Claims Filed Under the Foreign Claims Act by Civilians in Afghanistan and Iraq

Documents received from the Department of the Army in response to ACLU Freedom of Information Act Request

Army 15-6 Documents
(Released on July, 2008 | Learn More: The Human Cost of War - Civilian Casualties in Iraq & Afghanistan )

Document	Agency	Incident Date	Specific Location	Description
Army11761_11781.pdf	Army	25-Feb-05	Kalsu, Iraq	An Army patrol (or convoy) of two Bradleys was making its way back to a base in Kalsu, Iraq, when an Iraqi man in a blue 4-door Chevy Caprice Classic approached the patrol, getting right behind one of the Bradleys, and then in-between the Bradleys. In a sworn witness statement, a U.S. Army Officer wrote that he fired on the Iraqi because "we have been in Iraq for over a month and I have never seen a vehicle try to run pass [sic] a Bradley." First the officer fired at the trunk, then the grill and then at the Iraqi man. The Iraqi man's vehicle steered off the road. By the time Army personnel arrived approximately 60 local nationals were surrounding the car and the body was gone. Army personnel were not able to locate the body. The investigating officer determined that the conduct was within the Rules of Engagement (ROE) but recommended that the Army "Continue to reinforce ROE training, convoy operations and ensure all convoys have convoy warning signs." (No statements from Iraqi witnesses were taken.)
Army11782_11828.pdf	Army	10/5/2005	Kalsu, Iraq	At 1:45 am an Army patrol noticed a dump truck parked on the side of a road. Previous to this evening two troops had been killed by Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Devices (VBIED) and so new procedures had been instituted to deal with VBIEDs. One component of these procedures was an instruction that "soldiers are to error on the side of personal safety at all times, IAW the "right to self protection" of the Rules of Engagement (ROE)." The Army patrol followed those new procedures. The Army patrol stayed at 200 meter distance, put a spotlight on the vehicle, an Army gunner shot out the vehicle"s tires, the gunner then fired to the left of the vehicle, then the gunner fired into the engine block. Approximately 8-10 rounds were fired. At that point the Army patrol heard screaming from the vehicle. The Army patrol found 22-year-old Ali Salem Gaber with bullet wounds in both his legs. The Army patrol attempted to render medical aid but Gaber died within minutes. A search of the vehicle conducted by the Iraqi armed forces revealed no contraband. The investigating officer determined that all Army personal had followed the Rules Of Engagement but recommended that the operating rules as to how to approach VBIEDs be altered. It was recommended that Army patrols use bullhorns to call out to civilians since shouting from 200 meters away may not be heard. It appears from a document in the file that someone filed a claim for the damage to the vehicle and was awarded 10,000 Iraqi Dinars. (No statements from Iraqi witnesses were taken.)
Army11829_11835.pdf Army11836_11842.pdf Army11843_11844.pdf Army11845_11846.pdf	Army	April, 2005 (precise date is whited out)	Iraq	An Army patrol conducting an Improvised Explosive Device (IED) ambush came upon three Iraqi men in a van along the side of a road carrying a black tire with something inside it along an area known to be an IED site. The Army patrol fired one shot and one of the individuals started running. The van then fled and the Army patrol fired two shots at the van. The van was located 30 minutes later and one of the three Iraqi men was found. He had been shot in the leg and was bleeding. He died from his wounds. At the scene of where the first shot was fired a tire with two artillery rounds placed in the middle was found. The investigating officer determined that the conduct was within the Rules of Engagement. (No statements from Iraqi witnesses were taken.)
Army11847_11880.pdf Army11881_11891.pdf Army11892_11894.pdf Army11895_11897.pdf	Army	April, 2005 (precise date is whited out)	Iraq	An Army patrol observed an Iraqi man holding something in his hand within line of sight of a Possible Improvised Explosive Device (PIED). It was near midnight and after the curfew. The Army patrol determined the Iraqi man was exhibiting hostile intent and fired 10-12 rounds composed of 6-9 rounds of bursts of bullets. No warnings - either verbal or through lights were given. The Iraqi man was killed on site. A sweep of the area revealed that it was not an IED and no weapons were found. They found another man nearby who was taken in for questioning. The investigating officer determined that the conduct was within the Rules of Engagement (ROE) but recommended that the Army "Continue to reinforce ROE training" and "Order more spotlights for patrols, to allow for limited visibility warning signal." (No statements from Iraqi witnesses were taken.)
Army11898_11913.pdf	Army	2/18/2005	Kalsu, Iraq	In the immediate aftermath of a Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Device (VBIED) that was driven into a Shiite Mosque, Army patrols were put on alert of a possible coordinated VBIED. One Army patrol had a translator speak from a loudspeaker out of a Bradley that anyone approaching the Bradley should turn around or that they would be shot. (During this time there were a series of communications between various Army officials using pseudonyms, including "Killer," "Thug," "Reaper," "Battle," and "Dragon.") Four cars, including one white van approached the Bradley and did not heed the warnings. A series of shots were fired at the four cars. Three cars turned around. The fourth (which was in the lead) came to a stop 15 meters in front of the Bradley. Inside Army patrol found three dead Iraqi men, and four wounded Iraqi men. All seven Iraqi men were between the ages of 25-35. The car the Iraqi men were in was searched for contraband but nothing was found. A coffin on the roof of the car was empty. The investigating officer determined that the conduct was within the Rules of Engagement but recommended that the Army "Continue to reinforce ROE training, standardize TF 2/11 BCT check point operations and convoy operations" and noted that "Corrective actions for standardized Check Point signs has already been made." (No statements from Iraqi witnesses were taken.)
Army11914_11933.pdf	Army	3/23/2005	Kalsu, Iraq	An Army patrol that was assigned to trash burning duty had a car accelerate in speed toward the patrol. An Army official attempted to give arm signals, shot in the air, and shot into the grill of the car. The car then came to a stop. The Army patrol then went about its business without checking to see what had happened with the occupants of the car. Later another Army patrol came upon the car and found an Iraqi man with a bullet wound to the head. The Iraqi man was dead. In a typed statement the investigating officer determined that the conduct was within the Rules of Engagement (ROE). However, a handwritten statement on the same page states "We did not follow TTP's or MTP's. Proper escalation of force not used." The investigating officer then recommended that the Army "Continue to reinforce ROE training, standardize TF 2/11 BCT combat patrols and convoy operations." (No statements from Iraqi witnesses were taken.)
Army11936_11937.pdf	Army	30-Jan-06	Iraq	Three members of an Army patrol were performing dismounted reconnaissance when they were fired upon by three shots followed by three bursts from an Anti-Iraqi Force (AIF) about 50 meters away. The patrol returned fire and killed the AIF, an Iraqi woman. As the patrol moved and positioned two gun trucks in support of the unit, the Army personnel came under sporadic fire from a house 250 meters away. They returned fire in an exchange which lasted a total of 10 minutes, and then attacked and cleared the house, where they located the body of the initial shooter, along with spent round casings and ejected rounds, but no weapon. The remaining individuals were questions but this questioning revealed nothing conclusive. No determinations were made by the investigating officer, aside from the recommendation that no payments were necessary. (No statements from Iraqi witnesses were taken.)
Army11938_11954.pdf Army11955_11965.pdf Army11966_11976.pdf	Army	12 Oct. 2005	Iraq	An Army patrol was providing security and diverting vehicle traffic while a barrier emplacement team worked to erect barriers near an Iraqi Polling site. At approximately 9:15 PM, a white Volkswagen Passat driven by an Iraqi man bypassed the Army checkpoint and proceeded at a steady speed toward the barrier emplacement team. The patrol attempted to stop the vehicle first by making hand motions and verbal warnings in Arabic via loudspeaker. The vehicle driver turned off his headlights and the patrol signaled him using a laser pointer, although sworn witness statements differ with regard to whether this laser was red or green. When the vehicle was approximately 40 meters away, an Army official fired a single warning shot. The driver turned on the vehicle's high-beams, and the official fired a second warning shot, followed by two shots into the engine compartment and two shots at the driver, critically injuring him. Medics attempted to administer first aid to the driver, who died of his wounds and was turned over to Iraqi police. The vehicle's passenger sustained a gunshot wound to his left arm; he was guarded by Army personnel while the driver was treated, and was then taken on foot to a nearby hospital. The investigating officer determined that that Army personnel had followed the Rules of Engagement by responding to a hostile act with an Escalation of Force, and recommended that patrol leaders consider the issue of civilian traffic when conducting barrier emplacements, particularly during non-curfew hours. (No Iraqi witnesses were interviewed).
