18 Defendants, 19 WARREN PETERSEN, President of 20 the Arizona State Senate, in his official capacity; BEN TOMA, 21 Speaker of the Arizona House of 22 Representatives, in his official 23 Proposed Intervenors.		Case 2:21-cv-01417-DLR Document 16	6 Filed 02/24/23 Page 1 of 11
 Plaintiffs, Plaintiffs, v. KRIS MAYES, Attorney General of Arizona, in her official capacity, et al., Defendants, WARREN PETERSEN, President of the Arizona State Senate, in his official capacity; BEN TOMA, Speaker of the Arizona House of Representatives, in his official capacity, Proposed Intervenors. 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	AZ Bar No. 030446 Mark A. Lippelmann AZ Bar No. 036553 ALLIANCE DEFENDING FREEDOM 15100 N. 90th Street Scottsdale, AZ 85260 (480) 444-0020 (480) 444-0028 facsimile ktheriot@ADFlegal.org mlippelmann@ADFlegal.org <i>Attorneys for Proposed Defendant-Interve</i> IN THE UNITED STA	TES DISTRICT COURT
 KRIS MAYES, Attorney General of Arizona, in her official capacity, et al., Defendants, WARREN PETERSEN, President of the Arizona State Senate, in his official capacity; BEN TOMA, Speaker of the Arizona House of Representatives, in his official capacity, Proposed Intervenors. 	12 13		
25 26 27	 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 	KRIS MAYES, Attorney General of Arizona, in her official capacity, et al., Defendants, WARREN PETERSEN, President of the Arizona State Senate, in his official capacity; BEN TOMA, Speaker of the Arizona House of Representatives, in his official capacity,	REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION

	Case 2:21-cv-01417-DLR Document 166 Filed 02/24/23 Page 2 of 11
1	TABLE OF CONTENTS
2	Table of Authoritiesii
3	Introduction1
4	Argument2
5	I. The Legislative Leaders are entitled to intervention of right because they have a significant protectable interest
7 8	A. The State of Arizona endowed the Legislative Leaders with an interest in defending laws via A.R.S. § 12-18412
9	B. The Legislative Leaders' motion does not rely on Section 16 of
10	S.B. 1457, but that law confirms their interest in this case
11	II. In the alternative, the Court should grant permissive intervention
12	Conclusion7
13	Certificate of Service
14	
15	
16	
17	
18	
19	
20	
21	
22	
23	
24	
25	
26	
27	
	i

	Case 2:21-cv-01417-DLR Document 166 Filed 02/24/23 Page 3 of 11	
1	TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases	
2 3	Berger v. North Carolina State Conference of the NAACP, 142 S. Ct. 2191 (2022)	
45	Epic Systems Corporation v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612 (2018)	
6	Spangler v. Pasadena City Board of Education, 552 F.2d 1326 (9th Cir. 1977)6	
7 8	United States v. Hernandez-Garcia, 44 F.4th 1157 (9th Cir. 2022)4	
9	Virginia House of Delegates v. Bethune-Hill, 139 S. Ct. 1945 (2019)	
10 11	Wilderness Society v. United States Forest Service, 630 F.3d 1173 (9th Cir. 2011)2	
12	Statutes	
13	A.R.S. § 12-1841 (2021)	
14	S.B. 1457 § 16, 55th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2021)	
15	Rules	
16	FED. R. CIV. P. 24	
17	Rules of the Arizona House of Representatives, 56th Legislature 2023-2024, available at https://bit.ly/3HuL9bz6	
18	Senate Rules, 56th Legislature 2023-2024, available at https://bit.ly/3WXFLDv	
19		
20		
21		
22		
23		
24		
25		
$\begin{array}{c c} 26 \\ 27 \end{array}$		
- 1		

1

INTRODUCTION

 $\mathbf{2}$ The President and the Speaker have a right to intervene, and the parties' 3 responses confirm that no existing party will even try to defend the challenged laws. The Attorney General did not oppose intervention, admitted that she too challenges 4 the constitutionality of the laws, and promised that she "will not defend the 5constitutionality of those laws going forward." See ECF No. 160. The Arizona 6 7 Department of Health Services defendants and the Arizona Medical Board 8 defendants also did not oppose intervention and stated that they will not actively participate to defend the challenged laws. See ECF Nos. 158, 161. 9

