

UNCLASSIFIED



(S)(1)

TF 714

25 November 2007

MEMORANDUM FOR Commanding General, (b)(1) 1.4a, (b)(2) Hig, Balad, Iraq

SUBJECT: AR 15-6 Investigation, (b)(1) 1.4a, (b)(2) 11 OCT 07

1. (U) Background.

a (b)(1) 1.4a, (b)(2) The purpose of this investigation was to examine the circumstances and events surrounding (b)(1) 1.4a, (b)(2) (b)(1) 1.4a, (b)(2) 11 Oct 07 (b)(1) 1.4a, (b)(2) Iraq. to kill or capture (k/c) Highly Valued Individuals (HVIs) (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(2) The operation resulted in 15 noncombatant casualties.

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(S)(2)

b. (U) This investigation focused on the following specific issues:

(b)(2)High

(4) the number of collateral (noncombatant) deaths and/or injuries.

2. (U) Executive Summary.

(b)(1) 1.4a, (b)(2)

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(S)(2)



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[REDACTED]

(b)(1)

INVESTIGATION LOGIC FLOW

(b)(2)High

(b)(2)High

(b)(1)
(b)(2)

(b)(2)High

b. (U) This investigation finds no evidence of war crimes, violations of the Rules of Engagement, or the Law of Armed Conflict.

c. (U) (b)(1) 1.4a, (b)(2) was a legitimate military target within the Rules of Engagement (ROE), resulting in the detention of the HVIs.

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(b)(2)

(b)(2)High

(b)(2)High

(b)(2)High

[REDACTED]

(b)(1)

Page 3 redacted for the following reason:

(b)(1) 1.4a, (b)(2)

[REDACTED]

3. (U) Sequence of events.

(a) (b)(1) 1.4a, (b)(2) [REDACTED] 11640 OCT 07, at (b)(1) 1.4a, (b)(2) [REDACTED] initiated (b)(2)High strike on an HVI meeting. (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(2) was a HVIs meeting site [REDACTED] (b)(1) 1.4a, (b)(2) from (b)(1) 1.4a, (b)(2) (b)(1) 1.4a, (b)(2)AF received small arms fire when sent in for (b)(2)High (b)(2)High A second(b)(2)Highstrike was delivered to facilitate the ongoing fight on the ground (b)(1) 1.4a, (b)(2) itering a white sedan and driving south.

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(b) (b)(1) 1.4a, (b)(2) [REDACTED] 11705 OCT 07 (b)(1) 1.4a, (b)(2) received the mission of destroying that same moving white sedan containing HVIs who had earlier departed from (b)(1) 1.4a, (b)(2)

(c) (b)(1) 1.4a, (b)(2) [REDACTED] 11715 OCT 07 (b)(1) 1.4a, (b)(2) worked the kinetic strike option and (b)(1) 1.4a, (b)(2) (b)(1) 1.4a, (b)(2) conduct SSE on the kinetic strike aftermath. From time of alert, the pilots and ground assault force had barely (b)(2)High to receive the mission, gather the force, brief the plan, and load onto helicopters (b)(1) 1.4a, (b)(2) staff struggled to get asset (b)(1) 1.4a, (b)(2) (b)(1) 1.4a, (b)(2) n target.

(d) (b)(1) 1.4a, (b)(2) [REDACTED] 11800 OCT 07 (b)(1) 1.4, (b)(2) IAF was loaded and waiting on helicopter pads [REDACTED] when the targeted white sedan pulled into a compound (b)(1) 1.4a, (b)(2) the HVIs exited the vehicle and joined other military-aged males (MAMs) which indicated another possible HVI meeting (now called (b)(1) 1.4a, (b)(2) (b)(1) 1.4a, (b)(2) (b)(1) 1.4a, (b)(2)

(e) (b)(1) 1.4a, (b)(2) [REDACTED] 11810 OCT 07 (b)(1) 1.4a, (b)(2) cancelled the (b)(2)Highstrike and decided to use the precision fires of the (b)(1) 1.4a, (b)(2) with follow on insertion onto (b)(1) 1.4a, (b)(2) with follow-on ground assault force to k/c the HVI and (b)(2)High

(f) (b)(1) 1.4a, (b)(2) [REDACTED] 11825 OCT 07, HAF departed toward (b)(1) 1.4a, (b)(2) enroute the ground force company commander learned of the cancelled (b)(2)Highstrike, tha (b)(1) 1.4a, (b)(2) could conduct (b)(2)High on objective, the gathering of MAMs was declared hostile, and (b)(1) 1.4a, (b)(2) had authorize (b)(1) 1.4a, (b)(2) engage fleeing MAMs off the target.

