E.L. v. Claps

Families of incarcerated individuals sued in Colorado state court to stop county officials from enforcing a ban on family visits that they allege is unconstitutional. The district court denied their motion for a preliminary injunction. Relying on a case that declined to recognize a claim directly under the Colorado Constitution for damages—not injunctive relief—the district court held that there was no private cause of action for injunctive relief under the Colorado Constitution. The plaintiffs now seek review of the district court’s decision in the Colorado Court of Appeals.

Together with the ACLU of Colorado, the ACLU’s SSCI filed an amicus brief in support of the plaintiffs, urging the Court to reverse the district court’s order and clarify that when government officials engage in ongoing violations of Coloradans’ fundamental rights, the Colorado Constitution directly authorizes Colorado courts to issue injunctions ordering those violations to stop. Our amicus brief advances two main arguments.

First, we argue that the Colorado Constitution authorizes individuals to sue to stop violations of their state constitutional rights. Constitutional text, structure, history, and precedent make clear that injunctive relief is directly available for violations of individual rights under the Colorado Constitution, in line with the national consensus among state high courts. Specifically, the state provisions at issue in this case—on inalienable rights, due process, and unenumerated rights—either mirror enforceable federal protections or diverge from the U.S. Constitution in ways that indicate even broader state protection. And structural elements of the Colorado Constitution—including provisions on the separation of powers, the judicial power, and the right to a judicial remedy—reinforce that Colorado courts may issue injunctions to enforce state constitutional rights. In addition, Colorado case law confirms that Bill of Rights provisions are “self-executing”: They operate independently of legislation and cannot be impaired, directly or indirectly, by legislative action. Other state supreme courts agree that injunctive relief is directly available under their state constitutions, including courts that have, like the Colorado Supreme Court, expressly declined to authorize a parallel damages remedy in prior cases.

Second, we argue that the district court erred in relying on a Colorado Supreme Court precedent—Board of County Commissioners of Douglas County v. Sundheim— that addressed implied damages remedies, not injunctive relief, and made them contingent on the absence of alternative remedies. By relying on Sundheim to deny the plaintiffs’ request for an injunction to stop the family visit ban, the district court unjustifiably extended Sundheim’s ruling to the context of injunctive relief. This conflicts with Colorado law, including the principle that Bill of Rights provisions are self-executing and thus enforceable regardless of the legislative landscape. In short, Sundheim provides no basis to deny injunctive relief here.