EXHIBIT 20

FILED UNDER SEAL
FDNS Immigration Officer Journeyman Course

HQFDNS and National Security
For Official Use Only (FOUO) Material
President of the United States Barack Obama.

“My single most important responsibility as President is to keep the American people safe. That is the first thing that I think about when I wake up in the morning. It is the last thing that I think about when I go to sleep at night.”
COURSE DESCRIPTION

This course is designed to provide the Journeyman level FDNS Immigration Officer with an understanding of the following national security related areas:

Mission of DHS/HQFDNS/NSB components, CARRP overview/history/goals, duties performed by HQFDNS Immigration Officers at assigned other government agencies located in Washington D.C.
COURSE DESCRIPTION

HQFDNS external vetting procedures using both high and low side resources, the KST nomination process, HQFDNS reports and their relevance to the Field, RFA processing guidelines, terrorist conviction successes, national security red flag indicators, and terrorist travel patterns.
TERMINAL PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVE (TPO):

FDNS IO will have a basic understanding of:

- DHS/HQFDNS/NSB missions.
- CARRP History/Policy References/Goals.
- HQFDNS Immigration Officer/OGA Relationships.
- HQFDNS High Side/Low Side Checks.
- Terrorist Nomination Process.
- HQFDNS CARRP Related Reports and Statistics.
- RFA Submission guidelines.
- Recent Terrorists Convictions.
- Recognizing National Security Indicators.
- Understand current trends in terrorist travel patterns.
ENABLING PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES

- EPO #1: DHS/HQFDNS/NSB missions.
- EPO #2: CARRP History/Policy References/Goals.
- EPO #3: Be able to explain HQFDNS/OGA Relationships.
- EPO #4: Understand HQFDNS High Side/Low Side check process.
- EPO #5: Be able to explain KST Nomination Process.
- EPO #6: Understand Relevance of HQFDNS Reports.
- EPO #7: Identify Reasons RFAs from Field are rejected by HQFDNS.
  - EPO #8: Discuss Specific Terrorist Conviction Successes.
  - EPO #9: Recognize National Security Red Flag Indicators.
  - EPO #10: Be aware of terrorist travel patterns.
INTRODUCTION

USCIS leadership has identified national security protection as the agency’s primary mission.
Before September 11, 2001, background checks were completed on less than one-third of applicants and beneficiaries seeking immigration benefits.
9/11 Hijackers
Bomb Destroys Pan Am Flight 103 in Flight

- **Pan Am Flight 103** was Pan American World Airways third daily scheduled transatlantic flight from London's Heathrow Airport to New York's JFK Airport.

- On Wednesday 21 December 1988, the aircraft flying this route—a Boeing 747-121 named *Clipper Maid of the Seas*—was destroyed by a bomb, killing all 243 passengers and 16 crew members plus 11 people on the ground bring the total dead to 270.
Pan Am Flight 103
Terrorists Have No Limits and Will Stop at Nothing

- Abdel Baset al-Megrahi (convicted Lockerbie bomber), top left, is accompanied by Saif al-Islam Gadhafi, son of Libyan leader Moammar Gadhafi, upon his arrival at the airport in Tripoli on Thursday, August 20, 2009. (Scottish Justice Secretary Kenny MacAskill, who made the decision to release Al-Megrahi on humanitarian grounds- inset to the right).

![Image of Abdel Baset al-Megrahi and Saif al-Islam Gadhafi.]
KSTs in Action

- **HORROR SHOW**: A videotape shows a man identified as al-Zarqawi holding a sword before beheading American captive Nicholas Berg
Abu Mousab al-Zarqawi – KST Removed
Background Checks Are Conducted on All Applicants and Beneficiaries.

- Today background checks are conducted on all applicants and beneficiaries.

- The security checks may reveal criminal & national security information relevant to the eligibility and/or admissibility of the applicant or beneficiary for the benefit.
EPO #1: DHS/HQFDNS/NSB Missions

Department Responsibilities: Guarding against Terrorism

- **Protecting** the American people from terrorist threats is our founding principle and our highest priority.

- This is an effort where *everyone* - families and communities, first responders, the private sector, state and local governments, as well as the federal government - has an important role to play.

- We will direct *every resource available* toward prevention and preparedness, and empower Americans to live in a constant state of readiness, not a constant state of fear.
DHS - U.S. Defense Against Terrorism

- Customs Service
- Coast Guard
- Secret Service
- USCIS
- CBP
- ICE
- Federal Protective Service
- TSA
- FLETC
- Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service
- Office of Domestic Preparedness – FEMA
- Strategic National Stockpile – National Disaster Medical System
DHS - U.S. Defense Against Terrorism

- Nuclear Incident Response Team
- Domestic Emergency Support Teams
- National Domestic Preparedness Office
- CBRN Countermeasures Programs
- Environmental Measurements Laboratory
- National BW Defense Analysis Center
- Plum Island Animal Disease Center
- Federal Computer Incident Response Center
- National Communications System
- National Protection and Programs Directorate
- Energy Security and Assurance Program
TIER I

Tier I – Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO)

- An organization designated under section 219 of the INA by the Secretary of State with a finding that the organization engages in terrorist activities or terrorism.

- These organizations threaten U.S. nationals or the national security of the U.S.

- Over 40 different organizations are currently designated and include such organizations as HAMAS, Al Qaeda, Hezbollah, and Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC).
TIER II

Tier II – Terrorist Exclusion List (TEL)

- An organization otherwise designated, upon publication in the Federal Register, by the Secretary of State in consultation with or upon the request of the Attorney General or the Secretary of Homeland Security, as a terrorist organization, after finding that the organization engages in terrorist activities as defined in the Act.

- There is no requirement that these organizations threaten U.S. nationals or the national security of the U.S.
TIER III

Tier III – Undesignated Terrorist Organization

- An organization that is a group of two or more individuals, whether organized or not, which engages in, or has a subgroup which engages in, terrorist activities

- There is no official list for Tier III organizations.
Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTO) Tier I

Over 40 designated organizations

- Abu Sayyaf
- Al-Qa’ida
- Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA)
- Continuity Irish Republican Army
- HAMAS
- Hezbollah
- Jemaah Islamiya Organization
- Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization
- Palestine Islamic Jihad
- Revolutionary Armed Forces Colombia (FARC)

See [www.state.gov](http://www.state.gov) for full listing.
Terrorist Exclusion List (TEL)- Tier II

Over 60 designated organizations and companies

- Asbat al-Ansar
- Babbar Khalsa International
- Japanese Red Army
- Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (Army of the Righteous)
- Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement
- Libyan Islamic Fighting Group
- Revolutionary United Front
- See www.state.gov for full listing.
Terrorist Organizations – Tier III

- **Undesignated** organizations

- Two or more individuals engaged in or planning to engage in terrorist activity

- For handling of individuals involved in or having supported Tier III organizations.

