 1993) (same). Thus, under Miller, an individual has no Fourth Amendment-protected privacy interest in business records such as cell-site connection information, to the extent the records are kept, maintained and used by a cell phone company in the normal course of business.

The mere fact that location information at a very general level is being collected does not, in and of itself, implicate additional Fourth Amendment privacy concerns. For there to be a constitutionally cognizable privacy interest, it would be necessary to be able to locate the cell phone within a space, such as a home or building, for which there was reasonable expectation of privacy. It is impossible to tell from the originating tower alone whether a call is being placed from inside a building, let alone where within that building.

In United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983), the Supreme Court considered whether the police invaded the defendants' legitimate expectation of privacy by monitoring the signal emitted from a beeper (a radio transmitter) placed in a container of chemicals by the government. The defendants had placed the container in a car, and the signal emitted from the beeper allowed the police to track the movements of the car along public roads. At one point during the tracking, the police lost visual contact with the car after the driver "began making evasive maneuvers." Id. at 278. But the beeper's signal allowed the police to reestablish visual contact and eventually locate the
container inside a cabin. The Supreme Court held that the police had not invaded the defendants' legitimate expectation of privacy because "[t]he governmental surveillance conducted by means of the beeper in this case amounted principally to the following of an automobile on public streets and highways.... A person traveling in an automobile on public thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements from one place to another." Id. at 281. Significantly, the Court further held that "[n]othing in the Fourth Amendment prohibited the police from augmenting the sensory faculties bestowed upon them at birth with such enhancement as science and technology afforded them in this case." Id. at 282.

Similarly, the Supreme Court in United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705 (1984), held that the installation and use of a tracking device did not violate the Fourth Amendment when government agents installed a tracking device in a drum of chemicals with the consent of the drum’s owner and the drum was later transferred to the defendant, who had no knowledge of the tracking device. Id. at 708. Nevertheless, the Court did hold that the government’s use of the tracking device to find the particular location of the drum inside the defendant’s private residence was a violation of the Fourth Amendment, since the area inside the residence was not open to public view. Id. at 714. The Court reasoned that a warrantless search had occurred because the information obtained through the monitoring of the beeper inside the residence (the location of the drum) could not have been obtained from observation outside the residence. Id. at 714-15.\footnote{The Karo Court reserved the issue of whether monitoring the beeper required a showing of probable cause or the lesser showing of a reasonable suspicion. Karo, 468 U.S. at 718, n.5.}

Learning the cell-sites through which calls are routed at their inception and termination can only provide law enforcement with a general geographic location of a target telephone. Indeed, depending on terrain and how busy a particular tower may be at the time, a cell phone user may not even be connected to the network through the tower physically closest to him. This general geographic location information is not commensurate with the kind of precise information provided by the beeper described in Karo, or as would be provided by a GPS device.

Only one Circuit Court has analyzed the collection of cell-
site data, or its implications under the Fourth Amendment. In that decision, United States v. Forest, 355 F.3d 942, 950-51 (6th Cir. 2004), rev’d on other grounds, 125 S.Ct. 1050 (2005), the DEA agents conducting physical surveillance of the defendant lost sight of the defendant on the public highways. In order to determine the defendant’s location, agents intentionally called the cell phone several times to generate a signal from the cell phone in order to determine which cell phone tower was closest to the defendant. Using computer data from the cell phone provider, agents were able to determine which towers were being “hit” by the defendant’s cell phone. This cell-site data allowed agents to learn that the defendant had left Youngstown, Pennsylvania and traveled to Cleveland, Ohio. Id. at 947.

The defendant in Forest argued that the government’s use of cell-site data to track his location along the public highways was a violation of the Fourth Amendment. The Court rejected this argument and held that “[t]he rationale of Knotts therefore compels the conclusion that [the defendant] had no legitimate expectation of privacy in the cell-site data because the DEA agents could have obtained the same information by following [defendant’s] car.” Forest, 355 F.3d. at 951. Quoting Knotts, the Sixth Circuit held that “[t]he DEA simply used the cell-site data to ‘augment[ ] the sensory faculties bestowed upon them at birth,’ which is permissible under Knotts.” Id. at 951.

