

CaseMan Facts Report

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Case: FBI in Military Zones  
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Date & Time	Fact Text	Source(s)
To Be Determined	[redacted] has thought ever since he was at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba in 2002 that too much prominence was given to Department of Defense when it came to interrogations. [redacted] said that U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba is not a tactical interrogation mission it is a strategic interrogation and investigative mission that should be lead by the Federal Bureau of Investigation. [redacted] said that there are obvious problems at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba where there are tactical interrogators and handlers working in an obvious strategic environment.	[redacted] Interview 1 @39:50 - 41:15
To Be Determined	[redacted] advised that doesn't ever recall specifically instructing any agents in a group or one on one, that if you see something that is outside your comfort zone come see me immediately. [redacted] never had this conversation with any agents at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba because he never felt like he needed to. [redacted] just assumed that this was understood; he assumed that if an agent saw something that bothered them then they would come see him and tell him. This was something [redacted] never really thought about because he didn't think such an instruction was necessary.	[redacted] Interview 1 @1:03:55 - 1:05:57
To Be Determined	[redacted] said that he has never ordered any detainee onto the frequent flyer program. However, he cannot say for sure whether any agents under him have, in consultation with the Department of Defense, tacitly agreed that somebody should go on the frequent flyer program.	[redacted] Interview 1 @#2 - 16:34 - 16:50
Mon 03/05/1990	[redacted] comes on duty with the Federal Bureau of Investigation.	[redacted] Interview 1 @5:55

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??/??/2002	[redacted] recalled that sometime in early 2002 Marion E. "Spike" Bowman sent out an e-mail, possibly to [redacted] basically saying that you guys are the Federal Bureau of Investigation so conduct yourself like Federal Bureau of Investigation agents.	[redacted] Interview 1 @57:40 - 58:13	
??/??/2002 - Wed 05/19/2004	[redacted] said that prior to the May 19, 2004 there was no formal guidance from the Federal Bureau of Investigation regarding the treatment of detainees, or observations of possible detainee abuse. However, [redacted] had numerous conversations with [redacted] and possibly Michael B. Steinbach in August or September 2003 about the fact that the other agencies could do things that we can't do. The mantra at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba has always been conduct yourself the way you would in the continental United States absent Miranda. However, the issue about reporting incidents of possible detainee abuse was never really addressed and no guidance was given prior to the Abu Ghraib Prison scandal breaking.	[redacted] Interview 1 @55:45 - 57:15	b6 Per FBI b7C
06/??/2002	[redacted] was [redacted] immediate predecessor at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba as the tdy On-Scene Commander. Before [redacted] Joseph M. Demarest, Jr. and Arthur M. Cummings were also OSC's at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. [redacted] was the OSC at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba immediately after [redacted] worked with [redacted] at Salt Lake City as a squad supervisor for the Olympics.	[redacted] Interview 1 @11:50 - 13:34	b6 Per FBI b7C
Wed 06/26/2002 - Tue 08/06/2002	[redacted] is the temporary OSC for U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. This is [redacted] first tour at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.	[redacted] Interview 1 @5:30	
Wed 06/26/2002 - Mon 08/19/2002	[redacted] advised that his first tour of duty as the On-Scene Commander at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba was from June 26, 2002 to August 19, 2002.	[redacted] Interview 1 @pp. 1	
07/??/2002 - 08/??/2002	[redacted] advised that while he was a temporary OSC for the Federal Bureau of Investigation at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba they learned that [redacted] had significant connections to 9/11. It was determined, in consultation with personnel from JTF-170 at the time, that [redacted] was important enough that he should be segregated from the rest of the detainees	[redacted] Interview 1 @#3 0:22 - 1:35	b6 Per FBI b7C

