REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS BY INVESTIGATING OFFICER/BOARD OF OFFICERS

For use of this form, see AR 15-6; the proponent agency is OTJAG.

IF MORE SPACE IS REQUIRED IN FILLING OUT ANY PORTION OF THIS FORM, ATTACH ADDITIONAL SHEETS

SECTION I - APPOINTMENT

Appointed by [Redacted] Commanding

(Appointing authority)

on 16 OCT 05 (Date)

(Aattach inclosure 1: Letter of appointment or summary of oral appointment data.) (See para 3-15, AR 15-6.)

SECTION II - SESSIONS

The (investigation) commenced at 2-70 AR Maintenance Office (Place) at 1000 (Time)

on 22 October 2005 (Date) (If a formal board met for more than one session, check here □. Indicate in an inclosure the time each session began and ended, the place, persons present and absent, and explanation of absences, if any.) The following persons (members, respondents, counsel) were present: [Redacted] (After each name, indicate capacity, e.g., President, Recorder, Member, Legal Advisor.)

The following persons (members, respondents, counsel) were absent: [Redacted] (Include brief explanation of each absence.) (See paras 5-2 and 5-8a, AR 15-6.)

The (investigating officer) (briefly) finished gathering/hearing evidence at 0900 (Time) on 8 November 2005 (Date)

and completed findings and recommendations at 1500 (Time) on 14 November 2005 (Date)

SECTION III - CHECKLIST FOR PROCEEDINGS

A. COMPLETE IN ALL CASES

1. Inclosures (para 3-15, AR 15-6)

- Are the following inclosed and numbered consecutively with Roman numerals? (Attached in order listed) [Redacted]
  a. The letter of appointment or a summary of oral appointment data?
  b. Copy of notice to respondent, if any? (See item 9, below)
  c. Other correspondence with respondent or counsel, if any?
  d. All other written communications to or from the appointing authority?
  e. Privacy Act Statements (Certificate, if statement provided orally)?
  f. Explanation by the investigating officer or board of any unusual delays, difficulties, irregularities, or other problems encountered (e.g., absence of material witnesses)?
  g. Information as to sessions of a formal board not included on page 1 of this report?
  h. Any other significant papers (other than evidence) relating to administrative aspects of the investigation or board? [Redacted]

FOOTNOTES: 1) Explain all negative answers on an attached sheet.
2) Use of the NA column constitutes a positive representation that the circumstances described in the question did not occur treach investigation or board.

DA FORM 1574, MAR 83 EDITION OF NOV 77 IS OBSOLETE.
Exhibits (para 3-16, AR 15-6)

a. Are all items offered (whether or not received) or considered as evidence individually numbered or lettered as exhibits and attached to this report?

b. Is an index of all exhibits offered to or considered by investigating officer or board attached before the first exhibit?

c. Has the testimony/statement of each witness been recorded verbatim or been reduced to written form and attached as an exhibit?

d. Are copies, descriptions, or depictions (if substituted for real or documentary evidence) properly authenticated and is the location of the original evidence indicated?

e. Are descriptions or diagrams included of locations visited by the investigating officer or board (para 3-6b, AR 15-6)?

f. Is each written stipulation attached as an exhibit and is each oral stipulation either reduced to writing and made an exhibit or recorded in a verbatim record?

g. If official notice of any matter was taken over the objection of a respondent or counsel, is a statement of the matter of which official notice was taken attached as an exhibit (para 3-16d, AR 15-6)?

WAS A QUORUM PRESENT WHEN THE BOARD VOTED ON FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (para 4-1 and 5-2a, AR 15-6)?

COMPLETE ONLY FOR FORMAL BOARD PROCEEDINGS (Chapter 5, AR 15-6)

At the initial session, did the recorder read, or determine that all participants had read, the letter of appointment (para 5-3b, AR 15-6)?

Was a quorum present at every session of the board (para 5-2b, AR 15-6)?

Was each absence of any member properly excused (para 5-2a, AR 15-6)?

Were members, witnesses, reporter, and interpreter sworn, if required (para 3-1, AR 15-6)?

If any members who voted on findings or recommendations were not present when the board received some evidence, does the inspector describe how they familiarized themselves with that evidence (para 5-2d, AR 15-6)?

COMPLETE ONLY IF RESPONDENT WAS DESIGNATED (Section II, Chapter 5, AR 15-6)

Notice to respondents (para 3-5, AR 15-6):

a. Is the method and date of delivery to the respondent indicated on each letter of notification?

b. Was the date of delivery at least five working days prior to the first session of the board?

c. Does each letter of notification indicate:

   (1) the date, hour, and place of the first session of the board concerning that respondent?

   (2) the matter to be investigated, including specific allegations against the respondent, if any?

   (3) the respondent’s rights with regard to counsel?

   (4) the name and address of each witness expected to be called by the recorder?

   (5) the respondent’s rights to be present, present evidence, and call witnesses?

   (6) Was the respondent provided a copy of all unclassified documents in the case file?

   (7) If there were relevant classified materials, were the respondent and his counsel given access and an opportunity to examine them?

