MEMORANDUM FOR Record

SUBJECT: Commander’s Action regarding the AR 15-6 Investigation into the facts surrounding the IED Detonation resulting in the Destruction of 1xM114 and the Shooting resulting in the Death of a Local National on 21 Sep 05

I have reviewed the AR 15-6 Investigation and the evidence supporting the investigation. The findings and recommendations of the Investigating Officer are approved.

[Signature]

COL, EN
Commanding
REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS BY INVESTIGATING OFFICER/BOARD OF OFFICERS
For use of this form, see AR 15-6; the responsible agency is OJAG.
IF MORE SPACE IS REQUIRED IN FILLING OUT ANY PORTION OF THIS FORM, ATTACH ADDITIONAL SHEETS

SECTION I - APPOINTMENT

Appointed by MAJ, AR, Task Force Executive Officer
(Appointing authority)

on 23SEP05 (Attach inclosure 1: Letter of appointment or summary of oral appointment data.) See pars 3-15, AR 15-6.1

SECTION II - SESSIONS

The investigating officer (board) commenced at TF 4-64 AR, POB (Place) 0130

on 24SEP005 (If a formal board met for more than one session, check here ) . Indicate in an inclosure the time each session began and
ended, the place, parties present and absent, and explanation of absence, if any.) The following persons (members, respondents, counsel) were
present. (After each name, indicate capacity, e.g., President, Recorder, Member, Legal Advisor.)

N/A

The following persons (member, respondent, counsel) were absent: (Include brief explanation of each absence.) (See paras 3-2 and 3-6a, AR 15-6.1)

N/A

The investigating officer (board) initiated gathering/hearing evidence at 11:45 on 27SEP005

and completed findings and recommendations at 13:00 on 27SEP005

SECTION III - CHECKLIST FOR PROCEEDINGS

A. COMPLETE IN ALL CASES

1. Inclosures (pars 3-15, AR 15-6)

   a. Letter of appointment or summary of oral appointment data

   b. Other correspondence with respondent or counsel, if any?

   c. Privacy Act Statement (Certificate, if statement provided orally)?

   d. Explanation by the investigating officer or board of any unusual delays, difficulties, irregularities, or other

      uncertainties (e.g., absence of material witnesses)?

   e. Information as to sessions of a formal board not included on page 1 of this report

   f. Any other significant data relating to administrative aspects of the investigation or board

FOOTNOTES: 1. Expedites all negative answers on an attached sheet

2. Use of the N/A column constitutes a negative representation that the circumstances described in the question did not occur in this investigation.

DA FORM 1574, MAR 83 EDITION OF NOV 77 IS OBSOLETE.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Are all items offered (whether or not received) or considered as evidence individually numbered or listed as exhibits and attached to this report?</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Are copies, descriptions, or depictions of inanimate objects (real or documentary evidence) properly authenticated and in the location of the original evidence described?</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Are summaries or descriptions of conversations obtained by the investigating officer or board attached to this report?</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Is each written statement attached as an exhibit and is each oral statement either reduced to writing and made an exhibit or recorded in a verbatim record?</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Was a concise report when the board voted on findings and recommendations (paras 4-1 and 5-2b, AR 15-6)?</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>COMPLETE ONLY FOR FORMAL BOARD PROCEEDINGS (Chapter 5, AR 15-6)</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Was a concise present at every session of the board (paras 5-2b, AR 15-6)?</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Was each notice of any member properly served (paras 5-2b, AR 15-6)?</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Were members, witnesses, reporters, and interpreters sworn, if required (paras 5-1, AR 15-6)?</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>If any members who voted on findings or recommendations were not present when the board received some evidence, does the minutes describe how they familiarized themselves with that evidence (paras 5-2d, AR 15-6)?</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>COMPLETE ONLY IF RESPONDENT WAS DESIGNATED (Section II, Chapter 5, AR 15-6)</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Notice to respondents (paras 5-3, AR 15-6):</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Counsel (paras 5-6, AR 15-6):</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>If the respondent challenged the legal advisor or any voting member for lack of impartiality (paras 5-7, AR 15-6):</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>If requested, did the record include the respondent in obtaining evidence in possession of the Government and in arranging for the presence of witnesses (paras 5-8b, AR 15-6)?</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes:**
- If the box is checked, the statement is true.
- If the box is not checked, the statement is false.

**FOOTNOTE:**
- 1. Evidence of hearings is covered in an attached sheet.
- 2. The box of the next column represents a negative representation that the circumstances described in the question did not occur in this investigation or hearing.
The investigating officer, having carefully considered the evidence, finds:

The attached document for investigation findings.

SECTION V - RECOMMENDATIONS (para 5-11, AR 15-6)

In view of the above findings, the investigating officer recommends:

The attached for investigation recommendations.
SECTION VI - AUTHENTICATION (para 3-17, AR 15-6)

This report of proceedings is complete and accurate. If any voting member or the recorder fails to sign here or in Section VII below, indicate the reason in the space where his signature should appear.