	population in order to better control his interrogation environment.	
08/??/2002	About two days before [redacted] left U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba in 2002 he toured the Navy brig with [redacted] and most likely Lt. Col. [redacted] to see if this facility would work for them logistically to place [redacted] in this facility. [redacted] was transferred into the Navy brig sometime after [redacted] left. The Federal Bureau of Investigation and JTF-170 had operational security concerns about Navy personnel who were running the Brig, but who had no need to know regarding [redacted] and any information related to him.	[redacted] Interview 1 @#3 2:00 - 3:45
08/??/2002	Before [redacted] left U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba the plan for [redacted] was to isolate him with the idea of developing a relationship with and dependence on the interrogator, and to segregate him from the rest of the detainee population for the camp dynamic issue and operational security issues. The interrogation plan for [redacted] was basically to just get him in the Brig and get [redacted] in there to talk to him. There was no official or formal interrogation plan.	[redacted] Interview 1 @#3 6:55 - 7:41
08/??/2002	[redacted] said that everyone agency at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba was interested in [redacted] when it was discovered he had strong links to 9/11. [redacted] said that, "It was a ticket that everyone wanted." However, the Federal Bureau of Investigation had the lead due to the fact that they were the lead agency on the 9/11 investigation. Given that, the interrogation of [redacted] was a joint project among the Federal Bureau of Investigation, JTF-170	[redacted] Interview 1 @#3 07:45 - 08:40
08/??/2002	[redacted] advised that [redacted] was the lead interrogator for [redacted] because he had already obtained confessions from (b)(2) detainees at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba and was recognized by Michael E. Dunleavy as, "a national treasure." [redacted] said Michael E. Dunleavy may have done a lot of things people didn't like, but to his credit, "When the Federal Bureau of Investigation had a .400 hitter (in [redacted] down here (U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba) he recognized it."	[redacted] Interview 1 @#3 08:40 - 09:15
08/??/2002	[redacted] advised that in the summer of 2002 there was still the possibility	

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	that some of these detainees may end up in U.S. District Court. Also, there was a belief that [redacted] may possess some information on impending attacks against the U.S. However [redacted] and the Federal Bureau of Investigation had a more tempered approach to this issue than the military	[redacted] Interview 1 @#3 09:41 - 10:56	
??/??/2003	Although [redacted] had the very general guidance provided by Marion E. "Spike" Bowman to go by, very soon after he arrived in 2003 he began to learn all of the different things the other agencies could do and it brought up additional issues for the Federal Bureau of Investigation working in this environment. [redacted] knew that his agents were not allowed to engage in this conduct but it was still unclear if they could witness certain conduct or benefit from certain other interrogation techniques. [redacted] said to [redacted] "I know what ballpark I'm in, but I don't know where the foul lines are."	[redacted] Interview 1 @58:05 - 58:51	b6 Per FBI b7C
08/??/2003	When [redacted] first arrived as the Federal Bureau of Investigation's permanent OSC at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba he felt that the Bureau was too embedded with Criminal Investigative Task Force. It seemed to [redacted] that the Federal Bureau of Investigation was too focused on the military commissions, which he was skeptical would ever happen anyway. [redacted] felt the Federal Bureau of Investigation was spending too much time with Criminal Investigative Task Force and not enough time developing intelligence leads in support of counter-terrorism cases. At [redacted] first command briefing he told General Geoffrey D. Miller that the Federal Bureau of Investigation's primary mission at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba was to collect intelligence in support of our counter-terrorism cases both domestically and internationally. This redefinition of the Federal Bureau of Investigation's mission was warmly received by General Geoffrey D. Miller and his staff.	[redacted] Interview 1 @1:08:54 - 1:10:31	b6 Per FBI b7C
08/??/2003	[redacted] mantra as the Federal Bureau of Investigation OSC at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba was our primary mission here is to collect actionable intelligence and disseminate it to the intelligence community with an emphasis on things that support Federal Bureau of Investigation investigations. [redacted] added however that the Federal Bureau of Investigation also prides itself on the fact that the first four commission candidates, if they are convicted it will be	[redacted] Interview 1 @1:10:18 - 1:12:18	b6 Per FBI b7C