Army11977_11996.pdf Army11997_12008.pdf Army12009_12010.pdf	Army	5 Oct. 2005	Iraq	On the morning of October 5, 2005, a barrier team was emplacing barriers for Iraqi polling sites, moving from location to location and spending 10-15 minutes on each emplacement. The team blocked civilian traffic with stationary vehicles but no other obstacles. At approx. 10:00, a navy blue Peugeot driven by an Iraqi man bypassed a vehicle checkpoint by driving onto the sidewalk, passed the only available detour, and proceeded at a speed of approx. 40 mph towards the team. U.S. personnel signaled the driver first by shouting; then by signaling with hands and signs which read "Stop" in English and Arabic; then by firing warning shots into the engine block and hood of the car. They then fired between 6 and 10 rounds, hitting the driver. (One witness described this as "the 5 S's: Shout, Show, Shove, Shoot warning shot, Shoot to kill"). Iraqi police (IP) and Iraqi army (IA) personnel pulled the driver from the car and indicated that they wanted to take him to a nearby hospital; a U.S. medic disagreed, conducting a "cursory observation of the body" and determining that the driver had been killed. The investigating officer and several witnesses reported that the IA officers then became angry and aggressive, accusing the team of killing an innocent man and causing the team to leave the scene. According to some other witnesses, however, the team left the scene because it had run out of barriers, and "the situation was under control." The team did not return to photograph the site until the following day. The investigating officer determined that the conduct was within the Rules of Engagement (ROE). (No statements from Iraqi witnesses were taken.)
Army12011_12026.pdf Army12027_12039.pdf Army12040_12049.pdf Army12050_12061.pdf	Army	11 Oct. 2005	Iraq	While traveling in a three-vehicle convoy through an area of frequent enemy activity at approximately 7:00 PM, an Army patrol made a left turn and immediately saw friendly forces engaging a slow-moving civilian vehicle driven by an Iraqi man. Believing they recognized muzzle flashes coming from the side of the civilian vehicle, members of the Army patrol engaged it, and continued firing until the vehicle veered off the road, hitting a post, and a cease fire was ordered. At this point, members of the patrol inspected the car and found that its driver and two passengers, all unarmed, had died from gunshot wounds. The investigating officer found that the patrol had committed no wrongdoing, since "[i]t c[ould] be logically deduced that if friendly forces have engaged a suspected enemy, positive identification has been established", and that since the incident occurred at dusk, the patrol's ability to see that the individuals were unarmed was limited. (No Iraqi witnesses were interviewed).
Army12062_12079.pdf Army12080_12098.pdf Army12099_12114.pdf	Army	Sep. 5, 2005	Western Baghdad, Iraq	Duplicate; see entry for Army Bates 11426-11479.
Army12115_12128.pdf Army12129_12133.pdf Army12134_12139.pdf Army12140_12144.pdf Army12145_12159.pdf Army12160_12173.pdf Army12174_12184.pdf Army12185_12193.pdf Army12194_12197.pdf	Army	Oct. 16, 2005	Northern Baghdad, Iraq	Duplicate; see entry for Army Bates 11651-11733
Army12198_12214.pdf Army12215_12221.pdf Army12222_12229.pdf Army12230_12241.pdf	Army	Oct. 13, 2005	Baghdad, Iraq	An Army patrol was conducting a route clearance mission and discovered an Improvised Explosive Device (IED). The Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) team was called and the patrol set up a cordon to keep civilians out of the area. An Iraqi man approached the cordon on foot from the east, and the patrol signaled to him to stop by motioning, shouting in English and Arabic, and blowing an air horn. When this had no effect, a gunner fired a warning shot, and the Iraqi man retreated. According to sworn statements, the man again approached the cordon 15 minutes later, this time from the north, walking close to the IED. Members of the patrol signaled to him with hand motions and verbal commands, followed by blasts on the air horn and a warning shot. The man acknowledged this shot by flinching, but continued towards the patrol. The gunner then confirmed, using a laser range finder, that the man was 30 meters away from the patrol vehicle, and fired several rounds, striking the man in the abdomen and disabling him. Members of the patrol then approached him, noticing that he wore a long white robe, was clean-shaven, and carried a large quantity of Iraqi currency around his waist. They reported administering first aid and transporting him to a hospital. However, some army officers produced conflicting reports in their sworn statements, recalling that the man approached the cordon with two other men, and that the two men were deterred with warning shots but that the victim continued to approach. The Investigating Officer concluded that the actions of the patrol were "commensurate with established and published brigade, battalion, and company guidelines," and further emphasized that the man demonstrated hostile intent, arguing that his "actions, eerily, resemble those of reported suicide bombers, and further support my position of hostile intent." (No Iraqi witnesses were interviewed.)
Army12242_12249.pdf Army12250_12257.pdf	Army	Mar. 23, 2006	Western Baghdad, Iraq	An Army sniper team was stationed in a building alongside a highway in an area of high Improvised Explosive Device (IED) concentration. Prior to departure from the base, the team had been briefed on Rules of Engagement (ROE). At approximately 10:00 PM - past curfew and after the moon had set, leaving the team in darkness - an Iraqi individual was seen walking along the median of the highway, and appeared to be carrying something in his hands. The Army personnel lost sight of him momentarily and then observed him crouching in the median for approx. 45 seconds, and then standing and walking away. Determining this to be appropriate Positive Identification (PID) of the individual positioning an IED, a sniper fired on him and killed him. It was later found that the individual was a boy approx. 12 or 13 years of age; no IED was found on the site, and the object the individual had carried could not be identified. The recommendations of the Investigating Officer were redacted, but a memorandum from one of his superiors concurred with his findings and asserted that, given the actions observed, "SSG [REDACTED] acted within my expectations and IAW and the ROE," and recommended that sniper platoons continue to receive briefings on the ROE. (No Iraqi witnesses were interviewed.)
Army12258_12266.pdf Army12267_12276.pdf	Marines	5/12/2006	Iraq	At approximately 10:00 AM, an Army patrol was conducting a vehicle checkpoint, and had positioned two vehicles to block both eastbound and westbound traffic. Approximately one minute after these vehicles had been positioned, westbound traffic had backed up for 800 meters when a gray Audi driven by an Iraqi man bypassed the traffic jam and proceeded towards the checkpoint at approx. 60 mph. When it was approx. 300 meters away, an Army official signaled the vehicle by waving red flags and firing a pen flare. At approx. 100 meters, the official fired a tracer round in front of the vehicle, followed by three shots which punctured the passenger side wheels. When the vehicle was within 75 meters, a round was fired into the grill, followed by 14 rounds from a .50 caliber machine gun fired directly at the vehicle. The vehicle came to a stop, and personnel inspected it and found one male Iraqi killed, and one female Iraqi, age 53, unharmed. The woman stated that the victim was her husband, and that they had been returning from their son's funeral. She also stated that her husband had very poor eyesight, which might have contributed to his inability to see the flags and flares employed by the marines. A memorandum concerning the investigation's findings asserted that the soldier's actions were consistent with the Rules of Engagement (ROE) and that a condolence payment was appropriate. (No Iraqi witnesses were interviewed.)
Army12279_12305.pdf Army12306_12333.pdf Army12334_12358.pdf Army12359_12371.pdf	Army	1-Jan-06	Rahem Awa, Kirkuk, Iraq	An Army patrol arrives at the scene of an "agitated" demonstration of Iraqis protesting a rupture of a local sewage line that was flooding neighborhood homes. The investigation finds that the demonstrators, who had been further "agitated" by warning shots fired into the air by Iraqi police, were throwing rocks, injuring members of Coalition Forces, and burning tires and throwing aerosol cans into the fires. Thirty minutes after the arrival of coalition forces, a white sedan entered the area and ignored "orders" to stop, shouted in Arabic, Kurdish, and English, as well as hand signals. The investigating officer finds that the soldiers shot the driver, wounding him ten to fifteen times, after he had passed the "gun line," fearing a Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Device (VBIED). The driver was killed, as was an Iraqi bystander. Another Iraqi bystander was wounded. The investigating officer finds that Rules of Engagement (ROE) were followed and that because of a tense atmosphere in Kirkuk, a recent string of Improvised Explosive Device (IED) attacks, and the driver's behavior, there was reason to suspect a threat. Recommends additional EOF and ROE training, additional collateral damage training, the development of classes on "rounds impact" to prevent the further wounding and killing of bystanders, and condolence payments to the two bystanders, one killed, one injured. (No Iraqi witness statements taken.)
Army12372_12382.pdf Army12383_12397.pdf Army12398_12410.pdf Army12411_12422.pdf	Army	3/8/2006	FOB Loyalty, Iraq	A local national vehicle and an Army Bradley collide as the Bradley was on its way from the UN compound to Forward Operating Base Loyalty. The driver of the Bradley "believed the oncoming vehicle was going to stop" and continued driving towards it, running it over. First aid given but the driver of the car died within thirty minutes. The investigation at once claims that the driver of the Bradley signaled to the Iraqi driver and that "it is physically impossible for the driver to have seen the vehicle in question." Driver of Bradley to be issued "letter of concern," condolence payment and regrets offered to deceased's next of kin. This entrance to FOB Loyalty no longer allowed for use by coalition vehicles. An Iraqi Police investigative report is included, with a statement from the deceased's father, but not from the passenger in the car.
