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15	DIGNITY HEALTH dba CHANDLER REG CENTER	IONAL MEDICAL
16	UNITED STAT	TES DISTRICT COURT
17		TRICT OF CALIFORNIA
18	 	
19	JOSEF ROBINSON,	No. 3:16-cv-03035-YGR
20	Plaintiff,	DEFENDANT'S NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO DISMISS OR TRANSFER
21	,	FOR IMPROPER VENUE (FED. R. CIV. P.
22	VS.	12(B)(3), 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a)); OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE TO TRANSFER FOR
23	DIGNITY HEALTH d/b/a CHANDLER REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER,	CONVENIENCE (28 U.S.C. § 1404(a))
24	Defendant.	Date: August 23, 2016 Time: 2:00 p.m.
25		Location: Oakland Courthouse, Courtroom 1, Fourth Floor Judge: Hon. Yvonne Gonzalez Rogers
2627		Complaint Filed: June 6, 2016 Trial Date: None Set
28 LPS & LLP		CHANDLER'S MOTION TO DISMISS OF TRANSFER VENUE

MANATT, PHELPS & PHILLIPS, LLP
ATTORNEYS AT LAW
LOS ANGELES

CHANDLER'S MOTION TO DISMISS OR TRANSFER VENUE

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MANATT, PHELP PHILLIPS, LLI ATTORNEYS AT LAW Los Angeles

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (continued) **Page** SP Inv. Fund I, LLC v. Lowry, Stebbins v. State Farm Mutual Ins., Walker v. United States DOC. Wood v. Santa Barbara Chamber of Commerce, 705 F.2d 1515 (9th Cir. 1983)......9 **STATUTES** 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3) passim RULES

NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION

or as soon thereafter as counsel may be heard before the Honorable Yvonne Gonzalez Rogers,

hereby does move the Court pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(3) for an order

dismissing this action, or alternatively transferring this action to the U.S. District Court for the

District of Arizona, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) on the ground that venue in this district is

improper. In the alternative, Chandler will and hereby does move the Court for an order

transferring this action to the said district for convenience of parties and witnesses under 28

United States District Judge for the Northern District of California, in Courtroom 1, Fourth Floor,

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that this motion will be heard on August 23, 2016, at 2:00 p.m.

Defendant Dignity Health dba Chandler Regional Medical Center ("Chandler") will and

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TO PLAINTIFF AND HIS ATTORNEYS OF RECORD:

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U.S.C. § 1404(a).

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II.

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CHANDLER'S MOTION TO DISMISS OR TRANSFER VENUE

This motion is and will be based on this Notice of Motion and attached Memorandum of

Points and Authorities filed concurrently herewith, the Declarations of Eva-Maria Palermo and Maureen Sterbach, Chandler's Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), all pleadings and papers on file in this matter and all other such evidence or argument as

may be submitted to the Court at or prior to the hearing.

located at 1301 Clay Street, Oakland, California 94612.

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

STATEMENT OF ISSUES TO BE DECIDED

1. Whether this action must be dismissed, or alternatively transferred to the U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona, under 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) because venue is improper in the Northern District of California under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3).

2. Whether this action should be transferred to the U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) on convenience grounds.

INTRODUCTION

Dignity Health dba Chandler Regional Medical Center ("Chandler") in the Northern District of

Plaintiff Josef Robinson filed this employment discrimination lawsuit against Defendant

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California. However, the proper venue for this action is the U.S. District Court for the District of
Arizona. Robinson's complaint alleges a cause of action for violation of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16. Title VII includes a specific venue provision, which
supersedes the general venue statute (28 U.S.C. § 1391). The Title VII venue provisions requires
that an action be brought in: (i) the district in which the alleged unlawful employment practice
was committed; (ii) the district in which the employment records are maintained and
administered; or (iii) the district in which the plaintiff would have worked but for the alleged
employment practice. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3). Under Title VII, the only proper venue for this
case is the District of Arizona, because:

- Robinson is and was employed by Chandler in Arizona;
- Robinson alleges discrimination that arises from health coverage exclusions
 contained in a health benefits plan that applies exclusively to Arizona employees,
 and that is managed and administered in Arizona;
- Robinson's employment-related records are maintained and administered in Arizona; and
 - Most of the witnesses with relevant knowledge regarding Robinson's allegations reside in Arizona.