	based upon confessions obtained by Federal Bureau of Investigation agents. Also, the Federal Bureau of Investigation's investigative expertise lends itself to successful intelligence collection and dissemination. [redacted] says that Federal Bureau of Investigation U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba prides itself on the content of their IIR's. The techniques the Federal Bureau of Investigation uses to obtain and record the intelligence plays into the validity of the information.		
08/??/2003	[redacted] advised that when he arrived in August 2003 there was an incident where a guard threw a Koran on the floor and stepped on it. This was a major issue among the detainee population, and [redacted] played a significant leadership role in whipping up the fervor of the detainees because of the disrespect shown to the Koran. [redacted] thinks that this incident took place on an open cell block, rather than in an interrogation trailer or interrogation room.	[redacted] Interview 1 @#2 53:55 - 55:20	b6 Per FBI b7C
Tue 08/19/2003	[redacted] advised that [redacted] was the last field grade supervisor serving as temporary OSC before [redacted] arrived. However, [redacted] left before [redacted] arrived so there was a GS-13 acting in a supervisory capacity as OSC when [redacted] arrived, but [redacted] cannot recall his name. This unnamed agent along with the Administration Agent, [redacted] were running the Federal Bureau of Investigation's operation at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba when [redacted] arrived.	[redacted] Interview 1 @13:45 - 14:55	b6 Per FBI b7C
Tue 08/19/2003 - Tue 04/26/2005	[redacted] is the permanent OSC for Federal Bureau of Investigation U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba during this time period.	[redacted] Interview 1 @5:30	
Tue 08/19/2003 - Tue 04/26/2005	[redacted] said that while the OSC at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba he was privy to the fact that there were special interrogation plans for certain detainees, and that members of his staff were not necessarily privy to this same information. However, [redacted] did not regularly see these special IP's he just knew they existed. [redacted] thinks that the first special IP he ever saw was for [redacted], which was given to him by [redacted]. However, this special IP was never implemented and [redacted] gave him this copy so he could cut & paste the language used in it for a memo [redacted] was preparing for	[redacted] Interview 1 @23:35 - 27:16	b6 Per FBI b7C

	the U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba commanding general requesting that [redacted] be put in ( ) 2)		
Tue 08/19/2003 - Tue 04/26/2005	[redacted] said that when [redacted] gave him the IP for [redacted] the Bureau was very interested in getting [redacted] segregated from the rest of the detainee population by putting him in (b) 2). The Bureau wanted to be able to interview [redacted] in (b) 2) [redacted], and [redacted] believes that SOCOM Commander General James T. Hill had to approve all such requests. [redacted] submitted actually a Joint Task Force - Guantanamo document to General Geoffrey D. Miller, which would be forwarded to General James T. Hill, to authorize [redacted] to go into (b) 2) for interview purposes.	[redacted] Interview 1 @24:45 - 28:55	b6 Per FBI b7C
Tue 08/19/2003 - Tue 04/26/2005	[redacted] said that he regularly reminded the agents he supervised at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba that there are people here that can do things that you are not allowed to do; conduct yourself like an Federal Bureau of Investigation agent. However, this was the extent of his guidance and it never really went any further than that.	[redacted] Interview 1 @58:55 - 59:35	b6 Per FBI b7C
Tue 08/19/2003 - Tue 04/26/2005	[redacted] advised that since he has been the permanent Federal Bureau of Investigation OSC at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba probably only (b) 2) detainees have arrived. Also, barring some unforeseen circumstances, approximately 65% of the detainee population will not now, and probably never will talk to anyone from the U.S. government or cooperate in interviews with anyone from the U.S. government.	[redacted] Interview 1 @1:16:25 - 1:17:08	
Tue 08/19/2003 - Tue 04/26/2005	[redacted] advised that Federal Bureau of Investigation agents can't do any interviews with detainees without first coordinating with the Department of Defense. When an agent wants to interview a detainee he must first determine if the detainee is on somebody's else's coordination list. If the detainee is on another agency's list then the agent must contact that agency beforehand and coordinate his interview with their requirements. Sometimes the Federal Bureau of Investigation ends up not doing the interview but has the interrogator from the other agency attempt to obtain the information for them. Other times the Bureau can not do this due to classification concerns and in those cases the interview just doesn't happen. Still other times the	[redacted] Interview 1 @1:20:30 - 1:21:25	b6 Per FBI b7C