Army12423_12447.pdf Army12448_12470.pdf	Army	12/11/2005	"Uday's Farm," Iraq	A vehicle approaches an Army checkpoint at an "unusually high rate of speed." The soldiers at the checkpoint fire warning shots and signal to the vehicle with a spotlight. As the vehicle approaches, a total of twenty rounds are fired into the vehicle, stopping it 94 meters from the edge of the checkpoint. One female Iraqi passenger suffered a gunshot wound to the hand and a child, approximately three years old, was killed. (No Iraqi witness statements.)
Army12471_12500.pdf Army12501_12518.pdf Army12519_12526.pdf Army12527_12542.pdf Army12543_12592.pdf	Army	1/15/2006	FOB Rustamiyah, Baghdad, Iraq	Investigation finds that Army and Navy personnel shot and killed two Iraqis in self defense. The investigation finds that while the soldiers were conducting reconnaissance on a residence, they were threatened by an Iraqi man with an AK-47, who then opened fire. The soldiers returned fire, killing the man and a female occupant who was aiding him. Iraqi testimony, as reported by the investigating officer, does not conclude that the weapon was pointed at the soldiers or fired by the occupants. Iraqi testimony, as reported by the investigating officer, does find that there was an AK-47 in the home. One son of the victims says that his mother was shouting "thieves, thieves" and the investigating officer concludes that the couple believed they were being robbed. According to the investigation, the couple had been advised that the individuals outside their residence were American forces, but may not have heard that warning because they were already screaming. The investigation notes that while the witnesses claim that they shot a man with a gun, the woman died of direct gunshot wounds and the man died of injuries from bullet fragments. The investigation concludes the witnesses reported inaccurately because of poor lighting. A ten year old child in the home also suffered a "minor flesh wound" to his arm, and a 4 month old child died due to "exposure" the morning of the incident. The investigation notes this death as "not directly related to the incident and not independently verified." Investigating officer recommends condolence payments, as well as a clarification of "the use of civilian structures for military purposes." Large sections of the recommendations are redacted without citing an exemption. Names of victims (Yassin Muhamad Nafawa and Najat Hamed Nafawa) are not redacted.
Army12593_12642.pdf	Army	2/27/2006	Iraq	Army soldiers, taking fire from a distance, identify a van as either a "firing platform" or cover for their attackers. The soldiers then fire on the van. They kill one adult and two children. No weapons were found in the van. A rocket propelled grenade round was found near "the same location of the van when the patrol began taking fire." The investigation finds that Rules of Engagement (ROE) were followed, and notes that 5 days prior, this patrol had undergone an "updated ROE class." Condolence payments are recommended. The investigative officer recommends that this incident be used as a model for the importance of ROE and the "willingness of insurgents to use civilians to their advantage." No Iraqi witness statements were taken, though the investigation report notes that a crowd had formed around the van.
Army12643_12669.pdf Army12670_12697.pdf	Army	4/22/2006	FOB Striker, Iraq	An Army patrol shot and killed an Iraqi driver after he "failed to comply with warnings not to approach." The investigation finds the Escalation of Force (EOF) was appropriate and that Rules of Engagement (ROE) were followed, although asks why a smoke grenade was fired. Among the recommendations, the investigating officer suggests that the shooter "be commended for his excellent marksmanship." Though the report notes that the soldiers spoke to the passenger of the car, who was the victim's uncle, they did not include any Iraqi witness statements.
Army12698_12734.pdf	Army	10/31/2005	Kirkuk, Iraq	Army soldiers had been warned to look for a dark Opel that would be carrying a Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Device (VBIED). Seeing a vehicle matching that description approaching them, that did not slow down despite a soldier signaling and shouting at the vehicle, one soldier opened fire and shot the driver, who died of the gunshot wound. His wife and children were also in the car but evidently unharmed. Investigation finds that Rules of Engagement (ROE) were followed, that condolence payments should be issued, and that ROE should be reviewed. (No Iraqi witness statements were taken.)
Army12735_12744.pdf Army12745_12755.pdf Army12756_12765.pdf Army12766_12776.pdf Army12776_12792.pdf Army12793_12805.pdf	Army	2/5/2006	Baghdad, Iraq	An Iraqi driver does not respond to hand signals and shouts to stop from an Army patrol. When the vehicle reached a distance of 120 meters from the "security perimeter," soldiers pointed their weapons at the vehicle and the vehicle kept approaching slowly. The driver did not respond to a warning shot fired from a distance of approximately 70 meters. Each soldier fired on the vehicle with the intent of disabling it, according to the report, when it was 40 meters away from them. One of these gunshots killed the driver. According to the report, Iraqi police agree the vehicle showed no signs of intending to slow down, and they too suspected a Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Device (VBIED). All soldiers involved recieved Rules of Engagement (ROE) training two weeks prior. The investigation finds that ROE were followed. Investigating officer recommends condolence payment, the acquisition of green laser pointers for signaling to oncoming vehicles, the repair of a light pole damaged by the victim's car, and training on the "proper selection of an aiming point for a warning shot." Redactions from Arabic and English sources sometimes inconsistent. No Iraqi witness report taken. Strangely, another investigation report follows this one. More strangely, the investigating officer writes that on March 4, 2006, he or she was directed to investigate an incident that occurred after he or she was assigned to it, on April 3, 2006. In this incident, a vehicle approaching coalition forces ignored flashing lights and green lasers meant to signal a stop. The driver also ignored a warning shot fired from 50 meters. At 25 meters, the soldiers opened fire, killing one and wounding another. The report notes these two were "2nd BN ESU members from Tikrit." The investigation found that normal EOF procedures were "exceeded" and recommends continuing with EOF training, and reminding "local sheiks" of the need to obey soldiers' signals. (No Iraqi witness statements taken.)
Army12806_12827.pdf Army12828_12848.pdf	Army	7/10/2006	Iraq	Army soldiers shot an Iraqi male after the Iraqi male attempted to "forcibly take" a weapon from one soldier. The gunshots were intended to be nonlethal according to the report, but the victim bled to death. Escalation of Force (EOF) refresher training and condolence payments recommended. (No Iraqi witness statements taken.)
Army12849_12866.pdf Army12867_12881.pdf Army12882_12895.pdf Army12896_12901.pdf	Army	1/25/2006	Iraq	Army soldiers investigating a "suspicious compound" that resembles a militia or military facility ask to be let in, identifying themselves as American soldiers. The Iraqi man who responded pointed an AK 47 at them within one minute of their request. One soldier opened fire on the Iraqi man, who later died of wounds to the chest and head. Iraqi police take up the investigation, and no follow up on the victim's intentions or motivations is included with this report. The investigating officer does not recommend condolence payments, but is overruled by the memorandum conditionally approving his or her recommendations. (No Iraqi witness statements taken.)
Army12902_12922.pdf	Army	3/20/2006	Mosul, Iraq	Army soldiers in an "engineering convoy" try to signal to an oncoming Iraqi vehicle to stop, with "honking horn, flashing lights, and hand and arm signals." A warning shot was fired and then a "disabling shot," both of which failed to deter the vehicle. The soldiers fired into the windshield, killing a four year old boy. The soldiers in the convoy could not turn around right away "due to size of equipment." The soldiers eventually turned around and arrived on the scene after the boy had been taken to the hospital. Investigative Report recommends reviewing Rules of Engagement (ROE) regularly, using air horns to alert oncoming traffic, and the education of Iraqis by local government on what to do when approaching a military vehicle. (No Iraqi statements were taken.)
Army12923_12943.pdf	Army	1/22/2006	Iraq	Army soldiers had just finished a mission searching for a Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Device (VBIED) when they saw a vehicle coming towards them on a potential collision course. One soldier suggests to another that he should "honk his air horn." The report does not indicate whether the horn was sounded, but does note that the driver made eye contact with the soldiers but did not change course or speed. The same result followed when one soldier pointed his weapon at the car. The soldier then fired a "warning shot" causing the car to slow and swerve. The report indicates a 12 year old boy was wounded, in the arm and stomach, but does not note any deaths. The report does not indicate at what distance Escalation of Force (EOF) was initiated. Investigating Officer finds that conduct was within the Rules of Engagement (ROE). Recommendations include regular ROE review, notifying soldiers of the effects of ricochet bullers, and the continued use of air horns as warnings. Although the report notes that a crowd had gathered around the scene, no Iraqi witness statements were taken.
