1	IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT		
2	FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON		
3	AYMAN LATIF, et al.,		
4) Case No. CV-10-750-BR Plaintiffs,		
5	v.) October 3, 2014		
6 7	UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF) JUSTICE, Eric H. Holder, Jr.,) Attorney General, et al.,)		
8	Defendants.		
9) Portland, Oregon		
10	TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS		
11	(Oral Argument)		
12			
13	BEFORE THE HONORABLE ANNA J. BROWN, DISTRICT JUDGE		
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23	COURT REPORTER: AMANDA M. LeGORE, RDR, CRR, FCRR, CE U.S. COURTHOUSE 1000 SW Third Avenue Suite 301		
24 25	Portland, OR 97204 (503)326-8184		

1	APPEARANCES:	
2	FOR THE PLAINTIFFS:	HUGH HANDEYSIDE
3		American Civil Liberties Union Foundation 125 Broad Street, 18th Floor
5		New York, NY 10004 (212)519-7876
6		
7		STEVEN WILKER
8		Tonkon, Torp, LLP 888 SW Fifth Avenue, Suite 1600 Portland, OR 97204
9		(503) 802–2050
10	FOR THE DEFENDANTS:	DIANE KELLEHER
11		Department of Justice Civil Division
12		Federal Programs PO Box 884
13 14		Washington, DC 20044 (202)514-4775
15		
16		
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1	IN THE UNITED STATES DIST	IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT		
2	FOR THE DISTRICT OF	FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON		
3	JAMAL TARHUNI,)			
4	Plaintiff,) Ca	ase No. 3:13-CV-00001-BR		
5	v.) Oc	ctober 3, 2014		
6 7	ERIC HOLDER, Attorney General of) the United States (Sued only in) his official capacity), et al.,)			
8	Defendants.)			
9		ortland, Oregon		
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23	COURT REPORTER: AMANDA M. Lego U.S. COURTHOUS	ORE, RDR, CRR, FCRR, CE		
24		Avenue, Suite 301		
25	(503)326-8184	5 1204		

1	APPEARANCES:	
2	FOR THE PLAINTIFF:	STEVEN GOLDBERG 205 SE Spokane Street, Suite 300
3		Portland, OR 97202 (503)445-4622
4		
5		THOMAS NELSON Thomas Nelson, & Associates
6 7		PO Box 1211 Welches, OR 97067 (503)622-3262
8		(000,021 0202
9	FOR DEFENDANT ERIC HOLDER, ET AL.:	BRIGHAM BOWEN
LO	,	DIANE KELLEHER U.S. Department of Justice
L1		Civil Division Federal Programs Branch
L2		PO Box 883 Washington, D.C. 20044
L3		(202) 514-6289
L4		
L5		
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(Friday, October 3, 2014; 9:00 a.m.)

PROCEEDINGS

THE COURT: Good morning, everyone. Please be seated.

We are gathered for case management conferences in two cases. Latif against the Department of Justice, which is Civil No. 10-750. And Tarhuni against Holder and others, Civil No. 13-00001.

We also, I think, are going to be discussing some general issues that may pertain, Mr. Nelson, to Mr. Fikre's case, which is Civil No. 13-899, to the extent there may be some common management issues.

Before we get to the merits of case management for the two primary cases I called, I wanted to note for the record that I'd sent counsel an e-mail yesterday, alerting you that we would have present today, for a little while at least, Scooter Slade, who is a classified information security officer with the Department of Justice.

Some of you may already know him, some may not. His role will be -- to the extent it does become necessary for the Court in any case to consider classified evidence that's being offered by any party, he is the mechanism through which that evidence is managed and handled. And I just wanted to first

ensure you all knew of him. He's right here (indicating). And if any of you need his contact information and don't have it,

Ms. Boyer can provide it to you.

I think I copied him on the e-mail, so you should have his e-mail address as well.

The cases that we have, including Mr. Fikre's case, are civil cases, and they're not, per se, as I understand the application of the Classified Information Procedures Act, the CIPA -- as I understand it, that that statute does not explicitly apply to civil matters. It applies to criminal matters.

Nonetheless, I certainly have authority under Rule 16 to make whatever orders are necessary for the fair and efficient resolution of civil litigation. So I want you to know that I'm going to rely heavily on the standards set in CIPA and cases construing it, if ever there becomes a time where I'm going to have to rely on evidence that would otherwise come within the scope of the act. It's an existing set of standards. There have been cases helping judges to interpret it. And it is, I think, a starting point, if ever we need to deal with that. So I wanted you to know that.

Under CIPA, documents are not filed in the court record, in the CM/ECF court record. They are lodged with a classified information security officer like Officer Slade.

And that creates an initial significant problem, I think, with

respect to making clear and transparent whatever the record is underlying whatever rulings the Court ultimately makes.

So I'm simply observing that in the criminal matters where CIPA issues arise, there are -- various processes have been adopted in various courts about how to handle a matter lodged with a classified information security officer.

I am firmly committed to ensure we have as public a record as possible. I certainly cannot forecast whether a time will come that I must consider material that is not only ex parte but not on the public record in some sealed manner.

I'm going to do my very best to ensure that whenever there is any suggestion that I consider such a matter, there is a parallel reference in the public record to the fact of a request for such a consideration, so that there will be an opportunity for those who may not be included in the offer of that review, to know that it's happening and to have an opportunity to challenge it.

So, for example, in the Tarhuni case, there is pending a motion to compel. And the defendants did lodge with Officer Slade two declarations. He happens to be here. Not at my invitation, but he's here for other work on another matter. And he notified me that he was going to be here and that I would have an opportunity to see that which defendants in Tarhuni lodged with him but not in the public record in the Tarhuni case.

And I told him, when I met with him yesterday, that there were objections to my viewing that material that Tarhuni's counsel had filed. And I wanted to be sure those were heard and resolved before I undertook that.