Will any respondent was designated after the proceedings began (or otherwise was absent during part of the proceedings):

a. Was he properly notified (para 5-5, AR 15-6)?

b. Was record of proceedings and evidence received in his absence made available for examination by him and his counsel (para 5-4c, AR 15-6)?

Counsel (para 3-6, AR 15-6):

a. Was each respondent represented by counsel?

b. Counsel (if counsel is a lawyer, check here □)

   b. Was respondent’s counsel present at all open sessions of the board relating to that respondent?

c. If military counsel was requested but not made available, is a copy (or, if oral, a summary) of the request and the action taken on it included in the report (para 5-6b, AR 15-6)?

If the respondent challenged the legal advisor or any voting member for lack of impartiality (para 3-7, AR 15-6):

a. Was the challenge properly denied and by the appropriate officer?

b. Did each member successfully challenge cease to participate in the proceedings?

If the respondent given an opportunity to (para 5-2a, AR 15-6):

a. Be present with his counsel at all open sessions of the board which deal with any matter which concerns that respondent?

b. Examine and object to the introduction of real and documentary evidence, including written statements?

b. Object to the testimony of witnesses and cross-examine witnesses other than his own?

c. Call witnesses and otherwise introduce evidence?

d. Tender as a witness?

If requested, did the recorder assist the respondent in obtaining evidence in possession of the Government and in arranging for the presence of witnesses (para 3-8b, AR 15-6)?

Are all of the respondent’s requests and objections which were denied indicated in the report of proceedings or an inclusion or exhibit it (para 3-11, AR 15-6)?

FOOTNOTES:

1] Explain all negative answers on an attached sheet.

2 If use of the NA column constitutes a positive representation, the circumstances described in the question did not occur or this investigation or follow.
SECTION IV - FINDINGS (para 3-10, AR 15-6)

The investigating officer, having carefully considered the evidence, finds:

On 16 October 2005, at approximately 0400, two M2A2 Bradley Fighting Vehicles from 1st Platoon, A Company, 1-41 IN were travelling west on RTE HURRICANES en route to the 2-70 AR TAC. The lead Bradley, bumper number AV12, was commanded by SSG , and the trail Bradley, bumper number AV11, was commanded by LT . The two Bradleys were approximately 300m apart on the road and were actively scanning for activity in the surrounding terrain. As they were driving vic. MB 193915, LT the gunner, SGT , had spotted an unidentified object in a copse of trees approximately 300m south of his Bradley. Upon spotting the object, SGT immediately notified LT and LT in turn notified SSG Both LT and SSG stopped their Bradleys in order to give SGT time to identify the object in the field. Based on the size of the thermal signature, SGT and LT assumed the object was in fact a human being in a crouched position and they began scanning the area for clues as to the identity of the individual. There were no houses, animals, vehicles or other obvious signs of human habitation in the vicinity of the individual, so LT decided to investigate further. RTE HURRICANES was separated from the surrounding farmland by a large dirt canal that ran parallel to the RTE on the south side of the road. LT directed SSG to move back to the east on HURRICANES in order to find a suitable site to cross the large canal. Once he had found a way across, SSG was to maneuver on the suspect individual and detain him for questioning. LT acknowledged the order and began his movement back toward the east. As the AV12 Bradley started its move, the suspect individual visibly turned toward the sound of the moving vehicle and began reaching toward the ground. As soon as the individual began grabbing things from the ground, LT called his PSG, SFC , in order to verify their location and clear for fires to the south.

As he was receiving verification from his B section on their location, SGT lost visual contact with the individual. He had moved behind a small concrete canal that was just in front of his position and that ran from his initial position to the west, parallel to RTE HURRICANES. LT had his driver move the Bradley approximately 3m to the east, and which point his gunner re-acquired the suspect individual. As soon as his gunner re-acquired, LT gave the order to fire. SGT fired a 5-7 round burst from his coax and the individual once again disappeared from his thermal sight. SGT continued to engage the target area with 2-3 additional bursts and then LT ordered the cease fire.

SGT did not re-acquire visual contact with the individual following his engagement. In order to aid in the search for the individual, LT held his position on RTE HURRICANES and he instructed his wing Bradley to maneuver down to the location where they engaged while SGT continued to move down RTE HURRICANES to the east, eventually returning to RTE Sabers where he moved south to a position where he could cut back to the east and the last known position of the suspect individual. While SSG was moving, LT sent his dismount infantrymen across a small ford point on the large dirt canal parallel to RTE HURRICANES, and they began the search for the individual. They were joined by SSG who dismounts approximately 20 minutes. By approximately 0430, the dismounts had found the body in a small dirt canal that ran south from the small concrete canal the individual had first been seen behind. The medic with the dismount squad, SGT , verified that the individual had been killed in the initial engagement.

