UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES

UNION FOUNDATION,

. CA No. 17-2069 (TSC)

Petitioner,

v.

Washington, D.C.

JAMES N. MATTIS, . Thursday, November 30, 2017

. 10:00 a.m.

Respondent.

TRANSCRIPT OF MOTIONS HEARING BEFORE THE HONORABLE TANYA S. CHUTKAN UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

APPEARANCES:

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PROCEEDINGS

THE DEPUTY CLERK: Your Honor, we have Civil Action 17-2069, American Civil Liberties Union Foundation v. James Mattis. I'll ask counsel to please approach the lectern identify yourself and those at your respective tables, starting with the plaintiff's side. Thank you.

MR. HAFETZ: Good morning, Your Honor. Jonathan

Hafetz for the ACLU. I'm joined by Brett Kaufman from the ACLU

and Arthur Spitzer from the ACLU of the Capital Area.

THE COURT: Good morning.

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MS. WYER: Good morning, Your Honor. Kathryn Wyer for the government, and with me at counsel table is Terry Henry, also with the Department of Justice.

THE COURT: Good morning.

All right. We are here for a hearing on Petitioner ACLU's request that this Court order injunctive relief and the Respondent government's motion to dismiss. Just to sort of summarize where we are, the American Civil Liberties Union has filed the petition allegedly as next friend and on behalf of an unnamed citizen who is currently being detained by United States military in Iraq within an armed conflict zone.

Upon information, I believe this U.S. citizen -- and actually, I believe based even on an affidavit submitted by Respondent, this citizen has been in United States custody since on or around September 14, 2017. That is, by my estimate, two

months. Give me a moment. (Court reviewing document.)

That's correct. The declaration of Steven Dalbey submitted by the government states that, "On or around September 12, 2017, an American citizen surrendered to Syrian Democratic Forces, who subsequently turned him over to the United States." So we can assume it happened around that time.

The name of this individual has not been disclosed by the government, and according to the government's filings, however, representatives from the International Red Cross visited the detainee -- I'll refer to him as "the detainee" -- on September 29th and again on October 23rd.

Certainly, there have been media reports concerning the factual allegations regarding this case, but they're not on the record here. So I will certainly have questions for the government regarding the detainee's status.

The ACLU seeks to gain access to the detainee and asks this Court to order several things, including permitting ACLU counsel to meet and confer with the detainee in private and unmonitored attorney-client conversations; for this Court to order the government to make a prompt return to the writ in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 2243 in the Suspension Clause of the U.S. Constitution; order the government to cease all interrogations of the detainee while this litigation is pending; to provide notice to the Court and counsel prior to any transfer of the detainee to another U.S.-controlled facility or U.S. jurisdiction,

or transfer to the control of another nation; and for this Court to order the government to specify, in the case of the transfer, the receiving facility, jurisdiction, authority, or country of transfer.

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Petitioner has further asked this Court to declare that the indefinite detention of the detainee in military custody is unauthorized, arbitrary, unlawful, and a deprivation of liberty in violation of the Constitution. Petitioners ask the government to charge the detainee with a federal criminal offense in an Article III court or to release him, and finally, to grant such other relief as I request.

So Respondent has filed a motion to dismiss. In an effort to do some housekeeping, I'm going to deal with the first argument here, which is the government's argument that Petitioners have improperly proceeded with detainee as a John Doe without leave of court.

It's curious to this Court that the Respondent, the government, has prevented anyone from finding out the name of this detainee and refuses to disclose his name, then argues that the ACLU should not be able to proceed in a John Doe capacity because they're the ones who control his name. It's sort of circular reasoning.

But, in any event, the Court is going to grant the ACLU's motion, a request to file pseudonymously *nunc pro tunc*, and they will be allowed to proceed anonymously since we don't have a

name. All right. Mr. Hafetz, I'm going to hear from you.

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MR. HAFETZ: Good morning, Your Honor. The ruling the government seeks here on this motion for counsel access is truly extraordinary and unprecedented. It's asking the Court to dismiss a habeas petition filed on behalf of an American citizen who the executive has imprisoned in secret for two and a half months, without charge, without access to a court, and whose name the executive has refused to release publicly.

A ruling in its favor would give this or any future administration license to imprison Americans in secret and erect roadblocks that prevent them from enforcing their most basic rights under the Constitution.

In contrast to the blank check and the unprecedented ruling this administration is demanding from a court, the relief sought here could not be narrower: to afford the citizen legal advice and to give him the opportunity of legal representation to which he's clearly entitled.

Habeas, as Your Honor knows, is an equitable remedy, and here the equities are tremendously in the favor of the ACLU's motion. The choice is between endorsing the administration's effort to create a constitutional black hole for American citizens or allow the ACLUF to proceed with what is the unrebutted demand of a U.S. citizen, to speak to a lawyer, and what has been provided in other circumstances of detained enemy combatants in the United States, at Guantánamo and in Iraq,

which is access to a lawyer.

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THE COURT: Mr. Hafetz, the government's motion to dismiss and their opposition to your petition rests almost entirely on the issue of standing and whether the ACLU has standing to bring this petition. So I wanted to ask you some questions about that, and I agree we are in a very unusual situation.

I have not been able to find -- and I'm sure you've done more looking than I -- a case exactly on all fours with this one. Nevertheless, it presents some very, very troubling questions. But before we can get to the merits, I have to decide on some jurisdictional questions, and standing is probably the most prominent one and the one the government has, as I said, based most of its argument on.