10 Only Plaintiffs oppose intervention, but they misunderstand the Legislative 11 Leaders' motion and misstate the law establishing their interests in this litigation. 12To begin, even Plaintiffs do not dispute that the motion is timely, that existing 13parties will not adequately defend the laws, or that any interest in defending the laws would be practically impaired—indeed, annihilated—without intervention. 1415Instead, Plaintiffs only argue that the Legislative Leaders lack an interest in this 16 litigation. But their primary argument relates to a provision that the Legislative 17Leaders do not even rely on, and they try in vain to distinguish the U.S. Supreme 18Court's decision in Berger v. N.C. State Conf. of the NAACP, 142 S. Ct. 2191 (2022), 19which broadly controls when any state endows legislative leaders with authority to 20defend state laws, see id. at 2197–2202. The Legislative Leaders are entitled to 21intervention of right.

In the alternative, Plaintiffs do not dispute that the Legislative leaders satisfy all the requirements for permissive intervention. At a minimum, the Court should grant permissive intervention because the Legislative Leaders' defense shares common questions of law and fact with this action. Without intervention, this case would consist only of parties unwilling to defend the laws or the unborn children they protect. The Court should grant intervention.

ARGUMENT

12

I.

The Legislative Leaders are entitled to intervention of right because they have a significant protectable interest.

Plaintiffs do not dispute that the Legislative Leaders' motion is timely, that 3 no existing party will adequately defend the challenged laws, or that if the 4 Legislative Leaders have an interest in defending the laws, it would be practically $\mathbf{5}$ impaired absent intervention. So intervention is required so long as the Legislative 6 Leaders have a significant protectable interest in this case. Consistent with courts' 7 liberal policy in favor of intervention, the Ninth Circuit has clarified that Rule 8 24(a)(2) does not require proposed intervenors to identify any specific statutory, 9 legal, or equitable interest. Wilderness Soc'y v. U.S. Forest Serv., 630 F.3d 1173, 10 1179 (9th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted). "Rather, it is generally enough that the 11 interest is protectable under some law, and that there is a relationship between the 12legally protected interest and the claims at issue." Id. (cleaned up). The Legislative 13Leaders have such an interest. 14

15

A. The State of Arizona endowed the Legislative Leaders with an interest in defending laws via A.R.S. § 12-1841.

16 Plaintiffs do not dispute that "States possess a legitimate interest in the 17continued enforcement of their own statutes," or that Arizona is among the states 18that have "empowered the leaders of its two legislative houses to participate in 19litigation" to defend state laws against constitutional challenges. Berger, 142 S. Ct. 20at 2201, 2197 (cleaned up). Indeed, the State of Arizona expressly authorizes the 21Legislative Leaders to "intervene" and file briefs in any case challenging the 22constitutionality of state laws, ensuring that they "shall be entitled to be heard." 23A.R.S. § 12-1841(D), (A) (2021). For this reason, plaintiffs challenging state laws 24must notify the Legislative Leaders and facilitate their participation. Id. § 12-1841 25(A) & (B).

- 26
- 27

1 Instead, Plaintiffs try in vain to distinguish Berger by grasping for $\mathbf{2}$ differences between the laws allowing legislative intervention in Arizona and North 3 Carolina. But this is wrong, and it misses the point. The Supreme Court's decision in Berger did not rest on any particular nuance in the text of North Carolina's law. 4 See 142 S. Ct. 2201–03. Rather, what was important was that North Carolina's law $\mathbf{5}$ was one of many instances in which a state chose to authorize legislative leaders to 6 7 participate in defending its state laws. Id. And regardless of the state or the 8 particular statutory language used, the Supreme Court broadly reiterated that "a 9 State must be able to designate agents to represent it in federal court and may 10 authorize its legislature" if it so desires. Id. at 2202 (quoting Va. House of Delegates 11 v. Bethune-Hill, 139 S. Ct. 1945, 1951–52 (2019) (cleaned up)). "The choice belongs 12to the sovereign State." Id. at 2202 (cleaned up).