[Signatures]

SECTION VII - MINORITY REPORT (para 3-13, AR 15-6)

To the extent indicated in the enclosure, the undersigned do(es) not concur in the findings and recommendations of the board. (In the enclosure, identify by number each finding and/or recommendation in which the dissenting member(s) do(es) not concur. State the reasons for disagreement. Additional/substitute findings and/or recommendations may be included in the enclosure.)

[Signatures]

SECTION VIII - ACTION BY APPOINTING AUTHORITY (para 3-3, AR 15-6)

If findings and recommendations of the investigating officer (marked as approved/disapproved/approved with restrictive reservations) is the appointing authority recommends, the proceedings to the investigating officer or board for further proceedings or corrective action, attach correspondence (or a summary, if oral) as a numbered enclosure.
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B. MFR, Subject: Statement Adoption Certificate

C. 4th BCT Critical Information Report, 210740SEP05

D. 4th BCT Patrol Debrief, 211215SEP05

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F. 

G. 

H. DA1594 from E/4-64 Company Log Book, 21SEP05

I. Sworn Statements
   1. Sworn Statement of 1LT, dated 211130SEP05
   2. Sworn Statement of SFC, dated 211105SEP05
   3. Sworn Statement of SGT, dated 211110SEP05
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J. Chronology of Investigative Activities
SUBJECT: 15-6 Investigation of IED Detonation resulting in destruction of 1x M1114 and shooting resulting in a Local National death at 210740SEP05 on RTE.

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Task Force 4-64 Armor
4th BCT, 3rd Infantry Division
Forward Operating Base (FOB) 
Baghdad, Iraq APO AE 09348

AFZB-VBA-T 27 September 2005

MEMORANDUM FOR Commander, 4th Battalion, 64th Armor Regiment, 3rd Infantry Division, FOB 
APO AE 09348

SUBJECT: 15-6 Investigation of IED Detonation resulting in destruction of 1x M1114 and shooting resulting in a Local National death, at 210740SEP05 on RTE.

1. Purpose.
This memorandum lists the circumstance surrounding both the 21 September 2005 shooting resulting in a Local National death, and the IED detonation resulting in the destruction of various sensitive items and 1x M1114 Gun Truck involving an E/4-64 AR Task Force Ironclaw IED sweep along RTE and documents the findings of this investigation and provides recommendation for the same.

2. Facts.
1st Platoon with B-Section from Red Platoon departed FOB at 0614hrs to conduct route clearance of RTE and RTE (Exh. E, H). OOM was Red3 (MIA1), E33 (M1114), E32 (M1114), E31 (M1114), and E36 (M1114), E3 (M1114), and Red4 (MIA1) (Exh. C, E). The sweep started at 0620hrs where the Beast element proceeded through RTE at 0630hrs, and RTE at 0640hrs (Exh. E). The element then proceeded on to RTE at approximately 0700hrs, where they proceeded through RTE at 0705hrs and RTE at 0730hrs (Exh. E). On or about 210740SEP05 the 4-64 AR TOC was informed that their team was hit by an IED along RTE in the vic. of grid (Exh. C). One of the M114's in the (E32) was struck by the IED (Exh. C, E, G, H, I). The element immediately set up a cordon to establish local security and conducted radio checks to assess if anyone was hit by the blast (Exh. D, I). The Platoon Sergeant, SFC, was unable to raise SSG SSG's gun truck (E32) on the radio, and proceeded forward to E32 to find SSG and PFC lying on the ground by the vehicle (Exh. D, I). The other occupants of E32, SPC (driver) and SGT (tank mechanic), had both evacuated both SSG and PFC from the vehicle (Exh. D, I). In the process of the evacuation, the SSG began to take small arms fire from the west (Exh. D, I). SFC immediately notified the Platoon Leader, 1LT , that E32 had taken some casualties (Exh. I). 1LT then jumped to the TF 3-7 IN net and submitted MEDEVAC request and called for additional ground support (Exh. D, I). At approximately 0745hrs, a patrol from 3-7 IN reached the site (Exh. D, I). SFC decided to use one of the M2 Bradleys from the patrol element in order to evacuate SSG and PFC more quickly (Exh. I). Within
SUBJECT: 15-6 Investigation of IED Detonation resulting in destruction of 1x M1114 and Shooting resulting in a Local National death at 210740Z Sep 05 on RTE

5 minutes of the arrival of the element, SSG and PFC had been loaded into one of the M2’s along with PFC the platoon medic (Exh. I). SFC mounted back up with his crew from E31 and moved with the casualty-holding M2 and another M2 from the element to the CSH (Exh. D.I). They arrived at the CSH approximately 10 minutes after departing from the IED site and handed SSG and PFC over to the hospital personnel to be treated (Exh. D.I).

