Commonwealth v. Jose Arias

Officers from Boston’s Drug Control Unit (“DCU”) followed the Appellant, Jose Arias, in an unmarked vehicle for approximately six miles, during which they observed him make an improper left turn—a traffic violation for which he was never cited. The next day a different DCU officer called for a marked police car to pull Arias over based on the previous day’s improper turn. Over the police radio, the DCU officer made clear that the alleged traffic violation was not the true basis for the stop: “we’re looking to stop a vehicle for [a] drug investigation.” Arias contends that when the marked cruiser activated its lights and sirens, he attempted to turn off the busy road so that he could pull over on a different street, but before he could do so, another police car pulled in front of him, blocking his path. Officers then ordered him out of the vehicle, conducted a pat-frisk, discovered unlawful substances, and arrested him for “possessing/concealing” drugs.

Arias moved to suppress the substances discovered during the stop, arguing that the stop and search was unlawful because DCU officers lacked “reasonable suspicion.” One and a half years after arresting Arias, the Commonwealth claimed—for the first time—that the arrest and search were permissible under G.L. c. 90 § 21 because Arias had allegedly neglected to stop when requested. The Superior Court found that Arias’ unlawful left turn served as pretext for the stop and the real reason for the stop was to pursue a drug investigation. But the Superior Court held that the pretextual stop did not violate the Massachusetts Constitution and that the arrest was supported by the neglect-to-stop allegation.

Our brief makes three main points: (1) Article 14 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights does not permit pretextual stops, (2) statutorily-authorized arrests for fine-only misdemeanors, absent a breach of the peace, are unreasonable and therefore unconstitutional under Article 14, and (3) G.L. c. 90 § 25 is unconstitutionally vague as applied to this case.

The brief explains that arresting someone for a misdemeanor not involving a breach of the peace is unreasonable. And because Article 14 has long been recognized as affording greater protection than the Fourth Amendment, this case provides an opportunity for the Court to clarify that Article 14 prohibits all arrests for misdemeanors absent a breach of the peace, even statutorily-authorized arrests. Our brief further argues that G.L. c. 90, § 25—the statute under which Mr. Arias was arrested—is unconstitutionally vague as applied to the facts of this case because it fails to adequately define what constitutes a “neglect to stop.” And because G.L. c. 90 § 21 permits an arrest for a § 25 violation—even absent a breach of the peace—these statutes together effectively grant police unfettered discretion to stop, arrest, and search anyone for virtually any reason.