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So he retains the materials that were lodged with him by the defendants in the Tarhuni case, just so you know.

Officer Slade will be the classified information security officer who will work with all three of these cases, to the extent there is a need to deal with classified information going forward.

So he is the person who should be contacted by any of you, should there be some concern about that. And I'm saying all of this just because we have the happenstance of his presence here in the building today, while you're all here. So I wanted you to know of him. There he is.

I wanted you to know that I appreciate CIPA doesn't explicitly apply to civil cases, but it's the place I will start, to the extent we have to deal with classified material at any point. And I'll be open to any other reasonable arguments, of course, about what to do with those kinds of issues.

We have inherently conflicting interests at the heart of all three of these cases that may inevitably trigger consideration of classified information, but may not, depending on the course of developments going forward.

The -- in Latif, I have already expressly held that the existing process is constitutionally insufficient. I believe the parties are accepting of that analysis for purposes of the Tarhuni case and in terms of not requiring similar motion and briefing. I would appreciate being told if somebody thinks otherwise. And my guess is the same would be true in the Fikre case, to the extent we talk about a procedural due process matter.

So we're at a place where, as I've been discussing through status reports with the parties in Latif, primarily, where plans need to be made about how we're going to use everyone's resources to get to some resolution.

The Latif case has been pending for four years, and it needs the most attention, I think, in terms of timely focus for some kind of resolution. But Mr. Tarhuni's case isn't far behind. It was filed, I think -- wait a minute. What did I say? Oh, no. It was only filed in '13, and Mr. -- no.

MR. GOLDBERG: In January, January 1st.

THE COURT: All right. You're almost up to two years.

But my point is this: We've done a lot of work, all of us, to get to a place. And right now the Government, the defendants in the Latif case have indicated there is not any intention to appeal in any -- in an interlocutory way the rulings so far.

And we've got the suggestion that the Court should stay everything in the Latif matter so that the Government can spend six months uniting a variety of agencies around new processes. Before I get any further on our status issues, I wanted to ask Officer Slade whether there's anything he wanted to simply note for this record or for the parties with represent to contact to him, or going forward.

CISO SLADE: Just -- just one correction, your Honor.

Regarding the filed versus lodged, in criminal cases classified information is filed under CIPA. It's in civil cases that things are lodged with the Court.

THE COURT: And that's simply because that's the position litigants have taken over time?

CISO SLADE: CIPA, as a law, kind of deals with criminal case discovery. And then there's usually a protective order that outlines filing procedures. So that's why.

> So just that one correction. I'm sorry.

THE COURT: Okay. Counsel, do any of you have anything you would like to raise with respect to Officer Slade, while he's here? He does have other work, and he's going to excuse himself when he's ready.

MR. GOLDBERG: I do have one.

THE COURT: Yes, Counsel.

MR. GOLDBERG: Where -- can I ask where the documents are actually being lodged?

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THE COURT: That's a good question. With respect to the two documents in the Tarhuni case that the officer has, where are they?

CISO SLADE: The Government lodged them with me in Washington, and they'll be kept at a secure location here in Portland until the judge is ready.

MR. GOLDBERG: So I was going to mention that in the -- one of the earlier cases, the **Al Haramain** case, we were able to view classified documents at that point. It was related to the appeal. And we -- those -- the documents were kept in what was called a SCIF, a sensitive compartment --

THE COURT: We don't have a SCIF setting yet. SCIF being a secured classified -- secured compartmentalized information --

CISO SLADE: Sensitive.

THE COURT: Whatever it is, it's protected. Compartmentalized information facility.

Where $\operatorname{--}$ are you able to tell us where $\operatorname{--}$

CISO SLADE: So I don't think it's appropriate on a record to necessarily denote where or how the documents are going to be stored, but they will be kept per Government regulations in an appropriate facility --

THE COURT: And if the time comes that there will be access to the documents by one or more of you, there will be a process discussed with you about how to do that without undue

expense.

MR. GOLDBERG: The -- just two points, and then I'll be quiet.

THE COURT: You don't need to be quiet, Mr. Goldberg.

I invited questions. So go ahead.

MR. GOLDBERG: The only -- the concern that was raised back in the **Al-Haramain** case was that there was one SCIF facility, I think, in Oregon, but I think the F.B.I. had control over it.

And the issue in that case, which is a similar issue in the Tarhuni case, is that the F.B.I., of course, is a defendant in the case. So that's why I raise that issue.

The second question that I have is in terms of not classified but sensitive security information, SSI information, is that also going to be lodged in the secure --

THE COURT: I think these are questions that are premature, Mr. Goldberg. Because, as you probably all denoted from the proposal that I sent to you by e-mail, I'm more interested in getting some basic issues resolved. And surely, if we get to a place when it's necessary for information that is not on the public record or that is not accessible to every lawyer, if that eventuality arises, we'll have a process to discuss what, where, when, and how; so that we get there eventually.

I'm trying simply to assure all of you I'm very

sensitive to the need for a public record. I'm also obliged to
follow the law to the extent certain materials cannot be part
of the record. We're just going to work through this as we
need to. But I don't see any value in us hypothesizing about
what might or might not happen, and we'll deal with it when the
time comes.

Anything else for Officer Slade, while he's here?
Anybody?

All right. You're free to go, you're free to stay. Thank you for letting us know you were here.

CISO SLADE: Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. And we may be in touch.

CISO SLADE: All right.

THE COURT: Okay. Oh, hold on. Do you have a -- all right.

See, he's so secure, he even has a security pass for our doors. There you go. Maybe. There you go.

(CISO Slade exits.)

THE COURT: All right. So, let's get to the business of case management.

The record should also reflect that with respect to the Latif case in particular, I invited, over the last several weeks, a number of proposals from counsel that have been submitted by way of joint reports.