- No official list.
Executive Order 13224
Terrorist Financing List

On September 23, 2001, the President issued Executive Order 13224, which provides the means to disrupt terrorist support networks.

Under this order, the US Government **may block the assets** of individuals and entities providing support—financial and otherwise—to designated terrorists and terrorist organizations.

This authority has been used on numerous occasions to target **individuals actively engaging in terrorist-related activities**, including providing false documentation to illegal aliens to facilitate travel.
DHS and United States Armed Forces Personnel Working to Protect our National Security.

- United States Armed Forces Worldwide
- DHS Officers at airports, land and seaports- working to protect our borders.
- You at your desk- *all are on the front lines in the war on terror.*

[Image of United States Armed Forces and ICE logos]
HQFDNS

Office of Fraud Detection and National Security (FDNS).

- Falls under the National Security and Records Verification (NSRV) Directorate.

- Established to enhance the integrity of the legal immigration system.
HQFDNS

• Identifies threats to national security and public safety, detecting and combating benefit fraud and removing systemic and other vulnerabilities.

• FDNS Headquarters is composed of four separate branches: National Security, Intelligence, Fraud, and Mission Support.
HQFDNS National Security Branch

The National Security Branch (NSB) is the point of contact for technical advice to assist the field with vetting and adjudicating cases with national security (NS) concerns.

- The NSB supports USCIS officers in the field and works closely with law enforcement agencies and the Intelligence Community.

- NSB works to ensure the integrity of the immigration system and protect the country from threats to our national security.
National Security Branch

• National Security Branch (NSB):
  
  • Provides support to USCIS officers in the field during the vetting and adjudication of cases with NS Concerns.
  
  • Works closely with law enforcement agencies and the Intelligence Community to facilitate the exchange of information with the field.
National Security Branch.

The National Security Branch is comprised of 4 units:

1. Operations Support Unit.
   - Provides subject matter expertise on adjudication and vetting assistance.

2. Policy and Program Development Unit.
   - Works with other components to develop and maintain national security policies.

3. Other Government Agency Liaison Unit.
   - Works in partnership with law enforcement agencies and Intelligence Community.
National Security Branch.

4. Program Oversight and Analysis Unit.

**Mission:** Program oversight and analysis, documentation of current challenges, and identification of improvement opportunities, development of courses of instruction for Field management and CARRP Designated Officers.

**Duties:**

- Develop and engage metrics necessary to monitor compliance with policies and procedure.

- Identify key data elements and develop reports and analyses needed to accomplish mission, goals and objectives.
Program Oversight and Analysis duties continued.

- Prepare monthly, quarterly, and fiscal year reports and analyses.

- Conduct QA and Compliance Reviews.

- Liaison with FDNS Intelligence Branch and FDNS Fraud Detection Branch regarding information sharing and joint analysis projects.
EPO #2: CARRP History/Policy References/Goals

The Controlled Application Review and Resolution Program, (CARRP), process provides a disciplined approach to identify, record, and adjudicate applications/petitions with national security concerns.

This process applies to all applications and petitions that convey an immigrant or non-immigrant status in which an officer identifies a NS concern.
Controlled Application Review and Resolution Program (CARRP) Policy.

- In accordance with the memorandum entitled, *Policy for Vetting and Adjudicating Cases with National Security Concerns*, dated April 11, 2008, and *CARRP Operational Guidance*, the field is responsible for processing cases with national security concerns.

- The primary system for recording vetting, deconfliction, and other resolution activities is the FDNS-DS.
Controlled Application Review and Resolution Program (CARRP) Policy

- HQ FDNS maintains responsibility for external vetting of KST hits, and upon request from the field, HQFDNS provides advice, technical assistance, and operational support on cases with NS concerns.
Operational Guidance for Vetting and Adjudicating Cases with National Security Concerns
CARRP PHASE I- Background/History

During CARRP phase I:

HQFDNS IOs assigned to either the Background Check Analysis Unit, (BCAU), or National Security Advisory Unit, (NSAU), reviewed cases to verify or resolve National Security (NS) concerns.

The National Security Branch:

Documented the results of resolution activities in a Background Check Assessment (BCA) document in FDNS-DS.
CARRP PHASE I- Background/History

- HQFDNS Immigration Officers presented cases for Joint Review to: (NSRV, Domestic Ops, SC Ops).

- Non-National Security Cases – were released to the field for decision.

- NS Concern Confirmed / Unresolved – were sent to Field for Evaluation and Possible Denial.
CARRP PHASE II- History

- Decentralized vetting of national security (NS) cases.
- Delegated NS determination authority to Field and Service Center management.
- Developed procedures for controlled release of NS referrals to field for vetting.
- Established standards for vetting.
- Provided a mechanism for officers to obtain technical advice and assistance from HQFDNS.
CARRP PHASE II

- Limited referral of hits to HQ to those involving Known or Suspected Terrorist (KST) lookouts.

- Established coordination with external agencies to facilitate the vetting and adjudication and deconfliction of applications and petitions with NS concerns.
CARRP – GOALS

Expeditious vetting and adjudication of ALL applications or petitions, in which a potential NS concern is identified during the background check process.

Minimize the risk to national security, posed by applicants, petitioners, or beneficiaries who represent an active NS concern.
General Dwight D. Eisenhower

- Freedom has its life in the hearts, the actions, the spirit of men and so it must be daily earned and refreshed - else like a flower cut from its life-giving roots, it will wither and die.
Delineation Memo

The Clarification and Delineation of Vetting and Adjudication Responsibilities for Controlled Application Review and Resolution Program Cases in Domestic Field Offices, signed by Donald Neufeld on June 5, 2009 was issued.
Delineation Memo

Purpose of Delineation memo: to clearly delineate Domestic Field Office policy regarding CARRP case processing responsibilities of:

- Field Office Director (FOD)
- FDNS Supervisory Immigration Officer (FDNS-SIO)
- Supervisory Immigration Services Officer (SISO)
- FDNS Immigration Officer (FDNS-IO)
- CARRP Immigration Services Officer (CARRP-ISO)
CARRP Overview – Uniformity of Purpose

- FDNS-DS.
- KST
- Non-KST.
- Applications/petitions conveying status.
- Rescinded previous policy memoranda.
- Establishes a standard CARRP workflow- 4 stages.
- Designated Officers.
- Introduces Guidance for Identifying National Security Concerns (Attachment A).
- Used by all components.
- BCAA (Background Check and Adjudicative Assessment) within FDNS-DS.
EPO #3: Be able to explain HQFDNS Other Government Agency Relationships.
HQFDNS IOs Are Detailed to the Following OGAs.