As discussed below, Robinson's inclusion of a non-Title VII claim in the complaint (for violation the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 1557, 42 U.S.C. § 18116) does not change this result, as Title VII's venue provision trumps the general venue statute.

In an apparent effort to justify venue in the Northern District of California, Robinson's complaint includes a number of inaccurate and incomplete factual allegations, which are contradicted by the declarations filed in support of this motion. This Court should reject Robinson's attempt to avoid an Arizona venue, which is the *mandatory* venue dictated by his own Title VII claim. The complaint was filed in an improper forum and must, therefore, be dismissed or transferred.

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III. <u>FACTUAL BACKGROUND</u>

A. Robinson's Arizona Employment.

Robinson is a resident of Arizona. (Compl. ¶ 15.) He is, and at all relevant times has been, employed as a nurse at Chandler, a Dignity Health hospital located in Chandler, Arizona. (Compl. ¶¶ 17, 30.) Robinson joined Chandler after being recruited by Chandler's talent acquisition office, based in Phoenix, Arizona. (Declaration of Maureen Sterbach ("Sterbach Decl."), ¶ 9.) Robinson has never been a regular employee of any Dignity Health hospital outside of Arizona. (*Id.*, ¶ 10.)

Robinson's employment records were and are created, maintained, and administered at his place of employment in Chandler, Arizona. (Id., ¶¶ 4, 11.) The employment records are also processed and uploaded to an electronic database—a task that is performed by Dignity Health's corporate office located in Phoenix, Arizona. (Id.) In addition to the electronic copy, a hard copy of Robinson's personnel records is maintained locally by the Human Resources Department at Chandler. (Id., ¶ 11.)

Robinson's allegation that employment records relevant to the alleged unlawful employment practices "are maintained and administered at Dignity Health's corporate headquarters in San Francisco" is factually incorrect. (Compl., ¶ 12.) The employment records for employees of Chandler are not physically maintained or administered by Dignity Health's San Francisco headquarters. (Sterbach Decl., ¶ 12.)

B. The Arizona Health Plan.

1. Robinson's Enrollment in the Arizona Health Plan.

When hired as an employee of Dignity Health in 2015, Robinson was offered the choice of coverage under one of two self-funded health plans available to Dignity Health's Arizona employees. (Declaration of Eva-Maria Palermo ("Palermo Decl."), ¶ 11.) Robinson did not actively elect to enroll in a medical plan, and was therefore enrolled by default in the Dignity Health Arizona Preferred Plan (the "Arizona Health Plan" or the "Plan"). (*Id.*) And Robinson did not subsequently change his medical plan election during open enrollment. (*Id.*)

2. Background Regarding the Arizona Health Plan.

Dignity Health's Arizona Health Plan dates back prior to 1999 when Dignity Health was named Catholic Healthcare West ("CHW"). At the time, there was only one CHW hospital in Arizona, St. Joseph's Medical Center in Phoenix, Arizona, which was owned by CHW subsidiary Mercy Healthcare Arizona, Inc. Employees of St. Joseph's were covered by the Mercy Healthcare Arizona, Inc. Employee Health Care Plan, which was offered under the system-wide CHW Flexible Benefits Plan. (*Id.*, ¶ 4.) The Mercy Healthcare Arizona, Inc. Employee Health Care Plan excluded coverage for "transsexual or gender reassignment procedures." (*Id.*)

Effective January 1, 2000, the Mercy Healthcare Arizona, Inc. Employee Health Care Plan changed its name to the "Catholic Healthcare West - Arizona Medical Plan." (Id., ¶ 5.) The restated plan continued to be available only to CHW's employees in Arizona and continued to exclude coverage for "transsexual or gender reassignment procedures." (Id.)

CHW acquired Chandler Regional Medical Center—where Robinson works—in 1999 and, shortly thereafter in October 2000, Chandler's employees become covered under the Catholic Healthcare West – Arizona Medical Plan. (*Id.*, ¶ 6.) The Catholic Healthcare West - Arizona Medical Plan was amended and/or restated several times between 2000 and the present, including by changing the name of the plan in 2013 to reflect the hospital system's name change from CHW to Dignity Health (which occurred in 2012) and to provide two component plans – the Dignity Health Arizona Preferred Plan (in which Robinson is enrolled) and the Dignity Health Arizona Premier Plan. (*Id.*, ¶ 7.) These component plans continue to be offered only to Dignity Health employees in Arizona and continue to exclude coverage for gender transition surgery and related benefits. These plans are not offered to Dignity Health employees in any state other than Arizona. (*Id.*)