	agency would just allow the Federal Bureau of Investigation agent to interview their detainee. The same would go for agents from other agencies who wanted to interview a detainee on an Federal Bureau of Investigation coordination list.		
Tue 08/19/2003 - Tue 04/26/2005	[redacted] advised that the Federal Bureau of Investigation does not know all that goes on at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba while it is happening. In fact [redacted] said that a detainee could be getting tortured right now at Camp Delta and the Federal Bureau of Investigation would most like not know about it. However, [redacted] feels that he and others in the Federal Bureau of Investigation have a good enough relationship with members of Joint Task Force - Guantanamo that they would eventually hear about something like that.	[redacted] Interview 1 @1:22:32 - 1:23:43	b6 Per FBI b7C
Tue 08/19/2003 - Tue 04/26/2005	[redacted] advised that he can go anywhere he wants on the base unescorted and that goes for all Federal Bureau of Investigation SA's. The policy now is though they discourage interrogators from going to down to the cell blocks without a specific purpose.	[redacted] Interview 1 @1:24:50 - 1:25:40	b6 Per FBI b7C
(S) Tue 08/19/2003 - Tue 04/26/2005	[redacted] advised that he never saw anything in writing, either an interrogation plan or an MFR, regarding an interrogation technique where [redacted] was told that [redacted] harsher interrogation techniques would be used on him. However, at some point he became aware that this may have happened from conversations he had with people at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.	[redacted] Interview 1 @#2 - 4:51 - 6:36	b1
Tue 08/19/2003 - Tue 04/26/2005	[redacted] advised that his knowledge of any sleep deprivation or sleep disruption relates to the "frequent flyer" program. This was a program implemented by the Joint Task Force - Guantanamo, which involved moving the detainees every 4 to 6 hours including odd hours of the night. This is not a program designed to deprive the detainee of sleep, but sleep deprivation could be a byproduct of implementing this program. The design of this program was to not allow certain detainees to be comfortable with their surroundings, to just generally throw the detainee off a bit, to keep the detainee off balance so that the detainee does not have an advantage when being interrogated.	[redacted] Interview 1 @#2 - 8:35 - 10:30	b6 Per FBI b7C
Tue 08/19/2003 - Tue	[redacted] advised that while he has been at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba there have been two Camp dynamic macro type techniques that have been	[redacted] Interview 1	

04/26/2005	used, the first is the frequent flyer program and the second is the the Afghanie Wilderness Program. The Afghanie Wilderness Program involved moving some of the more recalcitrant (b (2) detainees to a cell block populated entirely by Afghan detainees. This normally had a marked impact on the detainee's behavior. Generally the detainees would quickly complain that they no longer wanted to be on that cell block and sometimes would agree to be interviewed in order to get away from their living situation for a while.	@#2 - 10:30 - 11:15	
Tue 08/19/2003 - Tue 04/26/2005	[redacted] advised that the Federal Bureau of Investigation worked with detainees that were definitely part of the the "frequent flyer" program. [redacted] thinks that [redacted] was in the frequent flyer program on more than one occasion primarily due to the fact that he was such a bad influence in Camp Delta.	[redacted] interview 1 @#2 - 11:42 - 12:13	b6 Per FBI b7C
Tue 08/19/2003 - Tue 04/26/2005	[redacted] said that the frequent flyer program was not a secret at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba; in fact he said that if the Office of the Inspector General had come down to visit a year ago we would have been told about this program during the camp dynamics brief of the command briefing session.	[redacted] interview 1 @#2 - 11:36 - 12:48	b6 Per FBI b7C
Tue 08/19/2003 - Tue 04/26/2005	[redacted] advised that the frequent flyer program and the Afghanie wilderness program were Department of Defense SOP's that were camp wide macro techniques that were never specifically discussed in his office. That is to say [redacted] never specifically discussed whether an agent could or could not participate or agree to this technique or not. [redacted] does not think he ever gave any agent advice on whether they could participate in interviews of detainees who had been subjected to either one of these programs.	[redacted] interview 1 @#2 - 20:47 - 21:55	
Tue 08/19/2003 - Tue 04/26/2005	[redacted] advised that he wasn't concerned about the use of either the frequent flyer program or the Afghanie wilderness program. He never saw these camp wide macro techniques as abusive. [redacted] knows that there were limitations to the duration of each program but he cannot recall them at this time.	[redacted] interview 1 @#2 - 23:10 - 24:00	
Tue 08/19/2003 - Tue 04/26/2005	[redacted] advised that he was aware that interrogators sometimes used the air conditioners in the interrogations rooms to manipulate the temperature. However, he had not heard of anything more extreme than that and has never heard of Federal Bureau of Investigation employees engaging in this.	[redacted] interview 1 @#2 45:20 - 46:16	b6 Per FBI b7C