- CBP National Targeting Center (NTC)
- DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A)
- DOS Office of Fraud Prevention Program (FPP)
- ICE Human Smuggling Trafficking Center (HSTC)
- ICE National Security Unit (NSU)
- FBI National Name Check Program Unit (NNCP)
- International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL)—Washington, DC
- INTERPOL Headquarters—Lyon, France
- NCTC Terrorist Identities Group (TIG)
- National Joint Terrorism Task Force (NJTTF)
- Terrorist Screening Center (TSC)—Call Center
- TSC—Special Projects Unit (SPU)
HQFDNS OGA FDNS IO Assignments

- NJTTF
- DHS I&A
- TSC SPU

- NCTC TIG
- ICE NSU
- FBI NNCP
- INTERPOL Washington, DC
- NTC
- INTERPOL Lyon, France

- TSC Call Center
- DOS FPP
- HSTC
CBP National Targeting Center (NTC)

The HQFDNS immigration officer detailed to the CBP National Targeting Center (NTC):

- verifies the identity of legal permanent residents who are possible TIDE matches.
- determines whether the subjects are entitled to benefits.
- serves as a SME and works closely with CBP intelligence analysts and officers in interpreting and analyzing real time data related to border crossings.
CBP National Targeting Center (NTC)

The HQFDNS immigration officer detailed to the NTC is involved in:

- tracking of outbound positive TIDE matches in an effort to better anticipate return travel.
- determining admissibility issues.
- ensuring that the traveler is eligible for re-entry.

The officer plays a significant role in USCIS internal vetting by assisting field adjudicators in the vetting of NTC records related to CBP inspection encounters.
The HQFDNS immigration officer detailed to the DHS I&A:

- serves as the point of contact for information sharing and collaboration between FDNS and DHS component offices.
DOS Office of Fraud Prevention Program (FPP)

The HQFDNS immigration officer detailed to the DOS FPP supports consular officers by:

- conducting DHS systems checks to verify information regarding pending visa applications overseas.

- using CLAIMS data to assist DOS with non-immigrant visa validation studies.
DOS Office of Fraud Prevention Program (FPP)

- coordinating with DOS National Visa Center (NVC) and Kentucky Consular Center (KCC) to help develop benefit fraud cases.

- providing training in DHS systems.

- facilitating policy issues between DOS and USCIS.

- presenting an overview of FDNS to FPP Managers on a monthly basis.
ICE Human Smuggling Trafficking Center (HSTC)

The HQFDNS immigration officer detailed to the ICE HSTC:

- provides operational support for ongoing investigations
- conducts intelligence research and analysis of immigration records
- acts as SME on immigration law
ICE Human Smuggling Trafficking Center (HSTC)

- researches USCIS/FDNS systems
- facilitates cooperation between USCIS and ICE
- scrutinizes raw and finished intelligence data from various sources and evaluates its impact on FDNS/USCIS operations.
- enhances the HSTC’s effort in combating human smuggling and fraud
ICE National Security Unit (NSU)

The HQFDNS immigration officer detailed to the ICE NSU:

- is primary conduit between USCIS and ICE on national security matters

- facilitates both external vetting and deconfliction efforts with ICE by providing information about pending ICE national security cases.

- assists field adjudicators in the deconfliction and vetting of TECS records related to ICE cases.

- acts as SME on immigration law to ICE agents in various units.
FBI National Name Check Program Unit (NNCP)

The HQFDNS immigration officers detailed to the NNCP in Winchester, Virginia:

- work closely with FBI analysts to ensure that all national security concerns are identified and that appropriate information is provided to USCIS.

- review FBI information related to individuals connected to pending applications and petitions to determine whether the information is relevant to the adjudication.
FBI National Name Check Program Unit (NNCP)

- if the information does not apply to the applicant, the national security concern is considered resolved. The adjudication process may continue.

- when the information does relate to the applicant detailee will work with the FBI analysts to develop Letterhead Memoranda for consideration in the adjudication.
International Criminal Police Organization
INTERPOL—Washington, DC

The HQFDNS immigration officer detailed to INTERPOL:

- coordinates with federal and foreign law enforcement officials concerning applicants for immigration benefits or individuals with a valid immigration status who are subjects of INTERPOL hits.

- performs the external vetting and deconfliction of INTERPOL cases that involve subjects who are seeking or have sought immigration benefits.

- plays a significant role in internal vetting by assisting field adjudicators in the deconfliction and vetting of INTERPOL records.
INTERPOL Headquarters—Lyon, France

The HQFDNS immigration officer detailed to INTERPOL HQ in Lyon, France:

- serves as the assistant director of Criminal Analysis Sub-directorate.
- provides strategic and operational analysis, risk assessments, training, and consulting.

These functions directly address INTERPOL’s support to efforts including:

- counter-terrorism
- counter-human smuggling
- organized crime.
NCTC Terrorist Identities Group (TIG)

The HQFDNS immigration officer detailed to the TIG:

- provides analysis of terrorist identities and supports TIG functions with respect to the nomination of individuals to the Terrorist Screening Database (TSDB).

- serves as a SME on immigration services and is not involved in either the vetting or deconfliction of national security concerns.

- The officer enhances the TIG’s records with pertinent USCIS information.
National Joint Terrorism Task Force (NJTTF)

The HQFDNS officer detailed to the NJTTF:

- researches FBI and USCIS systems to deconflict/vet national security concerns involving KST lookouts.
- serves as SME and coordinates with FBI and NJTTTF personnel at both the national and local levels.
- Gathers and exchanges information needed to render appropriate adjudicative decisions and to meet the needs of law enforcement and intelligence operations and counter-terrorism investigations.
National Joint Terrorism Task Force (NJTTF)

- The many regional JTTFs coordinate their efforts through the interagency National Joint Terrorism Task Force.

- NJTTF is headquartered in Washington DC, and is composed of representatives from 35 federal agencies.