Approximately 30 seconds after the IED exploded, a silver sedan approached from the west along a dirt road that connected to RTE approximately 150m from where the team was halted (Exh. D.I). The sedan accelerated toward theordon and entered E36’s (an M1114 in the convoy that was pulling security to the west) sector of fire (Exh. I). The gunner of E36 (SGT) attempted to first show at the vehicle to stop, then attempted to wave the vehicle down from his turret using hand and arm signals and by pointing his crew-served weapon at the vehicle (Exh. I). Despite his visual attempts, the vehicle continued on its course toward the convoy without showing any signs of slowing down. SGT then secured his M16 and fired a warning shot at a dirt mound that was just north of the road (Exh. I). Again, the vehicle continued on its course without showing any signs of slowing down (Exh. I). SGT fired another warning shot at the dirt mound with the same effect as the first warning shot (Exh. I). He then aimed his weapon at the silver sedan’s hood and fired 1 round at it (Exh. I). The vehicle maintained its course and showed no signs of slowing down (Exh. I). SGT then fired another round at the hood of the sedan with no evident effect (Exh. D.I). SGT then aimed his weapon at the driver and fired 1 round at the windshield of the vehicle (Exh. D.I). SGT could not determine if he had hit the driver and saw no change in the vehicle’s high rate of speed (Exh. D.I). After firing three more rounds at the driver, the vehicle slowed and headed off to the north side of the road near the dirt mound that SGT had fired the warning shots at (Exh. I). After the vehicle came to a complete stop, SGT resumed scanning his sector (Exh. I). The local national driving the silver sedan was pronounced dead by the Iraqi police at the scene, due to a gunshot wound to the head. Approximately 15 minutes after the IPs determined that the local national was dead, they evacuated the body from the scene. No further information about the dead local national was provided by the police on the scene to the

After the incoming vehicle threat was eliminated and the casualties were evacuated to the CSH, the maintained their cordon IOT facilitate recovery assets to remove the destroyed M1114 (Exh. C, D.I). SPC and SGT removed as many sensitive items and as much ammunition as possible from E32 (Exh. D.I). At approximately 0850hrs, recovery assets along with the TF 4-64 QRF arrived on site and began recovery operations (Exh. C, D). At approximately 0915hrs, the recovery team had E32 in tow, the cordon collapsed and all elements (Recovery, and QRF) proceeded back to POB (Exh. D.I). Upon arriving back to FOB, SGT and SPC were taken to the TF TMC in order to have their superficial wounds treated (Exh. D.I). The recovery team took E32 to the repair bays (Exh. I). The resumed to base to conduct repair operations as well as to conduct a mission debriefing with the TF S2.

SSG and PFC were both admitted to the CSH approximately 15 minutes after MEDEVAC element left the scene of the IED explosion. PFC

17358
SUBJECT: 15-6 Investigation of IED Detonation resulting in destruction of 1xM114
and Shooting resulting in a Local National death at 210746SEP05 on RTE 
received treatment for his shrapnel wounds at the CSH. The damage due to the shrapnel
wounds required evacuation out of theater to the United States for rehabilitation.
Approximately three days after being admitted to the CSH, PFC was evacuated
out of theater to the United States for rehabilitation. While in surgery at the CSH, the
doctors concluded that the damage done to SSG 7's left leg was too severe and that
amputation of the left leg was necessary. Doctors were able to clean up the wounds to his
right leg and brought him to stable condition. Approximately 3 days after being admitted
to the CSH, SSG was evacuated out of theater and back to the United States for
rehabilitation.

3. FINDINGS:

A. General.

1) Escalation of Force for all servicemen in Iraq is addressed in

The five steps discussed in Graduated Force are:

1. Shout verbal warnings to halt;
2. Show your weapon and demonstrate intent to use it;
3. Physically restrain, block access, or detain;
4. Fire a warning shot;
5. Shoot to eliminate the threat

2) In general, warning shots are only authorized when the use of deadly
force would be authorized in a particular situation. As per the current ROE, soldiers are
authorized to use up to and including deadly force in order to protect mission essential
equipment, when required. When a hostile act or hostile intent is believed to take place,
Coalition Forces are authorized to use up to and including deadly force in order to
eliminate the threat.

3) After interviewing the soldiers involved in this incident, I can conclude
that they all state the driver continued after SGT repeated attempts to stop the
vehicle with hand and arm signals and voice commands. It is reasonable to say that the
driver did not hear SGT voice commands due to the driver’s distance from the
M114 Gun Truck. It is also reasonable to say that the driver possibly didn’t see SGT
hand signals given his rate of speed, how fast the sequence of events were
happening, and the distance involved (Exh. 1).

B. Specifics.

1) ILT platoon conducts IED sweeps in this area numerous times each
week, clearing RTE of potential IEDs and EFPs, with some incidents in the past.
However, the intensity of the situation, with an IED hitting and destroying one of the
M114’s, the small arms fire that the halted convoy received immediately after the blast,
and the necessity of maintaining a cordon around the convoy in order for the platoon to
assess any casualties or damaged vehicles, caused SGT to believe that the
vehicle not heeding his warnings was a potential threat to the rest of the platoon, some of whom were on the ground (Exh. 1).