3. Administration of Dignity Health's Arizona Health Plan.

Dignity Health's Health and Welfare Benefits Department, which is based in Arizona, is responsible for the management and administration of all of the employee health plans in each state in which Dignity Health operates, including the Arizona Health Plan. (Id., \P 8.) The Health and Welfare Benefits Department is also responsible for the compliance function for all of

1	Dignity Health's employee medical plans. (Id.) The Arizona Health Plan documents,
2	amendments, and other compliance-related records are created and maintained in Arizona. (Id., ¶
3	9.)
4	In addition to the Health and Welfare Benefits Department, Dignity Health has an Arizona
5	Steering Committee, which is also based in Arizona, responsible for reviewing the Plan's
6	performance on a quarterly basis and for making decisions regarding benefits and coverage
7	exclusions in the self-funded health plans offered to Dignity Health employees in Arizona.
8	(Sterbach Decl., ¶ 13; Palermo Decl., ¶ 10.) Membership of the Arizona Steering Committee
9	includes:
10	o Maureen Sterbach, Vice President, Human Resources – Arizona Service Area
11	o Chuck Sowers, Vice President, Chief Financial Officer – Chandler Regional
12	Medical Center and Mercy Gilbert Medical Center;
13	o Marc Lato, MD, Medical Staff Offices – St. Joseph's Hospital and Medical Center;
14	o Jeffrey Jackson, Vice President, Chief Financial Officer – St. Joseph's Hospital
15	and Medical Center;
16	 Doneen Grimm, Pharmacy Director – St. Joseph's Hospital and Medical Center;
17	 Todd Ricotta, Executive Director – Arizona Care Network;
18	 Eva-Maria Palermo, Health & Welfare Manager – System Office Phoenix, and
19	 Larita Knight, Manager, Human Resources – Arizona Service Area.
20	(Sterbach Decl., ¶ 13.)
21	4. The Arizona Health Plan's Exclusion of Services Related to Sex
22	<u>Transformation.</u>
23	The Arizona Health Plan contains 90 enumerated coverage exclusions, one of which is an
24	exclusion of coverage for "[t]reatment, drugs, medicines, services and supplies for, or leading to,
25	sex transformation surgery." (Compl. Ex. C, pg. 58.) This coverage exclusion constitutes the
26	purported "unlawful" discriminatory practice that gives rise to Robinson's claims against Dignity
27	Health. (Compl. ¶¶ 55-58, 64-70.) Notably, this coverage exclusion is contained in the Arizona

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Health Plan, and is applicable *exclusively* to Dignity Health employees who work in Arizona.

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(Palermo Decl., \P 7.) As explained above, the exclusion of services related to sex transformation surgery originated prior to 1999 as an exclusion in the Mercy Healthcare Arizona, Inc., Employee Health Care Plan, and has existed in every version of the Arizona Health Plan since that time. (Palermo Decl., \P 4, 5, 7.)

5. The Arizona Health Plan Appeal Process.

Benefits coverage determinations under the Plan are administered by third-party administrator, United Medical Resources ("UMR"), in accordance with the terms of the Plan.
(Compl. ¶ 31.) All Plan coverage decisions are made by UMR based on Plan provisions specified in the Plan Document, without input from Dignity Health's corporate headquarters in San Francisco regarding individual coverage determinations. (Palermo Decl., ¶ 17.)

If an employee seeks to dispute a denial of benefits coverage by UMR under the Arizona Health Plan, the employee is afforded three levels of appeal. First, the employee may appeal to UMR by submitting a written request for review to UMR's Claims Appeal Unit in Salt Lake City, Utah. (Compl. Ex. C, pg. 68.) If the first appeal is denied, the employee may then submit a second-level appeal to UMR. (*Id.* at p. 70.) Finally, if the second-level appeal is denied, the employee may file a third-level appeal with the Dignity Health Employee Benefits Administrative Committee in Phoenix, Arizona. (*Id.* at p. 71.)