After the dismounts found the body, they continued to search the surrounding area. They searched for approximately two hours and found a shovel, which was located under the body in the canal, and a few stacked sandbags near where they had initially identified the individual at the eastern edge of the little concrete canal. Additionally, SSG searching along RTE HURRICANES for any possible IEDs. No weapons, IEDs or IED initiating materials were found. They tested the body using XSPRAY and the individual tested positive for SEMTEX and C4, though no explosives were found at the site. [CONTINUED ON PAGE 5]

SECTION V - RECOMMENDATIONS (para 3-11, AR 15-6)

In view of the above findings, the investigating officer (s) recommends:

That no action be taken against: LT or his section and that the details of this incident be distributed as an ROE vignette for discussion in the BDE.
SECTION VI - AUTHENTICATION (para 3-17, AR 15-6)

This report of proceedings is complete and accurate. (If any voting member or the recorder fails to sign here or in Section VII below, indicate the reason in the space where his signature should appear.)

(Recorder) ____________________________

(Member) ____________________________

(Member) ____________________________

SECTION VII - MINORITY REPORT (para 3-13, AR 15-6)

To the extent indicated in Inclosure __________, the undersigned do(es) not concur in the findings and recommendations of the board.

(In the Inclosure, identify by number each finding and/or recommendation in which the dissenting member(s) do(es) not concur. State the reasons for disagreement. Additional/substitute findings and/or recommendations may be included in the Inclosure.)

(Member) ____________________________

(Member) ____________________________

SECTION VIII - ACTION BY APPOINTING AUTHORITY (para 2-3, AR 15-6)

The findings and recommendations of the (Investigating officer) (board) are (approved) (disapproved) (approved with following exceptions/substitutions). (If the appointing authority returns the proceedings to the investigating officer or board for further proceedings or corrective action, attach that correspondence (or a summary, if oral) as a numbered inclosure.)

Unfortunate incident however the Brooklyn crew cited John Roe given the number of FED engageents in the area and the behavior of the crew.

Urgent to the ault or not the was action. Air herd it should be the the are face a difficult judgment call, which he did.
During the search of the area, LT ** identified a small house approximately 500m south of the site, and he sent his dismounts to investigate. While moving toward the house, a man approached from that direction. The dismounts detained him and brought him back to LT ** for questioning. The man identified himself as a local farmer with no known insurgent ties. LT ** said that Mr. ** came to this field in order to activate the irrigation systems for his village, which lay several kilometers to the west. He usually opened the canals around midnight, and he usually brought his son with him. LT ** did not know why he was in the field as late as he was on the day in question.

The evidence in this investigation proves that the shooting of Mr. ** was justified and was the result of reasonable assumptions on LT ** and a proper escalation of force. Lt. ** and his section began movement down RTE HURRICANES knowing that there had been at least one IED attack on that RTE just three days earlier (as can be seen in Exhibit 14) and that sections of the RTE had been previously identified as probable locations for future IED attacks by the Task Force 2-70 AR S-2 (as seen in Exhibit 15). Lt. ** and his section believed that attack by IED was the most likely form of contact he would encounter in sector and this fact is crucial in understanding Lt. ** decision making process during this incident.

From his perspective, Lt. ** was in a known IED target area, and he was on the lookout for possible human crouching behind partial cover and concealment with excellent observation of RTE HURRICANES. When he started maneuvering his wing Bradley back toward his position, the crouching individual reached for something on the ground—possibly an IED initiating device. At that moment, and under those circumstances, Lt. ** had a hostile actor with hostile intent and he took appropriate action. If he had not acted on the information he had at the time and made the call to engage, Mr. ** may have been destroyed. Lt. ** acted on the information he had at the time and made the call to engage at 10-15 seconds by sworn accounts, and then fired. Lt. ** made an appropriate tactical decision based on what he knew at the time. 

Knowing what we now know, after the fact, it is reasonable to believe that Mr. ** was not an IED triggerman. No IED or triggering device was found at the scene. Mr. ** was known to move about in the fields after dark to open irrigation channels. The position his body was found in suggests that he was trying to escape the situation. However, none of this information was available to LT ** when he felt that his section was in danger and he had to make his decision to engage or not engage. Further, even now there are some good reasons to believe that Mr. ** may have been a triggerman. Mr. ** had 10-15 seconds to hide or lose the initiator, some of which are as small as key chains and cellular phones. He was in the fields many hours outside of his usual routine, and he did not bring his son as he usually did. The movement of the second Bradley caused him to attempt to flee the area and he tested positive for two types of explosives. We can never know for sure if Mr. ** was an IED triggerman, but there were several indicators leading Lt. ** to believe he was when he decided to engage.

A Company, 1-41 IN, does have an appropriate TTP for dealing with suspicious local nationals that is well understood by the officers and soldiers of the company. They also have a good understanding of the CCLCC ROE and the CCLCC Rules for the Use of Force—both were referenced by the soldiers during their interviews.

After reviewing all material associated with this investigation, I find that LT ** had sufficient evidence, at the time he engaged, to identify Mr. ** as a hostile actor with hostile intent. In addition, I find no contributing factors that, if changed, could have altered the outcome of this event.

– Shihatha
AFZN-BB-DA

8 November 05

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: 15-6 Investigation Index of Exhibits for the A/1-41 IN Shooting on 16 OCT 05.