And in response to those, I sent to counsel a

tentative case management order that was my way of communicating to you what I thought should happen next.

Everyone's had that, the benefit of that approach. And so what I would like to do first is to hear the parties' concerns about the approach that I've laid out in the Latif case.

And then once that occurs, the hope is that a similar approach, whatever I settle with for case management purposes in Latif, can also be of used in the Tarhuni matter and maybe the Fikre matter; although that matter still has a pending motion to dismiss.

I want to address, just for the benefit of those who did not see my e-mail -- if you weren't counsel to the case or a client, you haven't. And, therefore, you haven't seen my proposed tentative order.

That my -- my view of the Government's suggestion, the defendants' suggestion in Latif, that this case should be stayed for six months while a process is undertaken that apparently will be a system-wide effort to revise the redress procedures, it's my view that it's not necessary in the Latif case to stay this matter at all.

I start from the perspective that the Latif case is not a class action. It is the case of 13 individuals who have claims that have been adjudicated to have merit and need to be resolved.

I applaud the defendants and their willingness to reformulate procedures, evidently system-wide. But this case is not a vehicle for the Court or the litigants to be concerned with system-wide changes.

Hopefully they'll happen and hopefully additional litigation will be avoided for other plaintiffs. But my primary concern, especially in light of the age of the Latif case, is that each of the 13 Latif plaintiffs gets a reconsidered redress process as soon as practicable.

And that in that process I'm certainly leaving open the possibility that one or more of the Latif plaintiffs may get redress and may get to a place where they're permitted to fly over U.S. airspace without a restriction of the type they've alleged in their complaint.

So I am not presently of the mind that the Court should stay Latif, or any other matter. I am much more of the view that we ought to figure out what defendants can accomplish with respect to each of the 13 plaintiffs, in terms of a current reconsideration of each plaintiff, so that defendants can tell me and the plaintiffs whether any of them now, based on a review and a re — considered redress process, consistent with the constitutional standards I've already articulated, whether any of them can be assured that going forward they'll be permitted to — to fly.

So my focus, as you hopefully deduced from the

proposed order I sent you, was to not stay the matter but to focus on a relatively short-term process for each plaintiff to be reconsidered.

I also am not in agreement with plaintiffs' perspective that we ought to be spending time and resources litigating now -- today -- what that process is, for two reasons.

First, I think, being the optimist that I am, that some plaintiffs are going to be more quickly identified and put in a position where they may fly, and it's not reasonable to delay that process while we litigate how the defendants may choose to reframe the processes in a system-wide basis.

Again, I get back to the notion that this is not a class action, and I'm concerned with the individual claims of each of the 13 plaintiffs.

So, to me, if a process defendants undertake ends up providing relief to even some of the plaintiffs in the near term, we've accomplished something without the expense and conflict of litigating hypothetical procedures.

So I'm very much in nature favor of a -- of giving defendants direction to reconsider each plaintiff, and stage the responses they can provide us in a way that clears -- clears obstacles for those whom the obstacles can be cleared sooner, rather than later.

And then we narrow whatever the remaining disputes

are, as to whatever remaining universe the plaintiffs would have, for whom defendants might continue to contend that their — they should not be permitted to fly over United States airspace. I'm respectful of the positions defendants have taken so far, that they don't admit there isn't a No-Fly List. They don't admit any plaintiff is on one. But we're past that with respect to the allegations in this action for these plaintiffs.

And I want -- I want to adopt a case management plan today that gets something done, that's substantive in the nearer term for the 13; and then for Tarhuni, and then potentially for Mr. Fikre. So that's a long way of saying I am not in favor of remanding the matter, and I'm also not in favor of litigating procedures in advance because I think defendants understand the standards the Court has articulated must be met. They should be given an opportunity to interact with all of the agencies involved, some of whom are not parties here. And we ought to be able to find out in the relatively near future whether some plaintiffs may get relief and others may need to go through a particularized process sort of like what I understand happened in the **Ibrahim** case.

The other advantage of pushing a reconsideration for each plaintiff now is that in the **Ibrahim** case -- at least that -- the first part of it that was tried, errors were found. And it may that a reconsideration under the standards I've

described might pick those things up, might lead defendants to conclude the information, whatever it was, might not be timely anymore. There — there could be a number of reasons why defendants might simply say the universe of 13 plaintiffs can be narrowed.

So -- so I'm -- I'm pretty firm on those two primary conclusions: That the case shouldn't be stayed, and we shouldn't be litigating procedure ahead of giving the defendants a chance to just see what can be done for each of the 13 plaintiffs.

But that said, I also told you in your -- in my message that I am open to argument. And that's what we're here for.

So I would like -- I would like plaintiffs' counsel, first, to address concerns about the approach I've articulated in the case management order. And then we'll hear from defendants. And then we'll slip to the Tarhuni perspectives, to the extent they -- they may relate on that.

Counsel, good morning.

MS. SHAMSI: Good morning, your Honor.

Hina Shamsi of the American Civil Liberties Union for the plaintiffs in Latif versus Holder.

Your Honor, you haven't met Hugh Handeyside, who is new to the case. He's also with the ACLU. And you know Mr. Wilker from Tonkon Torp.

THE COURT: Yes, thank you.

MS. SHAMSI: So, your Honor, we actually -- we really appreciate the thought that went into the Court's proposed case management order. And I think, from our perspective, we -- we appreciate that the proceedings will not be stayed. We -- it is very significant to us that the Court's proposal will provide at least something to us, we hope, with certainty about whether they are or are no longer on the No-Fly List.

And we also appreciated the Court's recognition of the significant burden that being on the list has played and — in our clients' lives and the need for a speedy resolution to the limbo that they've been in. So our general response is that we would be willing to live with the Court's order, with a couple of thoughts and suggestions to address our concern that our clients who may remain on the No-Fly List not be subjected to a procedure that might not be compliant. We share and hope that there will be a compliant procedure, but we need to ensure that if there isn't, we have some recourse.

