

July 30, 2010

Russell G. Leavitt
Office of the General Counsel
United States Department of Defense
1600 Defense Pentagon, Room 3B688
Washington, DC 20301-1600

VIA E-mail


Jameel Jaffer
ACLU Foundation
Legal Department
125 Broad Street
18th Floor
New York, NY 10004-24000

Re: American Civil Liberties Union v. Department of Defense, et al., No. 1:08-cv-01003-RJL

Dear Mr. Jaffer,

Attached, please find 114 pages of documents referred to the Department of Defense by the Department of Justice, in connection with the above-referenced Freedom of Information Act litigation. These documents have been reviewed by both the Department of Defense and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The redacted portions are withheld to protect classified information, sensitive internal DoD rules and practices, information related to criminal investigations, and personally identifying information. The relevant FOIA exemptions are found at 5 U.S.C., §§ 552(b)(1), (b)(2), (b)(3), (b)(6), and (b)(7)(c). Because this matter is already in litigation, your appeal rights are considered moot.

Sincerely,



Russell G. Leavitt
Associate Deputy General Counsel (Legal Counsel)

Attachment:
As stated

Filter: Linked To Source(s): [redacted] CaseMap Facts Report Interview 1" or Linked To Source(s): [redacted] Interview Notes
 10/13/05¹ - 19 of 7911 (0.2%) Filtered

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Case: FBI in Military Zones
 Created: 2/24/2009 11:00:13 AM

Date & Time	Fact Text	Source(s)
To Be Determined	Special Agent [redacted] was interviewed by the Office of the Inspector General on 10/13/2005. SA [redacted] was interviewed by Office of the Inspector General [redacted] and [redacted] via secure STU III phone.	[redacted] Interview Notes 10/13/05 at [redacted] Interview 1 at [redacted]
To Be Determined	SA [redacted] was at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba from 08/11/2003 to 09/26/2003. [redacted] stated that the Federal Bureau of Investigation sent out "communications" looking for volunteers to go to U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba and [redacted] said he volunteered. [redacted] said he recalls that he was the only agent from his division that put in a request to go to U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. [redacted] also mentioned that his SAC had concerns about sending [redacted] because he was 1 of 2 polygraph examiners, but because [redacted] was the only volunteer, the SAC approved his request.	[redacted] Interview Notes 10/13/05, [redacted] Interview 1 at 00:03:00:
To Be Determined	SA [redacted] said he did not do polygraph work down at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. [redacted] said the polygraph was mainly handled by folks from the Department of Defense Polygraph Institute. [redacted] said that there was some Federal Bureau of Investigation polygraph examiners, but that was not the norm.	[redacted] Interview Notes 10/13/05, Interview 1 at 00:04:06
To Be Determined	[redacted] said he did not recall the name of his first OSC at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, but towards the end of August 2003 or the beginning of September 2003, [redacted] was the OSC at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.	[redacted] Interview Notes 10/13/05, Interview 1 at 00:04:37
To Be	[redacted] said he prior to leaving for U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, he	[redacted]

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<p>Determined</p>	<p>received guidance from the Salt Lake City security officer [redacted] explained that he needed to get SCI "tickets" before he could go to U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, and [redacted] read [redacted] into those programs. [redacted] said that he received no additional training on working in military zones or how to treat detainees prior to his deployment to U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. [redacted] said when he arrived on U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, he did attend some kind of briefing in a conference room where the Federal Bureau of Investigation OSC (who he can not recall) spoke briefly, and the military also spoke.</p>	<p>Interview Notes 10/13/05, [redacted] Interview 1 at 00:05:35</p>	<p>b6 Per FBI b7C</p>
<p>To Be Determined</p>	<p>[redacted] suggested that the Federal Bureau of Investigation should provide an orientation type handout to the agents prior to deployment, and [redacted] also thought it would have been helpful if the Federal Bureau of Investigation had given clearer guidance on how the paperwork was to be processed (i.e., format and style) so that each new group of agents arriving on the island would not have to "reinvent the wheel". [redacted] explained that other people were classifying their reports, whereas the Federal Bureau of Investigation was not. When asked if he reported his concerns or issues [redacted] said he did not. [redacted] said that he did not know if this was a common concern among the other Federal Bureau of Investigation agents, because they were often issues at the time, like other agencies latching onto detainees and making it difficult to interview those detainees.</p>	<p>Interview Notes 10/13/05, [redacted] Interview 1 at 00:07:40</p>	<p>b6 Per FBI b7C</p>
<p>To Be Determined</p>	<p>Intentionally delaying or denying detainees medical care - A detainee told [redacted] that he had a cavity and had been wanting to see a dentist for a year. The military claimed to [redacted] that they did not have a request from the detainee for medical care. [redacted] led another Federal Bureau of Investigation agent to follow-up on the detainee's request and the detainee did get to see a dentist. [redacted] said he listed this incident because he wanted to err on the side of caution. [redacted] does not recall the name of the agent he asked to follow-up on the detainee's request.</p>	<p>Interview Notes 10/13/05, [redacted] Interview 1 at 00:09:59</p>	<p>b6 Per FBI b7C</p>
<p>To Be Determined</p>	<p>Subjecting a detainee to loud music - [redacted] said he heard from someone, maybe from interpreters, that they (Defense Humint Services people) was playing loud music. [redacted] was aware of [redacted] which he said was interfering with what the Federal Bureau of Investigation was trying to do. [redacted] said it was counter productive. They (Defense Humint Services ?) was upset with [redacted] so they</p>	<p>Interview Notes 10/13/05, [redacted] Interview 1 at 00:16:15</p>	<p>b6 Per FBI b7C</p>

(b)(2), Sec. 1.4

	<p>kept them up all night and then [redacted] would have to try to get them to cooperate during his interview, which [redacted] said was counter productive. [redacted] said that of the [redacted] that he named in his survey response, one detainee never spoke a word to [redacted] and the other one eventually opened up to [redacted] and told [redacted] about his training in Afghanistan, but [redacted] could not recall if he heard about the loud music from the detainees, the interpreters or through the "grapevines". [redacted] prospective was that this is not torture, it was not productive. [redacted] said that there were rules that detainees could only be in "the box" for X number of hours, and then [redacted] could not interview the detainees because they had to go back to their cells for a couple of hours. [redacted] does not think that they (Defense Humint Services ?) ever had any success with [redacted] but they probably claimed they did.</p>	
<p>To Be Determined</p> <p>(S)</p> <p>(S)</p> <p>(S)</p>	<p>Isolating a detainee for an extended period. [redacted] said that an Army Military Police (b)(2) had sent a detainee to (b)(2) for 30 days. [redacted] did not believe that it was right for the Army to start the clock over. [redacted] explained that [redacted] arrived at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba and wanted to interview [redacted]. At the time, the detainee was in (b)(2) and was taken out of (b)(2) for 3 days to be interviewed by [redacted] in (b)(2). (b)(2) When [redacted] was done, the detainee was sent back to (b)(2) and the Army started the 30 days clock over again. [redacted] did not feel that this was torture, but it was not productive. [redacted] said that the detainee knew he was to be at (b)(2) for 30 days, and in the detainee's mind, he thought he was coming back to (b)(2) soon. When he was not returned to (b)(2) [redacted] said that it made it more difficult for him to interview the detainee and to have the detainee to cooperate during the interview.</p>	<p>Interview Notes 10/13/05, [redacted] Interview 1 at 00:19:40</p> <p>(S)</p> <p>(b) Per FBI b7c</p>
<p>To Be Determined</p>	<p>[redacted] was asked about the conditions at (b)(2). [redacted] explained that the detainees are sitting in solitary confinement where there is a Military Police sitting at a desk across from their cage. [redacted] said that the detainee he mentioned in the techniques listed above complained that he was not given a pad to lay on, so it was just the elevated concrete bed. [redacted] said when he visited the detainee 2 or 3 times,</p>	<p>Interview Notes 10/13/05, [redacted] Interview 1 at 00:21:48</p> <p>(b) Per FBI b7c</p>

	<p>the detainee did not have a pad. [redacted] could not recall if he told anyone about this, and he said he did not know what the rules were. [redacted] said he did not know if the detainee had done something wrong and was being disciplined. [redacted] explained that the camps at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba were operated like correctional institutions in the United States where "privileges and punishments are worked out based upon certain requirements of behavior". [redacted] said he has seen U.S. prisoners in solitary confinement without mats to sleep on, and because he did not know the rules of the camp, he could not say that this violating someone's rights.</p> <p>[redacted] also said that the detainee told him that they (Army) kept the room too cold. (No further inquiry).</p>		b6 Per FBI b7C
To Be Determined	<p>Using rapid response teams or force cell extractions [redacted] said others who observed this technique described it to him, and he only heard that this technique was used 2 or 3 times. [redacted] explained that when this happened, the camps were shut down for a day or two, and all interviews were canceled. [redacted] said he never heard of force cell extractions being used to "break down" a detainee.</p>	<p>[redacted] Interview Notes 10/13/05, [redacted] Interview 1 at 00:23:34</p>	b6 Per FBI b7C
To Be Determined	<p>Federal Bureau of Investigation Impersonations - [redacted] could not recall exactly, but he believes that it was [redacted] that might have told him about the Federal Bureau of Investigation impersonations. [redacted] explained that these detainees knew that the Federal Bureau of Investigation agents treated them differently, and because they knew that the Federal Bureau of Investigation did not conduct interviews at night, [redacted] and other Federal Bureau of Investigation agents believed that the "night people" were representing themselves as Federal Bureau of Investigation agents.</p>	<p>[redacted] Interview Notes 10/13/05 ; [redacted] Interview 1 at 00:24:55.</p>	b6 Per FBI b7C
To Be Determined	<p>[redacted] said he was not told what to do if he witnessed mistreatment towards the detainees, and he was not told how to treat the detainees.</p>	<p>[redacted] Interview Notes 10/13/05 ; [redacted] Interview 1 at 00:26:13</p>	b6 Per FBI b7C
To Be Determined	<p>[redacted] said while he was at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba he heard stories about the lap dance, but [redacted] also heard that it was a topless lap dance. [redacted] said if he would have seen this taking place he would have told his on-site</p>	<p>[redacted] Interview Notes 10/13/05 ;</p>	b6 Per FBI b7C

	<p>supervisor. [redacted] said that Federal Bureau of Investigation agents did not need to be told to report something like that, and he could not imagine that agents would have not reported to their supervisor something like this.</p>	<p>Interview 1 at 00:26:43</p>	
To Be Determined	<p>[redacted] said the stories about the top dance and the draping of the [redacted] was pass down from crew to crew. [redacted] said he never heard the loud music, and he is not sure if he heard from the detainees or from other agents and interpreters that this technique was being used.</p>	<p>[redacted] Interview Notes 10/13/05; Interview 1 at 00:27:50</p>	<p>b6 Per FBI b7C</p>
To Be Determined	<p>[redacted] said he could not recall if he reported to [redacted] the one detainee's claim that he was not provided medical attention. [redacted] said he would have to think about it. [redacted] said he does not think he documented this in a 302, but he did give [redacted] an informal memo with all his concerns. [redacted] said his memo was more about his concerns with Defense Human Services. [redacted] was concerned that Defense Human Services had written a report and took credit for information that [redacted] had obtained.</p>	<p>[redacted] Interview Notes 10/13/05; Interview 1 at 00:28:18</p>	<p>b6 Per FBI b7C</p>
To Be Determined	<p>[redacted] was not detained by anyone when he returned back to the United States. [redacted] said that no one officially has talked to him about his time at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.</p>	<p>[redacted] Interview Notes 10/13/05, Interview 1 at 00:29:53</p>	<p>b6 Per FBI b7C</p>
To Be Determined	<p>[redacted] said he was not on the survey list that Inspections Division - FBI sent out in 2004.</p>	<p>[redacted] Interview Notes 10/13/05, Interview 1 at 00:30:20</p>	
To Be Determined	<p>[redacted] said if he would have seen anything that was torture, he would have reported it. [redacted] said he believed that the detainees were left in the interview rooms for long periods of time because the detainees would urinate in the room. [redacted] said that interrogators (not Federal Bureau of Investigation agents) would leave the detainees in the room, and [redacted] believed this would happen at night, not during the day. [redacted] said you could smell the urine and see the stains on the carpet. [redacted] also stated that the Military Police said they could see the detainees urinating in the rooms through the close circuit t.v.</p>	<p>[redacted] Interview Notes 10/13/05, Interview 1 at 00:31:26</p>	<p>b6 Per FBI b7C</p>

CaseMan Facts Report

Filter: Linked To Source(s): [redacted] - 20 of 7913 (0.4%) Filtered

Case: FBI in Military Zones
Created: 2/24/2009 11:30:48 AM

Date & Time	Fact Text	Source(s)
To Be Determined	[redacted] advised that she attended the 15 week military training course at Fort Huachuca. The training includes classes on dealing with sources, recruitment and obtaining information, tactical intelligence, grabbing POW's or insurgents & how to get actionable intel to assist battlefield among other classes.	[redacted]
To Be Determined	[redacted] advised that when she goes in the interrogation room with the detainees, she and she tries to take on the role of an older sister or motherly character.	[redacted]
To Be Determined	[redacted] explained that some interrogators are incapable of successfully employing the "fear up" technique with a detainee. On the other hand some interrogators are very good at it.	[redacted]
To Be Determined	[redacted] advised that she always follows the interrogation guidelines contained in section 34-52 of the Army's Field Manual.	[redacted]
To Be Determined	[redacted] advised that she and her colleagues refer to the A-K Memo as the BLOX Memo. She says that some of the techniques in the memo are off limits unless you get prior authorization by creating a special interrogation plan requesting that these methods be used and explaining why.	[redacted]
To Be Determined	[redacted] advised that she did not work with any of the following detainees:	[redacted]

To Be Determined	(b)(3) Use 130(c), (b)(6) said that she worked with Federal Bureau of Investigation agent [redacted] remembers [redacted] "rumbling" about LT [redacted] and the fact that he was doing some things that [redacted] considered unethical. [redacted] did not go into details with [redacted] about this, but [redacted] said that she reported here concerns up her chain of command.	@pp.3 (b)(3) Use 130(c), (b)(6)
To Be Determined	[redacted] advised that she attended training with [redacted] at Fort Huachuca.	
To Be Determined	[redacted] advised that she was familiar with Frequent Flyer Program. If you wanted to put a detainee on this program you had to fill out a form 508, Cell Move Request. [redacted] advised that the Frequent Flyer Program was designed to manipulate the detainee's environment. Detainees were put on the Frequent Flyer Program at the request of an Interrogator.	
To Be Determined	[redacted] believes that there are limits on the Frequent Flyer Program. She believes that the detainee must serve 4hrs in each cell they are moved to, and they must be given an 8 hour stretch to sleep. Also, she thinks that no more than 5 detainees can be on this program at one time.	
To Be Determined	[redacted] advised that she never saw any Federal Bureau of Investigation agents request the Frequent Flyer Program for any of the detainees that she worked with. However, [redacted] knows that the Federal Bureau of Investigation was aware of the Frequent Flyer Program, and that she heard from people on other teams that Federal Bureau of Investigation agents were "involved" in the use of the Frequent Flyer Program. She does not know if the Federal Bureau of Investigation agents specifically requested that detainees be put on the program.	
To Be Determined	[redacted] advised that the practice short shackling detainees stopped about 8 or 9 months ago b/c of the Abu Ghraib Prison scandal.	

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(b)(3) Use 130(c) (b)(6)

(b)(3) Use 130(c) (b)(6)

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To Be Determined	has seen a couple of detainees who were short shackled. She described short shackling as chaining both the hands and feet together so that the detainee is forced to make the detainee squat.
To Be Determined	advised that someone could observe a detainee who appeared to be short shackled or left in an interrogation room for a seemingly long period of time, but there could be reasons for this like: the detainee was under a no movement order due to violent behavior, someone forgot the detainee was in the interrogation room, there was no gear available to move the detainee, or maybe the Military Police on duty wanted the detainee to sit. If the guards want a detainee to just sit in an interrogation room for some reason and some questions them on it, they will most likely blame the interrogators for the situation.
To Be Determined	has heard that some interrogators have manipulated the temperature of the interrogation rooms, but she has never heard that the Federal Bureau of Investigation has done this.
To Be Determined	recalls that in late 2003 and the beginning of 2004 there were some issues about some detainees who were not showering, shaving or cutting their hair. It was suggested to Joint Detainee Operations Group that these detainees needed to shower.
??/??/2003	advised that when she first arrived at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba there were coordination problems with the Federal Bureau of Investigation. She thinks that the Federal Bureau of Investigation was working more of the criminal or legal aspects of the information the detainees possessed.
??/??/2003	advised that in the beginning the Interrogation Control Element interrogators would observe some of the Federal Bureau of Investigation interviews and the Federal Bureau of Investigation would observe some of the Interrogation Control Element interrogations of the same detainees. recalls that sometimes they would tell the Federal Bureau of Investigation they were getting "angry" b/c sometimes the detainees were telling them stories.
??/??/2003	advised that in the first 6 months she was at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba every time they saw a detainee they had to have a new interrogation plan. The plan

	had to be approved by the Interrogation Control Element chain of command. Within the Interrogation Plans, they identified the approaches and tentative approaches they were going to take with the detainee.	(b)(7)(F) (b)(7)(G)
7/7/2003	advised that during the summer of 2003 [redacted] told her that [redacted] had problems with the [redacted] was a [redacted] in civilian life, and had gotten in trouble for doing certain things on the job. [redacted] was concerned that any information that [redacted] obtained from [redacted] would be inadmissible in a legal proceeding due to the interrogation methods he was employing with [redacted].	(b)(7)(F) (b)(7)(G) (b)(7)(D)
7/7/2003 - 7/7/2004	advised that she dealt exclusively with the [redacted] detainees for the [redacted] was at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.	(b)(7)(F) (b)(7)(G)
03/7/2003 - 04/7/2003	heard from [redacted] LNU, an Federal Bureau of Investigation Analyst, via one Federal Bureau of Investigation Special Agent [redacted] LNU, requested that a detainee be short shackled. [redacted] described [redacted] as a tough agent. [redacted] was part of [redacted] Tiger Team, which was the [redacted].	(b)(7)(F) (b)(7)(G)
03/7/2003 - 04/7/2003	advised that [redacted] also told her that [redacted] wrote Federal Bureau of Investigation IO2's off of the material she read in IPK's.	(b)(7)(F) (b)(7)(G)
Mon 03/17/2003	first came to U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba on [redacted] as a Senior Interrogator with [redacted] they changed companies to [redacted] and then to [redacted] was also a military interrogator (S7-Echo) with the [redacted].	(b)(7)(F) (b)(7)(G)
04/7/2003 - 05/7/2003	advised that she observed one incident of possible detainee mistreatment while at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, and it was sometime either in April or May 2003. [redacted] observed [redacted] give a detainee a lap dance [redacted].	(b)(7)(F) (b)(7)(G)
04/7/2003 -	advised that the lap dance she observed involving [redacted] occurred in [redacted].	(b)(7)(F) (b)(7)(G)

(b)(7)(F) (b)(7)(G) (b)(7)(D)

(b)(7)(F) (b)(7)(G)

(b)(7)(F) (b)(7)(G)

(b)(7)(F) (b)(7)(G)

(b)(7)(F) (b)(7)(G)

(b)(3) FO Use 130(e)
(b)(6)

(b)(3) FO Use 130(e)
(b)(6)

(b)(3) FO Use 130(e)
(b)(6)

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(b)(3) FO Use 130
(c), (b)(6)

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Use 130
(c), (b)(6)

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130(e), (b)(6)

(b)(3) FO Use 130(e)
(b)(6)

(b)(3) FO Use 130(e)
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05/77/2003	<p>the Gold interrogation trailer in the evening. [redacted] remembered that there was a large commotion down the hall and it interrupted the interview she was involved with. [redacted] went out into the hall to see what was going on and she saw people rushing into an observation room. [redacted] went down to the observation room and witnessed the lap dance herself.</p>	(b)(3) FO Use 130(e), (b)(6)
04/77/2003 - 05/77/2003	<p>[redacted] advised that she reported witnessing the lap dance by [redacted] to Warrant Officer [redacted] heard afterwards that there were repeat performances of this "technique."</p>	
04/77/2003 - 05/77/2003	<p>(b)(3) FO Use 130(e), (b)(6) talked to [redacted] about the lap dance given by (b)(3) FO Use 130(e), (b)(6) that she witnessed.</p>	
Wed 04/27/2005	<p>[redacted] advised that she is currently a Senior Site Representative for (b)(3) FO Use 130(e), (b)(6) She supports the Interrogation Control Element Interrogators.</p>	

CaseMap Facts Report

Filter: Linked To Source(s) (b)(7)(D), (b)(7)(F), (b)(7)(G) Notes
 04/27/05¹ - 29 of 7911 (0.4%) Filtered

Case: FBI in Military Zones
 Created: 2/24/2009 11:53:20 AM

Date & Time	Fact Text	Source(s)
Wed 04/27/2005	<p>(b)(7)(D), (b)(7)(F), (b)(7)(G) advised that she met with (b)(7)(D), (b)(7)(F), (b)(7)(G) the day before and told him that there was a delegation looking into the things that they had previously talked about regarding (b)(7)(D), (b)(7)(F), (b)(7)(G) treatment at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba; specifically his treatment surrounding his movement to (b)(7)(D), (b)(7)(F), (b)(7)(G) advised that (b)(7)(D), (b)(7)(F), (b)(7)(G) seemed nervous at first, and was sweating a little during the initial stages of their conversation about these events. However (b)(7)(D), (b)(7)(F), (b)(7)(G) seemed to comfortable after she had asked a few questions (b)(7)(D), (b)(7)(F), (b)(7)(G) released the guards before she told (b)(7)(D), (b)(7)(F), (b)(7)(G) exactly what she wanted to speak to him about.</p>	(b)(7)(D), (b)(7)(F), (b)(7)(G)
Wed 04/27/2005	<p>(b)(7)(D), (b)(7)(F), (b)(7)(G) provided (b)(7)(D), (b)(7)(F), (b)(7)(G) with a physical description of the Federal Bureau of Investigation Agent he knew as (b)(7)(D), (b)(7)(F), (b)(7)(G) said that (b)(7)(D), (b)(7)(F), (b)(7)(G) said that (b)(7)(D), (b)(7)(F), (b)(7)(G) had a bad attitude and was very cocky in her dealings with him. (b)(7)(D), (b)(7)(F), (b)(7)(G) told (b)(7)(D), (b)(7)(F), (b)(7)(G) that she was divorced, but that she had two children. (b)(7)(D), (b)(7)(F), (b)(7)(G) never saw (b)(7)(D), (b)(7)(F), (b)(7)(G) together with (b)(7)(D), (b)(7)(F), (b)(7)(G) or another Federal Bureau of Investigation Agent he knew as (b)(7)(D), (b)(7)(F), (b)(7)(G) (Author's note: (b)(7)(D), (b)(7)(F), (b)(7)(G) see note in "Persons.")</p>	
Wed 04/27/2005	<p>(b)(7)(D), (b)(7)(F), (b)(7)(G) advised that a male Federal Bureau of Investigation Agent named (b)(7)(D), (b)(7)(F), (b)(7)(G) who accompanied (b)(7)(D), (b)(7)(F), (b)(7)(G) many times, was a nice guy but he told (b)(7)(D), (b)(7)(F), (b)(7)(G) something like, "if the government can prove what we think you are involved in then they will send you to Iraq or Afghanistan." To (b)(7)(D), (b)(7)(F), (b)(7)(G) the phrase, "what we think you are involved in," meant the Millennium bomb plot because that is why the Federal</p>	

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(b)(1), (b)(7)(C), Sec. 1.4(c)

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(b)(3) 14 USC 1302(e), (b)(7)(C)

		that if he did not explain [redacted] that the government was going to send him to a very, very bad place.	
		[redacted] said that [redacted] was interrogating him on behalf of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. [redacted] thinks that [redacted] was interrogating him in January 2003.	
Wed 04/27/2005		[redacted] told [redacted] to use 1302(c)(1) that he recalled a man [redacted]	(b)(3) 14 USC 1302(e), (b)(7)(C)
Wed 04/27/2005		[redacted] advised [redacted] that a female US military interrogator named [redacted] told [redacted] that she and [redacted] listened in on all of his interviews with the Federal Bureau of Investigation. [redacted] said that these interviews occurred between December 2002 and June 2003, and in all three interrogation trailers.	(b)(3) 14 USC 1302(e), (b)(7)(C)
Wed 04/27/2005		[redacted] told [redacted] that generally the detainees don't respect the Federal Bureau of Investigation because the US military are the ones that take care of them. The military are the ones that the detainees see on the cell block everyday and they are the ones that give you things.	
Wed 04/27/2005		[redacted] advised [redacted] that he did not think that anyone who he came into contact with was impersonating anyone, but he could not be sure because there were times when people were in the room with him and they did not speak.	
Wed 04/27/2005		[redacted] advised [redacted] that the Federal Bureau of Investigation people he dealt with prior to his movement to [redacted] were the following: [redacted] who [redacted] thought was the Federal Bureau of Investigation Special Agent.	

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(b)(1), (b)(7)(C), Sec. 1.4(c)

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(b)(3) 14 USC 1302(e), (b)(7)(C)

b6 Per FBI
b7C

(b)(3) TO Use 130(c)
(b)(5)

(b)(3) TO Use 130(c)
(b)(5)

01G-INTV-000239

	was working with [redacted] as a polygraph testing specialist. [redacted] gave (b)(1), (b)(6) Sec. 1.4(c) [redacted] 04/27/05 (b)(1), (b)(6) Sec. 1.4(c) his first polygraph test, which was inconclusive. (b)(1), (b)(6) Sec. 1.4(c) [redacted] also told [redacted] that [redacted] was a "big time bullshitter."	
Wed 04/27/2005	(b)(1), (b)(6) Sec. 1.4(c) [redacted] advised [redacted] that after the movement [redacted] brought in an Federal Bureau of Investigation Agent, but did not identify him. (b)(1), (b)(6) Sec. 1.4(c) [redacted] advised that this Agent gave him an assignment to tell him everything he knew about [redacted] and a Labanese/American whose picture he showed to (b)(1), (b)(6) Sec. 1.4(c) [redacted] said that this Agent was a nice guy who resembled [redacted] (b)(1), (b)(6) Sec. 1.4(c) [redacted] completed the assignment and the Agent seemed to be pleased with [redacted] work. (b)(1), (b)(6) Sec. 1.4(c) [redacted] advised (b)(3) TO Use 130(c), (b) [redacted] that [redacted] was the only person from the Federal Bureau of Investigation that was involved with the movement to (b)(1), (b)(6) Sec. 1.4(c) [redacted] involvement was that she conducted an interrogation of (b)(1), (b)(6) Sec. 1.4(c) [redacted] just before he was taken away. (b)(1), (b)(6) Sec. 1.4(c) [redacted] advised [redacted] that [redacted] may have also observed the movement. (b)(1), (b)(6) Sec. 1.4(c) [redacted] also advised that there was a (b)(1), (b)(6) Sec. 1.4(c) [redacted] who spoke Arabic "around" him during the movement, but he does not know if they worked for the Federal Bureau of Investigation or not. (b)(1), (b)(6) Sec. 1.4(c) [redacted] does know however, that many times (b)(1), (b)(6) Sec. 1.4(c) [redacted] work with the Federal Bureau of Investigation.	(b)(3) TO Use 130(c), (b)(6)
Wed 04/27/2005	(b)(1), (b)(6) Sec. 1.4(c) [redacted] advised (b)(3) TO Use 130(c), (b) [redacted] that the Federal Bureau of Investigation, in general, never impressed him. They were very nice to (b)(1), (b)(6) Sec. 1.4(c) [redacted] but once you got to know them they left. (b)(1), (b)(6) Sec. 1.4(c) [redacted] advised that cooperation was all about building trust, and you can't build trust in such a short period of time. (b)(1), (b)(6) Sec. 1.4(c) [redacted] said that the Federal Bureau of Investigation's problem was that they were not concentrating, and that he was frustrated at not being believed by them. *	
Wed 04/27/2005	(b)(1), (b)(6) Sec. 1.4(c) [redacted] advised that the only thing he lied to [redacted] about was knowing (b)(1), (b)(6) Sec. 1.4(c) [redacted] was ready to tell [redacted] everything, but then he left. *	b6 Per FBI b7C
Wed 04/27/2005	(b)(1), (b)(6) Sec. 1.4(c) [redacted] advised (b)(3) TO Use 130(c), (b) [redacted] that [redacted] told him when he was leaving, "I just want to tell you that you will not have a good time in the near future." (b)(1), (b)(6) Sec. 1.4(c) [redacted] understood this to mean that he would soon be tortured.	