1. The following exhibits are included as a part of the investigating officer's report:

- Exhibit 1: Appointment Orders
- Exhibit 2: Statement by L'T
- Exhibit 3: Statement by SGT
- Exhibit 4: Statement by SSG
- Exhibit 5: Statement by SPC
- Exhibit 6: Statement by SGT
- Exhibit 7: Statement by SSG
- Exhibit 8: DA FORM 3881 for L'T
- Exhibit 9: Commander's Incident Report
- Exhibit 10: Unsigned Statement by
- Exhibit 11: Photographs of Site
- Exhibit 12: Site Diagram
- Exhibit 13: Statement by CPT
- Exhibit 14: Analysis of IED Activity v/c. RTE HURRICANES
- Exhibit 15: TF 2-70 AR "TED Red Zone" Map

2. Point of contact for this memorandum is the undersigned.

CPT, AR
Investigating Officer
MEMORANDUM FOR HHC, 2nd Battalion, 70th Armor Regiment, 3rd Brigade, 1st Armored Division, APO AE 09378

SUBJECT: Appointment as Investigating Officer

1. Pursuant to AR 15-6, paragraph 2-1, you are hereby appointed as an investigating officer to investigate the shooting death of one local national on 16 October 2005 during a patrol conducted by 1/A/1-41 Infantry.

2. In your investigation, use procedures under AR 15-6, Chapter 4, for an informal board of officers. All witness statements will be sworn, and you will follow the procedures in AR 15-6, paragraph 3-7e for Privacy Act statements. If the person you are interviewing states that he/she does not know anything about the allegations, prepare a sworn statement to that affect for the witness to sign. If, in the course of your investigation, you suspect a soldier has committed an offense under the UCMJ, you must advise and read him/her their rights under the UCMJ, Article 31, or the Fifth Amendment, as appropriate, prior to conducting any interview.

3. During your investigation, answer the following questions:
   a. What was the sequence of events that led up to the incident?
   b. Did the soldiers involved properly escalate the use of force?
   c. Did the soldiers have Positive Identification (were they reasonable certain that the object of attack was a legitimate military target) before engaging the local national?
   d. Did the local national pose a threat by committing a hostile act or by demonstrating hostile intent?
   e. Did the On Scene Commander attempt to minimize collateral damage?
   f. What is the unit’s Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) prior to engaging a Local National?
   g. Were there any Law of War violations?
AFZN-BB-CO
SUBJECT: Appointment as Investigating Officer

h. Are there any operational lessons that should be captured and disseminated?

i. Were there any other contributing factors that, if changed, could have altered the outcome?

4. If it becomes evident that there is possible misconduct outside the scope of your investigation, notify the appointing authority immediately. If during your investigation you become aware of information that needs command attention, immediately notify the appointing authority for guidance.

5. Contact the Command Judge Advocate, CP, [redacted] for legal guidance prior to starting your investigation. [redacted] is located in Bldg 72 and his phone number is VOIP: 242-6045.


COL, AR
Commanding
11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BE INDICATED.

DA FORM 2823, DEC 1998

DA FORM 2823, JUL 72, IS OBSOLETE

USAPA V1.00
9. STATEMENT (continued)

them we didn't need them anymore, so they cut station. They didn't see anyone else in the area. They never did see the area where the body was. I think they couldn't see with their thermals because the guy had fallen into a canal, so his heat source was masked. After that I started to investigate and search for where the device was or whatever he had in his hands. Once we found the body, I had my 1 track take me back to where the individual was so I could dismount and investigate the area. So I started taking pictures, and I told SGT [redacted] to come here to focus his search from where we saw him initially, at the eastern edge of the little concrete canal to the body. There were no features of the area where he was at, so I figured that if he had a shady reason for being there, that house might be part of it. So I had his dismount set the individual down by the house so I could question him. I talked to the individual. His name was [redacted]. He recognized the individual. I questioned him and asked if he knew if he had insurgent ties or any shady reasons for being there. The individual explained to me that the man who was killed came out there to open up water canals. He told me that he does this at midnight with his son, but he didn't come out there in the mornings like when we found him. And he was alone this time - we never saw another individual.

We continued to search the area. We couldn't find what he was messing with. But he had 10-15 seconds where my gunner lost visual sight of him. He could have found a good hiding position or sunk it in the mud. We don't know. His body was 20-30m from where we saw him. It wasn't a great distance, he hadn't moved very far. The thing is, he used that water canal for cover. If he would have stood up and acted like a normal farmer, we wouldn't have had any trouble seeing him. But he was using the cover and concealment of the area to mask his movements. We couldn't even tell he had moved that far, if at all, from our position. From 300m away, a movement of 20-30m we won't be able to see that.

Every time we identify an IED trigger point, they usually have a supply stash - water bottles, various materials - because they plan on sitting there for a long time. Even when we've caught individuals red-handed, we've never been able to find a trigger device. They've been able to start it or get rid of it. But everything this individual was doing pointed to him being an IED trigger man. But that's not why I engaged - that's why I was maneuvering. I was maneuvering because everything pointed to this guy being a bad guy. But we don't engage based on assumptions. We engaged because as the 2 track started coming back, this guy started moving with something in his hands or on the ground. I would have engaged right then if I knew exactly where the B section was. It would have been the exact moment that he went for the stuff on the ground. While I cleared for fire, the gunner lost him. So I told the driver to back-up so that we could see better along the little concrete canal. I figured the guy was moving a little ways down the canal for more cover and to engage. Maybe 10 seconds passed between when I decided to fire and when he fired. It was almost immediate.

