This case asks whether the state can arrest, charge, and convict someone under Montana’s obstruction statute for exercising their federal and state constitutional right to record police officers in public spaces. The defendant was filming a traffic stop when police instructed him to move farther away. When he did not move as far as they wanted, they arrested him for obstructing a peace officer. The ACLU’s State Supreme Court Initiative, along with the ACLU of Montana, filed an amicus brief in support of the defendant arguing that the officer’s refusal to allow the defendant to peacefully record police activity from a public sidewalk was, in effect, a content-based restriction on speech that could not be justified under strict scrutiny. Even if the restriction was not content-based, our brief argues that it is not a reasonable time place or manner restriction.

When drawing its new maps, the Weld County Board of County Commissioners violated Colorado law imposing specific requirements meant to guarantee that county commission districts are drawn transparently and fairly, such that voters are empowered to elect responsive and accountable commissioners. A Colorado district court granted summary judgment to voter plaintiffs who challenged the maps, but the Board appealed the decision, arguing in part that voters lacked standing and a right of action to challenge the unlawful districts.

This case in the Oregon Supreme Court centers on whether Article I, Section 41(3) of the Oregon Constitution, which provides that Oregon prisoners lack legally enforceable rights to prison jobs and training, bars prisoners from collecting damages relating to lost prison jobs and training caused by the alleged breach of a settlement agreement by prison officials. The ACLU’s State Supreme Court Initiative, alongside the ACLU of Oregon, filed an amicus brief arguing that plaintiff Arnold Huskey, an incarcerated individual whose identity was used in Department of Corrections training materials, is entitled to damages notwithstanding Article I, Section 41(3), because plaintiffs in contract disputes never have to show standalone legal rights to the damages they claim. Instead, they need only show that the damages were reasonably foreseeable consequences of the alleged breach of contract.

Article I, section 9 of the Utah Constitution protects incarcerated individuals from both cruel and unusual punishment and unnecessarily rigorous treatment. This case asks whether death-sentenced plaintiffs seeking to challenge certain execution methods as cruel and unusual or unnecessarily rigorous under this provision must identify, in their pleadings, an alternative method of execution. The U.S. Supreme Court has required this alternative for Eighth Amendment challenges, but the ACLU’s State Supreme Court Initiative, alongside the Capital Punishment Project and ACLU of Utah, filed an amicus brief in support of the plaintiffs, arguing that federal caselaw does not limit the greater protections provided by section 9 of the Utah Constitution. Forcing prisoners challenging a method of execution to identify an acceptable alternative method is cruel, coercive, and not necessary to the administration of Utah’s death penalty laws.