- The FBI's involvement with the JTTF falls under the Operational Support Branch of the FBI Counterterrorism Division.
NJ TTF Components

- Air Force Office of Special Investigations (AFOSI).
- Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF).
- Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).
- Customs and Border Protection (CBP).
- Defense Criminal Investigative Service.
- Department of Interior's Bureau of Land Management.
- Diplomatic Security Service (DSS) (within DOS).
- Federal Protective Service (FPS) (within ICE).
- Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE).
- Internal Revenue Service (IRS).
- Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS).
- Postal Inspection Service.
- Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration.
- U.S. Border Patrol (within CBP).
- U.S. Park Police.
- U.S. Army.
- U.S. Marshall Service (USMS).
- U.S. Secret Service (USSS).
Terrorist Screening Center (TSC)—Call Center

The HQFDNS immigration officer detailed to the TSC Call Center:

- assists USCIS field officers in confirming whether or not applicants, petitioners, or beneficiaries who were identified by KST lookouts, are actual matches to the watch list.
Terrorist Screening Center (TSC)—Call Center
The HQFDNS immigration officer detailed to the TSC Special Projects Unit:

- A tear-line product contains the following two parts:

- (1) classified information that can be used for lead purposes and

- (2) unclassified information that the investigating agency has authorized for use in a written decision.
TSC—Special Projects Unit (SPU)

- The officers at the TSC have access to both USCIS and FBI systems.

- When USCIS adjudicators request tear-line products after internal and external vetting fails to produce legally sufficient grounds for denial, the officers detailed at the TSC review the content of investigative files to identify information that may indicate administrative violations of immigration law and summarize those facts in the tear-line documents.

- The draft documents are provided to the record owners for review, editing, and approval to share the information with USCIS.
Practical Exercise

Identifying Role of HQFDNS Immigration Officer Detailed with Other Government Agencies
Practical Exercise
Practical Exercise
Practical Exercise
Practical Exercise
Practical Exercise
Practical Exercise

Definition:

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Practical Exercise
Practical Exercise
Practical Exercise

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Practical Exercise
Practical Exercise
EPO #4: Understand HQFDNS High Side/Low Side check process.
High Side & Low Side Checks

- **High Side:** Database checks of information and intelligence systems on the Joint Worldwide Intelligence Community System (JWICS) that may include information up to and including TOP SECRET and Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) information.
  - TIDE
  - WISE
  - Information from Other Government Agencies

- **Low Side:**
  - Interagency Border Inspection System (IBIS) Name Check
  - FBI Name Check
  - FBI Fingerprint Check
High Side Checks

- Database checks of information and intelligence systems on the Joint Worldwide Intelligence Community System (JWICS)
High Side Checks

• NCTC online
  • primary source of terrorism information/intelligence produced by the NCTC.
  • NCTC intelligence products come from the intelligence community

• TIDE
  • U.S. government central repository of information on international terrorist identities.
  • Includes all information the United States has related to individuals known or suspected to have been involved in international terrorism.
High Side Checks

- WISE (Web Intelligence Search Engine)
- Central repository of message traffic and wire services received by the Defense Intelligence Agency.
  - Checking the WISE database allows for the review of intelligence that is not routed to DHS/USCIS.
High Side Checks

- LE
Terrorist Identities Datamart Environment

TIDE

The TIDE database includes, to the extent permitted by law, all information the U.S. government possesses related to the identities of individuals known or appropriately suspected to be or have been involved in activities constituting, in preparation for, in aid of, or related to terrorism, with the exception of Purely Domestic Terrorism information.
TIDE

A non-exclusive list of types of conduct that will warrant both entry into TIDE and terrorist screening nomination includes persons who:

- Commit international terrorist activity;
- Prepare or plan international terrorist activity;
- Gather information on potential targets for international terrorist activity.
TIDE

Federal agencies nominate individuals for inclusion in TIDE based on evaluations of intelligence and law enforcement terrorism information.

- Provide material support, i.e. safe house, transportation, communications, funds, transfer of funds or other material financial benefit, false documentation or identification, weapons, explosives, or training.

- Are members of or represent a foreign terrorist organization.
An automated or manual technique for separating an intelligence report into multiple portions separated by machine- or human-readable tearlines.

A Tearline section is the area in an intelligence report or finished intelligence product where the sanitized version of a more highly classified and/or controlled report is located.

The sanitized information within the tearlines contains the substance of the more detailed information without identifying the sensitive sources or methods, allowing wider dissemination of the substantive intelligence information to authorized customers.
Tearline Continued

- A tearline will be created with the objective of requesting the release to DHS of—information that may:

  1) lawfully be used for USCIS adjudication under applicable laws and regulations; and

  2) be disseminated for USCIS adjudication without creating a significant risk of compromise to FBI investigative or operational interests.
EPO #5: Be able to explain KST nomination process.
KST Nomination Process

- The National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), is a multi-agency organization:
- Created to analyze all intelligence pertaining to terrorism and counterterrorism
- The NCTC receives nominations for the watch list from:
- Many different government agencies (DOS, CIA, DOD)
- LE
KST Nomination Process

- The information is reviewed by NCTC personnel and is entered in:

- A classified database known as Terrorist Identities Datamart Environment (TIDE).

- If NCTC has enough information pertaining to an individual and that individual meets the criteria to be watch listed:

- NCTC forwards that information to the Terrorist Screening Center (TSC).
KST Nomination Process Continued

- Information from TIDE is imported into the Terrorist Screening Database (TSDB), an unclassified but restricted database:

- The TSDB houses the Terrorist Watch List.

- The consolidated terrorist watch list exports to downstream screening databases:

- Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) Interagency Border Inspection System (IBIS)
KST Nomination Process Continued

- Department of State’s Consular Lookout and Support System (CLASS) passport and visa
- DHS’s Transportation Safety Administration’s (TSA) No Fly and Selectee lists
- FBI’s Violent Gang and Terrorist Organization File (VGTOF)
- Individuals on the watch list are considered to be:
- Known or (appropriately) Suspected Terrorists (KST).
Standard for Including an Identity in TIDE

- HSPD-6: “Terrorist Information is defined as information about individuals known or appropriately suspected to be or have been engaged in conduct constituting, in preparation for, in aid of, or related to terrorism.”

- Totality of information … sufficient to cause an ordinarily prudent person to believe the individual under review may be a known or suspected terrorist”
Standard for Including an Identity in TIDE

- Persons ineligible for Visas or entry to the US based on Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) 212(a)(3)(B) (terrorist activity)

- FBI Full & Preliminary Investigation Subjects

- Not a judicial standard - Inherently subjective - Quality of source varies

- Lowering the bar would have huge database implications
EPO #6: Understand relevance of HQFDNS Reports.
Documentation of findings in FDNS-DS

Once an NS concern has been identified and confirmed in accordance with the April 11, 2008 CARRP policy memorandum and Operational Guidance, the Designated Officer must create a record of the NS concern within the FDNS-DS NS Concerns Tab.
NS Concerns Sub-tabs

All information related to an NS Concern is displayed within nineteen specific sub-tabs.
NS Concerns Sub-tabs Con’t.