<p>Tue 08/19/2003 - Tue 04/26/2005</p>	<p>advised that he was present when 10 new detainees arrived in November 2004 and he was impressed with how much better they looked when they arrived, than the ones he witnessed arriving in 2002. thought there was a marked increase in professionalism and appropriate sensitivity; it was impressive to see the improvement.</p>	<p>Interview 1 @#2 51:09 - 52:35</p>
<p>Tue 08/19/2003 - Tue 04/26/2005</p>	<p>advised that today he would probably not consent to have a detainee shaved. does not believe that shaving a detainee is abusive, but he would probably act differently due to the events at Abu Ghraib Prison. At the time he consented to this or authorized this he did not even think that this could be considered abuse. However, after Abu Ghraib Prison he can see where it could be potentially be problematic.</p>	<p>Interview 1 @#2 1:09:15 - 1:11:05</p>
<p>Tue 08/19/2003 - Tue 04/26/2005</p>	<p>advised that when was stationed at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba he began to work with at the request of the (b) 2 because had developed a decent rapport with him. continued to develop his rapport with to the point that was very cooperative and started providing information about other detainees had become a jail house snitch of sort. is surprised that Department of Defense is having so much trouble with given the great rapport that had developed with him.</p>	<p>Interview 1 @#3 11:42 - 12:22</p>
<p>Tue 08/19/2003 - Tue 04/26/2005</p>	<p>When asked if the Federal Bureau of Investigation ever employed any of the interrogation techniques contained in the Department of Defense's "A through X memo," advised that if isolation is one of the techniques contained in the A through X memo and b (2) is considered isolation, then yes. said that the Federal Bureau of Investigation recommended that detainees and be put in isolation at different times. also said that this action would be consistent with action that the Federal Bureau of Investigation would or could take in the U.S.</p>	<p>Interview 1 @ #3 17:00 - 18:32</p>
<p>Tue 08/19/2003 - Tue 04/26/2005</p>	<p>advised that while was housed at (b) 2 as part of the Department of Defense's interrogation plan for him, spent a significant amount of time at (b) 2 interviewing</p>	<p>Interview 1 @#3 36:00 - 37:00</p>

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	[redacted] also thinks that the Counterterrorism Center also interviewed [redacted] while he was at b(2)	
Tue 08/19/2003 - Tue 04/26/2005	[redacted] advised that both [redacted] and [redacted] were interviewed numerous times by the Federal Bureau of Investigation while at b(2)	[redacted] Interview 1 @#3 37:30 - 37:42
Tue 08/19/2003 - Tue 04/26/2005	[redacted] advised that he is not aware of any Federal Bureau of Investigation agent using the interrogation technique "pride and ego down," which is letter "I" in the Department of Defense's A through X memo with either [redacted] or [redacted]	[redacted] Interview 1 @#3 38:30 - 39:35
Tue 08/19/2003 - Tue 04/26/2005	[redacted] advised that everything he knows about concerning the interrogation techniques employed by the military with [redacted] he believes were approved by Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz. [redacted] was told this by [redacted] and [redacted]	[redacted] Interview 1 @#3 47:50 - 48:42
Tue 08/19/2003 - Tue 04/26/2005	[redacted] was told by General Jay W. Hood and General John T. Furlow that a helicopter was never used in conjunction with the movement of [redacted] and the implementation of the special interrogation plan for him. [redacted] told [redacted] that they didn't use a helicopter because General Geoffrey D. Miller decided that it was too difficult logistically to pull off, and that too many people on the base would have to know about it to get this done.	[redacted] Interview 1 @#3 59:30 - 1:00:35
Tue 08/19/2003 - Tue 04/26/2005	[redacted] did not think the Federal Bureau of Investigation impersonation issue was as big as [redacted] and [redacted] were making it out to be. Military Liaison and Detainee Unit told [redacted] that they were concerned that if the military tortured [redacted] and they were impersonating the Federal Bureau of Investigation, then if and when [redacted] was released he could say that the Federal Bureau of Investigation tortured him. [redacted] thought that this scenario was preposterous. [redacted] thought that [redacted] should go see General Geoffrey D. Miller about it immediately and [redacted] said, "no" that he would just go see [redacted] this because this a coordination issue. [redacted] did not think this was a General Geoffrey D. Miller level issue.	[redacted] Interview 1 @#3 1:00:45 - 1:03:10
Tue 08/19/2003	[redacted] did speak to [redacted] about the Federal Bureau of	