2) In general, gunners in vehicles will take commands from the vehicle commander, concerning escalation of force; however leaders will trust the judgment of their subordinates, knowing the gunner has a better position to observe the surroundings. SGT [redacted] used the proper steps in the escalation of force prior to firing his weapon. Then using his own judgment, SGT [redacted] fired his M16 in an attempt to protect his crew and his platoon from the perceived threat (Exh. 1).

3) He (SGT [redacted]) fired eight shots: two in the ground at the mound of dirt on the side of the road, two into the car's hood in attempt to warn the vehicle to stop, without injuring anyone at that point. However, the vehicle continued to advance at a high rate of speed, and at this point SGT [redacted] states that he was almost certain that the vehicle was an immediate threat to his M1114 and the halted convoy as a whole. He (SGT [redacted]) states that he fired 4 rounds at the driver until the vehicle slowed and veered off the road into the dirt mound that was approximately 50m away from SGT [redacted] M1114. The end result was the death of the local national due to a gunshot wound to the head. While this death was unfortunate, it did prevent the potential of additional friendly casualties, if the vehicle had breached the security perimeter of the

4) [redacted] is as follows:

   a. 
   b. 
   c. 
   d. 
   e. 
   f. 
   g. 

5) No positive identification of the local national killed has been determined to date. We are conducting further investigation in coordination with the Iraqi Police and local hospitals in order to obtain the identity of the local national. No record of any claim for condolence payment has been determined to this date. We are also conducting further investigation in coordination with local hospitals and the [redacted] in order to locate any family members of the dead local national and ensure a condolence payment for the family.
SUBJECT: 15-6 Investigation of IED Detonation resulting in destruction of 1xM1114 and Shooting resulting in a Local National death at 210740SEP05 on RTE

6) The investigating officer has interviewed all the necessary individuals involved and has reviewed all documents pertaining to this incident. I have determined although the results of this incident was tragic, SGT acted in accordance with the correct Rules of Engagement and used proper escalation of force procedures to remove the perceived threat.

4. RECOMMENDATIONS:

A. In view of all the evidence present, SGT actions were justified and in accordance with the MNC-I ROE, and no adverse action should result from this investigation.

B. In addition, there has been no evidence to suggest that the damages to were the result of negligence on the part of anyone involved in the IED detonation.

C. The Civil Affairs team should continue to locate family members of the deceased local national in order to ensure payment of condolence to the family.

D. No further action is required upon completion of this investigation. All of the parties involved should be relieved of any and all financial liabilities.

5. POC: Point of contact for this memorandum is the undersigned at

ILT, AR
Investigating Officer

Encls
Tabs A-J
A. Appointment Orders
B. MFR, Subject: Statement Adoption Certificate
C. 4th BCT Critical Information Report, 210740SEP05
D. 4th BCT Patrol Debrief, 211211SEP05
E. E/4-64 Patrol Debrief, 211030SEP05
F.
G.

H. DA1594 from E/4-64 Company Log Book, 21SEP05
SUBJECT: 15-6 Investigation of IED Detonation resulting in destruction of 1xM1114 and Shooting resulting in a Local National death at 210740SEP05 on RTE [redacted].

I. Sworn Statements
   1. Sworn Statement of ILT [redacted], dated 211105SEP05
   2. Sworn Statement of SFC [redacted], dated 21105SEP05
   3. Sworn Statement of SGT [redacted], dated 211105SEP05
   4. Sworn Statement of SGT [redacted], dated 211105SEP05
   5. Sworn Statement of SGT [redacted], dated 21109SEP05
   6. Sworn Statement of SGT [redacted], dated 211109SEP05
   7. Sworn Statement of SPC [redacted], dated 211108SEP05
   8. Sworn Statement of PFC [redacted], dated 211112SEP05
   9. Sworn Statement of PFC [redacted], dated 211108SEP05

II. Chronology of Investigative Activities
MEMORANDUM FOR 1LT HHC, Task Force 4/64 AR, 3rd Infantry Division, APO AE 09348

SUBJECT: Appointment as Investigating Officer

1. You are hereby appointed as an Investigating Officer pursuant to Army Regulation (AR) 15-6, Procedures for Investigating Officers and Boards of Officers, to conduct an informal investigation to determine the facts and circumstances surrounding the loss of an M1114 HMMWV, E Co, Task Force 4-64 AR.

2. You will conduct a thorough investigation of the matter to determine the circumstances surrounding the loss of the property. Your investigation should focus on, but not necessarily be limited to, the following:

   a. Events leading up to the IED attack

   b. Position of HMMWV in convoy

   c. HMMWV Driver's driving history

3. Prior to the beginning of your investigation, you must make an appointment with the Administrative Law Division of the Staff Judge Advocate's Office. An attorney at the Administrative Law Division will be your legal advisor.