The sub-tabs are not available for data entry or review until the User has drilled down into an NS Concern record, which is done by selecting the Subject’s NS Concern Name hyperlink.
- Data system for tracking applications/petitions with national security concerns.

- HQFDNS and the field rely on statistics generated from FDNS-DS.

http://
CARRP Reporting

HQFDNS Reports

- The Program Oversight and Analysis (PO & A) unit within NSB works with the Systems, Data, and Analysis Unit (SDAU), located within the Mission Support Branch of HQFDNS, to generate reports for HQFDNS management.

- SDAO was formed in order to support IT systems.

- SDAO creates reports based on requests from PO & A.

- These reports serve to keep HQFDNS management abreast of national security workload statistics.
CARRP Reporting

HQFDNS Reports

- Data Input
  - FDNS Officers in the Field

- NS Concerns
  - Tab Reports
  - POA/SDAU

- Data Review/Analysis
  - HQFDNS Management
Understand HQFDNS Reporting Requirements

Reports Used by HQFDNS
# Understand HQFDNS Reporting Requirements

## Reports Used by HQFDNS

### National Security Case Load Report

**April 2009**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Pending Begin of Month</th>
<th>Received in Month</th>
<th>Closed in Month</th>
<th>Cases Merged Deleted</th>
<th>Pending End of Month</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>KST</strong></td>
<td>853</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>838</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Non-KST</strong></td>
<td>3,410</td>
<td>287</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>3,401</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Grand Totals</strong></td>
<td>4,263</td>
<td>337</td>
<td>173</td>
<td>188</td>
<td>4,239</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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**Data Results as of May 3, 2009. Source FDNS-DS National Security Cases**

(Form Types: N-400, I-485 and Other Form Types – I589, 1698, 1730, 1731, 1881, I687, I821, I539, I129, I506)

1. **Pending Begin of Month**: Open NS Cases with incomplete adjudicative actions.
2. **Received in Month**: New or reopened NS Cases with incomplete adjudicative actions.
3. **Closed in Month**: Closed NS Cases with completed adjudicative actions.
4. **Cases Merged/Deleted**: NS Cases that have either been Merged/Deleted as a result of case consolidation in the current month.
5. **Pending End of Month**: Open NS Cases with incomplete adjudicative actions, month
Understand HQFDNS Reporting Requirements
Reports Used by HQFDNS

April 2009
National Security Monthly Aging Report
NS Concern Receipts - KST

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case Status</th>
<th>Form Type</th>
<th>0 - 6 Months</th>
<th>6 - 12 Months</th>
<th>12 + Months</th>
<th>Grand Total</th>
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Data Results as of End of April 2009. Source FDNS-DS National Security Concerns, all FDNS-DS locations.

(Form Types: N-400, I-485 and Other Form Types - I589, I698, I730, I731, I881, I687, I821, I129, I506)

* Pending: Open NS Concern with incomplete adjudicative actions (pending for each application) in the current reporting month and with i
Understand HQFDNS Reporting Requirements
Reports Used by HQFDNS

![Table](https://i.imgur.com/3Q0Q0Q.png)

April 2009
National Security Monthly Aging Report
NS Concern Receipts - Non-KST

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Data Results as of End of April 2009. Source FDNS-DS National Security Concerns, all FDNS-DS local
(Form Types: N-400, I-485 and Other Form Types - 1589, 1698, 1730, I-731, 1881, 1687, 1821, 1129, 1506)

*Pending: Open NS Concern with incomplete adjudicative actions (pending - for each application) in the current reporting month and with
# Understand HQFDNS Reporting Requirements

## Reports Used by HQFDNS

### April 2009

**National Security Monthly Aging Report**

**NS Concern Receipts - Non-NS**

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*Data Results as of End of April 2009. Source FDNS-DS National Security Concerns, all FDNS-DS locat*

(Form Types: N-400, I-485 and Other Form Types - I589, I698, I730, I731, I881, I687, I821, I129, I506)

¹ *Pending:* Open NS Concern with incomplete adjudicative actions (pending for each application) in the current reporting month and with
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Data Results as of March 2009, Source FDNS-DC National Security Concerns
(Form Types: N-400, I-485 and Other Form Types - I-589, I-730, I-821, I-539, I-129, I-506)
## Understan HQFDNS Reporting Requirements

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Data Results as of March 2009. Source FDNS-US National Security Concerns


**U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services**

**FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO)**

**LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE**

Version 1.1

118

Confidential - Attorney-Eyes-Only
Understand FDNS-DS Data Integrity Issues

Data Integrity

- It is important to reduce data integrity issues, without accurate data, reports run by HQFDNS can be skewed or incorrect.

- FDNS-DS data needs to be examined with a critical eye in order to locate trends and assess areas where training/clarification may be needed.
QUESTIONS?
EPO #7: Identify Reasons RFAs from Field are rejected by HQFDNS

When to request assistance from HQFDNS NSB:

- KSTs:
- If an NS concern exists for a Known or Suspected Terrorist (KST) and no grounds for ineligibility can be identified, the NS concern must be referred to HQFDNS-NSB for External Vetting and/or Adjudicative assistance via the Request for Assistance (RFA) process.
When to request assistance from HQFDNS NSB:

Non-KSTs:

- Officers are not authorized to approve applications with remaining Non-KST NS concerns without supervisory approval and concurrence from the Field director.
- Further Assistance
When to request assistance from HQFDNS NSB:

- If a determination cannot be made as to whether an indicator rises to the level of a NS concern or whether there is an articulable link between an individual and one or more of the indicators in DOMOPS Guidance, the Field may request assistance from HQFDNS Operational Support Services Unit.
When to request assistance from HQFDNS NSB:

Prior to requesting assistance from HQFDNS-NSB, the Designated Officer must:

1. Confirm that the Subject remains on the Terrorist Watch List, this should be done by querying TECS/IBIS and/or by contacting the Terrorist Screening Center (TSC). Document this activity within the Subjects Sub-tab in the TECS/IBIS field.

