CARRP

Deconfliction, Internal and External Vetting and Adjudication of NS Concerns

U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services

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LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE

Version 1.4
DESCRIPTION

• Identify how internal vetting and external vetting support the adjudication process when handling cases with national security concerns.

• Discuss the importance of law enforcement coordination as it relates to deconfliction and external vetting.

• Distinguish between the handling of Known or Suspected Terrorist (KST) and a non-KST NS concern.
Handling For Official Use Only (FOUO) Material

Materials and information are to be controlled, handled, transmitted, distributed, and disposed of in accordance with US DHS policy relating to Sensitive But Unclassified (SBU).
ENABLING PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVE (EPOs)

• EPO #1: Discuss the purpose of deconfliction and the importance of coordination with law enforcement/record owners.

• EPO #2: Discuss the purpose of internal vetting and identify various tools and techniques used.

• EPO #3: Discuss the purpose of external vetting and the roles and responsibilities of external vetting KSTs and non-KSTs.
ENABLING PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVE (EPOs)

- **EPO#4**: Apply USCIS policies in adjudicating applications or petitions in cases involving national security concerns.

- **EPO #5**: Identify standards for documenting deconfliction and vetting activities.

- **EPO#6**: Identify Information Sharing & Confidentiality Rules and Provisions
RECAP: Controlled Application Review & Resolution Program (CARRP)- Four Stages

1. Identify NS Concern
2. Eligibility Assessment/Internal Vetting
3. External Vetting
4. Final Adjudication

***Deconfliction
CARRP Process - Deconfliction

1. **IDENTIFYING NS CONCERN**

2. **INTERNAL VETTING/ELIGIBILITY ASSESSMENT**

   - Conducted by Field or HQFDNS depending on type of NS concern

3. **EXTERNAL VETTING**

4. **CARRP ADJUDICATION**

   - Deconfliction can happen within each phase multiple times
DECONFLICITION

DECONFLICITION VIDEO
FDNS Immigration Officers

• Primary liaison officers and points of contact (POC) for law enforcement and intelligence agencies
  
  • All coordination with the Intelligence Community is conducted through HQFDNS.
  
  • For CARRP, Background Check Unit (BCU) Officers have been designated to coordinate with law enforcement.

• Note: Local management certainly has the discretion to engage additional personnel in this capacity, as the intent is to maximize communication and cooperation, not impede it.
Deconfliction

• Coordination between USCIS and record owner of NS information

• To ensure that planned adjudicative activities do not compromise or impede an ongoing investigation or other record owner interest.
  • Interview
  • Request for Evidence
  • Site visit
  • Decision to grant or deny a benefit
Deconfliction

• Ensures that record owner is aware that the individual has a benefit pending with USCIS.

• Provides USCIS with opportunity to ask about
  • Aliases;
  • Family relationships;
  • Residence within or outside the U.S.;
  • Membership or involvement with organizations;
  • Military Training; and
  • Foreign Travel.
Deconfliction

- Provides USCIS with opportunity to ask about criminal activity to include fraud and immigration violations:
  - Arrests or detainments.
  - Charges filed/or that will be filed against applicant.
Deconfliction

- Preparing for RFE, Interview or Site Visit:
  - Also provides record owner with opportunity to submit questions.
  - Must be material to benefit sought.
Deconfliction

- Following receipt of additional information/evidence:
  - Also provides record owner with the opportunity to consider additional information that may inform further action or investigation of the case.

- Preparing for Decision
  - Also provides record owner with the opportunity to comment on decision
Deconfliction - Guidance

Request by Law Enforcement Agency for Abeyance or Expedited Processing during Deconfliction –

- Designated officers in receipt of LEA requests to grant, deny or place in abeyance the issuance of immigration benefits must refer the request to the USCIS chain of command.

- Request must be in writing, in accordance with the Operational Guidance.
Deconfliction - Guidance

- Designated officer must prepare a written recommendation to Field Director requesting to place the case in abeyance or for expedited processing.

- On a case-by-case basis, the Field Director will determine whether the request comports with the requirements for abeyance (8 CFR 103.2(b)(18)) or warrants expedited processing.
Deconfliction - Guidance

• Case will be held in abeyance for 180 days or until the investigation is completed, whichever is sooner.

• If closed and there is still a nexus to NS – Document file and FDNS-DS and proceed with External Vetting (advising the LEA/record owner that USCIS will continue the process to adjudicate the application)
Deconfliction - Guidance

• If closed and no other NS Concerns- A-file and FDNS-DS is updated and case is returned for routine adjudication.