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- Tue 04/26/2005	Investigation impersonation issue and they agreed that if this technique was to be used by the military again it would have to go through [redacted] and possibly higher level officials at the Federal Bureau of Investigation, maybe Office of the General Counsel - FBI would have to be involved.	[redacted] Interview 1 @#3 1:03:10 - 1:05:20
Tue 08/19/2003 - Tue 04/26/2005	[redacted] advised that he thought the [redacted] EC dated 11/26/03 was, "unprofessional, largely unsupported" and thought the Federal Bureau of Investigation shouldn't put their name on it until they could determine they were 100% sure that they knew what they were talking about.	[redacted] Interview 1 @#3 1:17:00 - 1:17:25
Tue 08/19/2003 - Tue 04/26/2005	[redacted] advised that if he receives an allegation of detainee mistreatment, his understanding is that he should report the allegation up his chain of command either via e-mail or a phone call or both. [redacted] advised that [redacted] would also most likely report the allegation to his boss Valerie E. Caproni.	[redacted] Interview 1 @#4 19:50 - 20:35
Tue 08/19/2003 - Tue 04/26/2005	[redacted] advised that in the case of an allegation of detainee mistreatment by an Federal Bureau of Investigation agent, he really doesn't know what he is "supposed" to do, but [redacted] and [redacted] would most likely report it to Office of the General Counsel - FBI and then executive management in Counter Terrorism Division - FBI. It would be up to Counter Terrorism Division - FBI to forward it to Office of Professional Responsibility-FBI. That doesn't change the fact that [redacted] like any other Federal Bureau of Investigation agent can contact Office of Professional Responsibility-FBI at any time.	[redacted] Interview 1 @#4 20:38 - 25:00
Tue 08/19/2003 - Tue 04/26/2005	[redacted] felt that allegations made by [redacted] against two Federal Bureau of Investigation agents was bungled from the beginning by Military Liaison and Detainee Unit, and was handled in a very nonchalant manner and that Federal Bureau of Investigation executive management did not have appreciation of the significance of it either. [redacted] said that it was "patently obvious" to both he and [redacted] that [redacted] allegations were different. [redacted] was an intelligent detainee making detailed allegations, giving full names, places, basically the type of allegations that they have never seen before. It was obvious to both [redacted] and [redacted] how these allegations should have been handled; [redacted] carefully and take the proper steps necessary to resolve such allegations. [redacted]	[redacted] Interview 1 @#4 20:45 - 23:20

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	<p>cannot believe that post Abu Ghraib Prison the Federal Bureau of Investigation is still going to say that detainee allegations are not credible.</p>	
<p>Tue 08/19/2003 - Tue 04/26/2005</p>	<p>advised while on a conference call with T.J. Harrington he learned that T.J. Harrington had not yet, as of the 2nd week of March 2005, seen the Office of the Inspector General's letter requesting documents pertaining to allegations made against agents working under his command in Iraq, Afghanistan, and U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. says that this is an indication of the lack of communication within the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the lack of effective information gathering necessary for making effective decisions. Also, it shows the lack of appreciation of the issues that and have been dealing with for the last year or so at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. says about Headquarters (FBI) that, "they do not get it." says that the Federal Bureau of Investigation can't even effectively handle allegations made against their own employees, let alone rework the Federal Bureau of Investigation's ability to conduct interrogations in a strategic environment.</p>	<p>Interview 1 @#4 32:50 - 38:40</p>
<p>Tue 08/19/2003 - Tue 04/26/2005</p>	<p>said that if there was an agent that reported some sort of retaliation while at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba he suspects that it was is aware that is very ill now, and that she has made allegations against and about how they handled her illness as well as the staff at the base hospital. is also aware that had gone to the press with her allegations and even sent a letters to the Director. advised that had reported incidents of alleged detainee abuse, but he cannot recall the specifics of what she reported. said that he never retaliated against anyone for reporting observations or allegations of possible detainee abuse.</p>	<p>Interview 1 @#4 1:02:42 - 1:05:20</p>
<p>10/??/2003 - 11/??/2003</p>	<p>advised that when he was the Federal Bureau of Investigation OSC in 2002 told him that he thought should have his beard shaved. and had met with and was "disgusted" with</p>	<p>Interview 1 @#2 57:05 - 1:02:13</p>