Army12944_12978.pdf	Army	3/23/2006	Samarra, Iraq	A "security element" of Army soldiers was attempting to stop oncoming vehicles by setting up a hasty checkpoint to allow its own safe passage. Three vehicles had been stopped. A fourth vehicle does not stop after hand signals and shouting. Warning shots produced the same result, and disabling rounds were fired. Three Iraqis (two adults and one child) were injured in the incident. The investigating officer finds that Escalation of Force (EOF) and Rules of Engagement (ROE) were properly followed, and that this incident be used as a "Rules of Engagement vignette" for "lessons learned."
Army12979_13003.pdf	Army	4/2/2006	Mosul, Iraq	According to the investigation report, a local vehicle approaches an Army vehicle, and the soldiers attempted verbal and hand signals to prevent the local vehicle from ramming them. According to the report, there was no time for a warning shot, and the local vehicle crashed into the U.S. vehicle after the soldiers had shot at the local vehicle from a distance of 15 meters. The driver was shot in the neck, the chest, and the arm, but the soldiers don't "know if [the driver] is still alive" or if condolence payments were made. Investigation report recommends "an aggressive public service campaign" to alert locals of the importance of staying away from military vehicles, as well as the contact and payment of the injured or possibly dead Iraqi. Investigating Officer finds that conduct was within the Rules of Engagement (ROE).
Army13004_13024.pdf	Army	7/5/2006	Bayji, Iraq	An Army patrol assisting Iraqi Bayji police in establishing a perimeter around a detonated Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Device (VBIED) is approached by a local truck. The truck does not respond to "hand and arm signals." Interestingly, a "local national vendor" was used to assist in stopping the vehicle. The truck does not respond to "disabling shots" fired from a distance of 50 meters. At 25 meters, soldiers fire with the intent to "eliminate the threat," killing the driver. Recommendations include the reinforcement of the use of "traffic cones and wire" in blocking roads, the increased use of radios by patrol, and to "enforce the Iraqi Police (IP) cordon to include all side roads." Also, a large stamp with the words "Task Force Band of Brothers" and "The Rendezvous Continues...Destiny Awaits" obscures much of the first two pages, and exemptions aren't listed. Investigating Officer finds that conduct was within the Rules of Engagement (ROE).
Army13025_13034.pdf Army13035_13037.pdf Army13038_13043.pdf Army13044_13048.pdf Army13049_13075.pdf Army13076_13102.pdf Army13103_13126.pdf	Army	5/30/2006	Samarra, Iraq	Army soldiers fire disabling shots at an approaching Iraqi vehicle. The vehicle does not respond, and further rounds are fired to "stop the car from approaching." The shots kill two Iraqi women, one of whom was pregnant. The conduct is found to be within the Rules of Engagement (ROE). Recommendations include checking to make sure signs indicate when a road is for "coalition only," the use of a number of methods to inform Samarra residents of off limits areas, the use of "serpentine barriers," and continued ROE training. Again, a large stamp with the words "Task Force Band of Brothers" and "The Rendezvous Continues...Destiny Awaits" obscures much of the first two pages, and exemptions aren't listed for that obscured material. No Iraqi witness statements taken.
Army13127_13140.pdf	Army	4/26/2006	Near Samarra, Iraq	Two Iraqis, both "extremely intoxicated," drove towards a U.S. Army checkpoint disregarding warnings to stop. At 10 meters, soldiers fired shots to disable the vehicle, wounding one Iraqi, who later died of his wounds. The second Iraqi ran towards Samarra, was captured and taken to "Patrol Base Razor ECP." The Iraqis were carrying loaded AK-47s in the car. Investigating Officer finds that conduct was within the Rules of Engagement (ROE). Recommendations include reviewing proper Escalation of Force (EOF) procedures, no condolence payments.
Army13141_13170.pdf	Army	5/25/2006	Iraq	A civilian cargo truck approaches a "mounted observation point," a checkpoint. An Army soldier uses sirens, lights, hand and arm signals to try to stop the truck, and does not respond to warning shots. Soldiers then fire at the truck's engine block. The soldier then fires through the windshield, killing the driver, who the investigating officer believes was intoxicated due to two empty gin bottles found in the truck. Investigation finds that Rules of Engagement (ROE) and Escalation of Force (EOF) were properly employed. One witness report claims that though the inside of the vehicle smelled of alcohol, the driver himself did not.
Army13171_13200.pdf Army13201_13231.pdf	Army	4/17/2006	Mahmudiyah, Iraq	An Iraqi van stopped at a "security halt" begins moving after an Army soldier shines a light "to keep the van halted." The soldier then waved his light, then fired a warning shot at a distance of 75 meters. At 50 meters, an order was given to fire disabling shots. Approximately 40 were fired, and the vehicle turned before stopping 25 meters from the soldiers. One Iraqi man was killed, one Iraqi woman and one Iraqi man were wounded. The wounded woman was given a "claims card" in order to obtain compensation for harm. Recommendations include the firing of a weapon with a "louder report" when possible, and "more easily recognizable" signals like flashing red lights. Investigating Officer doesn't mention whether conduct was within the Rules of Engagement (ROE).
Army13231_13250.pdf Army13251_13269.pdf	Army	20-Mar-05	Al Abarra province, Iraq	An army patrol was making its way to respond to a Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Device attack that occurred on one of the Iraqi Army headquarters in the Diyala region of Iraq. Several military vehicles were instructed to establish a checkpoint on the road leading up to the headquarters. Thirty minutes after establishing the checkpoint, a four door Hyundai approached the checkpoint. At 200 meter distance, the vehicle was signaled with two spotlights. Within 100 meters, the soldiers started shouting "Stop" in English and Arabic, also using hand signals to motion the vehicle to slowdown, stop and turn around. The vehicle then pulled over to the left side of the road; however it continued to proceed very slowly. A Non Commissioned Officer authorized his scout to fire, and three rounds were fired into the engine compartment of the car, and then an additional round into the windshield at the man who was driving. The vehicle then came to an immediate stop, and army personnel approached the vehicle. They checked that the driver did not have a pulse and that he had been shot through the left eye. The victim was then removed and placed into a body bag. A search of the vehicle by American forces revealed no contraband. The victim had $45,800 Dinars, one picture ID and another card in his front breast pocket. The damaged vehicle was towed to the Iraqi Police station. The body was put in an Iraqi ambulance, and the victim's possessions were given to the ambulance driver. The investigating officer determined that the soldiers responded with graduated force in accordance with the Rules of Engagement and used deadly force as a last resort in self defense. No recommendations were made. (No statements from Iraqi witnesses were taken.)
Army13270_13289.pdf Army13290_13302.pdf	Army	6/27/2005	Taji, Iraq	While investigating a Potential Improvised Explosive Device explosion in Taji, Iraq, a second Improvised Explosive Device detonated near one of the army patrol's dismounts and injured a soldier. Army patrol then noticed a Blue Bongo truck fleeing from the scene. Believing that the truck was operated by those who had triggered the explosion, the soldiers targeted the vehicle, and the on scene commander attempted to minimized collateral damage. The left tire of the suspect's vehicle was shot out. One passenger was shot and killed while running away from the vehicle. Life-saving measures were employed by a medic on the victim, to no avail. All the passengers (including the driver) were X sprayed (a test to determine whether the person had contact with explosive residue), and nothing significant was found on either the persons or vehicle. Soldiers investigated a nearby canal and ditch to the best of their ability, but due to the thickness of the brush and depth of the canal, they found no evidence that may have been used as a triggering device. The investigating officer determined that the soldiers used proper escalation of force and acted within the Rules of Engagement, and did not violate Law of War. It was recommended that Coalition Forces must continue to inform Iraqis that fleeing the site of a significant act would put them at risk and make them look suspect. (No statements from Iraqi witnesses were taken.)
Army13303_13346.pdf Army13347_13387.pdf	Army	5/4/2005	Al Muthanna, Iraq	Army Snipers (from HHT/1/11/ACR Platoon) witnessed two cars stop for three minutes in the vicinity of a known place where Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) had previously been placed. Ten minutes later one of the cars returned. The Snipers called a Quick Reaction Force (QRF) team that was in the area at approximately 10:30pm on May 4, 2005. The QRF witnessed the two men - likely Iraqi - take a tire and place it against a rock. The QRF blocked the car and instructed the occupants of the car to exit the car and come toward the QRF. The driver opened his door and stood outside the car behind the car door and said something to the passenger. The driver then reentered the vehicle and while most of the next part of what happened is redacted it appears that the QRF team then shot at the car repeatedly (according to the investigating officer 134 rounds were fired), whereupon the car was on fire. The driver survived the shooting and QRF tried to pull him from the flames but was not successful. He burned to death. By the time the car burst into flames the passenger was no longer moving. The investigating officer found that one contributing factor that if changed could have altered the outcome was that if the platoon had fired 50 rounds instead of the 134 it did fire enough bullets would been have fired to disable the vehicle but not kill the occupants. The investigating officer noted that the "platoon could have possibly disabled the vehicle without killing the occupants with prior rehearsed firing handover lines." The investigating officer then determined that the conduct was within the Rules of Engagement and that no further action be taken against the individuals involved in the incident. The investigating officer then recommended that the platoon get training on "fire control measures in both unit level SOP and rehearsals." The investigating officer then noted that he believed that the civilians killed demonstrated hostile intent and that no restitution (likely in the form of a condolence/solatia payment) be granted any family members in the future. (No statements from Iraqi witnesses were taken.)