So let me ask you: Although I could assume that the detainee would approve of this habeas petition that has been filed on his behalf, it hasn't been established definitively that he desires to file a habeas petition. So why should I grant the ACLU's request prior to having some indication from the detainee of his desire to file this petition? What of the government's argument that the detainee met with representatives of the International Red Cross on two occasions?

And I guess the assumption or the inference that the government asks me to draw is that, if he wanted a petition to be filed, if he wanted counsel, he would have asked the

International Red Cross to contact his lawyer, to obtain a lawyer for him. We don't know what the substance of his meetings with the Red Cross are because those are confidential. But what of that argument?

MR. HAFETZ: Your Honor, I think that the visits by the Red Cross are no barrier to standing and do not indicate one way or another whether the Petitioner wants counsel.

The Red Cross serves an important but limited function, which is to monitor the conditions of detention. They don't provide legal representation in court, and there are multiple reasons why the detainee, assuming he's allowed to send a message to family through the Red Cross, might want counsel and might not have -- and his family might not have found counsel for him.

THE COURT: But we have no indication from you or in the record or from anyone that -- well, obviously, we don't know who his family is because we don't know who he is. The government's saying, if he wanted help, legal help, he could have asked the Red Cross to contact a family member who could then find him a lawyer, and no lawyer has appeared on behalf of him. So the conclusion that the government -- or the inference the government wants me to draw is that he has not -- either he hasn't requested that his family be contacted, or he hasn't requested that a lawyer be obtained for him.

MR. HAFETZ: As Judge Bates made clear in the Abu Ali

decision, in this posture, on a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, the facts have to be taken as true, and, moreover, all reasonable inferences have to be drawn in our favor, in Petitioner's favor. So what we have before you is Red Cross access, but as the declaration of Gabor Rona makes clear, there are multiple reasons why the Red Cross might not be able to fulfill access:

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The detainee might not have a family. He might not wish to contact his family for a multitude of reasons. He might not wish to expose them to retaliation. He might have other reasons for not wanting to contact them. The family might not want to assist him because of a fear of retaliation or simply because he's been associated, allegedly, in the media with ISIS.

So there are multiple ways that this could break down and not lead to counsel. The government has given no indication of why this could or should have led to counsel, and indeed, would know. On the other hand, Your Honor, we have the unrebutted statement by the detainee, by the citizen, that he wants a lawyer. The government has -- when he was interrogated twice -- on two occasions during his interrogations, once before Miranda warnings were read and once after, according to the Washington Post, he's --

THE COURT: As much as I am an avid reader of the Washington Post, I don't think we can call that an unrebutted statement. I mean, we have a report that he's asked for a

lawyer, and I will have some questions for the government on that.

But let me ask you, Mr. Hafetz, does the ACLU believe that it would still have next friend standing if the detainee had indeed been in contact with family members, whether or not they were currently seeking a habeas petition on his behalf? In other words, if the detainee had been in contact with family members, would your argument for next friend standing be as strong?

MR. HAFETZ: Our argument for next friend standing would clearly have a basis, Your Honor, because I would point you to Judge Bates' decision in the Al Aulaqi case, where it was a father who was seeking next friend standing on behalf of his son. What that decision and other decisions makes clear is a mere relationship with a family member may enhance the probability that the next friend seeks to pursue the best interests of the detainee; but it does not guarantee that, and there Judge Bates rejected the father as next friend.

So the fact that he may have been in contact with a family member, if the family member didn't want to help him or the family member wasn't able to help him, his interests would go unfulfilled. So what's critical -- and all the courts recognize this; all the decisions recognize this. This is the exceptional circumstance.

This is the nightmare scenario where the government has

locked up an American citizen in secret, it's refused to release even his name, there's no alternative means of vindicating his rights, and there's no indication --

Again, I don't want to -- you know, Your Honor does not appear to want to hear too much about the article; and you can ask the government, but they don't dispute it. But in any event, even if that article didn't exist, there's no evidence here he does not want a lawyer.

So at a minimum -- and again I point to Judge Bates' decision in the *Abu Ali* case. At a minimum, the Court cannot dismiss the petition on the current record and has to find out whether or not this detainee wishes to have this petition filed and wishes to have access to counsel in connection with that.

THE COURT: On the issue of the significant relationship factor, ACLU argues that an entity with a relationship that is significant in comparison with others may serve as a next friend. So I'll assume that is the case.

Do you argue with the facts that we currently have, that your relationship -- that is, the ACLU's relationship with the detainee -- is more significant in comparison with others?

Because it's obviously not a family member. The ACLU has never represented this individual before, obviously. Right?

MR. HAFETZ: Correct.

THE COURT: And there appears to be precedent that granting next friend standing requires a presence of a

relationship between the petitioner and the real party in interest. So why should this Court find next friend standing in the absence of such a relationship? Now, I understand we are in new territory because we don't even know his name. You might have represented him; you don't know.

MR. HAFETZ: It's possible. Your Honor, the Supreme Court in the Whitmore decision does not adopt a requirement of a family relation, that it be a family member or there be a prior relationship. The D.C. Circuit has not adopted that requirement.

Judge Bates, in the Al Aulaqi decision, does not. Judge Kollar-Kotelly, in the Does decision, does not. The Eleventh Circuit has not, nor has the First Circuit. There are multiple circuits that have rejected that the next friend must have a prior relationship.

