

#### Federal Bureau of Investigation

Washington, D.C. 20535

May 4, 2010

MS. LAURA ROTOLO ACLU OF MASSACHUSETTS 211 CONGRESS STREET BOSTON, MA 02110

Subject: Documents describing the relationship between the National Joint Terrorism Task Force (NJTTF) and the Massachusetts JTTF.

FOIPA No. 1141761-000

Dear Ms. Rotolo:

The enclosed documents were reviewed under the Freedom of Information/Privacy Acts (FOIPA), Title 5, United States Code, Section 552/552a. Deletions have been made to protect information which is exempt from disclosure, with the appropriate exemptions noted on the page next to the excision. In addition, a deleted page information sheet was inserted in the file to indicate where pages were withheld entirely. The exemptions used to withhold information are marked below and explained on the enclosed Form OPCA-16a:

Section 552		Section 552a
□(b)(1)	□(b)(7)(A)	□(d)(5)
⊠(b)(2)	□(b)(7)(B)	□(j)(2)
□(b)(3)	⊠(b)(7)(C)	□(k)(1)
	□(b)(7)(D)	□(k)(2)
	⊠(b)(7)(E)	□(k)(3)
	□(b)(7)(F)	□(k)(4)
□(b)(4)	□(b)(8)	□(k)(5)
□(b)(5)	□(b)(9)	□(k)(6)
⊠(b)(6)		□(k)(7)

51 pages were reviewed and 8 pages are being released.

- □ Document(s) were located which originated with, or contained information concerning other Government agency(ies) [OGA]. This information has been:
  - □ referred to the OGA for review and direct response to you.
  - □ referred to the OGA for consultation. The FBI will correspond with you regarding this information when the consultation is finished.

☑ You have the right to appeal any denials in this release. Appeals should be directed in writing to the Director, Office of Information Policy, U.S. Department of Justice,1425 New York Ave., NW, Suite 11050, Washington, D.C. 20530-0001. Your appeal must be received by OIP within sixty (60) days from the date of this letter in order to be considered timely. The envelope and the letter should be clearly marked "Freedom of Information Appeal." Please cite the FOIPA Number assigned to your request so that it may be easily identified.

□ The enclosed material is from the main investigative file(s) in which the subject(s) of your request was the focus of the investigation. Our search located additional references, in files relating to other

individuals, or matters, which may or may not be about your subject(s). Our experience has shown, when ident, references usually contain information similar to the information processed in the main file(s). Because of our significant backlog, we have given priority to processing only the main investigative file(s). If you want the references, you must submit a separate request for them in writing, and they will be reviewed at a later date, as time and resources permit.

☐ See additional information which follows.

Sincerely yours,

David M. Hardy Section Chief Record/Information

Dissemination Section Records Management Division

Enclosure(s)

#### **EXPLANATION OF EXEMPTIONS**

#### SUBSECTIONS OF TITLE 5, UNITED STATES CODE, SECTION 552

- (b)(1) (A) specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy and (B) are in fact properly classified to such Executive order;
- (b)(2) related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of an agency;
- (b)(3) specifically exempted from disclosure by statute (other than section 552b of this title), provided that such statute(A) requires that the matters be withheld from the public in such a manner as to leave no discretion on issue, or (B) establishes particular criteria for withholding or refers to particular types of matters to be withheld;
- (b)(4) trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a person and privileged or confidential;
- (b)(5) inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would not be available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency;
- (b)(6) personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy;
- (b)(7) records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the extent that the production of such law enforcement records or information (A) could be reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings, (B) would deprive a person of a right to a fair trial or an impartial adjudication, (C) could be reasonably expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, (D) could reasonably be expected to disclose the identity of confidential source, including a State, local, or foreign agency or authority or any private institution which furnished information on a confidential basis, and, in the case of record or information compiled by a criminal law enforcement authority in the course of a criminal investigation, or by an agency conducting a lawful national security intelligence investigation, information furnished by a confidential source, (E) would disclose techniques and procedures for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions, or would disclose guidelines for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions if such disclosure could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the law, or (F) could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or physical safety of any individual;
- (b)(8) contained in or related to examination, operating, or condition reports prepared by, on behalf of, or for the use of an agency responsible for the regulation or supervision of financial institutions; or
- (b)(9) geological and geophysical information and data, including maps, concerning wells.