And so what we would propose is that in order for us to know what information — as the Court has said in her prior order — to intelligently submit to contest the reasons for placement on hearing, that the defendants actually provide to us the rules that they are using and applying for reconsideration so that we are able to, in essence, prepare to respond and to provide the information that the Court has now

ruled we're constitutionally entitled to provide.

And what we would propose --

THE COURT: So if I might interrupt, I did propose that, as part of the approach I outlined, defendants would be completing a final substantive reconsideration of plaintiffs' by January 16. They would be filing a report of that date, and would detail the procedures and standards they use.

So doesn't that address exactly what you're talking about?

MS. SHAMSI: Well, I guess that's where we then need clarification, your Honor. And perhaps I had read -- we had read your order a little bit differently.

THE COURT: All right.

MS. SHAMSI: Because for the final substantive reconsideration, it seems to us that the defendants would need evidence from plaintiffs about why they should not be on the list.

THE COURT: Well, I don't suggest this is the final final.

This is the defendants' best efforts to comply with the Court order and give each of the plaintiffs fair consideration. And if somebody ends up still not being able to fly at that list, then we have to figure out a new plan from there.

So you would clearly have an opportunity to argue

that you need to know why they are not being permitted to fly as of that day. And an opportunity to make a record and provide information.

MS. SHAMSI: So, again, may I just ask again for a clarification?

THE COURT: Yes. Yes.

MS. SHAMSI: Because what we had understood was that in order to be substantively compliant with the Court's procedural due process ruling before January 16th, the defendants would provide those plaintiffs who may remain on the No-Fly List with a notice statement of reasons. Like things that they were found incompliant with.

THE COURT: No. No, no. I'm not making myself clear.

I think the defendants know well what the standards are. The order so states. They know they have 13 people that I'm going to direct them to reconsider now.

I didn't step into the schedule I set interaction with your clients because I believe there is a good chance that some plaintiffs on defendants' own reconsideration, without them providing anything else, may end up with the relief they're seeking without us litigating what procedure they used and whether it was sufficient. And then a universe is created of plaintiffs who may not be so lucky, in which case we need a process for them to challenge a continued inclusion,

meaningfully.

And that's where we get into this notion of potentially having to provide classified information. We may have to litigate privileges that the defendants will want to assert, and so forth.

So I was not at all -- all I was trying to do, between now and January, was set up a definite schedule where each defendant would be reviewed by defendants on its own good faith effort -- on their own good faith effort to comply with the analysis I've already written out, and get -- get some people moving on with their lives; and others we would need to do more. So I was not going to require them to explain anything other than you're in or you're out by January 16.

And then in January, we would go forward with your suggestions about what -- what is needed for those remaining people to meaningfully challenge whatever defendants say their status is, assuming we can get to an agreement or a court order about disclosing that -- that status, without people having to pay money to buy a ticket and walk up to a TSA agent.

Am I being clear now?

MS. SHAMSI: Yes, I think I now --

THE COURT: I'm sorry if I wasn't clear.

MS. SHAMSI: I now understand better, your Honor.

But if I can, I would just like to explain why we, (A), were unsure; and (B), are worried that that might not be adequate,

if I may.

THE COURT: Sure.

MS. SHAMSI: And the reason for that is that we had understood -- and I put aside -- but the steps that we thought the Court was laying out, which we thought were sound, was that by October 10th plaintiffs would know who is currently no longer -- receive notice of who is able to fly.

Then when we had understood the Court's reference to constitutionally sufficient procedures being applied on an interim basis by November 14th, what we had understood that to mean was constitutionally sufficient procedures that the Court found were missing under the Court's June order. And that, to us, was notice in the statement of reasons because —

THE COURT: Okay. I see why you're saying that. And all I'm trying to do -- really, all I'm trying to do is to require defendants to apply the standards I've noted are lacking. And to see if in the near term we can narrow the field of your clients to those as to whom there may be a need to litigate through the nature of the process, the content of the information, and all of that, from those who haven't.

It seemed to me that we could do it on a schedule indicated without slowing down those who might be able to float to the top and move on.

MS. SHAMSI: And I understand that.

THE COURT: If the defendants want to give notice and

engage you, that's fine.

I was trying to figure out a process that would get us to a more defined process, a more defined set of issues without having to litigate the nature of the process prematurely and unnecessarily for those for whom it won't make a difference.

MS. SHAMSI: And, again, I understand that, your Honor. But with respect to individuals who may still remain on the No-Fly List --

THE COURT: Clearly we will need to do something.

MS. SHAMSI: We will need to do something. But those individuals will have had no change in their status. As I understand what the Court's saying now, will have no change because --

THE COURT: You know, Counsel, they may never have a change in their status.

MS. SHAMSI: Because they've not been able, still, to provide information to the Government about why they may not --

THE COURT: The -- let me be clear. The order I have set out is for a near term. It is not intended to prevent plaintiffs in any way from providing information or to allow for such a process after we get through this near-term step. It's not intended to be the end of anything. It's intended to reset the stage because four years have passed. And, in my mind, things can change. Information can be dated.

For whatever reason, all of the plaintiffs have alleged that four years ago, and longer, they've been deprived the right to fly over United States airspace. I want an updating of that so that, if we litigate and when we litigate, it's on current information and a current process.

MS. SHAMSI: And --

THE COURT: So if defendants say to you, Plaintiffs 1 through 8, we're -- we're not offering any assurance that they can fly, and we need a process, then I expect you and defendants' counsel to lay out for me a proposal for these -- these plaintiffs. Not the world, not the system. These plaintiffs meaningfully to challenge the information on which they're being deprived the right to fly. And we'll do that.