Further, even the cases the government cites, the *Coalition* of *Clergy* case from the Ninth Circuit, which adopts in general a significant-relationship requirement, says that that requirement must be interpreted flexibly in light of the practicalities and the particular facts before the court; and that court, just as the Fourth Circuit in the *Hamdi* decision, the Fourth Circuit in *Hamdi* recognized that if there's no other next friend before the Court, that a prior relationship would not be required.

I would also point Your Honor to Judge Mukasey's decision in the *Padilla* case, which is discussed in the briefs, where Judge Mukasey recognizes, citing a First Circuit decision,

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that a complete stranger could be a next friend.

Now, in that case, the attorneys did have a relationship with him because they were representing him when he was declared an enemy combatant, but that was sort of a fortuitous circumstance. Under the government's position, they could yank somebody off the street and not release their name and frustrate efforts to contact them, and it would be left to chance. This would undermine the protections of habeas corpus.

So, again, it would undermine that protection of habeas corpus to give the government license to lock up citizens without providing their name and without making possible -- ensuring an effective way for them to access the courts.

THE COURT: All right. Those are all the standing questions I had for you, and I'm now going to let you proceed.

I'll interrupt you again when I think the moment is right.

I do have some questions --

MR. HAFETZ: I'm happy to continue, or if you have more on standing...

THE COURT: I have more questions with regard to access to counsel. What's your response to the government's argument in their motion that this Court would be interfering with the operations of the executive if it were to order counsel access while the government continues to determine the detainee's -- and I have no idea what this means, but "his final disposition." It's an ominous term. I have many questions

about that, but what of that argument?

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MR. HAFETZ: I think it's completely without merit, Your Honor. These cases, in one form or another, were presented to the courts after 9/11, and in multiple cases and in each and every case, the Supreme Court said that you cannot deprive a citizen of access to habeas. In order for the habeas right to be meaningful, they must have access to counsel.

That's the Hamdi decision. That's Judge Mukasey in the Padilla decision, where I would add the government asserted what it doesn't assert here, that giving the lawyers access to Padilla, a high-level terrorist, would endanger the national security and would risk its ongoing interrogations and intelligence-gathering functions, and Judge Mukasey still said, under the habeas statute, a citizen has a right of access to counsel.

Now, in terms of the status question, Your Honor, the Supreme Court, this right has attached, clearly. Whatever one might think of where -- days or indeed weeks, but certainly -- you know, we are now at two and a half months, and the citizen clearly has the right to access counsel and to present his claims, any claims before a court.

The Hamdi case -- and I think this is very important,

Your Honor. What the Hamdi case says is, once the U.S. has

determined the citizen's status -- and they've determined his

status here. He's an enemy combatant. That's the only basis on

which they're holding him. Once that status has been determined and they've made a decision to continue to hold him as opposed to release him, he has a right to challenge that detention through habeas corpus. And as all of your fellow judges,

Your Honor -- Judge Lamberth, Judge Kollar-Kotelly, Judge Urbina -- have said, Judge Kessler as well, the right of habeas corpus means nothing without a right of access to counsel.

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THE COURT: Let me ask you, with regard to request for jurisdictional discovery, the ACLU requests in the alternative that I order jurisdictional discovery. But isn't Respondent -- how do you respond to the government's argument that, in arguing that the ACLU bears the burden of establishing standing to file the petition, why should I order jurisdictional discovery when you have a burden to meet regarding standing before I can even get there? So it's kind of a circular argument, right?

MR. HAFETZ: Your Honor, this Court has -- just to start -- and I'll answer your question in one second, but I just want to clarify one thing. The only jurisdictional question here is next friend standing. The Supreme Court, in the *Munaf* decision written by Chief Justice Roberts, was -- it's unanimously that the courts have jurisdiction over habeas petitions filed by U.S. citizens in Iraq.

So the only jurisdictional question is standing. The Court, under habeas of the All Writs Act, has the authority to issue writs and do what is necessary to determine its own

jurisdiction. So this is like the *Abu Ali* case, Judge Bates' decision, but in fact it's much easier.

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In Abu Ali, Judge Bates said the district court has considerable latitude to ferret out the facts and determine whether or not it has jurisdiction in accordance with the honor -- I'm sorry -- to honor the breadth and flexibility of habeas, right? Now, it was a different jurisdictional dispute, but it was a jurisdictional dispute nonetheless.

The dispute there was whether or not a citizen who was being held officially in Saudi custody, in foreign custody, was in fact in the actual or constructive control of the United States, and Judge Bates ordered jurisdictional discovery even as he recognized that there was substantial and delicate interests of foreign relations present in the case.

Here there are no such interests. The U.S. is the sole custodian of this detainee, and the discovery would be quite simple: Do you want a habeas petition filed to challenge your detention, which is presently your only potential relief from unlawful detention? And if so, do you want the ACLU to represent you pro bono, or, alternatively, would you like the Court to appoint another attorney pro bono to represent you?

It's a very simple, black-and-white series of questions that would resolve any uncertainty over whether or not this petition can be filed. Again, we don't think on the record that their jurisdictional discovery is necessary, but at a

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minimum, Your Honor, given the magnitude of the equities in this case, the Court just simply cannot dismiss the petition, but if there's any uncertainty, has to allow this limited discovery to go forward so that a citizen is not left in a legal black hole with no way to challenge the detention.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you. Ms. Wyer.