2. Document all adjudicative actions taken in FDNS-DS.

3. Complete a Background Check and Adjudicative Assessment (BCAA) and upload the document into the Attachments Sub-tab.
RFAs sent to HQFDNS NSB must include the following:

- **Subject:** Request for Assistance (External Vetting and/or Adjudicative Assistance)
- **Full Name (Applicant, Petitioner, Beneficiary, Derivative or Company)**
- **A- Number**
- **Pending Application(s) and/or petitions(s) & Form Type(s) to include Receipt Number.**
RFAs sent to HQFDNS NSB must include the following

- Requesting Officer Name and Contact Information, including phone number
- FDNS-DS NS Concern Number
- Litigation case information (e.g., court deadline)/Congressional interest, if relevant
Requests for assistance from HQFDNS NSB:

- Submission of complete and correct RFAs greatly assists HQFDNS Operational Support Services immigration officers to identify the individual of the NS concern and avoid duplication of efforts.

- HQFDNS-NSB will return cases where internal vetting and/or deconfliction were not properly completed and/or documented in FDNS-DS by the Designated Officer.
### Most common RFA submission administrative errors:

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Error Description</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Not including relevant Subject information in the body of the RFA.</td>
<td>HQFDNS-NSB receives a lot of inquiries. Including this information prevents HQ Officers from expending unnecessary effort.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sending an RFA but not sending an A-file. For KSTs send A file when requesting vetting and adjudicative assistance, Note: for Non-KSTs only send A file if adjudicative assistance is requested.</td>
<td>HQFDNS-NSB Officers need to see the file in order to form an accurate assessment. Note: no A files should be forwarded without first requesting assistance through the FDNS-NSB mailbox.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sending an A-file but not sending an RFA</td>
<td>HQFDNS-NSB receives a lot of lone files. This wastes time because HQ Officers have to track down who sent the file and why.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not indicating the type of assistance required.</td>
<td>If HQFDNS-NSB Officers don’t know what’s being asked of them, they can’t help. This creates unnecessary e-mail traffic to figure out what assistance is needed.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
RFA kickbacks from HQFDNS for not following policy:

- The following standard language email will be sent to Field Designated Officers who fail to follow CARRP policy when submitting RFA requests to HQFDNS. The policy issue that needs to be addressed will be indicated.

- **Standard language in responding to the Field when an RFA is not in compliance with CARRP Policies and Procedures.**

- This message is to advise you that I have reviewed your RFA below to ensure that all applicable CARRP policies and procedures pertaining to NS cases have been followed.
RFA kickbacks from HQFDNS for not following policy:

- 

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RFA kickbacks from HQFDNS for not following policy:

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RFA kickbacks from HQFDNS for not following policy:
RFA kickbacks from HQFDNS for not following policy:
EPO #8: Discuss Specific Terrorist Indictment and Conviction Successes
Terrorist Convictions

Recent Cases:

- Since Jan. 1, 2009, more than 30 individuals charged with terrorism violations have been successfully prosecuted and/or sentenced in federal courts nationwide, including the following:
Terrorist Convictions

* Five Sentenced in Terror Finance Case: (Northern District of Texas) – On May 27, 2009, five leaders of the Holy Land Foundation, once the largest Muslim charity in the United States, were sentenced for their role in funneling more than $12 million to the Hamas terror organization. Shukri Abu Baker and Ghassan Elashi were each sentenced to 65 years in prison. Mufid Abdulqader was sentenced to 20 years in prison, while Mohammed El Mezain and Abdulrahman Odeh were each sentenced to 15 years in prison.*
Terrorist Convictions

- Mohammed Warsame: (District of Minnesota) – On May 20, 2009, Mohammed Warsame pleaded guilty to conspiracy to provide material support to al-Qaeda, admitting that he attended al-Qaeda training camps, sent money from Canada to one of his former training camp commanders and continued to exchange messages with individuals associated with al-Qaeda once in Minnesota.
Terrorist Convictions

- **Ali al-Marri: (Central District of Illinois) – On April 30, 2009, Ali al-Marri pleaded guilty to conspiracy to provide material support to al-Qaeda, admitting that he attended terrorist training camps, learned al-Qaeda tradecraft and was dispatched by al-Qaeda to carry out its terrorist objectives in America.**
Terrorist Convictions

- *Five Sentenced in Fort Dix Terror Plot: (District of New Jersey)* – On April 28, 29, 2009, five individuals -- Mohamad Ibrahim Shnewer, brothers Dritan Duka, Shain Duka and Eljvir Duka and Serdar Tatar -- received sentences ranging from 33 years in prison, to life in prison plus 30 years, for plotting to kill U.S. soldiers in an armed attack on the military base in Fort Dix, New Jersey. All five individuals were convicted at trial in December 2008.
Terrorist Convictions

- **Seven Plead Guilty in MEK Terror Case: (Central District of California)** – On April 28, 2009, seven individuals – Roya Rahmani, Alireza Mohammad Moradi, Moustafa Ahmady, Hossein Afshari, Hassan Rezaie, Navid Taj and Mohammad Omidvar -- who were engaged in fundraising activities on behalf of the Mujahedin-e-Khalq (MEK), a designated foreign terrorist organization, pleaded guilty to federal charges of providing material support to terrorists.
Terrorist Convictions

- Wesam al-Delaema: (District of Columbia) -- On April 16, 2009, Wesam al-Delaema was sentenced to 25 years in prison for conspiring to murder Americans overseas, including by planting roadside bombs targeting U.S. soldiers in Iraq and by demonstrating on video how these explosives would be detonated to destroy American vehicles. He pleaded guilty on Feb. 25, 2009.
Terrorist Convictions

- **Christopher Paul: (Southern District of Ohio) --** On Feb. 26, 2009, Christopher Paul was sentenced to 20 years in prison for conspiring to use explosives against targets in Europe and the United States. Paul joined al-Qaeda in the early 1990s, fought in Afghanistan and Bosnia and conspired with others to target Americans both at home and abroad.
Terrorist Convictions

- *Four Plead Guilty in LTTE Prosecution: (Eastern District of New York)* -- On Jan. 27, 2009, four defendants -- Thiruthanikan Thanigasalam, Sahilal Sabaratnam, Sathajhan Sarachandran and Yogarasa Nadarasa -- pleaded guilty to terrorism violations in connection with their efforts to acquire surface-to-air missiles, missile launchers and hundreds of assault rifles for the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), a designated terrorist organization.
Terrorist Convictions

- Two Plead Guilty in Plot to Murder U.S. Soldiers: (Northern District of Ohio) -- On Jan. 15, 2009, Zubair Ahmed and Khaleel Ahmed pleaded guilty to conspiracy to provide material support to terrorists in connection with their efforts to travel abroad in order to murder or maim U.S. military forces in Iraq or Afghanistan.
Terrorist Convictions


- Jose Padilla, May 2002. Dirty bomb plot; convicted sentenced to 17 years in prison.