MS. SHAMSI: And, again, let me just try and articulate what I think the fundamental concern is. That with respect to individuals who may be still on the No-Fly list, as I understand it, the Government would not be considering — because it would not have provided notice and a statement of reasons — information that would, as you have said, your Honor, bring things up to a current state. That's — that's really the issue. Because with respect to those people — what I had understood, what we had understood, is that we would have an opportunity before January 16th — between November 14th and January 16th to receive notice and a statement of reasons and to be able to submit information, finally, to the Government

that actually takes into account what the Government's information and concerns might be. And then if people still remain on the list under a process that meets the fundamental standards that your Honor set out, then we would be back in court after January 16th in order for --

THE COURT: So what you're saying is you want to be sure that by January 16, the date I have picked for them to have completed a substantive reconsideration, that at least by that date, anyone remaining — anyone who hasn't been assured that he or she is able to fly would have affirmative notice of that and a statement of reasons?

MS. SHAMSI: And an opportunity to respond. Yes
That's what I had understood --

THE COURT: Well, I don't think we can get all of that done by January 16. I just don't think there's enough time for that. But at least the decision, you're saying — that benchmark that I set, January 16, should have provided you with the — the basis or some mechanism to provide information that's meaningful?

MS. SHAMSI: I -- that's right, your Honor. And I think that's something that we could live with. But we --

THE COURT: Well, I'm not negotiating with you. But I understand why you saw that part confusing of the proposed order, and I see the concern.

Okay. What else did you have?

MS. SHAMSI: Actually, your Honor, we had -- we thought everything else was fair.

The one other concern that we had was in paragraph 2 of the order. There's language that talks about plaintiffs who may not be on the No-Fly List or get notice that they're not on the list may no longer have justiciable claims. And that seems to make a set of assumptions, and we would just ask the Court to change that to read, "may have no other justiciable claims." Because we've -- you know, for those -- those individuals who may no longer be on the list, they've been through this entire process. They've received kind of notice. And so that -- THE COURT: Okay. I appreciate the interpretive concern there.

All right. Anything else?

MS. SHAMSI: No, your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you.

Well, Counsel, good morning.

MR. BOWEN: Good morning, your Honor. Brigham Bowen for the United States. With me is Diane Kelleher. This is the branch director of the federal programs branch.

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. BOWEN: I think largely our perspective is to echo the plaintiffs' perspective, that we appreciate the care and consideration that went into the Court's order. We think this is an order that we can comply with, in the main, and we

intend to meet the deadlines that are set forth by the Court.

So that's our primary response --

THE COURT: How were you interpreting this January 16 benchmark, in light of counsel's comments?

MR. BOWEN: We actually interpreted it the same way the plaintiffs did. We had interpreted the Court's contemplation to be that at some point between now -- or -- or August 4 and January, that the Government would in fact provide some sort of a statement and give the plaintiffs an opportunity to respond to that statement with whatever submissions they felt were appropriate.

THE COURT: Well, I can certainly be more specific in that respect, since you were reading it that way. Okay.

MR. BOWEN: We certainly were.

And -- and I would state that I think the Government appreciates that if we can do it, we are willing to do it. And we think that advances the ball. It does give the plaintiffs more of the redress that they're more concerned about and may in fact obviate the need for further litigation.

And if the Court's inclined to keep it as it is and not require it, that's acceptable to the Government as well.

But as long as -- you know, if we can get it done, I think it's in everyone's interest to do that.

The only other caveats we -- we wanted to make for the Court is because we contemplated that there would be this

back and forth, we had some concern that if that back and forth turned into something of relative substance, where the parties in fact intended to continue to have those conversations and they ran up against that January deadline, that in those exceptional cases we would hope that there would be some wiggle room for the parties to continue to engage in those conversations as needed in order to resolve process. Not from any lagging on the Government's part but simply because that back and forth required a little bit of breathing room.

THE COURT: What I'm trying to convey and -- is what I think you're hearing, that the time's come. These 13 plaintiffs need to have a reconsideration of their status under constitutionally permissible procedures.

And I just feel very confident that a current reconsideration may produce relief for some at least, and that this is relatively urgent. It's a four-year-old case, and we need to get decisions made for each of the individuals.

Of course, whenever litigants, acting in good faith and not delaying, have run out of time and they've made very good use of the time, it is not at all uncommon to ask for more time. If that's justified, then it will be granted. Nothing is carved in stone.

But, on the other hand, I was trying, with the prospective language of references to firm deadlines, to make the point that I've tried to make several ways this morning:

Four years is long enough. We need to get to some decisions about each of the 13 plaintiffs, so that to the extent any of them remain in a status where the Government contends there are justified reasons for the positions taken, that that can be reviewed by an appellate court on an adequately developed record, without undue delay.

MR. BOWEN: Thank you, your Honor. We appreciate that. And for that reason, we hadn't intended to ask for additional or changed language. We just wanted to note that for the record.

The only other statement we wanted to make -- and this is really more of a preview of potential for your other statement, but we wanted the Government's position to be clear on this. Is with reference to the paragraph that deals with interim orders, considering interim travel, the only point we wanted to make on that is that the policy that the Government has developed with respect to facilitating travel on occasion for people who may otherwise be unable to do so has -- was developed in the context of providing means for U.S. persons to find their way home from overseas, and was not actually designed to target other kinds of travel, particularly outbound travel. And so we just wanted to note that.

We don't know that the Court's order contemplates that there would be further submissions. And we just didn't want there to be any confusion about what the Government's

position may be in that instance, after there's been a back-and-forth with --

THE COURT: The reference there was intended, again, to reinforce what I want to make very clear: That time is of the essence. And to the extent people are ultimately going to be able to fly, that needs to happen sooner rather than later.