Army13388_13440.pdf	Army	11/25/2005	Saba Al Boor, Iraq	A four HUMVEE Army patrol was en route to an undesignated location in Iraq at approximately 3pm on November 25, 2005, when an Improvised Explosive Device (IED) exploded as the fourth vehicle passed by it. The HUMVEE was on fire and so the occupants exited the vehicle. The Army forces then began to shoot at areas where a triggerman may be and to look for any evidence of further hostile activity. One soldier alone expended 250 rounds. In the vicinity there was also a crane and behind the crane there was a blue civilian van. Apparently the van had moved off the road to let the Army patrol pass. The crane operator suffered shrapnel wounds from the IED and took himself to the hospital. The civilian in the van, a 51-year-old Iraqi male national named Saadon Daham Abd (of the Al Alwani Tribe), died from bullet wounds from the Army firing after the IED. The soldiers claimed they never saw the blue van. The investigating officer found that the conduct was within the Rules of Engagement. While the recommendation does not appear in the file it appears that the officer likely recommended that no further action be taken. (No statements from Iraqi witnesses were taken.)
Army13441_13466.pdf	Army	10/16/2005	Taji, Iraq	An Army patrol composed of approximately 3 Bradleys was traveling to an undisclosed location in Iraq to replace a Bradley there in anticipation of protecting polling stations. Along the way at approximately 4am on October 16, 2005, the last Bradley in the convoy - through thermal scanning - noticed a heat source that was crouched in the countryside. Because there had previously been Improvised Explosive Device (IED) attacks on that route, the Army officials were concerned and they sought to search for clues as to the person's identity by looking around for sheep, or a home or other things in the near vicinity that would explain why the person was out there. The Bradley then moved toward the individual. According to Army officials when the individual heard the sound of the Bradley coming toward him he picked something small up off the floor (which the Army officials thought was likely a trigger for an IED) and began to run. The Army officials lost sight of him for 10-15 seconds but then picked up his location again and engaged with several bursts (each burst is composed of 3-7 rounds). Army officials then went to search the area. Army officials found the Iraqi man dead. They found no IED trigger devices or other such contraband. They found a shovel underneath the Iraqi male. They tested the Iraqi male for weapon making residue and he tested positive. Army officials then noticed a small home about 500 meters away and interviewed the occupant of the home who informed that the decedent was Abbas Shihada Shihatha an Iraqi male national, that the decedent was a farmer who go to the fields and use his shovel to open the irrigation system, that he would usually go at midnight and that he would usually be accompanied by his son. That night he had gone past his regular time and was not with his son. While the file does not have the investigating officer's determination that the conduct was within the Rules of Engagement this conclusion can be gleaned from the fact that the investigating officer recommends that no action be taken against the Army officials involved. The investigating officer found no contributing factors, which if changed, would have altered the outcome of the incident. The findings and recommendations of the investigating officer were then approved.
Army13467_13483.pdf	Army	11/25/2005	Iraq	On the morning of November 22, 2005, Army officials (1st Platoon, 2nd Squad, Camp Tiji) and Iraqi Army Forces (IAF), conducted a joint ambush operation wherein Army officials gave IAF lead on the operation. The operation involved 30 IAF officials, 18 Army officials, an informant, and an interpreter. In several places in the file Army officials stated that they repeatedly warned IAF officials not to harm any detainees. An informant had told the officials that occupants of a maroon Opel were coordinating payments for the Abu Abdullah Insurgent Cell. At approximately 8:15am IAF officials in civilian clothing and a civilian vehicle approached the maroon Opel, and pretended to be the contact point. When the occupants of the maroon Opel gave the password, IAF sought to detainee the occupants - two Iraqi male nationals. The driver (identified as Malik Mahummud Nalif) was apprehended and the passenger (identified as Mula Khader) jumped into the driver' seat and tried to drive off. At that point an IAF officer shot Khader twice in the leg. Army officials moved in to treat Khader. Khader was coherent and had lost only a small amount of blood. IAF officials then began firing their weapons in the air. That is when they noticed a BMW that was turning away from the scene. There was a concern that the BMW may be setting off the maroon Opel (which at that point the officials thought may have been set up as a Vehicle Born Improvised Explosive Device). The BMW was stopped and its two occupants taken in for questioning. Khader and Nalif were taken to the Army base by IAF. The occupants of the BMW were taken to the Army base by the Army. When they arrived at the base Khader's condition had worsened markedly and he died of a heart attack. There is a note in the file that there was no proof of harm by the IAF and there is no explanation for why Khader's condition worsened so quickly and in the manner in which it worsened. The investigating officer's determination is not included in the file. The investigating officer refers the reader to an attached memorandum which reinforces the facts as supplied by the Army officials but contains no actual conclusion.
Army13484_13527.pdf	Army	11/12/2005	Iraq	On November 12, 2005, An Army patrol, along with an Estonian platoon were traveling back to an Army base when an Improvised Explosive Device (IED) went off. No troops were hurt and there was only cosmetic damage to a HUMVEE in the patrol. Army and Estonian officials then sought to cordon the area and seek out triggermen. During this process shooting occurred. An Army official in an Estonian vehicle stood up and looked over to the field area and noticed that several Iraqi men and a group of Iraqi women (no more than ten women) were making their way toward something in the field. The Army official saw one of the men pick up what looked like a body and carry it back to their home. The Army official heard yelling and what sounded like crying coming from the field. Fifteen minutes later the Army official noticed a pick-up truck leave the home. (Statements submitted by other Army officials gave substantially similar recounts). The Army official asked whether he should investigate and due to miscommunication with someone who appears to have been an Estonian gunner - likely based on language - the Army official was told not to. (It appears the Estonian gunner thought the Army official simply wanted to dismount.) Soon thereafter the Estonian troops advised that they had gotten word of a death and Army officials went to search the home but at that point no body was found. No death was reported in the Significant Act Database (SIGACT) notification of the IED incident. A week later on November 19, 2005, one member of the patrol returned to the home and with the help of an interpreter was told by the family (the family also presented a death certificate) that troops in clearing the IED site had shot and killed their 13-year-old daughter, Ibtihad Talib Yaseen. The investigating officer noted that there was a "critical communication breakdown due to the existing language barrier between U.S. and Estonian forces" which resulted in the death not being noted when it should have been. The investigating officer also noted that the Estonian troops may not have noticed the body at all because the Estonian troops ride low in trucks to decrease their chance of being hurt in IED attacks. However, this low-riding results in them not being able to see further out. The investigating officer wrote that there is no reason to believe that the killing was intentional and that it is "probable that while suppressing the area, someone aimed at the brem or into the trees and unknowingly penetrated them, thereby killing the unseen girl who was hiding on the other side." One recommendation of the investigating officer is redacted. Two recommendations that do appear are as follows: better communication between the U.S. and Estonian forces, and that the family be paid a condolence payment.
Army13528_13551.pdf	Army	11/2/2005	Taji, Iraq	On November 2, 2005, in a marketplace in Taji, Iraq, an Army patrol (elements of 1/320 FA) composed of four HUMVEES and 19 soldiers was en route to relieve a platoon of other troops who had been on a 48 hour mission. (Note: parts of this file are heavily redacted.) An Iraqi male national in a black sedan approached the patrol going approximately 40-50 miles per hour. Two months prior Taji Market had been the site of a Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Device (VBIED) and so the Army officials were concerned by the Iraqi male national's behavior. An Army gunner waived stop signs at the vehicle, which did not result in the speed of the car decreasing. When the vehicle came within 50 meters of the convoy escalation of force was used and an Army official shot three feet in front of the black sedan. The driver swerved to the right and slowed to 5-10 miles an hour. After this the driver then got back on the road and began to reaccelerate his speed. It was not clear to the Army officials if he still served as a threat and he was engaged and killed. The 3/1 AD Commander directed that a condolence payment be made to the family. The investigating officer noted that it was important for Army officials to be aware not only of escalation of force procedures but also of de-escalation of force procedures. The investigating officer noted that because the driver's conduct did not "CLEARLY" remove the existence of hostile intent that the Army officials did not err in shooting the Iraqi male national. The investigating officer concluded that "there is no fault or violations on the part of the soldiers involved in this incident" and that "[t]his unit and all units need to ensure that all leaders and soldiers understand how to escalate force and what factors to take into consideration for de-escalating force." (No statements from Iraqi witnesses were taken.)