MS. WYER: Your Honor, the government is seeking to have this petition dismissed for lack of standing. The Petitioner here — this is an unusual situation, because the next friend doctrine is itself an unusual doctrine in that it allows a third party to come in, when it's not that party's injury, and come in and assert claims on behalf of the real party in interest.

THE COURT: I hate to stop you so early in your argument, but I want to get some clarification for the record here. The declaration of Mr. Dalbey states that this detainee has been declared an enemy combatant. Correct?

MS. WYER: My understanding is, according to Mr. Dalbey's statement, when the detainee was taken into custody, he was determined to be an enemy combatant.

THE COURT: So the answer is yes.

MS. WYER: Well, at that point. I mean, to the extent that that can be determined at that point.

THE COURT: I thought that was an easy one.

MS. WYER: That's what the declaration says.

THE COURT: The declaration says he's an enemy 1 2 combatant. 3 MS. WYER: Yes. THE COURT: He's a U.S. citizen. He's being held in 4 5 a foreign country; I believe the declaration says it's Iraq. That's not really relevant for purposes of my ruling, but he is 6 7 being held abroad. Correct? 8 MS. WYER: Yes. THE COURT: And he has been held since September. 9 10 MS. WYER: Yes. 11 THE COURT: Over two months. Correct? 12 MS. WYER: Yes. 1.3 THE COURT: Has this individual been advised of his 14 right to counsel? 15 MS. WYER: That is not stated in the declaration. 16 THE COURT: I know. 17 MS. WYER: I have to respond by saying that the ACLU 18 is relying on statements in a Washington Post --19 THE COURT: I don't want --20 MS. WYER: -- that say that that is the case. 21 even if that were the case, even according to the statements, 22 even if you assume that the statements in the Washington Post 23 article are accurate, they do not indicate that this detainee is 2.4 seeking to file a habeas petition. At most, they indicate that 25 the detainee invoked his Miranda rights.

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THE COURT: Let me stop you. I don't want to rely on a report in any media. I want to rely on representations made by counsel. Has this individual been advised of their Miranda rights?

MS. WYER: Your Honor, the Department has not given an official statement on that.

THE COURT: So --

MS. WYER: Your Honor, I have to urge the Court to look at the situation here. This is an individual --

I'm not trying to be impatient, but I am growing impatient because I've asked a relatively simple question, which is there's a U.S. citizen in U.S. custody, been declared as an enemy combatant. I want to know two things: Has the citizen been advised of his constitutional rights? One. And two, has he asserted those rights?

That's the information that's within the government's control. We may not know his name, but the government knows his name and it's within the government's knowledge. So I'd like a representation. I'd like an answer to those questions.

MS. WYER: Your Honor, I don't have an answer to those questions because the government is not relying on the answers to those questions for its --

THE COURT: This Court feels the need for that information in order to make an adequate determination in this

case. Is it your position, Ms. Wyer, that the government is not going to provide the Court with that information? Because I must say, that would be a very extraordinary position indeed.

MS. WYER: Your Honor, I would have to seek -- I would have to confer with the Department of Defense before I can give an answer to that question.

THE COURT: So I therefore assume that the answer to the second question to that, which is whether this citizen has requested counsel, you're not prepared to answer either?

MS. WYER: It's the same answer, Your Honor. This situation is what -- this individual was taken into custody as an enemy combatant because he was fighting against the government in a foreign country. This is a wartime situation where the government has a right to detain individuals to remove them from the battlefield.

THE COURT: I'm not disputing that right. I am not disputing that right. Are you saying that simply because a U.S. citizen has been declared an enemy combatant they don't have any constitutional rights?

MS. WYER: No. Not at all. Not at all, Your Honor.

After --

THE COURT: No, Ms. Wyer. I heard you, but I want answers to my questions. This individual has been detained, without anyone knowing his name, in an unknown location somewhere abroad, by U.S. forces. He's a U.S. citizen.

It's been two and a half months, and you can't tell me whether he's been advised of his rights, whether he's asserted his rights, and you will not confirm a report that he's requested a counsel. Is that the government's position here?

I just want to be clear. Because you don't think it's relevant?

MS. WYER: Let me address certain parts of your question, Your Honor. First of all, in regard to this detainee, in regard to the detainee's identity, it is the Department's policy not to disclose the names of individuals immediately after being detained. That is under the Geneva Convention.

THE COURT: That's fine.

MS. WYER: There is a good reason for that. It is not that the Department is trying to do anything nefarious with this individual --

THE COURT: And I'm not -- that's not where my concern lies. I'm not disputing the government's right not to release his name or information. My concern is with those two questions that have yet to be answered by you, which is whether he's been advised of his rights and whether he's asked for counsel. That's where my concern lies.

The fact that you haven't released his name or his location, that's not where I'm focused on right now. So I'd like you to tell me if you believe that the answers to those two questions are not relevant to my determinations here today.

MS. WYER: That's what I believe, Your Honor, that

they are not relevant to the determination, because this is a situation where the government has -- the U.S. military has this individual in custody, and the Supreme Court in *Boumediene* recognized that the government needs to have a reasonable period of time --

THE COURT: Two and a half months.

MS. WYER: -- to -- well, Your Honor --

THE COURT: It's been two and a half months.

MS. WYER: It is still in the process. It is giving careful consideration as to what to do with this individual.