4. In conducting your investigation, use informal procedures under AR 15-6. Make specific findings as to the allegations above. The evidence you gather should support your findings. Make recommendations consistent with your findings to address any perceived or actual improper or criminal conduct.

5. In your investigation, all witness statements will be sworn and written on DA Form 2023, Sworn Statement. If, in the course of your investigation, you come to suspect that any individuals have committed a criminal offense, then use DA Form 3881, Rights Warning/Procedure Waiver Certificate, to advise them of their rights under Article 31, Uniform Code of Military Justice, or the Fifth Amendment (if interviewing a civilian), as appropriate. In addition, provide witnesses with a Privacy Act Statement before you interview them (See AR 15-6, Appendix B).
AFZP-VEA-C
SUBJECT: Appointment as Investigating Officer

6. I direct you to keep compile a daily chronology of all investigative activities and encourage you to consult with a legal advisor whenever and as often as necessary. In the case of any alleged criminal misconduct, you must consult with a legal advisor.

7. Submit your findings and recommendations to me on DA Form 1574 within 10 working days of receipt of this appointment order. Should you require additional time, coordinate with me, through the Office of the Staff Judge Advocate.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]
MAJ, AR
Task Force Executive Officer
MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: AR 15-6 Investigation Document Adoption Certificate

1. The undersigned coordinated with all personnel involved in the AR 15-6 investigation, regarding a shooting incident on or about 210740SEP05, involving elements of [REDACTED] Company, and determined the statements were substantially the same as at the time they were written; no changes were required. The investigating officer is adopting these statements as part of the investigation.

   A. Sworn Statement of 1LT [REDACTED], dated 211130SEP05.
   B. Sworn Statement of SFC [REDACTED], dated 211105SEP05.
   C. Sworn Statement of SGT [REDACTED], dated 211110SEP05.
   D. Sworn Statement of SGT [REDACTED], dated 211109SEP05.
   E. Sworn Statement of SGT [REDACTED], dated 21109SEP05.
   F. Sworn Statement of [REDACTED], dated 211109SEP05.
   G. Sworn Statement of SPC [REDACTED], dated 211108SEP05.
   H. Sworn Statement of PFC [REDACTED], dated 211112SEP05.
   I. Sworn Statement of PFC [REDACTED], dated 211108SEP05.
   J. Patrol Debrief conducted by CPT [REDACTED], BN S2

2. Point of contact for this memorandum is the undersigned at [REDACTED]@us.army.mil, VOIP [REDACTED].

ILT, AR
Investigating Officer
Task Force 4-64
Critical Information Report

LINE 1: Unit Reporting: E 4/64 AR
LINE 2: Incident: IED Explosion
LINE 3: Date/Time Group (DTG) Incident occurred: 210740SEP05
LINE 4: Location of Incident: RTE
LINE 5: Personnel Involved:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>SSN</th>
<th>Sex</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Race</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

SEE ATTACHED

LINE 6: Summary of Incident:

1st Platoon conducting IED sweep of RTE. Patrol configuration was E33, E32, E36, E31, and E24. At approximately 0740 hrs the third vehicle (E32) was struck by an IED. Approx 30 seconds after blast a silver sedan approached from the west at a high rate of speed bisecting the convoy. The gunner of E36 (SGT) used all appropriate ramp measures then fired warning shots in the dirt mound to the side of the vehicle. The vehicle continued to approach patrol and the gunner attempted to fire into the engine block of the vehicle. 3-7 IN called IPs to the scene and the IPs investigated the vehicle and stated the driver was shot in the head. IPs transported LN. Platoon established aordon of the area and E17 rendered aid to the WIA. Air medevac was requested that evening and was cancelled later because E17 with the assistance of 3-7 transported the two WIA to the CSH. The other 3 WIA was treated at site. QRF arrived on scene at approximately 0850 hours. Once the Recovery QRF arrived, Vehicle and equipment was recovered; patrol with recovery assets returned to the FOB @ approximately 0940 hrs. The three walking WIA was taken to the TMIC and treated.