(b)(3) TO Use 130(c)
(b)(5)

(b)(3) TO Use 130(c)
(b)(5)

(b)(3) TO Use 130(c)
(b)(5)

b6 Per FBI
b7C

b6 Per FBI
b7C

b6 Per FBI
b7C

Case/Mat Facts Report

Filter: Linked To Source(s): (b)(7) TO USE (b)(7)(D)

Notes

04/25/05 - 25 of 7911 (0.3%) Filtered

Case: FBI in Military Zones

Created: 2/24/2009 11:50:36 AM

Date & Time	Fact Text	Source(s)
Mon 04/25/2005	<p>(b)(7) TO USE (b)(7)(D) advised that (b)(7)(D) (b)(7)(D) (b)(7)(D) is very cooperative and therefore gets comfort items that other detainees do not get like a laptop computer and a Play Station video game. (b)(7)(D) (b)(7)(D) (b)(7)(D) is very well educated and is fluent in Arabic, English, French, and German. He is currently located at (b)(7)(D) (b)(7)(D) (b)(7)(D).</p>	(b)(7) TO USE (b)(7)(D) (b)(7)(D)
Mon 04/25/2005	<p>(b)(7) TO USE (b)(7)(D) says that (b)(7)(D) (b)(7)(D) (b)(7)(D) has unprecedented knowledge of terrorist activities and has also provided unprecedented cooperation. (b)(7) TO USE (b)(7)(D) (b)(7)(D) meetings with (b)(7)(D) (b)(7)(D) (b)(7)(D) usually last between 2 and 6 hours depending on the topics that are discussed. There are 2 guards with (b)(7)(D) (b)(7)(D) (b)(7)(D) at all times, and they are usually present during (b)(7)(D) (b)(7)(D) (b)(7)(D) meetings with him. (b)(7)(D) (b)(7)(D) (b)(7)(D) is not restrained in any way during his meetings/interrogations with (b)(7)(D) (b)(7)(D) (b)(7)(D).</p>	
Mon 04/25/2005	<p>(b)(7) TO USE (b)(7)(D) (b)(7)(D) has been working with (b)(7)(D) (b)(7)(D) (b)(7)(D) for approximately 9 months. (b)(7) TO USE (b)(7)(D) (b)(7)(D) is not the first interrogator to work with (b)(7)(D) (b)(7)(D) (b)(7)(D) since he decided to cooperate.</p>	
Mon 04/25/2005	<p>(b)(7) TO USE (b)(7)(D) (b)(7)(D) is currently working with (b)(7)(D) (b)(7)(D) (b)(7)(D) on his time line. Specifically, they were last talking about his time in (b)(7)(D) (b)(7)(D) (b)(7)(D) around (b)(7)(D) (b)(7)(D) (b)(7)(D). (b)(7) TO USE (b)(7)(D) (b)(7)(D) spent about (b)(7)(D) (b)(7)(D) (b)(7)(D) in (b)(7)(D) (b)(7)(D) (b)(7)(D) before he was kicked out and sent back to (b)(7)(D) (b)(7)(D) (b)(7)(D).</p>	(b)(7)(D) (b)(7)(D) (b)(7)(D) (b)(7)(D)
Mon 04/25/2005	<p>(b)(7) TO USE (b)(7)(D) (b)(7)(D) advised that last October or November (b)(7)(D) (b)(7)(D) (b)(7)(D) brought up the subject of his treatment since he had been captured including his experience of U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Mohammedou Ould Sidi was (b)(7)(D) (b)(7)(D) (b)(7)(D).</p>	

(5)

<p>(b)(3) TO Use 130(c) (b)(6)</p> <p>(b)(3) TO Use 130(c) (b)(6)</p> <p>(b)(3) TO Use 130(c) (b)(6)</p> <p>(b)(3) TO Use 130(c) (b)(6)</p>	<p>Mon 04/25/2005</p> <p>In their meeting in late 2004, (b)(3) TO Use 130(c), (b)(6) told (b)(3) TO Use 130(c), (b)(6) that he also went through "sexual overtones abuse" by female interrogators. (b)(3) TO Use 130(c), (b)(6) claimed that at first one female interrogator rubbed her body on him and whispered in his ear about sex. Also, the female interrogator whispered to him things about her own sexual/physical qualities. The next day another female interrogator joined the first female interrogator and they both did the same sorts of things to him that were done to him the day before. (b)(3) TO Use 130(c), (b)(6) told (b)(3) TO Use 130(c), (b)(6) that this treatment went on for hours. (b)(3) TO Use 130(c), (b)(6) advised that she considers (b)(3) TO Use 130(c), (b)(6) to be credible but that sometimes he does exaggerate. Also (b)(3) TO Use 130(c), (b)(6) advised that (b)(3) TO Use 130(c), (b)(6) has no real sense of time. (b)(3) TO Use 130(c), (b)(6) added that when (b)(3) TO Use 130(c), (b)(6) exaggerates he usually is very animated, but when he was telling this story he was not, he was very serious and straightforward.</p>	<p>(b)(3) TO Use 130(c), (b)(6)</p> <p>(b)(3) TO Use 130(c) (b)(6)</p> <p>(b)(3) TO Use 130(c) (b)(6)</p>
<p>(b)(3) TO Use 130(c), (b)(6)</p>	<p>Mon 04/25/2005</p> <p>(b)(3) TO Use 130(c), (b)(6) believes that attempts were made by the military to identify the individuals involved in (b)(3) TO Use 130(c), (b)(6) "sexual" allegations and she believes it is known who these individuals are. However, she thinks that these individuals have not yet been interviewed by the military.</p>	
<p>(b)(3) TO Use 130(c), (b)(6)</p> <p>(b)(3) TO Use 130(c), (b)(6)</p>	<p>Mon 04/25/2005</p> <p>(b)(3) TO Use 130(c), (b)(6) consulted (b)(3) TO Use 130(c), (b)(6) Interrogation Plan but could not find anything that called for the type of female interaction that (b)(3) TO Use 130(c), (b)(6) described. The only item that was close was one part that read, "females being close to the detainee." (b)(3) TO Use 130(c), (b)(6) says that it is a matter of judgement on what constitutes "close," but clearly what (b)(3) TO Use 130(c), (b)(6) describes beyond that.</p>	<p>(b)(3) TO Use 130(c), (b)(6)</p>
<p>(b)(3) TO Use 130(c), (b)(6)</p>	<p>Mon 04/25/2005</p> <p>(b)(3) TO Use 130(c), (b)(6) says that she had heard rumors of General John T. Furlow's investigation, but that nobody ever asked her for information on (b)(3) TO Use 130(c), (b)(6) pursuant to an investigation prior to this one.</p>	
<p>(b)(3) TO Use 130(c), (b)(6)</p>	<p>Mon 04/25/2005</p> <p>(b)(3) TO Use 130(c), (b)(6) told (b)(3) TO Use 130(c), (b)(6) that while he was in the middle of an interrogation in the gold building the Military Police came down the hall with dogs. (b)(3) TO Use 130(c), (b)(6) said that there were 2 additional Military Police with them, dressed in black from head to toe, along with (b)(3) TO Use 130(c), (b)(6) alleged that he was beaten severely then blind folded and had ear muffs put over his ears. (b)(3) TO Use 130(c), (b)(6) says that they must have put pinholes in the ear muffs so that (b)(3) TO Use 130(c), (b)(6) could hear some of what they were saying. (b)(3) TO Use 130(c), (b)(6) said that he was in the booth at the time with a female interrogator he calls (b)(3) TO Use 130(c), (b)(6) believes that (b)(3) TO Use 130(c), (b)(6) is probably (b)(3) TO Use 130(c), (b)(6)</p>	<p>(b)(3) TO Use 130(c), (b)(6)</p> <p>(b)(3) TO Use 130(c), (b)(6)</p>

(b)(3) TO Use 130(c)
(b)(6)

(b)(3) TO Use 130(c)
(b)(6)

<p>Mon 04/25/2005</p>	<p>advised that after he was blindfolded and his hands were tied behind his back and his feet were bound together. During the boat ride, he could hear what seemed to be an arguing in Arabic over who would be getting possession of him. He did not know where they were taking him on the boat ride. He was actually driven around Guantanamo Bay, while he pretended to argue over who would get him. He later heard second hand from [redacted] that at the end of the boat ride, [redacted] told [redacted] that they were now on a remote Caribbean island.</p>	<p>that after he was blindfolded and his hands were tied behind his back and his feet were bound together. During the boat ride, he could hear what seemed to be an arguing in Arabic over who would be getting possession of him. He did not know where they were taking him on the boat ride. He was actually driven around Guantanamo Bay, while he pretended to argue over who would get him. He later heard second hand from [redacted] that at the end of the boat ride, [redacted] told [redacted] that they were now on a remote Caribbean island.</p>
<p>Mon 04/25/2005</p>	<p>advised that he was beaten while in the interrogation room in the gold building and while he was on the boat. At some point, he claims he was hit in the head and became unconscious. He says that he was in a semi-conscious state for about two weeks, and at the end he asked the guards if he could see his interrogator. Someone from the team told him that a new interrogator would be brought in for him. [redacted] advised again that [redacted] has no real concept of time and that his estimation regarding his semi-conscious state is most likely grossly inaccurate and overstated.</p>	<p>that he was beaten while in the interrogation room in the gold building and while he was on the boat. At some point, he claims he was hit in the head and became unconscious. He says that he was in a semi-conscious state for about two weeks, and at the end he asked the guards if he could see his interrogator. Someone from the team told him that a new interrogator would be brought in for him. [redacted] advised again that [redacted] has no real concept of time and that his estimation regarding his semi-conscious state is most likely grossly inaccurate and overstated.</p>
<p>Mon 04/25/2005</p>	<p>advised that at some point after the boat ride, and after he had regained consciousness, [redacted] brought [redacted] a letter that said U.S. forces were going to arrest [redacted] to U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. [redacted] advised [redacted] that he very much believed this threat regarding [redacted] and that he broke down and cried at the time. [redacted] advised that she has seen this letter and that she believes it is [redacted] speculated that [redacted] probably wrote the letter that speaks about arresting [redacted] also believes that the threat of arresting his [redacted] is what eventually led [redacted] to cooperate with his interrogators.</p>	<p>that at some point after the boat ride, and after he had regained consciousness, [redacted] brought [redacted] a letter that said U.S. forces were going to arrest [redacted] to U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. [redacted] advised [redacted] that he very much believed this threat regarding [redacted] and that he broke down and cried at the time. [redacted] advised that she has seen this letter and that she believes it is [redacted] speculated that [redacted] probably wrote the letter that speaks about arresting [redacted] also believes that the threat of arresting his [redacted] is what eventually led [redacted] to cooperate with his interrogators.</p>
<p>Mon 04/25/2005</p>	<p>confirmed that she saw an airplane a sign to get a helicopter and take him for a ride. However, [redacted] has never seen any evidence</p>	<p>confirmed that she saw an airplane a sign to get a helicopter and take him for a ride. However, [redacted] has never seen any evidence</p>

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	that [REDACTED] was ever actually taken on a helicopter ride. [REDACTED] believes that [REDACTED] was taken on a boat ride instead of a helicopter ride.	04/25/05
Mon 04/25/2005	[REDACTED] advised that [REDACTED] told her that at some point the previous intelligence team put him in the "ice" box, which was a metal room from floor to ceiling. The room temperature was kept very low and the guards would keep him awake for very long periods of time by either throwing water on him or kicking the walls of the room. [REDACTED] thinks that this room is located on the [REDACTED] because [REDACTED] told her that one of the guards that moved him there had [REDACTED] written on his hand.	
Mon 04/25/2005	[REDACTED] advised that [REDACTED] is worried about retribution for his statements about the abuse that was done to him. [REDACTED] does not want his allegations of abuse to negatively affect his relationship with the U.S. or how the US views his cooperation.	
Mon 04/25/2005	[REDACTED] advised that [REDACTED] is also concerned about being returned to [REDACTED] because he has ratted on many people will being held in [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] thinks that he would most likely be killed by the other detainees if he was ever returned to [REDACTED].	
Mon 04/25/2005	[REDACTED] advised that from time to time the guards watch movies with [REDACTED] or play football with him.	
Mon 04/25/2005	[REDACTED] advised that [REDACTED] has met with the [REDACTED] Cross 3 or 4 times. These meetings have all occurred at the picnic tables in the middle of [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] has not spoken to the [REDACTED] about his allegations of abuse that occurred at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. [REDACTED] has refused to speak with them about this issue because he is worried about jeopardizing his status with the US or endangering his chances of becoming a US citizen.	

(b)(7)(D), (b)(7)(E), (b)(7)(F), (b)(7)(G)

CaseMan Facts Report

Filter: Linked To Source(s) (b)(3) to Use (b)(6) (b)(7)

Interview 1 Notes

04/25/05 - 12 of 7911 (0.2%) Filtered

Case: FBI in Military Zones

Created: 2/24/2009 11:53:14 AM

Date & Time	Fact Text	Source(s)
Mon 04/25/2005	<p>(b)(3) to Use (b)(6) provided a folder full of documents related to (b)(1)(b)(6), Sec. 1.4(c) The (b)(3) to Use (b)(6)(b)(7)</p> <p>first document is the memo she drafted after her conversation with (b)(3) to Use (b)(6) regarding possible abuse at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Within this document, (b)(3) to Use (b)(6) refers to a "Mr. X" whom she now believes is actually (b)(3) to Use (b)(6)(b)(7)</p>	
Mon 04/25/2005	<p>The second document provided by (b)(3) to Use (b)(6) is a "methods" document dated January 16, 2001. Within this document it calls for "remote invasion of space" to be used with (b)(1)(b)(6), Sec. 1.4(c) (b)(3) to Use (b)(6) advised that this should just entail getting closer to the subject in order to make him feel uncomfortable. This should not constitute rubbing, touching, or molesting the subject; all of which (b)(3) to Use (b)(6) thinks is clearly over the line of acceptable behavior by an interrogator. This document also makes reference to the "white room" approach. (b)(3) to Use (b)(6) advised that this approach entails placing a detainee in a room that is painted white floor to ceiling in an attempt to induce sensory deprivation. This method can be combined with sleep deprivation. (b)(3) to Use (b)(6) emphasized that this document is not an interrogation plan, and is not even close to an interrogation plan. [Author's note: this document did not make it back to Washington, DC.]</p>	
Mon 04/25/2005	<p>The third document provided by (b)(3) to Use (b)(6) is a memo she believes was drafted by (b)(3) to Use (b)(6) which details what (b)(3) to Use (b)(6) observed during an interrogation of (b)(1)(b)(6), Sec. 1.4(c) possibly in January 2003.</p>	
Mon 04/25/2005	<p>The fourth and fifth documents provided by (b)(3) to Use (b)(6) are formal MFR's prepared by (b)(3) to Use (b)(6) on March 31, 2003 and May 23, 2003 respectively. The MFR's are her reports of what the Federal Bureau of Investigation was doing with (b)(1)(b)(6), Sec. 1.4(c) at the</p>	

(b)(3) to Use (b)(6)
(b)(7)

	time.	
Mon 04/25/2005	The sixth document provided by b() 0 USC 30b b(6) entitled "Summary of Recent Interrogations:" is just the attachment to the May 23, 2003 MFR, again prepared by LT	() 3) 0 SC 3 b b(6)
Mon 04/25/2005	The seventh document provided by b(3) 0 USC 30b b(6) is the <u>Movement Plan for ISN 760</u> . b() s c 4c read this plan before and after she spoke to Mohamedou Ould Slahi about this incident. The eighth document is just another copy of the movement plan.	
Mon 04/25/2005	The ninth document provided by b() 0 USC 0b () 6) is the, <u>Timeline fo</u> b() () sec 4c b() sec 4c,	
Mon 04/25/2005	The tenth document provided by b() 0 USC 0b () 6) is a memo entitled, b() () sec 4c b() () sec 4c. This memo just briefly describes the efforts to coordinate the movement of 760 with the U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba Port/Harbor Patrol.	
Mon 04/25/2005	The eleventh document provided by b(3) 0 USC 30b b(6) is entitled, b() () sec 4c Personnel Assignment. This memo sets out who will be doing what during b() () sec 4c b(3) 0 USC 30b () 6) believes that the "Corpsman" positions listed for both the b() ec 4c and the b() ec 4c represent the medical personnel assigned to those boats.	
Mon 04/25/2005	The twelfth document b() 0 USC 0b () 6) provided is a copy of an e-mail from Steve Rodriguez to General Geoffrey D. Miller regarding the availability of one of the boats for the movement of 760.	
Mon 04/25/2005	The thirteenth and last document b(3) 0 USC 30b b() provided at this meeting is a memo of the reasons why the Special Projects Team believes 760 should remain in isolation. b() ec 4c believes that this document was written within the last couple of weeks.	
Mon 04/25/2005	b() 0 USC 0b () 6) advised that the letter shown to Mohamedou Ould Slahi regarding his mother was approximately 4 paragraphs, with a Washington, DC address at the top. She said that it looked like a normal MFR. The first paragraph mentioned Mohamedou Ould Slahi's mother's name, the second paragraph described the allegations against her, and the third and fourth paragraphs dealt with the arrest, detention, and eventual transportation to U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba of Mohamedou Ould Slahi's mother.	

OIG-INTV-000248

CaseMap Facts Report

Filter: Linked To Source(s): [redacted] Interview 1" - 49 of 7911 (0.6%) Filtered

b6 Per FBI
b7c

Case: FBI in Military Zones
Created: 2/24/2009 11:54:23 AM

Date & Time	Fact Text	Source(s)
09/??/2002	[redacted] entered into the Federal Bureau of Investigation in September, 2002. He was processed out of the Tampa Office and was assigned to Seattle. Prior to that he was an [redacted] [redacted]	[redacted] Interview 1 00:50 - 01:50
Fri 08/01/2003 - Thu 10/30/2003	[redacted] said that he reported to [redacted] in U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, but only for the last few days that [redacted] was in U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. [redacted] reported to other SSA's during his tour. [redacted] recalled reporting to a "silver haired" SSA from FL. [redacted] said that there wasn't necessarily a SSA that he reported to, rather it was a group of SSA's that were there. [redacted] said that if something needed supervisor attention he would have referred to the SSA from Florida.	[redacted] Interview 1 4:55 - 8:30
Fri 08/01/2003 - Thu 10/30/2003	[redacted] said that he was paired up with an Naval Criminal Investigative Service investigator [redacted] for a while.	[redacted] Interview 1 7:50 - 8:05
Fri 08/01/2003 - Thu 10/30/2003	[redacted] said there were friday meetings that were attended by all Federal Bureau of Investigation people including CIS and Criminal Investigative Division - Federal Bureau of Investigation people	[redacted] Interview 1 8:30 - 8:50
Fri 08/01/2003 - Thu 10/30/2003	[redacted] said was assigned to U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba from 8/01/2003 through 10/30/2003.	[redacted] Interview 1 1:55 - 2:25
Fri 08/01/2003 - Thu 10/30/2003	[redacted] said that he understood his role in U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba was to conduct interviews.	[redacted] Interview 1 11:20

b6 Per FBI
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<p>Fri 08/01/2003 - Thu 10/30/2003</p>	<p>[redacted] said that he was never told what he could or could not do, but that he "simply used [his] good judgement and 15 years of law enforcement to guide [him] through that."</p>	<p>[redacted] Interview 1 11:25 - 11:53</p>
<p>Fri 08/01/2003 - Thu 10/30/2003</p>	<p>[redacted] said that the Friday meetings were used to discuss tactics, because they were led by the military. The military told them what was available to the Federal Bureau of Investigation to use and assist the Federal Bureau of Investigation. [redacted] and [redacted] have the Friday briefings.</p>	<p>[redacted] Interview 1 11:55 - 12:35</p>
<p>Fri 08/01/2003 - Thu 10/30/2003</p>	<p>[redacted] said that [redacted] run the camp operations and [redacted] was part of SIOPS.</p>	<p>[redacted] Interview 1 13:50 - 14:05</p>
<p>Fri 08/01/2003 - Thu 10/30/2003</p>	<p>[redacted] said that the Friday meetings were a debriefing of what happened during the week.</p>	<p>[redacted] Interview 1 14:15</p>
<p>Fri 08/01/2003 - Thu 10/30/2003</p>	<p>[redacted] said that at the Friday meeting, the military would explain "different areas that the military could help enhance what the [FBI] was doing." [redacted] said he received a "list of Department of Defense interrogation tactics that could be utilized and/or approved by Donald Rumsfeldt, and they had set up programs around those guidelines, such as the frequent fever program and isolation techniques, dietary disruptions, and sleep disruptions."</p>	<p>[redacted] Interview 1 15:40 - 16:27</p>
<p>Fri 08/01/2003 - Thu 10/30/2003</p>	<p>[redacted] said he assumed that the military suggested that these tactics be utilized, since they were briefing the Federal Bureau of Investigation at the mandatory Friday meetings.</p>	<p>[redacted] Interview 1 16:30 - 16:55</p>
<p>Fri 08/01/2003 - Thu 10/30/2003</p>	<p>[redacted] said that the Federal Bureau of Investigation was "encouraged by the CTIF supervisors to utilize the military as a tool to assist in the interrogations."</p>	<p>[redacted] Interview 1 17:25 - 17:40</p>
<p>Fri 08/01/2003 - Thu 10/30/2003</p>	<p>[redacted] said that he worked with a Naval Criminal Investigative Service female agent, and he was uncomfortable with that situation. He then worked with [redacted]</p>	<p>[redacted] Interview 1 21:25 - 21:35</p>
<p>Fri 08/01/2003 - Thu 10/30/2003</p>	<p>[redacted] said he started to interview Detainee [redacted] because of a lead, but something caught his attention and he saw a situation that he felt warranted a follow up.</p>	<p>[redacted] Interview 1 26:50 - 27:00</p>

b6 Per FBI
b7C

(b)(3) 10 Dec 1986
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(b)(3) 10 Dec 1986
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<p>Fri 08/01/2003 - Thu 10/30/2003</p>	<p>_____ said that during the interrogation sessions with _____ _____ he provided him with coffee, Egg McMuffins, light conversation. "All in the interest in getting his story."</p>	<p>Interview I 30:35 - 30:58</p>
<p>Fri 08/01/2003 - Thu 10/30/2003</p>	<p>_____ said that he confronted _____ about the inconsistencies in his story. _____ said he was "getting nowhere with _____"</p>	<p>Interview I 31:15 - 31:30</p>
<p>Fri 08/01/2003 - Thu 10/30/2003</p>	<p>_____ said after a while, _____ realized that _____ _____ would not buy his story and began to shut down. _____ said that's when he got the idea to do the "Must and Jeff" routine.</p>	<p>Interview I 31:30 - 32:05</p>
<p>Fri 08/01/2003 - Thu 10/30/2003</p>	<p>_____ said he confronted _____ about his lying and told him that, "if you're not going to talk to us, we're going to turn you over to the military, and they ain't going to bring you cheeseburgers and coffee in the morning." _____ said that he hoped this would spark something from him, but nothing came of it.</p>	<p>Interview I 32:10 - 32:30</p>
<p>Fri 08/01/2003 - Thu 10/30/2003</p>	<p>_____ said in the meantime he got together _____ to do the "good cop, bad cop." _____ said that he told _____ that they had told _____ that they were going to turn his case over to the military. _____ said that he told _____ what they needed him to come in and do his "boot camp" thing, then the Federal Bureau of Investigation would come back in and "save him."</p>	<p>Interview I 32:30 - 32:53</p>
<p>Fri 08/01/2003 - Thu 10/30/2003</p>	<p>_____ said _____ agreed to do it and they had a date set up, and had it set up exactly the way _____ wanted it. _____ and _____ had a meeting ahead of time with the interpreter.</p>	<p>Interview I 33:05 - 33:30</p>
<p>Fri 08/01/2003 - Thu 10/30/2003</p>	<p>_____ said on the day they planned to turn _____ over to the military, they started the interview with the interpreter, and it was the same as before, _____ was not going to cooperate. _____ told _____ _____ that he _____ was done. _____ said that they dismissed the interpreter, _____ went into the observation room. _____ said that he also should have gone into the observation room to totally break the contact, then there was a dynamic entry into the room by the military. _____ stayed in the room.</p>	<p>Interview I 33:30 - 34:00</p>
<p>Fri 08/01/2003 -</p>	<p>_____ said that _____ came in and "dressed down"</p>	<p></p>