C. The Alleged Employment Discrimination.

Robinson is a transgender individual who identifies as male. (Compl. ¶ 22.) He is currently in the process of physically transitioning from a female to a male. (Compl., Ex. G.) Robinson brought the present suit because he was denied coverage under the Arizona Health Plan for services related to his sex transformation surgery. In June 2015, Robinson filed a benefits claim under the Arizona Health Plan for pre-authorization of a double mastectomy related to his transition. (Palermo Decl.,¶ 13.) In response, UMR issued a pre-service opinion denying the claim based on the Plan exclusion of coverage for sex transformation surgery. (*Id.*) Robinson appealed the denial of pre-authorization in July 2015. In a second pre-service response, UMR again denied the appeal based on the Plan exclusion. (*Id.* ¶ 14.) In August 2015, Robinson paid

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¹ UMR is based in Salt Lake City, Utah and Wausau, Wisconsin. (Compl., Ex. C.)

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out-of-pocket for a double mastectomy. (Compl. ¶ 38.) After receiving the procedure, Robinson filed a post-service appeal. (Palermo Decl., ¶ 16.) UMR issued its denial of the post-service appeal on February 10, 2016, again based on the Plan exclusion. (*Id.*) Robinson was provided information regarding additional appeal options; however, he chose not to pursue a second-level post-service appeal to UMR or a voluntary appeal to Dignity Health's Employee Benefits Administrative Committee, which is available to review individual coverage determinations as described in the Plan documents. (*Id.*) All of Robinson's appeals were decided by UMR, which makes all individual coverage determinations without input from Dignity Health. (Palermo Decl., ¶ 17.)

Importantly, Robinson does not allege that any Dignity Health employee, manager, or executive administered the Plan in an intentionally discriminatory matter. Nor does he allege that any Dignity Health employee, manager, or executive had discretion to make exceptions to the coverage exclusion. Rather, he alleges the purported discrimination is implicit in the Plan exclusion itself. (Compl. ¶¶ 55-57, 64-70, Ex. C.)

The only alleged communication with any Dignity Health employee based outside of Arizona was an email chain initiated by Robinson's fiancée, Melissa Mayo, with Dignity Health's Chief Human Resources Officer Darryl Robinson (forwarded to him by Dignity Health CEO, Lloyd Dean), more than a month after plaintiff Robinson underwent the double mastectomy for which he had been denied insurance coverage. (Compl. Ex. G.) Darryl Robinson is based in Dignity Health's corporate office in San Francisco, California. By the time of Ms. Mayo's first email in September 2015, the purported "unlawful" employment practice (*i.e.* the Arizona Health Plan's denial of coverage) was already complete, and plaintiff Robinson had already begun the appeal process through UMR contemplated in the Plan. Ms. Mayo's email communication with Darryl Robinson requested that Dignity Health provide Robinson with a fully inclusive plan that would provide coverage for gender transition surgery and related services. (*Id.*) However, the Arizona Health Plan does not contemplate the involvement of Darryl Robinson (or any other Dignity Health personnel, for that matter) in the review of individual coverage determinations, such as the denial of coverage at issue here. (*See* Compl. Ex. C; Palermo Decl., ¶ 17.) Rather,

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the Plan calls for individual coverage determinations to be made by UMR (not located in California). (*See* Compl. Ex. C at p. 70-71; Palermo Decl., ¶ 17.) Furthermore, Plan benefits and exclusions are reviewed and decided upon by Dignity Health's Arizona-based Health and Welfare Benefits Department and Arizona Steering Committee. (Sterbach Decl., ¶ 13.)

D. <u>Arizona EEOC's Investigation.</u>

Robinson ultimately filed a charge of discrimination with the Phoenix, Arizona office of the EEOC on December 3, 2015. (Compl. ¶ 18, Ex. A.) On May 12, 2016, the Arizona office of the EEOC issued a Determination, concluding that "[Robinson was] denied authorization in two separate letters based on [Chandler's] decision on the 'sex transformation' exclusion in their health care plan. . . . [Robinson] alleged [Chandler's] health care plan deprives him of a valuable employment benefit on the basis of sex." (Compl. Ex. A.) Robinson was issued a Notice of Right to Sue by the Phoenix, Arizona office of the EEOC on May 16, 2016. (Compl. Ex. B.)

IV. THIS ACTION SHOULD TRANSFERRED TO THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA UNDER RULE 12(b)(3) AND SECTION 1406(a).