• If still OPEN – Request a current formal abeyance and re-submit to the District Director for review.

• The withholding of adjudication period may be extended further.

*For more information see: Additional Guidance on Issues Concerning Vetting and Adjudication of Cases Involving NS Concerns pg. 7-8 and 8 CFR 103.2(b)(8)
QUESTIONS?
EPO #4: Identify the process for internal vetting of cases involving national security concerns.
EPO #4: Identify the process for internal vetting of cases involving national security concerns.

may consist of DHS, open source, or other systems checks; file review; interviews; and other research as specified in the Operational Guidance.
Things to consider during review of case

• Look at whole picture and from multiple angles.

• Review every page of application/petition.

• Review G-325 for completeness.

• Review Security Checks results, review them for relevance to applicant.
Things to consider during review of case

- Look for consistency in testimony and documentation to establish credibility.

- Clearly document changes made to the application or petition during the interview.

- Ask questions in the same order.

- Ensure that all biographical data is current and accurate to include current contact information.
Internal Vetting/Eligibility Assessment- cont’d
Internal Vetting/Eligibility Assessment- cont’d

- What systems will need to be checked?

- For Official Use Only (FOUO)/Law Enforcement Sensitive information cannot be disclosed without permission from the record owner.

- Classified information cannot be disclosed.
Biographical Information

• Aliases, various spellings, maiden names

• Marital status

• Children

• Location of family members
  • Immediate
  • Siblings, parents, ex-spouses
Immigration History

- Dates of and status at entry
- Purpose of stay
- Type of visa
- Applications/petition filings
- Previous denials
- Suspected immigration fraud
Education & Employment

• Education
  • Institutions
  • Degrees

• Work history
  • Current and past occupation
  • Business or professional licenses
  • Tax information/sources of income
  • Business associates
Internet as a Research Tool

- **GOOGLE** – Language Tools – Translates an ENTIRE website!

Google Language Tools

Search across languages
Type a search phrase in your own language to easily find pages in another language. We'll translate the results for you to read.

Search for:
My language: English  Search pages written in: Spanish

Translate and Search

Tip: Use advanced search to restrict your search by language and country without translating your search phrase.

Translate text

Translate a web page
http://

Spanish to English  Translate

Version 1.4
Russian News Website (in Russian)
Russian News Website (Translated to English)

Recent events

- 2019: Society
  - This summer has been 100 years.
- 2019: Sport
  - Big O: details of the ring
- 2019: Politics
  - Forging the football will never be a robbery.
- 2019: Society
  - These secrets will prevent accidents.

Politics

- 2019: Politics
  - 27/09/2019
  - Forging the wool will never be a robbery.
- 2019: Staff
  - 28/03/2019
  - Staff in development.

Events:

- MOE: aftershokov will not
  - Living in Khutsk came after a strike of nature: the city was on the way seismic waves caused by the powerful earthquake on Baku. It almost fell throughout eastern Siberia. Casualties and destruction in the region not, but in the same Khutsk townpeople spent several hours on the street.

- Around the world
  - Russian leaders greeted the guests.

- Around the world
  - Hillary Clinton does not deserve the expectation, the Democrats.

- Sports
  - Big O: details of the ring

- Science
  - Russian scientists greeted the guests.

- Culture
  - Around the world
  - Hillary Clinton does not deserve the expectation, the Democrats.

- Society
  - Around the world
  - Hillary Clinton does not deserve the expectation, the Democrats.

- Company News
  - Around the world
  - Hillary Clinton does not deserve the expectation, the Democrats.

- St. Petersburg
  - Around the world
  - Hillary Clinton does not deserve the expectation, the Democrats.

- Results of the week
  - Around the world
  - Hillary Clinton does not deserve the expectation, the Democrats.

- Hotline
  - Around the world
  - Hillary Clinton does not deserve the expectation, the Democrats.

- Politics
  - Around the world
  - Hillary Clinton does not deserve the expectation, the Democrats.
QUESTIONS?
Criminal vs. NS Objectives

**Criminal Law**
- Investigate Crime
- Gather Evidence
- Prosecute
- Plea
- Trial

**National Security Objective**
- Detect Foreign Power Activity
- Monitor
- Disrupt
- Infiltrate Covert Prosecute
Criminal Law

- Criminal investigations
- Collection of Evidence
- Objective: identifying and prosecuting criminals
- Limited protections of sources

- Legal tools
  - Subpoenas, Grand Jury
  - Search Warrants
  - Wiretaps (Title III)

- Constitutional protection via public, adversarial criminal process

National Security Law

- Intelligence (FI & CI) Operations
- Collection of Information
- Objective: detecting, monitoring and disrupting activities of foreign powers
- Secrecy to protect sources and methods

- Legal Tools
  - Executive authority (FISA)
  - Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
  - National Security Letters

- Constitutional protections via limitations of targets to foreign powers and their agents
U.S. Person (USPER)

- Results of security checks may indicate the individual is a USPER.