The defendant in Forest also attempted to distinguish Knotts by arguing that the beeper in Knotts was installed by and belonged to the government, while the defendant’s cell phone was his personal property. By calling the defendant’s cell phone, the defendant argued, the government agents had usurped the telephone’s cell-site data instead of using their own tracking device. The defendant further argued that he had not agreed to provide this cell-site data to anyone and had not authorized the cell phone company, Sprint, to disclose this information.

The Court in Forest rejected each of these arguments and found the distinctions legally insufficient:

the distinction between the cell-site data and [the defendant’s] location is not legally

*The case was remanded to the District Court for resentencing due to the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Booker, 125 S.Ct. 738 (2005).*
significant under the particular facts of this case. Here, the cell-site data is simply a proxy for [the defendant's] visually observable location. But as previously noted, [the defendant] had no legitimate expectation of privacy in his movements along public highways.

Forest, 355 F.3d at 951.

The requests in the government's typical cell-site applications are no different than what occurred in Forest and Knotts. Cell-site data will act as a proxy for crude surveillance, placing the user in a several square block to several square mile area. As this data will not even let the government know whether a caller has entered a building, let alone where he is within that building, the cell-site data does not disclose any information about which the cell phone user has a legitimate expectation of privacy. 5

Cell-Site Information Falls Within the Scope of the Pen/Trap Statute

Since there is no Fourth Amendment-protected privacy interest in the location of the cell tower to which one connects when making a call, the only restriction on government access to this information is statutory. By statute, contemporaneous acquisition of cell-site information falls within the scope of the pen/trap statute, 18 U.S.C. §§3121, et seq. In re Application of the United States of America For an Order for Disclosure of Telecommunications Records and Authorizing the Use of a Pen Register and Trap and Trace, ___ F.Supp. 2d ___, 2005 WL 3471754 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 20, 2005), (the "Southern District

5 The Forest Court rejected the application of Smith to cell-site information, holding that this information was involuntarily conveyed. While we question the Sixth Circuit's holding in this regard, it is immaterial here. As described above, the connections of the cell phone to towers in Smith were surreptitiously and involuntarily triggered by law enforcement agents who called the defendant's phone, rather than knowingly and intentionally made by the user as he made telephone calls. At this time, we are only seeking authority from the Court to obtain cell-site location information when a user voluntarily places or receives a call and when the user hangs up from that call.
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Opinion") at 3; but see, In the Matter of the United States of America for an Order Authorizing the Release of Prospective Cell Site Information, ____F.Supp.2d____, 2006 U.S. Dist. Lexis 312 (D.D.C. January 6, 2006) ("District of Columbia Opinion II") at p. 19 (finding no understanding that Congress intended to permit the use of the pen/trap statute to obtain cell-site location data under any circumstances).

Under the terms of 18 U.S.C. §3121(a), no person may install or use a pen register or trap and trace device without first obtaining a court order under Section 3123. Pen registers and trap and trace devices, in turn, are defined to include those devices and processes which record and capture "dialing, routing, addressing or signaling information" for telephone calls. 18 U.S.C. §3127(3). In order for a cell phone company to provide service to a cell phone, it must know in which cell-site the phone is located. Accordingly, cell-site information is used as signaling information to route cell phone calls, and the disclosure of this data falls squarely within the scope of the definitions for pen registers and trap and trace devices.