Army13552_13599.pdf	Army	10/7/2005	Farah Shia, Iraq	At approximately 10am on October 7, 2005, in the Iraqi town of Farah Shia, an Army Sniper team witnessed local nationals setting up an illegal check point. (The checkpoint was illegal because it was set up by civilians.) (Large parts of this file are redacted.) The local nationals appeared to be directing traffic to a mosque which was approximately 200 meters to the west of the checkpoint. At around noon of the same day a black KIA sedan ran through the checkpoint. One of the local nationals running the checkpoint approached the KIA in a white truck. The local Iraqi male national exited the white truck and approached the KIA with an AK-47. The occupants of the KIA had now dismounted too and one of the occupants also had an AK-47. The Army Sniper team had been instructed to gather local intelligence and "engage and destroy insurgents that threaten the sniper team or [local nationals] of Fara Shia." One Army sniper who believed that either his unit or local nationals were in danger shot the Iraqi male from the white truck and then shot the Iraqi male from the black KIA. Then a third vehicle, a white sedan sought to evacuate the Iraqi male from the white truck. Army officials instructed these local nationals to stop. When the local nationals did not stop they were engaged with 5 rounds of fire and then stopped. At that point a Quick Response Team composed of an Estonian platoon was called to the area and cordoned off the scene. Two Iraqi males, one from the town (the man in the white truck) and one who could not be identified (the man in the black KIA) were dead. The village elder on the scene took possession of the bodies. Also six local nationals who were detained were also released to the village elder. The investigating officer determined that the Army Sniper team's actions were within the Rules of Engagement. The investigating officer noted that civilian checkpoints are dangerous and can easily lead to incidents like these and that such civilian checkpoints once identified should be immediately shut down. The investigating officer noted that if the Army Sniper team had disbanded the illegal checkpoint when the Army Sniper team became aware of it when it was set up at 10am the incident would not have occurred. The investigating officer recommended no disciplinary action and stated that the shooter had "acted fully within the Rules of Engagement in order to stop Iraqi on Iraqi violence." The investigating officer then recommended that Commanders should discourage local leaders from setting up illegal civilian checkpoints and that they should disrupt such illegal checkpoints as soon as soldiers observe and report them.
Army13600_13634.pdf	Army	1/10/2006	Iraq	At 1:45am on January 10, 2006, an Army patrol composed of 3 military vehicles, noticed a vehicle out past curfew in Iraq. They stopped the vehicle and while conducting a search of the vehicle another two vehicles approached the hasty checkpoint. These two vehicles were also stopped to be searched. While the first of these two new vehicles were being searched the second car sought to get around the first. An Army official sought to tell the person to stop and when the person did not it appears (much of this part is redacted) that the Army official shot the local male Iraqi national. The Army officials sought to render aid but the Iraqi man died. The 15-6 investigation occurred later that day from 3pm to 7pm. However, no findings or recommendations of the investigating officer appear in the file. (No statements from Iraqi witnesses were taken.)
Army13635_13654.pdf	Army	9/18/2005	Iraq	On September 18, 2005, a tank that was part of a 3 military vehicle Army patrol suffered a mechanical failure, crashed through a guardrail and fell off the ramp and onto its side some 15 feet below. The other two vehicles in the convoy sought to control the situation by checking on the tank and assuring they were not attacked. (All three troops who were in the tank are listed as in stable condition.) About 150 meters east of the crash site a group of Iraqi local nationals started gathering. What happens next is redacted in the file but it appears that Army officials had to fire a number of warning shots toward the local nationals to get them to disperse. Ninety minutes later an Iraqi man approached the Army convoy and informed that his 14-year-old son had been shot and killed. The child had already been removed to the Khadimya Hospital. He was dead from a bullet wound to the chest. The investigating officer determined that because the child would have been standing "300-350 meters away from the closest security and in a direction that would be virtually impossible for a ricochet and hit him" and because they could not determine the type of weapon that caused the fatal shot to the child, that the child was not killed by a bullet from any of the warning shots. The investigating officer found that the Army officials utilized proper Escalation of Force "procedures and fired their shots in a direction and location that was appropriate to let the crowd know their intentions[.]" The findings section is completely redacted and the investigating officer then recommends no further action. (No statements from Iraqi witnesses were taken.)
Army13655_13685.pdf	Army	9/30/2005	Iraq	At approximately 7pm on September 30, 2005, an Army patrol (Co. 1-41 INF TF2-70) encountered a "suspicious" vehicle and sought to search the vehicle. Much of this file is redacted but it appears that Army officials engaged the vehicle in an escalation of force wherein one male Iraqi local national was killed and another was taken as a detainee. As to the death of the Iraqi man the investigating officer determined that the actions taken by the local nationals resulted in the shooting and that there was nothing that the Army officials could have done differently to avoid the situation. The investigating officer recommended that no action be taken against the Army officials. The file also contains a series of witness statements regarding allegations of abuse against the Iraqi man who was detained in the incident on October 2, 2005. Apparently the detainee was being transported on that date and at one point fell out of a Bradley. All of the Army officials stated that the detainee fell on his butt and none of the troops could explain why the detainee had blood on his face. There are no determinations or recommendations from the investigating officer as to these allegations of abuse. (No statements from Iraqi witnesses were taken.)
Army13686_13690.pdf	Army	5/25/2005	Al Abarra Nahiya, Iraq	On May 25, 2005, an Army unit went on a raid to kill or capture members of an Improvised Explosive Device (IED) cell operating in the Al Abarra Nahiya area in Iraq. During the raid, a 10-year-old Iraqi boy was killed, and a detainee (Luai Hagani) had his arm injured. One of the troops was concerned that he may have shot the 10-year-old boy. An investigation determined that while there is a possibility that the troop may have killed the boy it is more likely that the Anti-Iraqi Forces shot and killed the boy. The boy was standing 3 feet from the U.S. soldier when the soldier fired several rounds and the wounds on the boy were not consistent with rapid fire shots from that close a range. Also from that close a range if the boy had been shot by the U.S. soldier the boy would have spun and would have fallen backwards toward the soldier. Instead the boy fell face forward toward the soldier. The investigating officer then recommended refresher reflexive firing training for the entire platoon. The investigating officer also noted that he advised the soldier that he was likely not responsible for the boy's death but noted that the chain of command will monitor the solider for increased signs of stress. (No statements from Iraqi witnesses were taken.)
Army13691_13715.pdf Army13716_13724.pdf	Army	4/22/2005	Baghdad, Iraq	At approximately 2pm on April 22, 2005, two Army patrols began a joint patrol to "facilitate a right/left-seat ride inside of Gazaliyha." At around 3:30pm two Rocket Propelled Grenades (RPGs) were launched at the patrol. No troops or property was injured. The troops returned fire in the direction of the RPGs. Several bullets ricocheted and struck a 12-year-old Iraqi girl washing dishes in a nearby home. She was struck in the right arm, right leg and abdomen. The troops rendered aid and the girl was then taken to the hospital by her family. The investigating officer determined that the shooting was accidental and that the troops acted within the Rules of Engagement. The investigating officer noted that he did "not believe that the unit in question arbitrarily or capriciously fired without just cause and that both units acted to support each other." (No statements from Iraqi witnesses were taken.)
Army13725_13754.pdf Army13755_13764.pdf	Army	4/20/2005	Baghdad, Iraq	At approximately 12:30am on April 20, 2005, an Army patrol composed of one tank and two Bradleys sought to set up a blocking position and checkpoint on an overpass. After arriving they turned on their lights and approximately 20-30 local national vehicles avoided the overpass by taking the service road. However, after about a minute or two and before they could set up their various warning materials that a series of stopped vehicles were coming up a local national vehicle slammed into the tank at a speed of 60 miles per hour. No troops were harmed. The driver, an Iraqi man, was killed. The vehicle was also occupied by the driver's wife, three small children and another adult aged woman. These Iraqi nationals were treated and then taken to the hospital. The investigating officer determined that the troops were not at fault and that the incident was primarily the fault of the Iraqi man who died. The investigating officer then recommended that for future purposes the Standard Operating Procedures for blocking positions be reviewed and that some sort of system (other than simply having the lights of the vehicles on) be created where drivers are given immediate knowledge of the existence of the stopped vehicle/s. (No statements from Iraqi witnesses were taken.)