And if a process continues because it's difficult and it takes time and a true exigency arises, these 13 plaintiffs have a pending case, and they have access to a judicial officer who ought to be able to consider a request for some emergency relief if there was truly an exigent circumstance, after conferral with the parties.

So I suspect that if ever that happened, the parties would be able to solve the problem primarily. There's no reason the Government can't consider such a request. There just isn't. And there certainly isn't any reason the Court can't consider it in the form of a petition.

There may be reasons not to grant it. There may be need for litigation around it. But my point for including that language was, again, to underscore my commitment to assure that we are going to get through a process to judgment for these 13 plaintiffs, so that if there's a need for appellate review, it happens. Because certainly any number of possibilities can be the case. It may turn out that some plaintiffs will not be permitted to fly, and the Court may endorse that after a

process and full litigation. It may be that the Court doesn't agree with analyses, and there may be orders made that the Government or the defendants need to appeal. But we're going to get through that. And so I need to say it every way I can.

MR. BOWEN: We appreciate that, your Honor. And for the same reason, we weren't planning on submitting additional language or asking for changes.

THE COURT: That language was simply to assure the plaintiffs that I intend to take seriously the time involved and the reality of where they are.

And if it turns out somebody needs to make a request and -- that the -- the defendants disagree with, then we'll hear it. And it will be like any other contested matter.

MR. BOWEN: Understood. And the only other point we would make that there is that of course the Government would entertain those questions and engage them and take them seriously.

THE COURT: Which is why the proposed order referred to conferral. I'm certain you would confer. Okay.

MR. BOWEN: Thank you.

THE COURT: So, Mr. Nelson or Mr. Goldberg, do you have any thoughts on just the procedural approach from Latif as it might apply to the Tarhuni case?

I'll tell you, I would like to see this same kind of -- I would like to see Mr. Tarhuni included in this same

relative schedule. I would prefer not to litigate your motion to compel until it's done because I think something may be gained. It may narrow the focus. And avoiding spending time and resources on things that may not ultimately be necessary is, to me, common sense. But that was just how I was starting.

MR. GOLDBERG: We respect the Court's view of -- of how common sense should be applied to this procedure.

First of all, we've not seen the order.

THE COURT: Oh.

MR. GOLDBERG: So it's hard for me to be able to really respond, your Honor. But I will say this.

In terms of the way that Mr. Tarhuni's case is proceeding, I'm confident — throughout this case, we've approached the Government and asked them to reconsider evidence: Isn't there any way to get — to have the evidence looked at in terms of Mr. Tarhuni? The issues have arisen regarding family. Mr. Tarhuni's brother just died. Trying to figure out ways for him to be able to get to see his family in Libya. At that time, he had previously had an aunt die. All of this we've raised with the Government throughout the case, trying to confer, trying to resolve this case. And we've — the response has always been essentially no.

So we're confident -- and we know, in terms of where we would be on January 16th, is the Government will be saying, You're still on the list. And that we can't provide you -- or

any of the information as to why you're on the list, or we are going to assert -- or we have asserted, now, the state secrets privilege.

THE COURT: So you are saying nothing would be gained.

MR. GOLDBERG: So what I'm saying is that waiting —
for us to wait until January 16th is a waste of time. That
this continues to impact Mr. Tarhuni really significantly; both
as we've spelled out in our prior pleadings and as I'm advising
the Court now, in terms of things that have happened in terms
of his family. And we are not inclined to postpone — and,
obviously, it's going to require litigation and complicated
litigation on how to deal with all of these issues.

But waiting until January 16th, we honestly in good faith believe --

THE COURT: So you think the Government has already -- the defendants have already reviewed Mr. Tarhuni's status in light of the standards articulated in the Latif case and that nothing would be gained between now and January if your client was subject to the same directed review by this Court?

MR. GOLDBERG: Yes.

THE COURT: Is there any --

MR. GOLDBERG: And let me -- I say that based upon my communications with Mr. Bowen throughout -- as this litigation

1 has proceeded.

And, No. 2, because a critical part -- as we read your order of the constitutional standard -- was the importance of notice being given.

THE COURT: Right. Well -- so the process -- but the process, Mr. Goldberg, that was very helpfully clarified in the discussion that just happened, is that by January 16 the plaintiffs will be given, in Latif, notice and an opportunity to respond in a meaningful way. And if you say you haven't, your client hasn't, maybe he should be given that opportunity.

MR. GOLDBERG: We believe that, again, to the assertion of, not just the state secrets privilege but the sensitive security information privilege, and all of that, that none of that information is going to be provided — at least voluntarily — by the Government. And the only way it's going to happen is with involvement with the Court and resolution of the motion to compel.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you, Mr. Goldberg. Yes, Mr. Bowen.

MR. BOWEN: Your Honor, we -- we emphatically disagree with plaintiffs' perspective for a handful of reasons. I'll try to be brief.

The main is that I think it is really wrongheaded to prejudge the process. I don't think Mr. Goldberg -- I understand the cynicism, but I don't think Mr. Goldberg knows

what the result will be. He does not know what information he will or will not be given. And we are assessing this process and intend to — to make decisions in this case the same way we would in all of the others, with full and due consideration to the Court's — to the Court's decision and to the standards that are developed in the process. So I just don't think you can prejudge.

And I think it's important from a perspective of making sure that there's a -- a -- a clear case and controversy, that we know what the dispute is between the parties at that point.

On the -- on the assertions of privilege, we asserted privilege in response to a motion to compel to exclude evidence. That doesn't preclude any new information being submitted through the new process. I think those are very, very much separate-track issues.

And on that point -- I don't want to jump off topic. But on that point, in the Court's prior order in the Tarhuni case, we had actually moved for a stay of discovery in the general matter. And you had raised the possibility of reraising it.

We do raise that here. We would like to make an oral motion to stay discovery, at least during the pendency of this process. We think that there are numerous commonsense reasons for that.