A. <u>Legal Standard Under Rule 12(b)(3).</u>

A defendant may raise a contention of improper venue in a motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(3). On a Rule 12(b)(3) motion, "Plaintiff ha[s] the burden of showing that venue [is] properly laid in the Northern District of California." *Piedmont Label Co. v. Sun Garden Packing Co.*, 598 F.2d 491, 496 (9th Cir. 1979); *see also Cheng v. Schlumberger*, 2013 WL 5814272, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 29, 2013) ("Because [defendant] challenges venue, [plaintiff] bears the burden to establish that venue in this District is proper."). "Pleadings need not be accepted as true, and facts outside the pleadings may be considered." *Doe 1 v. AOL LLC*, 552 F.3d 1077, 1081 (9th Cir. 2009); *see also Ramos v. Molina Healthcare, Inc.*, 2012 WL 3104849, at *2 (C.D. Cal. July 27, 2012) ("When determining proper venue, a court can look beyond the pleadings of the claim, and does not have to take a plaintiff's factual allegations as true.").

B. Section 1406(a) Mandates That This Action Be Transferred.

Section 1406(a) provides in mandatory terms: "[t]he district court of a district in which is filed a case laying venue in the wrong division or district *shall* dismiss, or if it be in the interest of

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justice, transfer such case to any district or division in which it could have been brought." 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) (emp. added). Venue in the Northern District of California is plainly improper as Robinson's own Title VII claim mandates that the case be heard in the District of Arizona.

Title VII contains a specific venue provision that authorizes suit in: (i) the district in which the alleged unlawful employment practice was committed; (ii) the district in which the employment records are maintained and administered; or (iii) the district in which the plaintiff would have worked but for the alleged employment practice.³ 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3): Passantino v. Johnson & Johnson Consumer Products, 212 F.3d 493, 504 (9th Cir. 2000). "Only where the putative employer cannot be brought before the court in one of those districts may the action be filed in the judicial district in which he has 'his principal office.'" Stebbins v. State Farm Mutual Ins., 413 F.2d 1100, 1102 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (emp. added). "[V] enue should be found where the effect of the unlawful employment practice is felt: where the plaintiff works, and where the decision to engage in that practice is implemented." *Passantino*, 212 F.3d at 505 (emp. added). The mere fact that an employee had job-related interactions with his or her employer in a foreign district does not give rise to proper venue in the foreign district. Davidson, 2010 WL 3515760, at *4-5 (ruling that Title VII venue was not authorized in the Northern District of California notwithstanding the plaintiff's allegations that, *inter alia*: (1) plaintiff negotiated her employment agreement via telephone communications with corporate representatives in San Francisco, and (2) plaintiff was supervised by, and had frequent discussions with, a manager who was based in San Francisco).

The fact that Robinson alleges a cause of action under the Affordable Care Act, in

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² Chandler acknowledges that "[t]he interest of justice generally requires transferring an action brought in an improper venue instead of dismissing it." *Davidson v. Korman*, 2010 WL 3515760, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 8, 2010). However, a court has the discretion to dismiss a case under section 1406(a) if it finds that "the plaintiff 'purposefully sought to avoid' prosecution of his case in a different jurisdiction 'through blatant forum shopping." Id. (citing Wood v. Santa Barbara Chamber of Commerce, 705 F.2d 1515 (9th Cir. 1983)). Here, the Court should exercise its discretion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to section 1406(a) because Robinson's choice to file in the Northern District of California—despite Arizona's clear and exclusive connection to and interest in the action—constitutes "blatant forum shopping."

³ The third criterion is irrelevant in this case because Robinson continues to be employed at Chandler.

1	addition to his Title VII claim
2	action, which is covered by T
3	by the general venue provisio
4	Dehaemers v. Wynne, 522 F.
5	DOC, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
6	provision controls, notwithsta
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8	Title VII's venue provision re
9	VII claims under the ADEA,
10	Drug Stores, 950 F.2d 586, 58
11	well settled principles of statu
12	(section 2000e-5(f)(3)) applie
13	Robinson alleges that
14	practice was committed at Di
15	employment records relevant
16	Health's corporate headquarte
17	bases for venue is factually in
18	this Motion.
19	First, the "unlawful en
20	is the Plan coverage exclusion
21	excluding all healthcare relate
22	plan it provides to employees
23	Robinson").) This exclusion
24	corporate headquarters in San

a, does not change the result. "[W]hen a plaintiff brings a Title VII itle VII's restrictive venue provision, as well as an action governed in, the narrower venue provision of $\S 2000e-5(f)(3)$ controls." Supp. 2d 240, 249 (D.D.C. 2007); see also Walker v. United States 57421, 21-22 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 24, 2012) (ruling that Title VII venue anding plaintiff's assertion of a second cause of action that would eneral venue statute); Ramos, 2012 WL 3104849, at *3 (ruling that equired transfer of plaintiff's entire action, including the non-Title FEHA, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and common law); Johnson v. Payless 87-88 (9th Cir. 1991) ("given the conflict between the two statutes, atory construction dictate that the later, specific venue provision es rather than the earlier, general venue provision (section 1391b)").