THE COURT: Okay. Let me stop you. And I can't imagine what "careful consideration" entails, but I'm intrigued by a phrase in your brief, in the introduction to your brief, where you state that "The individual came into the U.S. military custody less than seven weeks ago," page 5 of 26, "was identified as an enemy combatant, and is currently detained in Iraq pending a determination of his further disposition."

Can you tell me what that means?

MS. WYER: Yes, Your Honor. By reference to other cases that are Supreme Court cases and other cases, when the government takes a detainee into custody, there are various options for what will happen to that detainee. The government could decide to criminally prosecute the individual; it could decide to transfer the individual, as happened in *Munaf* and *Omar*, to another government that has an interest in prosecuting

the individual; it could decide to release the individual; it could decide to further detain the individual. But that decision has not been made yet.

THE COURT: Right. And how long do you think the government gets to detain a U.S. citizen in custody, without counsel, with no information as to whether he's received his rights? How long do you think they get to detain him until they determine his disposition? Six months? A year?

MS. WYER: Your Honor --

THE COURT: Do they get to decide what's reasonable here?

MS. WYER: That is not the question before the Court because --

THE COURT: It is the question before this Court.

He's been detained two and a half months, and I would like to know --

MS. WYER: In regard to the standing --

THE COURT: I would like to know how long you think you should be able to continue to do this to a United States citizen.

MS. WYER: Your Honor, in regard to standing, standing must exist at the time the petition is filed. This petition was filed on October 5. Now, under *Boumediene*, the government can have a reasonable time to decide what to do with a detainee, and unless the Petitioner can prove that there is undue delay, the

Petitioner has not shown any evidence of the government's bad faith in its decision-making process.

The government is diligently attempting to make this determination and resolve -- and reach a final disposition regarding this individual, but that process is still underway.

THE COURT: How long is that process going to take?

MS. WYER: I don't have a prediction on that,

Your Honor. The government is diligently attempting to reach
that determination.

THE COURT: And what are the limits? Can you tell me the limits on how long the government should have to determine this individual's disposition as he sits somewhere abroad without a lawyer?

MS. WYER: For purposes of the standing determination, Your Honor, it is the Petitioner's burden to clearly establish that it meets the standing requirements.

THE COURT: Do you not see the circularity of this argument, Ms. Wyer? The U.S. military forces took this individual into custody, are keeping him in an undisclosed location, will not release his name, and will not let him have access to a lawyer.

Under those circumstances, isn't it a bit rich for the government to come in here and say, well, the ACLU didn't file this petition till October, so really it hasn't been that much time at all, when the entity that's responsible for him being

incommunicado is the government?

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MS. WYER: Your Honor, this individual is not incommunicado. This individual has been visited, as allowed under Department of Defense policy and the Geneva Convention, by the International Red Cross Committee.

THE COURT: Then I come back to my question which remains unanswered: Has this individual been advised of their constitutional rights?

MS. WYER: Your Honor, I don't have a different answer to that question, but this individual --

THE COURT: Well, I am going to order you, Ms. Wyer, or some representative of the government, to provide this Court with the answer to those two questions: whether the individual has been advised of their rights, and whether the individual has requested legal counsel or that a petition for habeas corpus be filed on his behalf. I want the answers to those questions by 5 p.m. today.

MS. WYER: Your Honor, this is an unprecedented situation --

THE COURT: It is.

MS. WYER: -- because there is no case where an organization has been allowed to proceed as next friend of an individual without -- to a stranger, with no prior relationship at all to that individual. To the contrary, courts have consistently rejected next friend standing assertions in those

circumstances, and Judge Bates and Judge Kollar-Kotelly of this court have clearly stated that it is inappropriate to assume that a detainee wants to pursue habeas relief. You cannot just assume that from the facts.

THE COURT: Well, I wouldn't assume it if the government would answer my questions.

MS. WYER: But it is not the government's -- this is -- the problem here, Your Honor, is that this Court does not have jurisdiction to make these inquiries unless this Petitioner has standing, and the Petitioner must -- has the burden to clearly establish its standing.

It would be inappropriate for this Court to exercise some supervisory authority over what the Department of Defense is doing in wartime in a foreign country unless it has jurisdiction based on this Petitioner's petition, and this Petitioner lacks standing.

THE COURT: I understand that's your position.

Let me ask you about the significant-relationship issue.

The ACLU is an organization -- and its stated purpose is in its pleading; I don't have to repeat it here. But is it the government's position that the ACLU is here to advance some other agenda?

I mean, the Supreme Court talks about that issue in Whitmore, and there are cases also that discuss, you know, the ACLU isn't some person who has walked off the street and

filed a petition with no institutional basis. I mean, this is what they do.

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Is it the government's position that they can't file a next friend brief simply because the detainee hasn't asked them to or because they're doing it for some other purpose other than to effectuate the individual's rights?

MS. WYER: Your Honor, we are not questioning the Petitioner's good faith, but the Petitioner here is interested in vindicating the Constitution as it interprets the Constitution. It has no specific interest in this individual, and it cannot because it has no relationship with this individual. It does not know the individual.

THE COURT: No one can know this individual.

The problem we have here is the government's argument is circular. They have taken this individual into custody and not allowed him to meet with anybody other than the International Red Cross, and we don't know the substance of his conversations with the International Red Cross because they're confidential.