In a generic situation like this, we recognize the individual and try to ascertain what the individual is doing. If there is some suspicion about the individual, we maneuver on him to detain and question him. If at any time you get positive identification of the individual as a valid target, you engage. We saw our 10% of positive identification, but that's not got me to engage. We didn't know where the IED was. We never found an IED. But at that time, everything pointed to an imminent attack. In my opinion, if I had not engaged, it would have been gross neglect on my part. I would have been putting my forces at risk had I not engaged. Looking back, there is nothing that we could have done differently to impact the outcome of the situation. If I was in the same situation again, I wouldn't do anything differently. I couldn't do anything differently.
At about 0430, A Section was rolling back to the TAC to pick-up a damaged Bradley and escort it back to Taji so we could continue operations in support of the polling sites. We were going down RTE HURRICANES travelling west, A12 was in the lead and we were in the rear. Basically our standard when we’re going down the road is the 2 vehicle scans the road looking for IEDs and the 1 vehicle scans the rear and the flanks looking for triggers and stuff like that. We were about one kilometer east of RTE OILERS and I was scanning to the south and I picked up a hot spot in a woodline. I told the driver to stop and the LT asked me what I had. I said I have a hot spot and that I didn’t know what it was but it was pretty large. The way the thermal contrast was working at that time, the trees were coming up hotter and it blurred everything and I had a hard time determining what it was. The LT sat down and we started watching it. I was pretty sure it was a guy but I wasn’t certain. He told 2 to stop, but I didn’t really pay attention to the radio. I was pretty sure it was a guy, so we started looking for a house nearby or anything that said this guy should be out here. It was in the middle of nowhere. I didn’t see any surrounding structures or other people. I continued to scan the area, went back to the guy looking for movement to distinguish the guy. Then the LT call the 2 and the guy looks back toward the 2 track and starts gathering something up off the ground. That’s when I had positive ID as a person, because I saw an arm come out. He was at the base of a tree at the end of a concrete canal. We could just see past the corner of the canal and see him sitting there. He started pulling stuff up off of the ground, and there were bunch of trees, and I told the LT that he was out of my sight— that he stood up and took off. So the LT started to call to clear fires to the south— we had a Bravo section down south and we weren’t sure exactly where they were. I remember him calling to clear fires.

I told the driver to back up because I lost sight of him. I had a tough time getting a visual with all the grass and trees down by where the guy was at. So the driver backed up 10-15 ft. and I caught sight of him again through the trees. I’m not sure if he was running at 45 degrees or straight away. To me when he stood up and gathered his things, it looked like he was running but I’m not sure— there was so much stuff covering the way that it really got blurry. When he was sitting, he was in a pocket where I could easily see him. When he stood up, I lost him. When we backed up, I stopped the vehicle, I got another visual of him and the LT said engage. I just fired off a burst— three to seven rounds of coax. I saw him fall, but I wasn’t sure if he was hit or avoiding the fire, so I followed up with a Z-pattern. A few more short bursts after that to suppress the area and that was it. The LT said cease fire and after that the 2 track had come up to us, but I can’t be sure because I was in the sight. I kept my reticle on target to make sure that we didn’t lose this guy in the terrain. I told the LT I was going to keep the visual in my sight and he dropped the dismounts and he told 2 to try and find a way to get down there. The dismounts circled around and I talked them into the area. They found a shallow area to cross the canal next to the road, and they got down there before the 2 track. SGT was the dismount squad leader.

Once the 2 track had made it around, the LT wanted to get down on the ground. We went back toward SABERS and found a place to move south over the canal and parked north of the small concrete canal the guy had been behind. After dropping the LT, they told me to come back up on the road and find any possible IED sites on the road. So the driver and I went back up to the engagement site and drove about 300m past the north-south concrete canal that tied into the east-west canal the guy was behind, because it looked like the perfect place for aiming an IED. The road was really soft and there could have been stuff anywhere but we didn’t find anything. After that, they said come back so we drove back to assist with overwatch and security. I went to meet SGT on HURRICANES to get a body bag, and we scanned again a few times with my daylight and ACOG, but there was nothing conclusive— nothing to go on. They didn’t find anything down by the canal that I know of. I guess when the guy died and fell over, there was a shovel underneath him. When he was sitting, we didn’t see anything like a shovel. I lost sight of him like 30 seconds before we engaged— maybe he picked it up on his way out, but we never saw anything like that in the AO or that he picked-up while he was sitting there that whole time. That’s about the only thing they found underneath him.
9. STATEMENT (Continued)
He had a little plastic sand bag, the kind you sit on, set-up out there. It was like a little raised-up area behind the concrete canal where he could have been sitting. He gathered up a couple of things when 2 was coming back- he looked down the road real quick and that's when we saw him. He looked at 2, we were stationary- he had eyes on us the whole time- he was watching us. He looked over at 2, picked something off the ground, and that's when I lost sight of him. I don't know if he ran or if he took a couple of steps out of the way or what. He looked to me like he was in a low crouch.