13Arizona's law is like North Carolina's law in this relevant respect. Plaintiffs concede that the Legislative Leaders are "entitled to be heard," Pls.' Opp'n to Mot. 1415to Intervene 6, ECF No. 159, and the statute goes further, specifically authorizing 16the President and the Speaker to "intervene as a party," A.R.S. § 12-1841 (D). To be sure, they must satisfy all of the other requirements of Rule 24-none of which are 1718 disputed here—but the statute creates a legal interest in intervention and 19participation in lawsuits like this. The State's delegation of defense invokes the 20Supreme Court's analysis in Berger and establishes a significant protectable 21interest.

Next, Plaintiffs suggest that Section 12-1841 might only allow the Legislative
Leaders to intervene in state court actions. But the plain language of the statute
provides no such limitation, and broadly empowers the Legislative Leaders to
intervene "[i]n any proceeding in which a state statute . . . is alleged to be
unconstitutional" A.R.S. § 12-1841 (A) (emphasis added). And for good reason.
The State has an interest in defending its laws against constitutional challenges,

and it would make no sense to enact a statute only authorizing a defense in state
 court while providing no defense against federal challenges equally capable of
 striking down state laws. Section 12-1841 applies "in any proceeding," including
 this federal lawsuit.

Finally, Plaintiffs ask this Court to ignore Section 12-1841 because another 56 statute also allows intervention in some cases (S.B. 1457 § 16, 55th Leg., 1st Reg. 7 Sess. (Ariz. 2021)), and Plaintiffs say that statute is more recent and specific. Opp'n 8 at 8–10. It is true that canons of statutory construction provide that when two 9 statutes conflict, specific or recent statutes can govern over more general or older statutes. United States v. Hernandez-Garcia, 44 F.4th 1157, 1164 (9th Cir. 2022). 10 11 But there is no irreconcilable conflict between Section 12-1841 and S.B. 1457, and Plaintiffs do not even argue that a conflict exists. Both permit intervention under 1213different circumstances, and the Legislative Leaders can invoke either using 14 different means. Indeed, the Supreme Court has recognized that a separate canon prohibits reading conflicts into statutes whenever possible. Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 15138 S. Ct. 1612, 1618 (2018). Because Plaintiffs have established no conflict between 16the statutes, the cited canons do not apply, and the Court should not disregard the 1718 interests created by Section 12-1841.

The State of Arizona has endowed the Legislative Leaders with a unique and
important right to intervene and participate in constitutional challenges, and under *Berger*, they have a significant protectable interest. Because no party disputes the
other elements for intervention of right, "the court must permit" the Legislative
Leaders to intervene. FED. R. CIV. P. 24(a).

24

В.

The Legislative Leaders' motion does not rely on Section 16 of S.B. 1457, but that law confirms their interest in this case.

The Legislative Leaders' motion mainly relies on Section 12-1841 when identifying their interest in defending the constitutionality of state laws. As

explained above, Section 12-1841 is alone sufficient to establish a significant 1 $\mathbf{2}$ protectable interest.

Plaintiffs' opposition mainly concerns Section 16 of S.B. 1457, a separate 3 provision on which the Legislative Leaders' motion does not mainly rely. Opp'n at 3-4. That section provides that "[t]he Legislature, by concurrent resolution, may appoint one or more of its members who sponsored or cosponsored this act in the member's official capacity to intervene as a matter of right in any case in which the constitutionality of this act is challenged." S.B. 1457 § 16. Plaintiffs concede that President Petersen cosponsored S.B. 1457, but argue that the Legislative Leaders are foreclosed from intervening without a concurrent resolution from the Legislature. Opp'n at 4. Plaintiffs' argument fails for at least two reasons. 11

First, the Legislative Leaders' interest in this case is separately and 12sufficiently established by Section 12-1841, so intervention is required *regardless* of 13whether the requirements in Section 16 of S.B. 1457 are also satisfied. S.B. 1457 14created another intervention right beyond those that already exist (under Section 1512-1841 and elsewhere), as sponsors of bills seldom have such intervention rights. 16Simply put, Section 16 of S.B. 1457 is one of many options available for intervention, 17a reality confirmed by the fact that the law simply provides that the Legislature 18"may" invoke Section 16 to appoint legislative intervenors. Nothing in S.B. 1457 19suggests that Section 16 is the exclusive source of authority for intervention.