- Under Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) of 1978, USPER is defined as

  - Citizens of the U.S.
U.S. Person (USPER)

- Aliens lawfully admitted to the U.S. for permanent residence

- an unincorporated association a substantial number of members of which are citizens of the United States or aliens lawfully admitted for permanent residence

- or a corporation which is incorporated in the United States, but does not include a corporation or an association which is a foreign power.
QUESTIONS?
CARRP Process - Deconfliction

- IDENTIFYING NS CONCERN
- INTERNAL VETTING/ELIGIBILITY ASSESSMENT
- CONDUCTED BY FIELD OR HQFDNS DEPENDING ON TYPE OF NS CONCERN
- EXTERNAL VETTING
- CARRP ADJUDICATION

Deconfliction can happen within each phase multiple times.
External Vetting

Consists of inquiries to record owners in possession of the NS information to identify:

(a) fact or fact patterns necessary to determine the nature and relevance of the NS concern, including status and results of any ongoing investigation and the basis for closure of any previous investigation; and

(b) information that may be relevant in determining eligibility, and when appropriate, removability.
KST External Vetting

• HQFDNS has sole authority to conduct KST external vetting

• Request for assistance to dhs.gov

• All activities (eligibility assessment/internal vetting/deconfliction) should be documented in FDNS-DS.
KST External Vetting

- Local senior-level official must review the case to confirm that no grounds of ineligibility have been identified.

- Supervisory and senior-level official concurrence should be obtained and documented in FDNS-DS.

- The sending office must confirm that the subject remains on the Terrorist Watch List
KST Hit Removed? Cont.

- A KST NS record can be added or removed during any stage of the CARRP process.

- If the individual was previously identified as a KST NS concern but the record is removed and there are no other indicators of a NS concern, the individual is no longer a KST NS concern.
KST Hit Removed? Cont.

• You can confirm that the individual has been removed from the watch list by conducting a query in TECS/IBIS. You may wish to reach out to your local ICE/JTTF to determine if there are any other issues.

• Determine whether the record owner is aware of any additional information indicating a NS concern or of any other information relevant to the adjudication.
KST Hit Removed? Cont.

• If the individual agent who posted the hits is not known, contact with the KST LEA/record owner is not required; however, the officer must determine whether there are any other Non-KST NS Concerns on the subject before proceeding with the case.

• To document the previously identified KST NS concern, update FDNS-DS to indicate that an NS concern was identified but no longer exists and include any follow up actions that were taken.
KST Hit Removed? Cont.

- KST NS concern has been removed but STILL has NS Concerns case will be processed in compliance with the CARRP Policy as a Non-KST NS concern.

- No other NS concerns, the case will be considered Non-NS/Non-CARRP case and adjudicated routinely after proper documentation in FDNS-DS and placement of the BCAA in the A-file.
Special Note

- ***Supervisors must confirm that the file is properly documented with a current print out of TECS/IBIS and NCIC and that all appropriate fields are updated in FDNS-DS, before concurrence with the decision that the case is no longer a KST NS concern.

- THERE HAVE BEEN CASES WHERE LE HAVE BEEN ENTERED THE DAY BEFORE THE APPLICANT IS TO BE NATURALIZED.
Non-KST External Vetting

• Non-KST external vetting completed by designated officer in the Field.

• Primarily FDNS IOs and BCUs in asylum/field offices and service centers.

• HQ International Ops for overseas offices.
Non-KST External Vetting: Contact Record Owner

- Contact with a case agent or record owner affords an opportunity to share information that may assist each party to complete their mission.

- To provide LEA with information of which they might not be aware.

- A secure telephone conversation with a case agent may yield far more information than over an open line. Be prepared to offer to discuss the case over a secure line and to take classified notes.
Law Enforcement Coordination

- To establish and maintain effective coordination with the ICE, FBI, or the JTTF representative:

- Be aware of any active law enforcement interest (deconfliction).
Law Enforcement Coordination

• Understand that investigative information is treated like evidence (chain of custody)

• Foster communication:
  • Initiate at supervisory level
  • Engage Agents only when necessary (Field Intelligence Group (FIG) within JTTF)
Law Enforcement Coordination

• Educate the LEA on your role and how you can help them so they are more likely to help you:

  • Access to and information available in A-file.