#### SUBSECTIONS OF TITLE 5, UNITED STATES CODE, SECTION 552a

- (d)(5) information compiled in reasonable anticipation of a civil action proceeding;
- (j)(2) material reporting investigative efforts pertaining to the enforcement of criminal law including efforts to prevent, control, or reduce crime or apprehend criminals;
- (k)(1) information which is currently and properly classified pursuant to an Executive order in the interest of the national defense or foreign policy, for example, information involving intelligence sources or methods;
- (k)(2) investigatory material compiled for law enforcement purposes, other than criminal, which did not result in loss of a right, benefit or privilege under Federal programs, or which would identify a source who furnished information pursuant to a promise that his/her identity would be held in confidence;
- (k)(3) material maintained in connection with providing protective services to the President of the United States or any other individual pursuant to the authority of Title 18, United States Code, Section 3056;
- (k)(4) required by statute to be maintained and used solely as statistical records;
- (k)(5) investigatory material compiled solely for the purpose of determining suitability, eligibility, or qualifications for Federal civilian employment or for access to classified information, the disclosure of which would reveal the identity of the person who furnished information pursuant to a promise that his/her identity would be held in confidence;
- (k)(6) testing or examination material used to determine individual qualifications for appointment or promotion in Federal Government service the release of which would compromise the testing or examination process;
- (k)(7) material used to determine potential for promotion in the armed services, the disclosure of which would reveal the identity of the person who furnished the material pursuant to a promise that his/her identity would be held in confidence.

### FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence:	ROUTINE		Date:	05/30/2006	õ
To: Countert	cerrorism	Attn:	SC Edward ASC UC UC A/UC MLDU A/UC Fly Team PM NJTTF	Dickson DTC	SEMU  . b6 b7c
Nat	erterrorism cional Joint Terroris ntact: A/UC	m Task	Force/LX-1	15400	b2
Approved By:					b6 b7C
Drafted By:		]:jjf			
Case ID #: 31	L5N-HQ-C1432188 (Pe	ending)			
Title: NATIO	NAL JOINT TERRORISM	TASK FO	RCE		

Synopsis: To summarize the operation and responsibility of the National Joint Terrorism Task Force (NJTTF).

Details: For information, the NJTTF was established in July 2002 to enhance communication, coordination and cooperation by providing a point of fusion for the sharing of terrorism intelligence, operational support to the Counterterrorism Division (CTD), and program oversight of the Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs) throughout the United States.

To accomplish this mission, the NJTTF is divided into four components: JTTF Program Management; Operational; Intelligence; and Special Projects. The following is an outline of the four components and their responsibilities:

#### I. JTTF PROGRAM MANAGEMENT COMPONENT

The mission of the Program Management Component (PMC) is to serve as the hub of support for the JTTFs relating to administrative, logistical, financial, and training matters.

The PMC has managed the expansion of the JTTF program from 35 JTTFs prior to the events of 09/11/2001 to the present

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Field Office JTTFs and additional

The PMC accomplishes its mission through the utilization of 4 Regional JTTF Program Management Teams made up of FBI NJTTF personnel who are responsible for maintaining proactive liaison with every JTTF in their assigned region. This regional concept greatly enhances communication between the NJTTF and the JTTFs and facilitates the early identification of issues so that they can be promptly addressed and resolved.

The PMC serves its mission of being the hub of support for the JTTFs by working toward the following listed goals and objectives:

Provide administrative, logistical, and financial guidance to the JTTFs;

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- Develop and implement policies and procedures for the effective and efficient operation of the JTTFs;
- Identify and improve access/allocation to critical resource needs of the JTTFs;
- Address emerging issues affecting the JTTFs on a national basis.
- Maintain JTTF records for CTD, Department of Justice, and Congressional requests for information.
- Finalize a standard JTTF memorandum of understanding.
- Improve performance measures to fulfill the FBI's counter-terrorism strategy.
- Improve the issuance of written guidance for JTTF programmatic issues.
- Develop a formal standardized orientation/training program for all new task force members.

## II. OPERATIONS COMPONENT

The NJTTF Operations Component's (OC) responsibilities are the management of leads (e.g., ACS, Guardian), to facilitate requests for information, and to provide operational support and coordination between the NJTTF and other CTD units. OC is also responsible for the execution of the NJTTF Crisis Response Plan and for the management of the NJTTF Command Post at SIOC in the event of a crisis.

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In addition, the NJTTF and CTD's Continuing Education and Professional Development Unit (CEPDU) have been tasked with the development and implementation of the JTTF training through the Virtual Academy for newly assigned JTTF members, particularly the Task Force Officers (TFOs). In furtherance of the JTTF training, the OC has also developed the Operations Reference Guide in the NJTTF Intranet website which provides training materials for conducting counterterrorism investigation.

In addition to the training manuals, the OC maintains the NJTTF website which was designed to provide a single source of information for the JTTFs. It contains critical information relevant to the JTTF program, such as policies and procedures, investigative resources, intelligence, and hyperlinks to substantive FBIHQ Units with the latest counterterrorism intelligence and information.