- Lackawanna Six, September 2002. Conspiring with terrorist groups; convicted and sentenced to from 7 to 10 years in prison.

- Iyman Faris, May 2003. Collapse Brooklyn Bridge; convicted and sentenced to 20 years in prison.

Terrorist Convictions


- James Elshafay and Shahawar Matin Siraj, August 2004. Plotting to bomb NY subway station; convicted and sentenced to 5 and 30 years in prison.

- Yassin Aref and Mohammad Hossain, August 2004. Conspiring to commit terrorist act; convicted of money laundering and material support for terrorism and sentenced to 15 years in prison.
Terrorist Convictions

- Umer Hayat and Hamid Hayat, June 2005. Supporting terrorism; convicted and sentenced to 24 years in prison.

- Levar Haley Washington, Gregory Vernon Patterson, Hammad Riaz Samana, and Kevin James, August 2005. Conspiring to attack National Guard facilities; convicted and sentenced to from 16 to 22 years in prison.

- Michael C. Reynolds, December 2005. Plot to blow up Wyoming natural gas refinery; convicted and sentenced to 30 years in prison.
Terrorist Convictions


- Hassan Abujihaad, March 2008. Hassan Abujihaad, a former U.S. Navy sailor from Phoenix, Arizona, was convicted of supporting terrorism and disclosing classified information; convicted and sentenced to 10 years in prison.

- Christopher Paul, June 2008. Conspiracies to target Americans in the United States and overseas; convicted and sentenced to 20 years in prison.
Terrorist Convictions

- **International Terror Inmates**

- There are currently 216 inmates in Bureau of Prisons (BOP) custody who have a history of/or nexus to international terrorism.

- Sixty seven of these individuals were extradited to the United States for prosecution, while 149 were not extradited.

- Seventy two of these individuals are U.S. citizens (45 of them born in the United States, 27 of them naturalized).
Terrorist Convictions

- The "Supermax" facility in Florence, Colo. (ADX Florence), which is BOP’s most secure facility, houses 33 of these international terrorists.

- There has never been an escape from ADX Florence, and BOP has housed some of these international terrorists since the early 1990s.

- In addition to the ADX Florence, the BOP houses such individuals in the Communications Management Units at Terre Haute, Ind., and Marion, Ill., as well as in other facilities among different institutions around the country.
Terrorists imprisoned at the "Supermax" facility in Florence, Colo. (ADX Florence):

- This list includes both former and current prisoners:
  - * Abdul Hakim Murad, of al-Qaeda's Operation Bojinka
  - * Ahmed Ajaj, involved in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing
  - * Ahmed Omar Abu Ali, Al Qaeda conspirator in several plots, including one to assassinate U.S. President George W. Bush
  - * Ahmed Ressam, involved in the 2000 millennium attack plots
  - * Clement Rodney Hampton-El, a.k.a. Dr. Rashid, involved in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing
Terrorists imprisoned at the "Supermax" facility in Florence, Colo. (ADX Florence):

- *Dandeny Muñoz Mosquera, chief assassin for Pablo Escobar, responsible for the bombing of Avianca Flight 203

- El Sayyid Nosair, involved in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing.

- Eric Robert Rudolph, terrorist, committed the Centennial Olympic Park bombing and other bombings

- Eyad Ismail, involved in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing

- Iyman Faris, involved in the NYC landmark plot, sentenced to 20 years in 2003
Terrorists imprisoned at the "Supermax" facility in Florence, Colo. (ADX Florence):

- James Ujaama, who tried to develop an al-Qaeda camp in Oregon

- Jeff Fort, he is currently imprisoned on drug trafficking charges. He is also the only American citizen ever convicted of terrorism for hire.

  * John Walker Lindh, dubbed "The American Taliban"

  * Jose Padilla, convicted of aiding terrorists

- * Khalfan Khamis Mohamed, participant in the 1998 United States embassy bombings
Terrorists imprisoned at the "Supermax" facility in Florence, Colo. (ADX Florence):

- Mahmud Abouhalima, involved in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing

- Mohamed Rashed Daoud Al-Owhali, involved in the 1998 U.S. embassy bombings

- Mohammed A. Salameh, involved in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing

- Mohammed Ali Hassan Al-Moayad, would-be financier of al-Qaeda and Hamas, serving 75 years

- Mohammed Odeh is one of the four former al-Qaeda members sentenced to life imprisonment in 2001 for their parts in the 1998 United States embassy bombings
Terrorists imprisoned at the "Supermax" facility in Florence, Colo. (ADX Florence):

- Mohammed Mansour Jabarah, a Canadian convicted of terrorism-related offences

- *Nidal Ayyad, involved in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing

- Oscar Rivera, leader of the Armed Forces of National Liberation, a Puerto Rican militant group, for bombing 28 targets in the Chicago area. Received an additional 15-year sentence for an escape attempt (from another prison).

- *Ramzi Yousef, of the 1993 World Trade Center bombing and Operation Bojinka, senior al-Qaeda member
Terrorists imprisoned at the "Supermax" facility in Florence, Colo. (ADX Florence):

- * Richard Reid, al-Qaeda's would-be "Shoe Bomber"

- ** Robert Hanssen, former senior FBI agent serving life for espionage

- ** Simon Trinidad, a former member of the FARC secretariat

- * Terry Nichols, Oklahoma City bombing conspirator
Terrorists imprisoned at the "Supermax" facility in Florence, Colo. (ADX Florence):

- * Theodore Kaczynski, the "Unabomber"

- * Timothy McVeigh, executed 2001 for Oklahoma City bombing

- * Tom Manning, political serial bomber, has been transferred to USP Hazelton

- * Wadih el-Hage, of the 1998 United States embassy bombings in Africa

- * Yu Kikumura, of the Japanese Red Army, released April 18, 2007, served 221 months, deported

- * Zacarias Moussaoui, involved in the September 11, 2001 attacks
EPO #9: Understand national security red flag indicators.
National Security Red Flags

Activities/involvement does not need to satisfy the legal standard for admissibility or removability in determining existence of NS concern.

Be alert for indicators of NS concern.

Presence of an indicator does not necessarily mean NS concern exists.
National Security Red Flags
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QUESTIONS?
EPO #10: Be aware of terrorist travel patterns.
TERRORIST TRAVEL PATTERNS
HQFDNS-NSB

U.S. Citizenship
and Immigration
Services

Version 0.1
Terrorist Travel Patterns

- By definition, transnational terrorist groups need to travel to commit terrorist acts.