20Second, in arguing that under Section 16 of S.B. 1457 the President and the 21Speaker lack authority to intervene on behalf of the Legislature without a 22concurrent resolution, Opp'n at 4, Plaintiffs overlook the fact that the Senate and 23the House of Representatives recently amended their rules, expressly authorizing 24the President and the Speaker to assert claims or rights "on behalf of" their 25respective houses, see Senate Rules, 56th Legislature 2023-2024, Rule 2(N), 26available at https://bit.ly/3WXFLDv; Rules of the Ariz. House of Representatives,

27

4

 $\mathbf{5}$

6

7

8

9

10

 $\mathbf{5}$

56th Legislature 2023-2024, Rule 4(K), available at https://bit.ly/3HuL9bz. Here,
the Legislative Leaders speak on behalf of the Legislature as a whole because they
assert rights and interests in defending state laws, which would be injured absent
intervention. Thus, even without a formal concurrent resolution, the practical
requirements of Section 16 are satisfied because the President and Speaker act on
behalf of their houses under the Legislature's new rules.

Because the Legislative Leaders have established an interest in defending
state laws under Section 12-1841, and because they speak on behalf of the
Legislature itself, the President and the Speaker are entitled to intervention.

 $10 \parallel$ II. In the alternative, the Court should grant permissive intervention.

11 At a minimum, this Court should grant permissive intervention to ensure 12actual adversity and a real defense on the merits. Under Rule 24(b), courts may 13grant permissive intervention to anyone who "has a claim or defense that shares with the main action a common question of law or fact." In determining whether 1415permissive intervention is appropriate, courts may consider "the nature and extent 16 of the intervenors' interest, their standing to raise relevant legal issues, the legal position they seek to advance, and its probable relation to the merits of the case." 17Spangler v. Pasadena City Bd. of Educ., 552 F.2d 1326, 1329 (9th Cir. 1977). It "may 18 19also consider whether changes have occurred in the litigation so that intervention 20that was once denied should be reexamined, whether the intervenors' interests are 21adequately represented by other parties, whether intervention will prolong or 22unduly delay the litigation, and whether parties seeking intervention will significantly contribute to full development of the underlying factual issues in the 2324suit and to the just and equitable adjudication of the legal questions presented." Id. Plaintiffs do not dispute that the Legislative Leaders satisfy all the 2526requirements for permissive intervention. Nor could they. The Legislative Leaders'

 $27 \parallel$ defense—that the challenged laws are constitutional— shares common questions of

		l
1	law and fact with this action. As explained above, the Legislative Leaders have an	
2	important interest in defending the challenged laws, and the other parties have	
3	publicly expressed that they will not defend the laws. Given these weighty interests	
4	and the need for parties willing to defend the challenged laws, the Court should	
5	grant permissive intervention.	
6	CONCLUSION	
7	The Legislative Leaders have unique interests in defending legislation that	
8	the existing parties will not protect. Intervention is therefore proper. Thus, the	
9	Legislative Leaders respectfully request that this Court grant them intervention as	
10	of right, or in the alternative, permissive intervention.	
11		
12	Respectfully submitted this 24th day of February, 2023.	
13	<u>s/Kevin Theriot</u> Karin II, Thanist	
14	Kevin H. Theriot AZ Bar No. 030446	
15	Mark A. Lippelmann AZ Bar No. 036553	
16	Alliance Defending Freedom 15100 N. 90th Street	
17	Scottsdale, AZ 85260	
18	(480) 444-0020 (480) 444-0028 facsimile	
19	ktheriot@ADFlegal.org	
20	mlippelmann@ADFlegal.org	
21	Attorneys for Proposed Defendant-Intervenors President Petersen and Speaker Toma	
22		
23		
24		
25		
26		
27		

	Case 2:21-cv-01417-DLR Document 166 Filed 02/24/23 Page 11 of 11
1 2 3 4	CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that on February 24, 2023, I electronically filed this paper with the Clerk of Court using the ECF system which will send notification of such filing to all counsel of record.
5 6 7 8	<u>s/ Kevin Theriot</u> Kevin H. Theriot
9 10	
11 12 13	
14 15 16	
17 18 19	
20 21	
22 23 24	
25 26 27	