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	<p>appearance. [redacted] told [redacted] that [redacted] beard was down to his waist and he was getting too much respect on the cell block for this. [redacted] recommended to [redacted] that [redacted] have his beard shaved in order to reduce his influence and the level of respect he was receiving from the other detainees on the cell block. [redacted] thinks that [redacted] had already consulted with the S-2 at the Joint Detainee Operations Group about having [redacted] beard shaved. [redacted] gave his consent to the shaving and [redacted] thinks that later that day [redacted] beard was shaved. When [redacted] met with [redacted] the next day, his beard was gone.</p>		
10/??/2003 - 11/??/2003	<p>[redacted] advised that [redacted] was controlling his cell block by being "the preacher" on the cell block. He was the guy on his cell block that every detainee differed to before they would go to an interrogation. This often happens today in Camp Delta.</p>	[redacted] Interview 1 #2 1:07:23 - 1:07:50	
??/??/2004	<p>Sometime after the Federal Bureau of Investigation's survey of agents [redacted] recalls that there was an allegation of depriving a detainee of food or water possibly for a period of 24 hrs. He thinks this allegation was contained in an e-mail by [redacted] or [redacted]. [redacted] is not sure of the specifics of the conditions involved.</p>	[redacted] Interview 1 @1:29:38 - 1:31:02	
Fri 05/07/2004	<p>[redacted] was interviewed by [redacted] on this date.</p>	[redacted] Interview 1 @16:40 - 16:57	
??/??/2005	<p>About the same time that General Randall "Mark" Schmidt came down to U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba [redacted] and [redacted] learned of some interrogation tactics that were used on [redacted] that neither of them knew had ever been implemented with [redacted]. They learned of this pursuant to the government considering charging [redacted] in the military commissions, and prior to that they wanted to make sure that everyone knew what happened with [redacted]. After [redacted] meeting with General Randall "Mark" Schmidt he had a very pointed conversation with General Jay W. Hood about the Joint Task Force - Guantanamo's</p>	[redacted] Interview 1 @31:36 - 35:05	

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	relationship with the Federal Bureau of Investigation due to what he just learned. [redacted] was concerned that the military was hiding things from the Federal Bureau of Investigation. However, General Jay W. Hood assuaged [redacted] concerns about the military's conduct with detainees and how much the Federal Bureau of Investigation would know about that.		
Tue 04/26/2005	[redacted] advised that the May 19, 2004 EC from Valerie E. Caproni was sufficient operational guidance for him to conduct his mission at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. He feels it provides him with the proper "umbrella" under which he can make day to day operational decisions and have those decisions be more black or white than they would have been prior to that memo.	[redacted] Interview 1 @1:02:07 - 1:03:27	b6 Per FBI b7C
Tue 04/26/2005	[redacted] is aware that "short shackling" was an approved technique within the Joint Task Force - Guantanamo, but he does not know for what period of time this was authorized. It was never brought to [redacted] attention regarding a specific allegation of abuse or mistreatment. [redacted] thinks that he may have had a conversation with [redacted] regarding the use of this technique. She was concerned about the use of this technique and others and [redacted] told her that it was an approved Joint Task Force - Guantanamo technique. [redacted] remembered that [redacted] was taken aback by this a little bit.	[redacted] Interview 1 @#2 - 28:53 - 30:30	b6 Per FBI b7C
Tue 04/26/2005	[redacted] believes that the May 19, 2004 guidance memo gives leaders in the field the framework within which to make decisions, but there are obviously some areas and issues that could use more clarifications on do's and don'ts.	[redacted] Interview 1 @#2 33:25 - 34:21	
Tue 04/26/2005	[redacted] said that the Federal Bureau of Investigation benefiting from the use of certain aggressive interrogation techniques could be problematic, but in some cases maybe not. [redacted] said that it would all depend on what technique was employed on the detainee. He thinks that the Federal Bureau of Investigation should be careful to just generally say that if we benefit from techniques that other agencies can use that we cannot, that's bad. It may be, but it should be taken on a case by case basis.	[redacted] Interview 1 @#2 38:15 - 39:52	b6 Per FBI b7C
Tue 04/26/2005	[redacted] advised that he could see how one could interpret shaving a detainee's beard as religious harassment.	[redacted] Interview 1	