THE COURT: So, Mr. Bowen, you would advocate my adopting an interim case management order in Tarhuni similar to the concepts we've discussing in Latif?

MR. BOWEN: Oh, yes. I'm sorry. I should be very clear. We would --

THE COURT: Which would, in turn, would deny your motion to stay. Would set aside the motion to compel for the near term, and allow the same kind of process to go forward for Mr. Tarhuni as is happening for the Latif plaintiffs?

MR. BOWEN: So that's correct. I don't want to quibble. But my understanding would be --

THE COURT REPORTER: I'm sorry. I didn't hear --

THE COURT: I'm sorry. Yes, I misspoke.

MR. BOWEN: Right. So --

THE COURT: I interrupted him. It was a motion to remand that I would be denying.

MR. BOWEN: Right. And we had a separate motion to actually stay discovery. And the real concern with the discovery is that if discovery is ongoing, regardless of whether the Court assesses the motion to compel, in theory there could be depositions and interrogatories, and all of those other things that embroil people in disputes that we --

THE COURT: Well, let me be explicit as to something that was implicit. I thought the process I was describing for Latif would be focused on getting the plaintiffs reconsidered

and not diverting the litigation to normal discovery processes.

I just assumed we would -- you would be focusing intently on reconsidering each of the plaintiffs, so we could get that guestion answered.

And if we get to a place where the plaintiffs remain aggrieved, then everything is on the table. Every kind of discovery request would be potentially possible.

MR. BOWEN: That's helpful.

Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Mr. Nelson, I know you didn't know that I was going to be thinking about your client, Mr. Fikre, too. And there is pending a motion to dismiss in your Fikre case. But I'm wondering if you've -- as you've heard this discussion, and I know -- I apologize. I didn't send to you all the tentative outline I was laying out in the Latif case.

But I wonder if you have any thought, Mr. Nelson, about a similar process in -- in the Fikre case, even though your pleadings are a bit behind the others.

MR. NELSON: Your Honor, for purposes of case management, we would appreciate being -- having Mr. Fikre's issues resolved as soon as possible.

As I indicated in the filing made last week,

Mr. Fikre is not in the United States. And a significant

deterrent, aside from his personal safety issues, a significant

deterrent is coming back to the United States and being stuck
here like Mr. Tarhuni is.

Mr. Fikre is trying to -- he is, if you will, an international person, born overseas, and he wants to do business overseas.

So coming -- cutting to your answer, yes, your Honor, we would appreciate Mr. Fikre's situation also being reconsidered at the earliest possible time.

We are dealing with a number of issues.

Just for the Court's information, I have informed Mr. Bowen that we will be filing an amended complaint -- a Third Amended Complaint that will raise issues --

THE COURT: Before I --

MR. NELSON: I'm sorry, your Honor.

THE COURT: -- resolve the motion to dismiss?

MR. NELSON: It raises issues that we have been referring to for quite a while involving surveillance. What we believe is illegal and unconstitutional surveillance that led to his indictment in San Diego.

We -- the reason we have waited until now, your Honor, is we finally got all of the information we needed to put in a claim under the federal Tort Claims Act. And as your Honor knows, there's a six-month waiting period. That six-month waiting period recently expired.

And so counsel for Mr. Fikre, including -- well,

40 Counsel for Mr. Fikre had been -- we had been going back and 1 2 forth rapidly, trying to put together a third amended 3 complaint. Not to raise -- not to relitigate the issues --THE COURT: You know you need leave of court. 4 MR. NELSON: Pardon me? 5 THE COURT: You need leave of court to do that. 6 7 MR. NELSON: Yes, I know that. I'm fully aware of 8 that. 9 THE COURT: Well, let me make an observation about 10 the motion to dismiss, as I have been tracking what you've been 11 filing. 12 The -- I was surprised that in the last form of 13 amended complaint that was filed you did not include a 14 procedural due process claim, which is sort of the fundamental 15 approach in Latif and Tarhuni that has resulted in the ruling 16 that I made, that has resulted in the progress.

I may be missing something but --

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MR. NELSON: Your Honor, I thought we had.

THE COURT: Well, I didn't see it that way.

If you're going to file a third amended complaint, you might take care to ensure that the procedural due process claim is very explicit.

Now, Mr. Bowen, if he wants to file a third amended complaint, it seems to me we should figure that out right now, rather than dealing with the pending motion to dismiss on the

last amended complaint.

What are your views?

I know that wasn't something you might have thought you would have to address today. But can we -- can we address it?

MR. BOWEN: I'm not in a position to sort of prejudge the Government's position on that. It does seem to have a certain commonsense appeal, and it was a question I had intended to raise, which is, well, what do we do with the pending --

THE COURT: Well, one thing we could do is I could deny the motion to dismiss as moot. I could give plaintiff leave to file a third amended complaint.

You can raise again, in due course -- we can figure out a schedule for you to file a new motion to dismiss, if you want to. In fact we could do it into January, so that we could include Mr. Fikre in this interim review process where I really want defendants focusing their attention, as opposed to litigating pleading motions and discovery motions.

MR. BOWEN: Thank you, your Honor.

I do think, given the -- the sort of shifting sands of where we are on Fikre, I would just like maybe a little bit of time to provide a statement to the Court that maybe we would file in short order. We -- right now our reply deadline, I think, is the 14th of October. And so we intend to file

something before --

THE COURT: How about we do this. How about we do this. You file your reply -- don't file a new amended complaint until he files something; which will either be a reply or it will be a consent to withdrawing the current motion to dismiss and a consent for plaintiff to file a third amended complaint, which I will approve.

If he files the reply, then you can file a motion to -- for leave to file a third amended complaint and argue that the current motion should be deemed moot, and we'll figure it out. But they may be able to moot the whole thing.