venue is proper in California because "the unlawful employment gnity Health's corporate headquarters in San Francisco and to such practice are maintained and administered at Dignity ers in San Francisco." (Compl. ¶ 12.) Each of these two alleged correct and is disproven by the sworn declarations accompanying

mployment practice" upon which Robinson bases his Title VII claim n related to sex transformation surgery. (Compl. ¶¶ 58, 70 ("By ed to 'sex transformation surgery' from the only available health Dignity Health has unlawfully discriminated against Mr. was not, as the Complaint alleges, "committed at Dignity Health's Francisco." (Compl. ¶ 12.) Rather, the exclusion is contained in Dignity Health's Arizona Health Plan, which exclusively covers employees working in Arizona, and which is managed and administered by Dignity Health's Health and Welfare Benefits Department and Arizona Steering Committee, both of which are based in Arizona. (Compl. Ex. C, pg. 58; Palermo Decl., ¶¶ 8, 10; Sterbach Decl., ¶ 13.) The exclusion was implemented in

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Arizona, and applied to an Arizona employee, to deny coverage for a medical procedure that was sought and performed in Arizona. There is no allegation in this case regarding any Dignity Health benefits plan or health coverage exclusion that applies to California employees. To the contrary, the complaint indicates that such benefits coverage for sex transformation surgery is already available to Dignity Health employees in California, and is only excluded for Arizona employees. (Compl., Ex. G.)

Second, Robinson's allegation that "employment records relevant to such practice are maintained and administered at Dignity Health's corporate headquarters in San Francisco" is also incorrect. Robinson's employment records were and are created and maintained at the hospital in Chandler, Arizona where he is employed. (Sterbach Decl., ¶¶ 4, 11.) In addition to Robinson's personnel records, the Arizona Health Plan documents, amendments, and other compliancerelated records are created and maintained in Arizona. (Palermo Decl., ¶ 9.) Thus, the location of Robinson's employment and Plan-related records does not support venue in the Northern District of California. See McCormack v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 2012 WL 5948965, at *2-3 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 28, 2012) (granting employer's Rule 12(b)(3) venue motion based on employer's declaration that "it does not 'maintain' or 'administer' employment records relevant to its Arizona employees [at its corporate headquarters] in California. Rather, such records are maintained and administered through its Phoenix District office, located in Tempe, Arizona."); see also Haller v. Maybus, 2016 WL 1366823, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 5, 2016) ("Even though the records are electronic and accessible in multiple districts, the Southern District of California is not a proper venue under the statute because, if nothing more, the employment records were created in Arizona.").

Consequently, Robinson has failed to meet his burden of establishing that venue is proper in the Northern District of California under any of the three prongs set forth in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3). Robinson's sole alleged connection to this District is a handful of emails – to which *he was not even a party* – initiated by his fiancée and with Dignity Health executives in San Francisco. Ms. Mayo's sent her first email *after* the alleged unlawful employment practice was already complete—*i.e.*, after Robinson had already obtained his double mastectomy and was

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denied coverage under the Arizona Health Plan. A self-serving email, sent to a California executive, by someone other than Robinson, after the alleged discrimination had occurred, and in contemplation of filing the instant lawsuit, cannot manufacture venue in the Northern District of California. See, e.g., SP Inv. Fund I, LLC v. Lowry, 2016 WL 590192, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 11, 2016) (finding that phone and mail communications to a California defendant were not sufficient to support the plaintiff's choice of venue in California because the plaintiff made no *physical* contact with California and all relevant employment acts took place in New York); Hawkes v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 2012 WL 506569, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 15, 2012) (rejecting the plaintiff's choice of venue in California where all relevant employment acts took place in Virginia, and the only connections to California were: (i) the defendant's corporate headquarters, and (ii) communications between the plaintiff's counsel and defendant's California employees).