Moreover, and what I find unusual, the government refuses to say whether this individual has been advised of their constitutional rights and whether they requested counsel or asserted their rights. And then, when an organization, based on, frankly, a report in the press that someone was being detained, has stepped forward to file a next friend brief, the government says, well, you don't have standing to do it because

you don't have any contact or relationship to him, you have no standing, when the lack of contact is the government's doing.

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Under this scenario, Ms. Wyer, as I see it, the government could snatch any U.S. citizen off the street, hold them as an enemy combatant in another country for as long as it took to come to some final disposition, during which time they would not allow them to meet with a lawyer, a family member, or even release their name.

That scenario, that kind of unchecked power, is, quite frankly, frightening. And I would like to know if the government is really here today to say that they can do that. How else would the detainee get a lawyer if not through some organization stepping forward on his behalf when you won't even tell me if he's asked for a lawyer?

MS. WYER: Your Honor, there's at least three points

I need to make here. First of all, that is not the situation
here. The U.S. military did not snatch this person off the
street in Kansas. He was picked up, or he was turned over by
forces in wartime on a battlefield. He was removed from the
battlefield under the law of war. He has been detained pursuant
to the law of war and DOD policies.

THE COURT: I mean no criticism as to the reason for his detention. I will accept Mr. Dalbey's declaration that this individual, the government had reason to believe that he is an enemy combatant and has held him lawfully as an enemy combatant.

That is not where my concern lies. My concern lies with his access to counsel.

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MS. WYER: Your Honor, the second point is, he's not being held incommunicado. And what could happen -- we're not -- we are not attempting to use the Red Cross as a vehicle for habeas rights; we're just simply pointing out that he is not incommunicado. And because it is the Department's policy not to release the name of this individual at this time, that does not mean that this detainee could not communicate to the Red Cross, who would communicate with his family, and the family would have the ability to identify him publicly and things could proceed from there. That could happen.

THE COURT: So is it your position that the fact that the detainee has been allowed access to the Red Cross is sufficient for him, if he wishes to, to effectuate his desire for counsel? Is that your position?

MS. WYER: We are simply making the point that it is inaccurate to say that this person is incommunicado.

THE COURT: Well, what is accurate, Ms. Wyer?

That's what I've been trying to get at. What is accurate?

Has this person asked for a lawyer? Have they been advised of their rights?

We are sitting here, and this is maybe the fourth time I've asked this question without an answer. Whether or not that individual would have been able to tell the Red Cross, "Contact

my family; I need a lawyer," I can make that assumption that he had that opportunity. Before I even get there, I'd like to know if he wants a lawyer.

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MS. WYER: Well, Your Honor, you have ordered us to provide that information, and so I plan to comply with the Court's order, certainly, by 5 p.m. today.

However, let's assume that this individual asked for a lawyer or invoked his right under Miranda during questioning as described in the Washington Post article. That would not mean that he wants to pursue habeas relief in an American court, and there are documented instances where individuals detained after having been -- after having fought against the United States in another country, they do not want to invoke American court relief. They do not want to pursue that option.

THE COURT: But you're making a bit of a jump here.

You're making a bit of a jump, because you're saying let's assume -- if we assume, for purposes of argument, that the individual has asked for counsel, that that doesn't mean they want to pursue a habeas petition. And that's true. That's a leap, though. If they've asked for counsel, how are they to get counsel with whom they could then discuss whether or not they wanted to file a habeas petition? They haven't been allowed to talk to a lawyer.

MS. WYER: Your Honor, if this individual asked for counsel, under Miranda in the context of being questioned, that

does not confer a right or a requirement for the government to immediately provide a lawyer.

THE COURT: No, it doesn't.

MS. WYER: What it requires is that the government stop questioning that individual. So there is no reason to assume that that would not have happened in this scenario.

THE COURT: I have some familiarity with Miranda rights. And certainly if -- you're right. The fact that an individual says, I don't want to be questioned, I want a lawyer, doesn't mean that the government gives them a lawyer immediately, but it does mean that they have to stop questioning them.

I find it unlikely that during the two and a half months that this individual has been in the government's custody that he's not been questioned. But I don't know because I don't know if he's been advised of his rights and whether he's asserted his rights. And, frankly, whether or not he's been questioned right now is not my concern.

My concern is his access to counsel, and a habeas petition may simply be a way of bringing him, "bringing the body forward" as the term goes, so that the person can assert their rights; because right now what we know is this person has had no contact with anyone other than the government and the International Red Cross.

MS. WYER: Your Honor --

THE COURT: So your assertion that just because he

hasn't been given a lawyer doesn't mean he wouldn't want a habeas petition is correct, but if they have asked for a lawyer, don't they have a right not to be questioned until they have a lawyer?

MS. WYER: Yes. They have a right not to be questioned. Your Honor --

THE COURT: And don't they have a right, then, if they've asserted their constitutional rights, to be either brought before a judicial officer or have some sort of a hearing or be charged? I mean, if they've asserted their rights, there are then steps which then must take place. Correct?

MS. WYER: Yes. Ultimately, yes --

THE COURT: When?

MS. WYER: After this initial, temporary situation ends and the government makes a determination regarding this individual's disposition. We are still in this preliminary, temporary stage.

THE COURT: Of two and a half months.

MS. WYER: And for purposes of standing, Your Honor, it is less than a month, because the Petitioner filed its petition on October 5, and that's the point where you have to determine whether this case presents extraordinary circumstances so as to deviate from the next friend standing principles that the Supreme Court set forth in Whitmore.