Addressing changing communications technology, Congress explicitly clarified the definition of pen registers and trap and trace devices to include "dialing, routing, addressing, or signaling information," via the USA Patriot Act of 2001 ("the Patriot Act") §216, Pub.L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001). When it did so, it was not writing on a blank slate. Prior to this clarification, the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit had already held that cell-site information was "signaling information" for purposes of the Communications Assistance For Law Enforcement Act (commonly known as "CALEA"), Pub. L. No. 103-414, 108 Stat. 4279 (1994). In United States Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, 227 F.3d 450 (D.C. Cir. 2000), the D.C. Circuit considered whether cell-site information was "call-identifying information." The court held that it was call-identifying

"Call-identifying information" is defined by CALEA, in a manner similar to the definition contained in the pen/trap statute, as "dialing or signaling information that identifies the origin, direction, destination, or termination of each communication generated or received by a subscriber by means of any equipment, facility, or service of a telecommunications carrier." Id. at 454, 463-64 (citing 47 U.S.C. §1001(2)).
information, adopting the Federal Communication Commission's explanation that: "a mobile phone sends signals to the nearest cell-site at the start and end of a call. These signals, which are necessary to achieve communications between the caller and the party he or she is calling, clearly are 'signaling information.'" Id. at 463 (internal quotations omitted). While noting that CALEA could have been clearer on its face, the D.C. Circuit observed that, because cell-site information is signaling information, it fell within the type of information covered by the pen/trap statute. Id. at 458, 463-64.

Once the Patriot Act clarified the statutory definition of pen register and trap and trace device to cover "signaling information," the pen/trap statute's inclusion of cell-site location information became explicit. Indeed, this Court must presume that Congress was aware that cell-site information was signaling information when it enacted the Patriot Act. See Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 580-81 (1978) ("Congress is presumed to be aware of an administrative or judicial interpretation of a statute and to adopt that interpretation when it re-enacts a statute without change. . . . So too, where, as here, Congress adopts a new law incorporating sections of a prior law, Congress normally can be presumed to have had knowledge of the interpretation given to the incorporated law, at least insofar as it affects the new statute").

7 Magistrate Judges in two districts have suggested that the Patriot Act’s clarification of the pen/trap definitions was intended to reach only the Internet. See In re Application for Pen Register and Trap/Trace Device With Cell-site Location Authority, 396 F. Supp.2d 747 (S.D. Tex. 2005) (the "Texas Opinion") and In re Application of the United States for an Order Authorizing Use of Pen Register and Trap/Trace Device and Authorizing Release of Subscriber Information and/or Cell-site Information, 396 F.Supp.2d 294 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (the "Eastern District Opinion").

In the Texas opinion, Magistrate Judge Smith pointed to two statements in the Congressional Record noting that the expanded definition of pen register and trap and trace device will apply to the Internet. See Texas Opinion, 396 at 761. Yet contrary to Magistrate Judge Smith’s conclusion, nothing in these two statements indicates that the expanded definitions are restricted only to the Internet. Moreover, not only is Magistrate Judge
Prospective Disclosure of Cell-Site Data is Authorized Pursuant to the Pen/Trap Statute and 18 U.S.C. §2703(d)

Having concluded that the pen/trap statute controls contemporaneous collection of cell-site information in the absence of any cognizable Fourth Amendment privacy interest, it would seem that this should be the end of the analysis. And so it would be, but for the fact that Congress restricted the government’s ability to rely solely upon the pen/trap statute to obtain cell-site information in 47 U.S.C. §1002(a)(2)(B), the codification of Section 103(a)(2) of CALEA. There, to enhance the protection of location information, Congress prohibited the disclosure of cell-site information "solely pursuant" to a pen/trap order:

(a) ... a telecommunications carrier shall ensure that its equipment, facilities, or services that provide a customer or subscriber with the ability to originate, terminate, or direct communications are capable of -