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(b)(3) No use (b)(7)(C)
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<p>Thu 10/30/2003</p>	<p>[redacted] yelling and screaming [redacted] said that it was clear right away that [redacted] was not going to work because [redacted] was laughing and said, [redacted]</p>	<p>Interview 1 34:00 - 34:45</p>	<p>b6 Per FBI b7C</p>
<p>Fri 08/01/2003 - Thu 10/30/2003</p>	<p>[redacted] said that after dressing [redacted] down, the [redacted] came out into the hallway and said that "you need to get his attention," and you should "short chain" him. [redacted] asked "What is short chain?" [redacted] said that the [redacted] did not answer, but instead turned around to the guard and ordered him to "short chain" the Detainee. The guards went into the interview room, the [redacted] stood in the doorway, [redacted] and [redacted] went into the observation room. The guards ordered [redacted] to sit on the floor. In bent over, they put the belly chain on him and bolted it to the bolt on the floor. [redacted] said that [redacted] still could have stood up, but his would have been bent over. Everyone left the interview room and came into the observation room.</p>	<p>Interview 1 34:55 - 36:15</p>	<p>b6 Per FBI b7C</p>
<p>Fri 08/01/2003 - Thu 10/30/2003</p>	<p>[redacted] said that "we [redacted] left and went back to the office." Then [redacted] called to the guards to check on him. [redacted] was told that he was asleep on the floor.</p>	<p>Interview 1 36:41 - 36:45</p>	<p>b6 Per FBI b7C</p>
<p>Fri 08/01/2003 - Thu 10/30/2003</p>	<p>[redacted] said that we [redacted] finished their paper work and went to lunch while [redacted] he discussed with [redacted] that he did not like this. [redacted] told [redacted] that it wasn't going to make [redacted] talk, that's [redacted]</p>	<p>Interview 1 37:00 - 37:20</p>	<p>b6 Per FBI b7C</p>
<p>Fri 08/01/2003 - Thu 10/30/2003</p>	<p>[redacted] said that this was not going to work, and that [redacted] found [redacted] interesting, and he didn't like that he was treated that way. [redacted] told [redacted] that he was going to go back and in the absence of the [redacted] and ask the guards to return him to his cell.</p>	<p>Interview 1 37:30 - 38:08</p>	<p>b6 Per FBI b7C</p>
<p>Fri 08/01/2003 - Thu 10/30/2003</p>	<p>[redacted] said that he returned to [redacted] and told the guards to undo [redacted]. At that time the guards informed [redacted] that the detainee had oriented on himself. [redacted] the guards to take him back to his cell. [redacted] went to [redacted] [redacted] to report this, but the [redacted] was not there. [redacted] told [redacted] the next day. [redacted] [redacted] that he would conduct an investigation and get back to [redacted] A.</p>	<p>Interview 1 38:08 - 38:09</p>	<p>b6 Per FBI b7C</p>

	few days later [REDACTED] talked to [REDACTED] and said that there was a new rotation of guards and the new guards were not informed that the detainee was suppose to get bathroom breaks, and that he had taken care of it. [REDACTED] did not know what that meant.		
Fri 08/01/2003 - Thu 10/30/2003	[REDACTED] said that when [REDACTED] came on board, [REDACTED] hold him about the matter and asked if he, [REDACTED] should document the matter in an EC. [REDACTED] asked if force was used to put the detainee in a seated position. [REDACTED] said no, that the detainee sat down on his own. [REDACTED] asked if the detainee was injured as a result and did you participate. [REDACTED] responded no to both.	Interview 1 38:55 - 39:34	b6 Per FBI b7C
Fri 08/01/2003 - Thu 10/30/2003	[REDACTED] said that he was told by [REDACTED] not to write an EC on the matter.	Interview 1 39:53	b6 Per FBI b7C
Fri 08/01/2003 - Thu 10/30/2003	[REDACTED] said that he reported the matter to every chain of command that was available to him. He took care of it in a timely fashion.	Interview 1 40:00 -	
Fri 08/01/2003 - Thu 10/30/2003	[REDACTED] said that he and [REDACTED] met with [REDACTED] between 8:00am and 9:00am. They talked to [REDACTED] approximately 10 to 15 minutes and told him that that was his last chance to talk to us. There were 5 to 10 minutes of the transition. The [REDACTED] then went in and "went at it" for 5 minutes.	Interview 1 40:40 - 41:30	
Fri 08/01/2003 - Thu 10/30/2003	[REDACTED] said that five four guards went in and adjusted the guards restraints. [REDACTED] said that it was probably approximately 3 hours that [REDACTED] was short chained.	Interview 1 41:30 - 42:10	b6 Per FBI b7C
Fri 08/01/2003 - Thu 10/30/2003	[REDACTED] said that within an hour of he and [REDACTED] arriving that morning, [REDACTED] was short chained to the floor.	Interview 1 42:55	
Fri 08/01/2003 - Thu 10/30/2003	[REDACTED] said to the [REDACTED] "you guys can do that?" The [REDACTED] responded, "We do it all the time." [REDACTED] said that the [REDACTED] saw the concern on his face and told [REDACTED] not to worry. The detainee would be given bathroom breaks and food. The [REDACTED] told [REDACTED] that the detainee is in "no pain", he just "can't stand up. He either has to sit down or lay down."	Interview 1 46:15 - 46:30	b6 Per FBI b7C

Fri 08/01/2003 - Thu 10/30/2003	[redacted] said that soon after he and [redacted] got back to the Federal Bureau of investigation office he called the guard house to check on the detainees, this was soon after 10:00am.	Interview 1 45:25	
Fri 08/01/2003 - Thu 10/30/2003	[redacted] said when he talked to (b)(2) [redacted] in the observation room after the shackling of [redacted] and Captain [redacted] told him that [redacted] would be short chained for hours. [redacted] stated that he believed it would be the better part of the afternoon.	Interview 1 45:55 - 46:15	b6 Per FBI b7c
Fri 08/01/2003 - Thu 10/30/2003	[redacted] said that he doesn't recall short chaining being on the list (meaning the list of tactics available to the FBI through the military), but if the (b)(2) [redacted] had briefed [redacted] on short chaining, he would have said "no, don't do that to him." [redacted] said that he was a civilian on a military base, and the (b)(2) [redacted] gave the soldiers an order to do this, [redacted] said that he said to himself, "what do I do, What do I do." [redacted] said that after he had some time to process this and talk it over with [redacted] "it doesn't sit well, and it didn't at the very moment." [redacted] said that it was a very awkward situation, and it didn't jump out as abuse.	Interview 1 47:10 - 47:50	b6 Per FBI b7c
Fri 08/01/2003 - Thu 10/30/2003	[redacted] said that he returned to [redacted] around noon.	Interview 1 49:50	
Fri 08/01/2003 - Thu 10/30/2003	[redacted] said that when he arrived back at the Federal Bureau of Investigation office later that afternoon, he explained the situation to people in the office and asked if they had ever heard of anything like this. They said they had not.	Interview 1 52:40 - 52:55	b6 Per FBI b7c
Fri 08/01/2003 - Thu 10/30/2003	[redacted] said that when he talked to the (b)(2) [redacted] the next day, the (b)(2) [redacted] made fun of him for being weak.	Interview 1 55:35	
Fri 08/01/2003 - Thu 10/30/2003	[redacted] said that he was told that if he saw anything improper that he should not get involved and report it. This is what he did.	Interview 1 59:00 - 59:05	b6 Per FBI b7c
Fri 08/01/2003 - Thu 10/30/2003	[redacted] said that he met with [redacted] afterwards and apologized to him. [redacted] told him that was not suppose to happen. [redacted] said that [redacted] accepted his apology.	Interview 1 1:01:50 - 1:02:12	

<p>Fri 08/01/2003 - Thu 10/30/2003</p>	<p>_____ said that his statement to _____ that he would be turned over to the military, was a statement to him that would have left him to his own paranoia. An example _____ gave was the threat a mother might make to a child - "wait until your father gets home." _____ said that there was a hope that _____ did not have a fondness for the military.</p>	<p>Interview 1 1:07:30 - 1:07:55</p>
<p>Fri 08/01/2003 - Thu 10/30/2003</p>	<p>_____ said the military passed out a list of approved techniques.</p>	<p>Interview 1 1:13:45</p>
<p>Fri 08/01/2003 - Thu 10/30/2003</p>	<p>_____ said that everytime he is saying that he is the one, he means that it was he and _____ as a team. She was there on all the interviews. They discussed all this between them, and they were both in agreement on everything they did.</p>	<p>Interview 1 1:18:11 - 1:18:30</p>
<p>Fri 08/01/2003 - Thu 10/30/2003</p>	<p>_____ said that _____ went to _____ beforehand to explain their plan. _____ said this _____ was in and out during this time. _____ said that according to _____ authorized the plan to have the military dress down.</p>	<p>Interview 1 1:19:40 - 1:20:25</p>
<p>Fri 08/01/2003 - Thu 10/30/2003</p>	<p>_____ said at one of the Friday meetings, _____ briefed the Federal Bureau of Investigation on the frequent flyer program and the isolation techniques.</p>	<p>Interview 1 1:20:47 - 1:21:15</p>
<p>Fri 08/01/2003 - Thu 10/30/2003</p>	<p>_____ said that he also used the frequent flyer program on _____</p>	<p>Interview 1 1:21:20 - 1:21:35</p>

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CaseMap Facts Report

Filter: Linked To Source(s): [redacted] Interview 1" or Linked To Source(s): [redacted] Interview Notes
 02/14/05" - 50 of 7911 (0.6%) Filtered

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Case: FBI in Military Zones
 Created: 2/24/2009 12:05:18 PM

Date & Time	Fact Text	Source(s)
To Be Determined	[redacted] advised that the Behavioral Analysis Unit normally consults on the hardest cases where normal interview techniques have failed and/or the defendant is especially recalcitrant. The Behavioral Analysis Unit's challenge at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba was to see how these same strategies could apply to the interrogation of terrorists. [redacted] advised that the Behavioral Analysis Unit's biggest challenge by far was overcoming the difference in cultures between American criminals and the alleged terrorists being held at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.	[redacted] Interview Notes 02/14/05
To Be Determined	[redacted] felt that allowing tacit Federal Bureau of Investigation approval of military interrogation plans that contain certain interrogation techniques might be construed as participating in some sort of conspiracy to violate the torture statute. [redacted] felt that Federal Bureau of Investigation Agents were at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba as federal law enforcement officers, but that by assisting the military with their interrogations the Agents were put in a position that potentially compromised their status as federal investigators. [redacted] asked the question, "how can we sit here and let them do things that we believe are wrong?" That is the reason why he wrote his "legal analysis" document included in the 05/30/03 EC. [redacted] felt it was imperative that the Agents in the field get immediate guidance from the Federal Bureau of Investigation or DOJ about how the Agents were supposed to deal with these issues.	[redacted] Interview Notes 02/14/05
To Be Determined	[redacted] advised that if he was observing or consulting on an interview in the United States in which some of the interrogations tactics called for in the military's plan for detainees [redacted] he would immediately stop the interview and certainly prevent the individuals conducting it from doing anything he thought was illegal.	[redacted] Interview Notes 02/14/05 @37:40

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1/18/05, Doc. 1-8

	<p>advised that he didn't have the power to do that down at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. In fact in the case of [redacted], he heard that the military had used some of the tactics that [redacted] felt might be illegal, but there was nothing he could do about it.</p>	
<p>To Be Determined</p>	<p>[redacted] advised that [redacted] and [redacted] certainly complained about the military's use of aggressive interrogation tactics, and when [redacted] arrived on the island he tried to "ramp up" the urgency of getting something done with respect to resolving the differences between the Federal Bureau of Investigation's and the military's approach to interrogating detainees. [redacted] felt that he and [redacted] had been so critical of the military's interrogation tactics that the military pulled away from the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the military just did their own thing separately. [redacted] feels that he and [redacted] were afforded a lot more access to detainees and the military's practices of interrogating detainees than were succeeding Behavioral Analysis Unit teams. [redacted] feels that this changed as a result of his and [redacted] strong objections to the military's aggressive interrogation tactics.</p>	<p>Interview Notes 02/14/05</p>
<p>To Be Determined</p>	<p>[redacted] remembers conversations with either [redacted] where they said that Marlon E. "Spike" Bowman was getting involved with the issue of Federal Bureau of Investigation Agents witnessing the military's use of aggressive interrogation techniques at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.</p>	<p>Interview Notes 02/14/05</p>
<p>To Be Determined</p>	<p>[redacted] heard from various Federal Bureau of Investigation Agents who served at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba subsequent to his tour that they had little or no contact with DHS-DOD. [redacted] heard that these Agents were only dealing with other Federal Bureau of Investigation Agents and Criminal Investigative Task Force Agents. [redacted] does not know if this was an actual policy move to separate these two groups or if this was just a practical reaction to the repeated negative instructions that [redacted] and [redacted] had with [redacted] and [redacted].</p>	<p>Interview Notes 02/14/05</p>
<p>To Be Determined</p>	<p>[redacted] and [redacted] his fifteen years as an Federal Bureau of Investigation Agent, that any information obtained as a result of coercive interrogation techniques would be inadmissible in a U.S. criminal</p>	<p>Interview Notes 02/14/05</p>

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	<p>proceeding. Therefore [redacted] was curious as to why the Federal Bureau of Investigation was at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba wasting their time supposedly following leads from the United States when any information that would be collected would not be admissible in U.S. courts because the detainees had been exposed to coercive interrogation techniques. [redacted] felt that using information supplied by U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba detainees could end-up actually destroying a criminal prosecution because the information would most likely be considered "fruit of the poisonous tree."</p>		b6 Per FBI b7C
To Be Determined	<p>[redacted] advised that it was very unclear to him under what legal conditions Federal Bureau of Investigation Agents were working while at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Bending somebody's thumbs back and squeezing somebody's genitals certainly would be illegal conduct for an interrogator in the United States, but U.S. laws did not seem to apply at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba with regard to the detainees. [redacted] asked Federal Bureau of Investigation headquarters for guidance on what Agents were supposed to do when confronted with the use of aggressive and sometimes abusive interrogation techniques, but before anything could be decided [redacted] had left the island.</p>	<p>Interview Notes 02/14/05</p>	b6 Per FBI b7C
To Be Determined	<p>When [redacted] first complained to his supervisors regarding the military's use of aggressive interrogation techniques, his supervisors responded by asking him basically why he couldn't get along with the military folks. They wondered why he was fighting with the military over interrogation techniques. It was almost like [redacted] supervisors thought his concerns were more of a personality conflict than anything else. This was one of the reasons why [redacted] wrote his legal analysis memo. [redacted] wanted to make it clear that his objections were not based upon a personality conflict at all; it was a legal conflict.</p>	<p>Interview Notes 02/14/05</p>	b6 Per FBI b7C
??/??/2002	<p>[redacted] advised that prior to leaving for U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, he attended a one or two week orientation session at Ft. Belvoir that was put on by the military to help familiarize Agents with how things were set up and worked at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. The military also provided instruction on the Muslim faith and the mindset of a terrorist.</p>	<p>Interview Notes 02/14/05</p>	b6 Per FBI b7C
??/??/2002	<p>[redacted] advised that 2 or 3 other 2 agent groups from the Behavioral Analysis</p>		

	Unit preceded his trip to U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. [redacted] believes that the first group may have been [redacted] and [redacted] and the other group was [redacted] and [redacted]. There may have been a third group, but [redacted] was not sure.*	Interview Notes 02/14/05
??/??/2002	[redacted] does not recall [redacted] or [redacted] ever mentioning anything about the use of aggressive interrogation techniques or any mistreatment of the detainees at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.	Interview Notes 02/14/05
??/??/2002	[redacted] had heard from [redacted] via e-mail, when [redacted] was at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba that the military was doing some pretty extreme things to [redacted]. [redacted] also heard this from [redacted] after [redacted] arrived at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.	Interview Notes 02/14/05
??/??/2002	[redacted] advised that the vast majority of Federal Bureau of Investigation Agents who were assigned to U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba were young inexperienced Agents. That was one of the main reasons why the Behavioral Analysis Unit was called in to assist at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. [redacted] estimated that the majority of Federal Bureau of Investigation Agents serving at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba had about 3 or 4 years experience. These Agents were then teamed up with Agents from the Naval Criminal Investigative Service and other government agencies, who also seemed to be younger and less experienced Agents.	Interview Notes 02/14/05
??/??/2002	[redacted] advised that the military thought that the Federal Bureau of Investigation's rapport based approach to interrogations was ridiculous and that the detainees were not going to tell the Federal Bureau of Investigation anything using those methods. The military thought that you needed to "play hard ball" with the detainees in order to get any information out of them. [redacted] believes that it was within this context that the idea arose of designating 10 detainees that the Federal Bureau of Investigation alone could concentrate on and interrogate in their own way. The military would stay away from those 10 detainees and basically be responsible for interrogating the rest of the detainees at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.	Interview Notes 02/14/05
??/??/2002	[redacted] advised that the Federal Bureau of Investigation's Supervisor at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba at the time, [redacted] told [redacted]	Interview Notes

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	<p>[redacted] and [redacted] that they should try to get along with the military with regard to the interrogation plan for [redacted] told [redacted] that General Geoffrey D. Miller wanted the Behavioral Analysis Unit to sit down with the military and come up with a plan that they both could agree on. [redacted] and [redacted] then met with the two behavioral analysis specialists from the Criminal Investigative Task Force who squarely agreed with [redacted] and [redacted] position on the interrogation plan for [redacted]. However, when these two specialists spoke up to that effect they were threatened with an insubordination charge and firing if they ever spoke out against [redacted] again.</p>	<p>02/14/05</p>
<p>7/7/2002</p>	<p>[redacted] advised that within the military's interrogation plan for [redacted] was a technique referred to as "apland syndrome." It turned out that this was suggested by an United States Army reserve interpreter who had worked with "the Agency" and had seen this before. [redacted] was told that this "syndrome" was based on the observation that when people were stationed in foreign places and couldn't talk to anyone there, as soon as they returned to an English speaking country they would tell the first English speaking person they met everything about themselves and what they had been doing. The military wanted to induce this same reaction in [redacted]. Their plan was to duct tape his mouth shut for several days and scream and yell questions at him for hours and hours. After however many days they did this the military thought that once they took the tape off [redacted] mouth he would spill his guts because they had prevented him from talking for so long. [redacted] thought it was the most ridiculous thing he had ever heard of. [redacted] thought it might be some kind of "bastardization" of the "Stockholm Syndrome." It was obvious to [redacted] that the military was getting suggestions on interrogation techniques from people who had no business making such suggestions.</p>	<p>Interview Notes 02/14/05</p>
<p>7/7/2002</p>	<p>In response to General Geoffrey D. Miller's directive for the Behavioral Analysis Unit and [redacted] to sit down in a room and hammer out an interrogation plan for [redacted] and not leave the room together until all parties agreed to a plan. [redacted] and [redacted] decided that what they really needed to do was come up with a solid plan that their unit could get behind 100%. [redacted] was going to write the Behavioral Analysis Unit</p>	<p>Interview Notes 02/14/05</p>

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	<p>plan for [redacted] and [redacted] was going to meet with the military and hammer out some kind of compromise plan for [redacted]. What became apparent to [redacted] was that the military could not agree to a plan that did not include the techniques called for in Phases III and IV, which included applying the U.S. Army Survive, Escape, Resistance and Evasion techniques and then sending the detainee off to a third country where he could be tortured to get information. The term, torture was used in an initial draft of this plan but it was later revised to say something like rent to a third country where "other techniques would be used." [redacted] kept some of the generations of that plan so that he could show the paper trail.</p>	
<p>77772002</p>	<p>[redacted] advised that [redacted] had written a legal analysis of the military's techniques called for in the interrogation of [redacted]. [redacted] felt that [redacted] had a result that she wanted to get to [redacted] and then constructed a ridiculous argument in order to end up at that result. [redacted] analysis said it was okay to employ tactics that were specifically excluded by the torture statute if those involved didn't have the intent to cause serious bodily injury or serious fear of death. [redacted] argument was that because the military's intent was solely to get information then they could employ tactics that were specifically prohibited by the torture statute. [redacted] advised [redacted] at the meeting to come up with an acceptable plan for [redacted] that her analysis of the legality of such techniques was absurd and had no legal basis. Furthermore, that anyone who followed her advice and employed these techniques would be put in a position where they could be arrested, indicted and even convicted unless the trier of fact found that they did not have requisite intent. [redacted] stuck to her analysis and would not budge. [redacted] advised that the best he could do with regard to a compromise plan for [redacted] was to get the military to agree to no initial 2 week period where rapport based techniques could be employed to see if they were effective before the military began employing their techniques.</p>	<p>Interview Notes 02/14/05</p>
<p>77772002</p>	<p>[redacted] advised that he and [redacted] attended a meeting hosted by [redacted] for all the interrogators of detainee [redacted] last prior to when the military was going to commence their plan for [redacted]. [redacted] described this meeting as more of a " pep rally " for what they were going</p>	<p>Interview Notes 02/14/05</p>

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	<p>to do to [redacted] than any kind of meeting regarding an interrogation plan. During the meeting they talked about things like stripping [redacted] naked and shaving all of the hair off of his body and bringing in the dogs and having them bark and growl at him. It became apparent to [redacted] that the military was committed to employing U.S. Army Survive, Escape, Resistance and Evasion techniques on detainees. [redacted] advised that U.S. Army Survive, Escape, Resistance and Evasion techniques are the way the military trains people to resist torture including techniques such as holding a rowel over someone's mouth and pouring water over it. This makes you feel like you are drowning but apparently you're not. However, it puts you in fear of drowning. What these techniques are designed to do is to get someone to realize that they are not going to drown, and that when the survive the incident they become more confident that they can withstand it in the future. [redacted] was opposed to these techniques in two ways. The first was that if someone thinks they are drowning then they are in fear of their life and that is prohibited by the torture statute. The other issue was that the detainees would also learn over time that they could survive these techniques, and that they could withstand them. [redacted] felt that once the detainees figured this out then they would be more emboldened to resist rather than cooperate.</p>	
<p>7/7/2002</p>	<p>After [redacted] and [redacted] left the "pep rally" meeting they were upset about the fact that the military was going to employ these tactics on [redacted] so they complained to their bosses, who in turn complained to [redacted] who in turn called down to U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. The issue went back and forth for a while until at some point [redacted] came back into the Federal Bureau of Investigation's control. [redacted] and [redacted] who was an Agent on the Pentbomb case, got to interview [redacted] in the brig. [redacted] was exhibiting signs of hallucinations, didn't know what day it was or what time of day it was. He was totally disoriented due to his prolonged isolation. [redacted] and his team recommended that [redacted] get a full mental and physical evaluation before any additional interrogations commenced for reasons of reliability as well as for the physical health of [redacted]. [redacted] learned later that a few days</p>	<p>[redacted] Interview Notes 02/14/05</p>

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	after he interviewed [redacted] the military came and took him to [redacted] and that he ended up in the hospital as a result of their treatment of him.		
7777/2002	[redacted] advised that during the "pep rally" meeting regarding [redacted] [redacted] told everyone present that General Geoffrey D. Miller told him that they could not step across the torture statute line, but their shadows could. [redacted] took this to mean that General Geoffrey D. Miller wanted the interrogators of [redacted] to use the most aggressive tactics allowable on [redacted] without actually committing torture.	Interview Notes 02/14/05	b6 Per FBI b7C
7777/2002	[redacted] advised that General Geoffrey D. Miller thought the Federal Bureau of Investigation's rapport based approach to interviewing the detainees was akin to making friends with the detainees or being friendly with the detainees. General Geoffrey D. Miller also made it clear that he did not like this approach at all. General Geoffrey D. Miller expressed this sentiment to [redacted] in "a sneer." [redacted] advised that General Geoffrey D. Miller characterized his own opinion on this by saying something to the effect of, the Federal Bureau of Investigation was trying to make friends at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba and he was there to do business.	Interview Notes 02/14/05	b6 Per FBI b7C
7777/2002	[redacted] advised that he and [redacted] and the other Federal Bureau of Investigation Agents at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, while he was there, had a great relationship with Criminal Investigative Task Force, their Agents and [redacted] one of their attorneys. However, the Federal Bureau of Investigation's relationship with the other military components who were conducting the majority of the detainee interrogations, represented by [redacted] and General Geoffrey D. Miller, greatly deteriorated over the course of his tour at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. [redacted] believes that this relationship deteriorated primarily due to the Federal Bureau of Investigation's fervent opposition to the military's approach to interrogating detainees.	Interview Notes 02/14/05	b6 Per FOI b7C
7777/2002	[redacted] advised that for each interrogation of detainees conducted by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and their Criminal Investigative Task Force counterparts, each team would receive a file on the detainee, as well as a lead book, which contained investigative leads sent out from the United States. The Agents were supposed to read through each file and lead book and show each detainee pictures of people that were recently obtained by the	Interview Notes 02/14/05	b6 Per FBI b7C

	Federal Bureau of Investigation and other law enforcement agencies. The Agents were also supposed to ask each detainee the questions contained in the lead books, and try to pull out details from each of their dossiers to determine what other persons of interest these detainees might know.	
7/7/2002	<p>advised that while he and [redacted] were observing an interrogated in one of the viewing rooms at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, they observed [redacted] and her partner bring a detainee into the other vacant interrogation room. After a few minutes [redacted] came into the viewing room and announced very loudly, "who the hell [redacted] (expletive) ing with this curtain?" Referring to the curtain in front of the viewing room's two way mirror for that interrogation room. [redacted] and [redacted] had no idea what she was talking about because nobody had touched that curtain. [redacted] then ordered a [redacted] guard who was present to duct tape the curtain closed around the window so it wouldn't move. [redacted] partner then came into the viewing room and sat in front of the monitor for that interrogation room and the Marine guard went into the interrogation room with [redacted] and the detainee. [redacted] proceeded to sit very close to the detainee, so close that her left knee was between his legs and her right knee was on the outside of the detainee's left leg. She situated herself between the monitor camera and the detainee so that her back was to the camera. [redacted] could not see through the two way viewing mirror because it had been taped shut. However, [redacted] could tell from looking at the monitor most of what she was doing. [redacted] left knee was right in the detainee's crotch area. She was rubbing the detainee's arms from his shoulders down past his elbows into his crotch area. A number of times [redacted] could see the detainee turn his head away, grimace in pain, rear back and make noise consistent with a response to pain. [redacted] would also lean in and apparently whisper in the detainee's ear from time to time. After a while [redacted] partner stood up and went into the interrogation room and then he and [redacted] room tell [redacted] guard then came into the viewing room and [redacted] asked him what [redacted] was doing to the detainee to cause him pain. The guard replied, "she was bending his thumbs back and grabbing his (expletive)." [redacted] asked why she was doing that, and the guard replied, "to cause him pain!" The guard went on to say, "If you think that is bad, I have seen her having guys on the floor crying tears in the fetal</p>	<p>Interview Notes 02/14/05</p> <p>b6 b7c</p>

	<p>position." [redacted] took the (expletive) to mean the detainee's genitals. [redacted] thinks that the (b)(7)(D) guard's name tag had been taped over. [redacted] sensed that the guard was feeling uncomfortable about his questions, and did not want to press the issue by asking his name.</p>		
??/??/2002	<p>[redacted] an attorney for Criminal Investigative Task Force helped [redacted] print out a copy of the torture statute so he could point out to (b)(7)(D) (b)(7)(D) exactly what he meant by some of the techniques in the interrogation plan for [redacted] violating the torture statute. [redacted] is sure that he pointed this out to (b)(7)(D) (b)(7)(D) at some point while he was at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.</p>	<p>Interview Notes 02/14/05</p>	<p>b6 Per FBI b7C</p>
??/??/2002	<p>[redacted] advised that [redacted] was their point of contact at Federal Bureau of Investigation headquarters while he and [redacted] were at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.</p>	<p>Interview Notes 02/14/05</p>	<p>b6 Per FBI b7C</p>
??/??/2002	<p>[redacted] recalled a meeting with General Geoffrey D. Miller at either the Criminal Investigative Task Force building or in the J-TAB building, at which General Geoffrey D. Miller said that he wanted to see immediate results with [redacted] and that the Federal Bureau of Investigation had had [redacted] long enough to deal with this detainee and that little or no progress had been made. [redacted] and [redacted] however, advocated that the Federal Bureau of Investigation be allowed to take advantage of the fact that [redacted] had been in isolation for so long and so try to build rapport with this guy and try to change his views on things. The military did not agree and insisted on immediate action.</p>	<p>Interview Notes 02/14/05</p>	<p>b6 Per FBI b7C</p>
??/??/2002	<p>[redacted] advised that [redacted] was one of the interrogators present at the "pep rally" meeting and was going to be one of the interrogators of [redacted]</p>	<p>Interview Notes 02/14/05</p>	
??/??/2002	<p>[redacted] advised that at one point during the "pep rally" meeting [redacted] said that they were going to chain [redacted] to the ceiling. [redacted] immediately interrupted and said to [redacted] "what are you nuts?" [redacted] then acquiesced and said that they would only chain him to the floor.</p>	<p>Interview Notes 02/14/05</p>	<p>b6 Per FBI b7C</p>
??/??/2002	<p>[redacted] advised that [redacted] applied some sort of lotion on the arms of the detainee prior to bending his thumbs back and grabbing his genitals. [redacted]</p>	<p>Interview Notes</p>	