  • Ability to interview.

  • Request for Evidence (RFE), Notice of Intent to Deny/Terminate (NOID/NOIT).

• Provide LEA(s) opportunity to participate when the case is adjudicated
Non-KST External Vetting: Outreach

Preparation for Outreach:

• Be familiar with the immigration status, pending applications, and the NS Concern.

• Have readily available any ORI, TECS ID, or case record numbers.
Non-KST External Vetting: Outreach

- Develop Lines of Inquiry – Identify areas to explore with record owner prior to initiating discussions.

- Be Prepared to Share Information, to the extent possible
  - Considerations include Privacy Act, VAWA, legalization, asylum, etc.
Non-KST External Vetting: Outreach

- Speak in layperson’s terminology (no immigration jargon).

- Educate about USCIS’s role.

- Be polite, respectful, and understanding.

- Be Prepared to Elevate the Discussion – When necessary.
Non-KST External Vetting: Outreach

Request any and all information about:

- Aliases;
- Family relationships;
- Residence within or outside the U.S.;
- Membership or involvement with organizations;
- Military Training; and
- Foreign Travel.
Non-KST External Vetting: Outreach

- Request any and all information about criminal activity:
  - For which applicant was arrested or detained
  - or which applicant has been charged;
  - For which applicant will be charged; and
  - For which applicant will not be charged (i.e., not relevant to the current criminal investigation)
Non-KST External Vetting: Outreach

- Document the Conversation:
  - Unclassified/FOUO notes
  - Classified notes, if necessary
No Record Owner?

• External Vetting is NOT required if there is no identified record owner.

• If the applicant is denied a benefit based on the Non-KST NS Concern identified through interactions with the subject or by other means, the officer **must** enter a record into TECS/IBIS for future reference by law enforcement.
National Targeting Center (NTC)

- Established on October 22, 2001

- A 24/7 operation with the centralized mission of coordinating anti-terrorism targeting and supporting all CBP Anti-Terrorism activities.

- Supports and responds to inquiries from the field, conducts tactical targeting to identify actionable targets, develops Automated Targeting System (ATS) rules, and supports Intelligence Driven Special Operations (IDSO).
National Targeting Center (NTC)

• All Terrorist Watch list encounters by CBP are processed through the NTC.

• Liaisons assigned to the NTC-P: U.S. Coast Guard, ICE, TSA, Office of Intelligence, and Federal Air Marshal Service, FBI, and DOS.
Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF)

- Established in the 1980s.

- FBI is the lead agency.

- They are the FBI's Joint Terrorism Task Forces, or JTTFs.

- Where are they based? In 100 cities nationwide, including at least one in each of our 56 field offices. Sixty-five of these JTTFs were created after 9/11/01.
Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF)

- How many members? 3,723 nationwide—more than four times the pre-9/11 total—including 2,196 Special Agents, 838 state/local law enforcement officers, and 689 professionals from other government agencies (the Department of Homeland Security, the CIA, and the Transportation Security Administration, to name a few).

- The first JTTF? New York City, established way back in 1980.
The newest?

Actually, there are 16 of them: in Montgomery, Alabama; Fayetteville, Arkansas; Fresno, California; Colorado Springs, Colorado; West Palm Beach, Florida; Bloomington, Indiana; Covington, Kentucky; Portland, Maine; Grand Rapids, Michigan; Helena, Montana; Erie, Pennsylvania; Providence, Rhode Island; Midland, Lubbock, and Plano, Texas; and Everett, Washington.
Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF)

- JTTF Their contributions?
- Northern Virginia jihad.

- instrumental in breaking up cells like the "Portland Seven," the "Lackawanna They've traced sources of terrorist funding, responded to anthrax threats, halted the use of fake IDs, and quickly arrested suspicious characters with all kinds of deadly weapons and explosives.

- Chances are, if you hear about a counterterrorism investigation, JTTFs are playing an active and often decisive role.
Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF)

- How do these JTTFs coordinate their efforts? Largely through the interagency National Joint Terrorism Task Force, working out of FBI Headquarters, which makes sure that information and intelligence flows freely among the local JTTFs.

- JTTFs are working 24/7/365 to protect the United States from terrorist attack.