My understanding in the beginning was the we were going to try and have the 2 come around and drop dismounts and search the guy. That's the standard. We tried it once before on OILERS. We had two guys out there that had something in their hands, and we were dropping dismounts and that's when they bolted. When they heard the ramp drop they took off running. So we were trying to get the 2 around, basically in a cut-off position. And the 2 was coming back, the guy reached for something on the ground, and I think that was the sign. I don't know if he was reaching for a trigger mechanism like he was getting ready to set off an IED or something. We hadn't reached the point where the concrete canal comes up to the road yet, and that was something I had seen (the canal coming up to the road) that looked like some kind of aiming marker for an IED. Like how sometimes they use things to signify on the side of a road as a marker to aim an IED.

I definitively had positive ID on this guy. The IED triggerman, in my opinion, is pretty crafty. They always use real good cover combined with a good exfiltration route. I surveyed the area real well while we were watching this guy, and everything matched. He had good cover and concealment, a good escape route, all that stuff. And normally when we stop to observe people out at night, they just continue on with whatever they were doing. They look over at you and continue what they're doing, or they stop, put their hands on their shovel or wave at you. I know they are working a lot at night because it's Ramadan, and I'm used to seeing people out, and that crossed my mind at the time- so I figured this guy was just out working. So I started to scan and look for houses and stuff, and nothing in the immediate area around him said that this guy lived in a local house and was just working in his garden or something.

Engage when the guy first started moving because I hadn't been given the go and the LT was clearing tires. We didn't engage because we didn't know where the friendly forces were at the time. Otherwise we would have engaged at that time. I would have preferred to engage at that time. I've never seen anyone behave like that before.

In regard to a unit SOP for this type of situation, what we've done in the past is observe the individual and send a maneuver element around to check them out- which is basically what we did here. We get dismounts on the ground to go out and search the guy, see what he's doing out there. We've done this in the past, send dismounts up and most people, they just walk right up to and say, "Hey, how's it going?" and the interpreter finds out what they're doing. Usually it's stuff like irrigating fields or digging up some potatoes or whatever.

That's all that's ever been put down. And to me, when he was grabbing stuff up off the ground when 2 was coming back, he could have had something up there on the road. In our minds, that's what it was. It was an IED set-up- he was waiting for the second vehicle. He was going to blow it and get the hell out of there. The guy tested positive for XSpray (SEMTEX and C4).

Looking back on it, he had a lot of time between when he picked-up whatever he had on the ground and when I caught sight of him again and engaged him. It was real muddy out there and he could have just stuffed it down or packed it in the dirt. To me, a guy that tested positive for C4 and was hanging out beside the road and evading US forces- there has to be something out there. We just missed it. There's something about it that doesn't add up- it wasn't right, the whole situation.
This page not used. Statement ends on page 2.

**Affidavit**

I, [redacted], have read or have had read to me this statement which begins on page 1 and ends on page 2. I fully understand the contents of the entire statement made by me. The statement is true. I have initialed all corrections and have initialed the bottom of each page containing the statement. I have made this statement freely without hope of benefit or reward, without threat of punishment, and without coercion, unlawful influence, or unlawful inducement.

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES:

[Redacted]

Organizations or addresses:

[Redacted]

Page 3 of 3 pages
SWORN STATEMENT
For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is ODCSOPS

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9307 dated November 22, 1943 (SSN).
PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately identified.
ROUTINE USES: Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval.
DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION
2-70 AR Maintenance Office
2. DATE (YYYY/MM/DD) 2005/10/22
3. TIME 1030
4. FILE NUMBER

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME

6. SSN

7. GRADE/STATUS
E-6

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
A, 1-41 IN

This is a sworn statement under oath.

We were travelling west on RTE_____, which is one of the main routes in the middle of our sector that we use frequently. It’s used by everybody that operates in that sector. We were heading west. Our vehicles were probably 150-300m apart. It was dark, and I'm guessing the time was between 3 and 4 AM. We were travelling to the west, and my gunner was scanning the road and about 10-15 ft. of each side of the road for IEDs. When I’m in the front, we tend to do 10 o'clock to 2 o'clock, and the LT will scan from the 6 o'clock, or from 9 o'clock to 3 o'clock.

So we were travelling west, and the LT called me up telling me that he was stopping his vehicle because his gunner spotted somebody to the south of that route, about 200-300 m off the road. He saw someone out in that farm field. By the time they picked this guy up, they were almost facing 9 o'clock. He told me they were spotting, and that they had positive ID on a guy in the bushes. I asked the LT if he wanted me to find a way to maneuver down there, because the way he was acting was pretty suspicious. My gunner scanned over that direction, but he couldn't see anything because there were some tall trees and stuff and he told me he couldn't see him. I turned our vehicle back to the east, and my gunner continued to try and find this guy, but he told me he still couldn’t make him out. So I asked the LT if I should maneuver out there, and he said, "Yeah, roger." I couldn't find any good routes because there was a canal separating us from that field. So what I had to do was maneuver back around the LT. As I started to maneuver my vehicle, the last thing I heard them say was "Alright this guy is packing stuff up- he’s running" and right there is the point where he decided to shoot. I was on my way back to his position, and we saw the engagement. Even then my gunner couldn’t pick him up. There was a pause in communication, and then the LT called up that he had engaged him, and he wanted me to maneuver on him.