Army13765_13777.pdf Army13778_13804.pdf	Army	4/2/2005	Baghdad, Iraq	While investigating an Improvised Explosive Device (IED) site and securing an area of cordon, an Army vehicle took fire from a Rocket Propelled Grenade (RPG) who fired from the east. Two Anti Iraqi Forces (AIFs) fired. Iraqi nationals were in the line of fire aimed at AIF, and three were shot. One was taken to a hospital by other civilians. It was recommended that the unit pay condolence/solatia payments to the family members of the injured individuals, and that the unit conduct consequence management follow-up in the neighborhood. The Investigating Officer doesn't mention whether the conduct was within the Rules of Engagement (ROE), but recommends no punitive action. (No statements from Iraqi witnesses were taken.)
Army13805_13816.pdf Army13817_13823.pdf	Army	6/27/2005	Gaziliya, Iraq	Navy Seals were in a house in order to destroy Anti Iraqi Forces (AIF) emplacing Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs). While completing their mission, the owner of the house came back and immediately left before apprehended by the SEALS. The owner then returned with an Iraqi policeman, but after translation between the two parties, the two parties left. The SEALS requested that extraction because they felt that their mission had been compromised, but before this was accomplished several local nationals armed with AK-47s and began to fire on the SEALS. The SEALS then engaged in deadly force, having perceived a threat. Four of the nationals were then killed during the engagement, and two were wounded. Later it was found that one of the casualties was Iraqi Police (IP) LT and others were his relatives. The investigating officer determined that the use of deadly force was within the Rules of Engagement. (No statements from Iraqi witnesses were taken).
Army13824_13867.pdf	Army	5/13/2005	Yusifiyah, Iraq	Army patrol was en route when the first vehicle was attacked by an Improvised Explosive Device (IED). The second vehicle moved to assess damage to the vehicle and human injuries. Once it was determined that there was no damage, the operators of the vehicles decided to look for possible triggermen. One possible suspect was noticed as it was past curfew hours. The suspect began to run away with a shovel in hand. The cause of or details surrounded the death of the suspect have been redacted. Army patrol confirmed that he had no detonation devices on him or in the surrounding area. Recommendations were made, including but not limited to informing the local population about curfew hours, identifying and teaching basic Arabic command phases to soldiers, and enforcing Rules of Engagement. Investigating Officer finds that Rules of Engagement (ROE) were followed. (No statements from Iraqi witnesses were taken.)
Army13868_13894.pdf	Army	5/6/2005	Iraq	The Macedonian Ranger Platoon was conducting overwatch security on a known rocket/mortar point, when it was noted that an Iraqi national, Alwan Schab, was approaching their positions from about seventy-five meters north. Most details surrounding Schab's cause of death were redacted, except that he may have been warned verbally and warning shots were fired. Schab's body collapsed in the field, and was treated by the Macedonian medic. Schab was irate during treatment, and spat blood at the medic and interpreter. His behavior indicates that he may have been on drugs or mentally challenged. Schab died from complications from the bullet wounds in his arms and abdomen. Conduct found to be within the Rules of Engagement (ROE). There was no disciplinary action taken, however it was recommended that ROE and Laws of War (LOW) refreshment briefing be conducted before each mission. (No statements from Iraqi witnesses were taken.)
Army13895_13939.pdf	Army	8/11/2005	Iraq	An Army patrol convoy passed by a local national near an intersection. Then an Improvised Explosive Device (IED) explosion occurs on the third vehicle of the convoy. The platoon retreats and tries to find the local national that was seen earlier. They also stop two vehicles with six individuals and X-Spray (a test to determine whether the person had contact with explosive residue) them. The individuals are later released. Concurrently, other Army soldiers begin to inspect a concrete factory and believe that it serves as a site for where the exploded IED was made. They call for backup, and notice a black sedan coming towards the compound from the north. Upon approaching the vehicle, two passengers leave and are apprehended, and the driver is dead, his chest cavity having been pierced by a bullet. Details surrounding the cause of death have been redacted. The investigating officer noted that after having considered all the evidence, it was questionable whether the vehicle engaged, or the people therein were legitimate military targets. The investigating officer also noted that the event occurred before attending refresher training in Rules of Engagement, and that proper techniques needed to be taught concerning the disabling of a vehicle while minimizing collateral damage. The investigating officer asked all witnesses to make a statement about the character of the soldier who shot and killed the victim. The investigating officer found that no Law of War violations occurred. (No statements from Iraqi witnesses were taken.)
Army13940_13941.pdf	Army	4/1/2005	N/A	No information available, only details about the Investigating Officer's report.
Army13942_13986.pdf Army13987_13993.pdf	Army	3/15/2005	Yusifiyah, Iraq	A green vehicle was moving towards a Forward Operating Base in Iraq, passing warning signs in Arabic and English that deadly force was authorized. Army Soldiers noted the vehicle approaching, and that it did not slow down its speed. Having already passed the warning triggers line, two warning shots were fired. As it passed the disabling fires line, two disabling shots were fired into the hood of the car. The vehicle continued towards the entry point. Once the vehicle passed the lethal fires control line, killing bursts were fired into the driver's side of the vehicle started, and the vehicle came to a stop fifty meters past this line. Cease fire was then initiated. After visual and initial assessment, it was determined that the vehicle was a possible Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Device (VBIED). Soldiers then noticed that children were inside the vehicle. The area was secured, and first aid was administered to the wounded. It was found that 9 Iraqis were in the car, including five children (one of whom was killed). The Investigating Officer determined that all personnel involved acted in accordance with the Rules of Engagement. It was recommended that Jersey barriers and a blocking vehicle be employed as physical obstructions. (No statements from Iraqi witnesses were taken.)
Army13994_14001.pdf Army14002_14009.pdf	Army	3/28/2005	Jafr As Sukr bridge, Iraq	Army patrol came across an Iraqi male national traveling by foot on Jafr As Sukr bridge, carrying a satchel. He had already made his way past checkpoint obstacles. Soldiers yelled and then made hand signs at the individual to change his direction. At this point, the individual paused and did change his direction, but continued coming towards the soldiers. As he entered the "Warning Shot Zone", one round was fired at the bridge at the front of the individual, whereupon the individual paused and faced the direction of the soldiers. They continued their shouts and gestures, but the individual continued west. When he crossed the "Killing Shot Line", the order was given to shoot to kill. He fell, and responder care was attempted. The individual died, and his brother claimed the body. The brother of the individual confirmed that the individual understood the bridge was closed to all traffic. It was recommended that the Tactical Phyops Team remind the local population that it was forbidden to cross the bridge and deadly force could be used against violators, as well as reinforce signs and blocking equipment. The Investigating officer found that the conduct was within the Rules of Engagement (ROE). (No statements from Iraqi witnesses were taken.)
Army14010_14038.pdf	Army	5/7/2005	Yusifiyah, Iraq	Two Army Bradley vehicles were traveling south on Mulla Fayyad highway in Iraq after having completed a mission, when the soldiers noticed a person suspiciously crouching in vegetation. Because the area was heavily targeted by Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs), the person was perceived to be a triggerman. Orders were given to engage with the suspected triggerman, and later the individual was found dead with a shovel nearby. The Infantry Squad was unable to find triggers, but thought it due to the vegetation of the area. The Squad attempted to identify family of the victim, but was unable to. The body was then taken to the Iraqi Army. It was found that the Squad acted within the proper Rules of Engagement, and the Investigating Officer recommended that the Squad conduct a thorough search for the IED trigger device.
Army14039_14064.pdf	Army	8/21/2005	Saba Al Boor, Iraq	On August 21^st 2005, an Iraqi male national entered the Saba Al Boor police station and reported that a U.S. Motorized Combat Patrol had shot at his vehicle (a blue mini van) while he was driving, and as a result, a male passenger had died. A second Iraqi male national who had been fishing with his son, corroborated the story as a witness. After the shots were fired, the driver and all other passengers fled from the vehicle. Once the driver and witness had come to the police station, the Warrior element was notified, and they acknowledged firing a shot during that time onto a blue mini van because it had not pulled over or yielded to the coalition combat patrol. No warning shots were ever fired. The shot was fired at the grill of the moving blue mini van from a moving patrol vehicle. It was recommended that coaching and training be provided on how to shoot and aim better on moving platforms. The Investigating Officer determined that the conduct was within the Rules of Engagement and that there were no Law of War violations. Statements from the Iraqi driver and witness were taken.
Army14065_14070.pdf	Army	11/20/2005	Baqubah, Iraq	This is not an investigation, rather a Duty Officer's Log at Forward Operating Base Gabe over the course of one day. Entries include logs about Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) and Possible Improvised Explosive Devices (PIEDs), and explosions and reactions to them. One entry talks about a Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Device (VBIED) detonation. Pseudonyms include "Bulldog" and "Trailblazer".
Army14071_14072.pdf	Army	11/20-21/2005	Baqubah, Iraq	This is not an investigation, rather a Duty Officer's Log at Forward Operating Base (FOB) Gabe over the course of one day. Entries include one partially redacted log at 6:33am involving 3KIA and 1 WIA. A fire truck is requested as a result of the incident, and arrives with the Iraqi Police (IP). An ambulance follows.