- Link: FBI War on Terrorism
Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF)

- Serve three main purposes:
  - prevent terrorist attacks;
  - respond to and investigate terrorist incidents or terrorist-related activity; and
  - identify and investigate domestic and foreign terrorist groups and individuals targeting or operating within the United States.
National Joint Terrorism Task Force

• The National JTTF (N-JTTF) located at FBI headquarters, includes representatives from a number of other agencies.

• USCIS liaises through ICE representative on JTTF.
NJTTF Full-Time Members

- Air Force Office of Special Investigations (AFOSI)
- Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF)
- Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
- Customs and Border Protection (CBP)
- Defense Criminal Investigative Service
- Department of Interior's Bureau of Land Management
- Diplomatic Security Service (DSS) (within DOS)
- Federal Protective Service (FPS) (within ICE)
- Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)
- Internal Revenue Service (IRS)
- Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS)
- Postal Inspection Service
- Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration
- U.S. Border Patrol (within CBP)
- U.S. Park Police
- U.S. Army
- U.S. Marshall Service (USMS)
- U.S. Secret Service (USSS)
QUESTIONS?
Practical Exercises

Internal/External Vetting
Practical Exercises

For each scenario:

1-Identify the NS indicators and determine if they rise to the level of a NS concern

2-Determine what internal vetting steps should have been taken (e.g. based on the scenario what systems checks would you have run)

3-Determine if there is enough information to determine whether the NS concern has been resolved or the NS concern remains
Practical Exercises #1

- Subject is applying for adjustment of status.

- Poison pen letter received at the American Embassy in Dhaka in November 2001.

- According to the letter, the SUBJECT'S spouse, was preparing "to train people in the U.S. for sabotage activities for the Osama Bin Laden Terrorist Organization."

- The inquiry was closed after all investigative leads were exhausted in May 2002.
Practical Exercises #1 Cont.

- The SUBJECT would file a bogus asylum claim so she could petition for her husband to enter and remain in the U.S. legally.

- A query of CLAIMS revealed that the SUBJECT did file an I-730 Asylee Relative Petition on behalf of her husband on 01/20/2004. The I-730 is still pending.

- reviewed their records and determined that they were not interested and would not open an inquiry on the subject.
Practical Exercises #2

- SUBJECT entered the U.S. on an F-1 visa through LOS. SUBJECT is being petitioned for by his USC spouse. In Iran, SUBJECT was an aerospace engineer and worked on a top secret program for the Iranian Department of Defense from 2000 to 2003.

- In January 2007, LE provided the above information:

- In May 2007, LE the SUBJECT had been fully vetted by ALL local agencies and no derogatory information was found.
Practical Exercises #2 Cont.

- No new IBIS or NCIC wants/warrant records were found relating to the subject’s name and date of birth.

- FBI Fingerprint Results: LE

- FBI Name Check Results: LE
Practical Exercises #3

- the applicant and his store are the targets of a current investigation and that the bank account is being utilized to illegally send money to Yemen.

- The record was last updated February 2006.

- Contact with record owner indicated that the subject is still under investigation for unlicensed money service business.
Practical Exercises #3 Cont.

- Investigation is trying to establish if there are national security concerns.

- LE requested that the N-400 be placed in abeyance but did not disagree with issuance of the I-90.

- The FBI Name Check remains pending since September 2005.
Practical Exercises #4

- Subject may be linked to suspected Algerian Terrorists/Illegal Aliens. Subject may be using fraudulent documents.

- A review of file revealed several memorandums and Report of Investigation concerning possible terrorist activity.

- Subject was referred to the Investigations branch by the U. S. Customs Service subsequent to a post 9/11 analysis of flight records pertaining to China Southern Airlines flight.
Practical Exercises #4 Cont.

• There are no indications of any specific illegal activity and no direct affiliation with any terrorist group involving this Subject.

• This Subject was considered a “Target of Potential Suspicion” due to the flight analysis. This case is not of concern and if there was derogatory information Special Agent stated that he would be able to reveal information.

• California Police Department arrested subject on 12202002 with a charge of driving under the influence alcohol (misdemeanor). The charge was dismissed on 03042003.

• FBI Name Check processed
Practical Exercises #5

• **LE** closed their International Terrorism Investigation on the subject in Colorado in August 2004. A lead was sent to New York that same month.

• **LE** Colorado was contacted and he stated that he closed his case because the subject moved from Colorado to New York but the subject was still of interest.
Practical Exercises #5 Cont.

- LE New York was contacted and advised that there was nothing derogatory on the subject in Albany, NY and no case had been opened.