Smith’s inference foreclosed by the D.C. Circuit’s holding in United States Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, supra, that cell-site information is “signaling information” (and thus falls within the scope of the expanded definitions of pen registers and trap and trace devices), it is also inconsistent with the Patriot Act’s statutory language and legislative history. Nothing in the definition of pen register and trap and trace device limits those terms to a particular method of communications, be it the Internet, cell phones, or hardline telecommunications. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3127(3) and (4). In fact, none of the electronic surveillance statutes - 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510, et seg. (the "Wiretap Act"), 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701, et seq. (the "Stored Communications Act" or "SCA") and the pen/trap statute - apply only to particular communications technologies. They are written in technology-neutral terms, and thus apply equally to all network and communications technologies. As the House Report on the Patriot Act explained: "This concept, that the information properly obtained by using a pen register or trap and trace device is non-content information, applies across the board to all communications media.” H.R. Rep. No. 236(I), 107th Cong., 1st Sess. at 53 (2001) (emphasis added).
(2) expeditiously isolating and enabling the government, pursuant to a court order or other lawful authorization, to access call-identifying information that is reasonably available to the carrier -

except that, with regard to information acquired solely pursuant to the authority for pen registers and trap and trace devices (as defined in section 3127 of Title 18), such call-identifying information shall not include any information that may disclose the physical location of the subscriber (except to the extent that the location may be determined from the telephone number). . .


There can be no dispute that cell-site information is “[i]nformation that may disclose the physical location of the subscriber.” Congress' insertion of the “solely pursuant” language to restrict the use of pen/trap orders to obtain this kind of information further demonstrates that the pen/trap statute applies to the collection of cell-site information, as discussed above. But, the additional authority, beyond the pen/trap statute, necessary for collection of location information is not specified in the statute. This is where 18 U.S.C. §2703 comes in. Southern District Opinion at 11. As is discussed in detail below, CALEA authorized the disclosure of cell-site information pursuant to §§ 2703(c)(1)(B) and 2703(d), provided the Government articulates facts demonstrating "reasonable grounds to believe" that the information sought is "relevant and material" to a criminal investigation. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d).

Title II of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act "ECPA") created a new portion of the criminal code dealing with access to stored communications and transaction records, commonly known as the Stored Communications Act or "SCA". Pub. L. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848, 1860 (1986)(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§2701, et seq.). The core provision of the SCA is §2703 which
describes circumstances under which the government can require disclosure of not only stored "content" communications, but certain non-content transaction and subscriber records.

In order to protect the privacy of more detailed non-content transactional records, CALEA amended the SCA by creating a distinction between basic subscriber records available pursuant to a subpoena and more detailed transactional records available only pursuant to a court order under §2703(d) or a search warrant under Fed. R. Crim. P. 41. Thus, post-CALEA, there are two categories of subscriber information in §2703.

The first category of basic subscriber records under §2703(c)(2) is specific. Section 2703(c)(2) allows the government to compel a limited class of historical information from a provider of "electronic communication service" or "remote computing service" — such as the customer’s or subscriber’s name, address, length of service, and means of payment — through the use of an administrative or grand jury subpoena, without the need of a court order.

The second more general category of subscriber records is broader and pertains to more detailed information about the subscriber’s use of the target device. Instead of providing a specific list, §2703(c)(1) speaks only of "a record or other information." Because of the more detailed nature of this information, §2703(c)(1) information cannot be compelled by a subpoena, but instead requires a court order under Section 2703(d) or a search warrant under Fed. R. Crim. P. 41. To obtain

Section 2703(c)(1) provides in pertinent part:

A governmental entity may require a provider of electronic communication service or remote computing service to disclose a record or other information pertaining to a subscriber to or customer of such service (not including the contents of communications) only when the governmental entity —

... (B) obtains a court order for such disclosure under subsection (d) of this section...

18 U.S.C. 2703(c)(1).
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a 2703(d) order, the government must offer "specific and articulable facts showing that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the . . . records or other information sought are relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investigation," a standard greater than a certification of relevancy for a pen register, but less than probable cause. See 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d). Congress intended this new "intermediate standard," midway between the standard required for issuance of a subpoena and for a search warrant, to apply to detailed transactional data. H.R. Rep. No. 827(I), 103rd Cong., 2d Sess., ("House CALEA Report") at 31 (1994).