	<p>recalls that this interrogation occurred during Ramadan and that he was also aware that if a Muslim was touched by a woman who was not his wife he would be considered unclean, and could not pray. [redacted] had heard that the Army interrogators would use perfumed "Victoria Secret" lotion so as to make it obvious to the other detainees that the particular detainee had been touched by a woman. [redacted] describes [redacted] as stocky black female, approximately 5'-8" to 5'-9" tall, kind of heavy set. At the time he observed her she was wearing a military camouflage uniform, but [redacted] could not determine in which branch of the military she served.</p>	02/14/05
??/??/2002	<p>[redacted] was present when reports on the progress of the interrogation of [redacted] were presented, including meetings with General Geoffrey D. Miller and video teleconferences. The military reported that they were applying techniques on [redacted] like the use of dogs, stress positions, and lights and loud music. However, [redacted] never personally witnessed these incidents.</p>	<p>[redacted] Interview Notes 02/14/05</p>
??/??/2002	<p>After witnessing the incident involving [redacted] and the unknown detainee, both [redacted] and [redacted] told their immediate Supervisor at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, [redacted] and the Criminal Investigative Task Force Supervisor as well. [redacted] and [redacted] wondered if reporting this incident further was something that they could put in an email or if it was something that should be reported during a STU phone conversation. [redacted] thinks that eventually they just made a call using the STU phones. After [redacted] and [redacted] reported this activity they were told that if they saw anything else similar to this they should certainly report it. However, [redacted] got the impression that his bosses definitely did not want him to run to General Geoffrey D. Miller about these types of issues. There was discussion amongst the Federal Bureau of Investigation personnel at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba whether they should, "sound the alarm" or should they continue to sort of "investigate" these situations.</p>	<p>[redacted] Interview Notes 02/14/05</p>
??/??/2002	<p>[redacted] felt that the United States Army interrogators were being encouraged from their superior officers to engage in aggressive interrogation techniques. An example of this would be the "pep rally" meeting conducted by [redacted] where the interrogators were encouraged to get as close to the torture stature line as possible. [redacted]</p>	<p>[redacted] Interview Notes 02/14/05</p>

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	did not feel that the incident with [redacted] was a case of a rogue interrogator acting on her own. [redacted] felt that this was more of a policy issue that had to be dealt with on a level that was much higher than his.		
??/??/2002	[redacted] believes that he made it clear to his bosses that he felt it was wrong and dangerous to have federal law enforcement investigators down at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba in an out of context militarily controlled environment that seemed to operating by very different rules.	Interview Notes 02/14/05	b6 Per FBI b7C
??/??/2002	While stationed at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba [redacted] attended at least 2 maybe 3 video teleconferences. These teleconferences included individuals from about 5 different locations, including the Pentagon, SouthCom, people from Department of Justice, the Federal Bureau of Investigation and someone from the Criminal Investigative Task Force. It was during one of these video teleconferences that [redacted] made the assertion that the Federal Bureau of Investigation - Behavioral Analysis Unit approved of the interrogation plan that the military created for [redacted]. [redacted] advised that [redacted] assertion was absolutely a lie. [redacted] did not interrupt the teleconference to correct this because [redacted] told [redacted] and [redacted] not to. [redacted] said that he did not want to embarrass General Geoffrey D. Miller in front of all the people from the Pentagon and Department of Justice. [redacted] said that they would talk to the General later to clear up the issue.	Interview Notes 02/14/05	(b)(3) DO Use (b)(6), (b)(7) b6 Per FBI b7C
??/??/2002	[redacted] advised that at the last video teleconference he attended, in the midst of [redacted] report regarding detainee [redacted] told the moderator at the Department of Defense that it was his understanding that the Federal Bureau of Investigation was not behind the military's interrogation plan for [redacted]. The moderator then said that she had just heard that maybe the Federal Bureau of Investigation is not behind the military's plan, and then asked if that was true. The moderator then suggested that maybe they needed a dispute resolution. The moderator then called off the teleconference to meet and possibly send a team down to U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba to resolve the dispute. [redacted] did not know the moderator, but she was a female and at the same location as [redacted].	Interview Notes 02/14/05	b6 Per FBI b7C
??/??/2002	[redacted]		b6 b6 Per FBI b7C

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		Interview Notes 02/14/05
10/7/2002	<p>For the first few days [redacted] was at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. [redacted] showed him around the facility. [redacted] showed [redacted] how they kept track of the interviews of each detainee, the location of [redacted] and the procedure to sign out prisoners for interviews. [redacted] believes that [redacted] was there for his first 3 days and then left.</p>	<p>Interview Notes 02/14/05</p>
Sun 10/27/2002	<p>When [redacted] first arrived at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, [redacted] met him at the airport. [redacted] was travelling back to the U.S. on the same plane that [redacted] flew to U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. [redacted] and [redacted] only spoke for a few minutes before [redacted] left. [redacted] also met [redacted] at the airport and took the ferry ride back with [redacted] and began to brief him on the situation at U.S. Naval</p>	<p>Interview Notes 02/14/05</p>

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	Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. [redacted] advised that at various times the Federal Bureau of Investigation got to pick different detainees or "projects" to work on, up to ten at a time. [redacted] also advised that detainee [redacted] was in isolation in the brig at the time.		b6 Per FBI b7C
11/7/2002	[redacted] said that there was pressure from above in the military to show some results with respect to detainee [redacted]. The military believed [redacted] and information and they wanted to get it. There was pressure from up the military chain of command to act immediately with respect to [redacted]. Therefore, the military at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba planned to take [redacted] away from the Federal Bureau of Investigation and only allow the military access to [redacted]. The military wanted to take [redacted] out of the brig, take him to [redacted] and apply the techniques outlined in the interrogation plan that [redacted] objected to.	Interview Notes 02/14/03	b6 Per FBI b7C
The 11/07/2002	[redacted] advised that the guy who was originally supposed to be his partner at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba could not make it at the last minute. So about a week after [redacted] left the island [redacted] arrived at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. [redacted] thinks that it was [redacted] first day when they met with [redacted] regarding the classified interrogation plan for detainee [redacted].	Interview Notes 02/14/03	b6 Per FBI b7C
The 11/07/2002	[redacted] advised that immediately after the meeting that he and [redacted] had with [redacted] regarding the military's plan for detainee [redacted] he and [redacted] had a telephone conversation with [redacted] on the conversation [redacted] and [redacted] confirmed that they did not approve of the techniques outlined in phases II and III of the military's interrogation plan for [redacted] and [redacted] also advised that they went down to [redacted] and saw what the military was doing there. They told the military personnel present at the time that they disagreed with their techniques and then left. [redacted] and [redacted] felt that [redacted] was trying to take advantage of the turnover of Federal Bureau of Investigation Agents. [redacted]	Interview Notes 02/14/03	b6 Per FBI b7C

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	<p>felt that [redacted] thought he could just bully [redacted] into approving of their plan for [redacted] by saying that the Agents before him approved of it.</p>	
<p>This 11/07/2002</p>	<p>[redacted] advised that on the front page of the military's interrogation plan for [redacted] there was a section entitled "Behavioral Analysis." This section went on to say that the Federal Bureau of Investigation's Behavioral Analysis team had approved of this plan or words to that effect. When they started going through the details of the plan [redacted] became suspicious about whether this plan was really approved by anyone in the Federal Bureau of Investigation's Behavioral Analysis Unit. [redacted] then asked [redacted] who in the Behavioral Analysis Unit approved this plan. [redacted] replied, "everybody." [redacted] then pressed [redacted] for names, at which point [redacted] got very upset and yelled at [redacted] "leave, follow or get the (expletive) out of my way." [redacted] told [redacted] that he was just trying to get to the bottom of the issue, and that he needed to know who in this unit approved of this plan. [redacted] then told [redacted] that "everyone back to [redacted] approved of this plan." [redacted] then told [redacted] that he was going to check that out because he didn't believe him and that the techniques delineated in this plan were not the kind of things that the Behavioral Analysis Unit did. [redacted] then stood up, got in [redacted] face and screamed, "have at it!" [redacted] then ripped the papers out of [redacted] hands and stormed out of the office. As far as [redacted] was concerned the plan violated the torture statute and he said so at that time. The officers remaining in the room were [redacted] the supervisor of Criminal Investigative Task Force whose name [redacted] cannot recall, and [redacted].</p>	<p>Interview Notes 02/14/05</p>
<p>12/7/2002</p>	<p>A couple of days before [redacted] left Cuba, he [redacted] and [redacted] had a 2 hour meeting with General Geoffrey D. Miller. They each took a portion of the issues to present to General Geoffrey D. Miller. [redacted] part was the efficacy and legality of the military's interrogation techniques. [redacted] felt that the military's techniques were unproductive, uncalculated and in violation of the law. In this meeting the Federal Bureau of Investigation was pushing hard</p>	<p>Interview Notes 02/14/05</p>

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	to get General Geoffrey D. Miller to understand for the past 25 years or so the Behavioral Analysis Unit had been getting important and reliable information from individuals who did not want to provide the information under much more stringent guidelines than were in place at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. General Geoffrey D. Miller's response to the Federal Bureau of Investigation's entire presentation was something to the effect of, "thank you gentlemen, but my boys know what they're doing." [redacted] advised that the General often spoke in similar sorts of military or management type idioms.		
12/??/2002	Within a day of witnessing the incident involving [redacted] and [redacted] contacted their office in Virginia and made their bosses there aware of what happened. [redacted] also brought up this issue during their meeting with General Geoffrey D. Miller, which occurred just a few days prior to [redacted] leaving the island.	Interview Notes 02/14/05	
01/??/2003 - Fri 05/30/2003	[redacted] advised that he and [redacted] began writing the EC dated 05/30/03 sometime in January 2003. He and [redacted] worked on this EC for months. [redacted] described some of the portions of this EC as "controversial." [redacted] and [redacted] would send drafts of this EC up the chain of command and they would be sent back down with sometimes substantive changes and sometimes just structural changes. [redacted] thought the controversy centered around the fact that the Federal Bureau of Investigation were guests of the military at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba and that this EC was actually telling the military that they shouldn't be doing what they were doing because their tactics were both ineffective and [redacted] felt possibly illegal.	Interview Notes 02/14/05 @32:35 - 35:00	
??/??/2004	[redacted] was contacted via e-mail and telephonically by Valerie E. Caproni regarding his observations while at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. [redacted] discussed with Valerie B. Caproni the details of the incident with [redacted] generally the military's interrogation plan for detainees [redacted] and eventually what happened to him, and the EC that [redacted] and [redacted] authored.	Interview Notes 02/14/05	
??/??/2004	[redacted] advised that issue of possible discipline against him never came up in conversation between him and Valerie E. Caproni. [redacted] was never given any assurances or promises that he would not be disciplined in connection with the information	Interview Notes 02/14/05	

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[redacted] he was providing regarding the events at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. [redacted]

CaseMap Facts Report

Filter: Linked To Source(s): [redacted] Interview 1" - 7 of 7911 (0.1%) Filtered

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Case: FBI in Military Zones
Created: 2/23/2009 3:36:02 PM

Date & Time	Fact Text	Source(s)
11/??/1998 - 04/??/2002	[redacted] advised that he worked primarily counter-terrorism cases, specializing in middle-eastern terrorism, for approximately four years prior to his TDY to U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. [redacted] was working out of the Detroit FO at the time.	[redacted] Interview 1 @01:55 - 5:35
04/??/2002	[redacted] advised that once he arrived at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba he was told that Miranda did not apply to the detainees and no identification would be shown to the detainees.	[redacted] Interview 1 @06:48 - 07:45
Wed 04/10/2002 - Fri 05/24/2002	[redacted] advised that although detainees did not have Miranda rights at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba they were still treated by Federal Bureau of Investigation agents the same way they would treat any other normal criminal subject. [redacted] said that it would be standard protocol for any Federal Bureau of Investigation agent to report obvious signs of physical abuse of a subject.	[redacted] Interview 1 @13:19 - 13:55
Wed 05/22/2002	[redacted] does not have a specific recollection of his interview with [redacted] on this date. He vaguely recalls this interview. [redacted] recalls that [redacted] mentioned at the beginning of the interview that he was beaten sometime prior to the interview. [redacted] further recalls that they assured [redacted] that he would not be physically abused at any time during the interview and had nothing to fear from the interviewers. Also, [redacted] does not recall that the detainee had any visible physical injuries like cuts or bruises or broken bones, and if he had appeared to be physically abused [redacted] would have reported it to his supervisor at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba and documented it in writing.	[redacted] Interview 1 @10:42 - 11:45
Wed 05/22/2002	[redacted] pointed out that he did not draft the interview write-up for this interview. He assumed that it was agent [redacted] who drafted this document.	[redacted] Interview 1 @11:48 - 12:00

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Wed 05/22/2002	<p>[redacted] advised that if [redacted] had any signs of physical abuse then he would have written something up and so he assumes that b/c there is no documentation that he wrote then [redacted] probably did not have any signs of physical abuse.</p>	<p>[redacted] Interview 1 @ 12:00 - 13:00</p>
Sun 05/22/2005	<p>[redacted] advised that he does not recall that [redacted] had a cut on the bridge of his nose.</p>	<p>[redacted] Interview 1 @ 15:45 - 16:05</p>

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CaseMap Facts Report

Filter: Linked To Source(s): [redacted] Interview 1" - 21 of 7882 (0.3%) Filtered

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Case: FBI in Military Zones

Created: 2/26/2009 9:46:06 AM

Date & Time	Fact Text	Source(s)
To Be Determined	[redacted] advised that she attended an interrogation with [redacted] one time and when the detainee came in it was obvious that his head and beard had been shaved. They asked the detainee about this and the detainee said that he was shaved as some form of punishment. [redacted] and [redacted] inquired about this with the military and they told them that they shaved him b/c the detainee had lice, and they were having a problem with an infestation of lice in the detainee population. [redacted] and [redacted] were satisfied with the military's explanation regarding the shaving.	[redacted] Interview 1 @1:56:25 - 1:58:40
To Be Determined	[redacted] advised that she tended to walk around the interrogation trailers and look in the observation booths. [redacted] advised that at some point the military began locking the observation booth doors so she could no longer do this.	[redacted] Interview 1 @2:04:45 - 2:05:00
To Be Determined	[redacted] heard of the Frequent Flyer Program. As she understood it the program consisted of moving a detainee from cell to cell on a constant basis for some period of time. [redacted] heard that this program was designed to control the detainees ability to collect and disseminate intelligence, and to try to prevent the detainees from forming groups in the different cell blocks.	[redacted] Interview 1 @2:17:25 - 2:19:00
To Be Determined	[redacted] provides her explanation as to how she was treated poorly by the Federal Bureau of Investigation.	[redacted] Interview 1 @2:29:55 - 3:01:00
To Be Determined	[redacted] continues to provide her explanation as to how she was treated poorly by the Federal Bureau of Investigation.	[redacted] Interview 1 @3:03:45 - 3:08:05
??/??/2003 - ??/??/2004	[redacted] advised that in her opinion SA [redacted] did not work the hours that he submitted on his timesheet [redacted] thinks that [redacted] worked less	[redacted] Interview 1 @25:50 -

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<p>hours than he claimed on his timesheet.</p> <p>??/??/2003 - ??/??/2004</p>	<p>_____ advised that at some point during her tour at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, _____ told everyone that we're going to start filling out the 1-A registers. This was not the practice at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba prior to this point, people were just e-mailing their time back to their field offices or Headquarters (FBI).</p>	<p>26:40</p> <p>Interview 1 @ 26:55 - 29:00</p>	<p>b6 Per FBI b7c</p>
<p>??/??/2003 - ??/??/2004</p>	<p>_____ does not think that anyone took any leave while they were TDY to U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. _____ didn't take any leave while at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba b/c she didn't feel like she had to b/c she never took a whole day off. Instead _____ tried to work around her Dr.'s appointments and her physical therapy appointments, and sometimes would work late into the night. However, _____ did take sick leave for her stay at the Cleveland Clinic and for her hospital stay in Ft. Lauderdale, FL.</p>	<p>Interview 1 @ 31:40 - 34:05</p>	<p>b6 Per FBI b7c</p>
<p>??/??/2003 - ??/??/2004</p>	<p>_____ advised that at some point during her tour at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, an Federal Bureau of Investigation _____</p> <p>At the time, some of the linguists were possible subjects in an Federal Bureau of Investigation investigation. _____ thinks that _____ actions could have been a violation of Federal Bureau of Investigation policy, and that Federal Bureau of Investigation U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba management did not handle this situation properly. _____ doesn't think that this issue was properly reported up the Federal Bureau of Investigation change of command. In addition, _____ believes that _____ mentioned to _____ that _____ had reported _____ and _____ actions to Federal Bureau of Investigation management at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. _____ was friends with _____ and was upset that _____ reported this and _____ confronted her about this.</p>	<p>Interview 1 @ 54:55 - 1:07:55</p>	<p>b6 Per FBI b7c</p>
<p>??/??/2003 - ??/??/2004</p>	<p>_____ thinks that the _____ situation should have been reported to Headquarters (FBI), and someone from Federal Bureau of Investigation FCI should have interviewed both _____ and _____</p>	<p>Interview 1 @ 1:07:55 - 1:10:45</p>	<p>b6 Per FBI b7c</p>
<p>07/??/2003</p>	<p>_____ advised that in July 2003 she replied to an Federal Bureau of</p>		

	Investigation EC soliciting one year agent positions at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. She was interested in taking this position in order to branch out from her squad work at the time, which was the national security squad, and to take advantage of the financial incentive inherent in the position.	Interview I @02:05 - 03:10
10/??/2003	[redacted] was told by other agents at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba to always put down 7:00 am to 7:00 pm on her time sheet. This was the blanket shift no matter what. Of course if you went over that you could add on time, but other than that it was always recorded as 12 hours a day.	[redacted] Interview I @14:45 - 15:30
10/??/2003	[redacted] advised that during her first few weeks she did some night interviews with detainees. She was trying to decide the best time of day to conduct interviews so she scheduled some "night missions." During this time [redacted] observed some detainees who were "short shackled" to the floor with loud music playing, strobe lights flashing, and the rooms seemed to be very cold. [redacted] advised that she observed this on two occasions during the time she was doing "night missions." [redacted] advised that the detainees were in a "fetal" position but not laying on their sides. They appeared to have their hands and feet shackled to the I bolt in the floor and were bent over. [redacted] believes that these detainees were most likely in pain, and she would consider this a stress position. When [redacted] returned to the office she commented to other agents about this conduct and she was told that this was normal behavior for military interrogators. [redacted] does think that she formally reported this to her supervisor.	[redacted] Interview I @1:28:20 - 1:32:31 & 1:37:13 - 1:38:55
10/??/2003 - 11/??/2003	[redacted] was told by supervisors at gmo that she was to use the 12 hour work day, for six days a week, but this didn't happen until sometime "later." [redacted] thinks this may have happened sometime around late November 2003 at a regular staff meeting at the Federal Bureau of Investigation offices. Also, this policy was reiterated whenever new agents would rotate in for IDY's.	[redacted] Interview I @16:05 - 16:38 & 19:05 - 20:35
10/??/2003 - 11/??/2003	[redacted] advised that on one occasion she did enter an observation room to observe a military interrogation that involved the use of more aggressive interrogation techniques. She observed the same situation that she had observed earlier, short shackling, strobe lights, and loud music.	[redacted] Interview I @1:39:25 - 1:1:40:00
Tue	[redacted] arrived on U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba on October 7, 2003	[redacted]

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10/07/2003	for her one year term there.	Interview 1 @04:20 - 04:40
02/??/2004 - 04/??/2004	[redacted] advised that she also observed some aggressive interrogation techniques during a trip to an interrogation trailer during the day. One day [redacted] went to one of the interrogation trailers to meet with 3 members of the Gulf States Team, and they were in the observation room at the end of the trailer. She could see on the monitors that they had 3 different detainees in 3 different interrogations rooms that were short shackled to the floor, with strobe lights flashing. The team members admitted to [redacted] that the detainees had been in the interrogation rooms for a while and that the room temperature was lowered and loud music was playing.	[redacted] Interview 1 @1:40:05 - 1:41:01
02/??/2004 - 04/??/2004	[redacted] also reported what she saw in the observation room of the interrogation trailer to [redacted]. [redacted] asked her what action she had taken about this incident, and [redacted] advised him that she had already reported it to [redacted] and he is going to "handle it." [redacted] cannot recall if [redacted] asked her to write something up on this or not.	[redacted] Interview 1 @1:42:03 - 1:43:22
02/??/2004 - 04/??/2004	[redacted] advised that she observed the 3 detainees short shackled in 3 different rooms approximately late morning or early afternoon. [redacted] advised that one detainee was shackled in the squatting fetal position, one was sort of "to the side" a little, and one was in a chair, but shackled so that he was forced to bend over. The music was loud rock music, or heavy metal music.	[redacted] Interview 1 @1:43:23 - 1:45:23
06/??/2004 - 07/??/2004	[redacted] advised that at some point during her TDY at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba she took IA [redacted] into an interview with detainee #905 [redacted] wanted to bring [redacted] on the interview due to her specialized knowledge regarding the bombings in Madrid, Spain. [redacted] advised that [redacted] had gone on interviews before, even with SA [redacted]. When [redacted] returned from the interview [redacted] told her that [redacted] was very upset b/c she took an analyst into an interview with her and that this was against Federal Bureau of Investigation policy. [redacted] advised that she had never heard of such a policy. [redacted] also told [redacted] at this same time that they could not modify the Brearins course in order for her to qualify. [redacted] had requested that she not be required to kneel and lay in the prone position as is	[redacted] Interview 1 @1:16:17 - 1:25:15

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	<p>normally required in the Federal Bureau of Investigation's course of fire. [redacted] believes that concessions and modifications are regularly made for certain agents back in the States like Asst. Directors. [redacted] says that [redacted] told her that the firearms course of fire had been modified for her once, and that this is something that happens with some regularity. [redacted] had been told by a doctor not to bend her knee a certain way or else it could result in injury. [redacted] did attempt to perform the regular course of fire and she hurt herself and she did not qualify.</p>	
<p>06??/2004 - 07??/2004</p>	<p>[redacted] advised that over the next few days after [redacted] had taken [redacted] into an interview, [redacted] and [redacted] fought, and [redacted] was eventually dismissed from U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Soon after [redacted] sat down with [redacted] and told her that if she was not happy at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba she could leave. [redacted] took this to mean, sbut up and do your work</p>	<p>[redacted] Interview 1 @1:25:17 - 1:25:45</p>

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Filter: Linked To Source(s): [REDACTED] CaseMap Facts Report 1" - 28 of 7882 (0.4%) Filtered

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Case: FBI in Military Zones
Created: 2/25/2009 3:25:41 PM

Date & Time	Fact Text	Source(s)
To Be Determined	[REDACTED] background information...	[REDACTED] @ 00:00:1
Fri 12/02/2005	At the time the Office of the Inspector General interviewed [REDACTED] he was the Deputy OSC (Operation Supervisor) at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. The SAC at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba when the Office of the Inspector General interviewed [REDACTED] was Frazier R. Thompson. [REDACTED] explained that they now refer to the Federal Bureau of Investigation OSC as the SAC.	[REDACTED] @ 00:04:00
Fri 12/02/2005	In October 2003, [REDACTED] he was directed to go to U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba at the request of the Extra Territorial Investigation Unit of the Counterterrorism Division.	[REDACTED] @ 00:05:30
Fri 12/02/2005	Discussion of why he went to U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.	[REDACTED] @ 00:05:50
Fri 12/02/2005	[REDACTED] did not receive any direct training from the Federal Bureau of Investigation about working in a military zone. [REDACTED] did serve nine years on active duty, which gave him the knowledge and experience with working with the military. [REDACTED] had the understanding that the Federal Bureau of Investigation were invited guests at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. [REDACTED] also knew the other agents were frustrated with the military style of interrogations, because the Federal Bureau of Investigation agents were bound by the regulations back in the U.S.	[REDACTED] @ 00:11:10
Fri	Further discussion about why he went to U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba	[REDACTED] @ [REDACTED] ssue.