- LE 2004 indicates the subject is of national security interest. Several messages have been left with the LE record owner but no response has been received.
Practical Exercises #6

- Subject filed N-400 on 2/21/06 while residing in Tucson, AZ.

- He currently resides in the Buffalo area. N-400 interview date for 12/21/06 was de-scheduled pending FDNS clearance and G-325A FBI name check.

- LE record states that Subject may be associated with an individual who is currently under investigation by LE.
Practical Exercises #6 Cont.

- Record owner was contacted and advised she had no specific information on the subject other than his association with the individual under investigation.

- The record owner inquired whether I recommended that the record be removed. I responded that that decision was up to LE after review of the all related records.

- LE checks were negative.
Practical Exercises #7

- The subject born in Iraq was referenced during the course of an ongoing Acts of Terrorism investigation in 2001. However, there is no additional information regarding the subject.

- Subject was interviewed regarding an allegation that he was sending money to Iraq. Subject advised that he entered the U.S. as a refugee from Iraq in 1996. He is currently unemployed but previously worked as a dishwasher at a local hotel.
Practical Exercises #7 Cont.

- He departed Iraq during the Gulf War and fled to Saudi Arabia. In 1999, he married a U.S. citizen.

- He recently completed three years of probation on a charge associated with drinking and knocking on a woman’s door.

- When asked about the allegation, he replied he sent $200 to his brother in Iraq about a year ago. He said it is common to provide financial support to family in Iraq.

Practical Exercises #7 Cont.

- Subject identified three individuals who he worked with and were happy following the events of 9/11. He did not believe these men were terrorists.

- He explained that he is Shiite Muslim and does not like Sunni Muslims of which Bin Laden is a member.

- [LE] crossing record to and from Amsterdam in 2003.

- Fingerprint results show his arrest from 2004 for trespassing.
Practical Exercises #8

- LE provides a DHS-2-ICE Tip Line report:

  - Alleged sleeper cell Muslim (Libya) information received DHS-2-ICE Tip Line – caller states the SUBJECT attends a mosque in Bloomington MN, which is under investigation.

  - Caller states his ex-wife was hood winked into bringing in and marrying a man from Libya. Caller claims SUBJECT is part of “sleeper cell”, and frequently attends a mosque in Bloomington, MN.
Practical Exercises #8 Cont.

- Caller had no proof of marriage fraud and is not able to substantiate “sleeper cell” claim.

- NCIC: LE

- FBI Fingerprint processed: LE

- FBI Name Check processed: LE
Practical Exercises #9

- the Subject has not been the subject of an investigation.

- However, he was referenced in a file regarding Threat Assessment Terrorism Matters, based on his country of origin, the United Arab Emirates.

- In April 2003, Subject voluntarily appeared and provided the following information:

- Subject is a Permanent Resident of the U.S. He and his mother originally settled in New Jersey but later moved to Virginia.
Practical Exercises #9 Cont.

- He is studying to be a Chemical Engineer but his original field of study was Criminal Justice. He received a citation after he sold beer to an underage person while working at a local convenience store.

- He believed that he could never obtain a job in law enforcement after receiving this citation.

- LE did not pursue an investigation and files disclosed no additional information regarding the captioned individual.
Practical Exercises #10

- Conducted by this writer on 09/25/2006 indicate that the Subject, a Chinese national, appears to match the following National Security LE.

- Subject of a Current Investigation record. “Subject is an associate of Mr. Wu who has allegedly smuggled controlled technology to the Peoples Republic of China.” LE.
Practical Exercises #10 Cont.

- On 10/05/2006, this writer contacted record owner concerning the above listed LE his investigation of the main target has not revealed any derogatory information pertaining to the N-400 applicant, and knows of no reason to hold up her application for naturalization.

- A LE the Subject does not appear to match any wants/warrants.

- A LE check was conducted with negative results. A DACS query was also LE

- FBI Name Check processed LE
EPO#4: Apply USCIS policies in adjudicating applications or petitions in cases involving national security concerns.
CARRP Final Adjudication

• Remember deconfliction prior to USCIS action!

• For KSTs: Cases with unresolved KST NS concerns can be granted ONLY after concurrence by the USCIS Deputy Director. Additional Guidance on Issues Concerning the Vetting and Adjudication of Cases Involving NS Concerns. Signed February 06, 2009
CARRP Final Adjudication

• For Non-KST NS Concern:

  • Any denial, referral, or Notice of Intent to Deny (NOID) an application or petition with NS concerns must be based on statutory grounds of ineligibility that can be cited in a decision.