Cell-site information falls within the scope of §2703(c)(1) but not §2703(c)(2). Southern District Opinion at 8-13; Texas Opinion at 748 (granting disclosure of customer records including historical cell-site data pursuant to a §2703 application); Eastern District Opinion at 307, n.10. It is non-content information not included in any of the §2703(c)(2) categories of basic subscriber information. Accordingly, disclosure of cell-site information may be compelled pursuant to a §2703(d) order. See § 2703(c)(1)(B).

Thus, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2703(c)(1)(B) authorizes the government to apply for an order and for the court to compel disclosure of "record[s] or other information pertaining to a subscriber or customer of such service (not including the contents of communications)." When the application is made contemporaneously with a pen/trap application, the not "solely pursuant" limitation of 47 U.S.C. §1002 is satisfied. The Court can and should order that the pen register/trap and trace device be configured to provide cell-site information at the origin and termination of calls, at the same time as numbers dialed by and dialing into the target telephone, and the duration of calls.
Earlier Courts Considering the Availability of Cell-Site Data

We are aware of six Magistrate Judge decisions nationally considering the availability of cell-site data, all in the past several months. The opinions, copies of which accompany this letter, are: the Southern District Opinion, supra; In the Matter of the Application of the United States of America for an Order Authorizing the Release of Prospective Cell-site Information, ___ F. Supp.2d ___, 2005 U.S. Dist. Lexis 34616 (D.D.C. Dec. 22, 2005), ("District of Columbia Opinion I"); District of Columbia Opinion II; In re Application of the United States for an Order authorizing the Installation and Use of a Pen Register and Caller Identification System on Telephone Numbers (Sealed) and Production of Real Time Site Information, ___F.Supp.2d___, 2005 WL 3160860, (D.Md. Nov. 29, 2005) (the "Maryland Opinion"); and the Texas and Eastern District opinions discussed earlier. Of these, the five opinions holding that the government cannot obtain contemporaneous cell-site data -- the Texas, Eastern District, District of Columbia I & II and Maryland opinions -- all appear to consider requests for cell-site information that, to a greater or lesser degree, go beyond what is being sought here or has typically been acquired by law enforcement agencies in this District. The Southern District opinion, authorizing contemporaneous cell-site information after a detailed analysis of the statutory scheme and opinions which preceded it, fits squarely the limited authorization being proposed to this Court at this time. As the Southern District opinion states:

First, the cell-site information provided in this district is tied to only telephone calls actually made or received by the telephone user. Thus, no data is provided as to the location of the cell phone when no call is in progress. Second, at any given moment, data is provided only as to a single cell tower with which the cell phone is communicating. Thus, no data is provided that could be "triangulated" to permit the precise location of the cell phone user. Third, the data is not obtained by the government directly but is instead transmitted from the provider digitally to a computer maintained by the government. That is, the provider transmits to the
government the cell-site data that is stored in the provider's system. The government then uses a software program to translate that data into a usable spreadsheet.

Southern District Opinion at 2.

We will not repeat Magistrate Judge Gorenstein's thoughtful statutory analysis in the Southern District Opinion or belabor his persuasive analysis of the opinions that preceded his. However, we think it is important to address two broad issues raised by the other opinions -- (1) whether 18 U.S.C. §2703 can be applied prospectively; and (2) whether 18 U.S.C. §3117, pertaining to tracking devices, controls rather than §2703.

1. **Prospective Disclosure of Cell-Site Information is Authorized by the SCA.**

As discussed previously, cell-site data are “record[s] or other information pertaining to a subscriber or customer,” which fall under Section 2703(c) of the SCA. The SCA does not impose any temporal restriction in either its description of “records or other information” or its procedures for disclosing that information. Thus, nothing within the SCA prevents disclosure of cell-site information on a prospective basis. Historical and prospective data are not treated differently, and courts should not engraft such a limitation onto the SCA where Congress has not done so.