Two lethally wounded WIA: SSG , M, 25 yrs old B
FPC , M, 22 yrs old, Other

Walking Wounded:

SPC , M, 23 yrs old, Other
SGT , M, 23 yrs old, Other
SGT , Battle Roster HSC 7725, FSC

LINE 7: [Handwritten]
LITE: Commander reporting:

LTC, AR
Commanding
On 21 Mar 2005, I was the patrol leader for a 150-street traverse 150 sweep convoy that was tasked to sweep Rtk-51 and Rtk-52. While sweeping South on Rtk-51 at approximately 0740, our E-32 vehicle was struck by an IED on the west (up) side of Rtk-51. The guid for the 160 strike, was running at 40 mph. As soon as it was assessed that the E-32 vehicle was immobilized and its occupants were injured, the E-17 46c was called in order to render aid with the Medevac (Rtk-51 and to evacuate the wounded. I was informed that there were 3 litter patients in the vehicle. I called 4-1-7 (9-7 in Red) and requested an Medevac Helicopter. Also, I requested additional ground support. Later, an Epper 1 patrol and began coordinating for a Medevac Red. A 9-7 patrol stood up on Red within 5 minutes of the blast. They had a board in the patrol and so we used the vehicle to evacuate the injured to the Design. A redbook report was given to me as I went up to the scene and asked for an update. At this time a more accurate report was given that the 160 and 5GE were the only 2 litter patients. The 160 and 5GE were the other occupants and they only perserved minor superficial wounds.
my vehicle. I observed 3-2 about 5-10 feet to the rear of the red vehicle. I then stopped the vehicle and went to 10". The 3-2 put rounds on the 10". The driver of the vehicle was him. He had about 1-2 rounds to the head. I witnessed the 10" rounds fired and execute the lead. The lead was fired all rounds. The 10" vehicle had clear vision of our position and did appear to be approaching us in a attacking manner, and it was breaching the fire distance. Once the screening came in, I received 6-2. Our position continued to for 3-2 while 3-2 made the site seeing for East.

END OF STATEMENT.

1. [Affidavit]

I, HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THE STATEMENT WHICH CONSTITUTES PAGE 1 AND EACH PAGE THEREOF. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS AND EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OR PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT CONSIDERATION. UNLESS IMPLIED OR TENDERED BY THE STATE OR ANY AGENCY OF THE STATE.

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized to administer oaths, this 2-1 day of 56th.

Signature of Person Administering Oath

INVESTIGATING OFFICER

Authority to Administer Oath

PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES
On the 21 Mar 05 IOPD conducted route sweeping operations at about 0630 hrs as we were sweeping south on Route 2 an IED was struck by an IED. I was called forward to the site and encountered IED. and I provided First Aid to the casualties while IIE coordinated the MEDEVAC. As we were treating our wounded we received a truck vehicle in order to seek cover and continued driving. Right after the fire stopped and I noticed a Bradley tank to drop the ramp for EVAC purpose. After the casualties in route to the CASH. The trip to the CASH took no more than 10 minutes where we turned the casualties over for further medical aid.
On the morning of September 21, 2005, our platoon was deployed on a route west of FOB [redacted], (we had just turned around), as we were driving on FOB west off. I was just looking on that direction as the gunner of the vehicle. I saw this civilian vehicle heading my 240B but it didn't stop, he kept coming and I shot his left about 50 meters from us. He did not stop and I follow with 3 of 5 rounds and I announced as this happened we didn't know if there was any injured from our platoon. The same IED's that were nearby in front of the [redacted] had been hit. It was E33.
SECRET

As soon as Kit came over the not clear platform and we got 70 minutes in E31, we asked them to assist, because we had hardly two minutes of the train car. Even after this, they had hardly two minutes to get back to E33. We hoped this is that we received their orders, and after this, we left the area and continued with the recovery.

We were not sure if we could assist, but they were sure to assist. We had hardly two minutes to get back to E33, and after this, we left the area and continued with the recovery.

SECRET
I, SGT [REDACTED], want to make the following statement under oath:

On the day of 2005-09-06, in Baghdad, Iraq, while on a mission, my platoon was tasked to sweep SGT [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]. When I arrived, right after the turn around point at approximately 0445 hrs, my Humvee E12 got hit on the passenger side with a VBIED. After the blast cleared, I noticed that out of the 5 personnel that were riding in that vehicle, who were (PFC, SPC, SGT, SSG, SGT) and myself. Two were injured, SSG [REDACTED] who was the TC and the gunner PFC [REDACTED].

PFC [REDACTED] who was the closest to me had sever injuries on both of his hands and SSG [REDACTED] was not responding. I proceeded to take PFC [REDACTED] out of the vehicle because he was screaming and drag him away from the vehicle. After that I went to assist SSG [REDACTED] with carrying out SSG [REDACTED]. At that moment, I notice that SSG [REDACTED] right leg was [REDACTED] we took them both to a safer location but we held shots fired and we moved them again trying to find cover behind the Humvee. After that we started doing first aid on them, and the medic was already working on SSG. [REDACTED]. I noticed that PFC [REDACTED] was also injured in his leg. At that moment I grab my first aid pouches and patched him up. After that I saw a Bradley fighting vehicle roll up to the
site. By then I was instructed by SPC _____ to drive to the medic, SPC _____ was already inside with the medic, and then they rolled out to the casualty, at the time I had the right side of my face, my jaw was hurt and bleeding as a result of some small shrapnel pieces that hit my face, me and SPC _____ were standing on site pulling security and collecting all our sensitive items, waiting for somebody to pick us up, also I was leading on one of his legs.