In Davidson, 2010 WL 3515760, a plaintiff who lived within the Northern District of California but worked elsewhere sued her employer in the Northern District under Title VII. The employer-defendant moved to dismiss or transfer the suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3) on the ground that Plaintiff did not work in the Northern District and none of the alleged unlawful employment practices took place in the Northern District. In response, the plaintiff argued that venue was proper in the Northern District under *Passantino* because the supposed "effects" of the unlawful employment practice were felt in the Northern District. Relying on the language of Passantino, the Davidson plaintiff specifically cited the following facts in support of her argument that the "effects" of the defendant's adverse employment decision were felt in the plaintiff's chosen forum:

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(1) Plaintiff currently resides in San Francisco and continues to feel the effects of Defendants' adverse employment practices; (2) Plaintiff negotiated her employment agreement over the phone from her San Francisco home; (3) Plaintiff's hire letter was sent to her San Francisco home; (4) Plaintiff sometimes traveled for her job, and after would return directly to her home in San Francisco; (5) Plaintiff was supervised by and had frequent discussions with an individual who was based in San Francisco; (6) Plaintiff once worked on a research project at a San Francisco law library; and (7) Plaintiff is aware that attorneys in her Sacramento office sometimes traveled to San Francisco to work on projects.

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Id. at *8. The court found these facts insufficient to support venue in the Northern District, explaining:

> "Plaintiff's reliance on an out-of-context quotation from the Passantino decision is misplaced. . . . The Ninth Circuit [stated] 'venue should be found where the effect of the unlawful employment practice is felt: where the plaintiff works, and the decision to engage in that practice is implemented.' . . . Passantino fails to support Plaintiff's argument that venue for her wrongful discharge claim is proper in this district, where Plaintiff lives. Nor does Passantino support Plaintiff's argument that venue is proper in this district because she had interactions with this district in connection with her job."

Id. at *9 (emphasis in original; citation omitted).

The *Davidson* decision demonstrates the force of Title VII's requirement that venue be based on the location of the plaintiff's employment, and it establishes that venue in the Northern District of California is not proper in this case. Indeed, the *Davidson* plaintiff, unlike Robinson, had some real contacts with the Northern District of California. The *Davidson* plaintiff not only had significant communications with her employer in San Francisco, but also she lived in San Francisco, had occasionally worked in San Francisco, and had been supervised by a manager based in San Francisco. Still, these forum contacts were insufficient to authorize venue under Title VII. By comparison, Robinson's connections to the Northern District are negligible. He does not allege that he lived here, worked here, reported to any manager based here, or personally communicated with any corporate representative here. His complaint's sole contact with this forum is a *post hoc* email chain initiated by his fiancée.

Accordingly, under Title VII's specific venue provision, venue is improper in the Northern District of California. The complaint must be transferred to the District of Arizona, which is the *only* district "where the effect of the [alleged] unlawful employment practice is felt: where the plaintiff works, and where the decision to engage in that practice is implemented." Passantino, 212 F.3d at 505.

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V. <u>ALTERNATIVELY, THIS ACTION SHOULD BE TRANSFERRED TO THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA ON CONVENIENCE GROUNDS PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1404.</u>

Even if the Court does not find that Robinson filed this action in an improper venue mandating transfer under section 1406(a) and Title VII, the Court should nonetheless transfer this action to the District of Arizona because Arizona is the most convenient venue. Under Section 1404(a), a district court, "[f]or the convenience of the parties and witnesses, [and] in the interest of justice . . . may transfer a case to another district court in which the case might have been brought." "While Title VII's venue provision does not displace the traditional section 1404 analysis, '[t]he factors expressly identified as a basis for venue under Title VII . . . should . . . be key factors in analyzing the 'interests of justice' prong of section 1404(a) analysis." Hong v. Morgan Stanley & Co., LLC, 2012 WL 5077066, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 18, 2012) (citing Ellis v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 372 F. Supp. 2d 530, 537 (N.D. Cal. 2005)). To support a motion to transfer under Section 1404(a), the moving party must establish that (i) venue would be proper in the transferee district and the action could have been brought in the transferee district; and (ii) transfer will serve the convenience of the parties and witnesses, and will promote the interests of justice. See Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 820 F. Supp. 503, 506 (C.D. Cal. 1992); accord A.J. Indus., Inc. v. United States Dist. Ct., 503 F.2d 384, 386-87 (9th Cir. 1974).