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12/02/2005			1 @
Fri 12/02/2005	Discussion about [redacted] and how in the past two weeks he recanted his earlier statements about [redacted] claims he made false accusations about [redacted] because he had been tortured and by the U.S. military while at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.	00:13:22	1 @
Fri 12/02/2005	In 2003, 760 was poly graphed by the U.S. military...	00:19:15	1 @
Fri 12/02/2005	More discussion about [redacted] recanting his statements about [redacted]	00:20:25	1 @
Fri 12/02/2005	According to [redacted] the Federal Bureau of Investigation started to interview 760 again sometime back in October 2005.	00:23:00	1 @
Fri 12/02/2005	[redacted] said he did not receive specific guidance about his assignment at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba in 2003. [redacted] said the only guidance he would have gotten was that the Federal Bureau of Investigation were guests, and make sure he maintain Federal Bureau of Investigation standards. [redacted] said he was not involved with interviewing detainees when he went to U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba in 2003. [redacted] said he thought all agents were told that the same standards they use for interviews in the states was the same for U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.	00:25:14	1 @
Fri 12/02/2005	Guidance on reporting abuse...	00:26:15	1 @
Fri 12/02/2005	[redacted] confirmed that he was not given specific guidance on what to do if he observed mistreatment of detainees, but his experiences had taught him if he had credible information that abuse or mistreatment had occurred, he would have reported it.	00:27:32	1 @
Fri 12/02/2005	[redacted] was the OSC at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba when [redacted] was there in 2003. [redacted] flew down to U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo	00:31:16	1 @

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	Bay, Cuba with [redacted]	00:32:00	
Fri 12/02/2005	[redacted] said he was at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba in 2003 to give the military a briefing and not to conduct interviews, so he did not receive any sort of orientation by the supervisors at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.	[redacted] @ 00:32:32	b6 Per FBI b7C
Fri 12/02/2005	[redacted] told [redacted] that [redacted] was taken up in a helicopter, sometime between September and December 2003, and was threaten to be thrown out if he did not confess to terrorism activities in connection to the Montreal Terrorist Cell ??? [redacted] does not know if she observed this or if it was something she heard. [redacted] thought this was something Military Liaison and Detainee Unit knew about because [redacted] worked in Military Liaison and Detainee Unit, and that Military Liaison and Detainee Unit was handling the accusations. [redacted] did speak with Military Liaison and Detainee Unit about the incident when he returned from U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, and from their reaction, he assumed they looked into and did what they could do.	[redacted] @ 00:34:20	b6 Per FBI b7C
Fri 12/02/2005	[redacted] said [redacted] told him about a time when he walked by a interview room and thought he saw a female interrogator pressing a detainee's thumb backwards, but a person was obstructing his view. [redacted] said [redacted] had just told him this story sometime back in 2005.	[redacted] @ 00:38:58	b6 Per FBI b7C
Fri 12/02/2005	Subjecting a detainee to loud music and flashing lights: [redacted] said he saw a classified Department of Defense memo about play loud music and flashing lights. [redacted] did not see this technique be used. [redacted] said the techniques were "dumb" and that the memo read like a 22 year had put it together based on what he saw in a James Bond movie. [redacted] also described the memo as lacking vision and that the techniques were ineffective.	[redacted] @ 00:41:17	b6 Per FBI b7C
Fri 12/02/2005	Isolating a detainee for an extended period of time: [redacted] personally observed detainees in a "hot cell" at Camp Delta for reasons unknown to him or for how long the detainees had been in the cell. [redacted] said he observed this with [redacted] and [redacted] described the cell as being a solid enclosing about 8x4 and made of metal. [redacted] said he did not know if [redacted]	[redacted] @ 00:44:19	

	they had any AC in the cell, but the detainees were not complaining about the heat. [redacted] said he did not discuss what he saw with anyone else. [redacted] said at the time it did not appear to be mistreatment.	
Fri 12/02/2005	Disrespectful statements and mishandling of the Koran: [redacted] said when there were reports in the news about the military at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba had flushed a Koran down the toilet, [redacted] called [redacted] and told him that it actually happened. [redacted] said he thought that a detainee had done it to create problems for the military, but [redacted] said that it was actually done by the military. This was another example of what was so frustrating for [redacted] and [redacted] to work with the military at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. [redacted] said [redacted] did not provide details about the Koran being flushed down the toilet.	00:50:29 @
Fri 12/02/2005	Touching a detainee or acting towards a detainee in a sexual manner: [redacted] said [redacted] told him about an interrogator who was a Jewish female contractor by the name of [redacted] or [redacted] who performed a lap dance on a detainee. [redacted] said he was also told by someone at HQ that Military Liaison and Detainees Unit was investigating the incident, so [redacted] did not feel the need to report what he had heard from [redacted]. The person at HQ that might have told him that Department of Justice was investigating the contractor could have been [redacted] but he can not recall for sure [redacted] did meet this contractor, he met her during his briefing when he was there for the [redacted] matter. [redacted] said this female contractor was one of the interrogators interviewing [redacted]. [redacted] said that [redacted] never said she witnessed these abuses, and if she had said to him that she witnessed any mistreatment, then he would have had her tell someone in the military. [redacted] believed that [redacted] heard this and that she did not witness this lap dance.	00:54:20 @
Fri 12/02/2005	[redacted] said that [redacted] also told him about a detainee being shown homosexual porn for 24 hours. [redacted] said it was his sense that [redacted] learned of this by reading the reports from the military interrogations.	00:59:10 @
Fri	[redacted] described an incident where [redacted] was asked if he	

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12/02/2005	were to tell a lie, what would that lie look like? [redacted] felt that this was not appropriate.	[redacted] @ 01:01:58	
Fri 12/02/2005	Reporting mistreatment to supervisors [redacted] said he reported back to Military Liaison and Detainee Unit and his unit about his disbelief on some of the rumors that are going around about the treatment of detainees at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba [redacted] unit chief at the time was [redacted]	[redacted] @ 01:03:50	b6 Per FBI b7c
Fri 12/02/2005	[redacted] said he remembers having conversations with folks from Military Liaison and Detainee Unit [redacted] and [redacted] about U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.	[redacted] @ 01:06:00	b6 Per FBI b7c
Fri 12/02/2005	In November 2003 [redacted] attended an Behavioral Analysis Unit meeting that was spear headed by [redacted] and the objective was to make recommendations to the AD of CTD on how to make things better down at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.	[redacted] @ 01:06:30	
Fri 12/02/2005	[redacted] did not know what type of investigation Department of Justice was doing regarding the "Sid" contractor at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.	[redacted] @ 01:07:13	
Fri 12/02/2005	[redacted] describes Strategic Information Operations Center and the video conferences he had with the folks at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, including [redacted] [redacted] was in D.C. with [redacted] during the conferences. At the time of [redacted] interview [redacted] is still in U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.	[redacted] @ 01:08:05	b6 Per FBI b7c

CaseMap Facts Report

Filter: Linked To Source(s): [redacted] Interview 1" - 26 of 7884 (0.3%) Filtered

Case: FBI in Military Zones
 Created: 2/25/2009 2:15:10 PM

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Date & Time	Fact Text	Source(s)
To Be Determined	[redacted] was told that he is a witness and not a subject of our review/investigation and that there are no allegations of wrongdoing against him. It was mentioned that the interview was voluntary, and [redacted] agreed.	[redacted] Interview 1 @ 00:03:15
(S) (S)	<p>[redacted] was asked about tapes related to detainees. [redacted] said that when the camp opened, there was no intention of putting in technical monitoring. Marion E. "Spike" Bowman suggested that monitoring be put in and the Department of Defense came to the Federal Bureau of Investigation and had them install surreptitious microphones in Camp X-Ray and used a system called [redacted].</p> <p>[redacted] It uses Moes(sp) (magneto optical disks), that store up to 3-terabytes. So if you run 150 microphones, it would be about 3 months worth of storage. Camp X-Ray might have been limited, there might have been more at Camp Delta. This was to record anything a detainee spoke. The guards didn't even know about it. [redacted] said that the military decided that this wasn't in their best interest. [redacted] but that didn't happen, and the disks sat around for a long time. Eventually, the military no longer did this for intelligence, they used the system for security reasons to keep track of the detainees plans to attack the guards. The military started to overwrite the old disks. [redacted] discussed how these could be used in discovery/legal issues. [redacted] said that they archived the 36,000 hours of recordings that are now in the MPI, evidence storage. The time period these cover is 10/03 - 02/04 for Camp Delta. There might be additional recordings from 2002. These should all be in evidence room by Camp Echo, which is controlled by the Joint Task Force - Guantanamo - Joint Detainee Operations Group. [redacted] does not know if Colonel [redacted] has knowledge of this. [redacted] said that there is a</p>	<p>[redacted] Interview 1 @ 00:14:50</p>

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current system that records audio from 05/04 to now (04/05)

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_____ said that currently, discs are being made of conversations in certain cells.
 _____ said that no interviews were recorded, rather this was only in the common areas and cells.
 _____ said that translation is now done in real time and reports are generated.
 _____ said that theoretically, there might be conversations between detainees of abuse.

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To Be Determined _____ dismissed video taping.

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Interview I @
00:29:20

To Be Determined _____ said that he designed his mission in U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba because he and Valerie E. Caproni saw the value of having a lawyer from OGC in U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.

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Interview I @
32:20

To Be Determined _____ said that he is not aware of any instruction that were given to Federal Bureau of Investigation employees that were coming to U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba related to joint interrogations, or otherwise participating in interrogations with non-fbi personnel. Once he got to U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba and made inquiries regarding the rules, _____ said that rules were understood to follow Federal Bureau of Investigation policies with the exception of the miranda, that came from Marion E. "Spike" Bowman, but Marion E. "Spike" Bowman said that he never documented it.

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Interview I @
00:33:00

To Be Determined _____ said that in the absence in direction to the contrary, one would rely on the guidance provided in the Legal Handbook for Special Agents. After _____ arrived in 08/04 he provided oral advise and training in that. He told the newly arrived Federal Bureau of Investigation employees that if they saw anything "untoward," beyond what the Federal Bureau of Investigation was authorized to do, or outside the scope of the military's authority, the agent was to remove himself from the room and report the incident to the _____ or to _____
 _____ told us that he and _____ instructed the newly arrived employees on the scope of the military's approved techniques as they were set forth in the A-X Memo. After receiving a report, _____ and _____ would make an initial determination to see if they need to further corroborate it with records and if necessary report it to headquarters. _____ said that he told people that if they witnessed something

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Interview I @
00:34:30

	that they should remove themselves from that situation and report it, they could not participate even if that meant standing in the back of the room. Further discussion of staying and leaving the room.	
To Be Determined	_____ said that it was made clear, at least since he was at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, that anything you see that you were not be able to do, should be reported.	Interview 1 @ 00:39:40
To Be Determined	_____ was asked about document #FBI006332, dated 05/19/04. _____ said that it is his understanding that is the current guidance for Federal Bureau of Investigation employees acting in extra territorial investigations, and this is what _____ gives employees when they come to U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba per Valerie E. Caproni.	Interview 1 @ 00:42:00
To Be Determined	_____ was presented with document #FBI004593 CDT, drafted by _____ dated 05/12/2004, re: Humane Treatment of Prisoners. _____ said that he never saw this document before. _____ agreed that it has a different reporting requirement. _____ said that the document looks like a draft document.	Interview 1 @ 00:44:00
To Be Determined	THIS PORTION OF THE DIGITAL RECORDING IS BLANK. IT APPEARS THAT THE INTERVIEW PICKS UP WHERE IT LEFT OFF. I WILL REVIEW THE MICRO-CASSETTE TAPES FOR ERRORS. _____ 12-28-06. The gap is a result of transferring the cassette tape to the digital recording - the full interview is in tact. _____	Interview 1 @ 00:46:45 - 01:35:10
To Be Determined	_____ was that he disagrees with the language "known or suspects" in the EC referred above. _____ said that rumors fly at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, and it's unfair for someone to be damaged by a rumor. _____ spoke of situations of interrogation, and the language is too broad. _____ said that Federal Bureau of Investigation employees not familiar with the other agencies policies and they saw something outside of Federal Bureau of Investigation guidelines, they should leave. If they are familiar with the other agency's guidelines, they should remove themselves if they saw something abusive. _____ said that a "shock the conscious" standard should apply.	Interview 1 @ 01:36:20
To Be Determined	_____ was asked if he was aware of any Federal Bureau of Investigation employee removing themselves from an interview for these reasons. _____ said, "not by direct knowledge," but he knows that the EC came from _____ in Afghanistan.	Interview 1 @ 01:40:45
To Be	_____ was asked if he were aware of detainee abuse by a variety of methods (the list	

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Determined	most likely came from the questionnaire). He heard or it was reported that a detainee was either without food and water for a number of hours, or the detainee was short shackled for a number of hours without the opportunity to reweave themselves. [redacted] said that the source of this would be a 302. [redacted] said there would only be one or two incidents of this. [redacted] said that his information on this wasn't received contemporaneous, rather it was after the fact while he was reviewing historical records. [redacted] note: could refer to [redacted]	Interview 1 @ 01:51:00
To Be Determined.	[redacted] heard of sleep deprivation or interruption.	[redacted] Interview 1 @ 01:54:00
To Be Determined	[redacted] heard of limited reports of use of duct tape, or the report on [redacted] where he implied that two Federal Bureau of Investigation employees beat him. Other threatening action is related to [redacted]	[redacted] Interview 1 @ 01:55:50
To Be Determined	[redacted] said he heard, in general, the use of shackles in a prolonged manner. [redacted] said he has no specifics. He heard of stressful or painful positions. [redacted] heard of extreme hot or cold and use of loud music.	Interview 1 @ 01:57:45
To Be Determined	[redacted] said that he has heard of allegations regarding disrespect of the Koran.	Interview 1 @ 02:00:00
To Be Determined	[redacted] said that he heard of putting woman's clothing on a detainee [redacted]	[redacted] Interview 1 @ 02:01:05
To Be Determined...	[redacted] said that he knows of one incident where SA [redacted] told a detainee, after a few days absence from interviewing [redacted]	[redacted] Interview 1 @ 02:01:35
To Be Determined	[redacted] said that he knows the story of [redacted] attempting to impersonate a Federal Bureau of Investigation agent.	[redacted] Interview 1 @ 02:05:20
To Be Determined	[redacted] discussed the Valerie E. Caproni memo regarding [redacted] and the alleged helicopter ride. [redacted] said that he looked into it and learned that it never happened. [redacted] did learn that [redacted] was taken on a boat.	[redacted] Interview 1 @ 02:08:00

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To Be Determined	_____ said that he has heard of a _____ _____	Interview 1 @ 02:14:00
To Be Determined	_____ said that there was never a mandate for him to review all 302's to look for allegations, or instances, of abuse.	Interview 1 @ 02:25:00
To Be Determined	_____ was asked about allegations of a detainee being shot then thrown into the ocean. _____ said that he had heard that but that the allegations was "outrageous" because there is no way this could have happened due to the physical layout of the camp. _____ said that it seemed crazy that a body would be thrown into the ocean.	Interview 1 @ 03:28:00
Fri 05/07/2004	_____ was given document # ?? dated May 07, 2004. _____ said that upon receipt of this, _____ advised _____ that he needed to talk to everybody there, and ask them what they saw or heard. _____ bid that _____ responded with several allegations. _____ addressed each one and told General Jay W. Hood. _____ and _____ told General Jay W. Hood that he had to absolutely assure them that nothing like that was happening, and if that assurance wasn't given to them, they would make the recommendation that the Federal Bureau of Investigation withdrawal from U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. _____ said that General Jay W. Hood provided that assurance.	Interview 1 @ 03:33:00
Wed 12/01/2004	_____ discussed his knowledge related to the allegations made by _____. He first learned of them in October 2004, that he reported to his supervisors _____ and _____. _____ was shown an email dated 12/01/04 which discussed abuse allegations. _____ said that 12/01/04 was the first time he sent an email regarding allegations of abuse by _____. _____ talked about his exchanges with a variety of Federal Bureau of Investigation people regarding _____ allegations and the Federal Bureau of Investigation's handling of them.	Interview 1 @ 02:50:00

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CaseMap Facts Report

Filter: Linked To Source(s): [redacted] Interview 1" - 63 of 7910 (0.8%) Filtered

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Case: FBI in Military Zones
 Created: 2/24/2009 3:02:23 PM

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Date & Time	Fact Text	Source(s)
To Be Determined	[redacted] has thought ever since he was at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba in 2002 that too much prominence was given to Department of Defense when it came to interrogations. [redacted] said that U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba is not a tactical interrogation mission it is a strategic interrogation and investigative mission that should be lead by the Federal Bureau of Investigation. [redacted] said that there are obvious problems at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba where there are tactical interrogators and handlers working in an obvious strategic environment.	[redacted] Interview 1 @39:50 - 41:15
To Be Determined	[redacted] advised that doesn't ever recall specifically instructing any agents in a group or one on one, that if you see something that is outside your comfort zone come see me immediately. [redacted] never had this conversation with any agents at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba because he never felt like he needed to. [redacted] just assumed that this was understood; he assumed that if an agent saw something that bothered them then they would come see him and tell him. This was something [redacted] never really thought about because he didn't think such an instruction was necessary.	[redacted] Interview 1 @1:03:55 - 1:05:57
To Be Determined	[redacted] said that he has never ordered any detainees onto the frequent flyer program. However, he cannot say for sure whether any agents under him have, in consultation with the Department of Defense, tacitly agreed that somebody should go on the frequent flyer program.	[redacted] Interview 1 @#2 - 16:34 - 16:50
Mon 03/05/1990	[redacted] comes on duty with the Federal Bureau of Investigation.	[redacted] Interview 1 @5:55

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<p>??/??/2002</p>	<p>_____ recalled that sometime in early 2002 Marion E. "Spike" Bowman sent out an e-mail, possibly to _____ basically saying that you guys are the Federal Bureau of Investigation so conduct yourself like Federal Bureau of Investigation agents.</p>	<p>_____ Interview 1 @57:40 - 58:13</p>
<p>??/??/2002 - Wed 05/19/2004</p>	<p>_____ said that prior to the May 19, 2004 there was no formal guidance from the Federal Bureau of Investigation regarding the treatment of detainees, or observations of possible detainee abuse. However, _____ had numerous conversations with _____ and possibly Michael B. Steinbach in August or September 2003 about the fact that the other agencies could do things that we can't do. The mantra at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba has always been conduct yourself the way you would in the continental United States absent Miranda. However, the issue about reporting incidents of possible detainee abuse was never really addressed and no guidance was given prior to the Abu Ghraib Prison scandal breaking.</p>	<p>_____ Interview 1 @55:45 - 57:15</p>
<p>06/??/2002</p>	<p>_____ was _____ immediate predecessor at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba as the On-Scene Commander. Before _____ Joseph M. Demarest, Jr. and Arthur M. Cummings were also OSC's at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. _____ was the OSC at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba immediately after _____ worked with _____ at Salt Lake City as a squad supervisor for the Olympics.</p>	<p>_____ Interview 1 @11:50 - 13:34</p>
<p>Wed 06/26/2002 - Tue 08/06/2002</p>	<p>_____ is the temporary OSC for U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. This is _____ first tour at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.</p>	<p>_____ Interview 1 @5:30</p>
<p>Wed 06/26/2002 - Mon 08/19/2002</p>	<p>_____ advised that his first tour of duty as the On-Scene Commander at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba was from June 26, 2002 to August 19, 2002.</p>	<p>_____ Interview 1 @pp. 1</p>
<p>07/??/2002 - 08/??/2002</p>	<p>_____ advised that while he was a temporary OSC for the Federal Bureau of Investigation at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba they learned that _____ had significant connections to 9/11. It was determined _____ in consultation with personnel from JTF-170 at the time, that _____ was important enough that he should be segregated from the rest of the detainees</p>	<p>_____ Interview 1 @#3 0:22 - 1:35</p>

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08/??/2002	<p>population in order to better control his interrogation environment.</p> <p>About two days before [redacted] left U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba in 2002 he toured the Navy brig with [redacted] and most likely Lt. Col. [redacted] to see if this facility would work for them logistically to place [redacted] in this facility. [redacted] was transferred into the Navy brig sometime after [redacted] left. The Federal Bureau of Investigation and JTF-170 had operational security concerns about Navy personnel who were running the Brig, but who had no need to know regarding [redacted] and any information related to him.</p>	<p>[redacted] Interview 1 @#3 2:00 - 3:45</p>
08/??/2002	<p>Before [redacted] left U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba the plan for [redacted] was to isolate him with the idea of developing a relationship with and dependence on the interrogator, and to segregate him from the rest of the detainees population for the camp dynamic issue and operational security issues. The interrogation plan for [redacted] was basically to just get him in the Brig and get [redacted] in there to talk to him. There was no official or formal interrogation plan.</p>	<p>[redacted] Interview 1 @#3 6:55 - 7:41</p>
08/??/2002	<p>[redacted] said that everyone agency at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba was interested in [redacted] when it was discovered he had strong links to 9/11. [redacted] said that, "It was a ticket that everyone wanted." However, the Federal Bureau of Investigation had the lead due to the fact that they were the lead agency on the 9/11 investigation. Given that, the interrogation of [redacted] was a joint project among the Federal Bureau of Investigation, JTF-170 [redacted]</p>	<p>[redacted] Interview 1 @#3 07:45 - 08:40</p>
08/??/2002	<p>[redacted] advised that [redacted] was the lead interrogator for [redacted] because he had already obtained confessions from (b)(2) detainees at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba and was recognized by Michael E. Dunleavy as, "a national treasure." [redacted] said Michael E. Dunleavy may have done a lot of things people didn't like, but to his credit, "When the Federal Bureau of Investigation had a .400 hitter (in [redacted] down here (U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba), he recognized it."</p>	<p>[redacted] Interview 1 @#3 08:40 - 09:15</p>
08/??/2002	<p>[redacted] advised that in the summer of 2002 there was still the possibility</p>	<p>[redacted]</p>

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	<p>that some of these detainees may end up in U.S. District Court. Also, there was a belief that [redacted] may possess some information on impending attacks against the U.S. However [redacted] and the Federal Bureau of Investigation had a more tempered approach to this issue than the military</p>	<p>[redacted] interview 1 @#3 09:41 - 10:56</p>
<p>??/??/2003</p>	<p>Although [redacted] had the very general guidance provided by Marion E. "Spike" Bowman to go by, very soon after he arrived in 2003 he began to learn all of the different things the other agencies could do and it brought up additional issues for the Federal Bureau of Investigation working in this environment. [redacted] knew that his agents were not allowed to engage in this conduct but it was still unclear if they could witness certain conduct or benefit from certain other interrogation techniques. [redacted] said to [redacted] "I know what ballpark I'm in, but I don't know where the foul lines are."</p>	<p>[redacted] interview 1 @58:05 - 58:51</p>
<p>08/??/2003</p>	<p>When [redacted] first arrived as the Federal Bureau of Investigation's permanent OSC at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba he felt that the Bureau was too embedded with Criminal Investigative Task Force. It seemed to [redacted] that the Federal Bureau of Investigation was too focused on the military commissions, which he was skeptical would ever happen anyway. [redacted] felt the Federal Bureau of Investigation was spending too much time with Criminal Investigative Task Force and not enough time developing intelligence leads in support of counter-terrorism cases. At [redacted] first command briefing he told General Geoffrey D. Miller that the Federal Bureau of Investigation's primary mission at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba was to collect intelligence in support of our counter-terrorism cases both domestically and internationally. This redefinition of the Federal Bureau of Investigation's mission was warmly received by General Geoffrey D. Miller and his staff.</p>	<p>[redacted] interview 1 @1:08:54 - 1:10:31</p>
<p>08/??/2003</p>	<p>[redacted] mantra as th Federal Bureau of Investigation OSC at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba was our primary mission here is to collect actionable intelligence and disseminate it to the intelligence community with an emphasis on things that support Federal Bureau of Investigation investigations. [redacted] added however that the Federal Bureau of Investigation also prides itself on the fact that the first four commission candidates, if they are convicted it will be</p>	<p>[redacted] interview 1 @1:10:18 - 1:12:18</p>

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	based upon confessions obtained by Federal Bureau of Investigation agents. Also, the Federal Bureau of Investigation's investigative expertise lends itself to successful intelligence collection and dissemination. [redacted] says that Federal Bureau of Investigation U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba prides itself on the content of their IIR's. The techniques the Federal Bureau of Investigation uses to obtain and record the intelligence plays into the validity of the information.		
08/??/2003	[redacted] advised that when he arrived in August 2003 there was an incident where a guard threw a Koran on the floor and stepped on it. This was a major issue among the detainee population, and [redacted] played a significant leadership role in whipping up the fervor of the detainees because of the disrespect shown to the Koran. [redacted] thinks that this incident took place on an open cell block, rather than in an interrogation trailer or interrogation room.	[redacted] Interview 1 @#2 53:55 - 55:20	b6 Per FBI b7C
Tue 08/19/2003	[redacted] advised that [redacted] was the last field grade supervisor serving as temporary OSC before [redacted] arrived. However, [redacted] left before [redacted] arrived so there was a GS-13 acting in a supervisory capacity as OSC when [redacted] arrived, but [redacted] cannot recall his name. This unnamed agent along with the Administration Agent, [redacted] were running the Federal Bureau of Investigation's operation at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba when [redacted] arrived.	[redacted] Interview 1 @13:45 - 14:55	b6 Per FBI b7C
Tue 08/19/2003 - Tue 04/26/2005	[redacted] is the permanent OSC for Federal Bureau of Investigation U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba during this time period.	[redacted] Interview 1 @5:30	
Tue 08/19/2003 - Tue 04/26/2005	[redacted] said that while the OSC at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba he was privy to the fact that there were special interrogation plans for certain detainees, and that members of his staff were not necessarily privy to this same information. However [redacted] did not regularly see these special IP's he just knew they existed. [redacted] thinks that the first special IP he ever saw was for [redacted] which was given to him by [redacted]. However, this special IP was never implemented and [redacted] gave him this copy so he could cut & paste the language used in it for a memo [redacted] was preparing for	[redacted] Interview 1 @23:35 - 27:16	b6 Per FBI b7C

	the U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba commanding general requesting that [redacted] be put in () 2)		
Tue 08/19/2003 - Tue 04/26/2005	[redacted] said that when [redacted] gave him the IP for [redacted] the Bureau was very interested in getting [redacted] segregated from the rest of the detainee population by putting him in (b) (2). The Bureau wanted to be able to interview [redacted] in (b) (2), and [redacted] believes that SOCOM Commander General James T. Hill had to approve all such requests. [redacted] submitted actually a Joint Task Force - Guantanamo document to General Geoffrey D. Miller, which would be forwarded to General James T. Hill, to authorize [redacted] to go into (b) (2) for interview purposes.	[redacted] Interview 1 @24:45 - 28:55	b6 Per FBI b7C
Tue 08/19/2003 - Tue 04/26/2005	[redacted] said that he regularly reminded the agents he supervised at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba that there are people here that can do things that you are not allowed to do; conduct yourself like an Federal Bureau of Investigation agent. However, this was the extent of his guidance and it never really went any further than that.	[redacted] Interview 1 @58:55 - 59:35	b6 Per FBI b7C
Tue 08/19/2003 - Tue 04/26/2005	[redacted] advised that since he has been the permanent Federal Bureau of Investigation OSC at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba probably only (b) (2) detainees have arrived. Also, barring some unforeseen circumstances, approximately 65% of the detainee population will not now, and probably never will talk to anyone from the U.S. government or cooperate in interviews with anyone from the U.S. government.	[redacted] Interview 1 @1:16:25 - 1:17:08	b6 Per FBI b7C
Tue 08/19/2003 - Tue 04/26/2005	[redacted] advised that Federal Bureau of Investigation agents can't do any interviews with detainees without first coordinating with the Department of Defense. When an agent wants to interview a detainee he must first determine if the detainee is on somebody's else's coordination list. If the detainee is on another agency's list then the agent must contact that agency beforehand and coordinate his interview with their requirements. Sometimes the Federal Bureau of Investigation ends up not doing the interview but has the interrogator from the other agency attempt to obtain the information for them. Other times the Bureau can not do this due to classification concerns and in those cases the interview just doesn't happen. Still other times the	[redacted] Interview 1 @1:20:30 - 1:21:25	b6 Per FBI b7C

	agency would just allow the Federal Bureau of Investigation agent to interview their detainee. The same would go for agents from other agencies who wanted to interview a detainee on an Federal Bureau of Investigation coordination list.		
Tue 08/19/2003 - Tue 04/26/2005	[redacted] advised that the Federal Bureau of Investigation does not know all that goes on at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba while it is happening. In fact [redacted] said that a detainee could be getting tortured right now at Camp Delta and the Federal Bureau of Investigation would most like not know about it. However, [redacted] feels that he and others in the Federal Bureau of Investigation have a good enough relationship with members of Joint Task Force - Guantanamo that they would eventually hear about something like that.	[redacted] Interview 1 @1:22:32 - 1:23:43	b6 Per FBI b7C
Tue 08/19/2003 - Tue 04/26/2005	[redacted] advised that he can go anywhere he wants on the base unescorted and that goes for all Federal Bureau of Investigation SA's. The policy now is though they discourage interrogators from going to down to the cell blocks without a specific purpose.	[redacted] Interview 1 @1:24:50 - 1:25:40	b6 Per FBI b7C
(S) Tue 08/19/2003 - Tue 04/26/2005	[redacted] advised that he never saw anything in writing, either an interrogation plan or an MFR, regarding an interrogation technique where [redacted] was told that [redacted] harsher interrogation techniques would be used on him. However, at some point he became aware that this may have happened from conversations he had with people at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.	[redacted] Interview 1 @#2 - 4:51 - 6:36	b1
Tue 08/19/2003 - Tue 04/26/2005	[redacted] advised that his knowledge of any sleep deprivation or sleep disruption relates to the "frequent flyer" program. This was a program implemented by the Joint Task Force - Guantanamo, which involved moving the detainee every 4 to 6 hours including odd hours of the night. This is not a program designed to deprive the detainee of sleep, but sleep deprivation could be a byproduct of implementing this program. The design of this program was to not allow certain detainees to be comfortable with their surroundings, to just generally throw the detainee off a bit, to keep the detainee off balance so that the detainee does not have an advantage when being interrogated.	[redacted] Interview 1 @#2 - 8:35 - 10:30	b6 Per FBI b7C
Tue 08/19/2003 - Tue	[redacted] advised that while he has been at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba there have been two Camp dynamic macro type techniques that have been	[redacted] Interview 1	