  • Seek supervisory and/or legal review.
CARRP Final Adjudication

• Unresolved Non-KST NS concerns after vetting and deconfliction appear eligible for benefit sought, the officer may:

  • Recommend approval of the application/petition and must elevate this recommended approval to the senior-level official for consideration/concurrence.

  • Recommend further review of the application/petition and must elevate this recommendation to the senior-level official.
CARRP Final Adjudication

- Senior-level concurs with the officer’s recommendation to approve the pending application/petition and the case has not been ordered withheld in accordance with 8CFR 103.2(b)(18).

- The senior-level official must concur in FDNS-DS and it must be reflected in the BCAA. (electronically generated):
  - Case will be updated in FDNS-DS to reflect “closed” and sub-status of “NS Concern not resolved.”
CARRP Final Adjudication

- Senior-level does not concur with the officer’s recommendation to approve the pending application/petition, or would like assistance from HQFDNS, the senior-level may submit a formal Request for Assistance (RFA).

- To include Vetting Assistance or Adjudicative Assistance.
CARRP Final Adjudication

- If, upon completion of additional vetting by HQFDNS the subject remains eligible for the benefit sought, the senior-level official may:
  
  - Provide final concurrence to the officer for approval; or
  
  - Request written direction on how to proceed with the adjudication
  
  - from the HQ program office with jurisdiction over the case.
CARRP Final Adjudication

- In the case where the officer recommends further review and the senior-level official determines that the application should be approved, the senior-level official will return the application/petition to the officer for adjudication consistent with the official’s guidance.
QUESTIONS?
EPO#5: Identify standards for documenting deconfliction and vetting activities.

- Results of vetting and deconfliction must be documented in the FDNS-DS.

- No classified information can be entered into FDNS-DS.

- Realize what you document may end up in discovery.
Documenting

• What? Results of vetting and deconfliction:

  • Security Checks.

  • Systems Checks (positive or negative responses)

    • “A query of the subject’s LE and LE in LE on 3/28/08 resulted in no match.”

    • “As of 4/11/08, a query by the subject’s LE and by LE and LE in LE provide the following travel history:...”
Documenting

- When?

- Document the date the query was conducted even for internet searches
Documenting

• Where?
  • On the non-record side (right-side) of the file
  • AND
  • In the appropriate tabs of FDNS-DS
  • DHS FOUO Coversheet
Documenting

Department of Homeland Security

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

THE ATTACHED MATERIALS CONTAIN DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY INFORMATION THAT IS FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY. FOR OTHER TYPES OF SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED INFORMATION REQUIRING PROTECTION AGAINST UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURE, THE ATTACHED MATERIALS WILL BE HANDLED AND SECURED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE MANAGEMENT DIRECTIVES GOVERNING PROTECTION AND DISSEMINATION OF SUCH INFORMATION.

AT A MINIMUM, THE ATTACHED MATERIALS WILL BE DISSEMINATED ONLY ON A NEED-TO-KNOW BASIS AND WHEN DISCLOSED WILL BE STORED IN LOCKED CONTAINERS OR AREA OFFERING PROPER PROTECTION AGAINST UNAUTHORIZED ACCESS AND UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURE.
Documenting

• How?

• Annotate source.

• For internet sources, provide website address (URL) and date.

• Ensure that the appropriate caveats are on the prepared documents (memoranda to file, e-mail correspondence).
Documenting

• Why?

  • to protect against any unauthorized disclosure of Third Agency information or information protected by confidentiality provisions, such as Asylum, VAWA, Legalization, etc.

• Historical record

• So others can follow along and understand where the information came from
QUESTIONS?

- Third Agency Rule.

- Privacy Act.

- Confidentiality Provisions
  - Legalization
  - VAWA
  - Asylum

- Handling Classified
Asylum Confidentiality

• No unauthorized disclosure about asylum.

• Application to 3rd party so can link identity to:
  • The fact that the applicant has applied for asylum;
  • Specific facts or allegations pertaining to the individual asylum claim contained in an asylum application; or
  • Fact or allegations that are sufficient to give rise to a reasonable inference that the applicant has applied for asylum.

• Authorized disclosure through written consent of the asylum applicant or authorization from the Secretary of DHS
Asylum Confidentiality

- Disclosure may also be made to USG officials or contractors and US federal or state courts on a need to know basis related to certain administrative, law enforcement, and civil actions.