Even were the SCA interpreted to impose temporal restrictions, cell-site data are records of the telephone company when they are obtained contemporaneously with pen/trap data. When collection of cell phone traffic data is ordered by the Court -- be it pursuant to a pen/trap order or combined pen/trap 2703 order -- the order is not implemented directly by the investigative agency installing a separate device.\(^9\) Rather, data

\(^9\) There are occasional exceptions to this rule, where separate devices, in fact, are utilized to collect phone traffic data. However, we are not addressing them in this letter or asking the court to authorize them at this point.
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pertaining to the target phone are captured by the telephone company, transmitted to the investigative agency, and then interpreted by the agency's computer for use. Thus, cell-site information is transmitted to an investigative agency only after it has come into the possession of the telephone company and is a record of the company.

The Texas, Eastern District and Maryland opinions ("the Contrary Opinions") point to procedural features, found in the wiretap and pen/trap statutes but not in the SCA, as evidence that the SCA was not meant to apply prospectively. See Texas Opinion, 396 F.Supp.2d at 760; Eastern District Opinion, 396 F.Supp.2d at 308-9. For example, the SCA includes no duration requirement and no sealing requirement. Contrary to the assertions of these Courts, however, there is simply no reason for the SCA to contain such procedural elements. Prospective disclosure of cell-site information is governed by both the SCA and the pen/trap statute. Thus, when the SCA is used prospectively to gather cell-site information, the collection is also governed by the pen/trap statute, and all the procedural features of that law apply to the government’s subsequent collection of cell-site data. To quote Judge Gorenstein's analysis on this point:

The principal reason why [§2703] does not serve easily as a fully independent source of authority for providing cell-site data is a structural one: the statute does not contain certain procedural features, such as a time limitation, that Congress has typically included in statutes that permit the gathering of ongoing information. But this is an understandable omission given that Congress envisioned a pen register as the mechanism that would be used to capture cell-site data, and the Pen Register Statute contains the procedural features missing from Section 2702.
In other words, the Pen Register Statute contains the time limitation (and sealing) provisions that are tied to the very "device" - that is, the pen register - that Congress deemed necessary to obtain prospective cell-site information. It is thus logical to conclude that these two statutes in combination contain the necessary authority contemplated by Congress in 47 U.S.C. § 1002.

Southern District Opinion at 12.

The Eastern District opinion further suggests that prospective use of the SCA would enable the Government to bypass the restrictions of the wiretap act. See Eastern District Opinion, 396 F.Supp.2d 313-314. That is untrue. Prospective use of the SCA to allow for the disclosure of content would violate the wiretap acts’s prohibition on interception of wire or electronic communications. See 18 U.S.C. § 2511. Both the wiretap act and the pen/trap statute include strict mandates on prospective disclosure of content and non-content information, respectively. The Government cannot intercept communications without complying with the wiretap act, and it cannot acquire pen/trap data, like cell-site information, without complying with the pen/trap statute. The congressional requirement that the Government cannot seek the disclosure of cell-site information “solely pursuant” to a pen/trap order requires the Government to also rely on the SCA for such disclosure, but it does not allow an end-run around either the pen/trap statute or the wiretap act.

2. The Tracking Device Statute Is Not Relevant to Orders for the Prospective Disclosure of Cell-Site Data

The Contrary Opinions also seek to transmute contemporaneous collection of cell-site data into the surreptitious placement of a tracking device, requiring probable cause.\(^\text{10}\) As a matter of