04/26/2005	used, the first is the frequent flyer program and the second is the the Afghanie Wilderness Program. The Afghanie Wilderness Program involved moving some of the more recalcitrant (b (2) detainees to a cell block populated entirely by Afghan detainees. This normally had a marked impact on the detainee's behavior. Generally the detainees would quickly complain that they no longer wanted to be on that cell block and sometimes would agree to be interviewed in order to get away from their living situation for a while.	@#2 - 10:30 - 11:15
Tue 08/19/2003 - Tue 04/26/2005	[redacted] advised that the Federal Bureau of Investigation worked with detainees that were definitely part of the the "frequent flyer" program. [redacted] thinks that [redacted] was in the frequent flyer program on more than one occasion primarily due to the fact that he was such a bad influence in Camp Delta.	[redacted] Interview 1 @#2 - 11:42 - 12:13
Tue 08/19/2003 - Tue 04/26/2005	[redacted] said that the frequent flyer program was not a secret at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba; in fact he said that if the Office of the Inspector General had come down to visit a year ago we would have been told about this program during the camp dynamics brief of the command briefing session.	[redacted] Interview 1 @#2 - 11:36 - 12:48
Tue 08/19/2003 - Tue 04/26/2005	[redacted] advised that the frequent flyer program and the Afghanie wilderness program were Department of Defense SOP's that were camp wide macro techniques that were never specifically discussed in his office. That is to say [redacted] never specifically discussed whether an agent could or could not participate or agree to this technique or not. [redacted] does not think he ever gave any agent advice on whether they could participate in interviews of detainees who had been subjected to either one of these programs.	[redacted] Interview 1 @#2 - 20:47 - 21:55
Tue 08/19/2003 - Tue 04/26/2005	[redacted] advised that he wasn't concerned about the use of either the frequent flyer program or the Afghanie wilderness program. He never saw these camp wide macro techniques as abusive. [redacted] knows that there were limitations to the duration of each program but he cannot recall them at this time.	[redacted] Interview 1 @#2 - 23:10 - 24:00
Tue 08/19/2003 - Tue 04/26/2005	[redacted] advised that he was aware that interrogators sometimes used the air conditioners in the interrogations rooms to manipulate the temperature. However, he had not heard of anything more extreme than that and has never heard of Federal Bureau of Investigation employees engaging in this.	[redacted] Interview 1 @#2 45:20 - 46:16

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Tue 08/19/2003 - Tue 04/26/2005	[redacted] advised that he was present when 10 new detainees arrived in November 2004 and he was impressed with how much better they looked when they arrived, than the ones he witnessed arriving in 2002. [redacted] thought there was a marked increase in professionalism and appropriate sensitivity; it was impressive to see the improvement.	[redacted] Interview 1 @#2 51:09 - 52:35
Tue 08/19/2003 - Tue 04/26/2005	[redacted] advised that today he would probably not consent to have a detainee shaved. [redacted] does not believe that shaving a detainee is abusive, but he would probably act differently due to the events at Abu Ghraib Prison. At the time he consented to this or authorized this he did not even think that this could be considered abuse. However, after Abu Ghraib Prison he can see where it could be potentially be problematic.	[redacted] Interview 1 @#2 1:09:15 - 1:11:05
Tue 08/19/2003 - Tue 04/26/2005	[redacted] advised that when [redacted] was stationed at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba he began to work with [redacted] at the request of the (b) (2) because [redacted] had developed a decent rapport with him. [redacted] continued to develop his rapport with [redacted] to the point that [redacted] was very cooperative and started providing information about other detainees. [redacted] had become a jail house snitch of sort. [redacted] is surprised that Department of Defense is having so much trouble with [redacted] given the great rapport that [redacted] had developed with him.	[redacted] Interview 1 @#3 11:42 - 12:22
Tue 08/19/2003 - Tue 04/26/2005	When asked if the Federal Bureau of Investigation ever employed any of the interrogation techniques contained in the Department of Defense's "A through X memo," [redacted] advised that if isolation is one of the techniques contained in the A through X memo and (b) (2) is considered isolation, then yes. [redacted] said that the Federal Bureau of Investigation recommended that detainees [redacted] and [redacted] be put in isolation at different times. [redacted] also said that this action would be consistent with action that the Federal Bureau of Investigation would or could take in the U.S.	[redacted] Interview 1 @ #3 17:00 - 18:32
Tue 08/19/2003 - Tue 04/26/2005	[redacted] advised that while [redacted] was housed at (b) (2) as part of the Department of Defense's interrogation plan for him, [redacted] spent a significant amount of time at (b) (2) interviewing [redacted]	[redacted] Interview 1 @#3 36:00 - 37:00

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	[redacted] also thinks that the Counterterrorism Center also interviewed [redacted] while he was at b)(2)	
Tue 08/19/2003 - Tue 04/26/2005	[redacted] advised that both [redacted] and [redacted] were interviewed numerous times by the Federal Bureau of Investigation while at (b) (2)	[redacted] Interview 1 @#3 37:30 - 37:42
Tue 08/19/2003 - Tue 04/26/2005	[redacted] advised that he is not aware of any Federal Bureau of Investigation agent using the interrogation technique "pride and ego down," which is letter "I" in the Department of Defense's A through X memo with either [redacted] or [redacted]	[redacted] Interview 1 @#3 38:30 - 39:35
Tue 08/19/2003 - Tue 04/26/2005	[redacted] advised that everything he knows about concerning the interrogation techniques employed by the military with [redacted] he believes were approved by Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz. [redacted] was told this by [redacted] and [redacted]	[redacted] Interview 1 @#3 47:50 - 48:42
Tue 08/19/2003 - Tue 04/26/2005	[redacted] was told by General Jay W. Hood and General John T. Furlow that a helicopter was never used in conjunction with the movement of [redacted] and the implementation of the special-interrogation plan for him. [redacted] told [redacted] that they didn't use a helicopter because General Geoffrey D. Miller decided that it was too difficult logistically to pull off, and that too many people on the base would have to know about it to get this done.	[redacted] Interview 1 @#3 59:30 - 1:00:35
Tue 08/19/2003 - Tue 04/26/2005	[redacted] did not think the Federal Bureau of Investigation impersonation issue was as big as [redacted] and [redacted] were making it out to be. Military Liaison and Detainee Unit told [redacted] that they were concerned that if the military tortured [redacted] and they were impersonating the Federal Bureau of Investigation, then if and when [redacted] was released he could say that the Federal Bureau of Investigation tortured him. [redacted] thought that this scenario was preposterous. [redacted] thought that [redacted] should go see General Geoffrey D. Miller about it immediately and [redacted] said, "no" that he would just go see [redacted] this because this a coordination issue. [redacted] did not think this was a General Geoffrey D. Miller level issue.	[redacted] Interview 1 @#3 1:00:45 - 1:03:10
Tue 08/19/2003	[redacted] did speak to [redacted] about the Federal Bureau of	

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<p>- Tue 04/26/2005</p>	<p>Investigation impersonation issue and they agreed that if this technique was to be used by the military again it would have to go through [redacted] and possibly higher level officials at the Federal Bureau of Investigation, maybe Office of the General Counsel - FBI would have to be involved.</p>	<p>[redacted] Interview 1 @#3 1:03:10 - 1:05:20</p>
<p>Tue 08/19/2003 - Tue 04/26/2005</p>	<p>[redacted] advised that he thought the [redacted] EC dated 11/26/03 was, "unprofessional, largely unsupported" and thought the Federal Bureau of Investigation shouldn't put their name on it until they could determine they were 100% sure that they knew what they were talking about.</p>	<p>[redacted] Interview 1 @#3 1:17:00 - 1:17:25</p>
<p>Tue 08/19/2003 - Tue 04/26/2005</p>	<p>[redacted] advised that if he receives an allegation of detainee mistreatment, his understanding is that he should report the allegation up his chain of command either via e-mail or a phone call or both. [redacted] advised that [redacted] would also most likely report the allegation to his boss Valerie E. Caproni.</p>	<p>[redacted] Interview 1 @#4 19:30 - 20:33</p>
<p>Tue 08/19/2003 - Tue 04/26/2005</p>	<p>[redacted] advised that in the case of an allegation of detainee mistreatment by an Federal Bureau of Investigation agent, he really doesn't know what he is "supposed" to do, but [redacted] and [redacted] would most likely report it to Office of the General Counsel - FBI and then executive management in Counter Terrorism Division - FBI. It would be up to Counter Terrorism Division - FBI to forward it to Office of Professional Responsibility-FBI. That doesn't change the fact that [redacted] like any other Federal Bureau of Investigation agent can contact Office of Professional Responsibility-FBI at any time.</p>	<p>[redacted] Interview 1 @#4 20:38 - 25:00</p>
<p>Tue 08/19/2003 - Tue 04/26/2005</p>	<p>[redacted] felt that allegations made by [redacted] against two Federal Bureau of Investigation agents was bungled from the beginning by Military Liaison and Detainee Unit, and was handled in a very nonchalant manner and that Federal Bureau of Investigation executive management did not have appreciation of the significance of it either. [redacted] said that it was "patently obvious" to both he and [redacted] that [redacted] allegations were different. [redacted] was an intelligent detainee making detailed allegations, giving full names, places, basically the type of allegations that they have never seen before. It was obvious to both [redacted] and [redacted] how these allegations should have been handled; [redacted] carefully and take the proper steps necessary to resolve such allegations. [redacted]</p>	<p>[redacted] Interview 1 @#4 20:45 - 23:20</p>

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	[redacted] cannot believe that post Abu Ghraib Prison the Federal Bureau of Investigation is still going to say that detainee allegations are not credible.		
Tue 08/19/2003 - Tue 04/26/2005	[redacted] advised while on a conference call with T.J. Harrington he learned that T.J. Harrington had not yet, as of the 2nd week of March 2005, seen the Office of the Inspector General's letter requesting documents pertaining to allegations made against agents working under his command in Iraq, Afghanistan, and U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. [redacted] says that this is an indication of the lack of communication within the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the lack of effective information gathering necessary for making effective decisions. Also, it shows the lack of appreciation of the issues that [redacted] and [redacted] have been dealing with for the last year or so at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. [redacted] says about Headquarters (FBI) that, "they do not get it." [redacted] says that the Federal Bureau of Investigation can't even effectively handle allegations made against their own employees, let alone rework the Federal Bureau of Investigation's ability to conduct interrogations in a strategic environment.	[redacted] Interview 1 @#4 32:50 - 38:40	b6 Per FBI b7C
Tue 08/19/2003 - Tue 04/26/2005	[redacted] said that if there was an agent that reported some sort of retaliation while at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba he suspects that it was [redacted] is aware that [redacted] is very ill now, and that she has made allegations against [redacted] and [redacted] about how they handled her illness as well as the staff at the base hospital. [redacted] is also aware that [redacted] had gone to the press with her allegations and even sent a letters to the Director. [redacted] advised that [redacted] had reported incidents of alleged detainee abuse, but he cannot recall the specifics of what she reported. [redacted] said that he never retaliated against anyone for reporting observations or allegations of possible detainee abuse.	[redacted] Interview 1 @#4 1:02:42 - 1:05:20	b6 Per FBI b7C
10/7/2003 - 11/7/2003	[redacted] advised that when he was the Federal Bureau of Investigation OSC in 2002 [redacted] told him that he thought [redacted] should have his beard shaved. [redacted] and [redacted] had met with [redacted] and [redacted] was "disgusted" with [redacted]	[redacted] Interview 1 @#2 57:05 - 1:02:13	b6 Per FBI b7C

	<p>appearance. [redacted] told [redacted] that [redacted] beard was down to his waist and he was getting too much respect on the cell block for this. [redacted] recommended to [redacted] that [redacted] have his beard shaved in order to reduce his influence and the level of respect his was receiving from the other detainees on the cell block. [redacted] thinks that [redacted] had already consulted with the S-2 at the Joint Detainee Operations Group about having [redacted] beard shaved. [redacted] gave his consent to the shaving and [redacted] thinks that later that day [redacted] beard was shaved. When [redacted] met with [redacted] the next day, his beard was gone.</p>		
10/7/2003 - 11/7/2003	<p>[redacted] advised that [redacted] was controlling his cell block by being "the preacher" on the cell block. He was the guy on his cell block that every detainee differed to before they would go to an interrogation. This often happens today in Camp Delta.</p>	[redacted] Interview 1 #2 1:07:23 - 1:07:50	
??/??/2004	<p>Sometime after the Federal Bureau of Investigation's survey of agents [redacted] recalls that there was an allegation of depriving a detainee of food or water possibly for a period of 24 hrs. He thinks this allegation was contained in an e-mail by [redacted] or [redacted]. [redacted] is not sure of the specifics of the conditions involved.</p>	[redacted] Interview 1 @1:29:38 - 1:31:02	
Fri 05/07/2004	<p>[redacted] was interviewed by [redacted] on this date.</p>	[redacted] Interview 1 @16:40 - 16:57	
??/??/2005	<p>About the same time that General Randall "Mark" Schmidt came down to U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba [redacted] and [redacted] learned of some interrogation tactics that were used on [redacted] that neither of them knew had ever been implemented with [redacted]. They learned of this pursuant to the government considering charging [redacted] in the military commissions, and prior to that they wanted to make sure that everyone knew what happened with [redacted]. After [redacted] meeting with General Randall "Mark" Schmidt he had a very pointed conversation with General Jay W. Hood about the Joint Task Force - Guantanamo's</p>	[redacted] Interview 1 @31:36 - 35:05	

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	<p>relationship with the Federal Bureau of Investigation due to what he just learned. [redacted] was concerned that the military was hiding things from the Federal Bureau of Investigation. However, General Jay W. Hood assuaged [redacted] concerns about the military's conduct with detainees and how much the Federal Bureau of Investigation would know about that.</p>		
Tue 04/26/2005	<p>[redacted] advised that the May 19, 2004 EC from Valerie E. Caproni was sufficient operational guidance for him to conduct his mission at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. He feels it provides him with the proper "umbrella" under which he can make day to day operational decisions and have those decisions be more black or white than they would have been prior to that memo.</p>	<p>[redacted] Interview 1 @1:02:07 - 1:03:27</p>	b6 Per FBI b7C
Tue 04/26/2005	<p>[redacted] is aware that "short shackling" was an approved technique within the Joint Task Force - Guantanamo, but he does not know for what period of time this was authorized. It was never brought to [redacted] attention regarding a specific allegation of abuse or mistreatment. [redacted] thinks that he may have had a conversation with [redacted] regarding the use of this technique. She was concerned about the use of this technique and others and [redacted] told her that it was an approved Joint Task Force - Guantanamo technique. [redacted] remembered that [redacted] was taken aback by this a little bit.</p>	<p>[redacted] Interview 1 @#2 - 28:53 - 30:30</p>	b6 Per FBI b7C
Tue 04/26/2005	<p>[redacted] believes that the May 19, 2004 guidance memo gives leaders in the field the framework within which to make decisions, but there are obviously some areas and issues that could use more clarifications on do's and don'ts.</p>	<p>[redacted] Interview 1 @#2 33:25 - 34:21</p>	
Tue 04/26/2005	<p>[redacted] said that the Federal Bureau of Investigation benefiting from the use of certain aggressive interrogation techniques could be problematic, but in some cases maybe not. [redacted] said that it would all depend on what technique was employed on the detainee. He thinks that the Federal Bureau of Investigation should be careful to just generally say that if we benefit from techniques that other agencies can use that we cannot, that's bad. It may be, but it should be taken on a case by case basis.</p>	<p>[redacted] Interview 1 @#2 38:15 - 39:52</p>	b6 Per FBI b7C
Tue 04/26/2005	<p>[redacted] advised that he could see how one could interpret shaving a detainee's beard as religious harassment.</p>	<p>[redacted] Interview 1</p>	

[Redacted] @#2 1:23:35 - 1:24:15

Filter: Linked To Source(s): [redacted] CaseMap Facts Report
Interview 1" or Linked To Source(s): [redacted] Interview Notes
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Date & Time	Fact Text	Source(s)
??/??/1988 - ??/??/1991	[redacted] worked on an international counter-terrorism squad out of the Bureau's Chicago FO.	[redacted] Interview 1 @02:45-
Mon 04/04/1988	[redacted] entered on duty with the Federal Bureau of Investigation on this date.	[redacted] Interview 1 @01:20
??/??/2002	[redacted] advised that in the spring of 2002 representatives of the National Center for the Analysis of Violent Crime visited U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba for a week to determine what contributions if any the National Center for the Analysis of Violent Crime could contribute to the Federal Bureau of Investigation's mission there. The team included [redacted] and [redacted]. This team's assessment was basically that the National Center for the Analysis of Violent Crime could provide assistance to agents at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba much the same way that the Center provides assistance to local police departments around the country, via telephone.	[redacted] Interview 1 @:15 - 5:15
??/??/2002	[redacted] said that he expected that something might happen or the Federal Bureau of Investigation might take some action based upon the EC that [redacted] drafted and sent out. [redacted] thought that the Bureau might take a look at the situation and say this isn't the right thing to do because the situation with [redacted] was on going.	[redacted] Interview 1 @1:31:52 - 1:32:28
??/??/2002 - ??/??/2003	[redacted] felt that first all his SAC Stephen R. Wiley had responsibility for addressing and correcting the issues and recommendations contained in [redacted] EC. Also, [redacted] felt that Federal Bureau of Investigation HQ bore the major responsibility for the success of the mission at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay,	[redacted] Interview 1 @1:34:25 - 1:36:45

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	Cuba. [redacted] pointed out that the EC was addressed to Federal Bureau of Investigation HQ personnel all the way up to the Asst. Director. The EC was addressed to Larry A. Mefford, John S. Pistole, [redacted] who in his view were directly responsible for the management of the Federal Bureau of Investigation's mission at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.		
07/??/2002 - 08/??/2002	An all hands mtg of all National Center for the Analysis of Violent Crime employees was held at which the SAC Mike Viernicki told everyone, "I'm not asking you I'm telling you. You're all going to do a rotation down there. (U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba)" The SAC then quickly walked out of the mtg.	[redacted]	b6 Per FBI b7C
07/??/2002 - 08/??/2002	[redacted] advised that prior to deploying to U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba he received no training or guidance on how to treat the detainees, or what he was to do if he witnessed any abuse or mistreatment of detainees.	[redacted]	
08/??/2002 - 09/??/2002	[redacted] advised that he and [redacted] were the second team of Behavioral Analysis Unit agents to deploy to U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. The first team was [redacted] and another female Behavioral Analysis Unit agent whose name [redacted] cannot recall.	[redacted]	b6 Per FBI b7C
09/??/2002	When [redacted] arrived at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba [redacted] was the Federal Bureau of Investigation's OSC at the time. About two weeks later [redacted] rotated out and [redacted] became the OSC.	[redacted]	
09/??/2002	[redacted] recalled that the law enforcement contingent at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba worked very well together, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, OSI, Naval Criminal Investigative Service, and CID. There was a regular orientation session held for all law enforcement agents arriving at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. At this training agents were told that because we are law enforcement we are going to treat the detainees in the same fashion as we would any suspect. No matter what the military does, we are going to treat the detainees this way. They made the point that we were all sworn law enforcement officers so, "we're going to play this way."	[redacted]	b6 Per FBI b7C
09/??/2002	[redacted] advised that very soon after he arrived, he and [redacted] were drafted into assisting the military with interrogating [redacted] As [redacted] understood it [redacted] was one of the Federal Bureau of Investigation's detainees, but the agents who were working on [redacted]	[redacted]	

Interview 1 @ 5:15 - 6:13

Interview 1 @ 10:50 - 11:25

Interview 1 @ 6:21 - 7:00

Interview 1 @ 11:25 - 12:35

Interview 1 @ 12:40 - 14:53

Interview 1 @ 18:40 - 20:21

	<p>had left the island. During this time the military decided that they wanted him. believes that the two Federal Bureau of Investigation agents working on were and</p> <p>When arrived at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba neither nor were on the island.</p>	
09/17/2002	<p>learned from that the military had taken control of explained to that the general told that we're taking and we've already cleared up through the Secretary of Defense. hold that the Bureau "rolled over" on the issue and Department of Defense got its way.</p>	Interview 1 @20:30 - 21:00
09/17/2002	<p>When arrived at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba was being kept in a cell in the Navy Brig. did not know for sure how long was held in the cell, but he knew that he had been in there while the previous rotation of Behavioral Analysis Unit Agents were at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.</p>	Interview 1 @20:52 - 21:30
09/17/2002	<p>advised that told and to go ahead and "do what you do" with the military regarding initially met with (b)(3) NO ONE EXECUTIVE who was running the entire operation and</p>	Interview 1 @22:05 - 23:15
09/17/2002	<p>advised that there was also a military Psychiatrist and Psychologist that were assigned to case. While was there one of these individuals rotated off the island and another one rotated in.</p>	Interview 1 @23:13 - 24:45
09/17/2002	<p>advised that at the first meeting with the military said that the military was going to make talk. He said right in front of and that the Bureau has been handling with "kid gloves" and we're going to take off the kid gloves and he is going to give us the information.</p>	Interview 1 @24:35 - 25:30
Sun 09/15/2002	<p>advised that by the time he arrived at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba the law enforcement agents were no longer conducting interviews with their military counterparts. The Tiger Team concept had already been abandoned. In fact the law</p>	Interview 1 @16:00 - 17:15

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	enforcement agents, and the military intelligence interrogators would alternate working the morning and evening shifts in order to minimize interaction with each other.	
<p>Sun 09/15/2002 - Wed 10/30/2002</p>	<p>[redacted] said that he never really understood the military's interest in [redacted] saw [redacted] as purely an Federal Bureau of Investigation detainee because the Federal Bureau of Investigation were the ones working the 9/11 case. As [redacted] sees it Federal Bureau of Investigation HQ let the military take [redacted] from the Bureau. [redacted] told [redacted] that the general wanted [redacted] and Federal Bureau of Investigation HQ told [redacted] that [redacted] is theirs. [redacted] told [redacted] to cooperate with the military so the Bureau could keep a hand in it. [redacted] had no doubt that [redacted] spoke to someone at Federal Bureau of Investigation HQ because he wouldn't have made that type of decision on his own and he didn't want to give him up anyway.</p>	<p>Interview 1 @ 27:35 - 28:50</p>
<p>Sun 09/15/2002 - Wed 10/30/2002</p>	<p>[redacted] advised that he and [redacted] managed to convince one of [redacted] early military interrogators to take a softer approach with [redacted] at first, which didn't work. After that the military put an interrogator in [redacted] cell and yelled and screamed at him for a while. Then military personnel entered [redacted] cell, put a hood over his head, dragged him out of the cell, put him in a jeep and drove him around the base and deposited him at [redacted] which was closed at the time. They placed him in one of the plywood booths at [redacted] which had been used as interrogation rooms when the camp was operational.</p>	<p>Interview 1 @ 30:23 - 31:30</p>
<p>Sun 09/15/2002 - Wed 10/30/2002</p>	<p>[redacted] advised that he and [redacted] observed the initial interrogation on [redacted] at the Navy Brig via the closed circuit television that had been set up in [redacted] cell. [redacted] and [redacted] were observing this along with [redacted] who at the time was "getting all excited." [redacted] advised that [redacted] was very inappropriate to say the least. It was obvious to anyone that he did not have a lot of control over his emotions, and should not be in a supervisory position because he couldn't handle it. [redacted] said that [redacted] said that [redacted] was "a nut." [redacted] believes</p>	<p>Interview 1 @ 31:33 - 33:10</p>

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	<p>that [redacted] had no business being in charge of any job dealing with people. Yet [redacted] was the Defense Humint Services's lead guy and had the equivalent of command rank.</p>	
<p>Sun 09/15/2002 - Wed 10/30/2002</p>	<p>[redacted] and [redacted] convinced the military to take [redacted] to [redacted] prior to embarking on their more aggressive interrogation plan. [redacted] advised that they procured the [redacted] interrogation trailer that was very nice, and had one of the more reasonable interrogators from Defense Humint Services, a guy named [redacted] LNFJ, (probably [redacted] who was a military reservist who also worked for the U.S. Dept. of Transportation Office of the Inspector General. [redacted] had [redacted] wanted [redacted] to sit down with [redacted] and give him some food from McDonald's and try to reason with him. The military agreed to do this but [redacted] refused to cooperate. After he finished eating [redacted] said that he was not going to talk.</p>	<p>Interview 1 @ 23:30 - 25:05</p>
<p>Sun 09/15/2002 - Wed 10/30/2002</p>	<p>[redacted] and [redacted] observed the transportation of [redacted] from Navy Brig to [redacted] and from [redacted]. [redacted] said the only reason he and [redacted] were there was because the Bureau insisted that they continue to observe. The OSC at the time, who [redacted] thinks was [redacted] told told [redacted] and [redacted] that he had spoken with someone at Federal Bureau of Investigation HQ who had advised that they should continue to observe the military's interrogation of [redacted] and [redacted] told the OSC that if and when the interrogation goes to certain point where extreme measures are being used against [redacted] then they would leave the situation.</p>	<p>Interview 1 @ 25:10 - 26:15</p>
<p>Sun 09/15/2002 - Wed 10/30/2002</p>	<p>[redacted] said that he and [redacted] made the military install a monitor in the interrogation booth at [redacted] so that they could observe the interrogation of [redacted] from another room.</p>	<p>Interview 1 @ 26:42 - 26:52</p>
<p>Sun 09/15/2002 - Wed 10/30/2002</p>	<p>[redacted] advised that after the military interrogators yelled and screamed at [redacted] for a while at [redacted] they brought in a dog to bark and growl at him. [redacted] was not aware of any particular fear that [redacted] had of dogs, instead he was told by the military officials</p>	<p>Interview 1 @ 26:55 - 27:27</p>

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<p>Sun 09/15/2002 - Wed 10/30/2002</p>	<p>that all Arabs feared dogs because they considered them unclean. [redacted] advised that a dog handler first agitated military working dog outside the interrogation room, then brought the dog to the doorway so [redacted] could see him, and then the dog was brought into the room with [redacted] and barked, growled and snarled at him. However, the dog did not make contact with [redacted].</p>	<p>[redacted] Interview 1 @38:45 - 39:20</p>
<p>Sun 09/15/2002 - Wed 10/30/2002</p>	<p>[redacted] advised that [redacted] had virtually no reaction to the military working dog that was brought into the interrogation room. Even though the dog was barking and growling very close to [redacted] he didn't flinch. [redacted] said that [redacted] reaction or non-reaction did not surprise him because he is what [redacted] describes as a "true believer." [redacted] surmised that [redacted] saw the dogs presence as just part of the game he was going to have to play with the military interrogators.</p>	<p>[redacted] Interview 1 @39:12 - 39:20 & 40:09 - 40:20</p>
<p>Sun 09/15/2002 - Wed 10/30/2002</p>	<p>[redacted] described an incident with [redacted] and a Koran that was brought to the interrogation room for [redacted]. During questioning one of the military interrogators, a [redacted] first name possibly [redacted] got up on the interrogation table in front of [redacted] in order to get closer to him to yell at him. While this [redacted] was on the table he was also squatting over the Koran that had been previously placed on the table. When [redacted] saw this he lunged for the Koran but the guards thought he was lunging for the [redacted] and they quickly threw him to the ground and restrained him. [redacted] asked the [redacted] if he thought [redacted] was reaching for him or the Koran, and the [redacted] admitted that [redacted] was reaching for the book not him. It wasn't clear to [redacted] whether it was the [redacted] intention to squat over the Koran or not.</p>	<p>[redacted] Interview 1 @39:25 - 41:45</p>
<p>Sun 09/15/2002 - Wed 10/30/2002</p>	<p>[redacted] advised that he and [redacted] advised Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) [redacted] about the military's interrogation tactics with [redacted] then made [redacted] and [redacted] inform the Criminal Investigative Task Force commander, who was a Resident Agent in Charge for Naval Criminal Investigative Service. [redacted] said that [redacted].</p>	<p>[redacted] Interview 1 @43:30 - 45:42</p>