- Relatives/beneficiaries are considered third parties.
Requests from Outside Agencies to Review USCIS Files

• See your Records section!

• Part I – Section 14 of the Records Handbook

• Outside agencies may be permitted to review a USCIS file for the following purposes:
  • Law enforcement
  • A routine use as described by the specific Privacy Act notice for the type of record requested
Requests from Outside Agencies to Review USCIS Files

- If a state or local agency wants to access records for reasons other than law enforcement or a routine use described by the Privacy Act notice for the records, they may file a FOIA request.
Third Agency Rule

• Records of other agencies either loaned to USCIS or a part of the USCIS files must be protected from unauthorized disclosure.

• Contents of an agency's report in possession of USCIS shall not be disclosed to another agency without the prior consent of the originating agency.

• Includes information resulting from security checks such as information provided by DOS, USMS, FBI, DEA, ATF
DHS Policy for Internal Information Exchange and Sharing (2/1/07)

• All DHS components are considered part of one "agency" for purposes of the Privacy Act 5 U.S.C. § 552a(a)(1), (b)(1).

• No DHS component should consider another DHS component to be a separate agency for information-sharing purposes.
DHS Policy for Internal Information Exchange and Sharing (2/1/07)

• Absent any legal prohibitions as set forth by the Department's General Counsel, information shall be shared within DHS whenever the requesting officer or employee has an authorized purpose for accessing the information in the performance of his or her duties, possesses the requisite security clearance, and assures adequate safeguarding and protection of the information.

• From this point forward, information-access and -sharing agreements with outside entities will be negotiated and entered into on behalf of the Department as a whole, not on behalf of an individual DHS component.
DHS Components

- U.S. Secret Service (USSS)
- U.S. Coast Guard
- U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)
- U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP)
- Transportation Security Administration (TSA)
- U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (CIS)
- Federal Emergency Management (FEMA)
- Directorate for National Protection Programs
- Directorate for Science and Technology
- Directorate for Management
- Office of Policy
- Office of Health Affairs
- Office of Operations Coordination
- Office of Intelligence and Analysis
- Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC)
- Domestic Nuclear Detection Office
Handling/Protecting Information
Sensitive But Unclassified & Classified

- Other Government Agency (OGA)
- **DO NOT PARAPHRASE** classified information!!
- Case agent name and contact information
- Case # (FBI, ICE, or other LEA)
Handling Classified Information

How do you ensure that someone has the appropriate clearance?

- Office of Security and Integrity (OSI) Personnel Security Customer Service
- USCIS-OSI-PERSEC-Customer Service (in Outlook)
Handling Classified Information

OR

- USCIS-OSI-PERSEC-CustomerServ@dhs.gov

- Include First Name, Middle Initial, Last Name and agency about individual you are seeking security clearance verification
Resources & Reference Materials


• Statement of Mutual Understanding of Information Sharing with Dept of Citizenship and Immigration Canada.

• Websites for Basic and Supplemental Systems Checks.
Resources & Reference Materials

- DHS FOUO Coversheet.

- Sample Background Checklist.

- Sample Classified Notes Page:
  - Classified info should not be typed into this document on an unsecure computer, intended for handwritten derivative notes.
Resources & Reference Materials

- Procedures for Handling Cases Involving National Security Concerns (Revised May 2008)
- Cases Involving Terrorism or Threats to National Security
- CARRP Known or Suspected Terrorist (KST) Asylum Process Flowchart
- CARRP Non-Known or Suspected Terrorist (Non-KST) Asylum Process Flowchart

FBI Name Check Policy
- Revised National Security Adjudication and Reporting Requirements (February 4, 2009)
- FBI Name Checks Policy and Process Clarification for Domestic Operations (December 21, 2006)

Material Support
- Withholding Adjudication and Review of Prior Denials of Certain Categories of Cases Involving Association with, or Provision of Material Support to, Certain Terrorist Organizations or Other Groups (March 26, 2008)
- Authorization to process cases involving the provision of material support to the AUO (March 10, 2008)
- Authorization to process cases involving the provision of material support to the ELN (December 18, 2007)
- Processing the Discretionary Exemption to the Inadmissibility Ground for Providing Material Support to the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) (September 5, 2007)
- Material Support Exemption Worksheet

Document Handling
- DHS Policy for Internal Information Exchange and Sharing (February 1, 2007)
- Safeguarding Sensitive But Unclassified (For Official Use Only) Information (January 6, 2005)
- DHS Guidelines for the Use of Classified Information in Immigration Proceedings (October 4, 2004)

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