Here, there can be no dispute that venue is proper in Arizona. Chandler is located in Arizona and does business in Arizona, and Robinson resides and works in Arizona. Also, the action could have been filed in Arizona because federal courts in Arizona have federal question jurisdiction over this action—just as this Court does. *See* 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Therefore, Chandler has easily met its burden on the first prong of Section 1404(a).

Chandler also meets its burden on the second prong: convenience and interests of justice. To determine whether transfer would promote the interests of justice, courts consider multiple factors, including the plaintiff's choice of forum; the convenience of the parties; the convenience of the witnesses; the ease of access to evidence; the familiarity of each forum with the applicable law; and any local interest in the controversy. *See Jones v. GNC Franchising, Inc.*, 211 F.3d 495,

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498-99 (9th Cir. 2000); Decker Coal Co. v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 805 F.2d 834, 843 (9th Cir. 1986). An analysis of these factors supports transfer to Arizona.

<u>Plaintiff's choice of forum</u>. Although a plaintiff's choice of forum is typically entitled to deference, that choice receives less weight when the chosen forum is not the plaintiff's residence. Hawkes, 2012 WL 506569, at *4 ("Because Hawkes does not reside in California, her choice of forum receives less weight."); SP Inv. Fund I, LLC, 2016 WL 590192, at *6 ("The deference afforded a plaintiff's choice of forum is substantially reduced . . . however, when the venue lacks a significant connection to the activities alleged in the complaint."). "[A] fundamental principle underpinning the § 1404(a) analysis is that litigation should proceed in that place where the case finds its center of gravity. Deference to the plaintiff's choice of forum should be minimized where, as here, the forum selected by plaintiffs is not the situs of material events." McCormack v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 2012 WL 5948965, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 28, 2012) (internal citations omitted).

Here, Robinson's choice of forum in the Northern District of California does not warrant deference because he does not reside in the chosen venue, the venue lacks significant connection to the health insurance coverage that represents the "center of gravity" for his discrimination claim, and the venue is not the situs of material events. Further, it would not inconvenience Robinson to litigate in the District of Arizona, as he lives there. Nor would it inconvenience his legal counsel, given that three of Plaintiff's attorneys of record have already had to seek admission in this District *pro hac vice* because they practice outside of California.

Ease of access to evidence and convenience of the parties and witnesses. As discussed above, the situs of material events in this case is Arizona – not the Northern District of California. Like Robinson, the vast majority of the witnesses reside and work in Arizona, including most of the benefits and human resources personnel with whom Robinson communicated regarding the Arizona Health Plan coverage exclusion. For example, members of Dignity Health's Health and Welfare Benefits Department and Arizona Steering Committee—which are responsible for making decisions regarding Plan benefits and coverage exclusions—all reside and work in Arizona. (Sterbach Decl., ¶ 13; Palermo Decl., ¶ 10.) Additionally, any employment records or

1 health plan records that may become relevant in this action are created and primarily maintained 2 in Arizona. (Palermo Decl., ¶¶ 8-9; Sterbach Decl., ¶¶ 4, 11.) 3 Therefore, the Arizona location of virtually all witnesses and evidence weighs in favor of 4 transferring venue to Arizona. 5 The local interest in the controversy. "Among the public factors for a court considering 6 a motion to transfer is the 'local interest in having localized controversies decided at home." 7 Hong, 2012 WL 5077066, at *6 (citing Decker Coal Co. v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 805 F.2d 8 834, 843 (9th Cir. 1986)). 9 Here, the Northern District has no discernable interest in an Arizona Health Plan that 10 applies exclusively to employees who work at one of Dignity Health's four Arizona hospitals. 11 Robinson does not, and cannot, allege that a single California resident is affected by the Arizona Plan coverage exclusion underlying his Title VII claim. A court sitting in California should not 12 13 adjudicate health care coverage issues that implicate the laws and policies of a different state, and 14 that solely impacts employees of a different state. 15 For all these reasons, the Court should exercise its discretion to transfer this action to the 16 district in which Robinson lives and works, and in which the witnesses with whom he personally 17 interacted also live and work: the District of Arizona. 18 VI. **CONCLUSION** 19 For the foregoing reasons, Chandler respectfully requests that this Court enter an order 20 transferring the action to the District of Arizona. 21 Dated: July 15, 2016 MANATT, PHELPS & PHILLIPS 22 23 By: /s/ Barry S. Landsberg 24 Barry S. Landsberg Attorneys for Defendant 25 DIGNITY HEALTH dba CHANDLER REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER 26 27 317240738.9 28

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