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	<p>there were military JAG guys who shared the office space with the Criminal Investigation Task Force commander and so they too were informed of these actions as well. [redacted] said that in fact it was one of the JAG attorneys who "really raised hell with the Pentagon about the tactics the military was using with [redacted] [redacted] could not recall this JAG attorney's name, but he remembered that he was an Assistant United States Attorney back in civilian life.</p>	
<p>Sun 09/15/2002 - Wed 10/30/2002</p>	<p>[redacted] advised that one day he and [redacted] were observing an interview during the late afternoon or evening hours at [redacted]. This was a little unusual at the time because by then the Federal Bureau of Investigation was working the morning and early afternoon shifts conducting interviews while the military was working the late afternoon and evening shifts. The interview that [redacted] and [redacted] were observing went a little long and they went into the time when the military would be conducting interviews. At some point [redacted] came into their observation booth and said to them, "hey come here I want to show you something." [redacted] left with [redacted] and went down the hall into another observation booth that was filled with military people and [redacted] says, "what do you think?" [redacted] looked into the interrogation room and observed a detainee who had his head wrapped with two bands of duct tape. [redacted] said that the tape went over the detainee's eyes and over the detainee's mouth, and that the detainee had a full head of hair and a full beard.</p>	<p>Interview 1 @ 50:05 - 50:05</p>
<p>Sun 09/15/2002 - Wed 10/30/2002</p>	<p>When [redacted] showed [redacted] the detainee whose head was wrapped in duct tape, [redacted] asked, "What did he do, spit on someone?" [redacted] said, "No, he wouldn't stop chanting the Koran." [redacted] left the observation booth soon thereafter. Prior to departing the observation booth, [redacted] could see that the detainee's hand were handcuffed in front and to the "I" slot in the floor so that he could not get up. The only voice he could hear was that of one of the interrogators yelling and screaming at him. [redacted] advised that there were two interrogators and two military guards in the room with the detainee at the time.</p>	<p>Interview 1 @ 50:06 - 51:20</p>
<p>Sun 09/15/2002 - Wed 10/30/2002</p>	<p>[redacted] is sure that the reason [redacted] gave for duct taping the detainee was because he would not stop chanting the Koran. [redacted] did not recall [redacted] saying that the detainee was duct taped because the detainee was inciting other</p>	<p>Interview 1 @ 51:35 - 53:30</p>

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	<p>detainees. Also, [redacted] said that there was only one other interrogation going on in that trailer at the time.</p>		
<p>Sun 09/15/2002 - Wed 10/30/2002</p>	<p>After observing the detainee whose head was wrapped in duct tape [redacted] returned to his original observation booth and informed [redacted] of what he had just seen. Soon thereafter [redacted] advised [redacted] of the duct taping incident and also informed the Criminal Investigative Task Force Commander and the JAG attorney.</p>	<p>[redacted] Interview 1 @53:54 - 54:10</p>	<p>b6 Per FBI b7C</p>
<p>Sun 09/15/2002 - Wed 10/30/2002</p>	<p>[redacted] did not know who the detainee was who had his head wrapped in duct tape, and he didn't want to know. [redacted] believed that the Federal Bureau of Investigation put their agents in a difficult situation when they sent them to U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. He was in a situation to observe potential criminal conduct, but felt discouraged from complaining about military conduct or reporting questionable military conduct because it might make the Bureau look bad.</p>	<p>[redacted] Interview 1 @55:20 - 56:50</p>	
<p>Sun 09/15/2002 - Wed 10/30/2002</p>	<p>[redacted] advised that Michael E. Dunleavy was in charge of U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba while he was there. [redacted] avoided contact with Michael E. Dunleavy because after meeting him on several occasions, he felt like he couldn't trust him.</p>	<p>[redacted] Interview 1 @57:09 - 57:45</p>	<p>b6 Per FBI b7C</p>
<p>Sun 09/15/2002 - Wed 10/30/2002</p>	<p>[redacted] said that it would have been very difficult for a detainee in an interrogation trailer to "incite" other detainees to do anything. But he was not surprised to hear that this was the explanation given by [redacted] as to why the detainee had duct tape wrapped around his head.</p>	<p>[redacted] Interview 1 @57:59 - 58:18</p>	
<p>Sun 09/15/2002 - Wed 10/30/2002</p>	<p>[redacted] explained his answer to question 18a. of the Office of the Inspector General questionnaire as follows: After the incidents that [redacted] and [redacted] observed with the military's interrogation of [redacted] [redacted] consulted with Federal Bureau of Investigation HQ and then told [redacted] and [redacted] that we have to treat the detainees like we would treat any other prisoner in our custody. He reminded them that they are not in the military and that they should do things the way the Federal Bureau of Investigation normally does things. [redacted] also said that if they observed anything unusual that they should report it to him and the Criminal Investigative Task Force commander and the JAG attorneys. [redacted] also gave this same instruction to the rest of the Federal Bureau of</p>	<p>[redacted] Interview 1 @58:22 -v 59:42</p>	<p>b6 Per FBI b7C</p>

<p>Sun 09/15/2002 - Wed 10/30/2002</p>	<p>Investigation personnel at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba at the time.</p> <p>[redacted] advised that prior to the military's interrogation of [redacted] [redacted] told [redacted] that the interrogation tactics they planned to employ with [redacted] were approved by the highest levels of the Department of Defense. [redacted] never showed [redacted] any written authorization and [redacted] never asked to see anything in writing and doubted that [redacted] would ever show such a document to [redacted]. [redacted] pushed the issue with [redacted] a little because he felt that [redacted] was a "cocky" and that he might be taking actions that were not authorized.</p>	<p>[redacted]</p> <p>Interview 1 @ 09:43 - 1:01:16</p>
<p>Sun 09/15/2002 - Wed 10/30/2002</p>	<p>[redacted] said that he observed [redacted] being subjected to sleep interruption while he was detained in the Navy Brig. [redacted] also partially observed [redacted] being subjected to sleep deprivation while being interrogated at [redacted]. [redacted] also was told by military interrogators that their plan was to keep [redacted] up for 48 hours while they interrogated him at [redacted]. [redacted] obviously did not observe all of this activity, but suspects that this did in fact happen. [redacted] recalled that the military's plan included regularly monitoring [redacted] physical condition during this 48 hour period.</p>	<p>[redacted]</p> <p>Interview 1 @ 1:01:20 - 1:05:03</p>
<p>Sun 09/15/2002 - Wed 10/30/2002</p>	<p>[redacted] advised that when the military working dog was brought into the room with [redacted] did in fact react to the dog and attempt to move away from the dog. [redacted] was chained in place at the time, but attempted to get as far from the dog as possible. It appeared to [redacted] at the time that [redacted] was very afraid of the dog at the time. [redacted] clarified his earlier comments regarding the use of the dog by saying that [redacted] was acting cool and calm when the dog was outside the room barking and growling loudly. However, when the dog was brought into the room [redacted] had a very natural reaction, which was to move away from the dog. [redacted] considered this action to be a threat to cause physical harm to [redacted] described [redacted] as "scared to death" of the dog when it was brought into the room.</p>	<p>[redacted]</p> <p>Interview 1 @ 1:05:00 - 1:06:40</p>
<p>Sun 09/15/2002</p>	<p>[redacted] described another incident that he observed where a [redacted]</p>	<p>[redacted]</p>

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<p>- Wed 10/30/2002</p>	<p>Sergeant had a detainee short shackled in sort of a catcher's position. [redacted] observed this action while he was observing another interview while in an observation booth at [redacted]. The interview [redacted] was observing was in one interrogation room while the short shackling was taking place in the other interrogation room. [redacted] said that it appeared that the detainees would not answer questions so this Sergeant locked out his chair and short shackled him while yelling at him the entire time. This went on for an hour or so while [redacted] was there, and was still going on when [redacted] left the observation booth [redacted] did not know who the detainee was, but he recognized the Sergeant as someone he and [redacted] earlier identified as a "screamer." He seemed to be the kind of guy that you sometimes had [redacted] want to happen with him, and you are going to have testify in court about it. [redacted] does not recall whether he informed the OSC of this incident but he does recall telling the investigators from SOCOM when they interviewed him [redacted] believed that this Sergeant was a [redacted] (b)(7)(C) (b)(7)(D)</p>	<p>Interview 1 @ 1:08:42 - 01:12:55</p>
<p>Sun 09/15/2002 - Wed 10/30/2002</p>	<p>[redacted] advised that the military had [redacted] shackled for the approximately 48 hours that they were interviewing him at Camp X-Ray.</p>	<p>Interview 1 @ 1:06:42</p>
<p>Sun 09/15/2002 - Wed 10/30/2002</p>	<p>[redacted] recalled that the military exposed [redacted] to loud music at the navy brig, and possibly at [redacted] as well.</p>	<p>Interview 1 @ 1:13:59</p>
<p>Sun 09/15/2002 - Wed 10/30/2002</p>	<p>[redacted] and [redacted] offered to write-up 302's about what they observed with [redacted] but they were told not to. [redacted] & [redacted] asked [redacted] if they should write-up 302's about what they were observing and [redacted] called HQ and the answer came back no. [redacted] even asked about doing 302's during his briefing with the SAC & ASAC when he returned & they told him not to do any 302's.</p>	<p>Interview 1 @ 1:14:45 + 1:15:57</p>
<p>Sun 09/15/2002 - Wed 10/30/2002</p>	<p>[redacted] said that the military used probe lights during their interrogation of [redacted]. He is not sure exactly where it was used but he believed it was done in [redacted] (b)(7)(C)</p>	<p>Interview 1 @ 1:17:38 + 1:18:15</p>
<p>Sun 09/15/2002 - Wed</p>	<p>[redacted] advised that when he asked the [redacted] who had squatted over the [redacted] Room in front of [redacted] was [redacted]</p>	<p>Interview 1 @ 1:16:45</p>

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<p>10/30/2002</p>	<p>trying to grab him or the Koran, the [redacted] said it was the Koran. The [redacted] went on to say that at first he thought [redacted] was trying to grab him, but then when [redacted] got his hands on the Koran [redacted] figured out what he was really going for.</p>	<p>- 1:17:41</p>
<p>Sun 09/15/2002 - Wed 10/30/2002</p>	<p>[redacted] thought it was odd that the military has never spoken to the translators who were present during [redacted] interrogation to corroborate what happened to him.</p>	<p>Interview 1 @ 1:18:40 - 1:20:05</p>
<p>Sun 09/15/2002 - Wed 10/30/2002</p>	<p>[redacted] felt that the military's treatment of [redacted] was unprofessional. [redacted] measuring stick for un-professionalism is the hypothetical situation of, if the activity was videotaped and it was being played in front of a court of law would you be happy with what you saw? [redacted] thinks that if a law enforcement officer did to anyone in the U.S. what was done to [redacted] they could be arrested for it.</p>	<p>Interview 1 @ 1:20:35 - 1:22:45</p>
<p>Sun 09/15/2002 - Wed 10/30/2002</p>	<p>[redacted] said that when [redacted] came to U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba to visit he and [redacted] told [redacted] about what was going on with the military's treatment of [redacted] and that the Bureau said it was okay for the military to take over control of [redacted] and we're going to let them do it. [redacted] had brought an agent [redacted] from the 9/11 squad who wanted to interview [redacted] but of course this never happened.</p>	<p>Interview 1 @ 1:23:45 - 1:25:40</p>
<p>Sun 09/15/2002 - Wed 10/30/2002</p>	<p>[redacted] advised that while he was at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba [redacted] was in his chain of command, but he did not see his SAC, Stephen R. Wiley still in his chain of command while deployed there. [redacted] explained that as Behavioral Analysis Unit agents they were sort of "attached" to the unit deployed to U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.</p>	<p>Interview 1 @ 1:26:17 - 1:27:35</p>
<p>Sun 09/15/2002 - Wed 10/30/2002</p>	<p>[redacted] advised that approximately 5 or 6 times while observing detainee interviews by Federal Bureau of Investigation agents the detainees told the agents when they walked into the room that they had just spoken to the Federal Bureau of Investigation the night before. Of course no one from the Federal Bureau of Investigation had interviewed them the night before, so it was obvious to [redacted] that someone had interviewed these detainees who claimed to be the Federal Bureau of Investigation.</p>	<p>Interview 1 @ 1:30:34 - 1:31:55</p>

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	<p>[redacted] suspected that whoever impersonated the Federal Bureau of Investigation in these circumstances was either the [redacted] or someone from the military.</p>	
11/??/2002	<p>When [redacted] returned from U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba he and [redacted] were debriefed by his then SAC Stephen R. Wiley, and their new ASAC Frankie Battle. [redacted] had typed up a page of concerns that he and [redacted] had concerning the Behavioral Analysis Unit's mission at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. The concerns centered around the facts that the Behavioral Analysis Unit really didn't have a mission and they were being put in a dangerous position, etc. During this meeting Frankie Battle attempted to interject by saying something to the effect of, "so what you guys are saying is that this getting to be a bad situation?" And before Frankie Battle could finish his thought, Stephen R. Wiley cut him off and said, "No we're going to support the mission."</p>	<p>[redacted] Interview 1 @ 1:28:25 - 1:30:25</p>
11/??/2002	<p>[redacted] eventually drafted an EC based upon [redacted] experience at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. He gave a draft to Stephen R. Wiley for his approval and before Stephen R. Wiley signed off on it he called [redacted] in for a meeting. At that meeting [redacted] told [redacted] Stephen R. Wiley went through the EC point by point and tried to get [redacted] to change things. [redacted] refused to substantively alter the EC so it went out exactly how [redacted] and [redacted] had agreed it should.</p>	<p>[redacted] Interview 1 @ 1:29:55 - 1:31:49</p>
Fri 11/22/2002	<p>Regarding his e-mail dated 11/22/02 to [redacted] Critical Incident Response Group Chief/Division Counsel, regarding Federal Bureau of Investigation agents participating or witnessing "extraordinary" interrogation techniques, and [redacted] response, [redacted] advised that he ran into [redacted] one day in the hallway and brought up this issue with him. [redacted] wanted to know if there was any written authority which allowed the military to engage in these activities. (018029CBT). After receiving a response from [redacted] again e-mailed [redacted] confirming that there was no written authority for Federal Bureau of Investigation agents to participate or witness these techniques. (004259CBT) [redacted] response was that his concern was with participation not observation. [redacted] advised that he was still concerned with observation of these techniques and would have liked some clear guidance.</p>	<p>[redacted] Interview 1 @ 1:37:55 - 1:42:32; -1:46:55 - 1:47:15</p>

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from HQ on this issue.

CaseMap Facts Report

Filter: Linked To Source(s): [redacted] Interview 1" or Linked To Source(s): [redacted] Interview Notes
08/02/05" - 33 of 7911 (0.4%) Filtered

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Case: FBI in Military Zones
Created: 2/24/2009 12:10:51 PM

Date & Time	Fact Text	Source(s)
10/??/2002	[redacted] advised that when he first arrived at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba during his administrative orientation with the Federal Bureau of Investigation, he was told that there were "War Crimes" case files in the Federal Bureau of Investigation office. At the time that if we ever "had anything" that was potentially a war crime offense, then we were to send a copy of the appropriate 302 to that file. This subject came up later when Agents brought up the issue that detainees were telling them of abuse they suffered while in Afghanistan and they (the Agents) wanted to know what they should do with the information. The issues were; what constitutes a war crime, and what do you want the Agents to put in the war crimes file? [redacted] believes this discussion took place while [redacted] was the Federal Bureau of Investigation OSC at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.	[redacted] interview Notes 08/02/05 @ 32:20 - 34:20
10/??/2002 - 11/??/2002	Special Agent [redacted] BOD with the Federal Bureau of Investigation on 09/28/1997. Background info here...	[redacted] interview Notes 08/02/05 @ 1; [redacted] interview 1 @ 00:34:00
10/??/2002 - 11/??/2002	Special Agent [redacted] said he volunteered to go to U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba after Houston was told by Federal Bureau of Investigation HQ that the office needed to provide a number of SA's to be assigned to U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. [redacted] said he was also working on a matter at the time that related to some of the detainees at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.	[redacted] interview Notes 08/02/05 @ 1; [redacted] interview 1 @ 00:05:40

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10/11/2002 - 11/11/2002	[redacted] said the only criteria for going to U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba was that you had an SCI clearance, and a passport.	[redacted] Interview Notes 08/02/05 @ 1; [redacted] Interview 1 @ 00:07:00	
10/11/2002 - 11/11/2002	Prior to arriving at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, SA [redacted] said he did not receive any formal training about working within a military zone, nor did he receive training on Islam or Arab culture. [redacted] said it was recommended to him by someone at Federal Bureau of Investigation HQ who was coordinating the agents TDY to U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba that he read a book, but he does not recall the title. [redacted] said he recalls reading "Islam for Dummies", which was inside the SCIF at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.	[redacted] Interview Notes 08/02/05 @ 2; [redacted] Interview 1 @ 00:07:43	b6 Per FBI b7C
10/11/2002 - 11/11/2002	[redacted] said he does not remember the name of his first OSC, but that [redacted] was the OSC towards the end of his assignment at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.	[redacted] Interview Notes 08/02/05 @ 2; [redacted] Interview 1 @ 00:09:00	b6 Per FBI b7C
10/11/2002 - 11/11/2002	After arriving at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, [redacted] said he was given a tour of where Camp X-Ray use to be, the SCIF, interview rooms, and the computer system. [redacted] does not recall any specific subjects that were covered during his tour of the base, and there were no discussion on detainee treatments. [redacted] said he did ask the military to tour the inside area where the detainees were being kept so that he could get an understanding of their living conditions before he started interviewing them. [redacted] said he toured the facility with an Army CID agent he was assigned to and a translator. In describing the call block where the detainees were kept, [redacted] said that no one had taken the time to "categorize" the detainees, so there were high and low risk detainees all mixed in together. [redacted] said the living conditions were clean and the cells had metal bunks and arrows on the floor pointing to Mecca. [redacted] said that the detainees were provided with a Koran and beanie-caps. [redacted] also said that the detainees had shower and exercise facilities. [redacted] said that what he saw at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo	[redacted] Interview Notes 08/02/05 @ 2; [redacted] Interview 1 @ 00:10:00	b6 Per FBI b7C

	<p>Bay, Cuba was better than what inmates in [redacted] had when he was a [redacted]. [redacted] said he stopped and talked to some of the inmates, and he did not hear any complaints about their living conditions.</p>		
10/??/2002 - 11/??/2002	<p>[redacted] said there was never anything official; but he was told the military had different rules than the Federal Bureau of Investigation. [redacted] was told that the Federal Bureau of Investigation could not lower the temperature to sub-zero, can not have the detainees stand on a concrete block or leave the detainee in the interview room when the interview was over. [redacted] said the inference was that the military could do all that. [redacted] said he never saw anything any writing or was it ever officially told to [redacted] by the Federal Bureau of Investigation or the military, but he had the impression that the military had more lead way than the Federal Bureau of Investigation.</p>	<p>[redacted] Interview Notes 08/02/05 @ 2; [redacted] Interview 1 @ 00:15:52</p>	b6 Per FBI b7C
10/??/2002 - 11/??/2002	<p>[redacted] said he saw the Federal Bureau of Investigation mission at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba for both as a criminal investigation and intelligence gathering for the military.</p>	<p>[redacted] Interview Notes 08/02/05 @ 6; [redacted] Interview 1 @ 00:17:34</p>	b6 Per FBI b7C
10/??/2002 - 11/??/2002	<p>[redacted] described an incident where he witnessed and then discussed with a Behavioral Analysis Unit agent about a high interest detainee that had been separated and isolated, and was being monitored by a camera set up in his cell, which was being displayed or fed through to a monitor at the Federal Bureau of Investigation administrative office. The Behavioral Analysis Unit agent told [redacted] that the Federal Bureau of Investigation was given special permission to use special psych ops on the detainee, which involved turning the lights on at night time, sleep deprivation and shutting off his water to his cell. [redacted] does not recall the name of the Behavioral Analysis Unit agent, but it was not [redacted] or [redacted] (based on the description provided by [redacted] the Behavioral Analysis Unit agent was most likely [redacted]. [redacted] thinks the detainee might have been isolated at or near the old camp - Camp X-ray. [redacted] explained that there were some detainees that were off limits to the Federal Bureau of Investigation because the military wanted to interview the detainee, and this detainee was under the control of the military, but the military</p>	<p>[redacted] Interview Notes 08/02/05 @ 6-7; [redacted] Interview 1 @ 00:19:07</p>	b6 Per FBI b7C

	<p>allowed the Federal Bureau of Investigation to monitor the detainee. [redacted] saw no problems with doing a psych op on the detainee because the detainee was not being physically abused, and [redacted] was given the impression by the Behavioral Analysis Unit agent that these techniques had been approved. [redacted] did not know if the military was also monitoring the detainee from another location.</p>		
10/??/2002 - 11/??/2002	<p>[redacted] said there was no discussions prior to or when he arrived at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba about what he should do if he saw possible mistreatment of detainees. [redacted] said he assumed he would report any mistreatment of detainees to the SSA. [redacted] also stated that any reports of past abuse needed to be reported and filed as a "war crime". [redacted] said he was not told what constituted a "war crime".</p>	<p>[redacted] Interview Notes 08/02/05 @ 2; [redacted] Interview 1 @ 00:32:15</p>	b6 Per FBI b7c
10/??/2002 - 11/??/2002	<p>[redacted] said that there were weekly meetings at the Federal Bureau of Investigation admin office where all the Federal Bureau of Investigation agents met, and then there were weekly meetings in the SCIE where all the agencies attended: CID, OSI, Federal Bureau of Investigation and all the other criminal investigative agencies. [redacted] said that during these weekly meetings with the other agencies he would hear occasionally from these other agents about techniques about altering the temperature and leaving detainees alone in the interview room for a long period of time, standing or sitting on concrete blocks. [redacted] said it was not clear who were using these techniques, but it was made clear that these techniques should not be used.</p>	<p>[redacted] Interview Notes 08/02/05 @ 7; [redacted] Interview 1 @ 00:35:53</p>	b6 Per FBI b7c
10/??/2002 - 11/??/2002	<p>SA [redacted] said he did sit in on an interview with another Federal Bureau of Investigation agent prior to conducting his first interview of a detainee. [redacted] explained that each Federal Bureau of Investigation agent were assigned certain regions and that they would interview detainees from those home countries. [redacted] said he was to be taking over interviews from another Federal Bureau of Investigation agent who was leaving, and [redacted] sat in with this agent on one of the agent's last interview with a detainee. [redacted] said he did not recall the agent's name, but he remembered that the agent was from the Sacramento FO and that the agent was the security officer for the FO at the time.</p>	<p>[redacted] Interview Notes 08/02/05 @ 8; [redacted] Interview 1 @ 00:40:03</p>	b6 Per FBI b7c

	<p>[redacted] confirmed that he sat in on only 1 interview prior to conducting any interviews himself. [redacted] was first partnered up with a Army CID agent, but he did not recall the name of the agent or if the name would be in his 302s. [redacted] explained that the Army CID agents were assigned to U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba for a much longer time than the Federal Bureau of Investigation agents, and his Army CID partner had been at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba for at least a month or two by the time [redacted] arrived at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba and he stayed beyond [redacted] time at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. After reviewing his 302s, [redacted] stated it appeared that his Army CID partner was [redacted] and [redacted] was the Federal Bureau of Investigation agent from the Sacramento FO he spoke of earlier.</p>	
<p>10/??/2002 - 11/??/2002</p>	<p>In response to the Office of the Inspector General questionnaire, [redacted] said he jointly planned detainee interviews or interrogation strategies, objectives, or tactics with non-FBI personnel. [redacted] explained that after he and Army CID SA [redacted] were done with their sets of interviews for the day, they would pull the files for the next day's detainees [redacted] and [redacted] would read through all the interviews that had been done to see if there were different questions that needed to be asked and create an outline of what they wanted to go over with the detainee. [redacted] and [redacted] would discuss particular problems with detainees, such as: were they cooperative or not; were they directly linked with Al Qaida or were they kids who decided to go up there as freedom fighters. [redacted] described an Iranian detainee, [redacted] (ISN [redacted]) who seemed to have some mental stability issues and had been put in isolation for awhile because of it, but he was more cooperative than other detainees. [redacted] said that he felt that [redacted] should not be at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, because [redacted] seemed to be a regular criminal and had gone to Afghanistan to make money and partly to get away from Iran where he had been charged with murder. In his opinion, SA [redacted] did not think [redacted] was somebody who was an Al Qaida figure. [redacted] also said that [redacted] was cooperative when other detainees were not.</p>	<p>[redacted] Interview Notes 08/02/05 @ 8; [redacted] Interview I @ 00:42:46</p>

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	<p>SA [redacted] also explained that during that time period they had not segregated the detainees, so some of the high ranking Al Qaida folks convince the others not to say anything. SA [redacted] said the detainees he interviewed were from Yemen and Iran, but mostly from Yemen. [redacted] said he did not interview any Saudi detainees, or does he recall interviewing any detainees from any other countries.</p>	
<p>10/??/2002 - 11/??/2002</p>	<p>[redacted] said during their planning of interviews they also discussed methods of getting the detainees to talk. [redacted] said he would talk to the detainees about food to get them to talk. [redacted] said that the agents were allowed to bring the detainees food and water as long as the agent got prior approval through the Federal Bureau of Investigation admin folks. [redacted] said he brought some McDonald's food for [redacted] once, and for another detainee from Yemen who was talking to [redacted] he brought a print out off the internet of a newspaper from his home country to let him know that if he worked with [redacted] they would give him something extra. Other than the incentives, detainees would not typically eat their meals in the interrogation rooms. [redacted] said they would generally bring the detainee water just to have it, even if the detainee did not ask for it, and if the detainee asked for more or something special like coffee or tea and they were being cooperative then they would bring it in for the detainee. [redacted] said that this was typical.</p>	<p>[redacted] Interview Notes 08/02/05 @ 8; [redacted] Interview 1 @ 00:46:10</p>
<p>10/??/2002 - 11/??/2002</p>	<p>[redacted] said Criminal Investigative Task Force had a list of detainees that the Federal Bureau of Investigation would be allowed to interview without any problems and that there was not any other interest, so they could interview the detainees in any way, over any topic, because it would not interfere with something else the military folks was doing. Sometimes detainees would go off this list and would be unavailable completely. [redacted] said that he remembers on a couple occasion he scheduled some detainees and when he showed up for the interview found out that the detainees were no longer available. [redacted] said he did not remember the detainees, but that it might be documented in 302s. [redacted] does not know specifically if the detainees that came "off" the list became back available, but on a couple of occasions they were told that they had other</p>	<p>[redacted] Interview Notes 08/02/05 @ 2 ; [redacted] Interview 1 @ 00:47:54</p>