#### III. INTELLIGENCE COMPONENT

The Intelligence Component is primarily responsible for enacting information sharing initiatives promoted by the FBI. The Intelligence Component compiles and provides, on a daily basis, intelligence derived from the FBI and NJTTF member agency sources to the JTTFs, the CTD and the Intelligence Community (IC). This process is divided into three subareas:

- Internal intelligence responsibilities include serving as an intelligence, information and analysis source for the NJTTF and its membership.
- Intra-FBI intelligence responsibilities include serving as a liaison to coordinate intelligence matters between NJTTF members and all CTD entities such as ITOS I, ITOS II and DTOU for current intelligence; SIOC for crisis resolution; CT Watch for threat resolution; and CTAS for analysis leading to threat mitigation.
- External intelligence responsibilities include serving as a liaison to coordinate intelligence matters between the FBI, the NJTTF member agencies, and other members of the IC.

On a daily basis, the Intelligence Component members compile terrorism-related intelligence reporting and finished analytical products for the NJTTF Daily Read Book; conduct assessment of emerging threats; produce the NJTTF Daily Threat Briefing; enhance liaison with FBI elements and other Intelligence Community contacts; answer intelligence RFIs from

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NJTTF component members; and support the NJTTF Operational Component and Special Projects Component initiatives.

#### IV. SPECIAL PROJECTS COMPONENT

The Special Projects Component (SPC) manages special programs developed through NJTTF resources. These programs are set forth as follows:

# A. Correctional Intelligence Initiative

Initiated in February 2003, the Correctional Intelligence Initiative (CII) is a CTD program designed to detect, deter and interdict efforts by terrorists, extremist groups and their supporters attempting to radicalize or recruit within all levels (federal, state and local) of U.S. correctional facilities. In order to effectively accomplish this task, each JTTF has designated a CII coordinator to represent the interests of the project with all levels of officials at U.S. correctional facilities.

Through the CII, the JTTFs completed threat assessments of more than 2000 U.S. correctional facilities in December 2005. The assessments were used to draft the first ever National Threat Assessment on the indication of prison radicalization. The final draft is currently being reviewed by the CTD management.

#### C. Rail Liaison Agent Program

The Rail Liaison Agent (RLA) Program's mission is to develop and coordinate a national strategy for rail-related terrorism investigations and to further liaison and training support between the FBI and the rail industry (freight, passenger and mass transit). In October 2005, the NJTTF identified JTTF personnel to serve as the RLAs for their JTTFs. Those designed RLAs were tasked to conduct outreach and build liaison between the JTTFs and their regional rail authorities to ensure a successful working relationship and to streamline terrorism-

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related threat and incident reporting.	b2 b7E
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# FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Frecedence: ROUTINE		Date:	11/24/2009
To: All Field Offices		ADIC/SAC JTTF/CT ASAC JTTF/CT SSAs	/SSRAs
Counterterrorism	Attn:	JTTF Coordin DAD Tracy A. DAD Virginia	ators North L. Bollinger
From: Counterterrorism  DTRS/National Joint Te  Contact: IA	rrorism	Task Force	
Approved By: McJunkin, James W Ward, Michael B Giuliano, Mark		b2 b6 b70	
Drafted By: drp			
Case ID #: 415A-HQ-C1432188-DR	(Pending	<b>3</b> )	
Title: NATIONAL JOINT TERRORISM DATABASE/RESOURCE SUPPORT	TASK FOF	RCE;	
Synopsis: To inform Joint Terror availability of National Joint Tedatabases and resources.	cism Task errorism	k Forces (JTI Task Force's	Fs) on the (NJTTF)
Administrative: Field JTTF member with their local JTTF federal, st prior to contacting the NJTTF.	s are en ate and	couraged to local repres	coordinate entatives
Details: The NJTTF's mission is other Counterterrorism Division S NJTTF does this through access to available through its from federal, state and local government.	Tack	and field JT	TFs. The
Supported units gain uninvestigations and intelligence as NJTTF's information sharing and as related to possible threats. Suppose submitting request for information in answering RFIs, coordinate to a that includes name checks and sear information (i.e. groups and organization)	nalysis loccess to ported un to the provide a	by leveraging unique info nits do this NJTTF. The collaboration	rmation by NJTTF TFOs, ive response

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facilities, special interest country travel, equipment, weapons, communication, and finances).

CTD Section and Unit Chiefs as well as SACs, and ASACs are encouraged to highlight the FBI's NJTTF existence and encourage its use to enhance ongoing investigations. The NJTTF FBI website, found at <a href="http://ctd.fbinet.fbi/njttf/">http://ctd.fbinet.fbi/njttf/</a>, can be accessed to provide the following information:

- a. JTTFs member contact information
- b. NJTTF Task Force Officers' agency information
- c. JTTF operation policy documents

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LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1: (Action)

# ALL RECEIVING OFFICES

Ensure the information contained in this communication is distributed to all personnel assigned to JTTF and/or Counterterrorism in their respective divisions.