LT _____ pulled up asked us some info and told me we were going to get on the HMMWV and ride back to the road on it and told the mechanic to ride on his humvee. We waited a little while there securing the site and recovering the vehicle, and after that we convoy back to FOB _____, where my self, SPC _____ and SPC _____ received medical attention. Me on the face, SPC _____ on the leg, and SPC _____ on his legs.

NOTHING FOLLOWS
After the explosion, the convoy was scattered. We were ordered to sweep the area for IEDs. The vehicle that was struck by the blast was an E-32, which contained looted items. Shortly after, I dropped down to the ground point. We had just swept one side of the road, and we were searching for mines. The vehicle that was struck by the blast was an E-32, which contained looted items. Shortly after, I dropped down to the ground point. We had just swept one side of the road, and we were searching for mines. The vehicle that was struck by the blast was an E-32, which contained looted items. Shortly after, I dropped down to the ground point. We had just swept one side of the road, and we were searching for mines. The vehicle that was struck by the blast was an E-32, which contained looted items. Shortly after, I dropped down to the ground point. We had just swept one side of the road, and we were searching for mines. The vehicle that was struck by the blast was an E-32, which contained looted items. Shortly after, I dropped down to the ground point. We had just swept one side of the road, and we were searching for mines. The vehicle that was struck by the blast was an E-32, which contained looted items. Shortly after, I dropped down to the ground point. We had just swept one side of the road, and we were searching for mines. The vehicle that was struck by the blast was an E-32, which contained looted items.Shortly after, I dropped down to the ground point. We had just swept one side of the road, and we were searching for mines. The vehicle that was struck by the blast was an E-32, which contained looted items. Shortly after, I dropped down to the ground point. We had just swept one side of the road, and we were searching for mines. The vehicle that was struck by the blast was an E-32, which contained looted items. Shortly after, I dropped down to the ground point. We had just swept one side of the road, and we were searching for mines. The vehicle that was struck by the blast was an E-32, which contained looted items. Shortly after, I dropped down to the ground point. We had just swept one side of the road, and we were searching for mines. The vehicle that was struck by the blast was an E-32, which contained looted items. Shortly after, I dropped down to the ground point. We had just swept one side of the road, and we were searching for mines. The vehicle that was struck by the blast was an E-32, which contained looted items. Shortly after, I dropped down to the ground point. We had just swept one side of the road, and we were searching for mines. The vehicle that was struck by the blast was an E-32, which contained looted items. Shortly after, I dropped down to the ground point. We had just swept one side of the road, and we were searching for mines. The vehicle that was struck by the blast was an E-32, which contained looted items. Shortly after, I dropped down to the ground point. We had just swept one side of the road, and we were searching for mines. The vehicle that was struck by the blast was an E-32, which contained looted items. Shortly after, I dropped down to the ground point. We had just swept one side of the road, and we were searching for mines. The vehicle that was struck by the blast was an E-32, which contained looted items. Shortly after, I dropped down to the ground point. We had just swept one side of the road, and we were searching for mines. The vehicle that was struck by the blast was an E-32, which contained looted items.
I, SPC [redacted], want to make the following statement under oath:

On this date of 2005-09-21, time 0745 E Co was sweeping for IED's on south of [redacted] while conducting our sweep. The second Humvee was hit by an EFP. In that Humvee it was myself (driver) SSG TC and squad leader, PFC [redacted] as Gunner and SGT [redacted]. After the explosion, I started yelling everyone's name, PFC [redacted] was screaming in pain about his hand. At that moment SGT pulls out set's him on the side. SGT [redacted] pulls SGT [redacted] out side the Humvee just to the right of me. I pulled security on the left side. SGT [redacted] was the spotter sitting behind me. After I saw that all was secured myself and SGT [redacted] pulled set [redacted] into the safety, then we start recover fire. I can't say what side SGT [redacted] told me and SGT [redacted] to drag SGT [redacted] on the other side of the Humvee. Then PFC [redacted] (medic) showed up placed a fur on SGT [redacted] leg to stop the bleeding. The Humvee was on fire that was hit was on fire SGT [redacted] yells out to me to get a fire extinguisher and put it out. I grabbed the fire extinguisher from Victor 8-31.
SSgt S. also attained PFC and placed on a second wound to his left leg. After that, a Bradley Fighting Vehicle arrived. I did not see the Bumpo hit during the combat. SSgt S. was placed in a medic truck. The area was cleared, and he was taken to the medical unit.

PFC F. was the first one to be taken out. The medic was first to be taken out. He was a couple of minutes behind the medic. SSgt S. was put back on a medic truck, and he was taken to the medical unit. SSgt S. was seen and checked out by the medic.
STATEMENT OF

TAKEN AT

DATED

STATEMENT (Continued)

AFFIDAVIT

I have read or have had read to me this statement which begins on page 1, and ends on page 2. I fully understand the contents of the entire statement made by me. The statement is true. I have initialed all connections and have initialed the bottom of each page containing the statement. I have made this statement freely without hope of benefit or reward, without threat or punishment, and without coercion, unlawful influence, or unlawful inducement.