The Petitioner is relying on this notion that within two

months or within three and a half weeks this individual should have been able, if he had family members, that if he wanted to file a habeas petition he would have somehow gotten that to happen within three and a half weeks. But it is hardly unusual.

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This individual could have a family member. He could proceed to file a habeas claim at some point in the future through a proper next friend. The fact that that has not happened yet is no reason to deviate from every case that has ever decided a next friend standing issue and to allow this Petitioner to have standing to assert next friend standing on behalf of a stranger.

The Petitioner, it says if -- under its theory, any third party could come into court and assert next friend standing on behalf of anyone who is detained and who has not yet filed a petition or who has not yet filed a habeas petition in any context. They could argue that you have to infer --

petition? What you just said is, "any third party could come into court and assert next friend standing on behalf of anyone who is detained and who has not yet filed a petition." That makes no sense. How can someone who is detained without access to counsel, in an undisclosed location, how could he be expected to file a petition?

What the government is saying is, we're going to keep this person, not allow them to talk to anybody other than the Red

Cross, with whom his conversations are confidential, and then -- and then when somebody files a petition on his behalf, we're going to say, well, you can't file on his behalf because you don't know him and he hasn't asked you. How is that not the most circular argument?

MS. WYER: Your Honor, the next friend standing doctrine requires that the friend petitioner have a significant relationship with the real party in interest and know enough about this individual to know what that individual's actual wishes are.

THE COURT: Why shouldn't I order jurisdictional discovery in this case? Why shouldn't I propound the following questions to the detainee: whether he wishes a lawyer; whether he wishes a habeas petition to be filed on his behalf at no cost; whether he wishes to be represented by the ACLU, or if he wishes the Court to appoint counsel. Why shouldn't I do that?

MS. WYER: Because, Your Honor, the Petitioner has not come forward with any evidence of this actual individual's --

THE COURT: But why should --

MS. WYER: -- situation.

THE COURT: Right. Okay.

MS. WYER: They don't have any --

THE COURT: Why shouldn't --

MS. WYER: -- discovery.

THE COURT: -- I, as the Court, get that information?

Why shouldn't I propound those questions to the detainee so

I can know -- so this Court will have on the record, without
recourse to the media or to any other party, whether he wishes
to have a habeas petition filed on his behalf? What would be
the government's position with regard to that procedure?

MS. WYER: First of all, Your Honor, in the Abu Ali case, the Court did not allow jurisdictional discovery -- or the Court relied on the fact, in allowing jurisdictional discovery, that the petitioner in that case had presented undisputed evidence regarding the fact that the United States had some control over the detention of the individual at issue there. Here there is no evidence presented --

THE COURT: But there's no other case on all fours with this one. This case presents an unusual circumstance for which I have not been able to locate a case on point.

MS. WYER: Your Honor --

THE COURT: So why should I not get the information that I need to determine whether this detainee actually does in fact wish the ACLU to represent him or whether he wishes this Court to appoint counsel for him since he does have certain rights?

MS. WYER: Because the standing issue is a prerequisite, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Standing is a prerequisite for jurisdictional discovery?

MS. WYER: The jurisdictional discovery that the Petitioner is seeking here would not allow the Court to find next friend --

THE COURT: Why doesn't the Court have the power to get that information?

MS. WYER: Even if the -- the Petitioner asked that jurisdictional discovery consist of two questions: first, whether in fact the individual did invoke his right to counsel under Miranda as reported by the Washington Post, and second, whether the individual has other family members who could assert --

THE COURT: That's not my question, though, Ms. Wyer.

My question is, why can't this Court propound those questions?

MS. WYER: The questions that Petitioner proposed would not mean that this Petitioner has next friend standing.

THE COURT: No. I understand. But why can't this

Court ask of the Petitioner the two questions: Do you wish to

be appointed counsel? Do you wish a petition for habeas corpus

to be filed on your behalf? Why can't I ask those questions of

the detainee in this case?

MS. WYER: Because jurisdictional discovery is inappropriate unless the discovery would settle the matter of the Court's jurisdiction and --

THE COURT: Wouldn't it? Wouldn't the answer determine whether the ACLU can represent him or whether I have to appoint counsel for him, a federal defender or someone else?

MS. WYER: No, Your Honor, because this is a case where Petitioner has filed a petition. Unless this Petitioner has next friend standing, this Court does not have jurisdiction to do anything in regard to this detainee. It does not have a supervisory power over, as I said, over U.S. military operations regarding detainees in foreign countries.

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Unless this Petitioner has filed an appropriate petition with next friend standing on behalf of this individual, this petition must be dismissed under Whitmore, under the principles that courts in the Fourth Circuit and the Ninth Circuit and every court to have considered next friend standing. If the Petitioner does not have next friend standing, the Court cannot simply proceed with another -- cannot substitute in a more appropriate petitioner on behalf of this individual. It simply must dismiss the petition.

Your Honor, again, this is -- I think the reason that the Court is seeing this as an unusual situation is because we are in this preliminary stage. It is in this temporary preliminary stage that the Supreme Court in *Boumediene* recognized would be the case.

THE COURT: My concern, Ms. Wyer, is that the government seems to not be able to give me any estimation of what this temporary preliminary stage is. You're asking this Court to allow the government to continue to hold a U.S. citizen without access to counsel in an undetermined location for

whatever time the U.S. government thinks is necessary to determine his further disposition.