\(^{10}\) Diverging from the holdings in the Contrary Opinions, District of Columbia Opinions I and II held even a finding of probable cause to be insufficient to authorize the collection of cell-site data under the pen/trap statute and Section 2703. District of Columbia Opinion I at 4 ("invocation of the probable
constitutional analysis, we have seen that cell-site information is entitled to none of the protection that may, under some circumstances, be accorded a tracking device by the Fourth Amendment. A cell phone signaling a cell-site if, and when, it makes a call also does not fit the statutory definition of a "tracking device." A "tracking device" is defined in 18 U.S.C. §3117(b) as "an electronic or mechanical device which permits the tracking of movement of a person or object." In other words, it is a homing device which allows law enforcement to closely monitor its physical location and the location of the person or thing to which it is attached. Cell-site data from pen registers and trap and trace devices, while providing general information about the location of a cell phone and its user when a call is placed, does not permit detailed, continuous tracking of the cell phone user's movement. At best, it can provide a cell phone and its user's general location within a broad area surrounding a particular cell tower if, and when, the user places a call. Thus, cell-site data does not actually "permit the tracking of the movement of a person or object," and certainly does not replace "physical surveillance" which would disclose a person's location at a particular moment, as the Eastern District Opinion presumes it would.

Moreover, the legislative history of the ECPA, which enacted the tracking device statute codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3117, demonstrates that Congress understood "tracking devices" to be homing devices which are separate and apart from cell phones. For example, the Senate Report on ECPA includes a glossary of technological terms. The glossary - which defines "electronic tracking devices" separately from cell phones and pagers - defines electronic tracking devices "as one-way radio communication devices that emit a signal on a specific radio frequency. This signal can be received by special tracking equipment, and allows the user to trace the geographical location of the transponder. Such 'homing' devices are used by law enforcement personnel to keep track of the physical whereabouts of the sending unit, which might be placed in an automobile, on a person, or in some other item." S. Rep. No. 541, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., at 10 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3564 (1986).

cause standard does not solve the fundamental problem that the statutes the government invokes cannot be construed to give the government the information it seeks").
There is no basis to supply a broader definition of “tracking device” than Congress intended. If “tracking device” were given the broad interpretation suggested in the Contrary Opinions, nearly all communications devices would be tracking devices. Certainly any device relying on a cellular communication system, including many pagers, text messaging devices such as Blackberries, and cellular Internet systems, like cell phones, would be considered a tracking device. Moreover, it is generally possible to determine the physical location of users connected to the Internet, making all computers which communicate over the Internet tracking devices, following the logic of the Contrary Opinions. Even credit and ATM cards would constitute tracking devices, because it is possible to determine an individual’s location from his use of the cards.

If the Government were surreptitiously installing the cell phone in an item owned by, or given to, a target, the Government’s monitoring of the cell phone would be unquestionably judged under the constitutional framework set forth by the Supreme Court in Knotts, 460 U.S. at 285 and Karo, 468 U.S. at 713–18 (1984), and the authority to track its potential movement across state lines evaluated under section 3117. Here, however, the Government merely seeks disclosure of information conveyed voluntarily by a cell phone user to a third-party cell phone company, and no “tracking device” is being used.

Finally, none of the Contrary Opinions have challenged the Government’s ability to obtain cell-site data historically pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §2703. Under any view, then, the statute permits the Government to present 2703(d) applications to the Court daily, or even every time a pen register or trap and trace device records a call. Nothing compels this Court to construe the SCA in a manner which permits the government to obtain cell-site data on a continuous and ongoing basis, but only through an unnecessary flood of identical filings. Cf. United States v. American Trucking Assoc., Inc., 310 U.S. 534, 543 (1940) (Court will not construe a statute in a manner that leads to absurd and futile results).

11 Surreptitious installation would also distinguish the circumstances from those in Smith, since the user would not be knowingly and voluntarily connecting with the telephone network.
Conclusion

For the reasons set forth in this letter, the Court should, as has been done in the past, authorize the collection of cell-site data pursuant to combined pen/trap and 2703 applications.

Thank you for the Court’s attention to this important matter. Should it be of use to the Court, please let me know if any of the Magistrate Judges or the Court as a whole would like to discuss this matter further with this Office or receive a briefing on any of the technology at issue.

Very truly yours,

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