- Indeed, without freedom of movement terrorists cannot plan, conduct surveillance, hold meetings, train for their mission, or execute an attack.

- Terrorists rely on forged passports and fake visas to move around the world unimpeded and undetected.
1993 WTC Bombers

- Ramzi Yousef, the mastermind of the attack, and Ahmad Ajaj, who was able to direct aspects of the attack despite being in prison for using an altered passport, traveled under aliases using fraudulent documents.
1993 WTC Bombers

- The two of them were found to possess five passports as well as numerous documents supporting their aliases:
  - a Saudi passport showing signs of alteration,
  - an Iraqi passport bought from a Pakistani official,
  - a photo-substituted Swedish passport,
  - a photo-substituted British passport,
  - a Jordanian passport,
  - identification cards, bank records, education records, and medical records.
Immigration Fraud

- Yousef and Ajaj concocted bogus political asylum stories when they arrived in the United States.

- Mahmoud Abouhalima, involved in both the World Trade Center and landmarks plots, received temporary residence under the Seasonal Agricultural Workers (SAW) program, after falsely claiming that he picked beans in Florida.
Immigration Fraud

- Mohammed Salameh, who rented the truck used in the bombing, overstayed his tourist visa. He then applied for permanent residency under the agricultural workers program, but was rejected.

- Matarawy Mohammed Said Saleh was supposed to get stolen cars for the plot; he married two American women in an effort to gain legal permanent residency.
Terrorist Use of Travel Documents

Illicit Travel More Difficult:

- Document security-digitization and biometrics
- More centralized, less name driven watchlisting
- US visa programs
- Counterterrorism operations against facilitators
Washing Machine Passports

Richard Reid – The “Shoe Bomber”


- Just before leaving Amsterdam, the operative obtained a replacement passport at the British consulate. The al Qaeda report says he had put his old one in a washing machine and removed a visa sticker for Pakistan, which he worried might set off alarms at security checks.

- The British Foreign Office says Mr. Reid, of British-Jamaican heritage, received a new British passport in Amsterdam on July 6, just before he flew to Tel Aviv on El Al.
Al Qaeda Training Manual
Excerpts From the Al Qaeda Training Manual

- Keeping the passport in a safe place so it would not be seized by the security apparatus, and the brother it belongs to would have to negotiate its return (I'll give you your passport if you give me information).

- All documents of the undercover brother, such as identity cards and passport, should be falsified.
Excerpts From the Al Qaeda Training Manual

- When the undercover brother is traveling with a certain identity card or passport, he should know all pertinent [information] such as the name, profession, and place of residence.

- The brother who has special work status (commander, communication link,...) should have more than one identity card and passport. He should learn the contents of each, the nature of the [indicated] profession, and the dialect of the residence area listed in the document
Excerpts From the Al Qaeda Training Manual Cont’d

- The photograph of the brother in these documents should be without a beard. It is preferable that the brother's public photograph [on these documents] be also without a beard. If he already has one [document] showing a photograph with a beard, he should replace it.

- When using an identity document in different names, no more than one such document should be carried at one time.

- The validity of the falsified travel documents should always be confirmed.
Excerpts From the Al Qaeda Training Manual Cont’d

- All falsification matters should be carried out through the command and not haphazardly (procedure control).

- Married brothers should not add their wives to their passports.

- When a brother is carrying the forged passport of a certain country, he should not travel to that country. It is easy to detect forgery at the airport, and the dialect of the brother is different from that of the people from that country.
Fraudulent Use Increasing

- Up tick in forged documents
- Why?
  - More operatives identified-Iraq travel patterns
  - Increased detection/information sharing
  - More use of “forgeable” documents
Fraud Document Use at Port of Entry

- The number of people identified by U.S. Customs and Border Protection inspectors at the nation's ports of entry as using fraudulent documents or posing as “impostors,” using other people's legitimate identification, has increased in recent years. Fraudulent document cases include altered or counterfeit documents and genuine documents presented by an impostor.

- 2006 • : 23,521
- 2007 • : 28,748
- 2008 • : 28,021
Imposters and Fraud Documents

- About 90 percent of cases involved documents seized at the ports of entry from impostors with legitimate paperwork, such as U.S. passports, green cards and border crossing cards.
Imposters and Fraud Documents

- During the 2008 fiscal year, the U.S. government reported 1,803 new immigration prosecutions for fraud and misuse of visas and other documents, according to data compiled and analyzed by the Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse at Syracuse University. That is up 194 percent from 2001, when the government reported 614 such prosecutions, the data show.
Fraud Documents

- Legitimate Issue/Borrowing
- Dedicated facilitators for collections and alteration
- Other terrorist groups/new skill sets
- Contract out to professionals
Al Qaeda Operations

- Unclassified intelligence reports indicate that:
  - Al Qaeda set up a passport-making operation in Afghanistan that altered travel and identity papers.
  - Al Qaeda members recycled dead members' documents to others, and trained in lifting and replacing photos and altering border stamps.
  - They also learned and exploited the minute anomalies in the immigration rules of scores of nations, the report said.
Breeder Documents

- Birth Certificates/National ID Cards
- Efforts to defeat biometrics/security features
- Less scrutinized-easy to forge
- Easy to get
- Backstopped alias identity
Systems Checks
QUESTIONS?
Resources & Reference Materials

Policies and Procedures

Read the policies and procedures for National Security.

Operational Guidance for Vetting and Adjudicating Cases with National Security Concerns

Domestic Operations:
- Interoffice Memorandum regarding Operational Guidance for Vetting and Adjudicating Cases with National Security Concerns (April 24, 2003)
- Operational Guidance for Vetting and Adjudicating Cases with National Security Concerns
- CARPP Known or Suspected Terrorist (KST) Process Flowchart
- CARPP Non-Known or Suspected Terrorist (Non-KST) Process Flowchart

International Operations:
- Guidance for the International Operations Division on the Vetting, Deconfliction, and Adjudication of Cases with National Security Concerns (April 28, 2008)

Refugee Affairs Division:
- Operational Guidance for Vetting and Adjudicating Refugee Cases with National Security Concerns (May 14, 2008)
- Refugee Adjudication Standard Operating Procedure: Cases Involving Terrorism and/or Threats to National Security

Asylum Division:
- Procedures for Handling Cases Involving National Security Concerns (Revised May 2008)
- Cases Involving Terrorism or Threats to National Security
- CARPP Known or Suspected Terrorist (KST) Asylum Process Flowchart
- CARPP Non-Known or Suspected Terrorist (Non-KST) Asylum Process Flowchart