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I find this to be an extraordinary situation, and I understand what the government's position is. But you haven't given me any kind of estimate or boundary for what this temporary preliminary situation is. Basically, it's just, "Trust us, we know what we're doing."

MS. WYER: No, Your Honor. We are not saying that this situation will go on indefinitely. What we are saying is that the Petitioner, at the time it filed the petition, it did not have next friend standing. And even now it cannot establish extraordinary circumstances that justify this Court, for the very first time, allowing an organization to come in and assert next friend standing on behalf of a stranger.

It would be inappropriate in this situation where it has been a short time. And the Supreme Court in Boumediene, the rationale behind those statements in Boumediene is that the Supreme Court recognized that when you're in this context, this military context in wartime in other countries, it is going to take some time for the government to decide, when it detains an individual, what to do with that individual and what the disposition of that individual should be.

And in *Boumediene*, the Court even said that the government would have the time it took to go through a whole administrative process, which presumably would be more than two months.

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So the time that has passed here is not inordinate; it is not unjustified. The government is diligently pursuing this decision and is going to reach a decision in as expeditious a fashion as it can, and it fully intends to do that.

THE COURT: Thank you, Ms. Wyer.

Ms. Wyer, I would like the answer to those questions: whether the detainee has been advised of his rights, and whether he has asserted his rights including whether he wished the petition to be filed on his behalf.

I would like the answer to those two questions by three o'clock today, not by five o'clock today. I just don't think it should take you that long, and I'm frankly amazed that you didn't come to this hearing with this information.

MS. WYER: Your Honor, I have a doctor's appointment at 3 p.m. today, so I would ask it to be 5:00.

THE COURT: Okay. Five o'clock.

MS. WYER: Your Honor, I would just like to emphasize again that this would be an unprecedented holding if this Court were to find a next friend standing to a stranger in this situation. The Fourth Circuit in Hamdi stated that there is all the difference in the world than the next friend who represents the interest of someone with whom he has a significant relationship and a next friend who files suit on behalf of a total stranger. This is a situation where the Petitioner here has filed a suit on behalf of a total stranger, and it would not

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be appropriate to allow next friend standing in this situation.

THE COURT: Thank you, Ms. Wyer.

Briefly, Mr. Hafetz.

MR. HAFETZ: Your Honor, just let me start with the directive the Court has issued. Just to be clear, he is not — the government has no — would not have any obligation to have — we don't know whether they've advised him of his habeas rights. But even if they haven't, he might still want a habeas petition.

I think that, you know, for -- just on the question of whether they advised him of his rights under Miranda, the issue is -- what it suggests is that, if that is true, is the one time the government is obligated by law to advise him that he has a right to counsel, he asked for counsel. And the inference there is that he wants access, but --

THE COURT: I understand.

MR. HAFETZ: Yeah. But even if the answer were no,
Your Honor, I think we're light years -- even if he did not
invoke it, we're light years from Whitmore. As Your Honor
knows, you had a prisoner who wanted to be executed and a fellow
prisoner who was trying to stop him. So you had the interests
where, you know, the prisoner had said, effectively, I don't
want this. So not silence, but I don't want this.

THE COURT: I understand the distinction between Whitmore, and I do emphasize that those two questions are not

contingent. Number 2 does not flow from number 1. He could still -- he could not have asserted his right to counsel and still wanted a petition to be filed on his behalf. So they're independent questions.

MR. HAFETZ: And for any questions that are subsequently asked to him, just -- you know, we don't need to decide it now, but just wanted to raise a couple of questions that we don't know whether what language --

THE COURT: Slow down for the court reporter.

MR. HAFETZ: Yeah, sorry. We don't know what language he speaks. He'd have to be able to understand, be able to read. There would be have, you know, absence of coercion, inducement and pressure. So, basically, because -- you know, at bottom, the issue here is self-determination. It's what does he want and to be able to get that answer.

I don't want to take more of Your Honor's time, just two very brief points on what the government raised. The ACLU, as Your Honor noted, is not just any third party. And I particularly direct you to the distinctions between this and the Coalition case, where here that was a group -- an ad hoc group of well-intentioned but loosey-goosey, and many non-lawyers, religious individuals who did not have experience in this area.

This is -- the ACLU has a, you know, a hundred year-old civil liberties organization that's provided not just representation to individuals, but representation in these

cases, detainees held as enemy combatants. And, in addition, we also attempted to contact the detainee prior to filing the petition, but they made that impossible.

And lastly, Your Honor, on Boumediene, just two points.

First of all, Boumediene involved noncitizens. We're talking about an American citizen. And second of all -- three points.

Second of all, any reasonable period has long elapsed, certainly for an American citizen. And third of all, what the Court referenced there was where the government had created a process to determine that person's status.

Here they've determined his status, and they've essentially done so through the process that the Supreme Court clearly rejected in <code>Hamdi</code>, which is you have a right to challenge your detention before your interrogator and your captor. That is not due process, and that is directly contrary to the <code>Hamdi</code> decision and the other Supreme Court decisions in this area. Thank you.

THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Hafetz. All right.

I await the government's response to the questions I have propounded, and I appreciate the arguments and will try and rule expeditiously. Thank you.

(Proceedings adjourned at 11:07 a.m.)

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CERTIFICATE

I, BRYAN A. WAYNE, Official Court Reporter, certify that the foregoing pages are a correct transcript from the record of proceedings in the above-entitled matter.

Bryan A. Wayne BRYAN A. WAYNE