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	<p>detainees they could interview now that was not on the list before. [redacted] did not consider this as interference with his job, but he did understand that the military was looking for specific intelligence and he could see where the Federal Bureau of Investigation's interviewing and techniques could interfere with what the military was trying to do, because the military had a certain "system" that they were trying to use to get the detainees to talk. [redacted] did not know what the "system" was, but could understand and see where the Federal Bureau of Investigation's interviewing might interfere and disrupt the military's system to get the detainees to talk to them.</p>	
<p>10/??/2002 - 11/??/2002</p>	<p>[redacted] said that the term "Federal Bureau of Investigation hold" was vaguely familiar, but could not tell us what it was. This was not something that [redacted] implemented or had a detainee put on.</p>	<p>[redacted] Interview Notes 08/02/05 @ 3 ; [redacted] Interview 1 @ 00:49:53</p>
<p>10/??/2002 - 11/??/2002</p>	<p>[redacted] answered question 29 of the Office of the Inspector General questionnaire that an Iraqi detainee told him about being deprived of sleep, or interrupting sleep by frequent cell relocations or other methods while being detained in Afghanistan by interviewers there. [redacted] said that he does not recall the detainees name or number, but the details of the interview is documented in a 302. [redacted] was shown a 302 of an interview of [redacted] dated 11/13/2002 [redacted] and confirmed that this was the 302 and detainee described in his response to question 29 of the Office of the Inspector General questionnaire. [redacted] explained that [redacted] arrived to U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba from Afghanistan, and then was interviewed by a team that consisted of a military intelligence officer and an Federal Bureau of Investigation agent. This system of "preliminary interviews" was a way to determine who these detainees were, where the detainees should go, and who should be interviewing them. [redacted] said that his military partner was [redacted] [redacted] said he did not have the resources to further investigate the detainee's claims and this is why he put the 302 into a "war crime" file, because [redacted] understanding was that it "would be looked at sometime in the future" and "leads" would be sent out to agents working in the field where the</p>	<p>[redacted] Interview Notes 08/02/05 @ 3-4; [redacted] Interview 1 @ 00:50:26; [redacted]</p>

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	<p>incidents occurred. SA [redacted] did not know if this particular detainee's claims were ever looked into by other agents. SA [redacted] explained that he extracted the information from the interviews that dealt specifically with the "war crime" and only put that information into a separate 302 that was then put into the "war crime" file. SA [redacted] also believed that the "wc" designation within the file number indicates that it is a "war crime" file.</p>	
10/7/2002 - 11/7/2002	<p>[redacted] answered question 37 (requiring a detainee to maintain, or restraining a detainee in, a stressful or painful position) of the Office of the Inspector General questionnaire that a detainee told him that this conduct had occurred to him in Afghanistan. [redacted] described in detail the detainee's statement in a 302 in which the detainee described being required to stand, or kneel, with his hands and arms over his head for hours until he would admit to his interrogators having connections to Al Qaeda. SA [redacted] said the detainee did not ever describe any physical abuse or ever being beaten, it was all techniques of sleep deprivation or weakening the body and muscles.</p>	<p>[redacted] Interview Notes 08/02/05 @ ; [redacted] Interview I @ 00:59:47</p>
10/7/2002 - 11/7/2002	<p>[redacted] answered question 43 (subjecting a detainee to extremely cold or hot room temperatures for extended periods) that others who observed this conduct, described it to him. In his survey response (43J), SA [redacted] stated that "Criminal Investigative Task Force administrative personnel advised all Criminal Investigative Task Force interviewers that this sort of conduct had occurred and that it was not an acceptable practice.", but Criminal Investigative Task Force did not state who was involved in this conduct, or exactly when it occurred. [redacted] did not personally observe the conduct, nor did any one ever tell him that the conduct was employed on a detainee. [redacted] explained that the agents would turn down the temperature so that they could be comfortable, and because the detainees were coming into the interview rooms from very warm temperatures it might seem really cold to them, where as the agents felt comfortable. [redacted] described the detainees were wearing the light prisoner garbs and slippers where the agents were a little more clothed and had not been subjected to days of warmth.</p>	<p>[redacted] Interview Notes 08/02/05 @ ; [redacted] Interview I @ 01:01:20</p>
10/7/2002 - 11/7/2002	<p>[redacted] answered question 45 (subjecting a detainee to bright flashing lights or darkness) of the Office of the Inspector General questionnaire that others who</p>	<p>[redacted] Interview Notes 08/02/05 @ ;</p>

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	<p>observed this conduct described it to him. In his response, SA [redacted] stated that he did not know the name or number of the detainee. [redacted] also identified the detainee as "a detainee with potentially valuable information, who was being housed in a separate location from the main camp where detainees were held", and the detainee "was being monitored by CCTV from the Federal Bureau of Investigation administrative office." [redacted] response identified the Federal Bureau of Investigation and government agency(ies) as the person(s) who treated the detainee(s) in this manner, and [redacted] stated that the "Federal Bureau of Investigation profilers who were on-site at the time described these psychological techniques which had been approved for use soften him up for interviewing). As discussed earlier, [redacted] stated that it was not flashing lights, but as it was described to [redacted] by a Behavioral Analysis Unit agent, that it was the changing of the pattern of the lights. [redacted] said he did not see the change in light pattern, he was only told by the Behavioral Analysis Unit agent that this was being conducted.</p>	<p>[redacted] Interview 1 @ 01:03:32</p>
<p>10/7/2002 - 11/7/2002</p>	<p>[redacted] answered question 46 (isolating a detainee for an extended period) of the Office of the Inspector General questionnaire that others who observed this conduct described it to him. The detail of the conduct is described in his response to question 45, which is discussed in the previous CaseMap entry. SA [redacted] also clarified his written statement to reflect that there was also isolation cells were the rest of the detainees were for disciplinary use and for detainees with mental problems, which [redacted] believes was near the old camp, Camp X-ray.</p>	<p>[redacted] Interview Notes 08/02/05 @ ; [redacted] Interview 1 @ 01:04:38</p>
<p>10/7/2002 - 11/7/2002</p>	<p>At the time SA [redacted] was at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, there was 1 large area where all the detainees were housed. SA [redacted] recalls that within the large area, there were construction on more housing units and that the detainees were in the process of being segregated.</p>	<p>[redacted] Interview Notes 08/02/05 @ ; [redacted] Interview 1 @ 01:05:41</p>
<p>10/7/2002 - 11/7/2002</p>	<p>SA [redacted] described conducting his interviews in mobile home units where it was broken up into interview rooms with attached observation rooms on either side of the unit with a hall way down the middle. SA [redacted] also stated that when the Federal Bureau of Investigation was not using the trailers, the military would use them. SA [redacted] said the trailers were designated as</p>	<p>[redacted] Interview Notes 08/02/05 @ ; [redacted] Interview 1 @ 01:06:48</p>

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	<p>"brown" and "orange" trailer. [redacted] said that there was a 1 way mirror between the interview room and the observation room with a tv monitor. SA [redacted] explained that the 1 way mirrors did not work well because the detainees could see who was in the observation room, so they had to keep the blinds down on the mirror so that the detainee could not see into the observation room.</p>		
10/??/2002 - 11/??/2002	<p>SA [redacted] answered "yes" to question 70 (during any of your overseas deployments or assignments, did you report any concerns regarding any detainee interview or interrogation practices, or other types of detainee treatment, to an Federal Bureau of Investigation supervisor?). SA [redacted] concerns were discussed in previous CaseMap entries relating to [redacted] and the "war crime" files.</p>	<p>[redacted] Interview Notes 08/02/05 @ [redacted]; [redacted] Interview I @ 01:08:40</p>	b6 Per FBI b7C
10/??/2002 - 11/??/2002	<p>SA [redacted] said he was not "debriefed" when return from his TDY at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. [redacted] said the reason he might have not been debriefed after returning from U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba was because it was understood that "a lot of stuff going on there was SCI", and [redacted] said he did not bring any of his reports back because he did not want to violate any policy. Other than administrative matters, SA [redacted] said "there was not any in depth debriefing" from his Corpus Christi field office.</p>	<p>[redacted] Interview Notes 08/02/05 @ [redacted]; [redacted] Interview I @ 01:09:16</p>	b6 Per FBI b7C
10/??/2002 - 11/??/2002	<p>In a response to an Inspections Division - FBI email (Office of the Inspector General Bates# 010684) regarding observation of aggressive techniques, SA [redacted] described the following incident: "A military interrogator [redacted] and I were interviewing a new arrival [redacted] at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba during the evening hour when we heard what sounded like thunder. After hearing several 'thunderclaps' we stepped outside the interview room to take a break and see if the weather had made a drastic change from the clear skies we had witnessed prior to the start of our interview. As we walked down the hallway of the temporary building where the interview rooms were located, I glanced in an open doorway where I saw at least two individuals dressed in BDUs standing and an inmate kneeling on the floor with his forehead on the ground. The inmate was holding his nose and crying. There was a small amount of blood on the floor near the inmate's face. I asked the BDU-clad personnel what had happened. They explained</p>	<p>[redacted] Interview. Notes 08/02/05 @ [redacted]; [redacted] Interview I @ 01:11:11</p>	b6 Per FBI b7C

	that the inmate had become upset with them and threw himself to the floor. (I had heard previously that one of the female military personnel would we her hands and touch the inmates as part of their psych-ops to make the inmates feel 'unclean' and upset them.) The inmate's nose appeared to be bleeding. One of the military personnel left the room to retrieve a medical kit for the inmate. I saw nothing else to contradict the military personnel's explanation of events."	
10/??/2002 - 11/??/2002	SA [redacted] recalled that he and [redacted] were interviewing [redacted] at the time, and the Major was with them assessing [redacted]. At some point, [redacted] said he heard noises and assumed it was rain and decided to take a break from the interview to check it out. As SA [redacted] was walking down the hallway there was an open door to one of the interview rooms where he saw a couple of folks in BDLs and a detainee on his knees and moaning. SA [redacted] asked what had happened, and was told that the detainee had gotten upset and threw himself onto the floor and that they were calling for medical assistance. SA [redacted] recalled that there was a "small amount" of blood on the floor, but could not remember if he saw the detainee bleeding from his nose or if someone had told him that. [redacted] said that the Major was there and he started to question the people in the room. [redacted] said he assumed the Major was handling the situation, so he proceed to leave the trailer. SA [redacted] summarized his observation as: "I didn't see anything; I heard some noise; I saw a detainee on the floor with what I think might have been a noise bleed with an explanation that he had thrown himself on the floor." SA [redacted] said that the explanation did not seem unusual, especially after having been at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba for a month and a half and seeing the detainees' behavior.	[redacted] Interview Notes 08/02/05 @ ; [redacted] Interview I @ 01:11:34
10/??/2002 - 11/??/2002	SA [redacted] described a rumor that he had heard about a black female military interrogator touching detainees as a technique. By touching the detainees, the detainees would feel that they were "unclean" to prey because they had been touched by a female. SA [redacted] does not know if a female military interrogator was in the room and if this technique was used on the detainee.	[redacted] Interview Notes 08/02/05 @ ; [redacted] Interview I @ 01:14:36
10/??/2002 -	SA [redacted] said he did not recall if he had a follow up conversation with	[redacted] Interview

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11/27/2002	the Major about the incident with the detainees who was bleeding. At the time, [redacted] said that it was a military issue and if it was going to be handled, it would be handled by him. SA [redacted] believed the explanation to be true, and he did not see any evidence otherwise to contradict it. SA [redacted] said that the military folks in the room did seem to be agitated nor was anyone restraining a military personnel back from the detainees.	Notes 08/02/05 @ ; [redacted] Interview 1 @ 01:19:29
10/??/2002 - 11/??/2002	SA [redacted] said he did not report to his SSA the incident he saw where a detainee was on the floor moaning and bleeding, because he did not "feel that it was an issue" and he thought the Major was doing some sort of "superficial investigation." SA [redacted] also stated that he did not document the incident or tell anyone else about the incident. [redacted] said if he saw this as an issue, he would have brought it to his SSA's attention and he would have documented it.	[redacted] Interview Notes 08/02/05 @ ; [redacted] Interview 1 @ 01:22:28
10/??/2002 - 11/??/2002	SA [redacted] was asked to review a 302 of a detainee that had complained he had not received the required medical attention for his amputated leg. After SA [redacted] reviewed his 302, he recalled that the detainee had not been following the doctors order to keep the dressing on the wound and that is why it was not healing properly. SA [redacted] believed it was a way for the detainees to get out of being interviewed by the agents.	[redacted] Interview Notes 08/02/05 @ ; [redacted] Interview 1 @
10/??/2002 - 11/??/2002	SA [redacted] believe that the technique of a female wetting her hands and touching a detainee to make him "unclean" is not abusive or torture. [redacted] believes it makes use of their culture and their way of thinking to break the detainees train of thought and to stop their technique of avoiding interviews.	[redacted] Interview Notes 08/02/05 @ ; [redacted] Interview 1 @ 01:40:40

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Case: FBI in Military Zones
Created: 2/24/2009 11:58:19 AM

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Date & Time	Fact Text	Source(s)
Tue 08/12/2003 - Thu 09/25/2003	[redacted] was told that she is being interviewed as a witness, that she is not a subject, and that the interview is a follow up to her questionnaire.	[redacted] Interview 1 @ 00:50
Tue 08/12/2003 - Thu 09/25/2003	[redacted] said that the U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba mission was emerging and there was guidance available in terms of a structured training program, they used more of a mentoring model than formal training. In her opinion that is appropriate for U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba at that time. [redacted] said that the people she dealt with were accessible.	[redacted] Interview 1 @ 04:00
Tue 08/12/2003 - Thu 09/25/2003	[redacted] said that the process at the time of her reporting for duty at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, was to have new agents team up with agents who had been there for a period of time. This is how [redacted] learned what techniques she could and could not employ. Later in the interview [redacted] stated that her mentor was SA Chris LNU.	[redacted] Interview 1 @ 05:20
Tue 08/12/2003 - Thu 09/25/2003	[redacted] said that the guidance she received was that, "we are Federal Bureau of Investigation agents no matter where we go, so we have policies in place and there are things that we do, and things we don't do, and the rules were no different on U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba in terms of what we could do and what we couldn't do." [redacted] said that no one specifically used those words, rather it was something she picked up from the milieu from the operation at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.	[redacted] Interview 1 @ 06:30
Tue 08/12/2003 - Thu 09/25/2003	[redacted] said that the agents she was teamed with didn't address the U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba policies more than what she would receive in the states. [redacted] said that a non supervisory SA had supervisory responsibilities and gave her recommendations on dealing with circumstances that she wouldn't run into in the states.	[redacted] Interview 1 @ 07:40
Tue 08/12/2003	[redacted] said that the 45 day detail should have been longer and [redacted] believes	[redacted]

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- Thu 09/25/2003	that the Federal Bureau of Investigation is moving to a longer detail.	Interview 1 @ 08:50
Tue 08/12/2003 - Thu 09/25/2003	_____ said that _____ reported for duty during her tour and prior to him was another SSA _____ (should not remember the name). _____ stated that she was partnered up with _____.	Interview 1 @ 09:50
Tue 08/12/2003 - Thu 09/25/2003	_____ said that _____ reported for duty on U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba on 08/11/03. _____ stated that she and _____ discussed how they would approach detainees in a general sense and a specific sense. _____ said that these were typical discussion with another agent that would take place before any interview. This would include discussing the background of the person, the possible techniques, and strategically how to obtain your goals. _____ said that they generally agreed on how to approach detainees.	Interview 1 @ 11:53
Tue 08/12/2003 - Thu 09/25/2003	_____ said that generally the approach was rapport building, because this was the most effective technique. They also discussed other techniques which were not used in the states - because they could collaborate with military personnel that aren't present in the states.	Interview 1 @ 13:10
Tue 08/12/2003 - Thu 09/25/2003	_____ said that _____ helped them coordinate the frequent moving of a detainee to break up that detainee's position of comfort with his guards. _____ believed the detainee's social relationship with the guards interrupted her efforts in the interrogations.	Interview 1 @ 14:00
Tue 08/12/2003 - Thu 09/25/2003	_____ said that she did not specify to the military how often the detainee would be moved, it was left up to the military. _____ does not know how often the detainee was moved. The "pet name" for that program was the frequent flyer program. It was _____ understanding that the detainee was moved every four hours, but _____ did not see any documentation, this is her best recollection of the program. _____ said that this program was beginning to make a difference with this detainee.	Interview 1 @ 16:05
Tue 08/12/2003 - Thu 09/25/2003	_____ said that in collaboration with the military, they brought in a different (PRT) that was with the Joint Detainee Operations Group and he used a technique that included yelling loudly at the detainee.	Interview 1 @ 17:05
Tue 08/12/2003 - Thu	_____ said that the yelling technique took place while _____ was behind the two-way mirror (outside of the interrogation room) because there are gender issues and women	Interview 1 @

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09/25/2003	are perceived as being softer and therefore less effective in a hard environment. [redacted] was in the room with the [redacted] [redacted] said that it was exclusively the [redacted] who used the technique. [redacted] was strictly an observer.	(7:40)	
Tue 08/12/2003 - Thu 09/25/2003	[redacted] said that this was the only detainee where they implemented these techniques, and appeared to have information of any value. [redacted] said that she regards the yelling and screaming technique as being unsophisticated and ineffective.	Interview 1 @ 18:30	b6 Per FBI b7C
Tue 08/12/2003 - Thu 09/25/2003	[redacted] said that the most significant factor in decreasing this detainee's resistance was to move him frequently to undercut his social network. [redacted] also believed that rapport building was effective.	Interview 1 @ 19:35	
Tue 08/12/2003 - Thu 09/25/2003	[redacted] said that the yelling technique was used only the one time. [redacted] said that there was one other interview that a military interrogator conducted that was similar to a typical Federal Bureau of Investigation interview.	Interview 1 @ 20:15	
Tue 08/12/2003 - Thu 09/25/2003	[redacted] said that she was given a copy of the approved interrogation techniques used by the military by [redacted] a JAG assigned to the Criminal Investigative Task Force and functioned as an attorney for the Federal Bureau of Investigation's use, similar to the role of a CDC in an Federal Bureau of Investigation division.	Interview 1 @ 21:05	b6 Per FBI b7C
Tue 08/12/2003 - Thu 09/25/2003	[redacted] said that her understanding was that document was distributed to them because there were agents that were concerned with the techniques that the military was utilizing, and the document was distributed as clarification so the Federal Bureau of Investigation agents would understand the boundaries and limits place upon the military and it would decrease the atmosphere of second guessing techniques that their colleagues in the military were using.	Interview 1 @ 22:00	
Tue 08/12/2003 - Thu 09/25/2003	[redacted] said that there was never a directive that they should do something if they observed a technique not on the list, but [redacted] said that they were Federal Bureau of Investigation agents no matter where they are, so if they observed something not on the list that was unusually harsh, the unspoken atmosphere was that she could express concern about that to their supervisor.	Interview 1 @ 22:50	b6 Per FBI b7C
Tue 08/12/2003 - Thu 09/25/2003	[redacted] said that she did not observe any techniques that were of the list that she was given. There were rumors floating around of techniques being utilized that were harsh, but they were only rumors.	Interview 1 @ 23:25	
Tue 08/12/2003	[redacted] said that the military is a separate body from the Federal Bureau of Investigation		

Tue 08/12/2003 - Thu 09/25/2003	[redacted] said after leaving the detainee, she believes that she went back to the Federal Bureau of Investigation office. [redacted] returned because he wanted to make sure that nothing went wrong, as the detainee wasn't in any type of distress that would be life endangering.	Interview 1 @ 33:00
Tue 08/12/2003 - Thu 09/25/2003	[redacted] said that it was a couple of hours before [redacted] went back to check on the detainee. [redacted] reported back to [redacted] that the detainee was ok, and that he had fallen asleep on the floor.	Interview 1 @ 33:45
Tue 08/12/2003 - Thu 09/25/2003	[redacted] said she and [redacted] knew that the [redacted] was going to come in and do his yelling technique, and that this was devised ahead of time and discussed with [redacted]. [redacted] said that [redacted] was ok with this.	Interview 1 @ 34:25
Tue 08/13/2003 - Thu 09/25/2003	[redacted] said that she believes that she mentioned to [redacted] that the detainee was in a stress position, however stress position is on the list of techniques for the military. [redacted] does not recall [redacted] reaction, because she said it is passing and she does not recall any remarkable response.	Interview 1 @ 34:30
Tue 08/12/2003 - Thu 09/25/2003	[redacted] said that she does not know when he was returned to his cell. [redacted] would have learned when the detainee was returned to his cell from a military person or from the detainee.	Interview 1 @ 35:30
Tue 08/12/2003 - Thu 09/25/2003	[redacted] said that she would check her records to see if she made a note when the detainee was taken back to his cell.	Interview 1 @ 37:00
Tue 08/12/2003 - Thu 09/25/2003	[redacted] said that she believes there was a limit, per military's policy, on how long a detainee could be left in a stress position and she never heard of a detainee exceeding the limit, but she could not say what the limit was.	Interview 1 @ 37:45
Tue 08/12/2003 - Thu 09/25/2003	[redacted] was asked if the detainee was given a bathroom break, or given food and water. [redacted] stated that she does not know if the detainee was given those opportunities, but the military had policy to deal with those issues. [redacted] said that upon her next meeting with the detainee, she does not recall him complaining about the stress position.	Interview 1 @ 38:15
Tue 08/12/2003 - Thu 09/25/2003	[redacted] said that she would characterize [redacted] style as more confrontive and using more traditional interviewing. [redacted] said that her background and training is different than [redacted] and she focuses more on rapport building.	Interview 1 @ 42:43

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Case: FBI in Military Zones
 Created: 3/24/2009 11:50:24 AM

Date & Time	Fact Text	Source(s)
To Be Determined	[redacted] advised that when she was at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba as the Administrative Agent everyone just emailed their time back to their respective field offices. Agents did not fill out I-A registers as they do in their field offices. While at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba [redacted] emailed her time to her secretary in the Miami FO. [redacted] has never filled out I-A registers while on tdy with the Bureau.	Interview 1 @32:55 - 34:45
To Be Determined	[redacted] advised that there was a bay of cells that were specifically designated as isolation cells at [redacted] The isolation block cells seemed to have solid metal walls instead of the the metal mesh walls that normal cell walls were made out of. [redacted] believes that the detainees who were put in isolation had committed some infraction of the detention regulations. [redacted] did not know whether detainees were sent to isolation for not cooperating during interviews.	Interview 1 @49:15 - 52:23
7/7/2002	Prior to departing for U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba the only training that [redacted] received from the Bureau was a one page handout from [redacted] who was the Miami FO's U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba coordinator. This handout dealt mostly with administrative issues like what to wear, and the physical conditions at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.	Interview 1 @6:50 - 7:40
7/7/2003	[redacted] recalls that at some point while she was at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba she went over to the Navy Brig with a TEA and removed a bunch of tapes and electronic monitoring equipment that [redacted] assumes was used to monitor a particular high value detainee who had been housed in the Brig.	Interview 1 @15:15 - 16:00
Thu 01/02/2003	Once she arrived at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba [redacted] received an orientation session from the OSC [redacted] and some of the	Interview 1 @07:42 -

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	Behavioral Analysis Unit folks who were there on the island. [redacted] says that the orientation dealt mostly with cultural differences and rapport based interview techniques one could use to overcome those issues.	9:55
Thu 01/02/2003 - Sun 02/13/2005	[redacted] advised that she arrived at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba on January 2, 2003 for a 45 day tdy. The first 30 days of the tdy she was the Administrative Agent, and the last two weeks she was an Interviewing Agent.	[redacted] Interview I @4:30 - 5:00
Thu 01/02/2003 - Sun 02/13/2005	[redacted] advised that she conducted about a dozen interviews while at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.	[redacted] Interview I @21:23 - 21:55
Thu 01/02/2003 - Sun 02/13/2005	[redacted] advised that she learned from the U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba case agent, [redacted] that [redacted] was removed from the general detainee population and that he wasn't getting much sleep b/c "they" were really concentrating on him. [redacted]	[redacted] Interview I @27:50 - 30:45
Thu 01/02/2003 - Sun 02/13/2005	[redacted] advised that one of the detainees who she interviewed while at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba had a large gash on his head. [redacted] noticed it b/c it was large and it did not have a bandage on it. She asked the detainee how he received the wound, and he said that he got it from having the goggles put on his head for the plane ride from Afghanistan to U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. The detainee was not complaining about the wound and [redacted] did request medical attention for the detainee. [redacted] said that it appeared the detainee was receiving some kind of medical care for the wound, but that it wasn't healing properly.	[redacted] Interview I @35:15 - 38:00
Thu 01/02/2003 - Sun 02/13/2005	Although [redacted] answered the question regarding prolonged shackling in a positive manner, what she was referring to was that detainees were more often than not shackled in some fashion during the course of intelligence interviews, which sometimes took many hours. [redacted] did not observe or hear about shackles being used to coerce detainees to cooperate in interviews.	[redacted] Interview I @38:05 - 41:00
Thu 01/02/2003 - Sun 02/13/2005	[redacted] advised that on at least one occasion she was told that the detainee population at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba had been reduced by 2 due to the fact that 2 detainees had been removed from the general population at U.S.	[redacted] Interview I @52:43 - 57:10

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	<p>Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. [redacted] did not know exactly what this meant but she assumed that [redacted]</p> <p>[redacted] was just told by the OSC [redacted] that she should reduce the total number by 2 b/c 2 detainees were no longer part of the count. [redacted]</p> <p>[redacted] thought the number was reduced from [redacted]</p>		
Thu 01/02/2005 - Sun 02/13/2005	<p>[redacted] advised that as the Administrative Agent she read JO2's that contained allegations that the guard staff was disrespecting the Koran. The disrespectful treatment of the Koran basically was that a non-believer was touching the Koran, not that the guards were doing anything in particular to them. [redacted] did not see read any allegations that the guards were burning, flushing, or in some other way desecrating the Korans. From what she could see the detainees were upset with the fact that the guards were fanning through the Korans to see if they contained any weapons. [redacted] thought that these allegations were unreasonable given the prison setting that the detainees were in.</p>	Interview 1 @ 07:48 - 1:00:55	b6 Per FBI b7C
Thu 01/02/2005 - Sun 02/13/2005	<p>Regarding her positive answer to Question #70 on the Office of the Inspector General Survey, [redacted] advised that this represented her concerns that she voiced to both [redacted] and the Criminal Investigative Task Force supervisor. Her concerns were very general in nature regarding the unusual legal situation that U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba represented.</p>	Interview 1 @ 1:01:00 - 1:03:10	b6 Per FBI b7C
Fri 02/07/2005	<p>[redacted] advised that she quickly picked some basic interview tactics with other intelligence agents at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba just prior to debriefing a newly arrived detainee at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. [redacted] believes that the other interviewers she worked with on this occasion were from DHS, DOD. [redacted] later confirmed that the detainee was [redacted]. This detainee was mistakenly identified as [redacted] on the 02/08/03 SitRep.)</p>	Interview 1 @ 02:15 - 22:45	
11/7/2005	<p>[redacted] advised that she was present at an interview of an [redacted] when a civilian contract interrogator "manhandled" the detainee during the interview. [redacted] said that the interrogator pulled the detainee out of his seat and pushed his face against the wall. [redacted] said that this happened very quickly and</p>	Interview 1 @ 1:22:30 - 1:30:50 & 1:32:50 - 1:35:08	b6 Per FBI b7C

	before she knew it it was over.		said she didn't have time to leave the room.		did not report this incident to any of her Federal Bureau of Investigation supervisors, either	
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