We had to travel back to RTE_____, to the east to move south. The air support sent out actually helped me find a way out there. The enemy from the LT's truck reached the site first. They went straight across the canal that was parallel to RTE_____, when my truck arrived, my dismounts linked up with his and they found the body about twenty minutes later. After they found him, I moved my truck to provide overwatch to the squad and then the LT came down with his vehicle. He actually found a crossing before reaching RTE_____, but I couldn't see. There was a small concrete irrigation canal that ran east to west through this field- we were on the south side of the canal where the suspected trigger man was, and the LT was just north of this little canal. Infantry guys didn’t have any problems moving over the canal.

I stayed in overwatch of the dismount squad, and they were looking for stuff that he had- it had been reported that he was stuffing a bunch of stuff in a sack before he ran off, and that was the point where they thought that he was about to do something or had been about to do something. And that's the point for us where stuff is totally scary and unpredictable. The dismounts didn’t find anything on the guy himself- they started looking for whatever he did have, because the LT told them that he had something like a sack or sackcloth. The place had little canals everywhere, and the place was real moist, and the guys were covered in mud by the time I got over there. I don’t think they ended up finding anything. SG____, the dismount squad leader for our section, and he led the dismounts in the search. They also identified the body.

About 200m south of the body was a house and that is where the civilian who identified the man who was shot came from. This civilian walked up, the dismounts searched him and then they had the interpreter talk to him. He said he knew who the guy was and he was from a village to the west along RTE_____. We’ve done sensing operations there and there’s a lot of anti-Coalition propaganda and whatnot there. He said that he has seen that man and his son around midnight opening some of the irrigation flood gates. I was wondering why- this field was like two kilometers from the village this guy was from. So I didn’t really understand that, why he was so far away. Even then, he said that usually his son was with him and they come at midnight, and this time he was alone and it was like 0500.

10. EXHIBIT

11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT TAKEN AT DATED__

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BE INDICATED.

DA FORM 2283, DEC 1998

DA FORM 2283, JUL 72, IS OBSOLETE

USAPA VI.00
9. STATEMENT (Continued)

SGT [redacted] said an X [redacted] swipe on the guy who was shot and it came up pink (positive for C4) so that was suspicious.

The foliage in the area was pretty thick to where it would be hard to see a person during the day without thermals. But you do have a clear shot at RTE [redacted] from the position the guy was in. Right where he was at was the edge of the heavy foliage, and it was real open from that position up to RTE [redacted]. In fact, it was elevated relative to where he was at. It sits up on a type of berm, and there was a canal separating the road from where he was at. I had to come all the way around in the east just to get down there.

We swept the road for IEDs as we came back toward the east, and after the sun came out I had the gunner go back out there and sweep from where I stopped originally back to RTE [redacted]. I'm sure we did about a 500m block of the road and he said he didn't see anything. And they didn't find any other IED apparatus either, even after the daylight search.

It a guy isn't doing anything wrong, they'll just be out there until we can get dismounts on the ground and ask the guy some questions. We've been able to do this before and it's been successful. It's safer for everyone involved to do it like this. I think the way they handled this was the way it should be done. It's scary out there with all the IEDs and stuff.

-------------------------------/NOTHING FOLLOWS/-------------------------------
SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is DODSOPS

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2651; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 (SSN).
PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately identified.
ROUTINE USES: Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval.
DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION
   2-70 AR Maintenance Office

2. DATE (YYYY/MM/DD)
   2005/10/20

3. TIME
   1000

4. FILE NUMBER

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME

6. SSN

7. GRADE/STATUS
   E-4

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
   A Co., 1-41 IN

9. 

   WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

We were going down the road, travelling west, and I was scanning from like 1 o'clock to 4 o'clock. The track behind us was scanning the opposite side. Apparently the guy was on the left hand side of the road. I didn't see anything. I didn't see the guy, I didn't see the shooting. I basically didn't see anything.

There was radio traffic, but between Battalion, Thunder Oscar and attack aviation you couldn't really hear anything. I heard the spot report. I heard them say that they saw the guy and that he was ducked down. I heard them say that he was bent down and gathering something, but I never saw him.

I saw where the guy was laying when we drove up to where he was—after the dismounts had found him and done the X-Spray, but we stayed in the vehicle and secured the site.

After the LT had dismounted, they found a man standing 30-50m from the body. He identified the body as that belonging to a guy who lived about 1 km away. The man said that the dead man used to come around with his son and open the irrigation systems, but his son wasn't there. I didn't see any irrigation systems nearby.

I'm sure we have SOPs for dealing with situations like this. We use ROE escalation of force, like it's described on the CFFLC ROE cards.


ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING STATEMENT TAKEN AT DATED

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BE THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.

DA FORM 2623, DEC 1998

DA FORM 2623, JUL 72, IS OBSOLETE

USAP 81.00

13459

Fowo
SWORN STATEMENT
For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is ODCSOPS

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT
Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 (SSN).

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately identified.

ROUTINE USES: Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval.

DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION
2-70 AR Maintenance Office

2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)
2005/10/29

3. TIME
0940

4. FILE NUMBER

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME

6. SSN

7. GRADE/STATUS
E-5

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
A, I-41 IN, Camp Taji, Iraq, APE AE 09378

9. WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

I did not know the individual was running away when I shot him. In fact, I thought he was facing us. The doc said the entry wound was in the front of his body. I certainly don't think that LT... thought the guy was running away when he gave the order.

\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\

10. EXHIBIT

11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT _______ TAKEN AT _______ DATED _______"

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BE THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.

DA FORM 2823, DEC 1998

DA FORM 2823, JUL 72, IS OBSOLETE

USAPA V1.00
160400OCT2005, A Section received an order from Avalanche 6 to move to Taji with a crew to pickup A63 so that it could be brought out to replace a broken vehicle in 3rd Platoon. Alpha section left there Polling sight move to Taji. While traveling West on route Huracanives, I called A12, an 1SG who identified a hot spot off the road approximately 300 meters. I called A12, SSC which was the lead track to stop while we checked on what it was. I began to scan with my gunner to determine what we were looking at. The heat signature was in a tree line behind cover. We maneuvered the Bradley to gain the best observation of the source of the heat source. While trying to identify what it was we scanned the Area for possible reasons there might be a heat source, local farm houses any live stock. We could not see anything besides the solitary heat source in a tree line positioned behind a cement water canal line parallel to hurricanes. My gunner and I continued to observe the heat source. We were able to identify that it was in fact a man hunched down behind a concrete irrigation canal. I called A12 and told him what we had and told him to start moving back to my location and to look for a route running South so we could maneuver onto the heat source. I was going to start maneuvering my Bradleys onto the man when my gunner and I observed him look over in the direction of my A12 driving back to the East and begin doing something with his hands he was picking up something while in a crouched position and doing something with it. I was able to determine Positive Identification because of the position of the man over watching Hurricanes. He was set up in a covered and concealed position that also provided him with a covered and concealed escape route. He was hiding from behind a concrete water canal and the only reason we were able to identify him was because we were in a flanking position. Had we been perpendicular to him or had moved forward 100 meters more we would not have been able to see him. The area we were in was an IED danger area and there have been numerous IED attacks on this route.

The man moved from his original position and told me we needed to move the Bradley so that he could regain a visual on him.
We began moving the Bradley back about 5-7 feet when my gunner located him again. I got the location of Bravo section and gave the order to engage to eliminate the threat. The gunner engaged with one burst and he then lost sight of the triggerman. I remained in over watch while I talked dismounts onto the target sight. The individual was located and confirmed that he was dead by my medic, S. The Grid from which we fired coax is MB. The Grid of the KIA was MB. After searching the site the dismounts were unable to find a trigger device. A Shovel was found but at no time did I or the A-11G recognize anything that resembled a shovel. In the hands of the individual or in close proximity. After questioning locals was out in the field at irregular time and not consistent with his regular routine. The neighbor reported that he came out at night at midnight to open canals in the area but not at or between 0430-0530. He normally was with his son, but this time was alone. S. Conducted an x-spray on the individual for explosive residue. His test came up positive for explosive residue. A mounted search of Hurricanes for an IED resulted in nothing found. The body was then released to an Iraqi ambulance and we escorted it to the family’s house.
PHOTOGRAPHS TAKEN BY LINE OF SIGHT OF THE SHOOTING
(VIC MB 193 915) 16 0600 OCT 05

EXHIBIT

Picture 1- Eastern edge of the small canal. This picture was taken from the initial position of the local national, facing northwest. RTE is visible in the background.

Picture 2- Picture from the initial position of the local national, facing west along the small concrete canal. The local national's body was found in the dirt canal seen in the background that runs from right to left in the picture (north to south), just to the left edge of the photograph.
**SMORN STATEMENT**
For use of this form, see AR 190-46; the proponent agency is ODCSOPS

**PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT**

AUTHORITY: Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 255; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 (SSN)
PRINCIPLE PURPOSE: To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately recorded.
ROUTINE USES: Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval.
DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

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<th>1. LOCATION</th>
<th>2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)</th>
<th>3. TIME</th>
<th>4. FILE NUMBER</th>
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<tbody>
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<td>20051030</td>
<td>1028</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME (If any)
6. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
A/1-41 IN

EXCL

I, , do solemnly swear or affirm that the statement under oath:

A/1-41 IN does not have a published SOP for addressing a perceived threat. In regard to a perceived threat, leaders in this company are taught and expected to act IAW doctrine, common sense, compassion, and Battle Drills. Each leader has a very prescriptive list of criteria that falls within the published ROE to ensure they are making the right decisions, which knowingly affect the outcome of our actions. In this particular case, the perceived threat was continuously observed and surveyed throughout the course of the engagement. The leader on the ground decided to action his platoon against the threat through Battle Drill 1, Platoon Attack. The measures taken were immediately to detain the threat, until certain factors led to the decision to use greater force. Continuing to observe the threat, and during the maneuver, the threat increased as did the response to the threat. I see nothing wrong with the escalation of force that was used during the engagement.

Nothing Follows

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

EXHIBIT 13