(g) (b)(1) 1.4a, (b)(2) [REDACTED] 11849 OCT 07 (b)(1) 1.4a, (b)(2) d the (b)(2)High force onto the objective (b)(1) 1.4a, (b)(2) (b)(1) 1.4a, (b)(2) the (b)(2)High force landed, attacked, and conducted (b)(2)High on the one building which most MAMs had retreated into.

(b)(1) 1.4a, (b)(2) the assault on (b)(1) 1.4a, (b)(2) resulted in capture of [REDACTED] (b)(1) 1.4a, (b)(2) and seizure of multiple cellphones. Additionally, there were seven military-aged males killed, six adult females killed, 9 children killed, and two military-aged males, two women, and three children wounded on the objective (b)(1) 1.4a, (b)(2) evacuated the wounded to the Balad CSH for medical treatment.

(h) (U) On 13 Oct 07, GOI spokesman (b)(6) stated "The issue of 15 civilian victims is a sorrow matter, but confronting al-Qaeda is an essential and vital issue," he said. "We are in a war

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against those diabolical and wicked groups; therefore, during military operations there might be innocents killed."

(b)(1) 1.4a, (b)(2) Findings.

a. (U) What were the circumstances surrounding the (b)(2)High fires on (b)(1) 1.4a, (b)(2)

(1) (b)(1) 1.4a, (b)(2) he decision to conduct a (b)(2)Highstrike. (b)(2)High fires was based on the day's earlier events on (b)(1) 1.4a, (b)(2) and the intelligence that indicated the presence of an HVI. The action upon the HVIs arrival at (b)(1) 1.4a, (b)(2) had the signature of a high level AQI meeting and presented what was believed to be a high threat environment for the assault force.

(2) (b)(1) 1.4a, (b)(2) considered the use of (b)(2)High as a course of action but felt that the potential collateral damage was not acceptable. (b)(1) 1.4a, (b)(2) made the decision to conduct (b)(2)High fires with the platform (b)(1) 1.4a, (b)(2) that would cause the least amount of unwanted damage and provide significant effects on his desired target. This decision was well within (b)(1) 1.4a, (b)(2) authority and the ROE.

(3) (b)(1) 1.4a, (b)(2) No formal or field CDE was conducted prior to the strike being ordered. During the investigation both a formal and field CDE were complete and showed that the target was a CDE 5 LOW (See ENCL 12, Tabs A and B). CDE 5 LOW is within (b)(2) authority for (b)(2)Highstrikes.

b. (U) Was there a breakdown in communications between the JOC and the strike aircraft?

(b)(2)High, (b)(5), Nonresponsive

[REDACTED]

(b)(1)
(b)(2)

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COMMUNICATIONS FLOW



(b) (1)

(b) (2)

(b)(2)High, (b)(5), Nonresponsive



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(b) (1)
(b) (2)



(b)(2)High

(b)(2)High, (b)(5), Nonresponsive

(b)(2)High



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(S)(1)
(b)(2)

[REDACTED]

(b)(1)

(b)(2)

(b)(2)High, (b)(5), Nonresponsive

[REDACTED]

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(b)(1)
(b)(2)

[REDACTED]

c. (U) Were the actions on (b)(1) 1.4a, (b)(2) in accordance with the ROE and reasonable under the circumstances as known at the time?

(1) (b)(1) 1.4a, (b)(2) considering the credible and corroborated intelligence that led the (b)(2) High (b)(2) High to (b)(1) 1.4a, (b)(2) and the events of (b)(1) 1.4a, (b)(2) the (b)(2) High's actions (declaring the OBJ hostile and the use of (b)(2) High fires and a support by (b)(2) High position) appear to have been within the ROE and reasonable under the circumstances the task force members knew at the time (tab 8).

(b)(1) 1.4a, (b)(2)

* [REDACTED]

(b)(2) High, (b)(5)

[REDACTED]

(b)(1)
(b)(2)

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(b)(2)High, (b)(5)

d. (U) How many collateral (noncombatant) deaths and/or injuries occurred and what was the cause?

(b)(1) 1.4a, (b)(2) Noncombatants were killed and wounded during the mission:

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(4 (b)(6) KIA: Young adult female (age unknown) (b)(6)

(b)(6)

(5 (b)(6) KIA: (b)(6) child (sex unknown) (b)(6)

(b)(6)

(6 (b)(6) KIA: 6 females of unknown ages and 9 children of unknown ages, unable to determine exact cause of death, based on the location of the bodies (see tab 9)(2)High diagram) it is highly probable that these deaths were caused by pre-assault fires, most likely from (b)(2)High but possible that they were the result of direct fire from the (b)(2)High gunners or the (b)(2)High force (b)(2)High

(b)(6) Would coalition forces pay condolence payments? (b)(5)

(b)(5)



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(S)(2)

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(b)(5)

(b)(5)

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5. (U) Recommendations:

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(b)(3), (b)(6)

(S)(6)

Investigating Officer

[REDACTED]

(S)(6)

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