Marks v. State

Location: Hawaiʻi
Court Type: Hawaiʻi Supreme Court
Status: Ongoing
Last Update: November 16, 2026

What's at Stake

This case asks whether the Hawai‘i Constitution permits an executive agency to exercise sentencing power. Hawai‘i law grants the Hawai‘i Paroling Authority (HPA) the power to set a defendant’s “minimum term”—that is, the amount of time they must spend in prison before the HPA even considers them for release on parole. The ACLU’s State Supreme Court Initiative and the ACLU of Hawaiʻi filed an amicus brief in the Hawai‘i Supreme Court arguing that this sentencing structure violates the separation of powers and that the HPA’s practices violate the sentencing and due process rights of incarcerated individuals.

Summary


Hawai‘i law divides the power to sentence between two entities: the sentencing court and the HPA. Upon conviction, Hawai‘i judges set maximum sentences but, unlike in most states with indeterminate sentencing, do not set a minimum. Instead, within six months of a prisoner’s incarceration, the HPA determines the minimum term of imprisonment a person must serve before becoming eligible for an initial parole hearing. After the HPA set Donald B. Marks’s minimum term at forty years, he challenged its minimum-term power, arguing that the system allows the HPA to sentence defendants without the protection and transparency provided by judicial sentencing.

The ACLU’s State Supreme Court Initiative and the ACLU of Hawai‘i filed an amicus brief in the Hawai‘i Supreme Court arguing that the HPA’s sentencing structure violates the separation of powers because the power to sentence categorically cannot be delegated to the executive branch. In the alternative, the brief argues that the statute purporting to delegate this power lacks the standards and safeguards necessary to a constitutional delegation of judicial power.

Our brief also argues that the HPA’s minimum-term hearings violate other state constitutional rights. The Hawai‘i Constitution prevents sentencing courts from considering certain types of uncharged conduct, engaging in fact-finding that increases a defendant’s sentence, and compelling a defendant to incriminate themselves after entering a no-contest plea. But the HPA does not comply with these rules, exposing defendants to a lopsided system where constitutional protections vanish at some stages in the sentencing process. The HPA also fails to use objective metrics and lacks transparent evidentiary standards, raising due process issues.

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