MR. NELSON: (Nods head.)

off the front burner, the plaintiff pleading his best claim so that we're not missing something that's going to come up later and extend anyway. Because if he's filed a tort claim notice, he has a right to file a lawsuit -- a new lawsuit. So we might as well manage it here. And then you would be relieved from answering the third amended complaint or moving against it until this January time, so that the primary focus is on this reconsideration of each of the plaintiffs in the near term.

I'm fine with that, if the Government wants to proceed that $\ensuremath{\text{--}}$

MR. BOWEN: We'll take all of those issues back to our clients. Thank you.

1 MR. NELSON: That's fine, your Honor. Thank you.

THE COURT: And take a look at that procedural due process part, please.

MR. NELSON: I certainly will.

Thank you.

THE COURT: So I think I will enter a case management order in Latif and in Tarhuni. I'm not going to enter any order -- well, wait a minute.

I'll wait in the Fikre case until I hear from the Government on how it wants to proceed on the briefings. But I think we should assume that the defendants in Fikre will also conduct a substantive reconsideration of Mr. Fikre under the standards that I've ruled apply. It just may be necessary to extend the schedule. I don't know. You should be able to do it. It's just one more person.

But there's a lot -- it really makes sense if we all sort of track in the same way, at least on this part, until the individualized issues necessitate individualized consideration.

And then I do anticipate that wherever we are in that, to the extent we have more than one person remaining as to whom the Government has issues, I think each of those individualized plaintiffs needs to have an individualized track.

We can't keep lumping everyone together because it's -- it's going to hurt -- the individuals need

individualized consideration on -- on an individualized schedule. And it may be that for each plaintiff we get a different schedule. We're moving forward after January, if that turns out to be necessary.

MR. BOWEN: Your Honor, I'm sorry. I just — the only point I wanted to just make clear is that I don't know whether the Government's position is that in light of some of the jurisdictional issues in Fikre, the Government necessarily would agree to do the revised procedures in the interim. But that's all to say.

THE COURT: I've also said I'm not issuing such an order.

I am going to issue an order that explicitly directs the Government to reconsider each of the Latif plaintiffs and Mr. Tarhuni, consistent with the constitutional standards I set. I'll -- I'll be more precise in the language in the order that I tentatively gave you to make clear what the expectations are. But the goal -- but then the outcome will be by January 16, unless that deadline is extended, all of the Latif plaintiffs and Mr. Tarhuni, will know what their status is and the reasons for that status in a way that they have been -- they've had an opportunity to address. So we'll know where we are in January, in a substantive way.

MR. BOWEN: Thank you.

THE COURT: And I think that's helpful for everybody.

1 Anything else? Mr. Goldberg, anybody? Okay.

MR. GOLDBERG: So am I assuming you -- you are not going to deal with any of the objections we filed at this point?

THE COURT: I'm going to issue an order basically delaying the issue regarding the discovery disputes because I want to see if Mr. Tarhuni gets the benefit of something out of this process between now and the middle of January. And if he doesn't, off we go.

MR. GOLDBERG: (Nods head.)

THE COURT: Everything can be reasserted.

MR. GOLDBERG: (Nods head.)

THE COURT: Maybe -- maybe it won't be necessary.

MR. GOLDBERG: (Nods head.)

THE COURT: I appreciate it's been a -- two years almost. In January, it will be two years for him. But it's worth -- it's worth getting a better record, and the Government being sure about what it's asserting with respect to this reconsideration. So it will be up-to-date and current as of January. If it is as you say, then we'll litigate it then.

MR. GOLDBERG: So -- with hesitation -- there's one point I'm wondering if I can raise, and if it makes sense, to wait.

In terms of the SSI clearance that we -- Mr. Nelson and I were given, it's subject to a protective order being

entered. And is it -- I suppose there's nothing to prevent us from -- the Government and ourselves, from trying to negotiate a protective order in case that's necessary?

THE COURT: I -- I am not to be heard as precluding any kind of reasonable agreement among you to do anything that moves forward. But my -- my issue is that these are public cases. And I am going to do everything I can to ensure we have a public record about decisions made and the reasons for them.

That's why I made the point about -- in the tentative order, of -- the reference I made to not needing a protective order is, first of all, we have 13 named people in the Latif case, and Mr. Tarhuni; all of whom have publicly declared what they believe their status is. It's just not a secret anymore that they may or may not have been on the list.

And so to say to one of them, for example, you could go buy a ticket and board an aircraft tomorrow should not be a secret event. Because, guess what? If they were told that under a protective order, they would go buy a ticket and be publicly observed walking through an airport and being allowed to board an aircraft.

So I don't see a protective order need around that kind of disclosure. But, of course, if any litigant thinks something needs to be protected, the issue will be raised, and I'll do my best to consider it fairly. But the priority is public filings, public disclosure, public reasoning because

1	it's public lawsuit. And when there are privileges asserted,		
2	we deal with them the way they've always been dealt with.		
3	They're asserted, they're evaluated, they're either		
4	acknowledged or overruled. Off we go.		
5	So, yes, Mr. Goldberg, negotiate away, as best you		
6	can.		
7	Anything else?		
8	Okay. Thank you, everybody. We're in recess on		
9	these matters.		
10	MS. SHAMSI: Thank you, your Honor.		
11	(Conclusion of proceedings.)		
12			
13	00		
14			
15	I certify, by signing below, that the foregoing is a correct		
16	transcript of the oral proceedings had in the above-entitled		
17	matter this 27th day of October, 2014. A transcript without an		
18	original signature or conformed signature is not certified. I		
19	further certify that the transcript fees and format comply with		
20	those prescribed by the Court and the Judicial Conference of		
21	the United States.		
22	/S/ Amanda M. LeGore		
23	——————————————————————————————————————		
24	AMANDA M. LeGORE, RDR, CRR, FCRR, CE		