Army14074_14085.pdf Army14086_14096.pdf	Army	Jan. 16, 2006	Hurriya neighborhood, Baghdad, Iraq	An Army patrol was conducting mounted checks in the Hurriya neighborhood of Baghdad, Iraq, when the first vehicle in the convoy saw two Iraqis dressed in civilian clothing, each pointing loaded AK-47s at them. Believing the Iraqis posed an immediate threat, the U.S. personnel chose not to fire any warning shots, and instead engaged the closest Iraqi, who was approx. 20 feet away, killing him with two gunshots to the chest. The personnel then shot and killed the second Iraqi as he ran from the patrol with his gun pointed towards them. It was later determined that the Iraqis had been providing security for a funeral. The investigating officer found that the soldiers acted within the Rules of Engagement (ROE), and recommended that no action be taken and that the matter be closed. (No Iraqi witnesses were interviewed in the investigation.)
Army14097_14123.pdf Army14124_14149.pdf	Marines	Mar. 16, 2006	Abu Ghraib vicinity, Baghdad, Iraq	A Marine patrol was deployed to recover a truck which had become stuck in the mud. Previously, this patrol had encountered 4 Vehicle-Borne Improvised Explosive Devices (VBIEDs) over the course of the past several days. As the patrol approached the truck, they saw a Kia van driven by an Iraqi civilian traveling towards them at 60-70 mph. Witnesses were unable to see how many passengers in the vehicle. When the van was 300m away, a marine waved a red flag to signal to the van to stop, which had no effect. Although Escalation of Force (EOF) procedure dictates that the Marine should have then fired a pop-up flare, the Marine believed he did not have time to do so, and instead fired one warning shot into the ground with his machine gun (EOF procedure dictates that a warning shot must be fired with a M-16A4 rifle, but the Marine, believing he did not have time to prepare his rifle, used his machine gun instead). The vehicle continued towards the patrol, and the gunner fired two rounds into the grill of the van followed by two six-round bursts into the windshield. The vehicle swerved and drove down an embankment while the Marines continued to fire. As members of the patrol approached the vehicle, they saw muzzle flashes and heard gunfire approx. 700m west of their position. It was not established who had fired the shots. The Marines then found that three Iraqi men had been killed in the van, and nine Iraqi civilians had been injured, including a nine-year-old boy and a fifteen-month-old girl. Interviews with the injured Iraqis revealed that these civilians had hired the van as a taxi, and that they had begged the driver to stop upon hearing the initial gunfire. The investigating officer and his commanding officers determined that, while the gunner had not strictly adhered to the EOF procedures, his actions were "appropriate under the circumstances," and thus within the Rules of Engagement. The investigating officer also recommended that, in the future, the patrol should be "prepared to fully employ the full range of EOF measures" and noted that "one marine cannot be solely responsible for employing each of the measures." It was also noted that the situation was being used to train Marines in the proper EOF procedure. Two Iraqi witnesses were interviewed, although their statements were not included in the 15-6.
Army14150_14167.pdf	Army	Mar. 23, 2006	Western Baghdad, Iraq	On the night of March 23, 2006, an Army patrol was conducting sniper operations alongside a highway which was the frequent site of Improvised Explosive Device (IED) attacks. Immediately before the mission, members of the patrol had been briefed on the Rules of Engagement (ROE). At 10:00 PM, after the moon had set below the horizon, members of the patrol saw an Iraqi individual walking along the highway median carrying something in his hands. The individual crouched in the median for approx. 45 seconds; although he was crouching behind the guard rail, it appeared to the snipers that he was burying something in the median. He then stood, no longer holding the object in his hands; one of the snipers, believing the Iraqi had been emplacing an IED, shot and killed him. Upon examination of the location, no IED was found. The Investigating Officer concluded that the sniper had acted within the ROE, and recommended that no action be taken against him. The appointing authority concluded that all snipers in the brigade should be retrained and that the sniper and spotter should be decertified. (No Iraqi witnesses were interviewed.)
Army14168_14206.pdf	Army	Mar. 24, 2006	Shula, Iraq	An Army patrol was conducting a planned raid on a house with the objective of capturing or killing an Iraqi target who had been identified by two sources as a member of an EFP cell. Members of the patrol (excluding interpreters and the sources who had identified the target) entered the house and shouted for the individuals on the first floor to "get down" (in English). Four members of the patrol, led by a SPC Westlake, then proceeded up the stairs where they encountered an Iraqi man standing on the landing above them. As the Iraqi man began to raise his hand, in which he was holding a pistol, SPC Westlake shouted "stop" in English and in Arabic and then fired three shots at the man, striking him in the head with the third. Members of the patrol then called for a medic, but the Iraqi man, Hydar Karnooth Mankhi, died at the scene from his wounds. Upon interviewing other individuals, the patrol learned that they had misidentified the house, and that their target lived across the street. The Investigating Officer concluded that the personnel involved had acted consistently with the Rules of Engagement, and recommended that no action be taken against SPC Westlake. The appointing authority concurred, and indicated that he would "look into refresher Arabic language training", as all of the personnel interviewed reported that they had received no language training since their deployment.
Army14207_14235.pdf Army14236_14271.pdf	Army	5/4/2006	North of Baghdad, Iraq	An Army Patrol which had recently transferred from the Rustimiyah area, South of Baghdad, to the Taji Forward Operating Base (FOB), North of Baghdad, was involved in three Escalation of Force (EOF) incidents on May 4, 2006. Upon arrival at Taji, members of the patrol were given no orientation or instruction regarding the conditions they would encounter in the area and how these conditions differed from those in Rustimiyah. In the first EOF incident, Army personnel conducting a traffic checkpoint fired warning shots at an approaching vehicle driven by an Iraqi which had disobeyed their hand signals; they later found that cooperating Iraqi Army (IA) forces, standing just out of sight of the U.S. personnel, had given the driver contradictory hand signals which may have led him to believe he should drive past the U.S. personnel. In the second EOF incident, a crowd of 40 or 50 Iraqis, including a man carrying a bucket and acting suspiciously, gathered around an Army official disabling an Improvised Explosive Device (IED). Army personnel fired warning shots towards the crowd, using non-lethal bullets. In the third incident, the patrol was conducting a checkpoint and used escalated force against a vehicle which was approaching them. A gunner fired warning shots directed at the vehicle, aiming his warning shots onto the pavement rather than into the dirt alongside the road. Moments later, a Mercedes-Benz rolled to a stop nearby; patrol members found that the driver had died from a bullet would to the head, most likely the result of the warning bullets ricocheting off the pavement. The investigating officer found that members of the patrol had not been sufficiently oriented to their new surroundings, and that the soldiers acted appropriately within EOF guidelines, although it would have been "more appropriate" for the soldier in the third incident to fire his warning shots into the dirt rather than the pavement. The investigating officer recommended stronger training for incoming personnel, including "right seat rides" to familiarize them with new areas. In response to a claim filed by the victim's sister, commanding officers recommended that condolence payments be paid to the victim's family. No Iraqi witnesses were interviewed, although documents prepared by the victim's sister were included.
Army14272_14288.pdf Army14289_14299.pdf	Army	Apr. 17, 2006	Mahmudiya, south of Baghdad, Iraq	While conducting a vehicle checkpoint at approx. 9:15 PM, an Army patrol was approached by a white van driven by an Iraqi male national. Members of the patrol shined a white light at the van to direct it to halt, but it continued driving towards the checkpoint. Members of the patrol waved their spotlights at the van and shouted "stop" (it was not specified whether they shouted in English, Arabic, or both). This had no effect, so when the van was approx. 75m away, a gunner fired a warning tracer round above the van. The van continued, so the gunner and two dismounted soldiers fired disabling shots at the van, which was now 50m away. The driver of the van, an Iraqi man, was killed by the shots, while his passenger, an Iraqi woman, was wounded. The patrol issued the woman a claims card for possible compensation, and Iraqi Army (IA) personnel called an ambulance. The Investigating Officer (IO) determined that the U.S. personnel's conduct was within the Rules of Engagement (ROE), given the speed at which the van was approaching, and pointed out that all members of the patrol had been briefed on proper Escalation of Force (EOF) prior to embarking on the mission. The IO recommended that no action be taken against the patrol, but suggested that warning shots should be fired with a louder weapon and that more easily recognizable traffic signals should be employed at night. A commanding officer concurred, noting that "waving of a light at night could be misconstrued to mean 'come on around.'" No Iraqi witnesses were interviewed.
Army14300_14326.pdf	Army	May. 17, 2006	Iraq	At approximately 7:30 pm, an Army patrol was manning a mounted observation point when they obvserved a cargo tru