Signature of Person Making Statement.

WITNESSES:

Signed at the place and on the day of this 21st day of September, 2005.

Organization or Address

Signature of Person Making Statement.

Investigating Officer

Organization or Address

Investigating Officer's Name and Title

17391
We were driving on a Mission. Traveling down Route [redacted], we turned around at the end of the route and started the other side of the road about 5 min. after the turn on IED went off on the second Humvee. 1st L [redacted] started asking for a SIT REP, calling for support and setting up a cordon. While this was going on Sgt. [redacted] shot a warning shot at a vehicle approaching from the right side. He then started to shoot more shots and hit the driver of the vehicle. We started setting up for a bird for medivac. While this was going on SFC [redacted] made a decision to ground medivac. They went North on [redacted] to the Casbah. There were a lot of support units in and out of the convoy helping everywhere the could. We then approached the 2nd Humvee. We started collecting everything we could; we found a lot of [redacted], I went to look into the TIC door for anything we needed to get out. That is when I found
more I also found Ssg laying in the floor board. Me and LT then started looking for something to put it in. We set put until the recovery team to come pick up the vehicle. When they arrived we loaded up and headed North on Vernon and went to the Bob. All this happen on 21 Sept 05 at about 08:00.
On September 21, at 7:45 am, we were tasked to conduct an IED sweep of Routes and on the way back from completing the first sweep of IEDs, went off in front of the vehicle. All I saw was smoke at the time. I was the second to the last vehicle in the convoy, also the medic vehicle. My vehicle called up the status of each vehicle when vehicle did not respond. We, vehicle, and me in the medic vehicle, pulled up to aid vehicle.

The first thing I saw when we pulled up was vehicle and vehicle saying on the ground. Vehicle pulling security. When suddenly we started taking small arms fire. Casualties were pulled to a cover position. Then I got out the vehicle and provided security for the medic along with vehicle. Both casualties were then taken to a Bradley Tank that was supporting the medevac crew. And finally we drove off with the Bradley Tank of the cashe.
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MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Chronology of AR 15-6 Investigative Activities

1. The following is a chronology of investigative activities that the investigating officer conducted.

232200SEP05 – Received Appointment as Investigating Officer by TF Executive Officer
232230SEP05 – Contacted 4BCT SJA and received initial briefing about the 15-6 investigation
240100SEP05 – Received copies of all sworn statements of all personnel involved with the IED strike, duty log, and company patrol debrief from the TOC.
240115SEP05 – Received copy of 4BCT CIR from Tusker TOC.
240130SEP05 – Arranged to meet with 1LT SFC and SGT the following morning.
240300SEP05 – Read through all sworn statements of personnel, duty log, patrol debrief, and 4BCT CIR to gain situational awareness of the incident.
240945SEP05 – Met with SFC to discuss paperwork requirements for the battle loss portion of the 15-6 investigation. Received 15-6 battle loss template from SFC as a reference. Met with SGT to supply SGT to discuss status of damaged sensitive items and the status of the
241000SEP05 – Met with 1LT and SFC to discuss the sequence of events and hear each of their perspectives on the incident.
241045SEP05 – Met with 1LT Executive Officer, to items and to get a copy of the company for record and discussed status of each with Arms Room NCO.
241135SEP05 – Met with SGT to discuss the EOF incident. Nothing significant was found that deviated from his sworn statement.
241245SEP05 – Began working on draft of 15-6, focusing on facts of the event.
250030SEP05 – Continued working on draft and completed facts portion of investigation.
250245SEP05 – Began working on digital photographs of damaged sensitive items
250950SEP05 – Attempted to obtain copy of S2 Debrief from S2 NCO, but due to technical difficulties, could not receive copy of the debrief.
251230SEP05 – Received copy of S2 debrief and incorporated into facts of the investigation.
252330SEP05 – Began working on finding of the investigation.
260400SEP05 – Findings of investigation completed.
261000SEP05 – Attempted to obtain paperwork from BMS regarding status of _____ negative contact with BMS.
261245SEP05 – Began working on Adoption Certificate, Table of Contents, and organization of Enclosures.
261630SEP05 – Attempted to take photographs of _____, but due to technical difficulties was unable to take photographs.
261830SEP05 – Received S2 Patrol Debrief from S2.
270100SEP05 – Made comments for _____.
270230SEP05 – Finalized word document of 15-6 investigation.
271015SEP05 – Received _____ from BMS.
271100SEP05 – Began transferring information from word document to DA1574 form.
271220SEP05 – Finalized chronology of investigation activities.

2. Point of contact for this memorandum is the undersigned at _____@us.army.mil, VOIP _____

ILT, AR
Investigating Officer